THE PROPHET'S INTERPRETER: SIR SAMUEL HOARE, HUGH TRENCHARD AND THEIR CAMPAIGN FOR INFLUENCE

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Abstract: Following the Conservatives' return to power in late 1924, Hugh Trenchard served as Chief of the Air Staff and Samuel Hoare as Secretary of State for Air until 1929. This article assesses their relationship at the Air Ministry. Hoare has been viewed largely through the historical prism of his later ministerial career, yet his role as Trenchard's 'interpreter' has received less attention. The pair would embrace political lobbying, cultural influence, and public relations to win support for the RAF. It is argued that Trenchard and Hoare pursued shared goals of embedding the fledgling air force within traditional concepts of establishment and society, while simultaneously drawing on the modernity and nascent future potential that air power embodied, to entrench the RAF's position as a permanent third service.

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INTRODUCTION

On 9 February 1921, Hugh Trenchard chose to circumvent his Secretary of State for War and Air, Winston Churchill, and wrote directly to the Leader of the Conservative Party and the Leader of the House of Commons, Andrew Bonar Law, setting out his argument that the Air Ministry should have a Secretary of State devoted to the Air Ministry alone. The Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) artfully included reference to the fact that he had 'spoken to Sir Frederick Sykes, and he, though perhaps not agreeing with the whole of the paper, is thoroughly in agreement with the necessity of having a separate Secretaryship of State for Air, which he regards as very necessary indeed'.[1] Given Trenchard's fractious relationship with Sykes, and Sykes' position both as Controller of Civil Aviation within the Air Ministry and son-in-law of Bonar Law, the reference to Sykes seemed designed to reassure Bonar Law that Trenchard meant no mischief with regard to his adversary. Bonar Law replied to Trenchard on 17 February, referring to Churchill's move to become Secretary of State for the Colonies and Air made on 14 February, writing, 'You will have seen, and I hope approve, of the temporary arrangement which we have made but we have come to no decision as to the future.'[2]

Trenchard was not to know that Bonar Law was going to step away from politics due to ill health within six weeks and Frederick Guest would soon after be appointed as Secretary of State for Air alone. Eighteen months later, Bonar Law returned to the heart of parliamentary and party politics, with the Carlton Club meeting of 19 October 1922 and Lloyd George's resignation leading to his appointment as both Prime Minister and (again) Leader of the Conservative Party. It was Bonar Law's choice to replace Guest with Sir Samuel Hoare that was arguably one of the most important ministerial appointments in the RAF's history. Hoare, later Lord Templewood, was to form a formidable pairing with Trenchard at the Air Ministry, one which would embrace political lobbying, cultural influence in society, and public relations, in some ways far advanced from the practices of the Admiralty and the War Office, to entrench the RAF's position as a permanent third service.

As Prime Minister, it seems that Bonar Law did not agree with Trenchard's points made in his 1921 letter that, 'The Air Force, now that its foundations are laid, must be allowed reasonable freedom to develop its own functions in accordance with its power and possibilities.'[3] Hoare recounted in his own memoir *Empire of the Air* that Bonar Law's view, given when Hoare was offered the appointment on 1 November 1922, was that the RAF would not maintain its independence for long, and that the Secretaryship might be abolished within weeks. From Hoare's account, it was Bonar Law's son-in-law Sykes who had persuaded him that an independent air force and the Air Ministry cost too much.[4] But Bonar Law stood down as Prime Minister in May 1923 with terminal cancer, while Hoare and Trenchard were fighting another review as the Salisbury Committee and its Balfour sub-committee were drawing their ultimately favourable conclusions about the independence of the RAF. It was Stanley Baldwin, Bonar Law's

successor, who gave Hoare a seat in Cabinet, a first for a separate Secretary of State for Air, fully meeting Trenchard's recommendation contained in his 1921 letter.

This article will assess the relationship between the two characters at the heart of this fight, Hugh Trenchard and Samuel Hoare. It will outline their individual and collective journeys as 'Whitehall Warriors' of the period. Once the major political battles of the early 1920s and the hiatus of a Labour government in 1924 had passed, Trenchard served as CAS and Hoare as Secretary of State until 1929 and this paper focuses on this five-year period. Hoare recalled their agreement that they needed to establish that the RAF 'was a normal and essential institution in the life of the country' through 'our carefully planned advance', and the latter sections will expand on these plans and their execution.[5]

The first of these will look in detail at Hoare and Trenchard's 'strategic plan for influence', which they properly advanced from 1924 onwards. The Army and the Royal Navy had greater and entrenched political power, and a far larger pool of advocates, than their junior rival. Familiar through experience with the most influential Whitehall networks in politics, Hoare and Trenchard pooled their collective skills and contacts to pursue a strategic plan starting with the royal family, and including promoting the perceived position of RAF officers within society and the cultivation of leading university authorities. Their thinking was the result of their experience of the RAF's vulnerability in the early 1920s and their understanding of the need to reach out to different segments of society. They were the inner core of this plan and the networks needed to achieve it. This section will explain the networks and methods used to entrench the RAF as an 'institution', accepted as part of the fabric of the establishment, and as a formidable self-advocacy group.

As well as formal and informal networks, the RAF and Trenchard in particular used public relations, in a form recognisable today, to project messages to the public and key commentators. An assessment of their methods, such as the use of annual flying exhibitions at Hendon, will demonstrate how the RAF promoted itself beyond Whitehall and will form the final section of this article. The backdrop to this period was one of imperial overstretch, domestic economic constraints, and, specifically, pressure on the defence estimates. The methods Hoare and Trenchard employed to gain influence required networks and creativity, not huge budget allocations, and additionally built on the reputation for 'efficiency' that the RAF championed in replacing costly ground forces with a tauter and cheaper imperial air control solution in Iraq and other colonies. Individually, these 'influence' projects were sometimes experimental and variably successful, but together they had a synergistic effect worthy of exploration.

HUGH TRENCHARD

The controversy over Trenchard's short tenure as CAS, who was replaced by Sykes, and the outrage around Trenchard's departure which led to his return to the Air Ministry,

have been characterised by their personalities, their longer-standing feuds, and also by the actors around them.

Lloyd George's handling of the appointment of the first Air Minister who was to preside over the formation of the RAF, which was to receive Royal Assent on 29 November 1917, was publicly denounced then and deserves little rehabilitation with the passage of time. Lord Cowdray was expecting the position as the then President of the Air Board, but learnt that Lloyd George had other plans from an open letter in *The Times* in which Lord Northcliffe, its proprietor, turned down the Prime Minister's 'repeated invitations' to take the position. Lloyd George then offered the position to Northcliffe's brother, Lord Rothermere, who accepted. Trenchard was summoned to meet with Rothermere, who was joined by Northcliffe and Major John Baird, and they immediately came to verbal blows over the Harmsworth brothers' campaign against Trenchard's commander and close associate, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. Nevertheless, Trenchard accepted the role, but the friction between him and Rothermere was to continue.

