EARLY BEGINNINGS

Helicopter Search and Rescue had its dramatic birth in the Far East theatre of operations during the Second World War. Three of General Orde Wingate's Chindits were being evacuated by a light L-1, single-engined fixed-wing aircraft when the aircraft suffered an engine failure and the pilot was forced to land in a paddy field in Japanese held territory. Among the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) units supporting the Chindits was an experimental flight of three Sikorsky R-4 Helicopters which had been sent to the theatre for battlefield evaluation. Lieutenant Carter Harman of the 1^st Airborne Commando, USAAF set off from a rear base at Lala Ghat near the eastern Indian frontier on a 600-mile transit flight, over mountains rising to 5000 ft, to the battle zone. He lifted out the four survivors, two at a time. Little more is known of this epic journey in a fragile, experimental aircraft; however many other deeds were completed by the 1^st Airborne Commando USAAF proving the value of the helicopter as a rescue vehicle. The title Air Sea Rescue changed to Search and Rescue as the capability to search for survivors was enhanced between 1945 and 1950.

In the years just after World War Two into the early 1950s very little was thought about helicopters within the RAF. The RAF was mostly concerned with the operation of the relatively new jet aircraft, the Venom, Vampire and Meteor, which, because of their difficulty of operation and unsophisticated technology, saw a significant number of aircraft losses. Unfortunately these also led to loss of aircrew, whose operating area was no longer restricted to the English Channel area where current Air Sea Rescue forces existed. It soon became clear that an UK-wide SAR service was needed. Moreover, agreement was already in place, from 1947, for the Air Ministry to assume responsibility for operation and administration of all search and rescue arrangements for both military and civil aviation.

In the meantime the Royal Navy was evaluating the helicopter as a possible successor to the Sea Otter and as a much more economical replacement for the escort destroyer, which always followed an aircraft carrier during flying operations in case of accident. The Royal Navy was sufficiently confident to order 60 "Dragonfly" helicopters made by Westland Helicopters Ltd, a development of the Sikorsky R-5. The first of these were delivered in 1947 to 705 Squadron, HMS Siskin, Naval Air Base, Gosport, Hampshire. On the night of 31 January / 1 February 1953 extraordinary weather conditions in north west Europe resulted in devastating floods in Holland and along the east coast of England. The full operational strength of 705 Squadron was deployed to Holland to assist with the rescue of people from rooftops, flooded fields, boats and dykes and to ferry medical personnel, supplies and food to remote areas. Approximately 800 people were lifted to safety.

The RAF's interest in Maritime helicopters at this time was centred in the Air/Sea Warfare Development Unit that had evaluated the Hoverfly 1 and 2. However it discarded them when it became apparent that they had no useful function in operational maritime rescue or anti-submarine operations. It was not until the Air Sea Warfare Development Unit moved to RAF St Mawgan in December 1951 and the arrival of the new Sycamore helicopter in February 1952 that the development of maritime helicopter operations was given the impetus that led to the formation of the Helicopter SAR Force that we know today. SAR equipment at the end of 1952 comprised a rope ladder and safety lines. During a deployment of a Sycamore to RAF Linton-on-Ouse, for daily SAR cover at Patrington for Exercise Ardent, it became evident that a winch was essential for sea rescue operations. The first winch arrived in 1953 and was allocated to the newly forming 275 Squadron.

From April 1950 and until 1953 the RAF's operational helicopter force comprised the Far East Air Force Casualty Evacuation Flight. This was formed at Seletar, Singapore to provide casualty evacuation for troops engaged in the remote jungle areas of Malaya during the Malayan Emergency. The unit was initially equipped with the Dragonfly but later competed, along with other newly forming helicopter units in the Middle East, with 275 Squadron for allocation of the Sycamore. The Casualty Evacuation Unit was a resounding success from the beginning and operated throughout Malaya for 20 months before losing its first aircraft to the far from neutral jungle. By 1953 it had expanded to form 194 Squadron.

