

RAF BRIZE NORTON AERODROME OPERATING HAZARD LOG
Last Updated 18 Aug 25

Nature of hazard.	Location of hazard.	Permanence of hazard. Temporary / Permanent.	Is the hazard affected by season / light or time?	What mitigation has been employed, if any to reduce its impact?	Further actions.	Additional information / comments.	Last review date dd/mm/yy.	Next review date dd/mm/yy	Related Safety Assessment / Safety Survey	Closure date and reference dd/mm/yy	Hazard SME
A short title used for the easy identification of the hazard. Included at the end of the title				<i>List the details of all strategies, actions, plans and measures in place to reduce or control the hazard. Reference any additional documents.</i>	<i>List any strategies, actions, plans and measures that are due to be taken or could be used to further reduce or control the hazard.</i>	<i>Hazard description, contributory factors, further information.</i>	<i>dd/mm/yy The date the hazard entry last received review.</i>	<i>dd/mm/yy The next review date in-line with the BM Hazard</i>	<i>The identifier for any related safety assessments.</i>	<i>dd/mm/yy Closure ref as required</i>	
BZNAOHL01 Rwy or Twy Incursions (Vehicles) (Vehicles and/or personnel operating in or close to the protected area of an active runway or taxiway)-MT Route on Taxiways.	Runway/ Taxiways	Permanent	1. Reduced visibility at night and during LVP increases possibility of driver disorientation. 2. Reduced visibility at night and in adverse weather reduces effectiveness of ATC, pilot and driver lookout. 3. Sun glare may reduce ability of airfield drivers to observe traffic light signals.	1. All airside drivers conduct an annual Airfield Access Brief (AAB) and tested prior to the issuance of an Airfield Access Permit (AAP). 2. Signage including "STOP" and "RUNWAY AHEAD" markings painted on airfield at crossing points (ESR Submitted). 3. 100% AAP checks at MEPs. 4. Traffic lights and barriers. 5. Driver, Pilot and ATC lookout and awareness. 6. Limited Access - Visiting vehicles escorted by Airfield Ops Driver. 7. Only MRE equipped vehicles allowed to cross/enter the active runway. Vehicles must be in receipt of a positive ATC clearance which is read back to ATC verbatim and follow by a green traffic light signal. Vehicles are not authorised to transit through a red light in any circumstance. 8. Light & flare signals. 9. Access to appropriate charts. 10. Supervision of instructions - ATC Supervisor or other controllers/ASOS identify an incorrect instruction. 11. Ac or vehicle challenge the instruction given to them by ATC. 12. Standard phraseology. 13. On receipt of an initial AAP Tier 1&2 permit, personnel receive airfield famil from their section. 14. Pers are required to provide justification for a Tier 2 Permit. 15. Employment of Airfield Driving Manager who has ownership and oversight of all driving/access requirements. 16. Brief is now accessed via MS Teams, providing ease of use for both military and civilian personnel.	1. Reiterated during the AAP Brief. 2. Specific incidents are highlighted during the AAP for educational purposes. Hotspots have been identified and are actively watched by Ramp Safety. 3. ATCO can break an ac off the approach or direct them to abort a departure. 4. Airfield Assurance, Airfield Op's, Ramp Safety and RAFF can be used to intercept as required. 5. Airfield Safety Driving Campaign scheduled to take place.	1. Airfield is only accessible to AAP holders from domestic site. 2. Vehicles/personnel may inadvertently cross the active runway (increasing the risk to aircraft) due to the following: 3. Airfield unfamiliarity 4. Drivers/Aircrew not adhering to ATC instructions. 5. Human error. 6. Recommendation from OSI DI to change the C/D & E/G intersection lights so that they operate independently. 7. Most of Taxiway B and a large portion of Taxiway G are co-located with the Southside MT Route, resulting in uncontrolled vehicles regularly on an active taxiway. 8. Personnel operating on the airfield after submitting inaccurate or false information. 9. Full review carried out of airfield driving/access. 10. Investigations ongoing for employment of Dep Airfield Driving Manager.	15/08/25	15/02/26	Nil	Open	A/F Assurance
