Jordanian
Air Force
F-16

Air Power
A Middle East Perspective

By
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Lieutenant General HRH Prince Feisal, the Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Jordanian Armed Forces, gave a presentation at last year's Middle East Air Symposium on some aspects of air power. This paper is based on that presentation, and also includes extracts from an interview given by General Feisal based on themes arising from the presentation. They are included in this edition of Air Power Review because together they provide a unique view of air power, viewed from a perspective that we do not often see – that of an Arab air force.

The underlying theme of this article is how to justify the value of air power, and, as a former air chief, I believe I can pose a question that is pertinent both to Jordan as well as most other countries. Given an environment where domestic security and crisis operations are equally as important as security from foreign threats, can we airmen truly justify our value in the security equation? As an air chief, my role in advancing the cause of air power was paramount. As a member of the joint staff, my role is to balance air power within a national security context. As a member of the Royal Court, my responsibility is to consider the total security equation that has essentially three elements: security from foreign threats, domestic security and safety from the consequences of man-made and natural disasters.

I plan to approach this theme from three distinct aspects, which will be interwoven throughout the paper. Firstly, I will discuss the roles and challenges of conventional air forces against unconventional forces which employ asymmetric tactics and weapons; secondly, I will address the unconventional use of air force assets in support of crisis response, homeland security and humanitarian operations; and thirdly, I will present my thoughts on alternative ways that pan-Arab air forces could operate together in the future with an emphasis on integrated out-of-area operations.

Since the destruction of Saddam's military machine, we have seen a major shift from conventional warfare to unconventional warfare in our region. Consequently, we must readjust our air order of battle to align our resources more effectively with unconventional uses of air power in missions other than traditional warfare. For many reasons the Arab air order of battle, which is lighter than our Western partners, is better suited for unconventional warfare. This is fortunate, since our adversaries are adopting asymmetrical strategies and tactics to counter our reliance on conventional warfighting systems.

In fact, a counter revolution in military affairs is underway. Intellectually, much of our military doctrine is wedded to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) ideology, which presupposes that the technological leaps which always transcend older realities of warfare will give militaries that successfully embrace them a considerable advantage. However, technology itself has reversed the RMA. Empowered by the Internet, cell phones and discounted airline tickets, net-enabled terrorists use new technology to operate worldwide and synchronize lethal strikes with devastating consequences. In 2005, net-enabled terrorists simultaneously bombed three Amman hotels, killing, maiming and injuring three hundred people. By camouflaging and embedding their operations within the mass population and urban environments, terrorists negate many of our high-technology weapons. Unconventional weaponry, like improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or chemical weapons employed by suicide bombers, now matches the firepower of traditional weapon systems. In 2004, our police foiled a truck bomb chemical attack that might have killed eighty thousand

Jordanians. In many ways, technology has made the suicide bomber a weapon of mass destruction. In the future, the unconventional warfare order of battle looks even bleaker. Rather than facing hundreds of suicide bombers controlled by terrorist organisations, we face the chilling prospect of facing armies of suicide bombers controlled by nation states.

From the perspective of the Royal Court, I see the dangers to Jordan's security and prosperity as being made up from a combination of man-made and natural threats. Countering conventional threats from the air, land and sea remains the bedrock of our armed forces but this must be balanced with other security and safety needs. New unconventional threats include insurgencies, improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers. Emerging threats include ballistic and cruise missiles. The increasing tensions in this area between Israel and Iran are especially troublesome since Jordan would be caught in the middle of any conflict between these 2 states. Weapons of mass destruction are back on our regional front burner with the Iranian nuclear programme, conjecture about Israel's nuclear arsenal, French declarations about pre-emptive nuclear strikes on terrorists and speculation that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction are hidden in Syria. However explosive weapons of mass destruction are my greatest worry at the present time; a water, cement or fuel truck loaded with thirty thousand pounds of explosive has a blast radius of a mile. Coupling this particular weapon with biological, chemical or radiological material would give a terrorist sufficient destructive capability to severely damage any city in our region. Other potential man-made crises include sabotage, cyber-warfare, random terrorism, organized crime, civil unrest and disobedience and the disruption of public events. While less lethal, these threats have a much higher probability of occurrence and a lot of disruptive power. As evidenced by recent earthquakes and the Asian tsunami, natural disasters also threaten the security of our citizens – in recent years, Jordanians have experienced numerous tremors along the Jordan rift valley, as well as a number of devastating flash floods. All these threats force decision makers to prioritize and re-prioritize requirements and funding. It is the responsibility of air chiefs to ensure that the decision makers are aware of the value of air power in responding to these threats, and if they are not aware, they need to be informed and educated.