SEARCH AND RESCUE POLICY - 1952

In October 1952, the global strategy envisaged the formation of two SAR squadrons of 16 helicopters each, one in Fighter Command equipped with Dragonflys and one in Coastal Command equipped with Whirlwinds. Almost immediately, a 12% cut in expenditure caused these figures to be halved while the Sycamore was to be substituted for the Dragonfly in Fighter Command. The Sycamore was deemed sufficiently powerful for the rescue of fighter aircrew; however, the more powerful Whirlwind was needed for the heavy-aircraft crews (five men at 100nm range). It took about three years (1953 - 1956) to build up the force to the point where the nine planned deployed Flights were able to offer standby over the whole of the East and South coasts, Wales and part of the Irish Sea. The Whirlwind 2s and the Sycamores had an effective maximum radius of action of 50nm. During the first two years the embryonic 275 Squadron, with only a few Sycamores, spent much of its time moving from one detached location to another in an attempt to provide SAR cover where fighter exercises were taking place. The end of 1956 saw the pattern of permanently detached Flights established which remains today; only their number and location has changed since with the advent of longer-range helicopters.

THE WHIRLWIND ERA (1955 to 1979)

The Whirlwind was, by modern standards, an unsophisticated single-engined aircraft. It was relatively under-powered and in its early days was not particularly reliable; several ac ditched or crashed; on 30 Aug 1955 XJ 436 flown by OC 22 Squadron, Squadron Leader Powry, ditched during a National Press demonstration with a Marine Craft Launch. One month later XJ 434 flown by Flying Officer Cox ditched during wet winching training. A further seven Whirlwinds of 22 Squadron alone crashed before all Whirlwinds were grounded temporarily in December 1967 following the fatal crash of a Queen's Flight Whirlwind. However this was not to be the end of Whirlwind accidents, although the rate of accidents was greatly reduced as it matured in to Service. Nevertheless, as with all RAF helicopter crews, the aircraft was operated to an exceptional standard. The limitations of its range, power and lift capability as well the shortness of its winch cable were overcome by the hard work and dedication of its crews in their sound training, development of SAR techniques and equipment, and often by sheer personal courage.

A large number of gallantry and professional awards were made to the RAF SAR Helicopter crews. These including six George Medals (GM), fifty one Air Force Crosses (AFC) and Medals (AFM) and ninety two Queen's Commendations for Valuable Service in the Air (QCVSA) and Queen's Commendation for Bravery in the Air (QCBA) and 86 AOC-in-C's and AOC's Commendations (these were awarded to the groundcrew as well as aircrew). Many Civil and foreign awards were also made. In general Pilots (Aircraft Captains) were recognised for their outstanding perseverance and aircraft handling skills in atrocious flying conditions. Winchmen were awarded medals for their courage and fortitude, often at great risk to their own personal safety. Navigators were recognised for their role in making the rescue possible by their calm professionalism and ingenuity, without which the SAR helicopter team could not operate. It is believed that the highest number of awards for a single RAF SAR helicopter operation was for the rescue of sixteen seamen from the deck of the sinking Motor Vessel Amberley on 2 April 1973.

Where possible, the aircraft was hovered at a low height over a flat surface before the winchman was winched out. The aircraft was then climbed to its operating height as the cable was winched out to maintain the winchman at a safe height above the ground. The pilot manoeuvred the aircraft to a point overhead the incident under the directions of the Winch Operator who also operated the winch to maintain the Winchman at a low height over the ground as he was carried to the survivor. Recovery of the winchman and survivor was effected by the reverse of this method with the aircraft being lowered as the winchman and survivor were winched in. This safe method of operating prevented some serious accidents; even in training it was not unknown for the winchman to fall off the cable through failure of equipment or procedures. Serious consideration was also given to the ever-present possibility of engine failure or the inability to hold a hover in turbulent wind conditions. With the winchman at a safe height above the surface the Winch Operator could cut the cable, severing the Winchman from the stricken helicopter, reducing the risk of serious injury, leaving the pilot to crash land or ditch the aircraft as best he could. This safe practice of winching was religiously adhered to, where possible, throughout the Whirlwind and Wessex eras.

