AIR POWER IN AN AGE OF ARMED HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

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Abstract: Conflicts in the immediate post-Cold War period – from the First Gulf War in 1991 to the NATO air campaign over Libya in 2011 – occurred within a fast-changing international order which prompted a reassessment by the West of their use of force. This article examines two themes which developed concurrently during the twenty years following the end of the Cold War. The first is the incorporation of humanitarian motives by Western leaders and the wider international society in their justifications for resorting to force – a development which has been conceptualised as armed humanitarian intervention. The second theme is the degree to which air power played either a supporting or supported role in such interventions. In charting the course of these themes, this article uses case studies from throughout the period and provides one possible theoretical lens of many through which to view them.

INTRODUCTION

All force – air power included – is directed towards a purpose. In Clausewitzian terms, it is the continuation of political intercourse, carried on by other means.[1] The previous two Centenary series of *Air Power Review* special editions have demonstrated that trend neatly, with specific reference to the Royal Air Force (RAF). The world's first independent air force was born of a need to secure victory in a general continental war over Europe, but the nascent RAF adapted quickly to the Inter-War years by taking up the role of Imperial Policing. In the lead-up to the Second World War, the air defence of the United Kingdom took priority, while success in the Battle of Britain and the entry of the United States into the War preceded the shift of focus to strategic bombing operations. Finally, the RAF of the Cold War period was dominated by broader nuclear strategy, a series of small interventions that accompanied the UK's withdrawal from Empire, and a notable but brief expeditionary operation in the Falklands War in 1982. This is, of course, a simplified summary of the application of air power in the RAF's first century; strategic imperatives cannot be so neatly delineated nor do they exist in isolation from one another. While the RAF was developing its nuclear capabilities, for example, it was also gaining experience in low-intensity operations across the rapidly-decolonising Empire. Similarly, a focus on Fighter and Bomber Commands can detract from the vital role of Coastal Command in securing the Atlantic convoys and, by extension, the survival of the British people. Nevertheless, viewing the development of the RAF as a history of 'phases' aids the understanding of air power. It identifies *generalisable patterns* in actors' thoughts and behaviour, and then frames specific events within those patterns.[2] It sacrifices detailed analyses of highly-particular events, but achieves a broader understanding of systemic factors affecting the direction of thought and deed. In essence, it is a method which treats the historical process as a social science rather than an art.[3]

This paper will attempt to continue that pattern of analysis, examining the period of air power's development in the roughly two decades immediately following the end of the Cold War, spanning the years 1990 (and the outbreak of the First Gulf War) to 2011 (and NATO's intervention in Libya). It argues that the theme which broadly unites the various conflicts of this period is 'armed humanitarian intervention' – the threat or use of armed force against a state, its government or its *de facto* authorities in order to prevent or end egregious abuse of human rights.[4] That this theme is used as an analytical framework does not suggest that every Western intervention was explicitly conducted in the name of humanitarianism; instead it contends that such conflicts contributed to the development of a more general strategy of armed humanitarian intervention which shaped decision-makers' action (or inaction). This paper will also explore how air power's role – and its dominance as a state's tool of first resort in the application of force – changed alongside the formation of that strategy. It will do so by examining a series of notable campaigns engaged in by Western states spanning the immediate post-Cold War period, specifically focusing on the political perception of

the concepts of humanitarianism and intervention, and on the operational application of air power.

