Viewpoints

# Towards Unification: The View from the Air

By Flight Lieutenant (Retd) Victoria Thorpe

**Biography:** Victoria Thorpe served in the RAF 2007-2016 as an Aerospace Battle Manager. During this time, she was privileged to work in numerous joint environments in the UK and abroad, including France, Germany, the Middle East and Afghanistan. She is currently fulfilling her passions for aviation and teaching as a Professor at the Inter American University of Puerto Rico, School of Aeronautics.

**Abstract:** Joint Force 2025 promotes the strengthening of interdependence between the Services of the British Armed Forces to increase overall capability. For the RAF, however, will increasing interdependence concomitantly reduce its independence? Or are interdependence and independence not mutually exclusive? Moreover, will being part of a more unified defence force improve or impede the RAF's ability to support future missions, joint or otherwise? To contribute to this emerging discussion this article examines historical debates, firstly, surrounding the significance of independence for air forces and, secondly, for and against unification from the air perspective. It concludes that there is great promise in the Joint Force 2025 concept with one notable caveat: that the RAF's role within it must be developed cognisant of the importance of valuing air power accurately.

## Introduction

Six years ago the *Future Character of Conflict* identified the need for 'increasing interdependence' between the British Armed Services, and 'a more comprehensive or "super" joint approach'[1]. It promoted a 'systemic change that allows us to operate as one team' to manage the increasingly unpredictable and challenging global security environment[2]. The Levene Report published shortly afterwards similarly stated that, whilst the single Services:

> 'are the rocks on which Defence is built…change is needed, and we are in no doubt that an increasingly unified Defence organisation can be better than the sum of its individual parts'[3].

The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 2015 therefore continues to promote the increasing unification of the British Armed Forces. 'Joint Force 2025' is the new paradigm towards which all the Services, and the relatively new Joint Forces Command, must now progress[4]. For some, this focus on an increasingly unified and interdependent organisation will be exciting, inspiring and satisfying. For others, it will be uncomfortable, threatening and concerning. All the Services will, however, be reflecting upon their role within this Joint Force. For the RAF this reflection will be important because, as the world's first independent air force, its ethos is strongly rooted in its autonomy. Nearly 100 years after formation, the RAF continues to draw pride from an independent identity; personnel wear easily identifiable blue uniforms and ranks, the Service has its own Air Command and Chief of Air Staff to determine resource allocation and defend interests, and it inculcates 'air-mindedness' in all new recruits to underpin a strong esprit de corps[5]. Although SDSR 2015 underscores the joint nature of current and future operations, it is noteworthy that the RAF is currently supporting many missions solo. Will being a part of a more unified defence force therefore improve or impede the RAF's ability to support future missions, joint or otherwise? To contribute to this emerging discussion this article examines some of the historical debates, firstly, surrounding the significance of independence for air forces and, secondly, for and against unification from the air perspective. It will conclude that there is great promise in the Joint Force 2025 concept with a notable caveat: that the RAF's role within it must be developed cognisant of the importance of valuing air power accurately.

## The independence paradigm

From the earliest air power theorists to present day academics, theories of how air power should best be harnessed have influenced the debate for and against independent air forces. In Britain the successes of the Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service during the First World War underpinned Lord Smuts' campaign for the establishment of the world's first 'Independent Air Force'[6]. Smuts noted that offensive air power might offer a strategic contribution in future conflict, stating that there was 'absolutely no limit to the scale of its future independent war use'[7]. He consequently adjudged that air elements should be centrally coordinated by air personnel through their own chain-of-command, coequal to that of their

Army and Navy counterparts: 'the proper and indeed only possible arrangement is to establish one unified air service'[8]. Smuts was not alone in his faith in the power of independence. Sir Hugh Trenchard and Sir Frederick Sykes, the two primary contenders for Chief of Air Staff of the newly formed RAF, also argued persuasively in favour of the creation of an independent air force. The RAF was hence formed capable of not only supporting the other two Services, but also conducting independent offensive action above and beyond the traditional battlefield. The paradigm had been established.