BZNAOHL02 Inconspicuous Colour of Vehicles on the AOS (Non-compliant with RA3267)	Airfield	Permanent	1. Weather conditions and darkness which reduce visibility, increase the likelihood of vehicles operating on the airfield being unseen.	1. Most airfield vehicles on permanent lease have oscillating/occluding amber lights mounted. 2. Airfield Assurance have a number of amber beacons that can be loaned to sections.	1. Airfield Access Manager and Ramp Safety requested to engage with airfield users to promote understanding and application of RA3267. 2. MT to accept requirements as stated in RA3267 when acquiring airfield-prodominant vehicles for lease.	1. BZN has numerous contractors operating on the airfield which make up approx 50% of the vehicle traffic on the airfield. The majority have appropriate lighting but colours vary between companies.	15/08/25	15/02/26	Nil	Open	A/F Assurance
BZNAOHL03 Rwy Incursion (Act Vs Act) (Air systems operating on the ground or in close proximity to a protected area of an active runway)	Runway	Permanent	1. Reduced visibility in adverse weather increases possibility of pilot disorientation. 2. Reduced visibility at night and in adverse weather reduces effectiveness of ATC or pilot lookout. 3. Sun glare may reduce ability of pilots to observe airfield lights.	1. All aircrew operate to a basic level of competency regardless of crew experience. 2. Signage including "STOP" and "RUNWAY AHEAD" markings painted on airfield at crossing points. 3. Runway Guard Lights 4. Specific taxi instructions regarding route and holding point. Explicit clearance required for aircraft to enter/cross the runway. 5. Traffic lights at runway intersections. Although aircraft do not require a green traffic light to proceed, red traffic lights serve as a timely reminder that the aircraft is approaching the runway. 6. Pilot and ATC lookout. 7. ATC procedures. For back track or line up, aircraft are required to be on Twr frequency, shared by aircraft that will be utilising the runway e.g. instrument approaches. 8. ATC procedures. Gnd controller requires a specific clearance for an aircraft to cross the runway on taxi, from the Twr controller. 9. Broadcasts of ac on instrument approaches are given on Twr frequency at 8 nm final. 10. Low Visibility Procedures. 11. Follow me available at request.	1. New Hold signage and update of Mil AIP to reflect this.	Aircraft may inadvertently cross or enter the active runway (increasing the risk to multiple aircraft) due to the following: 1. Airfield unfamiliarity. 2. Incorrect / unclear ATC instructions. 3. Aircrew not adhering to ATC instructions 4. Human error.	15/08/25	15/02/26	Nil	Open	TATCC(S) Cdr
BZNAOHL04 Potential collision between wildlife and air systems other than birds.	All operating surfaces.	Permanent.	Hazard increased during times of reduced visibility.	1. Look out by ATC and pilots. 2. Regular AWCU patrols. 3. High Stn boundary fences. 4. Culvert Protection. 5. Cull frequency will increase if deemed appropriate.	1. All Airside personnel are trained to report any unusual activity. 2. Continuous culls.	Possible increase for wildlife ingress due to vegetation growth along fence line.	15/08/25	15/02/26	Nil	Open	A/F ASSURANCE
BZNAOHL06 Non RA/MAA compliant obstacles in OFZ/ Rwy excursion	OFZ	Permanent	No	1. Obstacles other than trees within the runway strip are compliant with the requirements in MRP. 2. A number of obstacles have been identified which infringe the transitional surface, including: a) Stn Cdrs house and stone wall. b) A400M Hgr (Bldg 1300). c) Bay 35 outer fencing. These have been the subject of a Duty Holder Board which has reached a ALARP & TOLERABLE risk conclusion. 3. There are 4 obstructions within the taxiway strip that are MRP non-compliant obstacles within the taxiway surface, they include: a) The Oxygen Bay Shelter which infringes by 6.5 m. b) HRDF Receiver which infringes by 2.5 m. c) The fence around BFI 4. d) The M15 fence surrounding the sluice gate/water course, adjacent to Crash Gate 7, both of which infringe by 6 m. 4. A LoA acknowledging the obstacles and reduced wingtip clearance is in place between the Stn and Air Tanker. 