The paper is structured chronologically, charting the life-cycle of the Western strategy of armed humanitarian intervention. Influencing this cycle is the idea of 'permissive space', the normative capacity of the international society[5] to incorporate that strategy into its institutional organisation. The permissiveness of the international society to Western intervention (though not necessarily humanitarian in character) was initially realised in the First Gulf War, just as the full effects of technologically-advanced massed air power were seen for the first time. Almost immediately afterwards, in failed UN operations in Somalia and inaction over Rwanda, a humanitarian justification was engendered in Western strategic thought, and the question of how air power could be integrated with that motive was raised. The subsequent interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo represented to a large degree the maturation of a cohesive and air-centric strategy of armed humanitarian intervention, divorced from the legitimisation of UN authority. It is here in the chronology that this paper notes a shift in the international approach to Western strategy; the permissive space for intervention begins to close, hastened by US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq following the terror attacks of 11 September 2001. This change in the character of conflict also necessitated a change in the operational use of air power. By the time of the 2011 intervention in Libya (the first invocation of the military pillar of *Responsibility to Protect*) and a return to air-led campaigning, a normative gap had emerged which marked the end of this period of air power.

This paper attempts to cover the principle trends in the development of armed humanitarian intervention, though it does not address all major conflicts in the 20 years following the end of the Cold War. Its discussions of the conflicts in Bosnia and the 2003 invasion of Iraq are deliberately brief, so as not to detract from dedicated articles on those subjects elsewhere in this edition of *Air Power Review*; it only cursorily references No-Fly Zones over Iraq and the NATO intervention into Libya in 2011. Equally, though the UK military – especially the RAF – contributed to all of the interventions examined in this paper, it takes a more general approach which considers air power broadly; American operations and strategy are referenced frequently, to some extent recognising the US' hegemony in shaping the post-Cold War international order. However, this does not mean that the analysis offered is irrelevant to the RAF. It is precisely *because* the UK and the RAF were involved in actioning the strategy outlined hereafter that it is vital to understand the Service's role in this period of strategic history. Moreover, it provides the context alongside which later articles can be interpreted, as they delve into future developments in air power which will shape the next age of RAF operations.

THE FIRST GULF WAR: AIR POWER AND INTERVENTION

On 2 August 1990, Iraq's Republican Guard crossed the border into Kuwait on the orders of Saddam Hussein.[6] The Iraqi invasion precipitated the first major conflict of

the post-Cold War world – the First Gulf War – a war which established the supremacy[7] of the West in general and of the US in particular. In doing so, it also demonstrated the unparalleled strength of Western air power. This example does not lend itself to the notion of armed humanitarian intervention. But, as this section will suggest, the success of the First Gulf War created the foundations for such a strategy in the period that immediately followed.[8] It did so in two ways: firstly, it made clear the permissiveness of the international society to Western-led intervention under UN authority. Even traditional opponents on the Security Council – the Soviet Union (as it still was at the time) and China – supported or acquiesced to a coalition counter-invasion. Secondly, the campaign showed for the first time the *realistic* possibility that air power could act as *the* decisive force component in an operation. Certainly, the First Gulf War lacked a humanitarian motive; the coalition's mandate was to restore international order rather than alleviate any human rights abuses. And the air campaign was followed by a significant ground invasion of Kuwait and Iraq against a fielded force. However, in Operation Desert Storm it is possible to see the outline of a future air-centric intervention in, for example, Kosovo. Therein lies the importance of the First Gulf War to a Western strategy of armed humanitarian intervention.

The moral authority to intervene in the Gulf set a precedent for Western states. That authority was granted by the UN Security Council, which first reacted to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait by issuing Resolution (UNSCR) 660. Within, the Council condemned Iraq's actions as a 'breach of international peace and security' and demanded its withdrawal from Kuwait.[9] Saddam ignored it, prompting a series of further resolutions designed to compel him to comply with UNSCR 660. UNSCR 661, for example, imposed international sanctions on Iraq,[10] while UNSCR 665 enacted a naval blockade to enforce them.[11] The culmination of the Security Council's efforts was UNSCR 678, which invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter,[12] authorising 'all necessary means' (in other words, the use of force) to 'restore international peace and security'.[13] Importantly, this did not provide a humanitarian basis for the coming counter-invasion. The reference to 'international peace and security' was rooted within the UN Charter itself which, other than a brief mention in the preamble, does not base its purposes and principles on human rights. It explicitly defines its role as defending the sovereign equality and territorial inviolability of *states* rather than persons.[14] In the tradition of UN missions up to this point (none of which had invoked Chapter VII's authority to use force, but which were loosely termed 'chapter six-and-a-half' operations), the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty would be undertaken in the name of the stability of the international society rather than for concerns over human security.[15] Furthermore, neither of the main Western architects of the response – the UK and the US – were motivated by humanitarian impulses. The UK Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, sought to secure the global oil supply from Iraqi dominance.[16] President Bush, also cognisant of the resource dimension, did not want Iraqi expansion to accelerate the development of military capabilities, especially of nuclear weapons.[17] Neither the international