This pioneering policy would be recognised and respected by many future air power advocates. Italian theorist Douhet, for example, asserted in 1921 that 'National defence can be assured only by an Independent Air Force of adequate power'[9]. Later during the Second World War, Land Commander Field Marshal Montgomery stated that to splinter air support between army formations would be disastrous: 'Nothing could be more fatal to successful results than to dissipate the air resources into small packets under command of Army formation commanders'[10]. His reasoning was that oversight of all air assets by one central impartial authority ensured efficient and effective prioritisation of air support for the land battle. The enduring popularity of Montgomery's maxim for the RAF is evidenced by the use of this quotation in fairly recent RAF Strategy[11]. For the RAF, therefore, independence has been a core value for nearly a century, but this is not to say that independence has been unchallenged!

## Challenges to Independence Theory

As early as 1917 theorists around the globe were presenting different conceptions of how air forces should operate. The American theorist Mitchell for example proposed a seemingly half-way solution - that an air force should be divided into two, with one element to support ground forces, the other to undertake 'strategical operations'[12]. This perception was that air power had both independent potential *and* a joint-role to play, a bipolarity that Mitchell felt needed to be represented in force structure. By significant contrast, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff in 1918, Major General McAndrew, warned vehemently against the perils of giving the Air Force *any* autonomy, stating that Air Officers 'must be warned against any idea of independence'[13]. The debate in the U.S. lasted over 25 years before the pro-independence argument prevailed for the air force. Even then it succeeded perhaps only due to increasing support for air power's strategic potential for nuclear weapons projection[14]. Moreover, independence when granted was caveated, as the new independent air force operated from within a newly *unified* Department of Defense[15]. The U.S. therefore favoured alternative force structures to independence for a long time, and it was not alone in doing so.

Germany, for example, was prohibited from having an air force, or even aircraft, under the terms of Article 198 of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. As a result, German air power was developed clandestinely throughout the 1920s, and it was not until 1933 that Germany even created an Air Ministry. It did so, moreover, under the direction of the army-dominated High Command. During the Second World War the Luftwaffe was hence influenced by army Generals who tended to prioritise air power's tactical capacity over its strategic potential[16].

A positive result of this is that the Luftwaffe has been repeatedly commended for its world-leading tactical air support doctrine[17]. Japan also operated its air elements under Army and Navy authority during the Second World War, but impressively conducted some of the longest strategic bombing raids in history with these air forces. These raids demonstrated that air-autonomy was not a prerequisite for strategic success, provided that the value of air power in this regard was recognised by Army and Navy commanders. Not so successfully, France repeatedly subordinated its limited air elements to land commanders between 1920 and 1938, when it finally unified defence forces under a single Chief of Staff, General Gamelin. Tellingly this General was also the Chief of Staff of the Army and the French Air Force did not apparently have much influence during his tenure[18]. One historian has even suggested that so little money was spent on the French Air Force between the world wars that by 1938 it was 'seriously obsolescent'[19]. Modern day Latvia, by contrast, astutely operates a fully unified defence force in which the air element is just one department within a defence structure that includes a Joint department some ten times the size[20]. This approach is inherently pragmatic for an air force of c.300 personnel. These divergent approaches demonstrate that there are a range of theories available to defence policy-makers considering the management of air power within an Armed Forces. It is significant, however, that the success of either an independent or subordinate air force is often determined by valuations of the utility of air power.

## To unify or not to unify?

These valuations, however, naturally evolve as circumstances change, and some air forces have been subsumed into and liberated from unified defence forces, and some have experienced this repeatedly. Particularly illuminating for this article are some of the historical debates about whether or not to unify originally independent air forces with other Services. Arguments for and against unification have naturally tended to revolve around opposing beliefs that the process of unification will either improve or impede existing air forces' ability to operate. Notably, these debates have often been extremely emotive; during the unification of Canada's Armed Forces in the 1960s the officer-in-command, Rear-Admiral Landymore, spectacularly resigned as a result of his fears about the negative effects of unification. This article will therefore now examine the unification debate from both sides.

