AIR HISTORICAL BRANCH

TRANSLATION NO. VII/124

EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF THE GOERING CONFERENCE ON AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION PROGRAMME 23 MAY 1944

TRANSLATED BY
AIR MINISTRY, A.H.B.6
AUGUST, 1953.

G.373455/MKL/7/53/60

Present at Conference

Goering
Speer
Field Marshal Milch
Field Marshal von Richthofen
General Korten
Lieutenant General Koller
Major General Vorwald
Major General Galland
Colonel Eschenauer
Colonel Diesing
Colonel Marienfeld
Colonel Petersen
Colonel von Below
Lieutenant Colonel Knemeyer

Herr Schieber (State Councillor)
Herr Dorsch (Under-Secretary of State)
Herr Saur (Administrative Head of Jaegerstab)

Colonel von Brauchitsch

The Reichsmarschall: Gentlemen; the sessions held today and tomorrow are of the first importance, their primary object being to determine conclusively principles governing the entire future armament of the Luftwaffe.

During the past few days I have considered the whole situation in great detail and have also discussed the subject with the Fuehrer. Above all, I have attempted to gain experience from the mistakes which we have made in one way or another in the past. I now believe that the main point in this respect is that up to now we have been quite wrong in relying on the bomber arm. As soon as it was obvious that America was going to enter the war we should have realised that a time would come when the enemy would achieve overwhelming numerical superiority and that we were dealing with an enemy whose technical resources in this field were unlimited.

Looking back to the beginning of the war, the most outstanding feature of all Luftwaffe operations was the employment of the Stuka. All other types of aircraft, such as reconnaissance, fighter, conventional bomber etc., possessed no essentially new characteristic. The development of the dive bomber arm and its employment was something new, something unique, something which took the enemy completely by surprise and even surprised us by the unbelievable successes which it achieved.

If we study the air operations of the early campaigns we see that it was really the Stuka which brought us our great successes. However, we have since drawn false conclusions from this fact. The development of the Stuka arm was very much due to the work of Udet. The creation of a force which gave us such outstanding victories will always be considered his greatest service. Interest in the dive bomber arm naturally increased and the conclusion was reached that horizontal bombing was a thing of the past. This view was strongly supported by Udet and he expounded it to me repeatedly. It was his ardent desire to create a bomber arm consisting solely of dive bombers and to ask for the exclusive production of aircraft capable of dive-bombing in all circumstances, whatever their weight and size.

At this point we jumped from a single-engined aircraft of specific design and in which extensive concessions were made with regard to speed and rate of climb etc., to a much heavier twin-engined aircraft. And then we made what was, perhaps, our biggest mistake: we tried to apply this principle to the largest bomber undergoing development at that time - the Heinkel 177.

The Heinkel 177 had originally been planned as a four-engined aircraft. I was allowed to continue in this belief for a very long time by keeping up this pretence and was never definitely told that there were in fact only two engines, each consisting of two engines joined together.

The driving obsession to make even this heavy bomber capable of dive-bombing resulted first of all in scrapping the four-engined design in favour of the twin-engined type and, as there were no suitable engines with sufficient power available, this led, as I have already mentioned to the use of doubled engines. The He.177 should have been operational by spring 1941 and might have been ready a little later as a four-engined aircraft, but for the complete change in the line of development. For what was now necessary to make the aircraft capable of dive-bombing meant the end of the original He.177. All of the difficulties which now arose were due mainly to the sudden concentration on the twin-engined model and to the fact that an aircraft, which because of its heavy weight and flight characteristics could not dive like the Ju.187, was nevertheless being forced to do so. Furthermore, dive-brakes and every other conceivable type of accessory were tested for months and years until finally the aircraft was so completely altered that it could not then revert without some delay to its original function as a bomber.

The enemy, who did not have such complete faith in the theory of dive-bombing because he had no aircraft of this type, was obliged to use his bomber

forces for horizontal bombing. His large four-engined bomber was naturally the right one for this work. Moreover, he made things very much easier for himself. While we were encountering immense difficulties in making our bombers, even the 88, capable of dive-bombing, all it was necessary for him to do was to produce a bomb-sight which would enable him to carry out high-level precision bombing, thus achieving the same objective and even surpassing it completely by the development of his carpet-bombing technique.