society nor the West treated Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as much more than a matter of violated sovereignty; humanitarianism was not a motivating factor. And yet the relative diplomatic ease with which the West had gained the authority to intervene in an area once denied to them by Cold War politics allowed them to believe that intervention was now a readily-available tool of foreign policy.

That the First Gulf War represented a new political precedent for the West was best summed up by US Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who noted that it was 'the first test of the [post-Cold War] system'.[18] That test yielded one result above all others: the new international environment – characterised by universal American hegemony – was now permissive of intervention. The diplomatic capability of the West to deploy force was no longer constrained by the geopolitical considerations of a bipolar international society calibrated by the existential threat of a nuclear conflict.[19] The Soviet Union had instead, for the first time, publicly supported Western military action by condemning Iraq and backing every relevant Security Council resolution (although there was significant debate in Moscow over so sharp a change in foreign policy).[20] China too, weakened by the politically-embarrassing Tiananmen Square protests,[21] tacitly consented to the intervention by abstaining on (rather than vetoing) key resolutions and enforcing the sanctions regime against Iraq.[22] As much as this approval was welcome amongst Western leadership, it must be remembered that it was given under the specific context of UNSCR 660. The Soviet Union and China were both supporting an enforcement operation intended to uphold the peace and security of the international society – nothing more. This caveat constituted the limit to the permissive space for intervention, but it was a limit which Western leaders appeared not to recognise. In a period of liberal-democratic ascendency, it would be easy for them to conflate legitimisation of a particular intervention for wider authority in deploying force globally.

In the immediate response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, though, Western leaders were engrossing themselves as much in *how* their counter-invasion would proceed as they were questioning *whether* it ought to. The decisions made now would develop alongside ideas of armed humanitarian intervention, providing the ways of achieving that strategy's ends. Specifically, they would establish air power as a dominant force component in future operations. Although primarily a US affair, other coalition states, including the UK, were fully integrated in the military planning process by mid-September (they had waited for UNSCR 678 to be passed by the Security Council before preparing for offensive operations, though the RAF had already deployed Tornado F2s to Saudi Arabia within nine days of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait).[23] Because of that late entry (US Central Command's Air Force Component had begun planning on 3 August 1990),[24] UK efforts were largely incorporated within the approach already underway in the US Air Force's Checkmate Office in Washington and the Black Hole planning cell in Riyadh. Checkmate produced a concept of operations which they named *Instant Thunder* in deliberate rebuke to the gradualism inherent in the Vietnam War's *Rolling*

Thunder.[25] *Instant Thunder* had two core elements. The first derived from Checkmate's then-chief, Colonel John Warden, whose 'concentric rings' theory suggested that by targeting an enemy's leadership, key resource-production sites, infrastructure and population (what would be called 'strategic targets'), an air campaign could leave fielded forces isolated and deprive them of the capability and will to effectively employ force.[26] The second element stated that these strategic targets should be attacked with rapid application of overwhelming force.[27] Western air forces were well-placed to pursue this approach, possessing well-trained crews and technological superiority over their rivals (specifically, low observability aircraft, precision guided munitions, night-fighting capabilities and effective command and control).[28] Moreover, *Instant Thunder* would attempt to exploit Iraq's weaknesses, in particular its centralised air defence system and command, control and communications (C3) network, both of which provided ample strategic targets for any air campaign.[29]