WESSEX ERA (1976 to 1997)

The Wessex had many advantages over its predecessor. In many ways it was a like a large Whirlwind in that it had a large main cabin suitable for casualty handling with a cockpit separated from and above it. However, it was a much more robust aircraft with a heavy-duty, tail wheel, tricycle undercarriage. It had two powerful Gnome engines with a very good single engine capability. It was significantly faster, it had a much greater lift capacity and an enhanced radius of action. Its only perceived disadvantage was that being heavier it needed to be hovered higher over the sea and was not quite as manoeuvrable as the Whirlwind. Conversely it had a good Auto-Stabilisation Equipment system which made it a stable winching platform and improved its ability for transit in cloud. Its ability to operate in poor visibility and at night was improved by fitting a radar altimeter; however, without a full Auto Pilot system, it was still not designed to be operated over the sea at night.

Nearly two years were to pass before more Wessex helicopters were introduced into SAR duties. In 1976 No 22 squadron was partly re-equipped with Wessex HC2s in the SAR role. C Flight 202 Squadron at Leuchars became B Flight 22 Squadron in April 1976. D Flight 72 Squadron at Manston became E Flight 22 Squadron in June 1976 and C Flight 22 Squadron's Whirlwind 10s were replaced by Wessex HC2s at Valley in June 1976. A and D Flights 22 Squadron remained at Chivenor and Brawdy with their Whirlwind 10s.

202 Squadron maintained an all-Whirlwind 10 fleet at A Flight Boulmer, B Flight Leconfield, C Flight Coltishall and D Flight Lossiemouth. In most respects the Wessex was operated in a similar manner to the Standard Operating Procedures of the Whirlwind, their crews exploited the Wessex's advantages to the full. The Wessex became a very capable and versatile search and rescue helicopter, although limited because it was still not normal to operate the aircraft over the sea at night. Initially the winch fitted to the Wessex had 100ft of cable. Instead of a rope extension to the winch cable, previously used by the Whirlwind, a formal 120ft tape (attributed to Flt Lt Mike Ramshaw) was introduced to extend the effective length of the cable. The tape was used on both the Wessex and the Whirlwind. However, in 1977 a 300ft cable was fitted to the Wessex negating the necessity for the tape. The Wessex remained in SAR service until its final replacement by the Sea King Mk 3 at Valley in June 1997 and by the introduction of the Griffin, with the transfer of the Search and Rescue Training Unit at Valley from 18 Group to the Defence Helicopter Flying School, on 1 April 1997.

SEA KING HAR 3 (1978 to Present Day)

The Sea King introduced a major enhancement in search and rescue capability. It was a large helicopter with a significant fuel load, sufficient to maintain the aircraft operational for about six hours. Its maximum speed varied, with all up mass, up to 125 knots. The most significant operating improvement of the Sea King was in its all-weather and night operability over the sea. For this the co-pilot had a Decca-Doppler Tactical Air Navigation System (TANS) computer as well as a full range of radio navigation aids. The radar operator had a light weight helicopter search radar used for safe obstacle clearance during transit over the sea and, with its radar plot driven by a Radar/TANS interface giving the radar operator a moving radar map for close tactical navigation. Where a known feature could verify the radar position it was used for the control of search patterns. The aircraft was fitted with an autostabiliser and a simplex autopilot, comprising a height hold and automatic transition system, capable of automatically flying the aircraft to and from the hover over the sea. An Auxiliary Hover Trim system, operated by the Winch/Radar Operator, was used for final detailed manoeuvring within the hover. It had a limited icing clearance, sufficient for icing to be encountered and then avoided. It had a large passenger carrying capacity with sufficient area in the cabin for the carriage and use of modern first aid and life support systems. It even had a small galley with a water heater and space for holding snack meals and drinks.