The Air Ministry, based at the Hotel Cecil in London, was partly staffed by the personal selections of Rothermere, against Trenchard's wishes. Their styles of leadership and management were extremely incompatible and, by 19 March 1918, Trenchard had submitted his resignation, although he stayed on until 13 April seeing in the birth of the RAF on 1 April.[6] The circumstances of the delay in his resignation are disputed, but certainly served to damage his already jaundiced view of 'political desperadoes'.[7] Having spent only four of his previous twenty-four years of service in Britain, Trenchard was enduring an initiation into the power and networks of Whitehall, and he learned to use them in getting himself reinstated, first into command of the independent strategic bombing force on the continent, and then back as CAS within a year. Rothermere resigned in the wake of the controversy over Trenchard's departure, which had led to a lengthy debate in Parliament, and William Weir became the new Secretary of State for Air. Weir may not have wholly approved of Trenchard's behaviour at the time of his resignation, but clearly wanted to keep him within the RAF fold.[8] The debate in the House of Commons revealed the way that Trenchard would use his extensive contacts for support: two of his spirited supporters in the debate were former junior officers who had served under his command.[9]

Once back in command of the RAF, Trenchard set about writing and implementing his detailed proposal for the full establishment of the Service, the outline of which he had agreed with Churchill prior to his reappointment.[10] Sykes had previously written his own plan which, though criticised for its extravagance (well over 100 squadrons costing an estimated £21 million a year), has also won plaudits for its foresight even though it has been thoroughly eclipsed by Trenchard's plan in the majority of historical accounts.[11] Trenchard's Memorandum, entitled *An Outline of the Scheme for the Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force*, concentrated on laying the foundations of the RAF,

on training, on creating and fostering an Air Force spirit, and on research. This was a vision for a stable and durable RAF, centred on training and the development of officers and other ranks, with a much smaller footprint of flying squadrons than Sykes' more elaborate proposal had envisaged. On this basis, Trenchard ensured 'the new plant has a fruitful soil from which to spring'.[12]

The structure of the RAF, with its small elite body of officer pilots, supported by technically minded and qualified other ranks, was ideally suited to strong and forceful command along ideological lines. Trenchard visited and lectured his officers throughout his time as CAS, instilling directly in them his vision for the service. Though the debates continue about his doctrinal views regarding bombing, both as a strategic war winner and its utilisation in the more limited air control environment, those who criticise his vision (and inarticulacy) acknowledge Trenchard's 'unrivalled authority' and firm grip on the direction of travel of the RAF.[13] As Trenchard consolidated his position within the service, he also established himself within the important networks in Whitehall, where knowledge of air power was relatively limited and confined to some key organisations and people.[14]

Trenchard's concentration on building the foundations of the RAF in the early 1920s ('Twice he built an Air Force out of nothing – once in 1914, when all the available aeroplanes of the RFC went to France, and again after the demobilization in 1920') prepared the way for the incoming Secretary of State for Air to apply his own skills and abilities to the next phase in the RAF's establishment.[15]

SAMUEL HOARE

First appointed Secretary of State for Air on 1 November 1922, Hoare arrived at the Air Ministry having had a conventional journey into Conservative politics, as the son of the first Baronet Sir Samuel Hoare who was the Conservative and Unionist MP for Norwich, and with considerable experience of the machinations of party and parliamentary politics.[16] Educated at Harrow and Oxford, he had first been elected as an MP to the constituency of Chelsea in 1910.[17] During the First World War, he served in the Army, specialising in intelligence, having leant on his parliamentary colleague Major John Baird for introductions. He was posted to Russia and then Italy, and reached the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. In his own memoirs and papers, he made limited reference to this period, lending support to the view that the more 'political' nature of his military experience did not put him at a 'psychological disadvantage' in his dealings with significantly more senior officers.[18] He returned to politics having gained extensive experience of diplomacy, intelligence, foreign affairs and defence, all of which were to stand him in good stead at the Air Ministry.

As a politician, Hoare's reputation as a backroom political operator came to the fore in the lead-up to the 1922 Carlton Club Committee meeting, organising a key meeting of MPs on the eve of the decisive gathering which helped persuade Bonar Law to lead,

ultimately successfully, the revolt against Lloyd George's coalition.[19] Hoare himself recounted that he had come to know Bonar Law as much on the tennis court as in parliament, playing at least weekly with his close friend Beaverbrook at the latter's court in Fulham.[20] When Bonar Law became Prime Minister, he offered Hoare the Secretaryship of Air with the advice, as already mentioned, that the post might be abolished. Bonar Law, Hoare recalled, had been taking the counsel of his son-in-law (and Trenchard adversary) Sykes and said:

> Sykes tells me that the Independent Air Force and the Air Ministry cost much too much, and that there is everything to be said in peace time for going back to the old plan of Navy and Army control. I agree with him. I shall therefore expect you, if you take the post, to remember that it may very soon cease to exist.[21]

Hoare arrived at the doors of the Air Ministry with very little experience or knowledge of the still vulnerable third service. He wrote to his mother: 'I am going down to make my bow at the [Air Ministry] office tomorrow morning at 11. The whole thing is so new to me that I do not know in the least where I am.'[22] Awaiting his arrival on 2 November 1922 was Trenchard; the men had never before met.[23] Churchill wrote to Hoare on 9 December 1922 of Trenchard: 'I am sure you will very much enjoy being head of this brilliant little service and will do all you can for it. Trenchard was the rock on whom I always relied. He never failed.'[24] If Hoare's own account of their meeting and his early impressions of Trenchard are not too rose-tinted by the passage of time (and their strong relationship continued well beyond their respective tenures in the Air Ministry), then Churchill's letter arrived too late to be necessary.

Trenchard and Hoare's subsequent partnership, combining Hoare's political skills and understanding of Whitehall with Trenchard's vision for the RAF, already set out in his Memorandum, and his loyal following within the service, was to prove a key element to their successes in the inter-service battles of the 1920s. Hoare was in his first ministerial post and would have been keen to make his mark, and was fortunate to have inherited a CAS whose unparalleled understanding of his service was matched by his passion for its survival (notwithstanding any reservations he had had at the time of its inception).[25] When Bonar Law resigned due to ill health, his successor, Baldwin, retained Hoare as Secretary of State for Air, but crucially with a seat in the cabinet. Having fought and won these early battles, Hoare was soon temporarily out of the Ministry, and government, with Ramsay MacDonald appointing Lord Thomson of Cardington as his Labour government Secretary of State for Air in January 1924. Thomson was, for his brief tenure during 1924, to allow the Ministry to carry on in the direction of travel set by Hoare and Trenchard. He saw air issues as above party politics, and sought and received the informal support of Hoare during his time at the Air Ministry in 1924.[26] Thomson remained a supporter of aviation and continued to correspond with Hoare, eventually returning to the Air Ministry in June 1929 until his death the following year in the R101 accident.[27]

Hoare was appointed for the third time as Secretary of State for Air on the defeat of the Labour Government on 7 November 1924, just two years after his first arrival at the 'Adastral House' Air Ministry. Hoare and Trenchard faced nearly five years' more of partnership in the Air Ministry, a record length of time for a joint Secretary of State-CAS partnership not just for the inter-war years but to date, although they were not to know that. Writing for a review of Templewood's *Empire of the Air* in 1956, Lord Brabazon (a former Parliamentary Private Secretary to Hoare and long-time friend of Trenchard) drafted the following words sent to the editor of the Spectator:

> Trenchard is the hero of the book but until his life is written this is the finest tribute ever paid to him and the most complete story of his achievements.
>
> What I hope however historians will point out with force and clarity is the fact that great Commander as was Lord Trenchard, his subsequent career in forming the Air Force with all the wise and far reaching subsequent planning, could never have been brought into effect, had it not been for Sam Hoare.
>
> It was a national blessing that these two men, so entirely different from every point of view, got on so well together. Neither one nor the other alone could have done anything. Together they were irresistible.[28]

Hoare described Trenchard as a prophet and himself as the 'prophet's interpreter' which were grandiose descriptions. However to effectively market the RAF, Hoare's application of Trenchard's intent was an important element of their relationship: 'In nine cases out of ten he would start some new idea, and I would interpret it in words that the politicians and the public could understand.'[29] They approached their joint task by drawing up a quite extraordinarily detailed, imaginative, and political plan for influence that was to have a profound positive effect on the security of the RAF as an independent service.