It was a tragedy for us that the aircraft which should have been the mainstay of our bomber force was not available and that finally this aircraft was not and could not be made capable of dive-bombing. And while that was going on we had long ago developed in a much shorter time the Lotfe bombsight which enabled us to carry out extremely accurate bombing from very high altitudes. It was thus shown that horizontal bombing was not only still possible, but that it was in fact more effective.

But it was not only with the He.177 did we pursue this idea to absurd limits but with all our other bombers as well. We must have been fully aware that enemy fighter strength would eventually become overwhelming. We learnt this as early as 1940 when it became evident that the bombers at our disposal at that time could no longer operate over Britain by day without very strong fighter cover. Similarly, we were unable to put into practice the idea of daylight bombing attacks with strong fighter escort. The reason for this was that right from the very start, even as far back as the Reichswehr days, we adhered to a conception of fighter tactics which is fundamentally false. I might even say that we still persist in this false thinking today or that it is at least at the root of our present serious reverses.

It was therefore apparent at the time that we were unable to carry out strongly-esorted precision bombing attacks without interference, not even as far as London as the enemy can undoubtedly do in the Berlin area today.

We could not solve the problem of fighter escort. As we could no longer use our bombers by day we changed over to night operations. However, in order to compel the enemy to challenge our fighters by day we were obliged to make them carry bombs and thus once again it was we who created the fighter-bomber.

In this case too it was a tragedy that we did not continue with this development and that it was taken up by the enemy, who has now created a highly-developed fighter-bomber arm, such as we should have in our present situation, equipped with a long-range single-seater bomber capable of assuming the role of a fighter after dropping its bombs and still faster than any bomber when carrying its load.

We should have realised that we were faced with an enemy who would one day be capable of engaging us with large numbers of fighters and that eventually we would not be able to undertake daylight operations without a bomber capable of very high speeds, in which there would have to be concessions as regards bomb-load. But if we had followed this up to its logical conclusion today we would certainly have a type of fighter-bomber - or call it if you like a high-speed bomber - for I am certain that if we had not allowed ourselves to be led astray by other considerations we would now have had an aircraft, with which we could have acted quite differently.

The bombers which we now have can still be used on the Eastern Front. But apart from the 177 with its heavy armament, bombers can only be employed there at night and only fighter-bombers can be used on daylight operations. The fighter-bomber can still be used by day in the West as well, even though the aircraft available today have remained at the same level technically as when they were first produced in 1940. Moreover there has been no improvement whatsoever in the method of stowing bombs, in the range or in anything else; instead the same fighter-bombers as those we had in 1940 are still being blindly turned out today.

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However, the fighter-bomber still has its advantages; it requires no fighter cover at all in the East, and considerably less in the West than would be necessary for any other type of bomber.

When I consider our present plans I see that we have realised something which was fairly obvious and which the enemy's heavy blows have brought forcibly to our attention, that is that our fighter arm should be made so strong that it would at least offer sufficient protection to permit large-scale armament in other fields to proceed. However, it must be added that this project is at present imposing such a heavy burden on the bomber arm that if it continues and there is no radical change in the situation bomber operations will practically cease purely on account of lack of aircraft. We have here reports in which bombers appear in such small numbers that the Fuehrer himself described them yesterday as absolutely impossible.

We now have a number of propositions. Unfortunately every possibility has already been explored, in some cases to good effect and in others unnecessarily - unnecessarily because at that time I did not see things as clearly as I do now and because I did not exert my personal influence on armaments policy at the right time. I am quite certain about one thing: we can only regain our significance as an offensive force by recognizing here and now a number of basic points.

The first point to recognise is that production of our present types of aircraft should be discontinued as quickly as possible so that they may be replaced by new models. The second point is to agree on which types, if any, should still remain open to discussion. The third point is: On what lines should development and production in this field continue in the future?

As regards a bomber which can carry a fairly heavy load, can operate at night over Britain, has effective armament for night operations and has enough space available to take advantage of all the various instruments which are assuming increasing importance, only the He.177 can be considered at present. Whenever I mention the 177 I will be referring from now on only to the four-engined 177. At the moment the four-engined 177 is the only heavy bomber or long-range bomber - or whatever you wish to call it - at our disposal which can still hold its own in daylight operations in the East and in night operations elsewhere. It can carry a large bomb-load and has a longe range with a limited bomb-load; it is well armed and is large enough to take the extra instruments required for flying at night and in bad weather and for bomb-aiming.