Operation of the Sea King was significantly different from that of the Whirlwind and Wessex. Primarily instead of crew of three it had a crew of four; pilot, co-pilot, radar/winch operator and winchman. Traditionally the captain occupied the right hand seat as first pilot responsible for flying the aircraft. The co-pilot was responsible for normal navigation and aircraft systems management; he was also responsible for operating the radios and for general operations co-ordination during rescues. However, the aircraft captain had the opportunity to choose from which seat he was to operate and there were many occasions when the Operational Captain was in the left hand seat during an airborne diversion to an SAR operation.

Questions were asked within the first year of the Sea King's operation whether a single pilot and a navigator, as co-pilot, could operate the aircraft. This idea was quashed following the Squadron Commander's invitation to the Air Officer Commanding 18 Group (a Navigator) to handle the flying controls following an autostabiliser equipment failure. The autostabiliser equipment system had been poorly trimmed, causing a large attitude change in pitch and roll as the autostabiliser was disengaged making the aircraft difficult to handle. A Senior Non-Commissioned Officer Air Electronics Operator Radar/Winch Operator replaced the Navigator/Winch Operator. His duties were to guide the aircraft safely during transit over the sea and to place the aircraft in a position from where a transition down to the target could be made. At the rescue scene he left the radar-shack to become the winch operator. Additionally, with the Auxiliary Hover Trim joystick, he could position the aircraft finely should the pilot have insufficient references to maintain an accurate hover over a target in the sea. The Winchman's duties remained largely the same except that with a larger cabin a greater range of first aid and life support equipment could be carried and over the years the Winchman's expertise in first aid has increased to "Paramedic" standard. Previously when dealing with an injured survivor the winchman did his best to stabilise the casualty sufficiently to be winched and carried a short distance to hospital. Now, with the possibility of being well over two hours from medical assistance, the winchman will spend more time with the casualty before winching him into the aircraft and tend to his medical needs during longer transits.

The Sea King was capable of carrying out the whole of the range of SAR operations of the Whirlwind and Wessex. However, its size, with increased down wash, made it necessary for it to be hovered over the sea at about twice the normal operating height of a Wessex and three times the operating height of the Whirlwind. This made precise hovering more difficult; nevertheless, its mass and inertia made for a stable winching platform, provided that the autostabiliser equipment authorities were trimmed to the central position and the pilot made small control inputs. Outside these parameters the aircraft was more difficult to control smoothly. In the first year of operation different operating heights were tried. Experience quickly showed that when hovering at the normal 40ft above the sea on a calm day the down wash was sufficient to blow a single-seat dinghy upside-down with it's occupant still inside. Conversely the Sea King still had to be flown at Whirlwind heights when operating with the small RNLI Life Boats.

Eventually a normal operating height of 50ft over the sea evolved; this also has the major benefit of keeping the aircraft clear of most of the sea spray raised by the down wash. Salt ingestion into the engines can reduce their performance leading to engine failure. For mountain operations it quickly became the practice to fuel the aircraft to relatively low fuel states to ensure an adequate thrust margin; preferring to refuel the aircraft if necessary for longer range operations. Moreover, despite claims by Wessex crews to the contrary, the Sea King was just as effective in the mountains as the Wessex. Indeed when operated at similar fuel weights, to give it an equivalent patrol time as the Wessex, the Sea King had a greater power margin available than the Wessex.

One additional problem that was encountered with the start of Sea King operations was a significantly large increase in the level of static electricity generated by the aircraft. From the outset, static electricity discharges from the Whirlwind were encountered. The level of static electricity generated by the Wessex was greater than that of the Whirlwind, yet generally it remained within tolerable limits. At first the RAF Sea King Winchmen attempted to manage the problem. The fitting of static wick dischargers to the aircraft was suggested by the aircrew as a means of reducing the overall charge; however, this was initially discounted by the scientists because it would reduce the time from static discharges before the voltage re-built to previous levels. Eventually a trial fit of static wick dischargers, fitted to the main rotor blades and horizontal stabiliser, was authorised and proved to be effective in reducing the overall problem and remains part of the aircraft fit. At the same time the "zapper snapper" static discharge lead was invented and tried at Coltishall. Despite proving to be very effective in reducing electrical shocks to the Winchmen, its use was initially prohibited, because it had not been cleared by the engineering authority. This was soon rectified and the "zapper snapper" still remains standard winchman equipment.