What I am trying to suggest is that for most of the nations participating in MEAS[1], we will be looking at a far wider spectrum of operations in the future, covering everything from major conventional warfare to law enforcement support. This is true for most other countries as well, including the US, which, compared to Jordan, has almost unlimited resources. According to the recent Quadrennial Defense Review, the Defense Department's goal is to shift the emphasis of US forces

from countering a near-peer power to responding to a much wider range of contingencies. These include defeating terrorist networks, dealing with threatening regional powers, countering weapons of mass destruction, protecting the homeland, and fighting irregular forces for prolonged periods in places like Iraq. In addition, the Department of Defense (DoD) intends to expand its cooperation and integration with other US government agencies to help with domestic security and natural disasters such as the ones I have just mentioned. Domestic security and unconventional operations should also be major issues for the MEAS nations, which therefore need to consider closer integration in the key areas of air mobility, C4ISR[2] and combat power. Within these areas, airmen traditionally value combat power above all else, although this attitude is gradually changing. Ground commanders tend to call for more air mobility and logistics support rather than more air delivered precision weapons. From an inter-agency perspective, C4ISR is the priority. In particular there is growing interest in Jordan's lead with regard to net-centric operations, with the recent Network Centric Operations Symposium being a prime example. However, our rapid-response teams and domestic security officials are learning fast and are seeking affordable systems and procedures that can take advantage of the ability to deter or defeat adversaries by shortening the kill chain and finding, fixing, tracking, targeting, executing and assessing the enemy faster than he can 'F2T2EA' us. And this is particularly important because as our adversaries adopt asymmetric tactics, our law enforcement personnel become the new front line in national security. Now as I mentioned earlier, significant numbers of unconventional warfare forces are very active in Iraq. Additionally, many in the Iraqi law enforcement and military forces owe their allegiance to militia groups such as the Badr Brigade, Mahdi Army and Hezbollah, with the Kurds also representing another major separatist faction. In the past, trying to control these groups would have been a matter for law enforcement agencies rather than the military. However this is no longer true as the numbers and firepower are simply too great for traditionally configured law enforcement bodies. Since insurgencies tend to be borderless, the distinction between national security, traditionally defined as outside our borders, and domestic security, inside our borders, is very blurred. All of this leads me to the earlier question: can we airmen truly justify our value to the security equation? Furthermore, do the other agencies truly understand our value and can they access our unique capabilities?

Egyptian Air Force F-16s

At a previous MEAS, the Royal Air Force of Oman gave an excellent presentation regarding lessons learned from NATO's first out-of-area combat operation in Bosnia from 1993 to 1995, and compared this operation with a potential Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) out-of-area operation. More than forty four years after NATO was formed by a coalition the size of ours, NATO conducted their first out-of-area combat air operation known as Operation DENY FLIGHT to stop ethnic cleansing

of Bosnian Muslims. Several years later, NATO's Operation DELIBERATE FORCE helped pave the way for a comprehensive peace agreement. Both of these operations were conducted by several hundred aircraft from air forces similar to our Arab ones. Collectively, the GCC, Egypt and Jordan have about one thousand nine hundred combat weapon systems which could easily support a DENY FLIGHT or DELIBERATE FORCE-type operation. We have the aircraft, expertise and perhaps a cause, if the Iraqi government dissolves, to execute such an operation. However, we lack appropriate planning and preparation for pan-Arab out-of-area operations; what is needed is a MEAS working group to study NATO operational lessons learned and apply them to potential pan-Arab out-of-area operations. Furthermore, such planning should very definitely not be limited to warlike operations.