5. ATC and A/F Assurance carry out an annual review of data from latest Measured Height Survey to compile a list of obstacles that infringe the OFZ with the objective of presenting a DHB to the DDH.	1. All future works should meet the Class E airfield requirements as per RA3512, as facilities become redundant, replacements will also meet the new criteria. 2. Ongoing investigation to align MAA policy with current CAA mitigation for non-compliant obstacles.		15/08/25	15/02/26	Nil	Open	TATCC(S) Cdr and Airfield Assurance
BZNAOHL07 Bird Activity (Trees in the 25 Approach lane includes Birdstrikes on Airfield)	Approach lane Rwy 25	Permanent	Affected by season-migratory cycles, breeding season. Birds roosting in the Approach lane pose credible risk to inbound ac, especially ac in trail. (First ac passes and disturbs birds which ride the wash, thereby becoming a hazard for subsequent ac.)	Mitigations include: 1. Crew Lookout 2. AWCU Lookout 3. Assurance Monthly reports of BCU 4. External periodic checks of BCU. 5. Ongoing nest removal and tree cutting.	1. Works service request (Apr 25) made to have AWCU tracks made all weather, as wet weather increase the risk of mud being transferred to a/c operating surfaces. 2. Investigations ongoing into VolkerFitzpatrick providing support for hard-coreing of existing airfield surfaces.	Works service request made to have AWCU tracks made all weather, as wet weather increase the risk of mud being transferred to a/c operating surfaces. Annual Audit report supports this in recommendation. CAA visit highlighted areas of concerns.	15/08/25	15/02/26	Nil	Open	SLOps
BZNAOHL08 FOD	All operating surfaces	Permanent	Night hrs. reduce the effectiveness of lookout to mitigate against FOD. The high number of personnel who are able to access to the manoeuvring area leads to an increased risk of FOD.	1. Daily airfield inspections 2. Weekly sweeping plan 3. FOD Plods - Section and Annual. 4. FOD awareness training 5. Tool controls 6. Signage 7. Look out 8. FOD prevention strategy 9. FOD Management Plan 10. Annual stn FOD Plods		All FOD collected is registered and DASORs raised if applicable.	15/08/25	15/02/26	Nil	Open	FOD Officer
BZNAOHL13 Armed aircraft / dangerous cargo on airfield.	Licensed DG bays	Permanent.	No.	1. Aircraft parking plan - armed aircraft / aircraft carrying dangerous cargo may only be parked on designated licenced bays. 2. Designated safe headings for armed aircraft. 3. Aircraft with unknown cargo are considered armed until confirmed otherwise. 4. Armed aircraft / aircraft carrying explosive cargo are not permitted to enter hangars with minimal specific exceptions. 5. Internal and external armed aircraft signage. 6. Internal and external explosive freight signage. 7. Specialist advice available from ESA. 8. Authorised transportation containers for DG e.g. flares. 9. Approved explosive transit routes for movement of DG (not the MT route). 10. Licenced bays are surveyed and given a maximum Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ) rating. 11. Deconfliction of engine ground runs against aircraft carrying DG / armed aircraft. 12. ATC deconfliction of taxi patterns against parked armed aircraft / aircraft carrying DG. 13. ATC procedures / attendance of crash vehicles to DG laden aircraft prior to engine start / aircraft arrival. 14. Ramp Safety input leaflet for info into ASC DASOR Digest for safety education to broaden knowledge. 15. Exclusion zone placed around the DG Bay for certain loads.	1. Periodic Review of Parking Plan AESO (2-1-2-3)	1. Presence of dangerous cargo / explosive materials represents a potential hazard to aircraft, other airfield users and infrastructure. 2. Compliance by foreign visiting aircraft/aircrew may not be up to RAF standards or policy.	15/08/25	15/02/26	Constantly under review by ESA	Open	SLOps / ESS