Instant Thunder developed towards the end of 1990, eventually becoming the air campaign plan for the overall US Operation Desert Storm, though the original plan's basic elements were left intact. It was immediately successful. By the end of the first day of the air campaign, on 17 January 1991, Iraqi C3 was crippled and the air defence system was breached in multiple places. RAF Tornados had targeted Iraqi radar equipment with air-launched anti-radiation missiles (ALARM) and had flown low-level attack runs, deploying JP233 cluster munitions to deny runways to enemy interceptors.[30] By the close of the war, the UK would have conducted around 5% of the coalition's combat sorties[31] and, alongside their partners, enjoyed total air superiority in medium and high altitudes, a greater success than even the air planners had anticipated.[32] Around a month later, on 24 February 1991, when the ground offensive was launched, significant numbers of Iraqi troops in Kuwait – up to half, by some counts – had either deserted or chose to surrender to coalition forces as a direct result of the air bombardment.[33]

Nor was air power's role limited to combat strikes. Its utility was immediately recognised by coalition planners as it permitted rapid worldwide troop deployment in response to the outbreak of the crisis in the Gulf. Western leaders had been concerned that Saddam's invasion of Kuwait would be followed by further advances towards Saudi Arabia's oil fields, a possibility which could only be prevented through the deterrent effect of ground troops (who could also defend forward airfields).[34] An airlift of two US brigades into Saudi Arabia within eight days of one another in August 1990 averted more potential Iraqi aggression, as did the prompt arrival of F-15s to establish continuous combat air patrols along the Saudi-Kuwaiti-Iraqi border.[35] That speed of deployment was recognised in the official post-war report to Congress, which stated that the 'rapid buildup of crucial forces during these initial days would have been impossible without strategic airlift'.[36] The early use of air power extended to other roles, too, particularly intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Maritime patrol aircraft –

including three RAF Nimrod MR2s – provided support to coalition naval forces enforcing the UN-mandated naval blockade of Iraq, and over the course of the conflict expanded their role to include search and rescue operations and anti-surface warfare as well.[37] And combat sorties themselves were supported by rear echelon aircraft – mainly UK and US E-3 AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control Systems) – providing airborne command and control services from Saudi airspace.[38]

Air power contributed to a plethora of tasks in the First Gulf War. Much of this was by design, but its effectiveness exceeded the expectations of coalition planners. It was expected that the ground offensive would be the decisive phase of Operation Desert Storm and that the air campaign, though it might degrade Iraqi fighting capability, would not prevent the need for large land battles.[39] In other words, air power was to be the *supporting* element of a ground-centric campaign. However, when coalition armies entered Iraq and Kuwait, they were faced with an enemy that had been shattered by more than a month of aerial bombardment.[40] The coalition consequently suffered far fewer casualties than had been planned for; the US, the largest single force contributor, had expected to lose thousands of troops, but ultimately lost only 63.[41] Nor did air power need to support ground forces to the extent anticipated. Many planned close air support sorties were diverted to conduct deep interdiction strikes, based on the assessment that front-line Iraqi forces had already been degraded to a great extent.[42] It seemed that air power had defeated Iraq; the ground offensive, though it encountered some resistance from the remnants of Saddam's elite Republican Guard, served mainly to push the defeated enemy out of Kuwait in accordance with the mandate enshrined in UNSCRs 660 and 678. That is not to say that the ground element's role in Operation Desert Storm was negligible. Indeed, by engaging directly with Iraqi troops it was able to enforce the political solution which air power could not.[43] Nevertheless, air power demonstrated a level of decisiveness which had been denied to it in the past by the limitations of technology. This conclusion – and its implication for less costly future interventions – was not lost on Western leaders.[44] Before the operational potential of air power could be fully integrated into a broader international strategy, though, it would have to be developed through experience.

