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RESTRICTED

AIR HISTORICAL BRANCH

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RESTRICTED

SITUATION REPORTS

BY

GERMAN ARMY COMMANDERS IN NORMANDY,

MAY 15 - OCTOBER 11, 1944

TRANSLATED BY

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A weekly report is to be made by noon each Sunday to Army Group in the following form:

- I Estimate of the situation in general.
- II Report on and estimate of the enemy situation.
  - (a) Ground.
  - (b) Sea.
  - (c) Air.
  - (d) Internal situation.
- III In detail.
  - A Coastal defences (alterations).
    - (a) Organisation of defence.
    - (b) Construction of the Atlantic Wall.
      - (1) Fortifications completed.
      - (2) Approximate percentage of the whole project completed.
      - (3) Progress of construction and particular defects.
      - (4) Labour employed:
        - (a) Soldiers
        - (b) Civilians
        - (c) Consolidation of the land front.
  - B Enemy operations on the coast.
  - C Operations by enemy aircraft.

(figures in brackets indicate the figures of the preceding week.)

    - (1) (a) Bombing raids
    - (b) Strafing raids
    - (c) Focal points of attacks
    - (d) Total of attacks directed against:-
      - (aa) Positions.
      - (bb) Building sites
      - (cc) Transport targets
      - (dd) Airfields.

/ (c)

- (c) German civilians killed.
- (d) German civilians wounded.
- (e) French civilians killed.
- (f) French civilians injured.
- (3) Losses in material.
  - (a) In attacks on positions.
  - (b) In attacks on buildings under construction.
  - (c) In attacks on transport targets.
  - (d) Unserviceable airfields (in brackets, airfields attacked in the preceding week, and not yet made serviceable).
  - (e) In attacks on airfields.
  - (f) In other attacks.
- (4) Aircraft losses:
  - (a) enemy
  - (b) own.

D (1) Feeling and behaviour of the civilian population.

- (2) Instances of sabotage.
  - (a) Against railways.
  - (b) Against cables.
  - (c) Against crops.
  - (d) Attacks on soldiers.
  - (e) Attacks with use of explosives.
  - (f) Cases of arson.
  - (g) Others.

WEEKLY REPORT, MAY 15 - 20, 1944

I Estimate of the situation as a whole.

After a decrease in enemy air activity from May 15 until the morning of May 19, probably imposed by weather conditions, heavy enemy air attacks against coastal defences and rear areas (transport targets, Luftwaffe installations) were resumed from midday, May 19, and continued without respite on May 20.

Enemy air reconnaissance was concentrated on the Channel coast, in particular on both sides of the Canche and Somme estuaries, over Cotentin and the north-western area of Brittany. No results of our own air reconnaissance of the island during the time covered by the report are available, and consequently only an incomplete estimate of the enemy situation is possible.

Continuation of invasion preparations includes air reconnaissance of beach defences.

Our own defensive power has been increased by completing regrouping in the Netherlands, in the Cotentin, and in the Brittany area, and by increased fortification and mining.

## II Report on and estimate of the enemy situation.

### (a) Ground.

Concentrations in southern and south-eastern England again confirmed by the location of Montgomery's H.Q. south of London, and by the transfer of a British division from northern to south-eastern England, and of an American division from Northern Ireland to the south of England. The enemy has carried out reconnaissance of beach defences north-east of Calais and at the estuary of the Somme. According to the statement of prisoners, coastal reconnaissance extending from Holland to Normandy has been proceeding for almost the last two months, and probably includes reconnaissance of land minefields with new types of mines. The possibility that the enemy is informed at least about earlier types of beach defences must be taken into account.

### (b) Sea.

Since about May 7 it has been noted that a large formation of tank-landing craft has been transferred from western England (Liverpool ?) along the south coast as far as Harwich. It is not clear whether this is a practice manoeuvre or part of the strategical plan.

According to a prisoner's statement on May 20, there is supposed to be a large number of landing craft in the area between Eastbourne and Brighton. There has been a great deal of mining in the Hook of Holland area. Repeated explosions have been noted to the west of the Dutch Coast, which are probably the results of enemy minesweeping operations.

Strict enemy surveillance of the central Channel by destroyers and motor gunboats is presumably directed against German motor torpedo boats.

### (c) Air.

Following the improvement in the weather, the enemy Air Force attacked coastal defences with strong formations on the afternoon of May 19 and 20, and also transport targets and Luftwaffe installations (airfields and radar installations), particularly in the area of northern France behind the line Calais - Dieppe, and in the area of Greater Paris. Considerable damage was caused to three transport installations and to airfields. Attacks continue to have little effect against coastal defences, and these raids cannot be considered yet as a systematic preparation for a large-scale attack.

### (d) Internal situation.

Increasingly hostile feeling against enemy powers amongst population hit by air raids in northern France. Guerilla activities in Brittany have decreased, and combing-out operations continue.

## III In detail:

### Northern Military District:

- A (a) Coastal Defence Force. 16th Luftwaffe Field Division reinforced on the land front by SS units.

/(b)(1)

- (b) (1) 350 strong points of the winter defence programme have been completed, of which 297 are ready for action.
- (2) 100% completed, 85% ready for action.
- (3) Summer schedule advanced, nothing completed. Coastal defences carried out along 103 km., and under construction along 55 km. 50% of air landing stakes planned have been erected. Number of air landing stakes planned increased from 521,000 to 900,000. Lack of building materials of all types.
- (4) (a) 1,020,  
(b) 68,090.
- (c) 15% of defences completed, defence of towns carried out with the exception of parts of the anti-tank defences. Earthworks and defences commenced on land front.

B None.

- C (1) (a) None (15). (b) 4 (7). (c) Cannot be identified.  
(d) (aa) None (1).  
(bb) None (0).  
(cc) None (1).  
(dd) 2 (3).
- (2) (a) 0. (b) 1. (c) 0. (d) 0 (0). (e) 0. (f) 0.
- (3) Nil return.
- (4) (a) 4. (b) 2.

- D (1) Depressed, mostly tired of war, attitude reserved and expectant.
- (2) (a) 1. (b) - (d) None. (e) 1. (f) 2. (g) None.

15th Army H.Q.

- A (a) Unchanged.
- (b) (1) - (4): Construction according to plan. Focal point: beach defences completed, erection of air landing stakes, partial lack of cement, wire, hoop iron, planks and wooden casing frames at G.H.Q. LXVII A.K.
- (c) Construction completed and ready for action: machine gun, anti-tank, and mortar positions, blockhouses, dummy positions, and further dummy minefields layed. Lack of barbed wire and timber.

B May 17. Attempted reconnaissance of beach defences at Les Petites Hommes (to the east of Calais).

May 18. Enemy patrol (2 officers) in rubber dinghy taken prisoner at Cayeux.

Task: Reconnaissance of beach defences.

/ c

- C (1) (a) 48 (265). (b) 16 (50). (c) see II (c).  
(d)(aa) 10 (34). (bb) 9 (41). (cc) 19 (123). (dd) 19 (69).  
(2) (a) 6 (130). (b) 10 (315). (c) - (48). (d) - (28). (e) 4 (813).  
(f) 9 (1075).  
(3) (a) Destroyed: 1 radar installation.  
Damaged: 8 huts, 1 (radar) site, 5 guns, 1 Würzburg installation  
1 radar installation.  
(b) Medium damage: 1, slightly damaged: 1.  
(c) Destroyed: 25 motor cars, 1 lock, railway tracks.  
Damaged: 3 goods stations, 16 buildings, 1 bridge, 22 motor cars,  
1 locomotive, railways tracks, telephone lines, water  
mains, and electricity cables.  
(d) Epinoy (Maldeghem, St. Trond, Grevillers, Couvron, Athis,  
Wizernes, Melsbroeck Evere, Le Culot, Florennes, Beaumont).  
(e) Destroyed: 1 aircraft, 1 runway, 4 hangars, 1 workshop, 2 M/T  
vehicles, 6 huts, 1 airfield controllers caravan, telephone and  
electricity cables.  
Damaged: 1 aircraft, 4 runways, 7 tarmacs, 1 bay, 4 hangars,  
1 hut, 1 fire-fighting outfit, telephone and electricity cables.  
(f) Destroyed: 3 houses.  
Damaged: 106 houses, 2 industrial plants, telephone cables,  
water mains, and electricity cables.  
(4) (a) 6 (71). (b) - (3).

- D (1) Unchanged, reserved and expectant.  
(2) (a) 2. (b) 1. (d) 2. (e) 2. (f) 3.

7th Army H.Q.:

- A (a) The preparation for defence in Brittany has been strengthened by  
the arrival of II Paratroop Corps and the 5th Paratroop Division.  
It has been decided to transfer the reinforcements to Cotentin.  
(b) Consolidation report will be sent in later.  
B None.  
C (1) (a) 16 (24). (b) 10 (14). (c) Artillery positions, meteorological  
subsidiary station, and Luftwaffe equipment.  
(d) (aa) 10. (bb) - . (cc) 7. (dd) 3.  
(2) (a) 8 (7 missing). (b) 11. (c) - . (d) 2. (e) and (f) several  
French civilians injured in the attack on Le Mans.  
(3) (a) 1 pillbox slightly damaged, 1 gun slightly damaged, 1 hut,  
1 dugout, 1 searchlight, 2 motor cars, 1 water tank (1,000  
litres).

/(b)

- (b) -. (c) 7 railway tracks, about 30 wagons, about 5 locomotives. (d) -. (e) -. (f) 1 Luftwaffe locator installation, 1 radio aerial.

(4) (a) 7. (b) not known.

D (1) Population expects invasion, mood and behaviour quiet as before.

(2) (a) 2 (no damage). (b) 2. (c) -. (d) 7. (e) 1.

(f) and (g) -.

WEEKLY REPORT, MAY 21 - 27, 1944

I Estimate of the situation as a whole

Enemy air activity has greatly increased, but cannot be considered as the final phase of the invasion preparations. Air attacks have, as before, been carried out against coastal defences and areas to the rear (transport targets, Luftwaffe installations). There has been a striking increase in attacks on radar and locator installations, and especially on bridges.

Enemy air reconnaissance was carried out in the Calais - Cherbourg area and on the west coast of Brittany with no apparent point of concentration.

Our aircraft reconnoitred the harbour areas of Poole, Weymouth, and Portland. An examination of earlier results is necessary to gain a clear estimate of the enemy situation.

Our defence has been reinforced by increased constructional operations and mining. The steady deterioration of the transport situation however is having a bad effect on the situation.

II Report on and estimate of the enemy situation

(a) Ground.

Troop concentrations have been confirmed again in southern and south-east England with the new disposition of 1 American and 2 British divisions.

Since 0200 hours on May 27 there has been complete radio silence.

(b) Sea.

On May 24 photographic reconnaissance showed that there are sufficient landing craft in Poole, Weymouth and Portland to transport  $2\frac{1}{3}$  landing divisions. There is only a small number of vessels at Folkestone and Dover.

Air Attacks have been carried out on harbours between Ostend and Fecamp, and also on coastal batteries and radar installations. Only slight damage was caused.

Of 11 naval radar installations damaged, 10 are serviceable again, and 1 can still be repaired. Slight mining activity.

Minelaying is proceeding according to plan on the Dutch coast, but has been made more difficult between Boulogne and Cherbourg owing to losses of torpedo boats, motor boats and barges. The naval depot at Dieppe has been destroyed.

/Our

Our E-boat activity has decreased owing to the weather and mining. Operations by our U-boats off the northern coast of Brittany were unsuccessful because of prompt spotting by the enemy Air Force.

(c) Air.

Enemy air activity increased considerably by day, but night operations were hindered in the middle of the week by bad weather conditions in England. Attacks were concentrated in the area between the Somme and Seine estuaries extending to the Paris area, and are still mostly directed against transport (bridges) and Luftwaffe ground organisation. Attacks against coastal defences continue and those against radar and locator installations have increased.

Transport installations have suffered considerable damage; railway stations at Le Mans Epinal, Chaumont, Orleans, and Montigniers are completely out of action. About 280 locomotives are unserviceable. Several bridges, among them, five over the Seine, have been destroyed.

In attacks on airfields there were considerable losses on the ground in 11 cases; 12 airfields are unserviceable.

Attacks on coastal defences have not resulted in any serious damage. Dummy positions have been attacked several times.

Reconnaissance has been carried out mainly in the area between Calais and Cherbourg, and on the west coast of Brittany.

The quarters and positions of a Landgraf division in the area south of St. Briec were reconnoitred and attacked.

(d) Internal situation.

Considerable feeling against the Anglo-Americans is noticeable amongst the section of the population affected by air raids.

No changes are apparent in the activities of the Resistance organisations. The situation in Brittany remains uncertain.

III In detail:

Northern Military District:

A (a) Unchanged.

(b) (1) Of total schedule 1,218 ready for use, 49 others reinforced with concrete.

(2) 67% ready for use, 3% reinforced with concrete.

(3) May 1 - 25, 73 gun positions reinforced with concrete; a further 48 in course of construction.

(4) (a) 9,550,

(b) 66,170,

(c) Consolidation of land front proceeding according to plan. Obstacles 25% completed.

B None.

/ C



C (1) (a) 27 (0). (b) 28 (4). (c) Transport installation in the Limburg area.

(d) (aa) 3 (0). (bb) 0 (0). (cc) 26 (0). (dd) 11 (2).

(2) (a) 1 (0). (b) 5 (1). (c) 0 (0). (d) 0 (0). (e) 13 (0).

(f) 29 (0).

(3) (a) None. (b) None.

(c) 22 locomotives, 7 goods wagons damaged, 1 tug sunk, 1 tug beached, 1 barge (800 tons) burnt out, 9 barges damaged.

(d) None.

(e) Slight damage to tarmac and buildings, 1 Ju 88 slightly damaged (5%).

(f) 1 factory heavily damaged, farms and houses destroyed.

(4) (a) 40. (b) 6.

D (1) The majority of the population expects invasion - in a depressed state of mind. National Socialist propaganda has no effect; the rest are expectant and guided by self-interest.

(2) (a) 0. (b) 0. (c) 0. (d) 1 Dutch member of the SS.

(e) 2. (f) 2. (g) 0.

#### 15th Army H.Q.

A (a) 711th Infantry Division sector strengthened by bringing up 346th Infantry Battalion.

(b) (1) 3 anti-tank positions, 5 anti-aircraft positions, 10 anti-aircraft pillboxes, 1 emplacement, 2 large minefields, 2 small minebelts around towns, 76.4 km. belt of mines, other firing, machine gun, anti-tank, infantry firing, mortar, field gun positions, foxholes, dugouts for men and munitions, communication trenches, dummy minefields, blockhouses.

(2) 70%.

(3) According to plan.  
Supplies of materials lacking: cement, fuel, wooden frames, building materials, tools.  
Work stoppages owing to air raid alerts.

(4) (a) 27,059, (b) 31,966.

B 208 (16).

C Bomber formations: Calais - Armentieres - Abbeville - Berck - Cambrai - Ghent - Liege - Mons - Le Treport - Le Havre, Creil, Bernay, Laon, Chartres.

Reconnaissance: St. Valery - Dieppe - Le Treport, Etaples, Dunkirk to Ostende.

Fighter and fighter-bomber formations:

Ghent - Huy - Dinant - St. Quentin - Fecamp.

(d) (aa) 53 (10). (bb) 15 (9). (cc) 220 (19). (dd) 69 (19).

- (2) (a) 61 (6). (b) 156 (10). (c) 17 (0). (d) 35 (0).  
(e) 273 (4). (f) 641 (9).

(3) (a) Destroyed: 3 positions, 3 guns (2 cm. anti-aircraft), 5 radar installations, 2 Luftwaffe Signals installations, Luftwaffe Signals equipment, cables, 1 building, 1 rotary convertor, 1 radio station, 7 M/T vehicles, 1,055 litres fuel burnt.

Damaged: 8 buildings and huts, 7 positions, 14 guns (6 of these coastal artillery), 5 radar installations, 2 control plants, 7 pillboxes, receiver of a large radar site, other damage to a barracks.

(b) No damage worth mentioning.

(c) Destroyed: 4 goods stations, 1 works, 8 works installations, 1 transformer station, 1 bridge, 33 locomotives, 280 goods wagons, 2 motor cars, 12 lorries, 1 harbour installation, 1 viaduct, 3 vessels.

Damaged: 5 goods stations, 19 works, 6 works installations, 2 transformer stations, 14 railway bridges, 1 electrical plant, 117 locomotives, several hundred passenger carriages and goods wagons, 3 motor cars, 6 lorries, 1 harbour installation, 15 vessels and barges, roads, electricity and other cables, tracks.

(d) (Maldeghem, Wizernes, Epinoy, Arques, Poix-Ost, Cambrai, Ursel, Tirlémont, Diest)

(e) Destroyed: 8 aircraft, 2 aircraft bays, 3 blast bays, 28 hangars, 6 workshops, 8 airfield buildings, 1 M/T vehicle, 38 huts, 1 gun, 11 M/T garages, telephone wires, electricity cables, and water mains.

Damaged: 9 aircraft, 2 fuelling installations, 15 runways, 22 tarmacs, 15 aircraft bays, 1 blast bay, 3 hangers, 3 workshops, 16 airfield buildings, 8 boundary lightings, 2 M/T vehicles, 30 huts, 1 gun.

(f) Destroyed: 1 gasometer, several hundred houses (exact figures not possible), 1 crane.

Damaged: 6 industrial plants, 5 power stations, 5 gasometers, 1 bridge, 698 houses (in addition, many houses with no details of numbers), electricity and telephone cables.

(4) (a) 29 (6). (b) 3 (0).

D (1) Calm, reserved, expectant, partly upset by air raids.

(2) (a) 4. (b) 8. (c) 0. (d) 2. (e) 9. (f) 4. (g) 1 attack on German recruiting office.

7th Army H.Q.

A (a) Unchanged.

(b) (1) 15.

(2) 44,011 cubic metres of reinforced concrete (14.4% of the summer construction programme).

(3) Construction is lagging owing to lack of building materials and transport of every description. 159 trucks of cement were supplied instead of 1,600. Partial lack of fuel. The withdrawal of large numbers of workmen is also a handicap.

(4) (a) 2,507,

(b) 2,336.

B

C (1) (a) 53 (16). (b) 35 (10).

(c) Transport targets, mainly locomotives, supply bases, radar installations.

(d) (aa) 32 (10). (bb) 3 (0). (cc) 33 (7) (dd) 6 (3)

(2) (a) 26 (15) - including 7 missing.

(b) 62 (11). (c) 2. (d) 7. (e) 4. (f) 0.

(3) (a) 1 gun destroyed, 1 gun damaged, 1 heavy anti-aircraft gun damaged, 1 2cm. anti-aircraft gun damaged, 1 anti-tank gun damaged.

(b) 2 pillboxes damaged, 1 gun damaged.

(c) 53 locomotives, large numbers of trucks.

(d) - .

(e) Repair shops and huts.

(f) 1 mine-sweeper, 7 radar installations, 2 lorries, 2 field kitchens.

(4) (a) 21 (in addition, 1 probable) (7).

(b) 0.

D (1) No fresh information.

(2) (a) 1 (2). (b) 8 (2). (c) 0 (0). (d) 8 (7).

(e) 1 (1). (f) 0. (g) 0.

WEEKLY REPORT, MAY 28 - JUNE 3, 1944

I Estimate of the situation as a whole.

The continuation and systematic increase of enemy air attacks and more intensive minelaying in our harbours with improved mining equipment indicate an advance in the enemy's readiness for invasion. Concentration of air attacks on coastal defences between Dunkirk and Dieppe and on the Seine - Oise bridges confirm the presumed focal point of a large-scale landing, and the possibility that communications may be cut off on the flanks and in the rear. Air reconnaissance of harbours along the entire south coast of England is urgently required. Constructional work on the defence front is being impeded by a further deterioration in the transport situation and of fuel supplies (shortage of coal). The withdrawal of the 19th Luftwaffe Field Division means further weakening of our defence force in the area south of the Scheldt estuary.

/II

## II Report on and estimate of the enemy situation.

### (a) Ground.

Concentrations in southern and south-east England have been confirmed against by the location of 2 British armoured divisions and 2 American infantry divisions. Radio communication has been normal again in Great Britain since May 30.

Since June 1 the enemy radio has issued an increased number of code words for French Resistance organisations to be at the ready, but from previous experience this cannot be accepted as a hint that invasion is immediately imminent.

### (b) Sea.

Air reconnaissance of Dover revealed an unimportant increase in the number of landing craft. The other harbours on the south coast of England were not reconnoitred.

Increased enemy minelaying from the air has been concentrated on the Hook, Calais, Le Havre, St. Nazaire. Some harbours are closed because of enemy mines. Heavy losses have been suffered owing to improved enemy mining equipment. Our naval forces are temporarily impeded.

Some enemy targets have been located off our coast, but no actions have been fought with enemy naval forces. Numerous bombing attacks have been made on naval radar installations resulting in some equipment being put out of action, but all location stations are operating again. Naval D/F station Flanders has been destroyed by bombs.

A number of detonations have been heard up to 15 km. off the Dutch coast; presumably enemy minesweeping activity.

### (c) Air.

Constant enemy air attacks obviously concentrated on bridges over the Seine, Oise, and to a certain extent over the Aisne, also coastal defences in the Dunkirk - Dieppe sector and on the northern and eastern sides of Cotentin. Attempts to cripple rail transport continue, with raids on marshalling yards (Brussels, Rheims, Ternier, Troyes, Trappes, Saumur and Angers) and on locomotives. Fewer attacks have been carried out on Luftwaffe ground organisation than during last week. Supplies for agents continues at the same level. Active enemy air reconnaissance has been carried out in the Dunkirk - Dieppe sector, in the Flers - Caen - Isigny area, and also on the northern and western coasts of Brittany.