BZNAOHL17 Non-MAA Compliant Apron Stanchion Lighting	ASP and Aprons	Permanent	Night time only	1. Portable Lighting available on request 2. Highlighted in Defence Aerodrome Manual 3. New LEDs installed southside, C17 dispersal and Bays 70-80. Unfortunately that now blinds ATC preventing vision of Twy B and 07 App. shields to channel light were installed but removed due to safety; new design pending. 4. Waterfront LED conversion complete.	1. Lighting Survey has confirmed that lighting is below that laid down in RA3515(10). OC EMS has bid to bring the lighting to the required level. Work to be conducted on the Bay 35 lights.	1. Subject of separate review by DIO. 2. Intent to install new stanchion i/o B72/73.	15/08/25	15/02/26	Functional Safety	Open	A/F ASSURANCE TATCC(S) Cdr

BZN/AOHL/18 Environmental Trees infringing ILS glidepath Rwy 07 and TACAN	07 Approach	Permanent	No	1. Break-off procedures. Should an aircraft become dis-established from the glide path, procedures are already in place, laid down in RA3292 that dictate the actions in this event. 2. If visual with the airfield the pilot can convert to a visual recovery and continue the approach, if the pilot is not visual then they are to break off the approach, execute the missed approach procedure and will then be re-fered for another approach. 3. Procedure minimas are in force, beneath which an air system must not descend unless required visual references have been established. 4. ATC have the ability to monitor ILS approaches 5. Issues highlighted in DAM and via NOTAM	1. DIO engagement with landowner to allow felling of trees iaw MHS Sep 2019. As of Apr 21, Low Hill wooded area cut back to within MHS limits. Next priority is 07 app wooded areas - unfunded in FY21/22. DIO currently investigating the cutting back of the trees.	1. Annual MHS identifies trees. ATC monitor the on-going issue. Crews able to fly localiser only approach 2. The ground in-front of the 07 glidepath significantly slopes away, this causes the beam to refract. To mitigate this the glideslope was raised to 3.2 degrees. 3. Cutting the trees will improve the performance of the 07 ILS however, because of point 2 above, it will remain degraded due to topography.	15/08/25	15/02/26	Nil	Open	Simon Wooldridge, AST A/F ASSURANCE
BZN/AOHL/20 Poorly configured Runway AGL and Airfield lighting	Runway, Taxiway & ASP	UFN	No	1. Poor configuration of AGL presents failure to green temporarily during power loss and both sides of the rwy have joint light control, so when C goes green, so does D. 2. Monthly embargo to allow contractors to work on Rwy and Airfield AGL		All Rwy circuits have been replaced. Unserviceabilities are NOTAM'd Unserviceabilities are broadcast by ATC	15/08/25	15/02/26	Nil	Open	A/F ASSURANCE
BZN/AOHL/21 Operating from an Aging Operating Surface	Entire AOS	UFN	No	1. Annual Maintenance Inspection. 2. Monthly Vinci Inspections. 3. Daily Inspections by Airfield Assurance and Airfield Ops. 4. AWCU keeping a good lookout. 5. Application of Polymer in Sep 24 to prevent deterioration & prolong 'life'. 6. Repairs on numerous twys and the rwy thresholds. 7. Rapid runway recovery plan with DIO. 8. Full runway ops during summer months. 9. Rhinophalt on all twys except Twy A in Jul/Aug 24.		Programme to refurbish the AOS in 25. Last Polymer sprayed in Sep 24. Approx 1000m of the Rwy has been re-surfaced in summer 23. Risk to output recorded on PARMIS. Core Samples received with information on heat effects to the E/F intersection.	15/08/25	15/02/26	Nil	Open	A/F ASSURANCE
BZN/AOHL/35 Increased activity around TWE (Bay 1&2)	Airfield	Temporary	No	1. FOD Prevention measures employed by sections 2. Vehicle operator training, including forklift training 3. Driver lookout 4. Aircraft crew lookout	On going	TWE will remain in situ for approx 5 years. TWE now in place 5yrs +, Afld Assnce to request structural integrity survey completed via EMS as TWEs are now at life ex. Survey planned for Aug 25.	15/08/25	15/02/26	Nil	Open	A/F ASSURANCE