## In favour of unification…

One principle expectation of unification is greater cohesion of forces with the imposition of unity of command. The recent British SDSR recommendation for 'Joint Force 2025' is, for example, the most recent in a number of government papers in support of this notion. The British Strategic Defence Review Green Paper of 2010 highlighted concerns that single Service culture actually impedes cooperation[21]. It consequently recommended an investigation into the successes of 'tri-service' or 'purple' enterprises with a view to seeing whether they 'should be taken further'[22]. The Levene Report also highlighted the issue that single-Service career management systems incentivise officers 'to put the interests of their Service over Defence as a whole'[23]. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that a unified force would not suffer the same frictions. This assumption is not new; one commentator, Mark Watson, writing

in 1949 described the U.S. decision to unify its Armed Forces under a Secretary of State for Defense as the precursor to a 'welcome calm' following repeated inter-Service disputes[24]. 'Unity of command' is therefore persistently central to the appeal of unification. As the historian Gosselin reflected on Canada's pre-unification Armed Forces, in independent mindsets each Service saw 'the threat it wished to see' and acted independently to counter it[25]. Unification not only discourages this partisan behaviour, but it also takes the long established wisdom of revering 'unity of command' and structurally and culturally embodies it within an Armed Forces.

Pro-Unification voices also promote the concept's cost-benefits. Unification should theoretically reduce the costs associated with maintaining several Services, as duplication of effort is eradicated and Service rivalries are overcome in favour of overall defence output. As the Levene Report asserts, one issue with separate Services is that they tend 'to favour capabilities they consider to be core to their outputs'[26]. This can result in a force that is incorrectly balanced or inefficiently resourced for actual defence needs. The U.S. Armed Forces, for instance, despite unification in 1947, carried three different anti-aircraft system projects into the 1950s, each developed by a different Service[27]. This was because single Service mindsets survived unification. Indeed, for the air force these mindsets ironically began with unification! As George Fielding explained in 1946, defence unification ironically *guaranteed* liberties for the U.S. Air Force. He saw unification as an opportunity to free the air force from army subordination by establishing an Air HQ and budget as part of a larger unified structure[28]. Even structural unification cannot therefore ensure cultural unification, and the latter is arguably how a whole force starts to generate anticipated cost-savings.

Those in favour of unification are not wrong, however, to cite efficiency as a strong argument in favour of denouncing the single Service concept. The U.S. National Security Act (NSA) of 1947 acknowledged this very principle and resulted in a number of physical consolidations within the Armed Forces. These included the merger of two air transport, two sea transport, two rail transport, medical, recruiting, printing and machine repair services[29]. These consolidations did save money, although even the contemporary Watson cautioned that fiscal savings should not be a primary motive for unification, as they will be in 'respectable but not staggering amounts'[30]. The Levene Report echoes the NSA principles of greater efficiency nonetheless by asserting that 'there are some capabilities or functions currently undertaken in the single Services which might better be conducted on a joint basis'[31]. The aspiration towards Joint Force 2025 should be seen as further progression in this regard.

Also central to the reorganisation of any armed force is the necessity to maintain or improve civilian control, and unification is one way this can be achieved. Samuel Huntingdon asserted in 1957 that to maximise the professionalism of an officer corps it is necessary to isolate them from politics[32]. Proponents of unification hence argue that by reducing the officer corps' access to government, and channelling issues and direction through one central defence headquarters, the wider Armed Forces can be left to develop a strong professional ethos

unfettered by competition for resources and political favour. This also enables the reinforcement of civilian control of the Armed Forces by necessitating that all military orders are received via a single defence representative. This gives the military less freedom for interpretation. Unification can therefore be used to sever unhealthy politico-military connections and re-establish civilian authority. Canada's decision to unify its armed forces in the 1960s was certainly influenced by this. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, during which the world teetered on the brink of nuclear war, Canadian politicians discovered that their Naval and Air Force commanders had increased nuclear readiness states without permission[33]. The unification debate that ensued has hence been described as the symptom of a 'crisis in Canadian civil-military relations'[34]. The 1964 decision to subordinate all military elements to a Chief of Defence Staff that answered directly to the Minister of Defence was intended to restore political authority and repair the civil-military relationship[35]. It was also the first major step towards the creation of a fully unified defence force. (Interestingly this measure to channel ministerial communication via a single Chief of Defence Staff was also taken in Britain as a result of SDSR 2010, but this author hopes not for the same reasons!).