Whereas attacks on bridges have led to destruction or serious damage to all crossings over the Seine between Paris and Rouen, damage inflicted on coastal defences is comparatively small.

Air reconnaissance has been carried out in the area of the "Landgraf" divisions.

### (d) Internal situation.

Population in state of expectant tension and reserved as before. French Resistance organisations presumably ready for action again.

## III In detail:

### Northern Military District:

- A (b) (1) 1,226, 46 reinforced with concrete.  
(2) 68%.

(3) 8 positions ready for action, 5 positions reinforced with concrete, 55 under construction.

(4) Unchanged.

(c) Further consolidation.

C (1) (a) 8 (27). (b) 82 (28). (c) Through lines to Germany.

(d) (aa) 3 (3). (bb) 0 (0). (cc) 73 (26). (dd) 9 (11).

(2) (a) 5(1). (b) 7 (5). (c) 0 (0). (d) 4 (0).

(e) 116 (13). (f) 345 (29).

(3) (a) 1 field wireless damaged.

(c) Buildings and track damaged at Roosendaal station, 51 locomotives, 5 electric-driven cars, 22 passenger carriages and goods wagons damaged, 3 petrol wagons burnt out, 14 barges and 1 2 cm. anti-aircraft gun damaged.

(d) 0 (0).

(e) 1 Me 109 (100%), 1 anti-aircraft installation damaged, buildings damaged.

(f) 2 factories, numerous houses damaged or destroyed.

(4) (a) 21. (b) 4.

D (1) Unchanged.

(2) (a) 1. (b) 1. (c) 0. (f) 0. (g) Terrorist attack on defence corps control post.

#### 15th Army H.Q.

A (a) Flak Regiment 37 transferred to 348th Infantry Division, Flak Regiment 36 transferred to 344th Infantry Division.

(b) (1) 17 pillboxes, 5 gun emplacements, 103 machine gun, anti-tank gun, and infantry positions, 1 anti-aircraft position, 1 battle H.Q., 3 artillery firing positions, 1 command post, dugouts for men and ammunition.

(2) 62%.

(3) According to plan in general. Lack of cut timber, barbed wire, cement, sectional iron, hoop iron. Inadequate allocation of mines and wire. Continual breakdown of automatic sprayers impeding construction of coastal defences.

(4) (a) 29,889. (b) 36,120 + 742 prisoners of war.

(c) Construction completed for field service. Machine gun positions, foxholes, mortar positions, 1 large minefield, dummy minefields, air landing obstacles, anti-tank and infantry positions, observation positions. Partial lack of cement, wire, mines, shells, hoop iron and workmen.

C (1) (a) 182 (190).

(b) 109 (208)

/(c)

(c) Bomber formations: Ostend - St. Omer - Amiens - Neufchatel -  
Le Treport, Fecamp, Le Havre, Rouen -  
Bernay, Evreux, Creil, Chartres, Brussels,  
Charleroi, Hasselt, Antwerp, Liege,  
Chauny, Douai.

Reconnaissance: Dunkirk, Ghent - Bethune, Somme - Doullens -  
Amiens - Neufchatel - Dieppe.

Fighter and fighter-bomber formations: Gheel - Mecheln -  
Charleroi - Laon - Compiègne - Conches -  
Honfleur.

(d) (aa) 37 (53). (bb) 62 (15). (cc) 139 (220). (dd) 25 (69).

(2) (a) 387 (61). (b) 298 (156). (c) 2 (17). (d) - (35).

(e) 74 (273). (f) 35 (641).

(3) (a) Destroyed: 2 Freya sets, 1 medium wave locator set, 1 search-  
light-directing installation, 4 other Luftwaffe  
Signals installations, (several other installations -  
exact number not known), 1 naval gun, 1 2 cm. gun,  
several huts and buildings, 2 M/T vehicles.

Burnt out: 8,000 litres crude oil, ammunition and supply dumps.

Damaged: Several buildings and huts, several positions,  
3 Luftwaffe Signals installations, 1 searchlight  
(60 cm.), 1 field generating set and special  
trailer for 2 cm. gun.

Buried: 2 guns (17 cm.), 2 tank guns (5 cm.), 2 2 cm. guns  
(out of commission for some time). Heavy personnel  
casualties (157 wounded, 226 dead and 102 missing)  
in an attack on Beverloo (16 km. north of Hasselt)  
on troop camps, permanent naval regiment, barracks  
of infantry camp and Burg Leopold. Damage to wires  
and cables.

(b) Damaged: 9

(c) Destroyed: 1 goods station, 6 works buildings, 6 plants,  
9 railway bridges, 47 locomotives, 416 wagons, and  
tracks.

Damaged: 2 passenger stations, 12 works buildings, 2 plants,  
4 bridges, 1 water tower, 59 locomotives, 116 trucks,  
heavy damage to tracks.

(d) Maldeghem, Epinoy, Poix-Ost, Cambrai, Ursel.

(e) Destroyed: 1 aircraft, 1 fuelling installation, 7 hangars,  
circuits.

Damaged: 2 aircraft, 6 runways, 6 tarmacs, 1 workshop,  
5 airfield buildings, 1 boundary lighting, 2 anti-  
aircraft positions, 4 anti-aircraft guns, telephone  
and electricity lines.

(f) Destroyed: 1 power station, a large number of houses (exact  
figures not possible).

Damaged: 2 factories, a large number of houses (exact figures  
not possible).

(4) (a) 37 (29). (b) - (3).

D (1) Continues expectant and reserved; not hostile. Bad feeling in LXXXII A.K. sector owing to harvest having been partially damaged by defence measures.

(2) (a) 3. (b) 2. (d) 2. (e) 3. (f) 1.

7th Army H.Q.

A (a) Unchanged.

(b) (1) 6 fortified buildings, 1 reinforced concrete fortified building.

(2) 18%.

(3) Working of 6,361 cubic metres of reinforced concrete. Completion of field constructions held up for the moment in favour of beach and air landing obstacles. Lack of cement and wire, accessories and wood, pillbox shutters and doors, inadequate supply of electricity, fuel, bad transport conditions, lack of lorries is preventing uninterrupted construction.

Cement: 200 trucks instead of 1,600. Wire: 305 tons.

(4) (a) 36,848. (b) 62,745.

B - .

C (1) (a) 72 (53). (b) 31 (35). (c) fortified positions, transport targets.

(d) (aa) 52 (32). (bb) - (3). (cc) 29 (33). (dd) 7 (6).

(2) (a) 31 (26), 27 missing. (b) 125 (62). (c) - (2). (d) 3 (7).

(e) 56 (4), 150 missing. (f) 190 (-).

(3) (a) Destroyed: 4 pillboxes in course of construction, 3 reinforced concrete dugouts, 1 dugout for men, 2 billet buildings, 1 water tower, 1 Luftwaffe installation.

Damaged: 3 billet buildings, 1 Würzburg installation, 1 Mammüt installation, 1 3.7 cm. anti-tank gun.

(b) - .

(c) 49 locomotives and numerous trucks, heavy damage to buildings and tracks.

(d) - .

(e) Destroyed: 3 hangars, 2 anti-aircraft gun positions, 2 motor cars, 3 lorries.

Damaged: Tarmac, 4 aircraft, 3 motor cars, 2 lorries, 1 Luftwaffe installation.

(f) 1 ship and 1 motor boat damaged.

(4) (a) 16 (21). (b) 2 (0).

/ D

D (1) Attitude of population unchanged. Railway sabotage in Boulogne increasing again.

(2) (a) 5 (1). (d) 3 (8). (e) 2 (1).

G.H.Q., XXXXVII Panzer Corps:

C (1) (a) 4. (b) continual. (c) Seine bridge, Gaillon, (d) (cc) 4.

(2) (a) -. (b) 4. (e) and (f) not known.

(3) (c) Seine bridge, Coucelles sur Seine destroyed.

Estimate of the situation on June 11, 1944

The course of the fighting in Normandy so far clearly shows that the objectives of the enemy are:

(1) To establish a deep bridgehead between the Orne and the Vire as a base for a later attack with strong forces into central France, probably in the direction of Paris.

(2) To cut off the Cotentin peninsula and to take Cherbourg as quickly as possible, in order to gain a large and serviceable harbour. It seems possible, however, as the situation is developing, that the enemy may abandon the occupation of the Cotentin peninsula if fighting becomes too hard there, and make an early thrust into the interior of France, throwing in all his resources.

Owing to the obstinate resistance of troops in the coastal defence sectors and the counter-attacks immediately undertaken by the major reserves available, the course of enemy operations has, in spite of the employment of most powerful means of warfare, taken appreciably longer than our adversary had hoped. The enemy also appears to be using more forces than originally intended.

The enemy is visibly reinforcing on land, under cover of very strong aircraft formations. The Luftwaffe and our navy are not in a position to offer him appreciable opposition, especially by day. Thus the strength of the enemy on land is increasing more quickly than our reserves can reach the front.

Owing to the enemy's overwhelming air superiority it was not possible to bring up the 1st SS Panzer Corps, the 7th Mortar Brigade, III Flak Corps and II Paratroop Corps (Meindl) quickly into the area between the Orne and the Vire, or to make a counter-attack on the enemy forces which had landed. The 7th Mortar Brigade, III Flak Corps and II Paratroop Corps (Meindl) are still on the way up to the front, the 1st SS Panzer Corps has been forced on to the defensive in hard fighting and is being attacked on its open left flank by superior armoured formations.

The Army Group must content itself for the present with forming a cohesive front between the Orne and the Vire with the forces which are gradually coming up, and allowing the enemy to advance. In these circumstances it is unfortunately not possible to relieve troops still resisting in many coastal positions. The Army Group is trying to replace the panzer formations in action with infantry divisions as soon as possible, and to form mobile reserves with them.

In the next few days the Army Group intends to remove the centre of its operations to the Carentan - Montebourg area, in order to annihilate the enemy there and to divert the danger threatening Cherbourg. Only when this has been successfully accomplished can the enemy between the Orne and the Vire be attacked. Unfortunately this operation can no longer be supported by our fighter formations, as there are no longer any airfields near the front at our disposal.



Our operations in Normandy will be rendered exceptionally difficult, and even partially impossible, by the following conditions:

- (a) the extraordinarily strong, and in some respects overwhelming superiority of the enemy Air Force.

As I personally and officers of my staff have repeatedly proved, and as unit commanders, especially Obergruppenfuhrer Sepp Dietrich, report, the enemy has complete control of the air over the battle area and up to 100 km. behind the front. Almost all transport on roads, byroads and on open country is prevented by day by strong fighter-bomber and bomber formations. Movements of our troops in the battle area by day are almost completely prevented, while the enemy can operate freely. In rear areas all confined areas are continually exposed to attacks, and it is very difficult to bring up the necessary supplies of ammunition and fuel to the troops.

Even the movements of smaller formations, artillery taking up position, deployment of tanks and so on, are immediately bombarded from the air with annihilating effect. Troops and staffs are forced to hide in terrain which provides cover during the day, in order to escape these continual attacks from the air.

On June 9 in the battle area of the SS Corps, numerous enemy fighter-bomber formations circled uninterruptedly over the battlefield and strong bomber formations bombarded troops, villages, bridges, and road junctions as heavily as possible and without consideration for the population. Neither our flak nor the Luftwaffe seems to be in a position to check this crippling and destructive operation of the enemy Air Force (27,000 sorties in one day). The army and SS troops are defending themselves as well as they can with the means at their disposal, but ammunition is scarce and can be replaced only under the most difficult conditions.

- (b) The effect of heavy naval artillery.

Up to 640 heavy calibre guns were used. The effect is so strong that operation with infantry or panzer formations in the area commanded by this quick-firing artillery is not possible. In spite of this heavy fire garrisons on the coast and the troops sent into counter-attack in the area of Montebourg have held their positions with the utmost tenacity. It must be expected, however, that the enemy warships will intervene further in the fighting on land, especially in the Cotentin peninsula, if the Luftwaffe and our navy do not succeed in destroying them.

- (c) The material equipment of the Anglo-Americans with numerous new weapons and war material is far superior to the equipment of our divisions. As Obergruppenfuhrer Sepp Dietrich informed me, enemy armoured formations carry on the battle at a range of up to 3,500 metres with maximum expenditure of ammunition and splendidly supported by the enemy Air Force. This was also the case at Alamein. Furthermore, their great superiority in artillery and extremely large supplies of ammunition are increasingly apparent.

- (d) Parachute and airborne troops are used in such large numbers and so effectively, that the troops attacked have a difficult task in defending themselves. If enemy airborne forces land in territory unoccupied by us, they immediately make themselves ready for defence and can be defeated only with difficulty by infantry attacks with artillery support. Further operations of this type, especially in areas not occupied by our troops, must be expected. The Luftwaffe has unfortunately not been able to take action against these formations as was originally planned. Since the enemy can cripple our mobile formations with his Air Force by day, as has been shown during the last few days, while he operates with fast-moving forces and airborne troops, our position is becoming extraordinarily difficult.

I request that the Fuehrer be informed of this.

Rommel

June 12, 1944

WEEKLY REPORT JUNE 12 - 19, 1944

Estimate of the situation as a whole.

The enemy has brought about 25 divisions and a large number of H.Q. troops of all types into Normandy, and has formed them up in one bridgehead from the Orne to Montebourg. He has carried out his plan to cut off the northern part of the Cotentin peninsula, in order to take possession of Cherbourg. Between the Orne and the Vire the enemy, with 2 noticeable concentrations, continued his attempts to create a jumping-off base for the attack into the French interior, especially in the direction of Paris.

- (a) between Tilly sur Seulles and Caumont,
- (b) on both sides of Route Nationale 172 to take possession of the St. Lo area.

Despite his great superiority, especially in air power and naval artillery, the enemy has gained no successes in repeated large scale attacks with ruthless employment of men and material, and has even lost ground in the Caumont area.

The slowly progressing mopping-up operation between the Dives and the Orne has suffered losses from the fire of naval artillery and the operations of the enemy Air Force. According to intelligence and reliable captured documents the enemy has reached none of his distant objectives, but has been forced to employ far greater forces than was originally planned.

It must be expected that the enemy will bring up new forces, - 2 British army corps have already been identified - and will prepare a general offensive between Tilly sur Seulles and St. Lo in a southerly or south-south-easterly direction, with concentrated forces, and after extensive preparation by the Air Force and artillery of all types. At the same time the 1st American Army, covered in the south, will prepare for the attack on Cherbourg, in order to gain the port, which is of decisive importance to the enemy.

In front of the 15th Army sector the focal points of air attack appeared clearly again as the Channel front on both sides of Cap Gris Nez and on both sides of the Somme. According to enemy regrouping and strategic and technical opportunities, a large-scale enemy landing on the Channel front on both sides of Cap Gris Nez or between the Somme and Le Havre must be expected. The general offensive out of the Normandy bridgehead and a new large-scale landing may be made simultaneously, both having the Paris area as objective.

The enemy has suffered severe casualties in the battles in the bridgehead and has so far lost more than 500 armoured vehicles and over 1,000 aircraft.

An estimate of the effect of the long-range weapons is not possible at present, owing to the short time in which it has been used and to the lack of reliable data.

Internal situation:

The population is friendly in the theatre of operations, and sabotage and other resistance activities which broke out again in the first days of the invasion have decreased noticeably.

Details will be submitted after receipt of reports from the Armies.

WEEKLY REPORT JUNE 19 - 26, 1944

Estimate of the situation as a whole.

The battle for the fortress of Cherbourg has been the main feature of the weekly report. After the enemy cut off the Cotentin peninsula on June 18, and our own troops, according to orders, had to make a costly retreat to

Cherbourg, the enemy attempted to force the capture of Cherbourg by encirclement from the west, employing his superior forces, which include 5 infantry divisions, 1 armoured division, and many H.Q. troops. On June 21 he succeeded in reaching the 50 km. long Cherbourg land front practically at the same time as the retreating von Schlieben battle group.

After a brief interval for preparation, during which constant air attacks were made and greatly superior artillery was brought up, the enemy drove 4 wedges into the outer defence ring on June 23. The unequal heroic struggle of the gallant defenders of Cherbourg continued without any possibility of ground, air or naval support until the evening of June 25, while the enemy with the superior equipment of his three services systematically reduced the garrison. At present a few pockets of resistance are still holding out in the city area of Cherbourg and on the Jobourg peninsula.

This has proved that such an extensive fortress cannot be held without sufficient troops and without air and naval support. The fortresses are not equal to the massed enemy Air Force and naval artillery, without corresponding counter-action on our part. Even the strongest fortifications were demolished piece by piece.

The other two local enemy concentrations were on both sides of Tilly sur Seules and in the St. Lo - Carentan area. While the defensive success of June 17 resulted in a slackening of the enemy offensive in the latter area, an attack was made on both sides of Tilly sur Seules on June 25, after intensive bombardment from land and air on a 7 km. front, the enemy succeeding in breaking through to a depth of 5 km.

Once again the enemy suffered heavy losses in these battles - as he himself admits - including more than 750 armoured vehicles since June 6. Our own losses are however also extraordinarily high. Exclusive of the Cherbourg garrison, the following casualties were suffered from July 6 until June 25:

897	officers (including 6 generals, 63 C.O's and 4 officers of the General Staff)
40,217	N.C.O's and men
<u>1,956</u>	Russians
43,070	

Heavy losses, especially in panzer divisions, and lack of replacements are causing great anxiety owing to the large decrease in strength caused by the daily bombardment from land and naval artillery and from the air.

Enemy operational plans are judged to be as follows. The enemy has sent 27 - 31 divisions and a large number of H.Q. troops into the bridgehead and further reinforcements are to be expected. In England another 67 large formations are ready, of which at least 57 could be used for a large-scale operation. Enemy distribution of forces in the bridgehead, naval movements, intercepted radio orders to reconnoitre the Touques and Risle sectors and other intelligence reports indicate a thrust in the area to the north and north-west of Caen in the direction of Paris.

This thrust could be linked up with a large-scale landing between the Somme and Le Havre, and this is indicated by agents' reports and increased enemy air reconnaissance. The effect of the long range weapons may also compel the enemy to make a landing in this area. The combined objective of both these operations will be the area around Paris, whose rail communication to the east was completely cut off by the enemy Air Force on June 25.

/After

After the release of enemy forces in the Cherbourg area for other operations the enemy may regroup to the south and after about June 30 may attack between Carentan and Portbail towards the south, in order to gain possession of the line St.Lo - Coutances and thus secure the necessary road communications from Cherbourg harbour to the eastern part of the landing area.

The increasing supply crisis at the battle front deserves special attention. Owing to lack of space, the breakdown of the railway system, and incessant enemy air attacks, it is impossible at present to guarantee a regular flow of supplies for our own operations.

In detail:

Situation at sea.

(1) Enemy activity in the landing area.

Large-scale use of battleships, cruisers and destroyers for coastal bombardment, especially off the Orne estuary. Increased patrol of sea areas off Cherbourg, the Channel Islands, and the northern coast of Brittany by groups of cruisers and destroyers, concentrated in the area between Ile de Batz and Les Sept Iles.

(2) Enemy minelaying activity.

No recognisable area of concentration.

Situation in the air.

Fighter, fighter-bomber, and close combat formations concentrated on the support of ground troops in the battle area, - especially around Cherbourg - and in rear areas, while heavy bomber formations concentrated on special buildings. The enemy's great superiority also allowed him to continue attacks on airfields and transport targets.

While only isolated attacks were made in the Northern Military District, the V.1 launching sites in northern France and Belgium were attacked incessantly. During the day 4-engined aircraft made up to 1,450 sorties, twin-engined aircraft 300. Attacks against Luftwaffe ground organisation and railway installations caused considerable damage in some instances. Increased air reconnaissance was carried out on both sides of Dieppe and in the area between Fecamp and Etretat.

Regular fighter sorties up to the line Paris - Rennes caused an almost complete stoppage of road transport during the day. Owing to very strong fighter defence urgently required, support for Cherbourg and air reconnaissance of the Caen - Bayeux area was rendered impossible.

Considerably increased air attacks were carried out against our defence forces in the whole Channel area by day and night. Our sea transport can only operate in special weather conditions which exclude the possibility of fighter-bomber attack. Air attacks were continued against ports on the mainland and islands in the Channel Island area. Continuous fighter-bomber attacks were made against naval radar stations in Brittany.

Internal situation

Those sections of the population affected continue to feel embittered at the ruthless Anglo-American methods of warfare, especially with regard to air force operations, otherwise the majority of the population is reserved.

/Inhabitants

Inhabitants of the Belgian coast demand evacuation. The Launching of the new weapon in the struggle against England aroused interest, and in some instances, satisfaction. Terrorist and sabotage operations are continually sustained by reinforcements of men and material from outside.

In the entire area of the Army Group the number of young men, alone or in groups, on the roads has further increased, so that there are grounds for suspicion of extensive recruiting for Resistance organisations. According to counter-intelligence reports, specially large numbers are arriving in the Cambrai area.

In Belgium and in the border area between Belgium and France the signs of a systematic Resistance organisation under energetic leadership are increasing: former members of the Wehrmacht are being recruited by call-up notices, and a supply organisation is being built up. The number of acts of sabotage is increasing.

In Brittany continual reinforcement with well-trained, well-equipped men and experienced leaders (partly French parachute troops trained in England) by air and probably by sea has led to the formation of powerful fighting groups. Concentrations in areas Callac, to the north of Vannes, and in the more remote surroundings of Pontivy and Guincamp.

