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The Falkland Islands
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Date Last Updated : Friday, October 1, 2004 3:53 PM |
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[ Background | Balance of Forces
| Battles | Diary
] [ Home ] © Crown Copyright 2004 and © Deltaweb International Ltd 2004
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|
|
The Falkland Islands
|
Date Last Updated : Friday, October 1, 2004 3:53 PM |
|
[ Background | Balance of Forces
| Battles | Diary
] [ Home ] © Crown Copyright 2004 and © Deltaweb International Ltd 2004
|
|
The
48 hours after the sinking of the General Belgrano were relatively
quiet. During the night of 2 May an Argentine Naval patrol vessel opened
fire on a patrolling Sea King helicopter of 826 Squadron. Early in the
morning of 3 May two Lynx helicopters from HMS Coventry and Glasgow
armed with Sea Skuas were sent out to locate this vessel and attack
it. The offending craft was the Comodoro Somellera, an armed
patrol craft which was searching for the crew of the Canberra bomber
shot down the previous day. The first Lynx, flown by Lt Hubert Ledingham
and Lt Commander Alvin Rich sank the vessel with hits being scored by
both its missiles. This was the first operational firing of the Sea
Skua. The helicopter was then fired on by a second undetected vessel,
the Alférez Sobral, which the second Lynx attacked and badly
damaged, killing the Captain and seven crew members. The damaged patrol
ship limped back to Argentina several days later.
The
early morning of the 4th May passed without any major incidents. The
main part of the British fleet was 75 nautical miles to the south east
of Stanley. Morale was high in the light of the successes thus far,
although the fleet was in a high state of tension as there had been
several tentative reports of Argentine air activity, and it was realised
that a strong reaction to their presence must come soon. Lynx helicopters
undertook patrols around Stanley to pinpoint the positions of Argentine
radar systems. At 0815 hrs an Argentine reconnaissance aircraft, in
this case an old piston engined Neptune maritime patrol aircraft, was
sufficiently close to detect the radar emissions from one of the British
Type 42 destroyers. The position was plotted and it was assumed that
the carriers would be just to the east of the contact. Ninety minutes
later, two Super Etendards of 2 Escuadrilla de Caza y Ataque, each carrying
the air-launched version of the Exocet anti-ship missile, took off from
their base at Rio Grande on Tierra del Fuego. Unlike the previously
attempted raid, the Etendards successfully refuelled from a Hercules
and then descended to sea level as they approached the estimated position
of the British fleet. The aircraft, flown with great skill by Lt Commander
Bedacarratz and Lt. Mayora, did not communicate with each other but
were updated from the Neptune reconnaissance aircraft, and thus were
successful in making an undetected approach. Around 25 miles out from
the carriers they climbed to 120 ft and detected one large target and
two smaller ones.
At
1104 hrs local time, having set the internal guidance systems of the
Exocets to the targets they released their missiles and turned for home.
While the enemy aircraft were running in to the attack, Able Seaman
Rose, and air defence operator aboard HMS Glasgow, detected what
was thought to be radar emissions from the Etendard's targeting systems,
then as the Etendards pulled up the aircraft themselves were fleetingly
detected before they descended again and turned home. An alert to the
fleet was sent out, and HMS Glasgow fired chaff rockets to provide
false radar targets. By this time, however, the missiles were already
in flight, on an attack profile which was only than two minutes long
from the point of launch to the targets. The first missile headed straight
for the nearest ship, the Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield. Unfortunately,
HMS Sheffield was using her SCOT sattelite communications system,
sending routine messages at what was considered a quiet and threat-free
time. The frequencies used blotted out the radar emmissions that might
have warned of both the Etendards and the Exocet missiles presence,
so no evasive action was taken. The second missile headed for the main
group of ships but ran out of fuel and dropped harmlessly into the sea.
The
first Exocet hit HMS Sheffield's starboard side, at an angle
and around the midpoint of the ship. It punched through the outer skin
and disintegrated inside Sheffield. Luckily the warhead did not
explode, saving a great many lives, but the rocket fuel started a fire
in the ship which spread rapidly. The main fire-fighting system had
been cut, and all power was lost. Fire-fighting efforts began using
a bucket-chain, the only option left. The Lynx helicopter lifted from
the stern and began evacuating casualties, joined quickly in this effort
by Sea Kings from other ships. Despite the arrival of portable pumps
from other ships, the crew were forced back into the bow and stern sections
by the fire which still raged out of control four hours after the ship
had first been hit. A six man team in the computer room led by Lt. Commander
John Woodhead struggled to get the ships weapons systems back on line
and restore power. Their lines of retreat were cut off by fire and the
entire team were overcome by smoke and fumes.