Moreover, with four engines the speed of this aircraft would be increased. You can also imagine how much any future improvement of the engines would improve the performance of the aircraft. In brief, I consider that this is the only bomber available which can be used.

Of the rest, one of the Ju.288 sub-types, which is very heavily armed, has certain other advantages, but has no major advantage over the four-engined 177. I see no point in giving this type favourable consideration in addition to the 177, for the latter carries more bombs and its speed is about the same. Rate of climb and so on are of no importance in this matter.

The Ju.290 is a reconnaissance aircraft which we will not be able to use much longer as it is too slow. The Ju.390 is slightly faster, but has no other advantage. Moreover, these types consume a colossal amount of fuel.

(Milch: It has a long range.)

I am coming to that. Why do we need such a long range? It is necessary for submarine reconnaissance and special operations, but range is a decisive factor only in the case of reconnaissance operations. If today, we had a special reconnaissance Unit equipped with, let us say, 30 special aircraft and the capacity to replace eight to ten aircraft per month, this would be

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sufficient for the enormously wide aims of specialised reconnaissance operations. All other long-range reconnaissance operations could be carried out by the 177 which would not need to carry bombs and could therefore take on a great deal more fuel. Thus in this case too, the 177 could take the place of the long-range reconnaissance aircraft which would be required in fairly large numbers if we were to use a special aircraft for specialised operations.

So much for the heavy bomber! All the others such as the Ju.88 S, the Ju.188 etc. are no longer of vital importance; although they may still be improved in some respects they are neither new nor decisive and must be set aside. It must be clearly realised that in addition to the 177, production of which must now be increased from 100 to at least 200 (per month), we intend eventually to use the high-speed bomber against the Western Allies, that is, we will eventually give up aircraft which can carry large bomb-loads and instead will use only 1,000 kg. or 500 kg. bombs, according to the capacity of the aircraft.

At the moment we have the Me.410 at our disposal. However, I will not discuss this aircraft but will pass on to the new types. Among these I consider the only aircraft capable of becoming the future high-speed bombers and of enabling effective bomber operations to be carried out are the Ju.388 and the Do.335, which are really nothing more than fighter-bombers, and the Ar.234 and the Me.262 as auxiliary fighter-bombers. Thus, it all depends on speed and a small bomb-load, while the range need only be sufficient to enable us to operate over Britain effectively. Given this, we should be satisfied with the aircraft. The new jet bomber, the Ju.287, will provide us with a modern bomber which will once more allow us to operate with a bomb-load of two or three tons, which would mean that we will once more have an effective bomber.

However, it must be realised that high-speed bomber operations must result in different tactics. The highly-effective Lotfe and all similar instruments will have to be abandoned and a compromise found between the horizontal approach with the Lotfe and the all-out dive approach of the old Ju.87. We must produce a bomb-sight which will enable us to drop the bombs on the target whether the aircraft is making a glide or high-speed approach. This would be a comparatively simple piece of equipment. Thus, I do not expect this new high-speed bomber to be capable of diving like a Ju.87; instead, I must produce a bomb-sight which will enable highly effective bombing in a high-speed or glide approach, which will be comparatively simple and fit into a fairly small aircraft. Attention must also be paid to the production of a simple instrument panel so that the pilot can in all circumstances by a very simple procedure, find his way back to base even if bad weather prevents his finding the target and which would also enable him to carry out accurate navigation of the most simple type.

Thus, we would then have a heavy bomber and two or more other types which could be called long-range fighter-bombers or high-speed bombers - it makes no difference to me what they are called.

I will sum up these points again. If I exclude the Me.410 which is already available that leaves the Ju.388, the Do.335, the Ar.234, the Me.262 and also the Ta.151 if it can be given a range comparable to the other types. This means, therefore, that we are intentionally dropping the so-called medium bomber and will not revive it until we have the new jet bomber, which will lead the conversion of the whole of the Luftwaffe to this new type of propulsion. Meanwhile we can more or less forget everything else.

The following point now arises: what can be done to make possible reconnaissance at extreme ranges? What type of aircraft do I have for this purpose? There are the Ju.290 and Ju.390, types which have a colossal fuel consumption, and now - keep a firm hold on yourselves and don't fall under the table - the Me.264. This aircraft, which need be produced only in small numbers and could be further improved, would give us a much faster aircraft than the 290 and would make reconnaissance at extreme ranges possible. I

would set a definite limit - and we have all agreed on this point - of one Gruppe, which could be kept up to strength. This unit would be allotted special long-range reconnaissance duties and we must consider the possibilities if the 264 were especially adapted for this work. If this were done we could exclude all the types which devour so much fuel such as the 290, the 390 and the 288.