SOMALIA AND RWANDA: AIR POWER AND ITS LIMITATIONS

The First Gulf War was followed almost immediately by a succession of crises, broadly characterised by their internecine nature and egregious human suffering. Two in particular are explored in this section, being used to chart the initial difficulties of aligning the West's emerging interventionist strategy with humanitarian motives. They also exhibit the difficulties of integrating air power into what would become known as armed humanitarian intervention. The first of these crises mixed food insecurity in Somalia with political collapse and civil war. The Western response to Somalia's disintegration was couched within the UN system – one which had been designed to contend with inter-state conflicts rather than civil upheaval – and led to three poorly-

executed operations between 1992 and 1995. The failure of these operations exposed the limits to the nascent strategy of armed humanitarian intervention[45] and how force was mis-employed in support of that strategy. Western involvement also demonstrated the interaction between air power, humanitarian catastrophe and modern media in what was known as the 'CNN Effect' (wherein public reaction to images of suffering could influence official policy), a vital determinant of action which would exacerbate a rift between operational methods and strategic goals.[46] The second crisis explored in this section is the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. Like Somalia, the atrocities in Rwanda would inspire a desire to incorporate humanitarian goals into a strategy of armed intervention. That no significant action was taken by the West (with the exception of minor contributions to the weak UN mission there, and a small French force towards the end of the genocide) could be interpreted as a negative reaction to events in Somalia. But even the proposed responses suggested that air power alone would be inadequate in effecting a successful armed humanitarian intervention into a situation which relied on the speedy application of force. These tragedies of the early-1990s have become infamous as failures of a humanitarian international strategy, but they are better examined as the first steps towards that ultimate goal.

The political implications of the failure of armed humanitarian intervention in Somalia to Western strategy were twofold. It suggested, firstly, that a robust response to a crisis was needed from the start, and, secondly, that a permissive international society did not translate into public support. But it also officially incorporated humanitarian concerns into the post-Cold War institutions of international society. The UN had first entered Somalia with UNOSOM-I (the United Nations Operation in Somalia), responding to UNSCR 733 which had not only noted Somalia's disintegration as a threat to international peace and security in the region, but also explicitly called for 'all parties…to facilitate the delivery [and] contribute to the efforts of humanitarian assistance' there.[47] UNOSOM-I's objectives were therefore to monitor a tentative ceasefire between warring militias in the capital, Mogadishu, as well as to facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid in order to combat a worsening famine.[48] The force's objectives and its mandate show that the motives for the operation were at least partly rooted in a concern for human security, though the stability of the region remained an important determinant. However, UNOSOM-I was under-resourced and granted too little power from the start – its small number of peacekeepers were not able to enforce the ceasefire or to move freely around Mogadishu.[49] Their mandate was too restrictive for the reality of the situation which confronted them. Facing the aggravation of Somalia's humanitarian crisis, the UN replaced UNOSOM-I with UNITAF (Unified Task Force), a UN-authorised but US-led multinational force with troop contributions from mainly Western countries, including the UK. UNITAF, unlike its predecessor, was granted enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, with the right to employ 'all necessary means [i.e. force] to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia'.[50] As much as the First Gulf War had demonstrated to Western

leaders the permissive space for intervention in general, UNITAF's mandate revealed to them the permissive space for armed *humanitarian* intervention more specifically – parts of Africa which had only recently been closed to any such action by the power politics of the Cold War were now able to host military forces with the consent of the Security Council.[51] It was a significant step in legitimising a Western strategy of armed humanitarian intervention.