SEA KING HAR 3A (1996 to Present Day)

The last major enhancement to the RAF's SAR Helicopter force was in the purchase of six Sea King HAR 3As. In May 1996 the first Sea King Mk 3A course was started at the Sea King OCU at St Mawgan. However it was abandoned after three weeks because of problems with the height programmes of the flight path control computer. Further development of the systems was completed and in May 1997 the first Sea King Mk 3A course was completed. The crews from that course took the aircraft to Chivenor to commence SAR standby. The Sea King 3As was also deployed to Wattisham in July 1997. The Sea King Mk 3s from Wattisham replaced the last Wessex from Valley to complete a Sea King only SAR helicopter Force comprising 22 Squadron with Mk 3As at Chivenor and Wattisham and Mk 3s at Valley and 202 Squadron with Mk 3s at Boulmer, Lossiemouth and Leconfield.

The Mk3A was designed to be a quantum leap in autopilot controlled procedures for the SAR force. To do this it was fitted with a duplicated stabilisation and auto pilot system, increasing the range of options available to the flying pilot whilst airborne. In the Mk3, the pilot needed to fly the ac manually to a suitable point to let down to a target. He could be assisted by a rudimentary height hold down to 200ft and from there, once in to wind, an autopilot programme could be engaged to fly the ac down to a height band of 30 to 60ft. Once in the hover, the pilot would manually close with the target before re-engaging the auto hover mode. In the Mk3A the designer decided that this could be improved on. Firstly, the stabilisation system was changed to improve its characteristics. Secondly, a flight path computer, autopilot, was added that could carry out whole range of functions; not just an auto hover mode. Thirdly, to improve the system still further, a sophisticated navigation suite was added which could be tied into the flight path computer. Redundancy was also built into the navigation suite by having four independent navigation methods comparing their derived positions. The co-pilot, as operator, could decide which had the best information and therefore could influence the accuracy of navigation.

With all systems on line and the aircraft airborne the flying pilot could engage the Flight Path computer. The system then flew the aircraft's speed height and heading. This could be in a simple manner, just maintaining the speed, height and heading, or the heading could be tied into the navigation suite. A flight plan of different landmarks could be programmed from an extensive 3500 entry database. The aircraft would then follow the prescribed route without the pilot having to touch the controls. Once at the final destination the pilot still had to land the ac; however, on long over-water rescues, this is a major enhancement in reducing crew fatigue.

Over the water the aircraft's automatic modes, for poor weather or night operations, were also enhanced. Below 1000ft, the aircraft now had a Radar Altimeter hold which could be operated very easily. Once at or below 750ft, if a target was over-flown, the aircraft could be letdown automatically to the 50ft hover by pressing a single button. Once the button was pressed the aircraft took control and worked out a pattern to fly to letdown to the hover next to the target.

Further improvements were made to the "normal" methods of getting to the 50ft hover. The aircraft could be let down from any height below 750ft, thus increasing the flexibility of the modes of operation. This auto letdown capability was a 'hands-off' automatic flight from any air speed down to zero ground speed at 50 ft. In the Mk 3 this needed to be a straight-line approach into wind for the ac to be able to fly it. In the Mk 3A, not only could the system accept the aircraft's being out of wind slightly but also the aircraft can be forced to move left or right at the same time during its letdown. This permitted the aircraft to be flown closer to the target on letdowns. Furthermore, should a straight approach not be practical, both aircraft were able to fly a curving letdown. In the Mk3 the pilot had to control the direction and speed of the aircraft until the timed height programme had finished. In the Mk3A the pilot still controlled the speed and direction but once he had finished manoeuvring he was able return control to the flight path computer to complete the letdown.