According to these arguments, the impact of unification should therefore be largely positive; unification does not necessarily mean the abandonment of Service identities but the elimination of competition between them, thereby improving cooperation and camaraderie between all elements. Wasteful use of resources, such as duplication of effort and development projects, should also be a positive consequence, freeing up more resources that can then be intelligently re-allocated. Provided an air force is valued within a defence force there is no reason why it should not be apportioned its fair share of the overall defence budget and procurement attentions. As the creation of the U.S. Air Force demonstrated, the case for unification can also be a very positive step towards acknowledging an air force's co-equal status with other Services. Finally, it may also help build a stronger civil-military relationship.

## Against unification…

The case for unification has, however, often had a frosty reception, especially from serving personnel, and not without due cause. The complete unification of the Canadian Armed Forces in 1968, for example, was a disaster. Fifteen years after the event a profile for *Conflict Studies* described 'dismay among Canada's allies at the state of her armed forces'[36]. The same study also worryingly perceived the situation to be in decline rather than recovery, noting 'a growing gap between Canadian defence commitments ... and her ability to fulfil them'[37]. Yet Hellyer, the original driving-force behind the unification, had been confident that 'the demands of modern warfare are such that commanders and staff down to the lowest level of operation and the support echelons must act together and in unison'[38]. His expectation was that 'a single organisation which works and thinks together' would achieve this more robustly than 'the three service system of coordinating combined operations'[39]. In practice this actually meant the effective disestablishment of the Air Force. Described from within as 'the worst hit', the air force was split across six new commands, stripped of its HQ and lacking aircraft capable of performing its strategic obligations[40]. Not surprisingly, personnel were extremely demoralised.

The spectre of unification also prompts fears regarding the conceptual health of a force. As recently as December 2012, for instance, the RAF released a bespoke narrative underscoring the importance of remaining an independent air force[41]. It underscored the continuing validity of the Smuts Report's conclusions and the legacy of Lord Trenchard's vision for a specialist air service, and asserted that the unique quality of 'air-mindedness' in all air personnel is essential to the maintenance of UK security. This narrative emphasised pride in specialisation, an argument that has been used to counsel against unification for years. As George Fielding demonstrated in his discussion about the proposed merger of the U.S. Armed Forces after the Second World War: 'it is clear … that each Service – army, navy, air – develops most successfully under its own autonomous organisation'[42]. Autonomy arguably focuses intellect and creativity for the benefit of each Service. Unification is consequently undesirable because it might inhibit both the intellectual development and implementation of air power.

There are also concerns that unification might eliminate healthy competition between Services, or may result in one Service dominating the whole force's activities. Vice Admiral Radford opposed the unification of the U.S. Armed Forces in 1946 for this reason. He argued that when armed forces merged, the Army as the largest element tended to dominate military endeavours and thinking. Vice Admiral Radford controversially argued that army-dominance fosters unfettered militarism with dire consequences – he blamed the unification of armed forces in Germany, Japan and France (under Napoleon), for example, for their dangerous embracement of totalitarianism and militaristic culture[43]. He consequently argued that unity of effort and purpose can and should be achieved without structural or functional unity[44]. Central to his concerns was that unification would result in the likelihood that individual Services would have to sacrifice funding or resources to develop another Service's assets or capabilities. Not merely competition, he argued, the deeper concern was that the Service making the sacrifice may not be able to undertake the security responsibilities it had traditionally met. Admiral Nimitz echoed these concerns for the U.S. Navy in 1946:

> 'Unification can have one of two effects on the Navy. Either it will retain a sufficient degree of autonomy and prestige to enable it to discharge its mission effectively, in which case it might as well remain a separate service as it now is; or it will not do so, in which case it may sink to secondary status and the nation may lose command of the sea'[45].

A similar statement might as easily have been said by senior air staff with reference to command of the air. Opposition to unification thus often rests upon fears for the future of a Service and the ability of that Service to continue its traditional role. For an air force, unification is particularly concerning because the independent and strategic potential of air may be undermined if unification results in a land-dominated force principally concerned with air power's capacity to support the land battle.