If UNITAF represented a strategic step-change in Western post-Cold War foreign policy, it exposed the operational difficulties in its development. The UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, had deliberately granted UNITAF enforcement powers to counteract the weaknesses of UNOSOM-I. Specifically, he intended those powers to be used to: disarm the Somali militias, and to extend the UN's authority over the whole of Somalia (not just Mogadishu and its environs).[52] The overarching plan would be to then transfer control for UN operations in Somalia to a strengthened UNOSOM-II,[53] which would also be granted enforcement powers in support of a wide-ranging state-building mandate.[54] However, the US commanders of UNITAF interpreted their objectives more narrowly than did Boutros-Ghali. They reasoned that to alleviate food shortages in Mogadishu presupposed an improved security environment. They therefore determined to withdraw as soon as famine had been quelled, without disarming local militia.[55] Consequently, when UNITAF exited Somalia in May 1993, it left behind a more secure but still highly unstable situation in Mogadishu. UNOSOM-II (which also included US, UK and other Western troop contingents) now worked to implement Boutros-Ghali's desired outcome. They engaged in heavy ground fighting from 12 June 1993 (a departure from UNITAF's approach), culminating with the infamous Battle of Mogadishu on 3 October 1993 (immortalised in the film *Black Hawk Down*), in which US forces not under UN authority were evacuated from the Somali capital with the help of Malaysian and Somali UN peacekeepers after suffering numerous casualties.[56]

The Battle of Mogadishu, and the fighting which had preceded it, led to the negative implementation of the 'CNN Effect'. Already, public reaction to media coverage of Somalia's crisis had guided the international response to intervention. Images of victims of the famine had prompted the deployment of UNOSOM-I in the first place, arguably over the needs of increasingly dire situations in Liberia and the former Yugoslavia.[57] The ineffectiveness of that operation was visible to Western publics, whose domestic pressure on their own governments was eventually felt by Boutros-Ghali, necessitating UNITAF's robust mandate.[58] Now, UNOSOM-II's use of force was being broadcast around the world. The descent of an allegedly humanitarian operation into an urban campaign and the sight of the mutilated bodies of US servicemen being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu turned the pressure onto the US President, Bill Clinton.[59] He unilaterally ordered the withdrawal of all US troops from UNOSOM-II by March 1994,[60] fatally undermining the operation. European governments followed the US policy and extricated themselves from the disintegrating situation in Somalia.[61]

Lacking the necessary resources to continue, the Security Council terminated UNOSOM-II's mandate on 31 March 1995.[62] The operational approach to the various missions in Somalia had proved detrimental to a strategy of armed humanitarian intervention there. It was evident that weak mandates, tentative action and the deaths of troops had sapped domestic support for the intervention, in spite of an international desire to resolve the crisis. For the West, the failures of Somalia negated the negligible losses of the ground campaign of the First Gulf War. The notion of placing 'boots on the ground' was discredited; operational means would have to be better aligned with strategic ends if armed humanitarian intervention were to form the basis of future Western foreign policy.

This revelation was to an extent supported by the operational employment of air power during the intervention in Somalia. Its role was limited, as were its effects. Other than for logistics, neither UNOSOM-I nor UNITAF made much use of air power, being as they were ceasefire monitors and food distributors. It was with the transfer of authority from UNITAF to UNOSOM-II that aircraft were utilised offensively against Somali militia in Mogadishu. In a scaled-down application of the principles employed in *Instant Thunder*, planners intended to attack strategic leadership and key production targets in the capital.[63] Combat sorties, mostly comprising fixed-wing or helicopter gunships – especially the US AH-1 Cobra – did prove effective in striking weapons caches and command centres,[64] although they notably failed to achieve the strategic effect of killing the most influential Somali warlord, Mohamed Farah Aidid,[65] due to incorrect intelligence on his whereabouts.[66] Aircraft were also employed in support of special operations directed against militia leadership. The infamous Battle of Mogadishu was a heliborne assault of US Rangers against Aidid, but unanticipated low-level anti-air fire resulted in the loss of two UH-60 Blackhawks. Somali opposition also prevented aerial evacuation, leading to the envelopment of US ground troops and the subsequent death of 18 soldiers (as well as 78 wounded).[67] Were it not for the intervention of MH-6 Little Bird attack helicopters providing close air support, it is almost certain that US ground troops would have been overrun entirely before a column of UNOSOM-II armoured vehicles could relieve them.[68] Air power, then, achieved mixed results. Its attack capabilities were effectively employed to disorientate the country's largest militia – a success which could have been exploited to positive effect by more proactive efforts by UNOSOM-II.[69] But its vulnerabilities were displayed very visibly in the assault into Mogadishu, denting Western public support for the wider concept of an armed humanitarian intervention in Somalia.[70]