Northern Military District:

- A (a) Defence organisation considerably weakened by withdrawal of 16th Luftwaffe Field Division.
- (b) (1) 1,253 emplacements ready for action, 55 reinforced with concrete.
- (2) Of previous construction programmes and plans up to August 30, 1944, 69% completed, 1% reinforced with concrete.
- (3) 6 emplacements ready for action, 13 reinforced with concrete.
- (4) Approximately 17,000 fortress type, 46,000 field type in course of construction.
- B None.
- C (1) (a) 7 (10). (b) 21 (11). (c) not known.
- (d) (aa) 2 (0). (bb) 0 (0). (cc) 18 (6).
- (2) (a) 8 (2). (b) 24 (8). (c) 0 (0). (d) 0 (0). (e) 24 (15).
- (f) 51 (23).
- (3) (a) 1 locomotive destroyed, 1 damaged, 1 motor boat damaged.
- (c) 16 locomotives out of commission, 6 railway wagons damaged.
- (d) 0.
- (e) Damage to buildings and tarmacs, several aircraft damaged.
- (f) 1 farm and 3 houses destroyed, 9 houses damaged, blast furnace plant put out of action temporarily owing to the destruction of current and water supplies.
- (4) (a) 33 (29). (b) 5 (10).

D (2) (a) 1. (b) 1. (c) 10. (d) 1. (e) 1. (f) 0.

15th Army H.Q.

- A (a) Defence organisation weakened by withdrawal of 1st SS Panzer Division 'Adolf Hitler Bodyguard'. Reinforcement of threatened area of Le Havre by 89th Infantry Division seems urgently necessary.
- (b) (1) 3 pillboxes, 4 gun emplacements, 5 anti-aircraft positions, 4 anti-tank gun positions, 2 dugouts (fortress type), infantry, artillery, anti-aircraft, anti-tank gun, machine gun and mortar positions, observation positions, firing positions, dugouts for men, equipment, ammunition and fuel, 2 minefields extended, beach defences, 60 tons of mines moved, 95 km. minebelt, air landing stakes provided with mines and explosives.
- (2) 48%.
- (3) Considerably restricted by alarm conditions, transport conditions, breakdown of current, lack of material, building material, cement, sawn wood, fuel, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, lack of labour.
- (4) (a) 19,576. (b) 18,528 + 742 POWs.  
(c) ./.
- C (1) (a) 174 (95). (b) 31 (35).
- (b) Bomber formations: Brussels - Hasselt - Laon - St. Quentin - Amiens - Aumale - Abbeville - Arras - Lens - Armentieres - St. Omer.
- Reconnaissance: Dunkirk - Bruges - Antwerp - St. Quentin - Arras - Amiens - Le Treport.
- Fighter-bombers and fighters: Ostend - Tournai - Fourmieres - Soissons - Beauvais - Fecamp.
- (d) (aa) 9 (3). (bb) 79 (6). (cc) 75 (47). (dd) 24 (58).
- (2) (a) 201 (44). (b) 361 (104). (c) 1 (9). (d) - (6).  
(e) 41 (31). (f) 77 (52).
- (3) (a) Destroyed: Luftwaffe Signals plotting station, 1 auxiliary aerial, 2 guns (3.7 cm.).
- Damaged: 1 Luftwaffe Signals installation, 1 billet, 1 aircraft field generating set, tracks, 1 hangar, huts and circuits.
- (b) Destroyed: 1, heavily damaged: 4, slightly damaged: 9.
- (c) Destroyed: 3 works buildings, 28 locomotives, 84 trucks, 64 M/T vehicles, 3 lorries, a large number of railway installations.
- Damaged: 6 works buildings, 5 works plants, 4 railway bridges, 10 locomotives, 57 trucks, 5 M/T vehicles, 2 guns (10.5 cm.), railway installations, telephone and electricity cables and 4 roads. Also 2 torpedo boats, 1 patrol vessel, 1 motor minesweeper and

2 barges sunk, 2 harbour installations, 1 lock, 2 torpedo boats, 1 minelayer, 1 motor mine-sweeper and 6 barges in part badly damaged.

(d) Juvincourt (Amy, Melsebroeck, Abbeville - Drucat).

(e) Destroyed: 3 aircraft, 1 hangar, 3 airfield buildings, 3 huts, and 300 litres aircraft fuel (89 octane).

Damaged: 1 aircraft, 7 runways, 8 tarmacs, 1 aircraft bay, 2 hangars, 14 airfield buildings, 2 boundary lighting systems, 7 huts, 3 supply routes, water mains, electricity and telephone cables.

(f) Destroyed: 1 rolling mill, 2 plants, 1 electricity works, a large number of houses.

Damaged: A large number of houses, electricity cables and water mains.

(4) (a) 78. (b) 17.

D (2) (a) 1. (b) 1. (d) 1.

#### 7th Army H.Q.

A (b) (1) 6 fortress type constructions, 1 field type construction in reinforced concrete.

(2) 64,682 cubic metres of reinforced concrete, including beach obstacles, of summer construction programme dealt with (exclusive of Normandy).

(3) 6,070 cubic metres of reinforced concrete dealt with in the week covered by the report. Construction of field type fortifications held up again by A-plan and lack of engineers, but generally satisfactory. Construction of beach and air-landing obstacles is primary consideration. Lack of cement, accessories, wood and fuel. All types of transport in short supply.

(4) (a) On the coastal front: 6,069. (b) 8,105.

On the land front: 10,723, 14,615.

#### WEEKLY REPORT, JUNE 27 - JULY 2, 1944

#### I Estimate of the situation as a whole.

The most significant event of the week was the large-scale enemy attack to occupy the Caen area, in order to gain a base for further operations in the direction of Paris.

The enemy, who commenced the attack on June 25, with a bombardment from land, sea and air, sent in 5 infantry divisions, 1 armoured division, 3 armoured brigades, and a considerable number of H.Q. troops - especially artillery - and was able to force a breakthrough 9 km. deep and 9 km. wide.

The breakthrough was held up at first by the heroic resistance of the 12th SS Panzer Division, the Panzer Training Division, units of the 1st SS Panzer Division the 2nd Panzer Division and the 2nd SS Panzer Division, and was finally stopped by a well timed counter-attack by the II SS Panzer Corps,

/which

which was supported by the concentrated fire of army artillery and 2 mortar brigades. In the course of the week the enemy suffered especially heavy casualties, losing more than 150 armoured vehicles (amounting to more than 900 since the commencement of the invasion) and was no longer able to make a concentrated attack.

A continuation of our attempt to mop up the breakthrough area was repeatedly frustrated with heavy losses by day and night by the concentrated fire of the superior enemy naval and land artillery and of the Air Force. Our lack of artillery ammunition of all calibres made itself very noticeable.

After bringing up fresh forces (the enemy's reinforcements aggregate at least 2-3 divisions per week) and regrouping, a resumption of the attacks in the breakthrough area must be expected - various signs indicate an attack east of the Orne. The enemy objective is still a concentrated thrust at Caen.

While the heroic struggle of isolated pockets of resistance in Cherbourg ended on July 1 with the annihilation of the Keil battle group on the Jobourg peninsula, the enemy attempted to force a breakthrough in the St.Lo area with forces already brought down from Cherbourg, the main concentration of the attack being on both sides of Villers Fossard. After severe battles lasting three days, the enemy was repulsed everywhere.

Reports of heavy enemy losses are piling up.

Our own losses from June 6 to July 1 amount to:-

1,137 officers (including 7 generals, 79 C.O's and 5 General Staff officers)	
44,871 NCO's and men	
1,095 Eastern Volunteers	
<hr/>	
47,103	

In addition 500 officers and officials

and 15,000 men (minimum figure, 17,500 according to a report from 7th Army H.Q.) of the Cherbourg garrison.

Total	<hr/> 62,603
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#### Enemy strength and operational plans

At present in the landing area the enemy has approximately 33 divisions and strong H.Q. troops; in Great Britain another 64 large formations are standing by, 54 of which could be transferred to the mainland.

After the capture of the Caen area - by encirclement on two sides, if possible - and fresh consolidation, the enemy intends to commence the advance on Paris. At the same time he will attempt a concentrated attack on the St.Lo - Coutances area with forces released from the Cherbourg area totalling 10 infantry and 2 armoured divisions, in an effort to consolidate his land base. Signs of this operation are apparent.

There are no fresh data concerning the objectives of the American 1st Army Group in Great Britain. A landing on both sides of the Somme as far as the Seine must be expected in view of strategic cooperation with the Montgomery Battle Group for the thrust on Paris and the elimination of the long range weapon.

A separate report will follow regarding our plans.

/ II



## II Situation at sea:

Very heavy artillery fire from British, American and French battleships, cruisers and destroyers is concentrated on knocking out Cherbourg, covering landings off the Orne estuary, supporting the land battle at Caen, and silencing the coastal batteries.

Vessels are continually unloading along the invasion coast, and active convoy movements are taking place in the Channel. There are heavy shipping concentrations in the Thames and also at Harwich. Several actions have been fought with enemy escort boats and destroyers, in which we incurred heavy losses; an enemy destroyer was sunk by one of our patrol vessels.

Our escort vessels have been greatly handicapped by small numbers and by weather conditions, and have carried out only minelaying operations. Successful results of our mining operations have been observed. Mine-sweeping operations have been made off the Scheldt, St. Malo, and the Biscay ports.

Increased fighter-bomber attacks on our small naval craft are being made by day and night. The enemy Air Force is maintaining constant surveillance of all our shipping movements.

## III Situation in the air:

Fighter, fighter-bomber, and close combat formations are concentrated on the battle area. Every movement made by enemy ground troops (especially in Cherbourg and south-east of Tilly) is strongly supported. Widespread reconnaissance was transformed into active attack almost immediately, and movements were practically impossible. Attacks were directed against troop concentrations, movements of every description, positions, bridges, transport installations, ammunition dumps and recognised Staff Headquarters. Heavy bomber formations operated mainly against special buildings in the V1 launching sites. Operations were on a smaller scale than last week owing to the weather. Further attacks were made against airfields and transport installations.

Reconnaissance of rail and road transport was carried out from the battle area as far as the line Paris - Tours - Nantes. Active reconnaissance over the area Nieuport - Valenciennes - Hesdin - Somme estuary, and continual surveillance of the north and west coast of Brittany was maintained.

## IV Internal situation

Attitude of the civilian population reserved; in Normandy the friendly attitude towards the Germans noted at first is giving way to definite reserve, and in many places to increasing aversion. The number of refugees in the battle area is increasing, among them an especially large number of able-bodied men. Cases of betrayal of our troop movements are increasing.

### Resistance movements and sabotage

The central leadership of a large number of Resistance movements and terrorist groups in the Netherlands is known; little activity so far. Increasing development of Resistance organisations in Belgium and in the frontier area of northern France. Only minor acts of sabotage in Normandy; the Resistance movement has been crippled by the capture of almost all of its leaders.

In spite of successful mopping-up operations and capture of arms and ammunition dumps in Brittany, there has been an increase in sabotage activities towards the end of the week. It is presumed that the enemy's next objective is to bring the terrorist groups, already joined by parachute troops, up to the standard of regular troops by supplying them with weapons and uniforms (in one case 1,000 uniforms were discovered).

V In detail:

Northern Military District:

- A (a) No changes. 4 draft conducting battalions, provided to safeguard rear positions and defence area, were transferred to 19th Army H.Q. on July 1.
- (b) (1) 1,261 emplacements ready for action, 56 more already reinforced with concrete.
- (2) 69% of the former construction programme and plans up to August 30, 1944, completed, 1% reinforced with concrete.
- (3) June 23 - 29, 1944 8 emplacements ready for action, 9 reinforced with concrete, 23 commenced.
- (4) (a) 37,640.
- (c) Further consolidation of the land front.
- B ./.
- C (1) (a) 12 (7). (b) 16 (21). (c) 0.
- (d) (aa) 3(2). (bb) 0 (0). (cc) 13 (18). (dd) 4 (4).
- (2) (a) 13 (8). (b) 45 (24). (c) 2 (0). (d) 0 (0). (e) 18 (24).
- (f) 38 (51).
- (3) (a) 0. (b) 0.
- (c) 5 lorries destroyed, 3 cars heavily damaged, 1 river police boat slightly damaged, 8 locomotives put out of commission, 8 railway passenger carriages and 1 goods truck burnt out, 2 milk trucks destroyed, 2 lorries damaged.
- (d) 0. (e) Minor damage on one airfield.
- (f) Blast furnace plant slight damaged. Damage to civilian property.
- (4) (a) 4. (b) 3.
- D (1) Unfriendly and expectant.
- (2) (a) - . (f) 0.

15th Army H.Q.

- A (b) (1) 11 artillery and anti-aircraft positions, 1 tank-gun position, 1 anti-tank pillbox, 5 small emplacements, 1 machine gun site, battle headquarters, anti-tank gun, mortar, machine gun, dummy positions, dugouts for men and ammunition, observation positions, consolidation and mining of beach and air landing obstacles.
- (2) 49%.
- (3) According to plan. Lack of cement, wood, material for building positions, tools, mines of all types. Construction greatly handicapped by breakdown of electric current.
- (4) (a) 20,453. (b) 21,279 and 29 prisoners of war.

Less than last week in LXXXI Army Corps area.

- (c) Development according to plan. Partially impeded by lack of materials, tools and mines, and labour. Machine gun, anti-tank gun positions, foxholes, dugouts for men and ammunition, observation positions, mortar positions, artillery positions, dugouts for equipment, infantry positions, 4 minefields enclosed, 270 mines laid, 18.5 km. new belt of mines, air landing stakes provided with mines and explosives.

B ./.

C (1) (a) 128 (174).

(b) 28 (31).

(c) Bomber formations: Ostend - Iseghem - Brussels - Florennes - Maubeuge  
Valenciennes - Laon - Creil - Montdidier -  
Doullens - Neufchatel - Etaples.

Reconnaissance: Furnes - Tournai - Hesdin - Somme - Etaples -  
Calais.

Fighters and fighter-bombers: Scheldt estuary - Tournai -  
Dinant - Rethel - Creil - Rouen - Le Havre.

(d) (aa) 7 (9). (bb) 26 (79). (cc) 88 (75). (dd) 17 (24).

(ee) 18(18) (other objectives).

(2) (a) 40 (201). (b) 42 (361). (c) 1 (11). (e) 30 (41). (f) 50(77).

(3) (a) Destroyed: 1 gun (2 cm.), 1 cookhouse.

Damaged: 1 hut, 3 positions, minor damage to roads and  
tracks.

(b) Heavily damaged: 11.

Moderately damaged: 2.

Slightly damaged: 3.

(c) Destroyed: 1 electricity plant, 1 transformer station,  
19 locomotives, 24 trucks, railway installations,  
1 road, 2 M/T vehicles, 2 dams.

Damaged: 12 works buildings, 8 locomotives, 93 trucks,  
1 water tower, 3 cranes, 50 railway installations,  
11 M/T vehicles, 2 bridges, telephone and  
electricity cables.

(d) Le Culot (Amy, Abbeville-Drucat).

(e) Destroyed: 3 blast bays, 3 hangars, 1 workshop and 2 air-  
field buildings.

Damaged: 6 aircraft, 10 runways, 8 tarmacs, 1 aircraft bay,  
6 blast bays, 8 hangars, 1 workshop, 3 airfield  
buildings, 2 boundary lighting installations,  
telephone and electricity cables, water mains,  
1 narrow gauge railway line.

(f) Destroyed: 1 power station, 1 workshop with 5 M/T vehicles,  
1 billet, 1 swingbridge, 2 lorries, 6 cars,  
5 motor cycles and a large number of houses,  
1 oil tank burnt out.

/Damaged:

Damaged: 4 industrial plants, 1 power station, 1 M/T repair shop, a large number of houses, electricity and water mains.

(4) (a) 53 (78).

(b) 32 (17).

D (1) Unchanged, expectant, reserved, not hostile.

(2) (a) 1. (b) 4. (f) 1.

7th Army H. Q.

Breton Coast:

- A (a) Defence organisation further weakened by withdrawal of 275th Infantry Division.
- (b) (2) 65,882 cubic metres of reinforced concrete of summer construction programme used.
- (3) 910 cubic metres of reinforced concrete during the week covered by the report. Construction of field type defences held up by A-plan and lack of sappers. Concentrated work on coastal defences and air landing obstacles. Lack of cement and fuel, difficult transport situation, and considerable withdrawals of Todt Organisation labour is holding up work.
- (4) (a) 20, 473. (b) 36, 106.
- 

To C-in-C. West.

July 1, 1944

With a view to obtaining unified command of the Wehrmacht and concentration of all forces, I propose to take over command of the headquarters and units of the other two services employed in the Army Group area or cooperating with it.

(1) Luftwaffe

At present there is no question of strategic air warfare. Close cooperation between the flying formations and the flak corps and the heavily engaged army can be guaranteed only by the strictest command from one headquarters. Duplication of orders leads to military half measures.

(2) Navy

There is no longer any question of extensive naval strategy. Local tactical operation of the few vessels still at our disposal must be carried out in close cooperation with the movements of the army. The defence of Cherbourg has shown that a unified command and channel of communications are more effective. Finally, the supply situation, especially as regards transport, demands unified guidance and issue of orders by the Quartermaster General West.

Rommel

/WEEKLY

WEEKLY REPORT, JULY 3 - 9, 1944

I Estimate of the situation as a whole.

During the period covered by the report, the 2nd British Army and the 1st American Army, using unusually large masses of men and material in a large-scale attack, attempted to break through in order to conduct operations in open country.

The prelude was a local attack on July 3 concentrated on a 7 km. front in the area in front of Caen, which resulted in the loss of Carpiquet after heavy fighting. On July 8 the enemy launched a concentrated attack on Caen with at least 3 infantry divisions, several armoured brigades, and strong H.Q. troops, after having bombarded the whole area during the previous night with naval land and artillery of all calibres (80,000 rounds) and with continual air attacks (approximately 2,500 tons). After two days of very heavy fighting the enemy, who suffered particularly heavy losses of men and material - the 12th SS Panzer Division alone knocked out 103 tanks - succeeded in smashing the bridgehead and taking Caen. The enemy was not successful in effecting a breakthrough, however, as a secure defence had been built up in time on the Orne.

On July 10 the attacks were continued, concentrated on both sides of Verson, and are still in progress.

Fighting on the rest of the Panzer Group West front was only in the nature of local holding operations.

On the 7th Army front with 4-5 infantry divisions and strong armoured forces, the enemy launched a north-south thrust on July 3 between Prairies Marecageuses de Gorges and the west coast. In spite of ruthless employment of men, massed artillery, and air forces, the enemy was prevented from breaking through. An area of approximately 5 km. in depth had to be relinquished to the enemy in the course of the week; fighting continues on the line Plessis - Mobeacq - Bretteville.

From July 4 the enemy extended his attacks to the Vire. After having succeeded in establishing bridgeheads over the Vire and Taute, he attempted to break through into the area St. Lo - Periers - Coutances. In heavy battles he was prevented from making a decisive breakthrough. The 2nd SS Panzer Division and the Panzer Training Division were brought up to the battle area, and some units took part in the fighting. The 5th Paratroop Division is being brought up.

The enemy has once more failed to reach his breakthrough objectives this week, and has suffered heavy casualties. The 101st and 82nd American Airborne Divisions have already been withdrawn owing to heavy losses, but have been replaced by fresh divisions.

From June 6 to July 9 the enemy lost 1,297 armoured vehicles and 266 aircraft through the action of army and SS units.

Even when compared with the heavy enemy losses, our losses are also considerable. From June 6 to July 7 they amount to:-

1,830 officers (including 9 generals, 7 officers of the  
General Staff, and 109 C.Os.)  
75,166 NCOs and men  
3,787 Russians  
80,783

As opposed to these figures, 10,671 replacements have been brought up since June 6.

### Enemy strength and operational plans.

It is estimated that the enemy has at present 35 divisions and strong H.Q. troops in the landing area. In Great Britain a further 60 large formations are standing by, of which 50 could be transferred to the Continent at any time.

According to indications, and data, the plans of the Montgomery Army Group are just as we expect. After taking the whole of the Caen area and throwing adequate bridgeheads over the Orne the enemy intends to commence the thrust on Paris, in the course of which a large-scale landing must be expected in the 15th Army Zone by the 1st American Army Group to cooperate with the Montgomery Army Group and to eliminate the long range weapon.

According to a captured order, the American 1st Army's primary objective is the extension and consolidation of their land base by the occupation of the St. Lo - Coutances area and later the line Vire - Avranches. The strategy of attrition of both armies can be recognised by the use of masses of material and ammunition.

To improve our freedom of action, while at the same time preventing a breakthrough, Army Group B will attempt to withdraw panzer formations and replace them by infantry divisions.

Owing to the lack of transport space and the delaying effect of air attacks, the supply position is very critical as regards ammunition and fuel, in spite of some slight improvement in transport up to the front.

### II Situation at sea:

More intensive surveillance of the sea area off Le Havre and Cap d'Antifer by strong groups of enemy destroyers and escort vessels. Numerous naval actions.

Increasing control of the Channel Island area and the northern coast of Brittany by enemy destroyers and other naval forces.

Widespread use of battleships, cruisers and destroyers in bombardment of the coast and in support of the enemy attack on Caen.

Considerable enemy supply and reinforcement traffic; a temporary decrease was noticeable after our small naval craft had been sent into action.

Numerous fighter-bomber attacks on our defence forces. Air surveillance of the whole Channel coast, including coastal and outer routes between Brest and La Pallice. 3 fighter-bomber attacks on naval radar stations in the area of Cap d'Antifer and on Ile d'Ouessant.

Enemy mining activity slight in comparison with last week.

### III Situation in the air

Very heavy enemy air activity, only temporarily held up by weather conditions.

Fighter and fighter-bomber sorties were concentrated in the battle area in support of ground troops. Continual attacks against positions of every description, ammunition and supply dumps, and against movements far to the rear. Isolated fighter-bomber sorties as far as the Loire. Strong fighter forces covering the battle area and making operations by the Luftwaffe difficult.

Twin-engined formations directed attacks against transport installations (stations, trains, bridges, ferries and crossroads) and against troop concentrations.

/Heavy

Heavy bomber formations strongly supported by fighters attacked construction sites and special installations in the V1 launching sites, marshalling yards and airfields.

