Modern Airpower, Counter Insurgency and Lawrence of Arabia

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TE Lawrence, - more popularly known as 'Lawrence of Arabia' – is now widely considered as one of the most successful leaders of insurgent warfare. His leadership of the rising of the Arab tribes of the Hejaz against their Ottoman overlords during the First World War has been widely studied, and his main works contain a treasure trove of thought on irregular warfare. Introducing the notions of 'eating soup with a knife' and the 'kingfisher flash', they give the modern military officer much to ponder, especially engaged as we are in live operations against a modern insurgent threat. This article, based on previous work published in the USAF's 'Air and Space Power Journal', describes Lawrence's activities during the Arab Revolt, and introduces Lawrence's thoughts on insurgency. In particular, it looks at Lawrence's philosophies from our vantage point as modern airmen; specifically turning around Lawrence's theories on how to conduct irregular warfare against a technologically superior threat in order to examine the possible roles of modern airpower in countering a modern insurgency that is governed by Lawrence's principles.

Introduction

One of the more enigmatic and eccentric of English heroes, TE Lawrence - more popularly known as 'Lawrence of Arabia' - has risen in the military psyche from obscure young archaeologist to one of the key thinkers and writers, and indeed, in his day, one of the most successful practical leaders, of what has become the widespread modern phenomena of insurgent warfare. His leadership of the rising of the Arab tribes of the Hejaz against their Ottoman overlords has been widely studied by military minds as diverse as Mao Tse Tung and John Boyd.[1]

Although his main works - '*The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*'[2] and '*The Mint*'[3] - are widely known, beloved of staff college tutors and oft-quoted (although I suspect rather less widely read!), it is a relatively minor article, originally written for *The Army Quarterly* and reprinted in the 1939 volume '*Oriental Assembly*',[4] that brings together the nuggets of his ideas and is a treasure trove of thought on irregular warfare; it is a resource that it is worth revisiting in the light of modern experience. In addition to introducing the notions of 'eating soup with a knife' and the 'kingfisher flash', his description of the Evolution of the Arab Revolt, which commenced in June 1916, gives the modern airman much to ponder, especially when engaged in live operations against a modern insurgent threat. In an effort to stimulate debate, this article will describe Lawrence's activities during the Arab Revolt, and thereby introduce Lawrence's thoughts on insurgency. In particular, I will discuss his views from our vantage point as modern airmen - more specifically turning Lawrence's exposition on irregular warfare around in an attempt to examine the possible roles of airpower in countering an insurgency that is governed by the principles that Lawrence espoused.

During the First World War, the Ottoman Empire (ruled by what is now modern Turkey) sided with Germany and Austria-Hungary against the Entente Powers. Generations of poor treatment by their Ottoman overlords caused Grand Sharif Hussein, as the head of the Arab nationalists and ruler of Mecca, to enter into an alliance with the United Kingdom and France against the Ottomans in June 1916. Hussein had become convinced that the Ottoman Government[5] was planning to depose him at the end of the war and began an exchange of letters with the British High Commissioner in Cairo, Sir Henry McMahon. This correspondence, which has since become highly controversial, convinced Hussein that Arab commitment to the side of the Triple Entente would be rewarded by an independent Arab empire encompassing a wide swathe of the middle east, with the exception of British Imperial possessions and British interests in Kuwait, Aden, and the Syrian coast.[6] French and British naval forces had cleared the Red Sea of Ottoman gunboats early in the war so the maritime flank was secure. The port of Jidda was attacked by 3,500 Arabs on 10 June 1916 with the assistance of seaplanes and naval gunfire support from British warships; the Ottoman garrison surrendering 5 days later. By the end of September

1916, Arab armies with Royal Navy support had taken the coastal cities of Rabegh, Yenbo, and Qunfida; the remaining Ottoman forces in the Hejaz numbered some 150,000 well-armed regular troops.