The
crew were forced to retreat on deck in the bow section, but Petty Officer
David Briggs returned several times below decks to retreive important
equipment. He did not return from his last trip below having been overcome
by smoke. Captain Sam Salt had no further choice, and despite the valiant
fight by the whole crew, the order to abandon ship was given. After
only forty minutes all the survivors were off the ship. Twenty men were
killed in the attack and twenty-four were injured, four of them seriously.
242 men escaped without injury. However, their ship refused to sink,
despite the damage. HMS Sheffield was towed out to sea where
due to the heavy swell that developed she finally capitulated, becoming
a war grave for the bodies of the 19 men still on board.
At
dawn of 9 May a '42-22 missile trap' was sent to Stanley in the form
of the destroyer HMS Coventry and the frigate HMS Broadsword.
The plan was for the Type 42's Sea Dart missile system to be able to
attack any raider at medium range, while the Type 22's Sea Wolf missiles
would attack any aircraft that penetrated to close range. It was risky
sending 2 ships so close to an enemy airfield in broad daylight, but
something had to be done to draw the Argentinian aircraft up to enable
the Task FOrce to destroy them before the landing ships and vulnerable
troopships arrived. As part of the plan, two Sea Harriers were sent
to bomb Stanley airfield again, but low cloud forced them to abort this
mission. Instead they carried out a patrol at low to medium level, during
which they detected the Argentine trawler Narwal. The ship had
already been chased away from the area once by HMS Alacrity on
the night the Task Force entered the Total Exclusion Zone some ten days
previously. The Sea Harriers fired their cannon in front of the trawler
in an attempt to stop her, but got no response. A second pass was made,
and the Sea Harriers dropped their bombs, one of which hit the trawler,
but did not explode as the fuse had been set for a drop from 5,000 ft.
The Sea Harriers were forced to withdraw due to fuel constraints, and
were replaced by two more. These two also attacked with their cannons,
causing severe damage and a few casualties on board the Narwal.
An SBS boarding party was helicoptered in by Sea King and took the ship
without a fight. Despite outraged Argentine claims of British attacks
on a unarmed vessel, documents and a naval officer found aboard the
trawler proved that Narwal had been operating in the role of
fleet shadower, so this perfectly legitimate action kept further British
ship movements secret. This attack prompted a strong response, and the
'42-22 missile trap' was put into action. A Hercules transport aircraft
with four escorting fighters was detected approaching the Islands. At
extreme range HMS Coventry fired three Sea Dart missiles when
the aircraft were still 40 miles out, and obviously believed themselves
to be safely far from the Britsh fleet. Two of the missiles hit two
of the escorting Skyhawk fighter-bombers, destroying both of them and
killing their pilots. Three hours later HMS Coventry picked up
another target at much closer range. Another Sea Dart was fired, destroying
the Puma helicopter which was going to the assistance of the Narwal.
The
next action did not occur until 12 May. A 42-22 combination of HMS Glasgow
and Brilliant were now stationed off Stanley. HMS Glasgow
shelled targets on the shore during the morning and eventually drew
a strong response to the ship's presence. No fewer than eight Skyhawk
fighter-bombers were sent to attack the ships, the lead two pairs arriving
just as the Sea Harrier Combat Air Patrol was in the process of handing
over. The first four Skyhawks came in very low and fast, so the Sea
Dart missiles did not acquire the targets until the range was too short
for the missile syustem. HMS Brilliant fired its shorter ranged
Sea Wolf missiles for the first time operationally, the first two missiles
hit and destroyed the lead pair of Skyhawks. The third Skyhawk in the
formation hit the debris of the first two in mid-air, causing it to
crash as well. Captain John Coward of HMS Brilliant later stated
that his crew were very happy with the Sea Wolf system. The next wave
of Skyhawks were acquired by the Sea Dart system but a malfunction occurred
and again it did not fire. This time the Sea Wolf system failed to fire
as well, and all four of the attacking aircraft dropped their bombs.
One bomb hit HMS Glasgow, but it passed straight through its
engine room without hitting anything vital or exploding, so the damage
was minimal. A third Argentine raid was detected, but by this time the
Sea Harriers were back on station, and no attack developed. The Skyhawk
that had bombed Glasgow made the mistake of flying too close
to Goose Green airfield on the way back, and was shot down by the anti-aircraft
guns there, its pilot being killed.