That legacy of Somalia – one of failure – had an almost immediate impact on another humanitarian catastrophe which was unfolding elsewhere in Africa. On 6 April 1994, just one month after the withdrawal of Western troops from UNOSOM-II, the Rwandan Genocide began. Despite notable inaction by Western leaders during the atrocities, the crisis did rekindle support for a strategy of armed humanitarian intervention and suggested two characteristics of air power which could prove decisive in operationalising

such a policy: speed and reach. Ultimately, no intervention was mounted into Rwanda. The two major actors on the Security Council during the genocide – the UK and the US – feared that involvement would lead to a repeat of the problems experienced in Somalia.[71] They also refused to launch an aerial re-supply of the under-resourced UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda, out of concern for the threat to their aircraft[72] – another 'lesson' of UNOSOM-II. However, this approach did to some extent wipe the memory of Somalia's failures from the collective Western mindset. The genocide was allowed to reach its conclusion with relative impunity; the UN mission was powerless to intervene, while Belgian and French operations were minimal.[73] In light of so tragic an outcome, the desire in the West to pursue a strategy of armed humanitarian intervention was revived.[74] In a reversal of the previous year's events, the 'CNN Effect' (despite being unable to incite a positive intervention into Rwanda) revealed in graphic detail the results of non-intervention.[75] To the extent that the UK and the US did involve themselves with Rwanda, it was in reconnaissance and airlifting of humanitarian supplies to the country after the genocide. The RAF deployed a single Canberra PR9 under Operation Purposeful, providing accurate intelligence of the refugee flows within Rwanda. Similarly, Operation Support Hope made widescale use of air transport capabilities to quickly bring humanitarian relief to a post-crisis landlocked country with little developed infrastructure. It was an impressive display of air power, involving American transport aircraft flying from the continental US and being refuelled by UK-based USAF tankers.[76] That the Rwandan Genocide had been allowed to happen prompted a rebuke to Western non-intervention. However, the fact that minor support operations were made possible only through air power's speed and reach reinforced its role in facilitating a strategy of armed humanitarian intervention.

Despite the clarity with which these developments can be assessed after the events, the humanitarian disasters of the early 1990s indicated that the West did not yet operate a coherent strategy of armed humanitarian intervention. Certainly, the permissive space for intervention had been identified, and the moral desire to act in support of human security was now kindled. Moreover, air power had variously demonstrated its speed of deployment, global reach and accurate firepower. But these factors were yet to be integrated. The result was a display of serious limitations to the still-burgeoning strategy – limitations which were acutely visible to Western publics. It was ironic, then, that Lawrence Eagleburger, who had been briefly promoted to US Secretary of State at the end of President Bush's term of office, viewed the intervention in Somalia as a distraction from the UN's failings in Bosnia.[77] For it was the failures in Bosnia which would provide the impetus for a cohesive, Western, air-centric strategy of armed humanitarian intervention.