In October 1916, the British Army in Cairo sent Lawrence, a young officer previously employed on cartography and relatively minor intelligence roles, to assist in liaising with Hussein's Arabs. Lawrence spoke Arabic well and had travelled extensively in Arabia as an archaeologist before the war. Lawrence's initial contribution to the revolt was convincing the Arab leaders (Hussein's sons Ali, Faisal Abdullah and Zeid) to co-ordinate their actions in support of British strategy. He persuaded them not to attack and attempt to drive the Ottomans out of Medina, but instead devised a strategy whereby the Arabs attacked the Hejaz railway along which the Medina garrison was supplied and reinforced. This tied up far more Ottoman troops, who were forced to protect the railway and repair the constant damage, whilst still using up resources defending Medina against harassing attacks.[7] A plan was devised to mount the attacks from ports along the Red Sea, initially from the coastal city of Wajh. On 3 January 1917, Faisal began an advance northward along the Red Sea coast with a force of around 10,000 men and some 1200 camels; he was to be resupplied by the Royal Navy (RN) from the sea. However, moving such a large force took time and the RN, in the shape of HMS *Hardinge*, arrived first at Wajh on 22 Jan 1917, commencing an attack the next morning. Wajh surrendered on 25 January 1917 to a small force of British and Arabs landed from HMS *Hardinge*; they were joined by Faisal's main force within 36 hours.[8] Following the loss of Wajh, the Ottoman leadership abandoned their intended plan to capture Mecca and consolidated their defensive position in Medina with small detachments scattered along the Hejaz railway. The Arab force deployed in three main groups. Ali's force threatened Medina, Abdullah operated from Wadi Ais harassing Ottoman communications and capturing their supplies, and Faisal based his force at Wajh. Camel-mounted Arab raiding parties had an effective radius of around 1000 miles carrying their own food – which consisted mainly of a form of flour from which they made a simple form of bread - and taking water from a system of wells approximately 100 miles apart[9] … an enviable support requirement by the standards of today's logisticians! Putative allied air support was most effective during the campaign, both in provision of striking power[10] and in resupply.[11]

The Arab Revolt tied up some 30,000 Turkish troops along the Hejaz railway, prevented a link-up between the Turkish forces in Arabia and the Germans in East Africa and, by adopting harassing 'hit and run' tactics, gradually weakened the Turkish Armies by small scale attrition. The actual defeat of the Turks was, however, directed by Britain's General Sir Edmund Allenby. Nicknamed "the Bull," Allenby launched a successful offensive from Sinai the Autumn of 1917, sweeping up into Palestine to occupy Jerusalem in December 1917. His advance was delayed by severe winter weather in 1917-18 and continuing stubborn

Turkish resistance, but in the following year, with the Arab irregulars on his right flank, he advanced to eventual victory; taking Damascus on 1 Oct 18, and Beirut on 8 Oct 18. The use of air power in this stage of the campaign was crucial, and there are several references to its use in *Seven Pillars*.[12] Further south in the Ottoman Empire in Mesopotamia (modern Iraq), the British had overturned early disasters (in 1916, 8,000 Anglo-Indian troops had surrendered to the Turks at Kut – despite an early attempt to use air support to resupply the beleaguered garrison) and, under the leadership of General Maude, captured Baghdad on 15 March 1917;[13] by the end of 1918, Iraq was in British hands. The war against the Turks came to an end on 30 Oct 18 when Turkey signed the Mudros armistice.[14] The Arab peoples of the Hejaz and Syria were justly proud of the part they had played to secure Allied victory and looked forward to the Arab homeland promised to them by McMahon. However, they were soon to be disappointed as the extent of the Anglo-French Sykes-Picot agreement,[15] and the ramifications of the Balfour Declaration[16] in support of Zionist aspirations for a Jewish homeland, became more widely apparent. The scene was thus set for the series of events that became the genesis of the current problems in the Middle East. In addition to the cause of an Arab Palestine that sits at the centre of modern conflict, the deep-seated resentment based on the perceived betrayal of the Arabs by the British after the Revolt still provides a motivation for anti-western sentiment. Osama Bin Laden referred to this betrayal when, in his first public pronouncement post 9/11, he stated that 'our nation has tasted humiliation and contempt for more than 80 years.'[17]