There is a further advantage to be gained from concentrating on the high-speed bomber. This aircraft requires only one man, or two at the most, whereas four or five are required for other types. Thus there is a great saving of personnel and, as the aircraft are smaller, of material as well.

We must now consider how these types can be brought up to maximum efficiency for this work. I must once more have a bomber force of at least 2,000 aircraft which can be augmented by a total supply of 800 or 900 aircraft per month, including these small high-speed bombers; in this connection, however, there must be a steady production of 200 four-engined 177's per month and we must also consider what can be done to the 177 priority (the Feuhrer made a special point of this).

(Milch: It is being put in hand very quickly now.)

Then we will soon be using a decent aircraft again.

I wish to express myself quite definitely on this subject. We would then have a series of types performing various tasks. In the first place these aircraft (note: excluding the 177) could act as high-speed bombers and in the second place they could be the future night fighters, for nobody believes that we can use the 88 for much longer.

The same aircraft could also assume the role of the so-called twin-engined or heavy fighter that is a heavily armed long-range aircraft which does not carry bombs. In spite of all the present technical difficulties we must under no circumstances relax our efforts in the field of heavy armament; on the contrary, we must regard the 5 cm cannon as the minimum heavy armament and produce a machine gun, Saur, which has a really high rate of fire. This is still proving to be a disadvantage and we will not be able to manage indefinitely with the present calibre.

All these roles can now be filled by aircraft of this one type such as the Ju.388, Do.335 etc. I do not wish to deal with jet propulsion at all now as this is more or less something of the future which will bring about entirely new factors. When we have perfected the jet engine we will see to what extent this form of propulsion can be transferred from fighters and fighter-bombers to bombers and what further developments are made.

Then we have the second large category comprising the single-engined, single-seater aircraft - the fighters. If I again intentionally exclude the Me.262, which can be used as a fighter-bomber as well as a fighter, it is because we must improve the efficiency of present types as quickly as possible. Their weak armament, which has always been a shortcoming, particularly in the case of the Me.109, must be strengthened, and we must make every effort to increase their range.

Gentlemen, I must tell you something which I shall also tell the designers the day after tomorrow. We must consider the following facts: a year ago American four-engined aircraft carried out their first operations in any strength over the Reich. This was something new for us. Our fighters were not equal to the situation and because of this the enemy was at first able to maintain these operations. We then succeeded in adapting our fighters to deal with the four-engined aircraft. We were very successful and the enemy's losses were such that further operations might have appeared to be too costly. Now I

really must admire the way in which the enemy, who had not previously tackled this problem to any great extent, converted his normal, everyday fighters in the shortest possible time and suddenly confronted us in the vicinity of Liege. We had hardly recovered from this shock when his fighters penetrated as far as Hanover and we had not yet grasped this - it was quite unconceivable - when we heard that they had reached Berlin, Vienna, Munich, Nuremberg and other places. The speed with which the enemy increased the range of his normal fighter aircraft was absolutely amazing. When I think of the utterly pitiful way we fiddled about with our so-called fighter-bomber activities! And the most important thing is that the enemy did not use the most obvious method that comes to mind, that is the addition of one, two or three extra drop tanks - this would not have given him any advantage and would instead have resulted in heavier losses for the fighter escort - but, excluding his normal drop tank, he succeeded in next to no time in modifying his aircraft so that it could carry the fuel internally.

He may have been helped by some of his fighter types having more space available. However, I must remind you, gentlemen, that even the Spitfire is now turning up a hell of a long way from its home base and that the other types such as the Mustang etc. are so much like our own fighters in appearance that I can only wonder where they put the fuel. It has been suggested to me that they have more powerful engines, but if this were so they would logically use more fuel.

I must therefore admit that I am up against an absolute riddle, especially when I think of the speed with which this was accomplished. It has been suggested to me - and I have not checked this as it would drive me completely out of my mind - that he made use to some extent of a device which he first saw in a German aircraft, this being the inflateable tank installed inside the wing. A Me.410 which fell into enemy hands is supposed to have had this device and he was thus able to speed up his development tremendously.