Reconnaissance was made of rail, road and water transport as far as the line Rheims - Orleans - Angers - Rennes. Constant surveillance was noticeable in the Ostend - Lens - Amiens - Le Treport area and of the north and west coast of Brittany.

#### IV. Internal situation:

Attitude of the civilian population still reserved and expectant.

#### Resistance organisations and sabotage:

It has been confirmed that British and French parachute groups have been landed in areas outside Brittany to reinforce and direct the Resistance movement. Still relatively slight activity in the Netherlands. In Belgium and the frontier area of northern France, marked increase of partisan activity. The British radio is sending an increased number of code words to Resistance groups.

The number of attacks and acts of sabotage, which has been exceptionally high since the end of June has risen still further in the last few days. Heavy sabotage of electric cables during the night July 6 - 7.

Normandy: partisan activity has spread to areas formerly free of terrorists (Pont Audemer), and also in the battle area (Caen). Roads in rear areas have been covered with small mines.

Brittany: increasing sabotage of railway installations and long distance electricity cables. Attacks on small detachments of troops and goods trains reveal planned preparation and military direction (concentrated in the area Guingamp - Lannion); however no large-scale military use of partisan bands has been made. Concentration area of terrorist supply in southern Brittany, with up to 40 machines in one night.

#### In detail:

##### Northern Military District:

A (a) No changes.

- (b) (1) 1,270 positions ready for action, 54 others reinforced with concrete.
- (2) 70% completed, 1% reinforced with concrete, of construction programme and planning up to August 30.
- (3) June 30 - July 6: 9 positions ready for action, 7 reinforced with concrete, 5 begun.
- (4) Approximately 15,470 fortress type, 36,000 field type under construction.

(c) Land front further consolidated.

B ./.

C (1) (a) - . (c) 0 (0).

(d) (aa) 0 (3). (bb) 0 (0). (cc) 9 (13). (dd) 5 (4).

/(2)

(2) (a) 8 (13). (b) 8 (45). (c) 0 (0). (d) 0 (0). (e) 26 (18). (f) 42 (38).

(3) (a) 0. (b) 0.

(c) One railway and one road bridge damaged, 7 locomotive put out of commission, 10 goods trucks containing army lorries destroyed by fire, 11 goods trucks slightly damaged.

(d) 0.

(e) Runways, tarmacs and buildings damaged, 6 Ju 88s damaged.

(f) Numerous houses destroyed and damaged.

(4) (a) 9. (b) 1.

D (1) Unchanged.

(2) (a) 0. (b) 0. (c) 0. (d) 1. (e) 0. (f) 0.

15th Army H. Q.

A (a) Defence organisation in the Le Havre area reinforced after arrival of 98th Division.

(b) (1) 1 artillery pillbox, 6 pillboxes, 2 small dugouts, machine gun, anti-tank gun, anti-aircraft, tank gun, mortar, dummy positions (fortress type), ammunition and Goliath dugouts, Tobruk positions, consolidation and mining of beach and air landing obstacles. Main area of consolidation at river estuaries. Work started on installation of beacons on immediate front.

(2) 64%.

(3) In general, according to plan. Held up by lack of cement, material for building positions and mines, also partly by interruptions caused by air raids. Employment of Todt Organisation labour greatly restricted in parts.

(4) (a) 22,618.

(b) 22,828 and 29 prisoners of war.

(c) Foxholes, machine gun, anti-tank gun, mortar, anti-aircraft positions, dugouts for men, ammunition, equipment, horses and supplies, observation posts, artillery positions, battle headquarters, shelters, splinter bays for vehicles, fencing in of minefields, 478 anti-personnel and 660 anti-tank mines laid, work started on the Boulogne land front, air landing stakes provided with mines and shells at Le Havre; 1,600 anti-tank and 1,900 anti-personnel mines laid. Construction greatly handicapped by lack of labour, mining and construction material (especially wood and wire) as well as by lack of trenching and other tools.

B ./.

C (1) (a) 118 (123). (b) 31 (28).

/(c)



(c) Bomber formations: Brussels, Cambrai, Amiens, Beauvais, Dieppe, Somme estuary, Boulogne, Armentieres, Chauny, Rethel, Abbeville.

Reconnaissance: Ostend, Lens, Amiens, Le Treport.

Fighters and fighter-bombers: Scheldt estuary, Courtrai, Maubeuge, Laon, Montdidier, St. Valery e. C.

(d) (aa) 12 (7). (bb) 59 (26). (cc) 59 (88). (dd) 9 (17).  
(ee) 10 (18) other targets.

(2) (a) 48 (40). (b) 20 (42). (c) - (1). (e) 67 (30).  
(f) 22 (50).

(3) (a) Destroyed: 3 huts, 5 ammunition bunkers, 1 anti-aircraft gun (10.5 cm), 2 M/T vehicles, 1 ammunition depot.

Damaged: 3 ammunition bunkers, 1 railway installation, 1 building, 2 lorries, several huts, roads and cables. 2 light anti-aircraft trains buried, 100 rounds of anti-aircraft ammunition blown up.

(b) Heavily damaged: 11.

Medium damage: 3.

Slightly damaged: 7.

(c) Destroyed: 1 works building, 2 works installations, 1 railway bridge, 31 locomotives, 52 trucks, 1 road, 1 dam, several railway installations, 2 vessels sunk.

Damaged: 8 works buildings, 4 locomotives, 84 trucks, several roads, a large number of railway installations, 6 vessels.

(d) (Arques, Chambry, Coxyde, Diest, Juvincourt, Liegescourt, Poix-Ost, St. Pol-Brias, Ursel, Vlamerthinghe, Wizernes.).

(e) Destroyed: 1 ammunition dump.

Damaged: 2 runways, 1 tarmac, 4 blast bays and several buildings.

(f) Destroyed: 1 road, a large number of houses.

Damaged: 3 gasometers, a large number of houses.

(4) (a) From June 25 - July 1: 57 (53).

(b) 31 (32).

D (1) Unchanged, reserved and expectant.

(2) (a) One attempt.

(b) 3.

(d) 2.

7th Army H. Q.

- A (a) Further weakening of defences in Brittany after withdrawal of the 5th Paratroop Division and the 275th Infantry Division from their former coastal defence sectors.
- (b) (1) Nil return.
- (2) 66,800 cubic metres of reinforced concrete.
- (3) 515 cubic metres construction of field type positions further impeded. Increased difficulties in completing fortress and field type constructions. Terrorist menace is making employment of civilians more difficult.
- (4) Coastal front:
- (a) 2,500. (b) 3,200.
- Land front:
- (a) 3,700. (b) 10,200.

WEEKLY REPORT, JULY 10 - 16, 1944

I Estimate of the situation as a whole

The 2nd British Army has not achieved its aim of breaking through and operating in open country after the capture of Caen, when further attacks broke down owing to heavy losses. A counter-attack by our troops on July 11 was successful, and the former main defence line south of the Odon (south-west of Caen) was retaken; after this the enemy remained quiet, except for local infantry and considerable artillery activity. Regrouping and preparations on an increasing scale were observed towards the end of the week. In the early hours of July 16 the enemy commenced local attacks between Maltot and Vendes, and these are still in progress. An offensive by the 2nd British Army to break through towards the south-east can be expected from the evening of July 17.

On the 7th Army sector the enemy attempted to break through and force the capture of the St. Lo area in battles which are intensifying daily. Once more the enemy failed to reach his objective, but sectors 3 km. to 5 km. in depth to the north-east and north-west of St. Lo had to be yielded to him. After a defensive success on the northern front LXXXIV Army Corps fell back without enemy interference to the Seves - Lessay sector during the night of July 13/14. The enemy has not yet completely closed up on the new main defence line.

Enemy attacks concentrated on the St. Lo area are continuing on the same scale.

During the period between June 6 and July 16, the enemy suffered the following losses through the action of the army and SS units

1,705 tanks and 293 aircraft.

Our own losses from June 6 to July 7 amount to:-

2,360 officers (including 9 generals, 7 officers of the General Staff, 137 C.O's.)

93,938 NCO's and men

3,791 Russians

100,089 men

Replacements since June 6:

8,395 men brought up to the front

5,303 men warned for transfer to front.

The replacement situation gives rise to some anxiety in view of increasing losses. Some remedy must be found before units are depleted.

Enemy strength and operational plans.

Enemy supply of men and material continues without interruption, and it is estimated that there are approximately 37 divisions and strong H.Q. troops in the landing area. According to the distribution of enemy forces the following minimum artillery strengths are estimated, exclusive of naval artillery:

2nd British Army: 270 light batteries; 50 medium and heavy batteries

1st American Army: 130 light batteries; 135 medium and heavy batteries

Total of at least 400 light batteries; 185 medium and heavy batteries

In Great Britain a further 56 large formations are at the ready, of which 46 can be transferred to the Continent.

The known operational plans of the Montgomery Army Group still appear to remain the same.

The 2nd British Army is clearly concentrated in the area of Caen and to the south-west, and plans to make a thrust across the Orne towards Paris. The local attacks between Maltot and Vandes, which commenced on July 15 may be regarded as the preliminary to the offensive to break through over the Orne expected from July 17.

The 1st American Army will continue its plan to extend its land base up to the line Domfront - Avranches, using heavy concentrations of men and materials.

1st American Army Group: There are no fresh indications of the objectives of the 1st American Army Group. A large-scale landing must be expected in the area of the 15th Army, for strategic cooperation with Montgomery's Army Group, where the main weight of the enemy operations appears to be concentrated and for the elimination of long distance weapons. Agents' reports of an intended landing in southern Brittany contradict the distribution of forces reported in Great Britain.

Army Group B will continue its attempt to prevent all efforts to break through. The replacement of panzer formations by infantry units has not yet produced the desired result. Compared with the modern Anglo-American units, the infantry divisions are so inferior in equipment and strength that most of the reserve panzer groups had to be sent into action again.

## II Situation at sea:

Close patrol of the sea area off the landing area and Cap d'Antifer - Le Havre by enemy destroyer and MTB groups.

Numerous naval actions. According to a reliable source a number of enemy vessels have struck mines.

Extended and reinforced enemy patrols (including heavy cruisers) off the coast of Brittany as far as Lorient, concentrated on Brest. Surprise appearance of enemy destroyer group off the Ile de Croix.

/Fighter-

Fighter-bomber attacks were carried out against our defence forces along the whole Channel coast and also on the Atlantic coast as far as St. Nazaire.

Extensive supply movements by transports, freighters and LSTs in the landing area. Supply by small craft is decreasing.

Air reconnaissance of Cherbourg found only landing craft and low-tonnage steamers in the outer harbour, which must be presumed cleared. Large-scale unloading unlikely. Large-scale unloading activity in the landing area confirms the view that 17 days after the fall of Cherbourg there is no possibility of unloading in the inner harbour.

Enemy mining activity in the Channel has diminished, and is slight on the Atlantic coast.

### III Situation in the air:

In spite of being hindered by bad weather conditions, strong fighter and fighter-bomber forces were almost continuously active over the battle and rear areas. Considerably fewer sorties were made by heavy bomber formations owing to heavy attacks on Germany. Heavy bomber formations directed their attacks mainly against V1 launching sites, transport installations and airfields. Most of the attacks by twin-engined bomber formations were directed against railway installations.

By day and night fighter and fighter-bomber formations attacked supply routes and positions of every description in the main defence zone as well as covering the battle area. Repeated attacks were made on bridges, ferries and railway targets as far as the line Paris - Tours - Vannes.

Reconnaissance aircraft maintained constant surveillance of rail, road and water transport as far as the line Chalons s.M. - Orleans - Angers and the coastal area of Brittany.

### IV Internal situation:

The attitude of the civilian population continues expectant, and to some extent unfriendly. In the Belgian coastal area some of the population volunteered for work on defences following measures to evacuate the coastal combat area.

Resistance organisations and sabotage.

Slight increase in sabotage activity; progressive development of Resistance organisations, but no large-scale operations as yet.

Attacks on economic and municipal officials, Dutch police and National Socialist Party members.

Belgium and Northern France: sporadic sabotage of cables during the night of July 11/12, otherwise no increase in sabotage. Indications of progressive mobilisation of Resistance movements in the interior.

Normandy: increased laying of small mines on roads. Isolated arson attempts on vehicles.

Brittany: no numerical increase in acts of sabotage. Attacks are well planned however and reveal leadership by trained men. The supply system has been hardest hit by numerous explosions on railway tracks, and by attacks with explosives on locomotive depots and ammunition trains.

/Destruction

Destruction of railway bridges, especially in northern Brittany. Several attacks on power supply. Numerous attacks on members of the Wehrmacht. Areas of concentration: Lannion - Plouarot and Pontivy - Loudeac - Carhaix.

The further development of Resistance organisations has not been appreciably hindered by our intervention, and planned development of fighting groups must be expected. Main area where terrorist bands are being formed is to the south of Pontivy. Enemy losses: 168 dead (including 16 parachutists), 117 prisoners (including 4 parachutists).

V In detail:

Northern Military District:

- A (a) The battle group of the 19th Panzer Division transferred at 1800 hrs. on July 15. The remaining units of the division are in the former billeting area with orders to defend it against landings from the air.
- (b) (1) 1,288 positions
- (2) 71% of programme up to September 30, 1944, completed.
- (3) 18 positions ready for action, 7 reinforced with concrete.
- (4) No important changes.
- (c) Further consolidation of land front.
- B None.
- C (1) (a) 5 (7). (b) 2 (9). (c) 0 (0).
- (d) (aa) 0 (0). (bb) 0 (0). (cc) 2 (9). (dd) 0 (5).
- (2) (a) 0 (8). (b) 2 (8). (c) 0 (0). (d) 0 (0).
- (e) 0(26). (f) 1 (42).
- (3) (a) 0. (b) 0. (c) 1 barge and 1 vehicle damaged.
- (d) 0. (e) 0. (f) slight damage to houses.
- (4) (a) 4. (b) 7.
- D (1) Unchanged, expectant and unfriendly.
- (2) (a) 0. (b) 0. (c) 0. (d) 0. (e) 0. (f) 1.

15th Army H.Q.

- A (a) Army defence organisation weakened after withdrawal of 326th and 363rd Infantry Divisions.
- (b) (1) 2 gun and 1 anti-aircraft pillbox positions, 1 tank gun, 1 anti-tank gun 8.8 cm., and 1 7.5 cm. anti-tank gun position, 2 other pillbox positions (field type), machine gun, mortar, anti-tank gun and artillery positions, bunkers, reserve and dummy positions, consolidation and reinforcement of beach and airlanding obstacles by installation of explosives and anti-personnel mines, 1 60-ton bridge constructed and 1 minefield laid.
- (2) approximately 66%

(3) Lack of building material (especially cement and sawn wood), labour, transport and mines. Progress hampered by measures taken under Alarm II.

(4) (a) 22, 136.

(b) 21,988 and 32 POWs.

(c) Completed: Machine gun, mortar, anti-tank, and artillery positions, bunkers, foxholes, observation positions, battle positions; new mining: Boulogne fortress (commenced), and Le Havre land front, and a further 10.5 km 924 anti-tank and 90 anti-personnel mines laid.

B ./.

C (1) (a) 53 (118).

(b) 16 (31).

(c) Bomber formations: St.Omer, Arras, Albert, Montdidier, Chateau Thierry, Beauvais, Gisors, Aumale, Dieppe, Amiens, Abbeville.

Reconnaissance: Scheldt estuary, Brussels, Charleroi, Valenciennes, Calais.

Fighters and fighter-bombers: Scheldt estuary, Brussels, Charleville, St. Quentin, Soissons, St. Valery en Caux.

(d) (aa) 6 (12). (bb) 23 (59). (cc) 24 (59). (dd) 12 (9).

(ee) 4 (10) other targets.

(2) (a) 21 (without aircraft crews) (48).

(b) 20 (without aircraft crews) (29).

(c) 10 ( - ). (d) 1 ( - ). (e) 13 (67). (f) 10 (22).

(3) (a) Destroyed: 2 four-barrelled guns, 1 searchlight.

Damaged: 1 special trailer 202, railway installations, damage to windows. 1 anti-aircraft and battery control position buried.

(b) Destroyed: 1.

Heavy damage: 7.

Medium damage: 4.

Slight damage: 6.

(c) Destroyed: 1 railway bridge, 5 locomotives, 2 motor vehicles, 14 trucks (including 8 with ammunition), various approach roads.

Damaged: 2 railway works buildings, 1 transformer station, 1 railway bridge, 1 road bridge, 3 reservoirs, 4 locomotives, 19 trucks, 2 huts, tracks, telephone communications, 1 dam.

2 vessels sunk.

(d) Mons en Chaussee, Poix-Nord.

(e) Destroyed: 2 empty fuelling installations, 1 hangar,  
2 airfield buildings.

Damaged: 2 runways, 3 tarmacs, 1 set boundary lighting and  
telephone cables.

(f) Destroyed: a large number of houses (exact figures not  
known), 2 lorries (1 with load of cable).

Damaged: 1 bridge, 1 road, a large number of houses,  
telephone lines and water mains, damage to  
cultivated fields.

(4) (a) 49 (57).

D (1) Unchanged, reserved and expectant.

(2) (a) 1. (b) 25. (d) 1. (e) 2.

Panzer Group West:

Further consolidation of land front in 711th Infantry Division sector. Considerable lack of building materials and transport difficulties are holding up work. For other details see report on situation as a whole.

7th Army H. Q.

- A (a) Brittany: Defence considerably weakened by the withdrawal of 5th Paratroop Division and 275th Infantry Division.
- (b) (2) From summer construction programme: 67,098 cubic metres of reinforced concrete.
- (3) 698 cubic metres of reinforced concrete. Difficulties described in the report for the last week have further increased. Shortage of engineers and supervisors.
- (4) On the coastal front: (a) 8,533. (b) 6,323.
- On the land front: (a) 1,550. (b) 3,521.

WEEKLY REPORT, JULY 17 - 23, 1944

I Estimate of the situation as a whole.

On July 17, the 2nd British and the 1st American Armies began their large-scale attack from the Caen and St.Lo areas in an attempt to force a strategic breakthrough. In spite of their powerful air support and their superior artillery, this plan failed.

On July 18, after a heavy preliminary bombardment from land and sea artillery, and intensive bombing from over 1,000 aircraft, the attack in the area of Panzer Group West was begun from the bridgehead east of the Orne, launched with 4 infantry divisions, 3 armoured divisions and 2 to 3 armoured brigades. As a result of the intensive bombardment the enemy succeeded in breaking through across the line Touffreville - Colombelles to the south. With our last reserves we engaged the enemy in bitter fighting along the line west of Troarn - south of Frenouville - St.Andre - Bougie. The weather caused a slackening off in the fighting towards the end of the week, although heavy fighting for local targets continued.

/The

The enemy launched a concentrated attack against St.Lo in the 7th Army area on July 17. The bulges in the front line were taken back to the line north of St.Lo - Rampan - Le Mesnil Eury, and thus prevented a breakthrough. St.Lo was abandoned to the enemy during the night of July 18/19, and the front was stabilised immediately south of the town. The enemy did not renew their heavy attacks here either, because of the heavy losses they had suffered.

We can expect the enemy's large-scale attacks from Caen, St.Lo and west of the Vire to be resumed as soon as more favourable weather conditions permit the unhampered use of the enemy air forces.

Units of the army and SS destroyed 2,117 enemy tanks and 345 aircraft between June 6 and July 23.

During the period June 6 - July 23 our own losses were:

2,722 officers (including 10 generals, 8 General Staff Officers, and 158 C.Os.)
110,337 NCOs and men
<u>3,804 Russians</u>
116,863

10,078 men have been brought in since June 6 as replacements.

The disbandment of the 165th Reserve Division released 8,000 men for the infantry battalions which were sent to the front. Replacements for the SS panzer divisions are urgently needed.

#### Enemy strength and operational plans

The enemy has at least 40 divisions and strong H.Q. troops in the landing area, and is still bringing in further troops and materials.

There are still 52 large troop formations in readiness in Great Britain, and of these about 42 could be transferred to the mainland.

The operational intentions of the Montgomery Army Group seem to be unchanged.

The British 2nd Army will attempt to force a breakthrough in the general direction of Falaise, thus preparing for a thrust on Paris.

The 1st American Army will endeavour to gain its first target, which is the extension of the land base as far as the line Domfront - Avranches.

We have no further reliable information as to the aim or the time of starting of the attack by the 1st American Army Group. With enemy forces being continually transferred to the Normandy front it is unlikely that there will be further landing operations at points very far distant from there, but the 15th Army sector from the north of the Somme to the Seine is still in great danger.

The more territory Montgomery gains to the south of the bridgehead, and the quicker he wins it, the less likelihood there is of the forces still in England effecting a new landing at another point. It is much more probable that in this case the British and Americans will feed all the reserves available into the bridgehead, and any fresh landings will probably only be affected by air landing troops south of the present bridgehead, so that they could then use their air landings on an operative basis.

/Army



Army Group B will continue the endeavour to prevent a further breakthrough. Some of the pressure at the battle front has been slightly eased by the appearance of the 326th and 363rd Divisions and the 116th Panzer Division, and now mobile forces can be released.

## II Situation at sea

Enemy destroyers and motor torpedo boats have been guarding the sea area off the landing beaches, and thus prevented our motor boats from attacking the landing fleets. Enemy naval forces are bombarding land targets in Normandy.

Supply traffic very active, coming from the recognised supply bases, Thames estuary, Portsmouth, Weymouth, Plymouth area, Bristol Channel, each sending one convoy daily to the bridgehead. Small convoys are arriving daily (L.C.T.)

The closing to French fishing fleets of the sea area Cap de la Hague - Alderney - St. Peter Port (Guernsey) to the south as far as the Breton coast, as reported on July 23, 1944, suggests enemy action to forestall the sending of supplies to the Channel Islands. There is a possibility of leapfrog landings on the west coast of Cotentin.