Lawrence's thinking on the conduct of desert warfare developed as the campaign progressed and his writings contain much useful discussion and clear indications of how his ideas were derived. However, at the end of the chapter on the Arab Revolt in *Oriental Assembly* (and also contained in '*The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*'[18]), Lawrence helpfully sums up his view of insurgent warfare in fifty words:

'*…Granted mobility, Security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraic factors are in the end decisive, and against them perfections of means and spirit struggle in vain*'.[19]

So what does Lawrence mean by these 'fifty words'? What follows is an examination of these factors in detail, firstly in an attempt to fully understand Lawrence's thinking, before moving on to examine possible ramifications and opportunities for the use of modern airpower in countering such a strategy.

First, *mobility*. Lawrence was seeking the ability for his insurgents to move at will across the battlespace in which they operated. He points out that the number of conventional troops that would be required to fully secure the Hejaz was huge – over 600,000 – so the Turks could only occupy certain areas or hold wider areas for only short periods. The success of the insurgency depended on his ability to bypass these areas and to operate fluidly in the interstitial space. He likens the Turkish Army as 'plants, immobile as a whole, firm-rooted,

nourished through long stems to the head' whilst the insurgents 'were an influence, an idea, a thing invulnerable, intangible, without front or back, drifting about like a gas.'[20] As his early recommendation not to recapture Medina shows, he had no use for territory – rather Lawrence exploited the fact that the enemy would adopt a conventional approach - that of attempting to dominate ground - and would use this fact to tie up enemy forces and to create a logistical drag on the enemy system. Attacks on Medina were to continue, but solely to force the enemy to use up ammunition and supplies, and to heighten the importance of the Hejaz railway – the protection of which then became another burden for the Turkish Army. Air Cdre Julian Stinton, in his otherwise excellent 'viewpoint' in *Air Power Review*[21] discusses modern Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) operations as a 'critical tactical facet' - which such operations undoubtedly are - but then dismisses the movement of land forces by air as an alternative, suggesting that would surrender the ground to the enemy and would have the effect of fixing 'us' further. I would take issue with this last point and argue that the reliance on land Lines of Communications (LOCs) and the slow speed of movement on land is fast becoming our 'Hejaz Railway'. Air mobility, one of the four fundamental Air and Space Power roles,[22] frees a commander from reliance on land routes and enables rapid movement of troops and material throughout the theatre – to be delivered where and when the commander wishes, with little pre-notice, and enabling us to dictate the pace of the campaign.

As an historical aside, the Turks used many methods, including primitive airpower, in a 'Counter-IED campaign' to keep the Hejaz railway open,[23] flying recce aircraft forward of trains to detect the disturbed sand and tracks associated with mining activity and any insurgents waiting in ambush. Air counter-IED operations have therefore certainly been a facet of counter-insurgency for some time.

I appreciate that current doctrine for stabilization requires 'boots on the ground' to win 'hearts and minds' and to provide security for Other Government Department (OGD) and other Non-Government Organisation (NGO) activity, but at what stage do 'boots on the ground' become part of the problem and when does the activity required to protect such a force, with its inevitable 'collateral damage', lead to alienation; when do 'liberators' becoming 'invaders'? If it accepted that 'Boots' are indeed required then their movement around the battlespace, and their resupply, open up potential targets for the insurgent. Attacks on NATO convoys and bridges in the Khyber Pass region have recently illustrated this point – a land force requires much heavy materiel and Afghanistan has no Red Sea maritime flank! The continuing tragic loss of young soldiers to IEDs is fast becoming the focus of both military planners and, via an increasingly inquisitive media and with a government fighting for its life, with the population at home. Any opportunity to reduce our physical footprint, and dependence on soldiers in 'harm's way', by the use of airpower is surely a good idea? We must not lose track of the fact, in our many studies of insurgent tactics and culture, and the tactics

of the 'Underdog', that Air is our 'asymmetric advantage', especially if we can continue to protect our aircraft; moving by land merely proves targets for the insurgent – which was Lawrence's view of the Turkish Army. In the same edition of Air Power Review as Air Cdre Stinton's 'Viewpoint', Gp Capt Carl Scott clearly articulates the advantages of Air over soldiers on the ground in terms of persistence, tactical surprise and collateral damage, among other factors.[24]