On 8 October 2005, a powerful earthquake with a magnitude of seven point six on the Richter scale struck Pakistan causing a major humanitarian disaster. The United Nations responded immediately but was severely impeded by the lack of fixed and rotary aircraft to deliver critical supplies and airlift victims to safe areas – fortuitously the US was able to step in and fill the gap. Over a five month period US air forces flew more than four thousand sorties, supplied approximately nine million kilogrammes of aid, treated thirty thousand patients and cleared forty thousand tonnes of debris. While we are thankful to America for this support, a pan-Arab airlift fleet would be able to do the same or much more. One hundred Arab aircraft, or a third of our available assets, flying three missions a day, over the same five-month period, could fly over forty thousand sorties. Considering the overwhelming need for airlift and air mobility throughout the region, it is hard to explain why we have not considered a pan-Arab airlift-coalition of the willing before. This fleet could be used for far more than just humanitarian missions though: it could transport chemical/biological or medical teams to affected areas, evacuate critical personnel and support peace operations. Today, the United Nations has twenty eight peace operations manned by personnel from one hundred and three nations. Of these twenty-eight operations, eighteen involve Muslim countries, many located in our own region. From my point of view, Arab airlift capability is significant but underutilized – mainly due to the lack of a pan-Arab coordinating agency – but again this does not reflect the totality of air power's offerings in this area.

Arab coalition C4ISR aircraft, unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) and helicopters are critical to unconventional roles and missions. Law enforcement officials and border police clamour for more aerial surveillance assets or 'eyes in the sky', and whilst their need is obvious, this does not mean that we should have another air force in my country. Consequently, we are working diligently to share assets across national, sector and local platoon/police levels via a major new effort called the Royal Jordanian Joint C4ISR System. However, we still struggle with two major challenges: cultural and financial. Culturally, personnel at the local level know little about the national level and are reluctant to ask for assistance. Financially, high costs of national assets limit the number of platforms suited to small ground and law enforcement forces – for instance the cost of one F16 would buy a much greater number of lower-technology assets3 – such as our locally-produced Seeker aircraft. In July 2005, the US sent an assessment team to Jordan to evaluate the Seeker aircraft which is being supplied by us to the newly re-formed Iraqi Air Force. The assessment team evaluated the effectiveness of using low-cost, fixed-wing, manned

The Seabird Aviation Jordan Seeker SBL-360A is manufactured in Jordan

aircraft to provide situational awareness to the commanders of small units on the ground, and conducted trials in the areas of convoy escort, border surveillance and maritime patrol. According to the evaluators, 'the goal of the trials was to rediscover the tactics, techniques and procedures developed to support small units during past wars but since forgotten'. Ambushes continue to inflict significant casualties on small ground units in Iraq and Afghanistan, because small units often conduct operations without the ability to see beyond natural and man-made obstructions. For patrols and convoy escort, the integration of aerial observation into ground operations can extend the 'eyes' of the small-unit commander beyond line of sight. The small units considered in the operational assessment included military platoons as well as civilian police and border control forces, and beyond the operational assessment, the DoD team assessed the feasibility of establishing a regional learning centre for continuous air presence in support of small ground units. This is an idea that we would do well to take forward on a regional level. The DoD report concludes by stating 'We believe the Seeker to be well suited to provide continuous overhead presence for small ground units conducting patrols in built up areas, convoy escort and the patrol of linear structures (eg pipelines, power lines, roads and borders). Moreover, it appears that the Seeker may be uniquely suited for these missions'.

As I have already indicated, decision makers have several options to satisfy the growing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance requirements of rapid-response teams, law enforcers and small military ground units. The first option involves creating a new air cadre. The second, and preferable, option is to embed airmen and equipment from extant organisations into these units. If an airman on horseback can direct precision weapons dropped from a B-52, a doctor should be able to direct a C-130 medical drop for a humanitarian operation, a border security commander should be able to request a picture from an overhead ISR sensor, a law enforcement unit in a remote location should be able to request the airlift of augmentation forces, a security official at a major national event should be able to rely on a rapid response capability – and all of them should expect to have someone who can explain what air power can do for them to be on hand. It is unreasonable to expect others to understand our capabilities and procedures. Therefore, we have to go to them with personnel and equipment. Airmen have a longstanding and proud history of embedding forward air controllers into army units. We need to do the same for those civilian and military units dealing with crises, insurgencies and a host of other unconventional contingencies. Moreover, our network centric operations, doctrines, concepts of operation, tactics, techniques and procedures need to focus on a broader network of users. Network centric operations also need to focus on integrated applications as well as integrated hardware. Our network centric architecture should be built around communities of interest based on potential future threat and crisis

scenarios, with a typical community of interest potentially comprising military, law enforcement and emergency medical and fire response teams. We need to develop low-cost, user-friendly systems that we can give to other organisations so that they can reach back to us effectively. We could co-opt existing networks and devices using commercially available technology. Airmen equipped with suitcase-sized communication suites could quickly interface with small units to deliver air mobility, information superiority and precision firepower.