THE STRATEGIC PLAN FOR INFLUENCE

While Trenchard and Hoare were developing their strategic plan to take the RAF beyond its battles for survival in the early 1920s, to convince the country of its place as a 'normal and essential institution' and consolidate its position as an established third military service in Britain, the Royal Navy and organisations supporting the Navy were also contending with its role in the modern world.[30] The ambiguous outcome of the Battle of Jutland and the challenge to the Navy's status by the introduction of air power and, crucially, the air force's separation into a single service, confronted the Navy with a new reality, yet their identity was rooted in an earlier era of British maritime supremacy. The project to restore *HMS Victory* took place in the decade following the First World War. Supported by the Navy, the symbolism of this campaign evoked images of Britain and of the Royal Navy's centrality to British imperial greatness and, argues Don Leggett,

became 'a resource for narrating the Navy's place in post-war Britain'.[31] The Navy's historic role in the acquisition of Empire stood in awkward juxtaposition with more contentious contemporary discussions about its role in the age of air power, which made memorialisation of the triumphs of *HMS Victory* all the more appealing. Trenchard and Hoare, reunited in the Air Ministry late in 1924, also understood the importance of the RAF's place in Britain, but without a significant history beyond the narrative of successive rounds of inter-service battles (and successful outcomes) they had to think much more imaginatively. Forced to face their future, rather than memorialise a past as the Navy were wont to do, they constructed a strategic plan 'to win the Air Force a strong position in the National life'.[32] Hoare describes the elements of this plan in *Empire of the Air*, and his memoir's account is supported by both primary sources and other relatively contemporaneous accounts.[33]

This plan for influence was about entrenching the junior service within the establishment and creating a sense of the 'air' amongst the British people. This was not primarily about doctrine or arguments about the utility of air power, but about status and influence. The RAF had come into being in the year of mass enfranchisement, with suffrage for all men over twenty-one and for women with specific property rights over thirty, and during an era of substantial growth for mass circulation newspapers. Richard Overy argues that the history of Britain as a genuine parliamentary democracy covers the same historical period as that of the RAF and because the RAF was formed due to pressures to improve (and became most strongly linked with) home defence of the civilian population, the more direct relationship between the RAF and the public gave it 'a distinct democratic function'.[34] That said, outside of the role of home defence, it is not clear that a direct relationship' existed, but the modernity and novelty of aviation provided a route to the public's imagination. Trenchard and Hoare's joint strategic plan for influence was both of and ahead of its time, in direct contrast with projects like the restoration of *HMS Victory* which demonstrated the Navy had at least one eye (no Nelsonian pun intended), nostalgically on the past.

Hoare described the first strategic objective as Buckingham Palace and King George V: 'we had to soften the King's very natural prejudices against a new service that questioned many of the beliefs of the older services, and that in particular threatened the established doctrine of naval supremacy in the system of British defence'.[35] Hoare's written guide to royal relations, titled 'Relations with the King and Court' gives further insight into his concerted campaign to keep alongside the royal family for the benefit of the RAF:

> Students of Queen Victoria's diaries will realise how close and constant are the contacts between the principal Ministers and the Sovereign. If the King now takes a less direct part in the field of administration, he nonetheless sees more of his Ministers in private audiences and upon social occasions than did Queen Victoria.

> [...] When I went to the Air Ministry he [King George V] was strongly prejudiced against flying, the Air Ministry and the Air Force. It was with great difficulty that with Wigram's help I was able to somewhat wear down this prejudice.[36]

His papers demonstrate that he was in frequent contact with the Palace, and a summer guest at Balmoral. Hoare understood that the royal relationship required attention and stamina, which he applied with enthusiasm to deliver influence for the RAF. Trenchard was already an Aide-de-Camp to the King (he was appointed Principal Air Aide-de-Camp to the King on 22 February 1921; the King had refused to appoint Sykes in 1918) and Hoare campaigned to have him promoted to a rank corresponding to the Admiral of the Fleet or Field Marshal of the Army, that of Marshal of the Royal Air Force.[37] This he achieved by the end of 1926, 'but not without a tirade against the title of Marshal of any kind in the Air Force' from the King.[38]

The air pageants at Hendon will be discussed in more detail later, however Hoare's efforts to secure the attendance of the royal family are further testament to his dedication to this first strategic objective, in support of broader public relations. The first Hendon display, in July 1920, was attended by Prince Henry, Duke of Gloucester, and in 1923 King George V attended for the first time at Hoare's and Trenchard's requests.[39] Hoare recounted that 'year after year either he or I would go to the Palace in the early summer to persuade the King to give his *cachet* to the proceedings by himself being present', with other members of the royal family also attending, alongside royalty from abroad (the Queen Mother attended even though she refused to look up because she disliked aeroplanes).[40] Records show how these efforts with the royal family paid off, as correspondence between Trenchard and the royal household became significantly warmer during the late 1920s.[41]

More broadly, Hoare also recognised the lack of cachet that RAF officers had in society relative to their peers in the other services. 'High Society', and being seen to be part of it, was still an important element of the class system. Many Army and Navy officers regarded the Air Force as socially inferior, an attitude neatly exemplified by an artillery lieutenant who wrote in June 1922:

> Nobody appreciates the [hoi polloi] more than I do; I love them when they are in the right place, but I can't say I love them when they are planted down alongside me on the same footing [...] Dad, where on earth do the RAF get their officers from?[42]

The Army and the Navy had had centuries to establish firm links with the ruling classes who dominated political and social life. Here, as he did with other projects, Hoare exploited the contacts and social advantages of those politicians that he ensured were appointed to the Ministry. For his drive to raise RAF officers' profiles and standing,

he turned to his Under-Secretary of State, Philip Sassoon, who like Hoare's Under-Secretary of State in the early 1920s (the Duke of Sutherland), had wealth and grand property which was put to use to introduce RAF officers to the upper class way of life. Sassoon owned Trent Park, in London, which had its own golf course, and Port Lympne in Kent (which acquired a bachelors' wing for young pilots), as well as an art collection, light aeroplane and Rolls-Royce car, and worked 'unpaid out of interest and pleasure'.[43] An old Etonian, former Private Secretary to Lloyd George, and reputedly the wealthiest bachelor in England, he invested his efforts (with Hoare's encouragement) into the developing officer class of the RAF.[44]

The wives of Trenchard and Hoare also played their part in introducing officers to a more 'pedigreed' social life, and Lady Hoare hosted dinner and garden parties for the King, the Prince of Wales, and the Duke and Duchess of York, at their home in London where more RAF officers were introduced to the royals.[45] Andrew Boyle quotes Trenchard saying to his wife when invitations to three separate and simultaneous functions were delivered by post: 'It's a good sign. They're beginning to chase us socially now.'[46] Lady Maud Hoare was the daughter of the sixth Earl Beauchamp, highly motivated in support of her husband's career, and her social connections and networks surpassed even her husband's.[47]

The aspiration for RAF officers was for them to assimilate into these circles and this raises the question, echoing Samuel P. Huntington's work on how militaries reflect their broader societies (as opposed to 'high society'), whether there was any consideration of the need to mirror society and present the RAF as accessible in this way. As Stephen Rosen has argued, Huntington's work, well-supported by others, has demonstrated: 'that societies are uncomfortable with military organizations whose structures do not reflect the dominant characteristics of their societies'.[48] He also argues that technical services like the RAF, and those which are isolated from society by deployment, for example as the RAF was with imperial operations, are likely to be more distinct from society as a whole. Yet the RAF, with its unique military narrative of the pilot as leader, adventurer, and member of an elite corpus, and its embrace of modernity, had the scope to be both distinct from, yet simultaneously attractive to, society. Martin Francis describes this useful ambivalence:

> The flyer could be imagined as a classless meritocrat, a tribune of the people's war, or he could be envisaged as an anti-democratic superman, rendered omnipotent by his ability to literally ascend above the rest of humanity. He could be an emblem of scientific modernity or a reincarnation of the chivalric heroes of a medieval past.[49]

Hoare turned his attention next to universities, once more using political appointments to the Ministry to obtain maximum influence, appointing Sir Geoffrey Butler as his Parliamentary Private Secretary in 1924. Butler was one of two MPs for Cambridge University, an intellectual with an extensive academic network and a flair for private influence.[50] Hoare, with Butler, laid the groundwork for the establishment of a University

Air Squadron (UAS) in a visit to Cambridge, meeting with the Vice-Chancellor, Professor Seward, and President of the Board of Military Studies, Professor Inglis. The first two objectives of the formation of a UAS at Cambridge had been laid out as: '(a) To stimulate interest in the air (b) To promote the flow of candidates for the RAF, the AF Reserve and the AAF [Auxiliary Air Force].'[51] Trenchard subsequently dined at Cambridge before addressing the Cambridge Union Society on 'The Air Defences of Great Britain' and finished his speech outlining the scheme for a UAS at Cambridge:

> The Air Force squadron which, during term time, must be mainly kept alive by means of courses of instruction in engines, rigging, wireless, etc., and by lectures, with possible flying as observers at Duxford or some other Air Force station during the term, if the university authorities will allow this, and with further flying during the long vacation, will, I trust, be the means of stimulating interest in the air as a whole at the university, and that the interest will be continued after members have gone down from the university and gradually throughout the country.[52]

Professor Inglis, proposing a vote of thanks to Trenchard, is reported as inferring that CAS saw Cambridge as a national incubator for hatching out new and progressive ideas.[53] Hoare recalled that Butler was also focusing on the 'new and progressive', suggesting that the RAF avoid replicating the Army's Officer Training Corps (OTC) model: 'Keep entirely clear of the OTC methods. They are out of date and not suitable for a new chapter in a plan for the new world.'[54] Pertinently, one of the attendees at the dinner was the Officer Commanding the OTC and President of the Board of Military Studies, Brigadier General Edmund Costello VC, who had previously been Chief Staff Officer to the Air Officer Commanding in Palestine. He was reportedly supportive of an arrangement which would relieve him of direct responsibility for an air unit through the establishment of an independent UAS.[55] Progress was rapid with Cambridge and the RAF's first UAS was formed on 1 October 1925. In order to reduce concerns about an overtly military unit, which was seen to be less palatable both to parents worried about aircraft accidents in the RAF and to the university authorities, the Cambridge unit, like those at Oxford and London, which would follow, was essentially civilian in appearance. There was no RAF uniform, no use of RAF rank, and the Officer Commanding was titled instead the Chief Instructor: 'In fact the whole scheme was an excellent example of our English way of persuading our consciences that things are not as they are.'[56]

Hoare had followed his visit to Cambridge with one to his alma mater, Oxford, but found the reception there somewhat cooler. He rightly judged that once Cambridge embraced the concept, Oxford would review its position, and Oxford UAS formed soon after Cambridge UAS. Not only were the squadrons successful in their reach into the future leaders of next generations and in creating air awareness at these important centres of learning and research, but the Cambridge, Oxford and London (created in 1935) UASs were to provide a significant number of officers to the war effort from 1939 onwards:

for example, ninety-seven were to fight in the Battle of Britain, with twenty-three losing their lives.[57] Less tangible, but also highly important from an influence perspective, Hoare and Trenchard had expanded their networks into the major universities of the country, and into the world of university science and academia. Hoare visited the new UAS at Cambridge within months of its establishment and by July 1926 he had been made an honorary fellow of Butler's own college, Corpus Christi.

At the Cambridge Union Society dinner in April 1925, Trenchard had also described in some detail the next element in the Hoare-Trenchard plan for influence: the Auxiliary Air Force (AAF). This was to enable the RAF to gain footholds in locations across the country embedded within civilian lives. He described the concept in his speech:

> We feel very much indeed the importance of trying to get the nation intimately connected with the air service for Home defence, and we feel that all good men of the different types – the pilot, the engineer, the dashing motor driver, the literary man and the scientific man – which so largely predominate in the English public, all could be of use in the defence of this country. [...] Remember that if we get the best and, in the future, if it is looked upon as much of an honour to belong to one of these auxiliary Air Force squadrons as it is to belong to a good club or a good university, so will it be a great means of enabling the spirit of aviation to be spread throughout the country for civil purposes and for service purposes.[58]

Sykes had been against 'part-time' flying and Hoare blamed him for the stalling of the Bill on the AAF, drawn up during Hoare's first term and brought onto the statute books during Thomson's short spell as Minister. Hoare recalled that the Bill 'remained in the pigeon-holes of the Air Ministry', and believed that Sykes had used his influence to bear on his father-in-law, Bonar Law, then Prime Minister.[59] Unencumbered by Sykes and Bonar Law in 1924, Hoare and Trenchard were free to proceed and, within eleven days of Hoare's return, produced a paper outlining the future for the AAF. The document noted that: 'Each AAF Squadron will provide a means whereby the surrounding neighbourhood can be brought into closer touch with aviation and members of the civil community can take a very real part in the Air Defence of the country.'[60] Trenchard's 1925 speech shows a developed plan with the locations of the first six squadrons outlined and by 1929 six squadrons were already operating and three more were about to form. Like the UASs, the auxiliary concept served the dual purpose of influence in public and civilian life, and a later vital source of manpower for the Second World War.

However, all of these projects already outlined were relatively limited in their geographic and class span. They reached a relatively small audience which was just the tip of a much larger iceberg: the general public's increasing interest in air displays and air activity, demonstrated not only by the popularity of displays but by the increased coverage of air activity related to the RAF, in the popular press and other publications.

PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE RAF

Linking the projects outlined above with a broader appeal to the general public, was the concept of 'air-mindedness'. Hoare summarised what he had wanted to achieve in making the public 'air-minded' in the House of Commons: 'the aim of making the country generally better instructed upon air questions, making our citizens more capable of forming sound judgments upon air questions, and making people more directly interested in flying'.[61] Though he was talking on that occasion in the context of civil aviation, his words provide a sound general definition. More contemporary definitions include 'a given nation's response to the airplane' and 'an enthusiasm for aeroplanes, for aviators and for aviation and everything associated with it'.[62] Brett Holman has pinpointed an important aspect of air-mindedness sometimes missing in analysis, and that is the negative connotations of the concept and the specific cultural response of fear of the air and the threats it could bear. In Britain, especially as a result of the attacks on the mainland in 1917 which were the essence of the creation of the RAF, air-mindedness could be negative and positive at the same time: fear of attack from the air and support for the RAF who could (in theory in the 1920s and in practice in the summer of 1940) defend Britain. Hoare's definition is resolutely neutral and, as will be discussed, the plan to increase awareness of the RAF did not necessarily require public enthusiasm so much as acceptance.