But in leaving this subject I wish merely to say that the types which we are now producing as fighters, whether heavy or light, will also act as ground attack aircraft in the future. Consequently, we also have in this category the close reconnaissance formations, the ground attack formations and the fighter formations again composed of the same basic material. Thus, in this field too, we are approaching a major simplification, particularly if we manage to reduce this endless series of different types, such as the Me.109 AS, Me.109 K, FW 190/801, FW 190/213A, 213E, 605 D etc., which are soon due to appear.

We must carry out this simplification as quickly as possible and concentrate on the best types available at present. Later the Ta.152 will also be transferred to the ground attack arm and the Me.109 will eventually be replaced by the Me.262.

Even if we could improve the Me.109 to some extent today we would still not achieve any worthwhile advantage over the enemy as this type has always had at least one defect, its poor armament. The Me.109 can at best carry only two 151 (20 mm.) machine-guns in addition to the central cannon-gun, and there the matter ends. The guns fitted in "gondola" fairings have been flatly rejected by the pilots and the aircraft can be used in future only as an interceptor of four-engined bombers. The Me.109 has always been a matter of great concern to me, especially as this aircraft unfortunately still constitutes the bulk of the fighters which we are producing - not the FW 190, which is now much more in demand than the Me.109.

I should like to summarise once more my views on future policy. Long-range reconnaissance and heavy bomber formations will be able to use the same type of aircraft. I will not deal with reconnaissance at extreme ranges at this point as this involves a special aircraft which will have to be discussed in detail later. The close reconnaissance, ground attack and single-engined

fighter formations will also use the same type of aircraft. The long-range fighters or heavy fighters, the high-speed bombers and the night fighters are more or less in the same category. Then there are the jets, which are an entirely separate issue.

We can, therefore, make one major simplification here and now, for the same aircraft can be used for the most diverse tasks, as, for example, close reconnaissance, ground attack and fighter operations, and, in the other category, the bulk of our bomber formations, that is the high-speed bombers, twin-eingined fighter-bombers etc. can also use the same type of aircraft. We can undertake an extensive reduction in the number of different aircraft types. When I consider that one type of aircraft can be used as a high-speed bomber, long-range fighter, twin-engined fighter-bomber and so on, it appears that, excluding the jets, practically no other types except the Do.335 and Ju.388 will be required any longer. If you consider that fighters, close reconnaissance aircraft and ground attack aircraft can be supplied from one source such as the Ta.152 and its predecessors, then every need is in fact satisfied. In brief, every contingency which I have mentioned can be met by four types, namely the He.177, the Do.335, the Ju.388 and the Ta.152. In addition, there will be the infusion of the new Ar.234 reconnaissance aircraft, the Me.262 fighter and the Ju.287 bomber. Thus, everything has been reduced to the barest essentials. The type as such is available and needs only to be modified for employment as a bomber, fighter or reconnaissance aircraft.

As regards armament I wish to emphasize once again that the fighter armament of the future must be the quick-firing 5 cm cannon- this is already being developed - and as heavy armament the 7.5 which can be provided at a somewhat later date. However, the 5 cm gun must gradually become the main armament of single-engined and heavy fighters. We should also come to a decision about the free armament of the He.177 and discuss the possibility of developing the 151.131 into a weapon which could be used as a super-heavy machine-gun, thus taking a further step towards standardisation in this field as well.

There remains only the task of undertaking development and production as quickly as possible and moreover I must again emphasise that the Ar.234, Me.262 and Ju.287 jet types which are at present being developed and produced will, if all goes well, soon replace all the rest.

I believe that this must be given precedence as a basic principle and that the ideal number would be a strength of about 500 aircraft and 12 or 13 long-range reconnaissance Gruppen, which would necessitate a rate of replacement of about 180 aircraft per month. However, I do not wish to regard the long-range reconnaissance aircraft as being restricted to this function as the 388 and 335 can be used to a considerable extent. I have not yet decided about reconnaissance being carried out by the 177, but in any case only a fraction of these aircraft would be so employed. As regards close reconnaissance formations we have about 16 Gruppen. The total would therefore be 832 aircraft with a rate of replacement of 250 to 280 aircraft per month. I would like to increase the bomber formations to 63 Gruppen comprising 2,500 to 2,600 aircraft with a constant rate of replacement of 850 to 900 aircraft per month, including 200 of the four-engined type. The remainder would consist of high-speed bombers until the jet bomber appears.