Returning to an earlier point, as airmen, we need to show and tell our story differently. We tend to emphasize our value against foreign threats over all other missions, and as a result modern air forces are a victim of their own successes in speed, reach and lethality. Our ability to shorten the length of combat operations tends to sideline us in post-combat operations which are much longer in duration – we are consigned to being considered as only important in Phase 3 combat operations, rather than the critical integrator for most Phase 4 elements. Considering today's environment, we should emphasize our contributions to non-traditional missions while gently reminding our citizens of the value of our combat capability. The air power story will hold more power and more truth if we show and not just tell. By exercising and demonstrating our ability to support unconventional missions, airmen will help decision makers, opinion formers, joint, law enforcement and rapid-response teams better understand our value and how to capitalize on our capabilities. Today, misperceptions and a general lack of understanding of how to work with airmen still exist. We need to pro-actively address unconventional applications of air power before a crisis occurs. For example, we need to be able to present convincing answers to the following types of question:

How would an air coalition mount a coordinated out-of-area expeditionary force to counter a common threat, disaster or crisis? Do ground forces know how much air mobility they need and how to sequence their priorities to match our capabilities? How could air power best be used if a bird flu or other pandemic hits? What is the value of air power for major national and international events such as the holding of the Asian Olympic Games in a MEAS country? How would rapid-response teams and event managers understand and access air power's capability? The list is endless but the problem is self-evident – gaining buy-in from our new partners, and then developing better joint and rapid-response concepts of operations, tactics, techniques and procedures. Furthermore, all of these will need to be routinely exercised if they are going to be of benefit.

In conclusion, air chiefs need to be both diligent and proactive in justifying the value of air power in traditional and unconventional roles. In the unconventional arena, we need to clarify our roles against unconventional forces which use asymmetric tactics and weapons, but we also need to actively pursue unconventional roles in supporting or leading crisis response, homeland security and humanitarian operations. Lastly, we should seek unconventional ways to team together. Air chiefs should deliver a strong message to their stakeholders that non-traditional missions have risen in importance and enforce the notion that budgeting and resourcing speak louder than words. If airmen fail to do this, policy makers will shift these resources on their own accord, thereby putting our proud legacy at risk. Finally, I believe that a combined air response force in the Arab Gulf would assist us all to meet today's unconventional and conventional threats. The necessity for combined out-of-area operations to preserve our gains and protect our

people may soon be upon us. And whilst I am well aware of the political problems inherent in taking forward such an activity, it should at least be possible to undertake some joint contingency planning, particularly if we aim for a task that is likely to attract widespread support, such as a generic humanitarian airlift operations in support of the ummah[4]. This is, I believe, an opportunity that we cannot afford to miss, and I invite my fellow air chiefs to join with Jordan in seizing this historic opportunity.

Q. *On more than one occasion you have spoken of your belief in the need for the Arab air forces to work more closely together, for instance to enable a better response to humanitarian operations such as those that were required in the wake of the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan and tsunami. There is a school of thought which suggests that such activities, especially when manifested in more permanent arrangements, can lead to the building or strengthening of ties between those nations that take part – effectively assisting in the building of international institutions. Do you agree with this view, and if so how important do you think this additional element is?*

A. My hope in this area of humanitarian operations has always been that we would be able to approach this from the perspective of a 'coalition of the willing', which is particularly important as within the Middle East air grouping (the Gulf Co-operation Council states plus Egypt and Jordan) there are a wide range of capabilities. Our greatest need is to be able to institutionalise an approach that will allow for the most effective use to be made of the resources available, and here we have looked at NATO as an example of the sort of structure that we are looking for where we could set up a central staff organisation that would provide that vital co-ordinating role. Once we have the central staff element in place, they can then be used to organise exercises for instance – probably mostly involving staffs of the various air forces – in order to carry out the training necessary to generate common processes and a greater understanding of what each member can bring.