The RAF and the Air Ministry were quick to realise the value of displaying their machines and prowess to the public with an annual air pageant, the first of which took place in July 1920. Originally designed to advertise 'its successful independent existence to a sceptical or ignorant public', it was a very effective early public relations exercise by the nascent third service.[63] The pageant featured static and flying displays, including aerobatic and formation manoeuvres. It also served a role, which increased throughout the 1920s, to exhibit the military purpose of the RAF and, as David Omissi argues, to act as a vehicle to propagandise about the RAF's activities overseas, particularly that of air control around the Empire.[64] In 1921 the draft programme laid out at the Air Ministry included a flying demonstration comparing aircraft which were used at the beginning and end of the 'Late War', in order to demonstrate the improvement in speed, climbing, and manoeuvring ability that had been made.[65] So the RAF showcased rapid technological and strategic progress; the spectacle was literally and figuratively about moving forward. In 1925, the pageant was renamed a display 'to emphasise that the RAF was not putting on a flying circus to entertain the public but was merely demonstrating what it had achieved in the previous year's training'.[66] Trenchard outlined the grounds for approval of the first pageant as a necessary and important part of the training of the RAF, and the later name change reinforced that message, notwithstanding the many other elements of the displays which reached beyond internal training objectives.

Hendon was an obvious choice of venue, located in North London and easily accessible by motor vehicle and public transport, especially after Colindale underground station

opened in 1925, and preferable to RAF airfields further from the capital.[67] It had been the site of an early pre-war flying school and regular air races which attracted a 'smart, gay crowd' before the RAF's foray into display events.[68] Hoare expressed concerns over the size of the site and the risk of aircraft accidents, but was convinced by Trenchard's firm belief that it would stimulate public interest in the RAF.[69] The first display attracted some 40,000 spectators with numbers rising during the intervening years to 170,000 in 1932 (excluding the several hundred thousand more who would gather to watch from outside the enclosures).[70] No doubt the presence of the royal family, and King George V specifically from 1923 onwards, as earlier referenced, contributed to the popularity of the event with the general public. Combined with the accompanying BBC radio and press reporting, and the advertising that surrounded the event, it reached millions.[71]

The use of the event to showcase RAF operations overseas was a key aspect of the displays and one that encompassed not just public relations but propaganda. In Hoare's view, 'Iraq provided the finest training ground for airmen in the world' and the air displays offered the RAF the opportunity to inform the public of its contribution to Empire, while curating the content to present a sanitised version of actual operations.[72] Martin Thomas argued that the RAF's independence 'rested in a large part on its capacity to prove itself as an economical means to uphold colonial control in the Arab world'.[73] With the Hendon displays the RAF promoted a particular narrative about 'native' characteristics and their susceptibility to the power of the aeroplane, to complement their economic arguments in Whitehall. Omissi interpreted the displays as having a clear propaganda purpose and discussed in some detail the 1922 *Attack on a Desert Stronghold* display which involved the re-creation, at Hendon, of a tribal desert fort where a Bristol Fighter had been forced to land: 'The stranded machine was at once heavily attacked by the locals – British airmen disguised as gaily coloured 'Wottnotts'. [...] British bombers then attacked the fort – an impressive structure with minarets and loopholed towers 100ft high – and sent it up in flames.'[74]

These artificial representations demonstrated the RAF's attempt, in a controlled but public environment, to reconcile what Satia has described as 'ethical scruples' with 'actual violence', by depicting the efficacy of colonial air power and reinforcing the image of Arabia as 'the land of the RAF'.[75] Dramatically illustrated posters used to advertise the event, and programme descriptions served to glorify the role that the RAF was playing in the Middle East and beyond, although there were some changes over time as the public became more attuned to discussions about disarmament, and to expose the public to one of the RAF's main justifications (i.e. air control) for its continued existence. The timing of the establishment of the air displays is particularly interesting in relation to the debate over whether Britain was an imperial *society* rather than just an imperial *nation*, notably between John M. MacKenzie and Bernard Porter. Porter's arguments about the isolation of Empire from British culture are applied to the nineteenth century and he posits that it was the challenge to Empire in the early twentieth century that made the domestic argument

Royal Air Force Aerial Pageant 1922 programme front cover, *Attack on a Desert Stronghold*, image courtesy of the RAF Museum.

for Empire so important at that time. At Hendon, the RAF was providing a 'crowd-friendly' demonstration – of colonial rule at a knock-down price in blood, manpower, and treasure, while reinforcing an imperialist narrative of Britain's superiority over its colonial subjects.[76]

Omissi also described the machinations behind a decision to withdraw a 'set piece' showing air force bombers sinking a battleship, stating the option 'was ruled out for fear of offending the Admiralty and thereby deepening the political problems of the Air Ministry'.[77] This tactful decision in 1922 did not survive the turbulence with the Navy over the next couple of years, as J. C. C. Davidson's papers, from his time as Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, demonstrate. They include a series of correspondence from 1926 between Commander Bellairs MP and Hoare, centred on Bellairs' accusation that the Air Ministry had been engaged in propaganda against the Admiralty and the Navy, where Bellairs writes:

> If the Air Ministry is now really desirous of stopping propaganda against the Navy, I can supply a test.
>
> It is the habit of the Air Ministry to arrange at exhibitions and at Hendon, a display in which a warship model is blown up from the shore while an air plane comes over.
>
> The propaganda motion is to send every spectator home with the idea that a battleship, costing millions, is at the mercy of a single bomber costing £20,000. Nothing could be more remote from the truth. The effect is to undermine public confidence in the Navy, and not even the Bolsheviks could render the country a worse disservice.[78]

It was at this time that the Navy was struggling with an aversion to overt public relations at a time when the RAF was proving extremely adept at the art, which Christopher Bell argued had at its root in the Navy's distaste for self-promotion and its attachment to the ideal of a 'Silent Service' (although this phrase is more usually specifically attributed to the Royal Navy's Submarine Service). He quotes Lord Burnham (proprietor of the *Daily Telegraph*) in 1926 writing that the Navy's 'policy of silence has been carried too far. [...] It is obvious that if you shut down the discussion of naval problems and the recital of naval achievements you must damp down the ardour and appreciation of the nation'.[79] By the autumn of 1926, a committee had been established to hold a naval pageant in Portsmouth, ostensibly as a fundraising activity, and from 1927 until 1938 'Navy Weeks' became a popular public feature in the annual calendar. Given the accusations from Bellairs of propaganda, Bell's footnote on the participation of aircraft in Navy displays is telling:

> Notably, it was only after the Navy regained control of the FAA [Fleet Air Arm] that aircraft began to play a prominent part in Navy Week displays. These usually took

> the form of mock air attacks on British ships, and always ended with the ships still afloat and several of the attacking aircraft 'destroyed.'[80]

The Navy came late to the party in terms of public relations, although Bell argues that the Royal Navy would not have extracted significantly more money from the government with a more extensive propaganda effort.[81] However, he does not consider the counter-argument that the RAF's assiduous courting of public attention aided the RAF's cause by parading and celebrating modernity in combination with the reassuringly traditional elements of Empire and of the royal family.