In addition to reducing the reliance on land LOCs, modern air power can seriously hamper the insurgents' ability to 'drift about like a gas'. The use of air striking power is well documented[25] and, indeed, played a successful part in 'air policing' operations in the Middle East very early in Airpower's history. However, more modern use of air power in asymmetric warfare has, for various reasons subject to endless debate, been somewhat inconsistent in its contribution to campaign success and has failed to provide 'what it says on the tin'. The cause has not been helped by enthusiastic airmen… and politicians… perhaps making over-optimistic claims about the efficacy of air power. However, recent advances in technology have enabled rapid, tailored effect with unprecedented accuracy and, coupling reach and, increasingly, persistence with this increasing technical capability, the utility of air striking power is developing a pace. However, we can be an awful lot smarter about how we use airpower, and we are seeing rapid developments in the use of air assets to give the commander a far more useful capability, some would say fundamental capability, against Lawrence's strategy - the ability to know what is going on across the battlespace. A complete and accurate picture enables the commander to 'fix' the insurgents - not in the traditional physical sense of pinning them in space, but multi-dimensionally, with the ability to dislocate their decision cycle by destroying **their** *mobility* and denying them the opportunity to move undetected and strike at will. Air power then becomes the 'gas', particularly against an asymmetric opponent with no air capability, and the enemy becomes increasingly rooted. As Air Cdre Stinton states in his article, the '*Find*' function has become a key role, although '*Understand*' may be a more accurate descriptor. Lawrence himself says;

'The corollary of such a rule was perfect 'intelligence', so that we could plan in certainty. The chief agent must be the general's head; and his understanding must be faultless, leaving no room for chance.'[26]

So what does Lawrence mean by *Security*? He states that 'rebellion must have an unassailable base, something guarded not merely from attack, but from the fear of it.[27] Lawrence used the Red Sea ports as a start point and was able to rely on the Royal Navy's dominance of the area to secure his base. The Arab revolt is only one of several examples in modern history of an insurgency using a secure flank for re-supply. North Vietnamese forces used bases and supply routes in neutral Cambodia and Laos, throughout the Vietnam War, to support the insurgency by the Viet Cong in the South – the so-called Ho Chi Minh trail. This forced the United States into the first of several difficult moral

dilemmas that it was required to face during the conflict – did they maintain international legitimacy, and the moral high ground, but accept that the North could re-supply its forces at will or did they risk condemnation by interdicting targets in 'neutral' territory? Currently, our opponents in Afghanistan clearly rely on their influence in the North West Tribal areas of Pakistan as a neutral secure base.[28] Any damage to international relations with the (unwilling?) host nation is a 'win' for the insurgent who can add more allies to his cause. When that host nation is nuclear armed and struggling to remain stable, such a 'win' may have far reaching strategic consequences.