However that co-ordinating element will also be vital in terms of responding to an actual incident. For instance when the lead air force has arrived and been able to assess the situation on the ground, it will then be able to pass back a prioritised list of needs – which the central staffs would then be able to allocate to different contributing states dependant upon their resources. It also means that states can participate which might not have the assets to directly play a part in the airlift – if the priority were water for instance, then a nation which did not have a great deal of air transport might be able to provide palletised loads of water that could be collected by the aircraft of another nation. The important element is to institutionalise the processes so that we can work together efficiently and effectively.

In fact the nature of air power makes it uniquely suited for the building of bridges between nations – because of the fundamental attributes of air power. Its ability to deploy quickly, and with a very low footprint, mean that it is far easier for air forces to carry out exercises together than land forces – and such exercises are of course an excellent way to develop greater understanding and co-operation between different nations. In my part of the world air force exercises are politically far easier to organise than equivalent land exercises, particularly because of the much lower signature that they generate nationally. And because airmen of all nations share common problems and difficulties, that always helps to provide a base from which to start – we can create frameworks and mechanisms that others can then build on.

Q. *Another area that you have focussed on, which probably tends to be overlooked by Western air forces, is the opportunities that could be afforded by sharing, or making better use of via networking, assets with civil agencies such as the police and other emergency services. From your perspective, does the failure of countries to address this matter come down to the technical challenges involved or, possibly, more fundamental cultural issues?*

A. I think that elements of both are important. Here in Jordan we are introducing a major C4I programme for the armed forces, but are also planning on setting it up in such a manner that it will also form the backbone of a national C4I system that the emergency services will be able to tap into in the event of a major national emergency. Now this obviously necessitates a considerable amount of work in terms of thinking about how various databases will interface and sorting out the necessary protocols, but perhaps one of the advantages we have here is that we are effectively starting from the ground up, and hence have no legacy systems that we have to deal with. So the technology side is important, but, even where you have addressed this, you will still have cultural problems to deal with.

Here I think we are faced with 2 particular problems, and the first comes from those of us who work in uniform. We like to be self-reliant, because traditionally that has been how you ensured that you were able to deliver – but such an approach does not enable effective integration, where we should be worrying not about the colour of someone's uniform, but who is best placed to carry out the activity. The other factor, although related to some extent, is finding out where duplication currently exists - or where there are gaps in our coverage. I think that the most efficient way of addressing these problems is through the use of demanding inter-agency exercises at national level, which push the edges of the envelope in order to show exactly where such overlaps or holes exist! One final point that I should like to make in this regard is that when we do put people on the spot in such a manner, we need to be careful that when assessing their responses, and especially the decisions that they make, that we do this in the light not of hindsight, but only with regard to the information that they actually possessed at the time. A decision that may not have the best outcome may still be the result of the best decision that could be made at the time, and we need to make sure we do not end up with a blame culture dependant totally on the outcome.

Q. *Jointery is a concept about which a great deal has been written, but it is often clear that it can be easier to write about this as a concept than to achieve it. How joint do you think your own armed forces are, and are there any particular lessons that you can identify in terms of achieving a truly joint approach to military problem solving?*

A. Moving to a truly joint approach is always a slow process as it is a significant cultural change. We have had joint Staff and National Defence Colleges in Jordan for about 10 years now, and therefore have a generation of 'joint' officers who are 'trickling up' to more senior positions. However we did come across a problem during our current move to a Joint HQ, in that that my Air Force HQ were not convinced that they needed to be physically co-located, and I have had to insist that such a change is to be made – after all if we do not have the Air Force in the HQ then it will not be truly joint. More importantly, if you are not co-located then it is very difficult to build up the degree of trust and openness that is required to become truly 'colour-blind', and that in turn is needed before you can move to a proper J1 – J8 structure. And unless you are properly joint you will not develop the understanding of your brother services that is necessary to be able to produce

an effectively combined campaign plan – as I learned during my time at the RAF Staff College when we carried out our major campaign planning exercise with the Army at Camberley!