While Trenchard had seen the potential of air displays in winning public hearts and minds, Hoare was convinced that by his own example (and that of his wife) he could demonstrate the capabilities of the aeroplane, and he endeavored to achieve this with a number of high profile, and ambitious, overseas trips including to India and Iraq. From his first spell in office, he resolved to:

> 'Fly yourself, and whenever possible with your wife, and show that you can keep to a definite time-table in carrying out a flying programme' – that was the marching, or rather flying order that I gave myself. No minister in any part of the world had ever used an aeroplane for official tours.[82]

He was committed to the promotion of civil aviation and civil air routes, not least to demonstrate the peaceful benefits to trade and relations that aviation could deliver away from the horrors of war.[83] While it is understandable that Hoare's colonial travels have been interpreted from the perspective of using air to extend imperial relationships, and that he 'set about this task with gusto', another reading of his evident enthusiasm is that he was crusading for the cause for aviation more generally, i.e. using the Empire to extend air-mindedness was his primary motivation.[84]

Hoare's India trip, accompanied by Lady Hoare and Air Vice-Marshal Sir Geoffrey Salmond, who was to command the RAF in India, departed from London in December 1926, arriving in Delhi on 8 January 1927. This was the farthest a Secretary of State had ever journeyed by air and 'a pungent statement of power and prestige, as the Hoares' reception in New Delhi confirmed'.[85] This followed flights to Iraq by Hoare in 1925 and by the Labour Secretary of State, strongly encouraged by Hoare (who had hoped to carry out the first Iraq trip before losing office, in 1924). On their return from India after 12,000 miles of air travel, Sir Samuel and Lady Maud received 'something like a hero's welcome' and both were recognised in the 1927 birthday honours list.[86] They were also invited to lunch with the King at Buckingham Palace after their flight: 'The practice is that only outgoing or incoming Governors and their wives lunch at the Palace. It was therefore a very special invitation that was offered to us.'[87]

A final element to the Air Ministry's public relations campaign was its support (specifically Hoare's) for Great Britain's (i.e. the RAF's) competing for the Schneider Trophy in the late 1920s. Hoare argued in *Empire of the Air* that the contest had become too expensive and complicated for purely private ventures, and that: 'A victory meant greater prestige for British industry, and even if we did not win, the making of machines and engines was certain to add considerably to our knowledge about speed and its effect on men and materials.'[88] The RAF won the Trophy in 1927 and again in 1929, and public interest in the event developed from passive interest in the first to active participation in the second. The 1927 event took place in Venice, but the 1929 event was held on the south coast of England and may have amassed the largest crowds at any sporting event in the inter-war years. Reports vary between an optimistic estimate of a million spectators, and the half-a-million estimated to be on Southsea beach alone; there were many more members of the public at the other viewing locations of Gosport and Ryde.[89] Although later the Labour government of 1931 rolled back on its commitment to fund RAF participation, which was saved by a £100,000 contribution from Lady Houston (the widow of a Conservative MP), under Hoare's direction the RAF had once more placed itself firmly in the public eye, alerting ever greater numbers of people to its being at the vanguard of modernity and technological progress during the second half of the 1920s.

Of course, it has been argued that similarly impressive numbers attended the Empire Exhibitions of the 1920s and that 'one can be impressed without being educated'.[90] That said, the air environment was new to such crowds, and the aim of the strategic plan of Hoare and Trenchard was to embed the RAF as an institution of the establishment. Arguably, the aim of public awareness was to overcome the perception of the RAF as an outsider, rather than to educate or 'convert'. Porter categorised different ways in which (imperial) propaganda aroused public opinion including enthusiasm, hostility, indifference, and pride. However, his fifth category was 'passive acceptance of it [Empire], as a "fact of life"; a sixth was acceptance of it as a kind of *imagined* identity, or myth'.[91] The architects of the strategic plan for RAF influence would have settled for – in fact were partly aiming for – the fifth, since that passive acceptance would also confer permanence in the public consciousness, while the sixth would perhaps encapsulate the attempt (not least with the re-creations of colonial air policing at Hendon) to create an imaginative resonance around the alternative military environment of the 'air'.

CONCLUSION

The partnership between Trenchard and Hoare, which began with the latter's appointment as Secretary of State for Air in 1922, had by the late 1920s developed into a multi-layered relationship with the pair pursuing their shared goal of embedding the fledgling Royal Air Force, while embracing the modernity it embodied and its nascent future potential, within traditional concepts of establishment and society. Once Hoare returned to the Air Ministry in late 1924, the RAF was starting to draw clear of the worst

of the inter-service battles that dominated the first half of the decade, and the already established and highly effective Hoare-Trenchard partnership was ready to address more ambitious themes and objectives. Their strategic plan for influence combined reaching into establishment stalwarts such as the royal family, Oxbridge and high society, with a broader appeal to the public, and the inculcation of air-mindedness and awareness of the RAF by placing the RAF 'brand' amongst communities with the AAF and the Hendon air displays. This was a project of great ambition, yet it was largely achieved during Hoare and Trenchard's time at the Air Ministry.

The scheme was never formalised and took shape primarily because Hoare returned to the Air Ministry in 1924, was afforded five years' working alongside Trenchard, and had the ambition, contacts, background and political capital to see through the plan to its conclusion. Hoare has been viewed through the historical prism of his later ministerial career, not least his time as Foreign Secretary, culminating in his resignation over the Abyssinian crisis, and even attempts to reappraise him have concentrated on the 1930s rather than earlier.[92] Historians' references to him from his period as Air Minister are limited and sometimes present him during the 1920s only in order to provide stark relief to the more controversial ministerial career that followed.[93] Yet he embraced his first ministry with energy and enthusiasm and when he was promoting civil aviation and broader arguments about Empire, rather than the military arm of the Air Ministry, his efforts were complementary and mindful of his CAS, the men under command, and the new military arm they fought to establish. In terms of the strategic plan for influence, Hoare prioritised the areas where he had unique influence, starting with the royal family and elite circles. Trenchard had a more populist eye, and was not in any case well-connected via birth in the way that Hoare was, and he excelled with his vision for the RAF's place in the country, his close supervision of the Hendon air display planning, and through his proactive command and shaping of his service.

The Hendon air displays demonstrate, perhaps best, the melding of these different strands: harnessing the media and mass public interest, while courting the royals and society through their entreaties and provision of 'enclosures' and 'boxes' leading to favourable comparisons with Ascot.[94] They also showed the use of various influence and public relations strands to promote, and indeed illustrate, the RAF's current and future roles. Omissi's view that 'The Hendon display was propaganda, in that its object was to persuade rather than inform, but successful propaganda feeds off the preoccupations, anxieties and prejudices of its audience', encapsulates the way in which promotion of 'air-mindedness' contained subtexts about the utility of air power, in defending the home population and projecting power through air control, and of placing the RAF firmly at the heart of the notion of country and Empire post-World War One.[95] Although the enormous interest in the displays does not prove a seismic shift in public mindset, in the case of the promotion of the RAF, 'passive acceptance' rather than conversion to active advocacy was sufficient reward.

In contrast, the Royal Navy, burdened with history, was predisposed to revert after the First World War to its traditional outlook and retrospective place in notions of Empire, including in its support of the *Restoring Victory* campaign. The RAF, in contrast, could only look forward and deal with the present and the future. In the subtler arts of influence and public relations, where some messages and aims were overt and articulated, whereas others hid in plain sight, the Air Ministry used every tool at its disposal. This began and ended with the knowledge and experience, combined with the networks, of Hoare and Trenchard. In 1922, Hoare, it must be remembered, arrived in his first ministerial post at Adastral House and would have been ambitious to prove his mettle as a minister. Trenchard had weathered the machinations over his first appointment and then resignation as CAS and was ready to embrace a new Secretary of State with an open mind, a political brain, and an extensive network within Whitehall and Westminster. Commentaries on the shifting balance of power between the three services have looked less at cultural configuration and political influence outside of narrow parliamentary politics, and focussed more on economics and classic narratives on inter-service rivalry. This misses the important opportunity which the RAF was grasping in positioning itself as modern, vital and necessary. Even the Royal Navy's successful promotion of *HMS Hood*, which included Empire tours in a maritime ambassadorial role, focussed more on a physical entity, than on the wider image of the Navy and on the role of sea power in the post-World War One era.[96] The challenge of the new technology of air power, and its doctrinal use, has also been the subject of significantly more debate than the challenge of the third service working assiduously and imaginatively on its role within the elite and broader reaches of society. Yet this cultural dimension was precisely what Trenchard and Hoare tackled with their strategic plan.