Unfortunately there was a price to pay for these improvements. The Mk 3 was a joy to hover in any situation. The controls were light and sensitive allowing precision placement of the ac. The Mk 3a was not so easy to fly. To allow all the equipment to work small "gaps" had been placed in the control runs so that computer inputs could be differentiated from pilot inputs. This equated to a dead-band when trying to hover the ac. As a result the controls became less sensitive and the ac tended to wander around in the hover. This could be overcome with pilot practice. Unfortunately, it took more practice to hover a Mk3A competently than it did to hover a Mk3. For this reason alone the aircraft gained a poor reputation in its early years. It was only later, as the early "pioneers" of the Mk3A return to fly the MK3, that they realised it was a small price to pay for what was a quantum leap forward in SAR safety and reliability.

SEARCH AND RESCUE WING

From the outset in 1953 it was envisaged that the two separate SAR Helicopter Squadrons would act independently. 275 Squadron was established in 13 Group Fighter Command and 22 Squadron in 19 Group Coastal Command. Each had its own training and engineering organisations. The Sycamore was operated with a crew of two while the Whirlwind had a crew of three. The two squadrons started to be drawn together in May 1958 when 275 Squadron was transferred to 18 Group Coastal Command. However, it was not until the introduction of the Whirlwind Mk 2 to both Squadrons that the training for both squadrons was brought together; the Training Flight of 22 Squadron at St Mawgan having achieved Operational Training Unit status in July 1959. In 1962 the Central Flying School (Helicopters) (CFS(H)) took over the SAR training at its detachment at Valley. The Operational Training Unit was closed and the QHIs from St Mawgan then formed the helicopter element of the Coastal Command Categorisation Board. On 27 November 1969 Coastal Command was disbanded at a Stand-Down ceremony at St Mawgan and on the following day 19 Group was re-titled Southern Maritime Air Region (SOUMAR). From then on both SAR Squadrons came under 18 Group of Strike Command.

From October 1957 the Squadron Headquarters for 275, 228 and 202 Squadrons had been at Leconfield. From June 1956 until April 1974, 22 Squadron's Headquarters had been at St Mawgan and then at Thorney Island. However, in January 1976 both Squadrons were brought together under the Search and Rescue Wing at Finningley. The 18 Group Standardisation Unit (Helicopters) (18 GSU(H)) also moved from Northwood. The Headquarters of the Search And Rescue Wing was in the "Green Shed", an apt description for a series of pre-fabricated offices and corridors, housing the Officer Commanding, the Wing Adjutant and secretarial staff, the Officers Commanding 202 and 22 Squadrons with their Training Officers (Pilot, Navigator and Winchman) and the 18 GSU(H). The Second Line servicing for all the RAF SAR helicopters was carried out at the SAR Engineering Wing Headquarters across the road from the "Green Shed". The whole of the organisation of the front-line RAF SAR Force had the advantage of being contained under one roof. The Squadron Training Officers and the 18 GSU(H) worked closely together to improve flying and operational standards, Standard Operating Procedures and equipment. The SAR Wing saw the introduction of the Wessex into SAR service in 1976 and the Sea King in 1978/9.

In December 1992 the SAR Wing was disbanded with the closure of Finningley. The Headquarters element of the Wing moved to St Mawgan under the Command of the Station Commander RAF St Mawgan as the SAR Force Commander. The Headquarters of 22 Squadron returned to St Mawgan and the 202 Squadron Headquarters moved to Boulmer. The 18 GSU(H) moved back to Northwood until February 1997 when it also moved to the SAR Force Headquarters St Mawgan. The Training Officers of the Squadrons, although posted to their respective Squadron Headquarters, tended to operate and travel from their chosen dispersed Flight locations in an attempt to reduce the inevitable disruptions to their family life that the nomadic existence of the training officer entailed. In September 1997 Headquarters 22 Squadron moved to Chivenor. Now under 2 Gp, both 202 and 22 Squadron Headquarters are based at RAF Valley, Anglesey at the force headquater building. The SAR Helicopter Force still remains dispersed although it retained the ethos of a coherent Search And Rescue Force.

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