Unification is also a concern for military personnel at all levels. Although it is imposed 'from above', success depends upon acceptance by the whole military force. Herein lies one of the

most intangible issues with unification – the emotional and cognitive dimensions. Many of the arguments in favour of unification are logical and well-reasoned, but a principle objection to the concept arises from the anticipated inertia of Service personnel to emotionally accept the new system. This inertia, borne of pre-existing Service loyalties and historical or shared experiences, may prevent personnel from adopting a new and possibly radical 'united' ethos. The U.S. Armed Forces, for example, in the early days following unification, struggled to inculcate a joint ethos. Despite the inauguration of the unified force in the late-1940s, Service divisions were still keenly felt by the officer corps well into the 1950s. A study of officers' attitudes in 1955 revealed that Service loyalties were still fierce at Service headquarters[46]. These loyalties diminished at Joint Staff headquarters and further declined at the Office of the Secretary of Defense[47]. Exposure to a joint environment and shared experiences evidently lessened Service loyalties, but even in the 1980s the issue of inter-Service rivalry was still problematic. This is evidenced by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which mitigated some of the effects of these rivalries by removing the Service chiefs from the operational chain of command.

Those opposed to unification may therefore argue that it jeopardises an air force's ability to function, develop and thrive. It may result in necessary sacrifices of funding and resources to other elements, and may even threaten the air force with domination by another larger Service. It may also destroy existing cohesion and prosperity by stripping the air force of its unique air-mindedness, or overwriting its ethos and heritage with a new, less mature ethos and culture. This in the worst instance may interfere with an air force's ability to project power and influence from the air, as personnel lose air-mindedness, pride in specialisation and morale. Indeed, unification may not take root at all, as personnel may cling onto old ideals that hamper the development of the new unified force.

## Conclusion

By examining some historical debates for and against both independence and unification, this article has highlighted two contrasting outlooks for the RAF over the next decade as it finds its place in Joint Force 2025. These outlooks very much depend upon which side of the debate you support. Proponents of unification might suggest that increasing 'jointery' will have a positive influence on the defence community by eliminating Service competition, guaranteeing funding and resources where they are needed, and improving overall force cohesion. By contrast, opponents of unification may argue that the potential for air power to be undervalued in a unified force makes the air force vulnerable to funding shortfalls, resource cuts and intellectual suffocation. A subsequent loss of direction, morale and conceptual cohesion would likely undermine its overall fighting power. The fate of an air force in a unified force appears to rest precipitously upon the perception of the value of air power within that force. When defence priorities change it is axiomatic that the role of air power within the Armed Forces should be re-examined; if there is a disconnect between the perception of an air force's purpose and the way it is commanded and resourced, it will be ill-equipped to respond to crises as required. This is true of both an independent air force and air elements

within unified armed forces. A key conclusion to be drawn from both sides of both debates is, therefore, that the future of the RAF within the more unified Joint Force 2025 will be profoundly influenced by the dominant valuation of its worth.