A review of Hoare's (aptly titled) *Empire of the Air* argued that 'it is easier to secure major reforms if one works with the social grain of the country rather than against it'.[97] While Trenchard's memorandum had laid the foundations on which the RAF's argument for survival had been built, their combined efforts from 1924 utilised Hoare's complementary understanding of the 'social grain' and his access to those relevant networks. The *novel* had to embed itself in the *normal* and, in working with the 'social grain', Trenchard and Hoare found their route, alongside the economic and doctrinal arguments about the utility of air power, into establishing the RAF as an institution which never again faced the serious challenges to its independence that they had experienced in the immediate post-World War One years. In many ways, the RAF benefited from being so modern and novel that it could simultaneously exist above or alongside broader society, without the need to mirror it, but firmly guided by strong leadership and an eye on the importance of tradition in forming a sustainable identity.

Hoare catalogued the days leading up to the resignation of the Baldwin government in 1929 and recalled that the King said to him 'there could now be no question of breaking

up the Air Ministry or the Air Force', thereby meeting Hoare's primary strategic objective. Hoare continues: 'I spent the morning at Gwydyr House [location of Hoare's office in Whitehall], saying goodbye to my many friends at the Air Ministry. When I walked out onto Whitehall I felt that I had lost my principal anchor in life. For more than six years I had concentrated all my efforts upon air questions.'[98] This was the end of the most formidable pairing of Minister and Chief that the RAF and the country have, perhaps, ever seen.

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NOTES

[1] Parliamentary Archives, Personal Papers of Bonar Law, 100/2/12, letter from Trenchard to Bonar Law, 9 February 1921.
[2] Parliamentary Archives, Personal Papers of Bonar Law, 101/5/49, letter from Bonar Law to Trenchard, 17 February 1921.
[3] Parliamentary Archives, Personal Papers of Bonar Law, 100/2/12, letter from Trenchard to Bonar Law, 9 February 1921.
[4] Samuel John Gurney Hoare Templewood, *Empire of the Air: The Advent of the Air Age 1922-1929* (London: Collins, 1957), 36; Sykes presents several versions of his views on an independent air force, and certainly argued for the predominance of the civil over the military arm during his time as Controller-General of Civil Aviation, Frederick Hugh Sykes, *From Many Angles: An Autobiography* (G.G. Harrap & Co.: London, 1942).
[5] Templewood, *Empire of the Air: The Advent of the Air Age 1922-1929*, 182.
[6] Gary Sheffield and Peter Gray, *Changing War: The British Army, the Hundred Days Campaign and the Birth of the Royal Air Force, 1918* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 160.
[7] Andrew Boyle, *Trenchard: Man of Vision* (Collins, 1962), 247.
[8] William J Reader, *Architect of Air Power: The Life of the First Viscount Weir of Eastwood 1877-1959* (London, 1968), 73.
[9] Sir John Simon and Lord Hugh Cecil.
[10] RAF Museum, Personal Papers of Lord Trenchard, MFC 76/1/164, letters between Churchill and Trenchard, April 1919.
[11] Higham, *Armed Forces in Peacetime Britain, 1918-1940*, a Case Study, 149.
[12] Cmd 467, *An Outline of the Scheme for the Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force*, 11 December 1919, copy available TNA AIR 1/17/15/1/84.
[13] It has been argued that these concepts of strategic bombing and air control are on a continuum, see discussion in Peter W. Gray, *Air Warfare: History, Theory and Practice* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 47; Higham, *Armed Forces in Peacetime Britain, 1918-1940, a Case Study*, 169–70.
[14] See, for example, recollections of Lord Brabazon: 'Year after year I have seen the Air Estimates discussed with no more than a dozen members present in the House of

Commons, and with no interest displayed by the House, by the country or the Press. [...] For all the effect our debates had we might have saved parliamentary time by having a private dinner!', RAF Museum, Personal Papers of Lord Brabazon of Tara, AC 71/3 Box 71, lecture given by Brabazon at Wilbur Wright Memorial Dinner, 28 May 1942.

[15] Grey, *A History of the Air Ministry*, 120.

[16] British Academy and Oxford University Press, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, 2004, http://www.oxforddnb.com/.

[17] RAF Museum, Personal Papers of Lord Brabazon of Tara, AC 71/3 Box 19, letter from Brabazon to Hoare, 1 November 1922.

[18] Higham, *Armed Forces in Peacetime Britain, 1918-1940*, a Case Study, 283.

[19] Stuart Ball, *The Conservative Party and British Politics, 1902-1951* (London; New York: Longman, 1995), 15; Templewood, *Empire of the Air: The Advent of the Air Age 1922-1929*, 26–27.

[20] Templewood, *Empire of the Air: The Advent of the Air Age 1922-1929*, 17.

[21] Ibid., 36.

[22] Cambridge University Library, Personal Papers of Viscount Templewood, Part V: 1(1), letter from Hoare to his mother, 2 November 1922.

[23] By this time, Sykes had left the Air Ministry; he was subsequently elected as MP for Sheffield Hallam in the November 1922 general election.

[24] Cambridge University Library, Personal Papers of Viscount Templewood, Part V: 1(6), letter from Churchill to Hoare over a month after Trenchard's and Hoare's first meeting, 9 December 1922.

[25] Reader, *Architect of Air Power*, 67.

[26] Cambridge University Library, Personal Papers of Viscount Templewood, Part V: 1(44), letter from Lord Thomson to Hoare, 23 January 1924.

[27] See Cambridge University Library, Personal Papers of Viscount Templewood, Part V: 2(73), letter from Lord Thomson to Hoare, 2 March 1927: 'I do so agree with you about keeping Air Policy out of party politics'; Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archives, PUB 220/63, Gleamings and Memoranda, on Thomson's support later in the decade for Hoare in the Air Estimates debates.

[28] RAF Museum, Personal Papers of Lord Brabazon of Tara, AC 71/3 Box 16, letter from Brabazon to the editor of *The Spectator*, 7 January 1956.

[29] Templewood, *Empire of the Air: The Advent of the Air Age 1922-1929*, 42.

[30] Ibid., 182.

[31] Don Leggett, 'Restoring Victory: Naval Heritage, Identity, and Memory in Interwar Britain', *Twentieth Century British History* 28, No. 1 (28 December 2016): 57.

[32] Templewood, *Empire of the Air: The Advent of the Air Age 1922-1929*, 189.

[33] C G Grey, though considered a colourful and somewhat unreliable narrator, reveals pertinent facts about the different elements in Grey, *A History of the Air Ministry*.

[34] Richard Overy, 'Identity, Politics and Technology in the RAF's History', *The RUSI Journal* 153, No. 6 (1 December 2008): 74.

[35] Templewood, *Empire of the Air: The Advent of the Air Age 1922-1929*, 182.