So, does the insurgent's security provide a 'target set' for the modern airman? Well, again it comes down to the 'find' function. The domination of the high plateau of air, and indeed space, enables the construction of complete situational awareness. Whilst air cannot provide the entire picture, and as FA&SOC 2009 says 'plumb the depths of strategic nuance and tactical complexity,'[29] traditional properties of air power - technological capability, ubiquity and reach - must be increasingly supplemented by persistence and backed up with vastly increased processing and analysis to ensure that the enemy cannot 'hide', enabling us to strike both whenever we want to, and using the most appropriate strike assets. Perhaps more importantly, it also gives us the option to strike only IF we want to – reliable situational awareness may mean that our cause may be better served by **not** striking, thus preserving intelligence sources, keeping the 'known' enemy guessing and reducing the risk of collateral damage, potentially handing the enemy a propaganda coup. The drive when faced by a fleeting target is always to attack, for fear of being unable to re-acquire the target if it is lost to 'view'. A more robust picture enables the commander to choose his moment and, if more tactically desirable, merely 'watch' rather than 'shoot'. I would also argue that a neutral base is useless to the insurgent if they can be targeted the instant they leave its protection. In addition, and although very controversial, history has shown that the delivery of effect into a neutral 'haven' by air is considerably more acceptable (or perhaps more deniable?) than the presence of a raiding, or invading land force – examples include Nixon's bombing of Cambodia or, more recently, UAS-launched missile strikes against Taleban leadership in Pakistan. We as airman are of course fully aware of the psychological effect of attack from the air but it could perhaps be best summed up in this context by Gp Capt Scott, who quotes an insurgent speaking to the New York Times: 'We pray to Allah that we have American soldiers to kill… these bombs from the air we cannot fight.'[30] The psychological effect is more than a security issue; it also heavily influences Lawrence's *doctrine* which I shall discuss shortly.

Friendly conventional forces also have a 'security' issue. The current cry is always for more troops to fulfil our security tasks. However, it is also recognised that force protection is vital if our forces aren't merely to become targets for insurgency. In addition, our footprint in theatre must be strictly controlled if the 'teeth to tail' ratio is to remain efficient in

terms of fighting power. Although air bases require force protection and logistic support, I would argue that air power is a very efficient way of using real estate in theatre and is certainly effective in terms of effect delivered versus support infrastructure. Especially if the unique reach of air power can be utilised and power can be projected from outside the immediate area of operations. The ratio of combat effect to supporting forces has always been an issue, Sir Robert Thompson, renowned expert in counter-insurgency and known for his leadership role in the Malayan emergency, had this to say about the US presence in Vietnam in the latter stages of the conflict:

How many Americans, out of 500,000, were only defending each other, writing memos to each other, and how many were actually making a positive contribution to the future security of Vietnam?...[31]

I have already briefly mentioned *Doctrine*. When Lawrence talks of *Doctrine*, I think it is clear that this means ideas – ideas to unify and motivate his force, and ideas to motivate the support of the population at large. Lawrence states that a rebellion can be successful with only 2% of the population active in a striking force as long as the remaining 98% is passively sympathetic.[32] I would stress here the word 'sympathetic'… not 'supportive', merely sympathetic. He goes on to state that:

'We had not won a province until we had taught the civilians in it to die for our ideal of freedom: the presence or absence of the enemy was a secondary matter'.[33]

The battle for the hearts and minds of the indigenous population is a well-understood and permanent fundamental of western counter-insurgency doctrine, but the methods of winning this battle are many and varied. I have argued the strengths of air power to provide a 'hands off' capability and reduce the footprint of the 'foreign soldier', adding to campaign legitimacy and popular support. The presence of foreign troops hands a potential propaganda victory to the insurgent – 'How can this government be legitimate if it relies on the infidel?' However, it is also well known that a stray bomb can provide a very effective enemy propaganda victory so application of force from the air must be carefully controlled and accurately delivered.[34] We must also not dismiss the moral effect on the enemy. Strike from the air is difficult for the insurgent to counter, as I have postulated previously, it is our 'asymmetric advantage' and thus badly affects morale – particularly if the strike is unexpected and in an area thought to be safe. John Boyd, creator of the 'OODA'[35] loop, was clear that the aim of a commander should be to create 'moral conflict' – '…to increase menace, uncertainty and mistrust in the mind of the enemy whilst increasing initiative, adaptability and harmony within friendly forces…',[36] and indeed quoted Lawrence as stating that the commander must 'arrange the mind' of the enemy.[37] It is in this area that the primacy of emerging information operations becomes apparent. Thomas X Hammes, in his treatise on the development of 21st Century warfare, *The Sling and the Stone*, suggests that his Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) takes place tactically in a low intensity conflict, but that, at the operational

level '…all an opponent has to move is ideas.'[38] Again, Lawrence was a trendsetter: '…the printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander.'[39]