There have been numerous small sea battles between our protective naval forces and enemy motor boat fleets off the coast between Dunkirk and Le Havre.

Most closely watched sea area around Brittany is off Brest.

Enemy mining activity continues to be slight.

## III Situation in the air

The enemy air forces were hindered by bad weather conditions, especially in the second half of the week.

Fighter and fighter-bomber formations gave strong support to the ground troops, covered the battle area, and attacked our troop movements in the rear areas. Fighter-bomber attacks against transport targets and airfields were carried as far afield as Brussels, Orleans and Nantes. Medium bomber formations turned their attention mainly against railway installations. They also attacked the Seine crossings and airfields.

Heavy bomber formations concentrated mainly on traffic centres north-east of Paris (Vaires Meaux, Laon, Tergnier, Ham, Chaulnes) and in the northern France - Belgium area (Maubeuge, Courtrai, Ghent, Alost) and also buildings and installations in V1 launching sites and Luftwaffe ground organisations. About 2,200 heavy bombers were used to support the attack from the Orne bridgehead.

There has been complete air reconnaissance on the invasion front. Special points for this were Lille, St. Omer, both sides of the Somme, the Channel Islands, and the coasts of Brittany. Reconnaissance in depth against rail, road and sea traffic as far as Antwerp, Troyes and Angers.

## IV Internal situation

### Behaviour and attitude of the civilian population.

Unchanged - quiet and expectant.

Sabotage activity and Resistance organisation: slight local decline in sabotage activities. We can expect further extension of the resistance organisations, especially in Belgium and north France, and in southern Brittany.

/In

In Holland there have been further attacks on Dutch official buildings (including post offices) in the hope of obtaining rationed goods and stealing large sums of money.

Belgium and north France: increase in airborne supplies to secret agents (especially around St.Omer). On July 22, terrorists attacked the French national bank at Abbeville, stealing 39 million francs.

In Normandy sabotage to cables, and small mines have been laid in the supply roads. In Brittany, the slight easing up of sabotage activities is, according to captured documents, a result of orders from the headquarters of the whole Resistance movement. Many supplies have been dropped in southern Brittany, so that in spite of present conditions, we can expect the arming and equipping of the Resistance movement to continue, and they will probably go over to a coordinated offensive. 88 terrorists have been shot and 65 taken prisoner.

V In detail:

Northern Military District:

A (a) No change.

(b) (1) 1291 positions ready for operation, 53 of them concreted.

(2) 71% completed, 3% concreted.

(3) July 14-20, 3 positions made ready for operation, 13 positions concreted.

(4) About 15,900 fortress type, and about 36,000 field type under construction.

(c) On the land front digging in and the construction of obstacles continues.

B None.

C (1) (a) 10 (5). (b) 7 (2). (c) 0 (0).

(d) (aa) 2 (0). (bb) 0 (0). (dd) 2 (0).

(2) (a) 0 (0). (b) 0 (2). (c) 0 (0). (d) 0 (0). (e) 10 (0).

(f) 50 (1).

(3) (c) 1 freighter with cargo slightly damaged, 4 locomotives put out of action, 2 buses and 1 lorry badly damaged.

(4) (a) 42. (b) 4.

D (1) No change.

(2) (e) 2. (g) 6 raids on Dutch public buildings and police.

15th Army H.Q.

A (a) Defence forces have been further weakened by the withdrawal of the 363rd Infantry Division and the 166th Panzer Division.

(b) (1) 2 anti-tank guns, 2 light gun positions, 1 pillbox. Shelters for personnel, munitions, supplies, horses, tanks, equipment and decontamination. Positions for light guns, anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, mortars, machine guns, single-seater fighters, anti-tank mines and flame throwers, observation posts. Wiring and mining of foreshore obstacles, laying of minefields.

- (2) Roughly 72.
- (3) Shortage of building and obstacle materials (especially cement, wood, wire, mines and grenades), transport means, fuel, and labour.
- (4) (a) 20,445.
- (b) 18,792 and 22 prisoners of war.
- (c) Completed

Positions for infantry and anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, cannon, mortars, close range anti-tank weapons and smoke mortars. Air raid shelters for arms stores, munitions, horses, supplies, kitchen staffs and personnel. Battle headquarters and tree shelter positions. Slit trenches, observation posts, dummy minefields, continued mining of the land at Le Havre, 1024 anti-tank mines, and 60 Teller mines have been laid. Air landing posts, and bringing up of mines and grenades.

B 3.

C (1) (a) 72 (53). (b) 31 (16).

(c) Bomber formations: Bruges, Ghent, Antwerp, Brussels, Maubeuge, St. Quentin, Laon, Le Treport, Abbeville, St. Omer, Bethune, Albert, Montdidier, Neufchatel, St. Valery en Caux.

Reconnaissance: Scheldt estuary, Brussels, Charleroi, St. Quentin, Soissons, Noyon, Amiens, Dieppe.

Fighters and fighter-bombers: Scheldt estuary, Antwerp, Brussels, Charleroi, Charleville, Laon, Soissons, Rouen, Fecamp.

(d) (aa) 16 (6). (bb) 23 (23). (cc) 50 (24). (dd) 10 (12).  
(ee) 4 (4) other targets.

(2) (a) 67 (39). (b) 143 (30). (c) 2 (10). (d) 1 (1).  
(e) 26 (13). (f) 71 (10).

Also many losses in (e) and (f) without the exact figures known.

(3) (a) Destroyed: 1 searchlight, 2 radar installations (Würzburg Riese) 1 munitions shelter (empty), 2 anti-aircraft batteries silenced.

Damaged: 1 four-barrelled gun (2 cm.), 5 empty huts, 1 sound location equipment, armoury, 1 hospital, railway lines, electricity and telephone cables. 1 shelter badly damaged (radar installation - Nordpol), roof collapsed in several places, and a large number of instruments shattered.

(b) Badly damaged: 7

Moderately damaged: 2

Slightly damaged: 5

/(c)

(c) Destroyed: 1 goods railway station, 3 industrial buildings, 3 locomotives (plus some more without exact figures being known), 59 railway trucks (plus some more, exact number not known), 2 lorries, 1 dam.  
1 canal lock (Oise - Aisne canal) unserviceable.

Damaged: 10 industrial buildings, 4 railway bridges, 25 locomotives, 25 railway trucks, (plus many more, the exact numbers not known), railway tracks (very badly in parts), 7 lorries, telephone cable, 1 sound detector, and 1 railway anti-aircraft gun.

(d) (Mons en Chaussee, Poix-Nord),

(e) Destroyed: 2 aircraft.

Damaged: 1 aircraft, 2 runways, 1 tarmac, 1 set boundary lighting, hangars, telephone and electricity cables.

(f) Destroyed: 2 lorries.  
Courtrai 25% destroyed, centre of Rouen badly damaged, civilian losses high.

(4) (a) 18 (49). July 9-15, 1944. (b) 21 (31) July 8-14, 1944.

D (2) (a) 5. (b) 7.

#### Panzer Group West

Main defence line, field type, built along the whole front.

#### 7th Army H.Q.

- A (a) The defence of Brittany has been further weakened by the removal of the 275th Infantry Division.
- (b) Available materials all used up. Coastal barriers have been strengthened by the erection of 484 cbm. of steel reinforced concrete. No more supplies possible at the moment.

July 21, 1944

My Fuehrer !

I forward herewith a report from Fieldmarshal Rommel, which he gave to me before his accident, and which he has already discussed with me.

I have now been here for about 14 days, and after long discussions with the responsible commanders on the various fronts, especially the SS leaders, I have come to the conclusion that the Fieldmarshal was unfortunately right. Especially my conference yesterday with the commanders of the units at Caen, held just after the last heavy battle, forced me to the conclusion that in our present position - considering the material at our disposal - there is absolutely no way in which we could do battle with the all-powerful enemy air forces, to counter their present destructive activities, without being forced to surrender territory. Whole armoured units which had been sent into the counter-attack, were attacked by terrific numbers of aircraft dropping carpets of bombs, so that they emerged from the churned-up earth with the greatest of difficulty, sometimes only with the aid of tractors. And so they were really too late when they arrived.

/The

The psychological effect on the fighting forces, especially the infantry, of such a mass of bombs, raining down on them with all the force of elemental nature, is a factor which must be given serious consideration. It is not in the least important whether such a carpet of bombs is dropped on good or bad troops. They are more or less annihilated by it, and above all their equipment is ruined. It only needs this to happen a few times and the power of resistance of these troops is put to the severest test. It becomes paralyzed, dies; what is left is not equal to the demands of the situation. Consequently the troops have the impression that they are battling against an enemy who carries all before him. This must make itself evident to an increasing extent.

I came here with the fixed intention of making effective your order to make a stand at any price. But when one sees that this price must be paid by the slow but sure destruction of our troops - I am thinking of the Hitler Youth Division, which has earned the highest praise - when one sees that the reinforcements and replacements sent to all areas are nearly always hopelessly inadequate, and that the armaments, especially artillery and anti-tank guns and the ammunition for them, are not nearly sufficient for the soldiers' needs, so that the main weapon in the defensive battle is the good spirits of our brave men, then the anxiety about the immediate future on this front is only too well justified.

I am able to report that the front has been held intact until now, due to the glorious bravery of our troops, and the determination of all the commanders, especially the junior ones, although land has been lost daily.

However, in spite of all endeavours, the moment is fast approaching when this overtaxed front line is bound to break up. And when the enemy once reaches the open country a properly coordinated command will be almost impossible, because of the insufficient mobility of our troops. I consider it is my duty as the responsible commander on this front, to bring these developments to your notice in good time, my Fuehrer.

My last words at the Staff Conference south of Caen were:

"We must hold our ground, and if nothing happens to improve conditions, then we must die an honourable death on the battlefield".

(signed) von Kluge, Fieldmarshal

Analysis of the situation, July 15, 1944

The position on the Normandy front is becoming daily increasingly difficult, and is rapidly approaching its crisis.

Owing to the fierceness of the fighting, the enormous amount of material in the enemy's possession, especially their artillery and armour, and the undisputed mastery of the air obtained by the enemy air forces, our losses are so great that the battle potential of our divisions is rapidly deteriorating. Reinforcements from home come in very small quantities, and take weeks in arriving because of the bad transport situation. We have lost about 97,000 men, including 2,360 officers - which means an average loss of 2,500 to 3,000 men per day - and we have received up till now 10,000 men as replacements, of which about 6,000 have already been sent to the front.

Also the losses in supplies for the troops have been extraordinarily high, and it has not been possible to provide more than very meagre replacements, as for example 17 tanks up till now to replace about 225.

/The

The divisions which have been newly brought in are not used to battle conditions and with their small consignments of artillery, anti-tank weapons, and means of engaging tanks in close combat they are not able to offer effective resistance to enemy large-scale attacks for any length of time, after being subjected to concentrated artillery fire and heavy air raids for hours on end. It has been proved in the fighting that even the bravest unit is gradually shattered by the well-equipped enemy, and loses men, weapons and territory.

The destruction of the railway network, and the great danger of enemy air attacks on all the roads and paths for 150 kilometres behind the front has made the supply position so difficult that only the absolutely essential things could be brought up, and above all artillery and mortar ammunition was at a premium. These conditions are not likely to improve, as convoy vehicles are decreasing as a result of enemy action, and with the enemy capturing many airfields in the bridgehead it can be expected that their air activities will increase.

No forces worth mentioning can be brought in to the Normandy front without weakening the 15th Army on the English Channel, or the Mediterranean front in southern France. The 7th Army front alone requires most urgently 2 fresh divisions, as the forces there are tired out.

The enemy are daily providing new forces and masses of materials for the front; the enemy supply lanes are not challenged by the Luftwaffe and enemy pressure is continually increasing.

In these circumstances it must be expected that the enemy will shortly be able to break through our thinly-held front, especially in the 7th Army sector, and push far into France. I should like to draw attention to the attached reports from the 7th Army and II Parachute Corps. Apart from local reserves of Panzer Group West, which are about to be sent to the Panzer Group's sector, and which in the face of the enemy air forces can only march during the night, there are no mobile reserves at all at our disposal to counter any breakthrough on the 7th Army front. Our own air force has hardly entered the battle at all as yet.

Our troops are fighting heroically, but even so the end of this unequal battle is in sight. In my view we should learn a lesson from this situation. I feel it is my duty as C.in C. of the Army Group to point this matter out.

(signed) Rommel

## Appendix

- (1) G.O.C. 7th Army reports orally on July 14:

"Our strength has sunk to such a low level that the local commanders can no longer guarantee their holding out against enemy large-scale attacks. Battle group of II Parachute Corps reports in addition that of the 1,000 men given to the 6th Parachute Regiment, 800 have become casualties within a very short time. The main reason for this was their lack of experience. Troops must first be trained by experienced soldiers behind the lines. However, the present conditions cannot be altered just yet, as we have no more reserves".

- (2) Report from 7th Army H.Q. dated July 15, on losses in personnel amongst the units under the command of G.H.Q. II Parachute Corps:

"3rd Parachute Division up till July 12	4,064 men
Battle group 353rd Infantry Division (2 battalions)	
till July 12	485 men
" " 266th " " (3 battalions)	
till July 12	316 men
" " 343rd " " (1 battalion)	
till July 12	184 men

Since the battle strength of the units is sinking noticeably every day, as a result of the superior equipment of the enemy and their uninterrupted artillery fire, even the best troops are no longer in a condition to beat off for any length of time any attempts at a breakthrough".

- (3) I should like to call your attention to the radio message from the battle group of II Parachute Corps on July 12 which was heard by C. in C. West.

To Armed Forces High Command

In addition to my report to the Fuehrer on July 21, I enclose the following summary of the situation by G.O.C. 7th Army, SS General Hausser.

I wish to add the following to the measures suggested at the end of it.

- to (1) Panzer Training Division to be distributed amongst the 363rd Division, which is coming up to the front, and placed under the command of the Army.

Length of time: 14 days.

2nd Panzer Division on the Army boundary to be distributed amongst the 326th Division. It cannot yet be decided whether they can be sent to the 7th Army or to the area of concentrated fighting around Caen.

- to (2) According to a message from Army G.H.Q. this will be impossible at the moment.

- to (3) The 7th, 8th and 9th Mortar Brigades are stationed at the centre of the present bitter fighting around Caen. Additional heavy artillery cannot at present be brought up, as the 14th Artillery Brigade amongst other units is being diverted to the east.

- to (4) Replacements of equipment are desired, although we cannot expect the amount required.

- to (5) We are attempting to engage the enemy, but with the enemy air superiority at the vital points on the front this has not yet been possible.

(signed) von Kluge, Fieldmarshal

Review of the situation, July 19, 1944

The enemy were unsuccessful in their attempt to force an operational breakthrough during the 2½ weeks of continuous fighting in western Normandy. They did however manage to achieve many local penetrations and to surround isolated pockets of our troops, which meant that our line had to be gradually withdrawn, and we were forced to surrender St.Lo.

The general course of the front line is not favourable, as the left wing is considerably in advance of the rest. The countryside helps our troops only in the northern sector.

Up till now we have found 13 to 14 enemy divisions, of which 2 are armoured divisions. Of these, 6 infantry and 2 armoured divisions are being used at the point of concentration of the attack, as are also several armoured units and very heavy land artillery. As the enemy are only just starting their operations on the mainland, they have not yet marked out any boundaries for the bringing up of further supplies and

/reinforcements.

reinforcements. The enemy have sufficient forces in the Normandy theatre of operations to launch another large-scale attack very soon.

We have discovered that the enemy are regrouping on the northern front, and are moving their artillery to the south-east, bringing up more divisions (5 infantry divisions and 4 armoured divisions), and also they have started their attacks again on the transport routes behind our lines. There are further signs in their rear that they are preparing soon to begin a new attack to the south and south-west, concentrated on both sides of the Vire and Taute. Enemy attacks on both sides of the boundary of Panzer Group West will probably be continued.

We must also be prepared for a new onslaught with airborne landings, possibly combined with sea landings.

Our own troops are being hard pressed as a result of the heavy losses incurred in the defensive fighting. The battle potential of the infantry is being especially undermined by the artillery and mortar fire, which the enemy is putting up in hitherto unknown quantity, using a tremendous amount of ammunition (20:1), even for small reconnaissance raids, and for the large attacks this is increased to a 30 hour long pounding. Thus in prolonged fighting the potential of the infantry drops from that of a regiment to that of a company. Because of the losses incurred in the previous fighting, the infantry at the front line has become so depleted in many places that after similar artillery preparations, the enemy are bound to break through our lines. The defensive actions and counter-attacks which would then be necessary would quickly use up all the weak reserves in the divisions and corps. The Army's reserves at the moment consist of 3 battalions of the 275th Infantry Division.

The heavy artillery bombardments have led to a great loss in arms and equipment, which has been especially noticeable in radio equipment, artillery, cannon and machine guns.

The effect on the morale of facing an enemy equipped with such superior weapons is especially bad when the commanders are killed and the units become mixed up in the desperate attempts to close up the gaps.

The use of the newly brought in battle group of the 275th Infantry Division and the 5th Parachute Division, cannot do much to help the difficulties of the 7th Army. These troops have had absolutely no training in field work or as a unit. Apart from the commanders themselves there are no experienced leaders or staffs in two regiments of the 5th Parachute Division. If they were to be used immediately in the danger areas, there would immediately be a crisis, and extremely heavy losses.

As a result of the increased interruptions on the railway lines and the insufficient motorised transport, the present impossible supply situation will only be improved if several munitions and fuel convoys can arrive. If the supply convoys cannot come, then we can expect the supply situation to deteriorate.

To strengthen the defence the Army should put the units and formations in order as far as the situation allows, and regroup the artillery at the danger points.

The following measures are absolutely essential:

- (1) Bringing up as an army reserve a mobile formation, completely ready for battle, to be used west of the Vire or to safeguard the boundary with Panzer Group West, (possibly also as defence against airborne or sea landings).

/(2)



- (2) The continual bringing up of reinforcements. At least 2 infantry battalions should be brought up every month, to reinforce each division, otherwise even the weak forces we have had at our disposal up till now cannot be maintained.
- (3) The strengthening of our front by the introduction of 1 to 2 mortar brigades, more heavy artillery, and replacing the cannon, trench mortars and machine guns which have been rendered useless.
- (4) Increased supplies of munitions and fuel should be ensured to be brought in express trains, and the supply lines should be guarded by fighters and anti-aircraft guns, especially at the Loire bridges, which are a vital artery for the Army.
- (5) Combating the particularly heavy artillery fire, and the raids by bombers and fighter bombers, by sorties of our own fighters, so that the attack on the morale of our troops can be effectively eased, if only for a time.

(signed) Hausser

WEEKLY REPORT, JULY 24 - 30, 1944

I Estimate of the situation as a whole.

The week was characterised by the large-scale attack by the 1st American Army, which was probably reinforced by units of the 3rd American Army (see below).

On July 25 and 26, 2 Canadian infantry divisions with 1 armoured brigade attempted to force a breakthrough along a 7 km. front in the sector of Panzer Group West between Bourguebus and the Orne. I SS Panzer Corps, after hard fighting and counter-attacks, successfully beat off the attack, and the enemy halted in the face of the infantry of Panzer Group West; the artillery fire continued in intensity. The introduction of fresh infantry and tanks has been noticed daily in the area south of Caen.

On July 30 the enemy attacked on the western wing of Panzer Group West, and forced a bridgehead 5 km. deep and 8 km. wide. The battle in the area south of Caumont is continuing.

The expected enemy attack on the 7th Army began on July 24. Following an artillery barrage and carpet bombing of unprecedented intensity the enemy succeeded, after a day's heavy fighting, in breaking through the front between the Vire and the sea. Our losses in men and materials were so high because of the enemy's superiority in artillery and the air that it was not possible to build up a new defence front quickly. Although we managed to stop the enemy large-scale attack between the Army boundary and Percy, the position between the St. Hilaire - Percy line and the sea is still not clear, and strong enemy forces are being brought into the gap.

The enemy will continue their push to the south, and also intend to attack on a broad front in the Panzer Group West sector.

During the period June 6 - July 30, units of our army and the SS destroyed 2,395 enemy tanks and 402 aircraft.

Our own losses for the period June 6 - July 27 were:

3,017 officers (including 11 generals, 8 general staff officers,  
and 180 C.Os.)

120,424 NCOs and men

3,806 Russians

Total 127,247

Since June 6 14,594 men have been brought in as replacements.

#### Enemy strengths and operational intentions

It still seems improbable that the enemy will attempt a further landing on the west coast of Europe. A further American-Canadian High Command has been transferred to Normandy, and probably 2 army groups have been formed. Now that Cherbourg is being used more and more, we can expect them to bring in extra forces to a greater extent.

The enemy now have about 45 divisions and strong forces of G.H.Q. troops in the landing area. They could bring in at least 35 divisions of the 45 in Great Britain, and they will probably transfer more troops from the U.S.A.

The British and American forces will first attempt to extend their land base further south, and if this breakthrough is successful they will turn the mass of their troops against Paris. In addition the Americans will strive to cut off Brittany from the land.

A large-scale landing by airborne troops south of the present bridgehead can be expected to ensure the success of the new operations.

Army Group B will attempt to prevent a breakthrough even though it means the reckless exposure of the lines hitherto not attacked. However, the lack of tanks and other fast moving units is telling against the highly mobile enemy.

#### II Situation at sea.

Enemy destroyers, gunboats and fleets of speedboats are keeping a close watch on the sea areas off the landing area.

The enemy are keeping their bridgehead continually supplied. Convoys sailing in and out of Cherbourg were noticed for the first time on July 26. A small amount of unloading activity has apparently begun at the large and small harbours. There is still no shipping in the inner harbour, according to our air reconnaissance.

We are still able to bring small amounts of supplies to the Channel Islands as planned. On July 28/29 a convoy was intercepted by strong formations of fighter bombers between St.Malo and Jersey.