BZN/AOHL/39 Loss of ATC equipment during station generator testing or in the event of an unplanned power outage.	Airfield	Permanent	No	1. Traffic light and barrier failures are displayed in VCR and fail to red. 2. Similar to LVP vehicles deployed to protect Rwy access points 3. Aquila engineers on 24 hour call 4. BCP for outages. 5. LoSS still mitigated by TCAS (for Xpdr ac only) and lookout. 6. UPS and generator. 7. Generator switchover can be targeted to a specific period where traffic levels are light. 8. Agreement with DIO in-place enabling ATC to cancel the generator testing by direct line right up to the point of switching the power off. 9. DSF liaise with TATCC(S) ref planned outages.		1. UPS backup for all ATC services with 30 min time. 2. Routine station generator testing takes place at RAF Brize Norton every 4 weeks. During the switch to from mains power to the backup supply, interruption has been experienced in a number of key systems involved in the provision of an ATC i.e SSR, Airfield CCTV, RW Traffic Lights, ET, HRDF, ATC Air Conditioning & Lighting. NOTE - RAF Benson also shares the Brize Norton SSR head.	15/08/25	15/02/26	Nil	Open	TATCC(S) Cdr
BZN/AOHL/42 Non-compliance of LOx Bay distance from Twy Echo	Twy Echo	Permanent	No	1. Stn based platforms can all transit Twy Echo safely without impact to aircraft. 2. All Stn based platform operators are aware on the non-compliance.		RA3512 states twy centreline to object is to be 43.5m. The distance from the Twy Echo centreline to the LOx Bay fence is 40m.	15/08/25	15/02/26	Nil	Open	A/F ASSURANCE
BZN/AOHL/43 Non-compliant gradients and dimensions of AOS	Entire AOS	Permanent	No	1. Safety survey completed which list numerous mitigations for each hazard. 2. AOS Refurb will make some of the non-compliances compliant.			15/08/25	15/02/26	Safety Survey	Open	A/F ASSURANCE
BZN/AOHL/44 Limited STAR-NG performance due 40kt 'Speed Gate'.	Radar Performance	Permanent	No	1. Safety assessment for the use of electronic conspicuity completed by TATCC(S). Implemented, and current operating procedures deemed ALARP by BMFHQ and DDH. 2. Distribution of 40kt "speed gate" video aimed to highlight the hazard with visual aids to DDH and Fg Sgns within TATCC(S) AOR. 3. Information related to radar performance highlighted in both RAUWGs and FIH to inform non-standard users of TATCC(S) Air Traffic services. 4. Work into use of multiple sensors ongoing. This will provide some redundancy and improved detection, but ultimately won't fix the issue. 5. Electronic conspicuity used by ATC Sup for increased SA.		Limitations with the STAR-NG non cooperative radar associated with 40kt "speed gate". Aircraft operating as per parameters found in 20221208-DHAN 22-01 MARSHALL. Surveillance Sensors will no longer be displayed by STAR-NG. Ultimately, this results in a lower proportion of non-transponding traffic, mostly gliders, not being shown to Controllers. This hazard is very well documented at BMFHQ, and DDHs and Fg Sgns across TATCC(S) AOR have been informed, with recommendations to review BowTies. In accordance with BM Orders, TATCC(S) employs the use of electronic conspicuity to supplement some traffic information, although issues with this have been identified as per 20220412-Electronic_Conspicuity_SAofC-OS.	15/08/25	15/02/26	20221208-DHAN 22-01 MARSHALL Surveillance Sensors	Open	TATCC(S) Cdr
BZN/AOHL/45 Airfield Works causing changes to taxi patterns	AOS	Permanent	No	1. Airfield Assurance communicate with ATC to ensure taxi pattern not too complex. 2. Any taxiway closures NOTAM'd to ensure crews are aware.			15/08/25	15/02/26	Nil	Open	Airfield Assurance and TATCC(S) Cdr
BZN/AOHL/46 Overbanding Issues	AOS	Permanent	No	1. Daily inspections. 2. Monthly maintenance inspections.		AOS Refurb will remove a large amount of overbanding across the airfield	15/08/25	15/02/26	Nil	Open	Airfield Assurance
BZN/AOHL/47 ILS non- compliance	ILS	Temporary	No	ATC radar monitoring for safety Aircrew reporting of unlocks or equipment issues	Continued work by BM HQ to understand costs for Aquilla modelling and tests	Held until next routine flight check or until something manifestly changes the risk calculus.	22/09/25	28/02/26	Yes	Open	OC OSW TATCC(S)