I have left *time* until last. Speed has always been a key property of air power[40] and the ability to react, theatre-wide, is a major advantage we hold. It is our key asymmetric advantage and, applied thoughtfully, should enable the commander to drive the rhythm of the battle. Again, the fascination of 'boots on the ground' and 'dominating ground' would be known to Julius Caesar and Wellington – surely we must use our advantage to dominate the conflict in all dimensions rather than merely to support a 'conventional approach? Time also plays a key role in the insurgent's campaign plan. His aims are long and absolute. Unwilling to compromise on the eventual end state, most insurgencies are willing to be patient and to fight a long campaign. Western, conventional forces, with democratic governments, are rarely afforded that luxury, with the need to justify the continuing expense and increasing casualty toll to constituents, and public opinion being a key driver – especially when, to them, it is a 'war in a far flung land' rather than a fight for survival in a disputed homeland. Democratic governments will always have problems fighting long drawn out campaigns against distant threats. Loss of life and material will exacerbate those problems and will drive public opinion and hence government decision-making. As Robert Thompson said of Vietnam '…the South can only lose it on "the Hill"'.[41] The lessons of many years of 'Southern Watch' over Iraq show just how much military, coercive, effect Air Power can deliver with little political controversy at home.

TE Lawrence was an enigmatic, ascetic, character who was the subject of much controversy during his lifetime. On return from the war, and after attending the Paris Peace negotiations – where he was dismayed by the British and French attitude towards Arab independence - he eventually shunned publicity and, in 1922, enlisted in the ranks of the RAF as AC John Ross. He was soon discovered and was forced to leave the RAF, enlisting as a private in the Royal Tank Regiment. After 2 years service, friends in the Prime Minister's office enabled a transfer back to the RAF, and Lawrence was posted as an airman to RAF Cranwell. He retired from the RAF in February 1935 and only 2 months later died in a motorcycle accident near his home in Dorset.[42] Basil Liddell Hart argued that:

Military History cannot dismiss him as merely a leader of irregulars; he is... a strategist of genius who had the vision to anticipate the guerrilla trend of civilised warfare that arises from the growing dependence of nations on industrial resources'.[43]

Conventional employment of modern, joint, expeditionary force has proved an expensive and controversial means of countering modern insurgencies and has had historically, at best, mixed success. The 'traditional' use of airpower as a panacea to an unconventional threat has also proved problematic, and of limited effectiveness. By examining the concepts espoused by TE Lawrence for the conduct of irregular warfare, and by careful consideration of

historical campaigns, I propose that imaginative application of modern airpower, and in particular airpower as a provider of the 'find' - and where possible, 'understand' functions - holds the key to countering future insurgencies. We must be bold, both as airmen in pushing the boundaries of new air capabilities and thinking more radically than we have ever done in the past about our way of doing business, in order to fully utilize our 'asymmetric advantage' and, whilst recognising the need to truly understand the motivation and mindset of potential adversaries, use our unique strengths to fight on our terms and at our pace. John Nagl quotes former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, referring to the US Special Forces cavalry 'charge' at Mazar-i-Sharif in November 2001:

'*The Lesson… is not that the US Army should start stockpiling saddles. Rather it is that preparing for the future will require new ways of thinking, and the development of forces and abilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and unexpected circumstances*'[44]

Military airmen have always been innovators… but have always had to guard against those in the joint arena that merely see airpower as enabling a 'view over the hill', 'flying trucks' or 'joint fires'. The fundamental air power properties of agility, reach, ubiquity and speed of response,[45] combined with the imminent development of a persistent presence in theatre and minimal tactical footprint, will allow air power to play a much greater role in denying an insurgent enemy the requirements stated in Lawrence's 'fifty words' - without providing the enemy a target set, exacerbating political problems and risking the political sensitive, and tragic, casualties that the 'boots on the ground' that a conventional joint force may attract. It is my view that with an innovative approach, emerging technology and a willingness to confront 'sacred cows', Air and Space Power is on the verge of delivering what we airmen have always promised.