## Notes

[1] MOD, *The Future Character of Conflict* (London: MOD, 2010), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33685/FCOCReadactedFinalWeb.pdf, accessed 27 Jan 2017 p.14.
[2] Ibid. p.14.
[3] Lord Peter Levene, *Defence Reform: An Independent Report into the Structure and Management of the Ministry of Defence* (London: MOD, 2011), p.7.
[4] MOD, SDSR 2015 Factsheet (MOD:2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492800/20150118-SDSR_Factsheets_1_to_17_ver_13.pdf, accessed 27 Jan 2017, pp.4-9.
[5] MOD, *AP3000: British Air and Space Power Doctrine* (MOD: Centre for Air Power Studies, 2009), http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/9E435312_5056_A318_A88F14CF6F4FC6CE.pdf, accessed 27 Jan 2017, pp.24-26.
[6] General Jan Smuts, *Report on Air Organisation and the Direction of Aerial Operations* (1917), http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2009/January%202009/0109keeperfull.pdf#search=smuts, accessed 27 Jan 2017. p.2 para 5.
[7] Ibid. p.2, para 5.
[8] Ibid. p.4, para 8.
[9] Guilio Douhet, *Command of the Air* in Joseph Harahan and Richard Kohn, *Command of the Air: Guilio Douhet* (Alabama: Alabama University Press, 2009, [1921]), p.32.
[10] General Bernard Montgomery, *High Command in War* (Germany: 21 Army Group, 1945), p.6.
[11] RAF, *Royal Air Force Strategy 2006* (London: MOD, 2006) http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/019F678C_934E_B436_27509563C48B6CE9.pdf, accessed 27 Jan 2017, p.4.
[12] Mitchell quoted in Irving Holley, *Ideas and Weapons* (New York: Yale University Press, 1953), p.47.
[13] McAndrew quoted in Mark Clodfelter, 'Pinpointing Devastation: American Air Campaign Planning before Pearl Harbour', *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 58, No. 1 (1994), p.82.
[14] Herman Wolk, 'The Quest for Independence' in Bernard Nalty ed. *Winged Shield, Winged Sword 1907-1950: A History of the United States Air Force* (Washington D.C.: Air Force History and Museum Program, 2003), p.391.
[15] NSA (1947) http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/laws/nsact1947.pdf, accessed 27 Jan 2017, Sections 207-209.
[16] Murray Williamson, 'The Luftwaffe Experience 1939-1941' in Benjamin Franklin Cooling ed. *Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support* (USA: Washington DC, 1990), p.74.
[17] James Corum, *The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940* (USA: Kansas University Press, 1997), p.252.
[18] George Fielding, 'Our Armed Forces: Merger or Coordination?', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (1946), p.267.
[19] A. Stephens, *The War in the Air 1914-1994* (Alabama: Air University Press, 2001), p.40.

[20] http://www.armedforces.co.uk/Europeandefence/edcountries/countrylatvia.htm, accessed 27 Jan 2017.
[21] Robert Ainsworth, *Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defence Review* (UK: Stationery Office Ltd, 2010), p.26.
[22] Ibid. p.36.
[23] Levene, *Defence Reform*, p.14.
[24] Mark Watson, 'Two Years of Unification', *Military Affairs*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1949), p.198.
[25] Daniel Gosselin, 'A 50-Year Tug of War of Concepts at the Crossroads: Unification and the Strong Service Idea' in eds. Allan English, Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs and Laurence Hickey, *Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives Context and Concepts* (Kingston: Canadian Defense Academy Press, 2005), p.142.
[26] Levene, *Defence Reform*, p.14.
[27] 'Armed Forces: Charlie's Hurricane', *Time*, 4 June 1956. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,866924,00.html, accessed 27 Jan 2017.
[28] Fielding, 'Our Armed Forces: Merger or Coordination?', p.263.
[29] Watson, 'Two Years of Unification', p.193.
[30] Ibid, p.197.
[31] Levene, *Defence Reform*, p.45.
[32] Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (USA: Harvard University Press, 1957), p.83.
[33] Daniel Gosselin, 'Hellyer's Ghosts: Unification of the Canadian Forces is 40 Years Old Part One', *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2009), p.11.
[34] John Hood, 'Defence Policy and the Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces: An Analysis', Theses and Dissertations (Canada: Wilfred Laurier University, 1975), p.6.
[35] Douglas Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), p.64.
[36] Simon Ollivant, 'Canada: How Powerful An Ally?', *Conflict Studies*, No. 159 (1984), p.3.
[37] Ibid, p.3.
[38] Hellyer cited by Daniel Gosselin, 'Hellyer's Ghosts: Unification of the Canadian Forces is 40 Years Old Part Two', *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2009), p.6.
[39] Ibid, p.6.
[40] Jack Meadows, 'RCAF 75th Anniversary', *Aeroplane* (1999), p.38.
[41] 'Why We Have an Independent RAF' (RAF Air Media & Comms, 2012), p.3.
[42] Fielding, 'Our Armed Forces: Merger or Coordination?', p.269.
[43] A. W. Radford, 'Merging the Armed Services', *World Affairs*, March edn (1946), p.60.
[44] Ibid, p.60.
[45] Fielding, 'Our Armed Forces: Merger or Coordination?', p.263.
[46] Andrew Henry, John Masland and Laurence Radway, 'Armed Forces Unification and the Pentagon Officer', *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (1955), p.175.
[47] Ibid, p.175.