Ground attack formations will be increased to 38 Gruppen comprising 1,500 to 1,600 aircraft with a rate of replacement of 750 to 750 aircraft per month. Then there are the long-range and heavy fighters which will have 24 Gruppen numbering 1,250 aircraft with 480 replacements per month and the single-engined single-seater fighters - this will be the main production difficulty - which will have 82 Gruppen comprising 5,500 to 5,600 aircraft with 2,600 replacements per month. These are our plans, and the figures are rather higher as I have added on ground attack aircraft.

/(Milch:

(Milch: That is approximately correct.)

In addition, there will be 45 night fighter Gruppen numbering 1,800 aircraft with 650 replacements per month. That is ample, and if we reduced the figure to 500 it would still be adequate.

This would provide a comprehensive programme. The jets are included, but as they appear the other types could be reduced.

Thus, with about 14,000 to 14,500 aircraft and 5,500 to 6,000 replacements per month I would have an air force which, although still numerically inferior to the enemy would at least be capable of achieving local parity.

I submitted this proposal to the Fuehrer yesterday and he shares my opinion that every possible effort must be made to achieve this aim and from this point to restore the Luftwaffe as the factor which will finally tip the balance in our favour. The Army and the Navy have always demanded absolute priority but whenever they get into difficulty they call for the Luftwaffe and must be constantly reminded that if they had not been so short-sighted the air power which they need would be available.

I wished to make this quite clear so that you, gentlemen, would have until tomorrow to consider these proposals. I have given a great deal of thought to the matter. I have also asked myself repeatedly if, in a year or two's time, I shall regret these steps as I now regret many things. However, after considering every aspect I am certain that the policy which I have just described is the correct one and the best that can be managed in the present circumstances.

We must therefore consider how far we can accomplish this programme with the means at our disposal. Then we must decide what amendments must be made to the programme, after which no further alterations will be made. We must also determine how our present resources and production can best be absorbed into the programme. With regard to this, I wish to make just one more request; I want you to consider whether the high-speed bombers can carry bombs of various calibres, such as the smallest type in canisters as well as medium bombs (50 kg and 52 kg bombs), instead of always carrying on 1,000 kg bomb. It should be possible to adapt the aircraft to carry a stick of 50 kg bombs, even if the weight is not perfectly counter-balanced. Different types of bombs are necessary for different purposes.

There is only one more question to settle. If we consider the He.177 in an anti-shipping role its main weapon is the remote-controlled anti-shipping bomb. This bomb was originally intended for the He.177, as was the Fritz X. There then remains the question of the torpedo. And here for the first time in my programme I am in real trouble. I decided that I would not let my boys carry out torpedo attacks in the He.177 unless a torpedo were produced which could be released at a range great enough to permit even the He.177 to make a horizontal approach. However, as we are now dealing with this part of the programme, I thought surely there is at least a possibility that the Ju.388 is able to carry a torpedo.

(Milch: Certainly! This also applies to the successor to the conventional torpedo, the so-called FK, which will put us in a much better position.)

That too. We must remember that since the speed of torpedo-carying aircraft is always slightly reduced, in certain cases their range could be increased by fitting drop tanks which could be jettisoned prior to the attack. It would also be a help if they economised in fuel by approaching the target area at low speed. Furthermore, this type is more suitable than any other for launching the attack owing to its speed and rate of climb. Thus, the Ju.388 would meet these requirements. I am convinced that the Do.335 would also be suitable for this task.

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The He.177 is unfortunately not being produced in sufficient quantity. I could still use all the available He.177's for night operations until further notice, first of all in the East and then elsewhere.

The Ju.188 will enable night operations to be continued for some time until the new formations become operational. If the 2,600 bombers planned in the programme comprise let us say 600 He.177's and 2,000 high-speed aircraft which can operate by day, then this will be sufficient. It makes no difference to me how many bombs can be dropped by night or by day, the decisive point is how many bombs can be dropped over a period of 24 hours. I am satisfied if one type of aircraft can fly only at night and another only by day.

I think we have now dealt with every problem. All that remains is for us to consider the various aspects calmly tomorrow.

These were the main points which I wished to make and I believe that it would be useful if we now discussed fully how the Director General of Luftwaffe Equipment has worked out the programme and then how this can be co-ordinated with the programme outlined by me. Saur, I should like to point out that the figures which I have mentioned here are not final and are still open to amendment.

A.H.B.6 Distribution
Same as Translation VII/122

G.373455/MKL/7/53/60