There has been only slight speedboat and air activity off the Dutch coast.

There is armed enemy air reconnaissance in the sea area between Calais and Belle Ile whenever the weather permits. Our escort vessels have had several encounters with enemy motor torpedo boats in the sea area between Fecamp and Le Havre.

There have been numerous fighter-bomber attacks on our escort vessels between Ostend and Le Havre.

The enemy sea control off Brittany is as usual centred on Brest. Little enemy mining activity.

#### III Situation in the air.

Most of the enemy air forces in the battle area were employed in the support of the ground troops west of the Vire. (They were using 1,500 4-engined and 400 twin-engined aircraft, and also about 3,000 fighters and fighter-bombers on the second day of the attack).

Apart from that there have been continual heavy attacks on transport targets and the telephone systems.

/Strong

Strong forces of enemy fighters and fighter-bombers supported their ground troops, and prevented our air force from reaching the battle area. They also raided targets as far as Rheims, Orleans, transport in the Loire estuary, Seine crossings, and airfields.

Medium bomber formations attacked for the most part railway installations, especially in the area enclosing Paris, Chartres, Argentan and Lisieux. Heavy forces made a raid on the bridges near Tours.

For 2 days heavy bomber formations dropped bombs in quantities previously unknown on the main defence line and the area immediately behind the line west of St.Lo. Before the offensive began west of the Vire there were heavy raids on the airfields of Athies, Juvincourt, Creil, Beaumont, (all north-east of Paris).

There has been complete reconnaissance in the battle area and to the rear of it, as far as the weather would permit. Pyrotechnic devices were again used to guard the Seine crossings at night. Heaviest concentration north of the Seine in the area Nieuport - Le Treport - Amiens - St. Pol - Lille.

#### IV Internal situation

Attitude of the civilian population is expectant; enemy successes sometimes openly acclaimed.

Sabotage activity and Resistance organisations; another increase in sabotage activities. The activities of the Resistance organisations are becoming more military in character, especially in Brittany.

There have been further raids on municipal and postal buildings in Holland, increased sabotage activity in Belgium and France; in Normandy more sabotage and attacks, and in Brittany, further attacks on army vehicles. Having abandoned their temporary armed peace, the Resistance organisations have gone over to miniature warfare. The methods of carrying out raids and the safeguarding of the Maquis camps with minefields suggest that they have military leadership. Continued supplying by air leads us to believe that the Resistance movement will increase its activities. 71 terrorists have been shot, and 51 taken prisoner.

#### V In Detail:

##### Northern Military District

##### A (a) Unchanged

(b) (1) 1321 positions ready for use, 33 concreted.

(2) 73% completed, 2% also concreted.

(3) July 21-27, 30 positions ready for use, 10 positions concreted.

(4) No change.

(c) Ground obstacles in the land front have been laid.

##### B None.

C (1) (a) 2 (10). (b) 12 (7). (c) 0 (0). (d) (aa) 0 (2). (bb) 0 (0).  
(cc) 10 (8). (dd) 2 (2).

(2) (a) 0 (0). (b) 0 (0). (c) 0 (0). (e) 4 (10). (f) 12 (50).

(3) (c) 2 ships, 7 locomotives damaged.

/ (f)

(f) Main transformer of Huitzen transmitter burnt out, transmitter out of action.

(4) (a) 1. (b) 10.

D (1) Negative.

(2) (a) 1. (b) 2. (c) 0. (d) 0. (e) 0. (f) 1.

15th Army H.Q.

A (a) Defensive dispositions greatly weakened by the withdrawal of the 84th and 331st Infantry Divisions.

(b) Completed: positions for 2 cannon, 2 tank guns, 1 anti-tank gun, 9 light guns, 1 pillbox, 1 battle headquarters, 1 command headquarters, 1 double machine gun casemate, 1 triple embrasure tower, 2 fire control positions.

Constructed: Positions for light guns, tank guns, mortars, flame-throwers, tank mines, searchlights, observation posts, air raid shelters for men and munitions, dummy installations. More beach obstacles have been completed.

(2) about 80%.

(3) According to plan.

Main shortages are cement, building materials, mines, and above all, fuel.

(4) (a) 17,538

(b) 23,796 and 22 prisoners of war.

(c) Completed: positions for guns, tank guns, mortars, machine guns, air raid shelters for men and munitions, observation posts. The building of obstacles for airborne landings is continuing, 1024 anti-tank mines and 60 Teller mines have been laid, and there is mining at the fortress of Le Havre. Construction is slowed down because of shortages as under (b)(3).

C (1) (a) 66 (72).. (b) 60 (31).

(c) Bomber formations: Gravelines - Gent - Brussels - Valenciennes - Cambrai - Arras - Aire - Abbeville - Amiens - Laon - Chauny - Chateau Thierry - Creil - Dieppe.

Reconnaissance: St. Pol - Amiens - Le Treport - Lille - Nieuport.

Fighters and fighter-bombers: Terneuzen - Macheln - Huy - Charleroi - Rathel - Gisors - Cap d'Antifer.

(d) (aa) 8 (16). (bb) 18 (23). (cc) 76 (50). (dd) 11 (10).

(ee) 13 (4) = other targets.

(2) (a) 50 (67). (b) 71 (143). (c) 3 (2). (d) - (1). (e) 21 (26).

(f) 28 (71).

(3) (a) Destroyed: 1 barrack hut, 1 accommodation building, 1 ammunition store, 1 machine gun, 1 cannon. Also in attacks on Luftwaffe fuel stores: an oil and grease distribution centre burnt out, 2 barrack huts destroyed, 3,000 litres Otto fuel and tank wood burnt up.

Damaged: 1 anti-aircraft position, 2 cannon.

(b) Destroyed: 2.

Badly damaged: 4.

Moderately damaged: 4.

Slight damage: 2.

(c) Destroyed: 1 railway installation, 27 locomotives, 92 trucks (of which 45 were blown up with ammunition), 25 lorries, 1 coal crane, 2 cannon (2 cm.), 1 street bridge, 1 ship.

Damaged: 15 industrial buildings, 1 railway bridge, 1 water tower, 20 locomotives, 80 trucks, 1 crane, 3 lorries, 1 omnibus, 2 ships, 2 lorries blown up by mines.

(d) Athies.

(e) Destroyed: 2 berths, 1 airport building, 1 air control centre, 1 direction finder, 500 rounds 8.8 ammunition.

Damaged: 7 airfields, 9 runways, 4 tarmacs, 1 airfield building, 1 set boundary lighting, 1 tarmac road, pipes.

(f) Destroyed: 50 houses.

Damaged: 3 industrial installations.

(4) (a) 32 (July 16-22, 1944) (18).

(b) 37 (July 15-21, 1944) (21).

D (2) (a) 4. (b) 3.

#### Panzer Group West:

Defence greatly weakened since the 2nd and 116th Panzer Divisions were removed.

#### 7th Army H.Q.

Brittany: Defence greatly weakened by the removal of the remains of the 5th Parachute Division. Field and fortress building on the coast continued. Lack of cement and concrete continues to hamper building.

### WEEKLY REPORT, JULY 31 - AUGUST 7, 1944

#### Estimate of the situation

In the landing area the enemy have already at least 46 divisions and strong forces of H.Q. troops; in addition they could bring another 35 divisions in from Great Britain, and more from the U.S.A. We judge from the amount of transport being sent across the Channel that they are probably bringing 4 divisions across each week.

It still appears that the enemy intend to make a push for Paris. To this end the British forces are attempting to win area around Falaise, and the American troops are trying to cut off the 7th Army in the Normandy area and occupy the Le Mans sector.

/The

The British also intend to continue their attempts at a breakthrough at the Vire, although the concentration of forces east of the Orne and other reports lead us to believe that they will attack from this area from the north to the south, with the idea of encircling us.

Parts of the American forces are intended to seal off Brittany and occupy the province.

The extending of the enemy operations and the forces involved in such an action make it seem unlikely that they will attempt a second big landing operation on the west coast of Europe, although they may try to land airborne troops behind our lines to open up the road to Paris.

In more than 2 months of fighting the 5th Panzer Army and the 7th Army opposing a vastly superior enemy have caused the failure of his first operational plan. Only now has the enemy succeeded in capturing Cotentin, thus coming nearer to his first targets on the western side: the line Domfront - Avranches, cutting off Brittany.

All units available have been sent from Army Group B to the front line, and the armoured units have been assembled on the western flank of the 7th Army, so that with the east-to-west push to Avranches they could cut off the enemy in Cotentin, thus making impossible further operations to the south.

The shortage of armoured and fast moving units compared with the highly mobile enemy forces is still serious. Because of the enemy superiority in materials, especially in the air our losses have been high, although units of the army and the SS have shot up 2,799 enemy tanks and 450 aircraft since June 6.

From June 6 to August 6 our losses have been:

3,219 officers (including 14 generals, 9 staff officers, 201 C.Os.)
141,046 other ranks
3,810 Russians
<u>Total 148,075</u>

Replacements arrived:	19,914 men
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On the way:	<u>16,457 men</u>
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	<u>36,371 men</u>
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To C.-in-C. West,

August 7, 1944

Below is submitted an extract from a report from 7th Army H.Q. submitted at 0350 hours on August 7. According to a telephone report from 7th Army H.Q. received at 1130 hours on August 7, SS General Hausser has given spoken approval to this draft.

"Part II:

State of the troops in the rear zone:

As a result of a breakthrough by enemy tanks at the left end of the front, most of the divisions (77th, 91st, 275th, units of the 265th, units of the 353rd, 5th Parachute, 2nd SS Panzer, and 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Divisions) which have been fighting all the time from the start of the invasion without any rest and with few supplies reaching them, are all split up into small groups. They have fought their way separately back through the enemy lines.

/Groups

Groups of men, mostly without officers or N.C.Os with them, are wandering aimlessly through the countryside in a general easterly or south-easterly direction, some following express instructions to rally there, and some following wild report of their orders. They are mostly heading for Bagnoles and Le Mans.

Most of these straggling groups are in a very bad condition. They are bringing only a part of their arms with them (only guns, revolvers and Tommy guns). Motorised and cavalry units still have a few machine guns and heavy infantry weapons, although most of them are in need of repair. Their clothing is in a terrible state. Many are without headgear and belt, and have worn out their boots. Many are going barefooted. Where they cannot obtain food from supply stores they are living off the country with no respect for property, and the hatred of the civil population and the terrorist activities are thus intensified. The terrorists have wiped out a considerable number of them. The parachute troops are especially unpopular with the people.

The morale of these straggling forces is badly shaken. The enemy command of the air has contributed largely to this, as it makes it impossible to steer a straight course by day in the difficult countryside. In addition there is the enemy superiority in tanks and heavy weapons of all kinds, and his greater supplies of ammunition. The troops have had no proper rations for weeks. There is no radio apparatus available. Newspapers never reach the men, although the enemy produces almost daily "News for the troops" ("Nachrichten fuer die Truppe"), which is cleverly written, and is being dropped in great numbers from enemy aircraft. Such a state of affairs cannot be endured by even the best troops for any length of time without having an unfortunate effect. In addition, rumours are being circulated by enemy agents: the second attempt to murder the Fuehrer and Himmler has been successful - the Russians have entered Germany - it is useless to continue the war, you have already lost it - why not go home and not sacrifice your life at the last minute for a lost cause.

It must be stated that the greater part of the stragglers are trying to return to their former division. The rounding-up staff of the Army H.Q. has been set up to collect all the stragglers and maintain discipline in the rear areas. To this staff have been assigned a battle and a transport commander. The following have been placed at their disposal: a fortification engineers commander with road repair squads, army and combined forces patrols, military police forces, special duty patrols from the Army H.Q. and at the moment 2 mobile field courts martial, and another is to be added later. All stragglers are to be held up at a special line, collected in reception camps, and formed into replacement units to be sent immediately back to the front line."

G.H.Q., Army Group B.

To Chief of OKW Operations Staff,  
for information of C.-in-C. West

August 10, 1944

The American forces have broken into the southern flank of the Army Group with 1 armoured division, 3 motorised infantry divisions, and two smaller motorised cavalry detachments, and have now captured the area from Le Mans to the east. Now they have obviously turned across the line Mayenne - Beaumont - Bonnetable - La Ferte Bernard to the north.

It seems therefore that they are working in cooperation with the British who are expected to continue their push on Falaise, and thus close in on the 5th Panzer Army and the 7th Army from two sides. The use of fighter-bombers and bombers is significant, and they are dropping carpets of bombs in advance of the enemy spearheads in the Beaumont and Bonnetable areas.

The units of the 9th Armoured Division which are at present fighting under G.H.Q. LXXXI Army Corps, and other scattered units are not able to offer protection for the south flank or to keep open the Alençon - Flers road, which is vital for bringing supplies.

It should therefore be considered whether a short and sharp tank attack would not destroy these enemy spearheads which are advancing northwards, and thus ensure the basis for the successful continuation of the battle, and pave the way for the decisive attack. However, these armoured formations could only be transferred from the Mortain district for a short time, and would have to be under the command of General Eberbach for their task, which would be limited in duration, and restricted to a certain area.

The attack on Avranches could not take place until August 20, because of the weather, which is favourable for the enemy, and the length of time it would take to bring up the troops. Therefore this thrust to the south would not postpone any other operations. I request a decision.

(signed) von Kluge

August 11, 1944

Telephone conversation between Chief of General Staff C.-in-C. West and Chief of General Staff of Army Group:

Chief of General Staff C.-in-C. West reports that according to a message from Chief of OKW Operations Staff about the situation report, dated August 10, which went through Army Group, the Fuehrer requests immediate replies to the following questions:

- (1) Why cannot the attack by the Eberbach Group start before August 20?
- (2) What is your opinion of the attack from the present front of the XXXXVII Panzer Corps, thrusting in the old direction, bearing in mind the enemy's position?
- (3) When, with what forces, and from which area could an attack towards Le Mans be made?
- (4) When could the 11th Panzer Division with battle headquarters reach Tours, to attack Le Mans from there?
- (5) If the attack towards Avranches cannot be effected before August 20 then an attack on the XV American Corps must be started earlier.

As exact data are required for a decision of such importance, an answer should arrive tonight.

In reply to questions concerning conduct of attack:

To question (1)

Because according to Paragraph 3 of the Fuehrer's order all formations to be freed cannot be ready until August 20.

The 331st Infantry Division which has arrived from the 15th Army cannot be used in the attack because it is vitally needed in the north (363rd Infantry Division is almost totally annihilated).

The 85th Infantry Division in the area north of Falaise must remain where it is (89th Infantry Division has been more or less destroyed, and the 12th SS Panzer Division "Hitler Youth" suffered heavy losses in the last attack).

/The



The other divisions which will also be sent into the attack cannot arrive at the attack assembly point at Domfront before August 20.

The battle group of the 6th Parachute Division (only 1 reinforced regiment) had to be sent to the area south of Alencon (forward units arrive early on August 11) because the situation there threatens to be dangerous. This is in accordance with the Fuehrer's order Paragraph 6b.

To question (2)

I have just had a conference with General Eberbach, who was in the battle area until 24 hours ago, and he states that such an attack would not have much chance of success.

Because: (a) The enemy on this front has been reinforced.

(b) There would be no element of surprise.

(c) Our battle strengths and the number of tanks would need to be considered increased because with the troops and materials already there, no attack could be made. They also need considerable supplies of fuel and artillery ammunition and this could not be done in a few days.

(d) In face of the enemy air superiority, we could only hope to launch a large-scale night attack. This could only be done if the weather were to change, and that cannot be expected in the immediate future. There is no moon, and that increases the difficulty of attacking and moving by night.

Our judgment of the fighting capacity of the troops does not coincide with that of General Hausser. I will find a solution to this vital question today after a personal discussion.

To question (3)

With the Panzer Division so weak in men and equipment, we would need to bring at least 2 of the best divisions from the Alencon area. The disposition of forces is dependent on the developments of the situation, which cannot yet be foreseen.

Advance during the night of August 11/12. They should break through on August 13, 14 and 15. (As far as possible the battle should be fought during the day, although even then the enemy air superiority is undisputed - see report on carpet bombing dated August 10). These are the most optimistic calculations, and are based on the assumption that the enemy have no more troops available apart from those already brought in.

Owing to the shortage of tanks, the Panther Detachment of the 9th Panzer Division would have to be used.

To question (4)

The 11th Panzer Division cannot be assembled in Tours before August 18 or 19, even if they start loading at 1400 hours on August 11.

von Kluge, Field marshal

/To

To Chief of OKW Operations Staff,  
for information of C.-in-C. West.

Result of conversation with the C.-in-C. on August 11.

Yesterday evening SS General Hausser was of the opinion that the attack in the direction of Avranches would be possible after the forces had been regrouped.

His attitude today is as follows:

No longer practicable, as the enemy have brought in new forces which could no longer be defeated by the ever dwindling forces of the Panzer Division, especially in view of the numbers of enemy tanks, and the enemy mastery of the air. The thrust to the sea could no longer be a rapid one, but would be a prolonged and tough battle, and the panzer troops are no longer equal to it.

Both the C.-in-C's are now of the same opinion.

I am in complete agreement with this decision, and wish to add the following remarks: In a very short time the position on the extreme southern wing of the Army Group has deteriorated, because of the deep enemy penetrations to the north, and the strong enemy air support (bomber units). At the moment the 9th Panzer Division is fighting near Alencon with its back to the vital supply bases.

The putting in of the battle group of the 6th Parachute Division (at present only a reinforced battalion, and the whole only a reinforced regiment) which took place today, is only a negligible addition to our forces.

To improve the situation at this point panzer forces must be brought in on this wing immediately, so that they can attack the enemy under the command of General Eberbach.

During the night of August 11/12, the 116th Panzer Division could be released, and the 1st SS Panzer Division "Adolf Hitler Bodyguard" and the 2nd Panzer Division released on the night of August 13. These units can only be released however, if the outward salient in the 7th Army front line were shortened towards the east. All this means that for practical purposes the idea of a push to the sea must be abandoned.

As the position on the extreme left wing of the Army deteriorates hourly, an over-all decision must be reached, and it must be as follows:

- (a) Attack and defeat the enemy near Alencon with all available armoured forces.
- (b) Bring in more divisions on this wing, and so ensure the safety of the Army Group's wing by an attack to the west.

I request an immediate decision, so that the first unit can be withdrawn tonight.

von Kluge, Fieldmarshal.

To Chief of OKW Operations Staff

Telephone conversation between Fieldmarshal von Kluge and General Jodl, on August 11, at 1520 hours.

- (1) Withdrawal of the western outward salient of the 7th Army on the night of August 11/12 intended along the line La Lande Vaumont - Vongeon - Sourdeval - heights east of Mortain - south of Rancoudray.

/(2)

- (2) Assembly of attacking force in the Gandelain area - St.Cyr en Pail - Carrouges - La Motte Fouque.
- (3) Composition of the attacking force:

Commander: General Eberbach with XXXXVII Panzer Corps and LXXXI Army Corps.

1st SS Panzer Division "Adolf Hitler Bodyguard"  
2nd Panzer Division  
116th Panzer Division  
8th and 9th Mortar Brigades  
1 heavy artillery detachment.

A fourth panzer division will probably be sent later.

- (4) Start of the attack: Probably at dawn on August 14.
- (5) Intended direction of the attack: From north-west to south-east, all 3 panzer divisions in a line.  
Western panzer division from the area St.Cyr en Pail - Pre en Pail in the direction of Fresnay sur Sarthe.  
Central panzer division from the area La Lacelle towards the cross-roads at La Hogue.  
Eastern panzer division from the Gandelain area towards Rouesse Fontaine. Direction of the thrust will be reviewed according to the situation.

von Kluge, Fieldmarshal

The Fuehrer has ordered:

"The serious threat to the deep southern flank of Army Group B renders it necessary to eliminate the danger by attacking.

- (1) The American XV Army Corps in the area Le Mans - Mamers - Alencon is to be destroyed by a concentrated attack. To this end the attacking enemy forces are to be smashed deep in the flank by a strong formation of tanks coming from an approximate line Sille - Guillaume - Beaumont in the direction of Alencon and Mamers. When the 9th Panzer Division has thus been eased of its difficulties it is to join this attack from the north. General Eberbach will be in complete command.
- (2) In order to release the Panzer Corps for this attack, forces inside the 7th Army sector are to be sent south. I am in complete agreement with a limited withdrawal of the front between Sourdeval and Mortain to release forces. The main point of the defence of the rest of the front must be centred on both flanks in the area around Falaise and Mortain.
- (3) A group of infantry divisions is to be formed around Chartres (338th and 48th Infantry Divisions and later the 18th Luftwaffe Field Division) under the command of 1st Army H.Q., so that they will be able to protect Paris and the rear of Army Group B. They are to be sent from there forward into the Le Mans area as soon as possible, to mop up this area after the withdrawal of General Eberbach. Anti-tank troops with anti-tank guns and anti-tank close range weapons are to press along the important roads leading west to stop enemy armoured car and tank raiders approaching Paris. All forces available in Paris are to be placed along the roads and block the way into the city from the west and south-west.
- (4) You are to keep to the idea of attacking towards the sea to the west, taking Mayenne and the district to the north if necessary, after defeating the American XV Army Corps.

- (5) For the time being the 11th Panzer Division will remain as rearguard support and the sole mobile reserve of the 19th Army.
- (6) Plans to be reported in detail. Also report the intended grouping of all panzer and SS detachments in the Army Group".

Addendum by Army Group B:

Appendices will follow. Apart from the troops already ordered to be transferred by the 7th Army to General Eberbach, the 7th Army is also to send the Panther Detachment of the 9th Panzer Division to this group.