[36] Cambridge University Library, Personal Papers of Viscount Templewood, RF.3 (51), paper on 'Relations with King and Court', undated but written after Hoare left office in 1929 and before the King's death in 1936. Wigram was Clive Wigram, Assistant Private Secretary, later Private Secretary, to the King.
[37] Wigram wrote in September 1918: 'His Majesty feels that it would be a mistake, to start off with such an appointment in the Air Force, as these appointments are only held by very Senior Officers as a reward for long and distinguished service. [...] You will see that the present principal Naval Aides-de-Camp and Aides-de-Camp General all have the G.C.B., except Birdwood, and are a good deal older and have more service than Sykes.' Royal Collection, RA/PS/PSO/GV/PS/RAF/23952/11, 16 September 1918.
Recorded in *The Gazette (London Gazette)*, issue 32239, 25 February 1921, https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/32239/page/1581 accessed 27 May 2017.
[38] Templewood, *Empire of the Air: The Advent of the Air Age 1922-1929*, 183.
[39] King George V recalled this first attendance in his private diary, Royal Collection, RA/GV/PRIV/GVD/1923-1925 (2 volumes), 30 June 1923.
[40] Ibid., 185-6.
[41] For example, letters from Trenchard to Captain Brooke, Comptroller and Equerry to the Duke of York, were addressed formally ('Dear Captain Brooke') in 1926 but more warmly ('My Dear Brooke') by 1928, Royal Collection RA/ADYH/MAIN/19 and RA/ADYH/MAIN 36 dated 1 May 1926 and 5 June 1928.
[42] Quoted by Omissi, 'The Hendon Air Pageant, 1920-37', in John M MacKenzie, ed., *Popular Imperialism and the Military: 1850-1950* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 200.
[43] Gordon Pirie, *Air Empire: British Imperial Civil Aviation, 1919-39*, Studies in Imperialism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 73.
[44] Jackson describes RAF officers as being 'a little overawed at bumping into' Churchill and the Prince of Wales at Port Lympne, Stanley Jackson, *The Sassoons: Portrait of a Dynasty* (London: Heinemann, 1989), 198.
[45] See, for example, correspondence from Hoare to the Duke of York about a garden party in April 1923, which the Duke and Duchess of York eventually attended on 29 June 1923, Royal Collection, RA/ADYH/MAIN/8, 2 April 1923 and 10 May 1923.
[46] Boyle, *Trenchard*, 517.
[47] John Arthur Cross, *Sir Samuel Hoare: A Political Biography* (London: Cape, 1977), 10.
[48] Stephen Peter Rosen, 'Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters', *International Security* 19, No. 4 (1995): 17.
[49] Martin Francis, *The Flyer: British Culture and the Royal Air Force, 1939-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 13. Of course the RAF was a class-based organisation but Francis captures a more broad-brush impression of the aviator.
[50] Stephen Parkinson, 'Sir Geoffrey Butler and The Tory Tradition', *Conservative History Journal* 2, No. 2 (Autumn 2014): 18–26.
[51] TNA AIR 2/312, 'Flying Training in the Cambridge University Air Squadron', 1 September 1928.

[52] *Flight*, 7 May 1925.
[53] *Flight*, 7 May 1925.
[54] Templewood, *Empire of the Air: The Advent of the Air Age 1922-1929*, 196.
[55] Clive Richards, 'The University Air Squadrons Early Years 1920-39', *COMEC Occasional Papers* 7 (2016): 17.
[56] Grey, *A History of the Air Ministry*, 197.
[57] Richards, 'The University Air Squadrons Early Years 1920-39', 21.
[58] *Flight*, 7 May 1925.
[59] *Templewood, Empire of the Air: The Advent of the Air Age 1922-1929*, 190.
[60] TNA, AIR 8/71, Confidential Air Staff Memorandum No. 30 on the AAF, 17 November 1924.
[61] HC Deb (1928) Fifth Series, Vol. 220, Col. 1914.
[62] Scott Palmer quoted in, and Holman in, Brett Holman, 'Dreaming War', *History Australia* 10, No. 2 (1 January 2013): 180–81.
[63] Omissi, 'The Hendon Air Pageant, 1920-37', 200.
[64] Ibid., 206.
[65] TNA Air 2/4427, Draft Programme of Flying, 1921.
[66] Omissi, 'The Hendon Air Pageant, 1920-37', 201.
[67] Ian Smith Watson, *The Royal Air Force 'at Home': the History of RAF Air Displays from 1920* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2010), 11.
[68] Harold Balfour Lord of Inchrye, *Wings over Westminster* (London: Hutchinson, 1973), 16.
[69] Templewood, *Empire of the Air: The Advent of the Air Age 1922-1929*, 185.
[70] Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control*, 171.
[71] The Balance Sheet for the 1921 Royal Air Force Aerial Pageant included spending on poster design, billposting, fly posting, general posters and pamphlets, sandwichmen, press advertising and a press cuttings service, TNA, AIR 2/4427, Balance Sheet,1921.
[72] Cambridge University Library, Personal Papers of Viscount Templewood, V:8 (21), speech by Hoare, 11 May 1925; Trenchard was closely involved in the detailed content, for example suggesting the inclusion in the 1922 programme of events 'An exhibition of loading men and guns into a machine and unloading them, on similar lines to the experiments carried out in Egypt by Sir Geoffrey Salmond', TNA Air 2/4428, Minute Sheet, 22 July 1921.
[73] Martin Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 141.
[74] Omissi, 'The Hendon Air Pageant, 1920-37', 203.
[75] Priya Satia, 'The Defense of Inhumanity: Air Control and the British Idea of Arabia', *The American Historical Review* 111, No. 1 (1 February 2006): 18.
[76] See Bernard Porter, *The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Bernard Porter, 'Further Thoughts on Imperial Absent-Mindedness', *Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History* 36, No. 1 (March 2008): 101–17; John M. MacKenzie, '"Comfort" and Conviction: A Response to Bernard Porter', *Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History* 36, No. 4

(December 2008): 659–68; Pirie, *Air Empire*, 240.
[77] Omissi, 'The Hendon Air Pageant, 1920-37', 203.
[78] Parliamentary Archives, Personal Papers of J. C. C. Davidson, DAV/172/U17, letter from Bellairs to Hoare, 18 April 1926.
[79] Christopher M Bell, *The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy between the Wars* (Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with King's College, London, 2000), 166.
[80] Ibid., 177.
[81] Ibid., 179.
[82] Templewood, *Empire of the Air: The Advent of the Air Age 1922-1929*, 96. Pathé contains imagery of various trips by Sir Samuel and Lady Maud some entitled 'Our Flying Minister' http://www.britishpathe.com/search/query/Hoare/search-field/record_keywords accessed 1 June 2017.
[83] See, for example, speeches by Hoare, Cambridge University Library, Personal Papers of Viscount Templewood, Part V: 5, speeches 1923-1929.
[84] Pirie, *Air Empire*, 106.
[85] Ibid., 105.
[86] Cross, *Sir Samuel Hoare*, 101.
[87] Cambridge University Library, Personal Papers of Viscount Templewood, RF.3 (51), paper on 'Relations with King and Court'.
[88] Templewood, *Empire of the Air: The Advent of the Air Age 1922-1929*, 206.
[89] Williams, 'The Upper Class and Aeroplane Sport between the Wars', 456–57.
[90] Porter, *The Absent-Minded Imperialists*, 265.
[91] Ibid., 261.
[92] Matthew Coutts, 'The Political Career of Sir Samuel Hoare during the National Government 1931-1940' (Ph.D., University of Leicester, 2010).
[93] Pirie, *Air Empire*, 73.
[94] *Flight*, 2 July 1926.
[95] Omissi, 'The Hendon Air Pageant, 1920-37', 216.
[96] Ralph Harrington, '"The Mighty Hood": Navy, Empire, War at Sea and the British National Imagination, 1920-60', *Journal of Contemporary History* 38, No. 2 (2003): 181.
[97] *New Statesman*, 26 January 1957.
[98] Cambridge University Library, Personal Papers of Viscount Templewood, V:4 (51), paper titled 'The Resignation of the Second Baldwin Government', 13 June 1929.

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