Notes

[1] Robert Coram, *Boyd: The Fighter Pilot who Changed the Art of War*', (Back Bay Books: New York, 2002)
[2] TE Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, (Jonathan Cape: London, 1935)
[3] TE Lawrence, *The Mint*, (Jonathan Cape: London, 1973)
[4] TE Lawrence, Oriental Assembly, (Imperial War Museum: London, 1939)
[5] TE Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, p50
[6] Margaret Macmillan, *Peacemakers – The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War*, (Murray: London, 2002)
[7] Adrian Greaves, *Lawrence of Arabia, Mirage of a Desert War*,(Phoenix:London, 2008)p88
[8] James Barr, *Setting the Desert on Fire*, (Bloomsbury: London, 2007) pp 91-93
[9] Lawrence, *Oriental Assembly*, p124
[10] Barr, *Setting the Desert on Fire* p145
[11] Lawrence, *Oriental Assembly*, p127
[12] Lawrence, *Seven Pillars*, pp 613-5
[13] Barr, *Setting the Desert on Fire,* p120
[14] Wiliam L Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, (Westview Press: Oxford, 2004) p155
[15] The Sykes Picot agreement was a secret treaty signed between Britain and France in May 1916 and, in essence, agreed a division of former Ottoman lands in the Middle East between France and Britain. See

Cleveland p163
[16] The Balfour Declaration was contained in a letter from Arthur Balfour, the then British Foreign Secretary, to Lord Montagu, a leading British Zionist, on 2 Nov 17 and contained affirmation of Britain's future support for a Jewish Homeland in Palestine. See Cleveland p 244.
[17] Osama Bin Laden. Reported in **http:news.bbc.co.uk/I/hi/world/south_asia1585636.stm**, quoted in Barr, p314
[18] Lawrence, *Seven Pillars*, pp 193-7
[19] Lawrence, *Oriental Assembly*, p134
[20] *Op cit* p120
[21] Air Cdre Julian Stinton, 'Integrated Air Operations - Some Ramifications for our Modus Operandi', *Air Power Review*, Vol 11, Number 3, Winter 2008.
[22] AP3000, Fourth Edition, p41
[23] Eg see Barr *Setting the Desert on Fire,* p110
[24] Gp Capt Carl Scott, 'Letter from America', *Air Power Review*, Vol 11, Number 3, Winter 2008, p80
[25] (Future Air and Space Operational Concept (FA&SOC) 2009, p2-5, AP3000, p50.
[26] Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, pp 193-7
[27] Lawrence, *Oriental Assembly*, p133
[28] For a recent example see *The Times*, 12 Feb 2009, p35
[29] FA&SOC 2009 p2-4
[30] Gp Capt Carl Scott, 'Letter from America', *Air Power Review*, Vol 11, Number 3, Winter 2008, p80.
[31] Sir Robert Thompson, *Make For the Hills*(Leo Cooper:London, 1989) p168
[32] *ibid* p134
[33] Lawrence, *Oriental Assembly*, p118
[34] AP3000 p51
[35] Observe-Orient-Decide-Act
[36] Coram, *Boyd* p337
[37] Lawrence, *Seven Pillars*, p 193
[38] Thomas X Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone – on war in the 21st Century*, (Zenith Press: St Paul, MN, 2006)
[39] Lawrence, *Oriental Assembly*, p118
[40] AP3000 , p16
[41] Thompson, *Make For the Hills,* p182
[42] Adrian Greaves, *Lawrence of Arabia, Mirage of a Desert War*, (Phoenix: London, 2007) p230
[43] Basil Lidell Hart, *TE Lawrence in Arabia and after*, (Cape:London, 1948) p 438
[44] John A Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2002) p xxi
[45] AP3000 p16