G.H.Q., Army Group B

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To Army Group B  
August 13, 1944

Estimate of the situation

Because of the new directive from the Fuehrer the task will fall to the 7th Army of holding the assembly area for the thrust to the coast which is planned to take place later. Apart from this, the success of General Eberbach's Panzer Group in keeping the rear and flank free from enemy attacks is dependent on whether or not the 5th and 7th Armies can hold the front. If, as has been announced, more armoured detachments have to be withdrawn this will have to be done by 4 battle-weary divisions.

In opposition to this thinly-manned front line the enemy have 8 infantry divisions and  $3\frac{1}{2}$  armoured divisions, which weaken the strength of our forces daily by continual attacks. Opposite the southern flank of the Army, which is only guarded by very weak forces, the enemy have another 3 infantry divisions, and when the Eberbach Panzer Group begin their thrust, we can expect these troops to become active. In these circumstances it seems to be necessary either to strengthen the 7th Army forces for their task, which is essential to the completion of the operation, by sending them infantry detachments and anti-tank weapons, or to give up the salient in the front line which juts out to the west, and by firmly holding the Falaise area, build up a north-south front line, which would make for a shorter front line and narrower sectors, and would strengthen the weak defences south of Domfront.

With that in mind, the disadvantage of giving up valuable territory seems to be less. Until the mobile forces of the Panzer Group are strong enough to begin an operative thrust towards the sea, after they have cleared up the position deep in the Army Group flank, it seems to be more important to have a fortified front line through Falaise, Flers and Domfront or south of it so as to have a good base, than to have to run a continual risk of having the present front line broken up and a new enemy thrust near Domfront and to the south of it.

G.O.C. 7th Army

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To Chief of OKW Operations Staff  
for information of C.-in-C. West  
and Luftflotte 3.

August 13, 1944

The British forces, with 7 infantry divisions, 2 armoured divisions and 3 armoured brigades are at the moment east of the Orne ready to begin an attack towards Falaise and the south-east; British and American forces, with 15 infantry divisions, 4 armoured divisions and 7 armoured brigades, are on the north and west fronts of the 5th Panzer Army and the 7th Army. 3 motorised divisions and 1 armoured division could attack the loose defences of the southern front.

The American XV Army Corps with 2 infantry divisions and 2 armoured divisions, had thrust between Alençon and Mortagne towards the north; but on August 12 they turned west, being covered from the north, to attack the 7th Army in the rear, or to meet the expected attack by our panzer forces. Further enemy forces (units of the American XX Army Corps) seem to have been brought up.

It seems therefore that the enemy are trying by all possible means to surround the bulk of the 5th Panzer Army and the 7th Army. To counter this, units of the 116th Panzer Division belonging to the Eberbach Panzer Group (battle H.Q. at Vieux Pont) had to engage such a superior foe at Sees on August 12 that although they were able to hold the enemy temporarily they could not stop his wheeling to the west. This division was pushed to the north during the course of the costly battle, and is now stationed on both sides of Argentan to prevent further enemy advances.

The 1st SS Panzer Division "Adolf Hitler Bodyguard" in their eastward march only reached the road both sides of Ranex at 1100 hours on August 13. They had been held up by waves of fighter-bombers attacking them. Like the 2nd Panzer Division which is following them up, they will probably enter the fighting by a west-east movement, to safeguard the rear. With the present panzer divisions so weakened, it will be necessary, if we hope for unqualified success, to bring in as quickly as possible more panzer detachments - 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, 21st Panzer Division - especially as their assembly area is being constantly diminished by the enemy penetrations.

The situation therefore requires that we clear the enemy from the rear of our armies. That will mean attacking the American XV Army Corp, even while our supplies, in particular munitions and fuel, are being continually depleted.

I therefore suggest, in complete agreement with all the higher commanders at the Army Group, that we retire to a line centred on Flers during the night of August 14/15, thus freeing our armoured forces from the battle, and then we could transfer all our armoured forces to the Eberbach Group so that they could be used for an offensive, with the exception of the battle group of the 2nd SS Panzer Division, which would have to take over the defence of the southern flank.

If the widely spread front line remains as it is at present, with its critical lack of resources, it will be broken through and surrounded by the enemy, with his superiority in men and materials, and his mastery of the air, and our units could not fight their way out.

Further measures will be decided during the course of events. I request instructions for the conduct of the battle in the sector of C.-in-C. West.

von Kluge

WEEKLY REPORT, AUGUST 8 - 14, 1944

Estimate of the situation.

At the moment the enemy have roughly 50 divisions in France, and also strong G.H.Q. troops. 31 divisions are still in Great Britain, and further forces are standing ready in America. The transport across the Channel continues at an increased rate.

As the main objective in their attempt to force a breakthrough on the front the enemy are trying to close in from two sides on the bulk of the 5th Panzer Army and the 7th Army and thus surround them. The southern arm

of this pincers movement (American XV Army Corps with possibly also the American XX Army Corps following them up) have crossed the Mortagne-Alencon line, and under cover from the east and north have swung west, so that they can strike at the 7th Army from the rear, and catch up with our Panzer forces which are coming up. In cooperation with that we can expect an enemy attack to start east of the Orne.

The enemy would not begin new operations until they have settled the battle with the 5th Panzer Army and the 7th Army. The fact that they are only feeling their way east from the Le Mans area with reconnaissance units also points to this conclusion. American units reinforced by French Resistance groups are continuing the battle for the fortresses in Brittany.

The High Command of the Allied invasion troops under General Eisenhower has been moved, and this is a further proof that they do not intend any further large-scale landings on the west coast of Europe by sea. However we can expect a large-scale landing in greater force by the airborne troops being prepared in Britain, to share in the operations against the Army Group.

Army Group B will assemble the bulk of the panzer detachments in the south-eastern flank under the command of General Eberbach, so that they can destroy the enemy in the Alencon area.

The question of supplying the fighting front in all areas has become more difficult as a result of the increased enemy air activity. The lack of mobility is becoming increasingly awkward.

Since June 6, army and SS units have destroyed:

3,370 enemy tanks  
475 aircraft

Our losses for the period June 6 to August 13, 1944 were:

3,630 officers (including 14 generals, 10 staff officers, 243 C.O.s.)  
151,487 NCOs and men  
3,813 Russians  
158,930 men

We have received as replacements: 30,069 men

9,933 men are on the way.

#### WEEKLY REPORT, AUGUST 15 - 21, 1944

##### Estimate of the situation.

The enemy now has in France about 53 divisions and strong G.H.Q. troops, which are combined in the British 21st and the American 12th Army Groups under General Eisenhower. There are 30 more divisions in Britain ready to come over to the mainland of Europe and further reinforcements can be expected from the U.S.A.

After the end of the battle with the 7th Army and after essential units have broken free, the enemy are trying to surround the forces south of the Seine downstream from Paris. The American XV Army Corps with 3 motorised divisions and 1 armoured division crossed the Nollencourt - Houdan line in a northward direction on August 18, and have reached the Seine at a point between Vernon and Mantes; spearheads have already crossed the river. It seems that they are trying with the bulk of their forces to press to the north-west from south of the Seine and cut off the 5th Panzer Army and the

/remains

remains of the 7th Army from their rear communications. Thus the enemy are showing their obvious intention of finishing off our forces in the Normandy area and then turning eastwards.

Simultaneously with this, 2 corps are operating between Chartres and the Loire, with the intention of bypassing Paris to the south, proceeding east and capturing the Loing and Seine crossings. According to previous experiences, we should be able to expect them to turn in towards Paris from the south-east. The enemy have only sent reconnaissance units against the ring of defences round Paris.

In conjunction with these operational intentions, there is always the possibility of a large-scale landing by the airborne troops standing ready in Britain, although only weak airborne forces are being used in southern France. American units are striving to overcome the heroic resistance of the garrison at St. Malo and the fortresses of Brest, Lorient and St. Nazaire. The French Resistance groups are becoming more and more active.

Army Group B is striving to wipe out the enemy forces which are attempting a pincers movement south of the Seine, and to assemble the bulk of the panzer detachments on the eastern flank under General Eberbach.

Enemy air activity rose to immense proportions this week, and in many cases rendered it impossible for us to move our troops. For a brief period supplies could only be brought to the troops with fighter escorts. Our inferior mobility is hampering our tactical decisions.

Army and SS units have destroyed since June 6 3,663 tanks and 494 aircraft.

Our own losses have not yet been assessed.

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To the Chief of the Combined Services High Command,  
General Jodl, to be submitted to the Fuehrer.

August 24, 1944

On the basis of the latest developments in the situation I have arrived at the following estimates of the strengths in the West:

- I The enemy now have about 53 divisions in north-west France, and could raise this number to 55 or 57 by September 1. There are about 8 divisions operating in southern France. All the enemy divisions are extensively motorised and mechanised. In support of the ground operations they have about 7,000 fighters and 7,200 bombers in north-west France, and in southern France roughly 1,300 fighters and 900 bombers (at present, from a third to a half of these are serviceable.)

The following possibilities are open to the enemy:

- (a) After gaining the Seine bank crossings they could push northwards past Paris between Rouen and Mantes to the Somme. Their objectives would be the V1 bases and the vital Belgian industrial basin. They could use 30 - 35 divisions for this thrust.
- (b) Thrust through Paris towards Rheims to the traditional invasion route into Germany. They could use 35 divisions for this.
- (c) West - east push south of Paris across the line Troyes - Auxerre in the direction of Dijon, so as to cut off Army Group G, and then through the Belfort basin for a thrust to Alsace. 25 divisions could be used for this.

For all three operations they could use their airborne army (5th and 6th Airborne Divisions) to open up the way (Seine or Somme crossings).

They could conduct operations (a) and (b) simultaneously with 15 and 25 divisions respectively.

- II As was reported on August 18, our own troops are exhausted. We cannot expect appreciable reinforcements before September 1, and the promised replacements still later.

Work on the Somme-Marne positions has only been going on for a short time, and they are not yet ready for any defensive action. It is therefore essential to bridge the gap until at least September 1, because, if things go very badly, the enemy spearheads will in that time have reached the Somme positions, the area east of Paris, or the Dijon area.

First of all the Seine position downstream from Paris is being manned: 4 H.Q. staffs have been put in there, the LXXXVI, LXXIV, LXXXI, XXXXVII Panzer Corps, with 12 divisions or divisional battle groups (711th, 346th, 3rd Paratroop, 353rd, 271st, 331st, 344th, 17th Luftwaffe Field, 49th, 18th Luftwaffe Field, 6th Paratroop and 275th).

One group from the panzer divisions (what is left of about 6 divisions, which are to be quickly renewed) must be placed under the H.Qs of I and II SS Panzer Corps between the Somme and the Seine as mobile reserves, and at the same time be renewed. The bridgehead south of the Seine must be held as long as possible to make our crossings easier, and to keep the enemy forces in check. It will only be withdrawn when the advantages in holding it are outweighed by the disadvantages.

The problem of Paris is still urgent. Admittedly the 47th Division will be brought in there from August 25/26 to strengthen the defences, but in the face of enemy pressure from the outside and with the increased danger inside the city, this reinforcement will not be sufficient for safety. We have therefore ordered a strong line to be set up just to the north and east of Paris.

We can only expect 3 infantry divisions (338th, 716th and 198th) to be sent back from Army Group G, with 1 panzer division, the 11th. The intention is to form from the panzer divisions a group (about 7 or 8 divisions) in the southern flank of the 1st Army, so that they can attack the enemy spearheads and thus cover the western flank of the 19th Army. 15 extra divisions will be necessary in addition to the forces already available, to hold the Seine - Yonne - Dijon line, and they will have to be assembled in the area Troyes - Dijon - Geneva Lake by September 10.

The 3 divisions from the north and the 15th Army area, which will be released by the arrival of the 36th, 553rd and 563rd divisions will be urgently needed to build up a front on the right flank of the 1st Army. It is taken for granted that there will be sufficient Luftwaffe forces, roughly in the strength of at least 300 fighters ready to take off at any moment.

- III We will need for the Somme-Marne line altogether 4 Army H.Qs, 12 Corps H.Qs and at least 30 to 35 divisions at the front, 1 panzer army with 4 panzer H.Q. staffs, and 12 panzer divisions in reserve to counterbalance the enemy motor mechanised units.

If the enemy begin a strong campaign and bring in new forces, the possibility will have to be reckoned with that the Seine - Yonne - Dijon line cannot be held for long, and we may have to withdraw to the

/Somme



Somme-Marne line. Speedy construction work is therefore needed at the latter line, and a defence force, which can continue this work, is essential. For this we could use the very weak remains of the 12 divisions which need a rest (Remains of the 352nd, 84th, 89th, 326th, 363rd, 276th, 277th, 708th, 272nd, 273rd, 343rd and the 5th Paratroop Division).

Furthermore, the same must be done as on the eastern front. We must look ahead, and build more rearward positions behind the Somme-Marne line, extended to include the Western Wall.

I request the required instructions giving consent for this.

Model, Fieldmarshal

To Chief of OKW Operations Staff,  
to be presented to the Fuehrer.

August 29, 1944

I report the following as supplement to the measures taken by Army Group B on August 28 and 29, 1944.

- (1) Enemy position: The British Army Group (25 - 27 divisions) has begun a rapid thrust across the Seine to the north, concentrated on the eastern flank, with the intention of pressing our troops back to the sea, provided the breakthrough is successful, and capturing the V1 bases. Apart from their heavy artillery and immense air superiority the enemy are able to put in up to 1,500 tanks between Paris and the coast. The American Army Group with the 12 divisions (including up to 1,200 tanks) at present in the area north of Paris - Soissons - Chalons s.M. - Vitry le Francois will continue to attack in a general north-easterly direction. This assumption is based on information from a reliable source, stating that the V Corps have been ordered to attack the towns of Montcornet and Rethel; according to the same source the XII Corps is to take the heights east of Chalons s.M. The XX Corps, between the V and XII Corps, is attacking Rheims. For the remaining 10 - 12 divisions of the American Army Group (including about 750 tanks) there are the possibilities of following up either towards Rheims or to the east through Troyes.
- (2) Position of our troops: The divisions which have arrived from Normandy across the Seine under immense difficulties and after the hardest fighting have only a few heavy arms, and in general they are only armed with carbines. The supply of necessary personnel and material replacements is, as has been reported in detail completely inadequate. After 5 battle-weary infantry divisions have been sent back to the Reich, there remains, with replacements and reassembling of the remains of the 11 Normandy infantry divisions, enough to form about 4 units, but they will only have equipment if the demands made in the order dated August 27 are fulfilled.

From the 6 SS panzer divisions and 5 army panzer divisions we could only form 1 regimental group, which could be the 11th Regimental Group, and that could only be done if we received replacements of men and equipment.

The panzer divisions now have 5 - 10 tanks each. With regard to artillery, the infantry divisions only have single guns left, and the panzer divisions have a single battery each.

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At the moment the troops are strongly influenced by the enemy's superiority, especially in aircraft and tanks, and by the fighting in isolated pockets. Measures are being taken. The low degree of manoeuvrability of the infantry divisions, caused by the fact that their mobility is only an emergency expedient (horses), has proved to be a distinct disadvantage in the unequal struggle against a highly mobile enemy, especially as there is absolutely no reserve of assault guns and other heavy anti-tank guns. And so the units available and those which have been brought in from the coast are at the moment tactically inferior. A speedy alteration in these circumstances is the first consideration for successful operations.

With regard to the situation in the air, I wish to refer to my teleprinter message dated August 29, concerning the maintenance of the fighting capacity of the fighter units, which is of vital concern to the Army Group.

- (3) The concentration of all available fast-moving units in the area Chalons - Rheims - Soissons, ordered by me on the evening of August 28, and reported at once to General Jodl by Chief of the General Staff of C.-in-C. West, was essential to ward off the swift and dangerous thrust carried out by the American Army Group against the rear of the 15th, 7th and 5th Panzer Armies. Considering the enemy position (see (1)), this meant that the right flank was in danger of an enemy tank attack, and on the left flank there was the possibility of a further enemy advance in the direction of Dijon.

The following temporary expedients are possible:

Withdrawing on the right flank to the Somme if necessary - this was requested by General Dietrich because of the condition of our troops, but I refused this until now.

Diverting to the left flank the reinforcements meant for the right flank of the 1st Army (559th Division and the 106th Panzer Brigade).

Only when the 347th and 553rd Divisions have been brought in, as I ordered, will it be possible to withdraw the fast-moving units in the area Soissons - Rheims - Chalons, which are supposed to come under the command of the 5th Panzer Army as from August 31. Otherwise there would be a dangerous gap left, which would speedily have dangerous consequences. It should here be emphasised that the fighting capacity of the Bittrich and Schwerin groups is very small. We can only expect any improvement when we receive more tanks and artillery.

Model, Fieldmarshal

To Chief of OKW Operations Staff, with the request that it be submitted in the original to the Fuehrer.

- (1) Enemy position: The British army group is making a concentrated thrust to the north-east, towards the Scheldt estuary (Antwerp), with the double intentions of capturing the V1 bases and cutting off the 15th Army. The units which are still spread out in depth are now closing up.

An American battle group from the 12th Army Group with about 6 - 8 divisions has joined in this thrust, and can bring in more forces. At least 2,500 tanks might be used altogether in this operation.

The bulk of the 3rd American Army has been closing up in the Verdun area for the last 3 days, and could start an attack against the Luxembourg - Metz line at any time.

French and Belgian Resistance groups are joining the battle to an ever increasing extent. The large-scale airborne landing which is expected will most probably be in the region of the West Wall.

/Altogether

Altogether the enemy have brought up till now 55 divisions and strong forces of H.Q. troops into the north France battlegrounds, and in addition they could bring 30 more divisions from Britain and transfer further forces from the U.S.A.

- (2) Position of our own troops: Our own troops, which in the meanwhile had suffered very heavy losses, were no match against the enemy's superior equipment and great mobility, especially on the northern flank. They were repeatedly overtaken and cut off, as closely-linked panzer units, assault guns and anti-tank weapons were lacking as much for open warfare as for a local concentrated attack to delay the enemy advance. Otherwise the situation described in my report dated August 29th has become even worse, as the troops are daily becoming more exhausted.

At the moment we only have the following which are really fit for action:

- (a) with the 15th Army, which includes the area under C.-in-C. Netherlands, about 4 infantry divisions, not counting the fortress garrisons.
- (b) with the 5th Panzer Army, 3 or 4 panzer divisions and  $1\frac{1}{2}$  or 2 infantry divisions.

The position is more favourable in the 1st Army area, as there has been no enemy pressure there since August 29.

After receiving the 19th, 553rd and 559th Divisions and the 106th Panzer Brigade they now have a battle force of about 3 panzer and panzer grenadier divisions, as well as  $4\frac{1}{2}$  infantry divisions.

- (3) We do not yet know how the 15th Army's attempts to break through are progressing. It seems that only some units will be able to fight their way through. The line Albert Canal - Maas - western positions can still be considered as the line to be held by Army Group B. But it will need to be manned by 25 fresh infantry divisions and an adequate armoured reserve of 5 - 6 panzer divisions.

As a result of the developments on the western flank, 2 panzer brigades (besides the 105th) and several infantry divisions must be sent there immediately.

At least 10 more divisions and 5 more panzer divisions will be needed later (until September 15). Otherwise the approach to north-western Germany will be open. It is already necessary to provide powerful skeleton forces as quickly as possible for the western positions and the West Wall; the 11 fortress battalions and the 6 machine gun battalions which were expected between September 15 and 20 will arrive too late. They must man the western positions earlier. Otherwise it is suggested that anti-aircraft units from Germany could be brought in in sufficient numbers.

The mobile battle force which the Fuehrer has commanded to be formed in the southern flank, according to paragraph 2 of the order dated September 3, could then be formed from the following units:

- 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division
- 15th Panzer Grenadier Division
- 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division
- 9th Panzer Division
- 106th Panzer Brigade
- Battle groups of the 11th and 21st Panzer Divisions
- and 3 other panzer brigades.

For this 3 panzer divisions could possibly be transferred from the east.

To C.-in-C. Army Group B

September 7, 1944

I request that the following estimate of the situation, which was formed after a conference with Fieldmarshal Model, and based on the latest reports, be submitted to the Fuehrer:

- (1) Enemy position: At the moment the Anglo-Americans have in Belgium and northern France about 54 extensively motorised and mechanised divisions and very strong H.Q. forces. French and Belgian Resistance groups are supporting them to an ever increasing degree. There are still at least 30 divisions in England, including 6 airborne divisions which are ready to be brought over to the mainland. The transport of forces direct from the U.S.A. has begun.

The British 21st Army Group has taken from its 25 - 27 divisions about 8 or 10 divisions with probably 600 tanks between Boulogne and Antwerp for an extensive, partly encircling, attack against the units of the 15th Army which are cut off from the east. A second battle group between Antwerp and Diest is being prepared. Theirs will be the task of forcing a crossing of the Albert Canal, and of pressing on to Rotterdam and Amsterdam.

6 to 8 more British divisions with probably 400 tanks are now closing in, probably from the rearward areas. They could be used to augment the forces intended for the thrust into Holland, or to help the troops against the 15th Army, according to the requirements of the situation.

The fortress of Le Havre is being attacked by 2 or 3 divisions with about 100 tanks. Contrary to what is the case with other fortress being attacked, it is important for the enemy to take this harbour, which is the most useful in France, as quickly as possible.

The fortresses of Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne will involve for some time a number of the other divisions of the British forces at present engaged against the 15th Army.

The American 12th Army Group with 15 to 18 divisions and about 1,000 tanks is between Hasselt and Toul attacking to the east on a broad front, with the object of pushing on to the Rhine. To the rear of its northern flank 3 or 4 units are apparently being brought up.

The following points of concentration for attacks seem to be indicated:

- (a) The area between Hasselt and the heights running from the east of Namur to south of the Maas.
- (b) Charleville - Sedan area.
- (c) The area on both sides of, and especially south of Metz.

The southern flank, which at the moment is rather bent back, will probably be brought into line to coincide with the enemy advance from southern France against the Burgundy Gate.