Q. *Reacting to fast developing situations requires a responsive command process, with the concept of 'mission command' generally accepted as being the way of getting best results. How do you see the 'mission command' concept developing in Arabic military cultures?*

A. I do not think that this is a particularly cultural issue, and perhaps I can best illustrate this with reference to our role in bringing aid to the civil population in Lebanon after the recent conflict there. Our diplomatic ties with Israel were crucial to being able to secure the air routes into Lebanon, both for our aircraft and those from other Arab nations – in fact we were able to get teams in to assess the state of the runway and make that operational again extremely quickly. But all of the air forces that were involved were able to rapidly replan and reorganise as necessary. You will understand that due to the political sensitivities not all nations' aircraft were allowed to fly directly into Beirut, so for the others we used Jordan as a hub where relief shipments could be cross-loaded from one aircraft to another, or where RJAF crew could join a flight so that it could be 'co-crewed' for the leg into Lebanon. There was no need for a great deal of debate, and our command system allowed us to just get on with it. Overall I would see our role here, which was absolutely fundamental to getting timely relief into Beirut, as being a classical example of just how rapidly Air Forces can respond in a crisis.

Q. *Strategic air power doctrine, which is of course mostly 'lessons learned from history', has tended in recent years to flow in one particular direction – from America out to the rest of the world. Do you think that there are perhaps regional perspectives on doctrine which would be of benefit to the broader air power community? Also, is it difficult to share perspectives other than from an air force seen as being at the technological 'cutting edge'?*

A. One of the important aspects of air power is, I believe, the unique nature of the Air Chiefs' community. Unlike army commanders, most of the world's Air Chiefs meet on a regular basis at events such as the Middle East Air Symposium (MEAS), the Royal International Air Tattoo (RIAT) and a number of other recurring events – and this makes the flow of 'lessons learned' much easier in a number of directions. However we do have a shared need to look very carefully at how we produce and use our doctrine, and to make sure that we balance our thoughts about the potential that technology offers with an understanding of the lessons that we have learnt from the past. Technology certainly can be a key enabler, but it is also possible to become a slave to the particular opportunities that it brings – and it certainly does not provide a solution to all problems, as Israel's recent campaign in Lebanon seems to show.

One of the other problems with doctrine flow is that at the moment we have one air force in the world which has a range of technologies that no other air force can match; but this means that their doctrine will not be directly applicable to other air forces as they have to work out how to employ air power without all of those capabilities – so we need to be careful about how we use doctrine, and not just dogmatically copy one particular approach.

Q. *Following on from that point, the problem of communicating the 'airman's story' is not a new one, but seems to have to be repeated in every generation. Is there something particular about air power which makes it difficult to understand intuitively?*

A. This comes down to how we view the world, and airmen certainly have a different perspective from those who operate on the surface, either on land or at sea – and in fact this works in both directions. But there is a problem in that airmen generally make up a minority percentage of the overall force structure, and therefore it is necessary for us to explain what we can do to others. But we need to ensure that they understand not only the capabilities that we bring but also the limitations, and in promoting an understanding of air power we must ensure that we do not oversell ourselves or leave them with unrealistic expectations. What we must develop is a joint understanding so that we can concentrate on finding the best asset to carry out a particular task, and not worry about which service it comes from. The problem is that if you do not understand something, it is easy either to ignore it or to misinterpret its capabilities.

Q. *Your background and current position – a keen military aviator, long-time member of the Jordanian Armed Forces, and member of the Royal Court – undoubtedly give you a unique view of both the world and air power. What do you think are the main contributions that air power could make towards achieving peace and stability in this particular region?*

A. I am a firm believer that the unique capabilities of air power can, if properly used, play a tremendous role in this field. As I have already mentioned, air forces are uniquely able to work together, and through joint exercises and deployments are able to lead in creating bridges between nations. And a growing emphasis on the unconventional use of air power – for areas such as humanitarian operations or intelligence in support of the emergency services – also help to create a drive towards international institutions that produce frameworks and mechanisms which also encourage greater dialogue, debate, and therefore understanding. These I think are the aspects which we need to concentrate on building, as a means of developing that shared understanding which is essential to producing any longer term solutions. So as in most areas, whilst air power cannot provide a complete solution, it can leverage its particular attributes in order to provide the greatest possible contribution to an overall resolution.

Notes

1 Nations that participated in MEAS 06 included Jordan (who hosted the event), Bahrain, Egypt, Oman, Quatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, plus representation from the UK, USA, France and Turkey.

2 Command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

3 In fact it would pay for around 50 Seeker aircraft.

4 The world-wide extended community of Muslims.