In Brittany there are about 5 American divisions tied down by the fighting for the fortresses and attempting to enclose them.

- (2) Against this must be stated: Our own troops are all engaged in the fighting, are being heavily attacked and are partly exhausted. They have no artillery or armoured weapons. No reserves worth considering are available. The enemy's numerical advantage in tanks is complete.

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At the moment Army Group B has about 100 tanks. The enemy air forces control the battle area and the communications deep in the rear of our lines. The enemy pressure towards Liege (Meuse Valley), which is obviously directed against Aachen and the Rhine - Westphalia industrial region, has become a serious threat.

It seems to me to be of vital importance to bring up at once the strong forces which have so often been requested - at least 5, and if possible 10 divisions with assault artillery detachments and sufficient anti-tank weapons and also a number of panzer divisions.

All the forces at our disposal (the weak 9th Panzer Division, 1 weak panzer assault detachment, 2 assault gun brigades, with assault guns on the way) have been sent by C.-in-C. West to the Aachen area.

The 12th Grenadier Division has not yet arrived. In agreement with Fieldmarshal Model I perceive here the acute danger which also threatened the rear of the West Wall. No operative enemy airborne landings have taken place as yet. They can take place as the situation demands, either behind the West Wall, or also to form a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Rhine. They will take place wherever the enemy thrust towards the Rhine is successful.

It is our task to play for time with the forces available so that the western positions and the West Wall can be prepared for defence by the H.Q. authorities who have been entrusted with the job, together with units of the armed forces and the Party. The forces which have been reported to me as being intended for the forming of the western positions, 135,000 men all told, seem to me to be totally inadequate. Even if one includes all the rear units of the forces under C.-in-C. West, many more workers will be required along a line of positions more than 500 kilometres long. We do not fail to recognise the difficulties (equipment, billeting, supplies etc.) in the organisation of these auxiliary forces and the indefatigable work of all the Party officials, and civilian departments.

However, the whole organisation takes time!

According to information from the commander of the western fortresses, General Kuntze, the building of the western positions will require 6 weeks. This time must therefore be gained by fighting.

If I am to command with any possibility of success, I again demand that all available tanks be sent up at once apart from the forces intended for the Aachen area to protect the Rhine - Westphalia industrial area, and regardless of the consequences, to complete the panzer units and assault gun brigades, also a special delivery of all the anti-tank weapons which can be mustered, which can afford the troops some method of defence against the enemy tanks.

The Fuehrer has ordered me, regardless of the local losses on the front, to carry out an advance deep into the American east flank, in a north-westerly direction, from the area around Epinal. If a strong panzer group subordinated to the 5th Panzer Army, which itself has been put at the disposal of C.-in-C. West for this attack (but is instructed to cooperate with Army Group G), is to be used, I consider it essential that 10,000 cbms. of fuel should be brought up immediately. Also it will be necessary to have all available forces of the Luftwaffe for this attack, even if it means leaving the other fronts exposed.

(signed) von Rundstedt, Fieldmarshal

To C.-in-C. West, Fieldmarshal von Rundstedt.

September 8, 1944

The situation of the 7th Army has developed in the last two days in a particularly threatening manner. The remains of this army which are still available will be able to offer temporary resistance in the Maas sector between Maastricht and Liege. South of Liege, as far as the newly announced Army Group boundary there is only a very thin and totally inadequate line of defences. The enemy here enjoys practical freedom of movement as far as the West Wall, 120 km. length of which, behind the 7th Army, is manned by only 7 or 8 battalions.

Of the reinforcements which have been already reported, the 9th Panzer Division, which was detailed by C.-in-C. West on the evening of the 6th September, has not yet arrived, and the furthest forward division, the 12th Grenadier Division, is not expected to arrive until September 12. In any case, neither of these formations will be sufficient to carry out the present task allotted to them - the battle to gain time before the West Wall, followed by the holding of the West Wall itself.

If 3 infantry divisions and 1 panzer division cannot be transferred to the 7th Army with all haste, we can be certain that the exhausted units of the 7th Army will, as happened south-west of Brussels, again be attacked, and this time completely beaten. This would mean that the strategic breach for which the enemy have been striving between the Maas and the Mosel would be opened up automatically, this time on the German frontier. I should like to stress at this point that when the 1st Army received timely reinforcements the situation improved for them considerably. If the same is to be done for the 7th Army it must be now or never.

I request that these conclusions, which have been made on reviewing the deteriorating situation, be brought to the notice of the Fuehrer.

Model, Fieldmarshal

To Army Group B

September 15, 1944

The Army reports in connection with the disorders which took place at the evacuation of Aachen:

According to reports which came in from the G.O.C., the Divisional Commander, the Battle Commandant, and the Q2 of the Army, the blame lies incontestably with the Party officials entrusted with the evacuation. When the situation developed adversely, the responsible Party officials and the police, who alone could have kept peace and good order during the evacuation, hastily abandoned the city and tried to control the evacuation from the outside. Notice was given that every citizen who did not participate in the evacuation would be a traitor to his country, and this, coupled with the fact that there was no responsible local authority available, led to a panic, which developed into a headlong flight and universal looting.

As a result of the situation reported above in the city of Aachen, the commander of the 166th Panzer Division, Count Schwerin, took upon himself the duty of stopping the evacuation first of all, and then conducting it in a rational way. In doing this he disturbed the Aachen District Administrator by reporting that enemy attacking spearheads would probably be approaching the city by the afternoon. He has also given a letter to a member of the Party who had been named to him, in which he advised the population of Aachen, in English, to trust to the protection of the approaching American

/armies.

armies. Furthermore it has been clearly established that he had always taken all possible measures for the defence of Aachen, and that he has always commanded his division exactly as directed by the High Command.

Nevertheless, General Count Schwerin has been relieved of his post as Divisional Commander because of these mishaps. A court-martial enquiry has been started.

The Army Corps and Division immediately contacted the appropriate Party departments, and now everything has been done to control the evacuation according to plan.

Brandenberger, General of Tank Forces

7th Army H. Q.

To C.-in-C. West, Fieldmarshal von Rundstedt

September 24, 1944

The position of Army Group B has become increasingly worse on the northern flank since the airborne landing on September 17, because the enemy succeeded in bringing in considerable reinforcements during daily flights. Our own reinforcements were insufficient. It was only possible to force a postponement of the enemy's operational intentions - a breakthrough via Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Arnhem, as a base for the attack on the Ruhr area - during the bitter fighting of the past few weeks, but apart from the holding of Arnhem, it was impossible to stop the enemy. The renewed airborne landing on September 23, the extent of which it is not yet possible to judge, will lead to an exceptionally critical situation if we are not able to bring in adequate forces early enough to support the hard-pressed front line of the 1st Parachute Army.

The fact that the new landing took place on September 23, that is, 6 days after the first, suggests that the enemy had originally intended the landing on September 23 for another purpose, but now consider the time to be ripe to strengthen the present operation, obviously with the idea of turning to the south-east between the Rhine and the Maas. The danger is particularly great for this area, as there are no permanent defences in the way of the presumed line of attack. Our own forces are inadequate against the enemy's considerably reinforced armies, and cannot stop the enemy's continual push forward. New forces must be produced, or transferred from other fronts.

The quickest means of restoring the position would be an attack. That has been attempted in the direction of both Veghel and Nijmegen. The forces available for the attack on Veghel proved to be insufficient for the task. Our pressure on Nijmegen could only be increased to an inadequate extent.

After yesterday's airborne landings - which the enemy could continue at any time - we cannot expect to be able to push the enemy back across the Waal, and so we must set up defences in the region of the Lower Rhine on both sides of Arnhem.

The following consequences arise from this situation:

- (1) The enemy resistance west of Arnhem must be eventually broken by all the means at our disposal, and the enemy must not be allowed to create a bridgehead on the northern bank of the Lower Rhine.

It will therefore be necessary to reinforce the II SS Panzer Corps with the 506th Tiger Detachment and the whole of the 246th Division.

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- (2) To release further forces, and to prevent the destruction of our formations, it may be necessary to withdraw the 15th Army with the LXVII Army Corps into a bridgehead Bergen op Zoom - Roosendaal - Moerdijk, with the LXXXVIII Army Corps closing the gap on the left behind the Waal. Time could be found to put through this operation in spite of the fact that it would mean having to establish land communications with Walcheren in the event of penetration to the west, north of the Waal, by strong enemy motorised formations. The renewed danger of the encirclement of the 15th Army which this would entail could only be eliminated by bringing up strong reserves for the eastern flank of the Army. The conduct of battle of the 15th Army would therefore be such that the bridgehead could be held while preparations for a withdrawal were being made.
- (3) While they are clearing up the position west of Arnhem and defending the present front east and south-east of Nijmegen, the 1st Parachute Army are so to direct their fighting on the left flank that a larger bridgehead can be held on the west bank of the Maas about 20 kilometres west of Venlo, from which it would be possible to launch an attack towards the north-west, after reinforcements had arrived. In view of the necessity for giving support at Arnhem and Nijmegen, forces for this bridgehead could only be obtained by introducing new units, or by withdrawing forces from the 7th Army.

The possibility of launching a larger counter-thrust from the sector of the 1st Parachute Army's left flank calls for examination of the question whether further forces (2 panzer divisions and 2 panzer brigades) could not be spared from other sectors for this operation.

It would be necessary to work very fast if we wished to make use of the enemy's present confinement in his corridor through Eindhoven. The 9th and 116th Panzer Divisions could be relieved by a good infantry division. Purely for defensive operations the following are needed:

- 1 infantry division
- 1 panzer division
- 1 panzer brigade.

- (4) The 7th Army are still defending their present positions, and are preparing for a counter-attack to clear the enemy from the area east of Aachen. Before the 9th and the 116th Panzer Divisions could be released they would need an infantry division, and a further infantry division would be needed to replace the 2 panzer divisions from I SS Panzer Corps. If the 9th and 116th Panzer Divisions are used north-west of Venlo, another infantry division will be needed as rearguard in the Aachen district.

Altogether, if Army Group B is to continue a successful defensive action it will require as a minimum:

- (a) 2, or better, 3 infantry divisions for the 7th Army.
- (b) 1 infantry division, 1 panzer division, a strong panzer brigade for the 1st Parachute Army.
- (c) 1 assault gun brigade each for the 15th Army, the 1st Parachute Army, and the 7th Army.
- (d) Increased supplies of ammunition, especially for light and heavy field howitzers.
- (e) Replacements for the infantry divisions at the points of heaviest fighting, at least 6 draft conducting battalions.

Model, Fieldmarshal



To C.-in-C. Fieldmarshal von Rundsted

September 27, 1944

The fighting of Army Group B has suffered because of the following circumstances:

(1) Almost unlimited air superiority of the enemy.

The unsparing use of our fighter formations on various days has brought considerable temporary relief. In the main battle this relief is one of the first essentials for success. These experiences emphasise the necessity for producing the new fighter type as quickly as possible, even if it is at the expense of the bomber units.

(2) Superiority of the enemy artillery.

At the moment the Army Group has over 821 light and heavy cannon, some of them immobile. Against this the enemy artillery have at least 2,680 cannon. This discrepancy would not be so serious if we only had adequate supplies of ammunition. As this was not the case however, as is well known, the enemy's artillery superiority was more obvious. It is urgent that we have a speedy improvement in the supply either of ammunition or equipment, preferably of both.

(3) Preponderance of the enemy armoured weapons.

At the present, our 239 tanks and assault guns are opposing 2,300 enemy tanks, i.e. 10 times the number. Moreover, this represents only half of the ascertained potential of enemy armoured units. Even though the enemy have shown a certain unwillingness to use tank formations in close concentration during the past few days, there can still be no doubt whatsoever that they could throw in sudden concentrations of tanks at any time they wished. Therefore the request for increased supplies of assault gun brigades must be repeated. The formation and use of independent panzer brigades outside the framework of the panzer divisions has not been successful in the previous fighting. More adequate replacements for the tried panzer divisions, and the introduction of assault gun brigades and detachments form the most effective counter-measure against the enemy's panzer superiority.

It is an incontrovertible fact that the reverses in the west are primarily due to the panzer divisions having to fight when they were exhausted. The supply of equipment for them must be kept up.

(4) Insufficient replacements of personnel

Even if the number of enemy infantry units is only  $\frac{1}{3}$  higher than ours, the battle potential of our troops is lowered by their inadequate equipment, and by the fact that there are too many garrison and emergency units amongst our battalions.

During the period between September 1 and 25, our heavy losses were about 75,000 men; during the same period we received only 6,500 men as replacements. This intolerable discrepancy will eventually lead to the complete annihilation of whole valuable divisions, in spite of the plentiful use of newly constituted units. It is essential that we receive adequate numbers of replacements, so that it will be possible for the divisions to re-form their field relief battalions.

The Army Group will continue to try to withdraw in good time the units which have suffered very badly in the fighting, and form new units, as has already been done in the case of 14 divisions. The necessity for maintaining to some extent comparable and useful divisional strengths will mean that we will have to bring in garrison units.

I am reporting the foregoing points, although they are already known, because the result of the present decisive battles is dependent on their being given more consideration. I request that they may be brought directly to the notice of the Fuehrer.

Model, Fieldmarshal

To Army Group B

September 29, 1944

Estimate of the situation.

According to a verbal message from Reichsminister Speer, there is a factory in Weisweiler (4 kilometres east of Eschweiler) in which is made 40% of the total amount available of an alloy which is vital for the whole steel production.

Even if the present situation does not offer a direct threat to Weisweiler, it must still be emphasised that the defences of the works, which lies only 6 kilometres behind the lines, are not sufficient to provide for the safety of the works in all circumstances. Apart from that, the works lie within the range of effective enemy artillery fire.

In this respect also the situation demands that the enemy penetration east of Aachen be cleared up. The Army wishes to refer to the estimate of the situation dated September 23, 1944. In the first place the Army requests the bringing up of 2 panzer divisions to ensure the success of the proposed attack. If these cannot arrive within a short time, it will be considered necessary to have two complete attacking divisions, 1 Tiger or Panther detachment and sufficient assault guns (4 sections for the infantry divisions) or 2 brigades and H.Q. artillery (5 - 6 heavy detachments). The need for sufficient ammunition is stressed. In addition, the Army requests complete support in the formation now proceeding of a mortar battalion and an anti-tank battalion, the personnel for which have been assembled and armed by the Klosterkaemper Reception Unit, although their lack of mobility and the shortage of optical instruments hinders any rapid preparations.

Brandenberger

7th Army H.Q.

To C.-in-C. West

October 1, 1944

The following estimate of the situation is forwarded as an appendix to the report already sent by courier:

The reports by our agents of the Americans' bringing strong reinforcements into the Aachen area, and of intended operations directed against Cologne have not yet been confirmed by our front line reconnaissance. The only indication which could point to an intended attack has been the partial withdrawal by 1000 - 1500 metres of the most forward American positions in front of LXXXI Army Corps, as the enemy used a similar method of leaving the ground open for bomber attacks on the invasion front.

The general impressions of the enemy's movements, the reports of prisoners, the scrutiny of captured documents, artillery reconnaissance and reconnaissance by agents near the front line have not so far supplied any other indications. Even so, the Army is expecting the enemy to use the breach in the West Wall around Aachen as a springing-off ground for a breakthrough operation in the direction of Cologne and the Ruhr industrial area. Therefore the Army is accordingly making its dispositions on the basis of the agents' reports.

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In addition to the reinforcements for the defences in the Aachen - Monschau area mentioned in the report dated September 30, 1944, the Army has ordered that an infantry battalion and the 341st Assault Gun Brigade (without the 2nd Battery) be transferred from LXXIV Army Corps, the 628th Mortar Detachment and the 1310th Fortress Artillery Detachment from I SS Panzer Corps, and the 2nd Battery of the 341st Assault Gun Brigade which is still with LXXX Army Corps. All these units are to be transferred to LXXXI Army Corps by October 2. One of the draft conducting battalions formed by the Klosterkaemper Reception Unit and a mortar corps are also to be placed under the command of LXXXI Army Corps.

With regard to munitions tactics, a definite concentration is being built up with LXXXI Army Corps. In addition the Army requests:

- (1) Air reconnaissance in the area Liege - Amiens - Paris - Luxembourg.
- (2) Luftwaffe support against the enemy artillery and prepared positions in the area of the breakthrough east and south-east of Aachen.
- (3) A Tiger or Panther detachment to be brought in.
- (4) The 7th Mortar Brigade which had already been promised to be brought in.
- (5) The supply of a heavy artillery detachment with German guns.
- (6) Adequate supplies of ammunition, with special reference to types of captured ammunition.
- (7) The supply of medium mortars to take the place of the heavy and light mortars in the mortar battalion which is now being formed, as this is the only way of ensuring adequate supplies of ammunition.
- (8) The Todt Organisation to be persuaded to speed up the construction of an anti-tank front between Erkelenz and Dueren.
- (9) Supplies of fuel to be sent to III Anti-aircraft Corps so that it will be possible to regroup the units with LXXXI Army Corps, in accordance with the plan to concentrate forces there. Because we are so very short of fuel ourselves, it will not be possible for the Army to supply them with fuel.

Army Group B

To Army Group B

October 9, 1944

I request that the following estimate of the situation be submitted to the Fuehrer:

- I (1) The point of greatest danger to the 15th Army is at the moment on their right flank in the area north of Antwerp, where the enemy is attempting to establish land connections with Walcheren.

With the enemy so strong in the area Nijmegen - Arnhem and near Aachen, it is not possible to withdraw further forces to help the 15th Army. Therefore the 15th Army must shorten its front between Tilburg and Bois-le-Duc, to release forces for the right wing.

The right flank of the 1st Parachute Army (XII SS Corps and II SS Panzer Corps) had to go over to the defensive. The situation

around Aachen may make it necessary to remove troops from II SS Panzer Corps and send them there. I therefore request permission to give up the Arnheim bridgehead.

- (2) The most dangerous point on the whole western front is on the right flank of the 7th Army, where there is a definite threat of encirclement to the whole area around Aachen. The bringing-up of reinforcements is being continually slowed down by the regular destruction of the railways, so that, for example, the heavy Panzer Detachment 506 (Tiger) has still not arrived at Aachen, the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division will have to be diverted through Kaiserslautern, and so on. It is estimated that the enemy already have a superiority of 6 infantry divisions and 3 panzer divisions near Aachen, and it is possible that more forces will be sent up (American XXVII Army Corps). In spite of all endeavours, it does not seem as though we will be able to push back the enemy bulges in the front to the north and south-east of Aachen. There is an ever increasing danger that the enemy will be able to draw the circle more tightly round the town. I have issued clear instruction that Aachen is to be defended right to the very last, in agreement with the Fuehrer's orders. In this case, the possibility of the loss of the 246th Infantry Division must be accepted.
- II. In the Army Group G area the enemy is seeking to invest Metz from the south, and to seize the Vosges passes by an attack on a broad front between Luneville and Lure. As yet there is no indication that there will definitely be an attack on the Burgundy Gate. It will be the task of Army Group G to offer stubborn resistance and thus gain enough time for the further building up of the Vosges positions. In this connection it may be deemed necessary to withdraw the bridgehead at Metz back to the Mosel.
- III. The main factor which made it possible for the enemy to gain his recent successes (breakthrough at Einhoven, gaining the northern bank of the Waal at Nijmegen, pincers movement on Aachen etc.), is our shortage of reserves for counter-attacking. This shortage made it impossible to form concentrated defences in time, even at the points where it was obvious that there was going to be a concentrated attack.

There is already a shortage of troops at the parts of the front line which have not yet been attacked, between Monschau and Diedenhof. The 48th Infantry Division was replaced there by the 416th Division, which has had no battle experience, and units of the 19th Infantry Division were removed (for the southern-flank of the 1st Army), so all that remains is a defence garrison under command of the divisional staffs. Considering the low battle potential of the defence battalions it would in my opinion be fatal to remove from the area around Trier the 36th Infantry Division, which is the only complete unit.

Just because I was so concerned about the shortage of reserves I requested that a reinforced regimental group be sent from each of the first 3 available infantry divisions. I now ask in addition for an infantry division to be sent in from the assembly areas on each of the three dates, October 12, 15 and 18.

It would be possible to post relief detachments in northern Holland in place of the 256th and 361st Peoples' Grenadier Divisions. After the experiences of Nijmegen and Arnheim it is not very likely that the enemy will attempt any airborne landings east of the general line connecting Emden and Hamm. However the area west of this line is in great danger. And yet we have no great amount of reserves there.

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I therefore request that the reinforcement of the 6th Panzer Army in the area Enschede - Borken - Haltern - Hamm - Muenster - Rheine be done especially early. From that area the Army can if required counter-attack at once in a north-west, west, or south-west direction.

My detailed requirements, once again, are:-

- (a) Accelerated arrival of at least 7 draft conducting battalions (4 for Army Group B, 3 for Army Group G).
- (b) Greater supplies of anti-tank weapons and materials.
- (c) Further increase in ammunition allocations so that with an increased firing power, we will be able to approximate to the enemy strength.

C.-in-C. West Fieldmarshal von Rundstedt

To C.-in-C. West, Fieldmarshal von Rundstedt

October 11, 1944

I wish to report that the situation at Aachen has become more critical. In spite of all our efforts the enemy succeeded in narrowing the corridor on both sides of Haaren to 3,000 metres.

This unfortunate development is mainly the direct result of the complete lack of replacements for the divisions which for several weeks have been in the thick of the fighting.

I request that representations be made to the Fuehrer of the urgency of providing as quickly as possible relief in the form of at least 1 draft conducting battalion for the 183rd and 246th Peoples' Grenadier Divisions, as well as for the 12th Division, since otherwise these divisions will be exhausted and it will be impossible to avoid further reverses.

The bitter and necessarily costly fighting against the enemy's large supplies of man and materials cannot possibly be continued without regular replacements.

Model, Fieldmarshal

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