BOSNIA AND KOSOVO: AIR POWER AND HUMANITARIANISM

The UN's intervention in Bosnia, UNPROFOR (the United Nations Protection Force), was marked by its inability to prevent serious ethnic cleansing of Muslim Bosniaks by the

Bosnian Serb Army.[78] It necessitated significant NATO involvement, culminating with Operation Deliberate Force, an alliance campaign of aerial bombardment alongside a ground offensive by Bosnian Croat forces. That operation finally arrested the human rights abuses in Bosnia and paved the way for the subsequent diplomatic resolution of the conflict, the Dayton Peace Accords. It also affected the broader strategy of armed humanitarian intervention, taking responsibility for enforcement out of the hands of the UN and offering an alternative NATO-led air-centric response instead. In the years between Operation Deliberate Force in 1995 and Operation Allied Force – the NATO intervention in Kosovo in early 1999 – those insights, along with the lessons of previous interventions of that decade, were amalgamated into the latest form of the West's strategy of armed humanitarian intervention. Operation Allied Force was the manifestation of that strategy, and to that extent represented the ascendancy of air power as a tool of Western foreign policy. But, as with every other such operation, it was inherently flawed. This section will therefore suggest that even at the zenith of its development, the strategy of armed humanitarian intervention could not effectively operate in the changing international society, and that from 1999 onwards, it was largely in decline in Western political thought.

UNPROFOR undermined the West's faith in the UN as the primary means of implementing armed humanitarian intervention. As had happened under UNOSOM-I, it was neither adequately resourced nor given the appropriate powers to protect civilians in designated safe zones, as per its mandate.[79] NATO did deploy a small ground-based Rapid Reaction Force to support UNPROFOR in its mission, but that too was stifled by a restrictive command and control structure which incorporated the UN as an authority-holder.[80] Where NATO *was* able to have a greater effect in preventing human rights abuses was in the air. It had been conducting Operation Deny Flight since 1993 to enforce a UN-mandated No-Fly Zone over Bosnia,[81] but, like the Rapid Reaction Force, this mission was hindered by the political constraints of working alongside the UN. Operation Deny Flight notably failed to prevent the massacre of Bosniaks in Srebrenica by Serb forces, the official UN report citing concerns over the boundaries of the peacekeeping mission itself, as well as the safety of the lightly-armed Dutch peacekeepers on the ground.[82] NATO therefore escalated their air power involvement in 1995, launching Operation Deliberate Force on 30 August of that year. This new mission was to be an offensive air campaign against the Bosnian Serb Army designed to force them into negotiations with the other parties to the conflict.[83] By November, it had succeeded, and the Dayton Peace Accords were underway.[84] Operation Deliberate Force was not acting in isolation. Croat ground troops had been engaged in a major offensive against the Bosnian Serbs. It was likely the combination of this with NATO's air campaign which defeated the latter – Operation Deliberate Force was essentially supporting the unfolding situation on the ground.[85] However, air power had been '*a* decisive factor in [NATO's contribution to] ending the 1992-95 Bosnian Conflict'.[86] Indeed, it had always been considered as the most likely operational approach for

'[getting] results from what may have been NATO's last bolt in Bosnia', after the ineffectualness of its ground presence.[87] Air power had been employed in other roles prior to Operation Deliberate Force, but it was the robustness of the air bombardment and its quick success in ending the humanitarian crisis which endeared it to Western leaders. Bosnia, then, established the framework of how a Western strategy of armed humanitarian intervention would be operationalised in the future: non-UN forces would rely on the robust application of force by air power.

That template was actioned in another Balkan intervention four years later. In 1999, European governments (with mild support from the US) were attempting to avert a potential genocide against ethnic Albanians in the Serbian-owned province of Kosovo. At the helm of this effort was the UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, who elucidated most clearly a Western strategy of armed humanitarian intervention (or, as he called it, the 'Doctrine of the International Community') in a speech to the Chicago Economic Club on 22 April 1999.[88] From the political perspective, it was an integration of two long-standing approaches to international relations: just war theory and classical realism. Blair argued that the international community had a moral obligation to intervene in other states to prevent or halt egregious human rights abuses. He caveated this obligation with certain limits, including the requirement for legitimate authority and reasonable prospects of success. And he also suggested that any such interventions should involve some degree of national interest on the part of interveners, in order to sustain the political will to reach a conclusion.[89] As he spoke, RAF aircraft were striking targets in Serbia on his orders, alongside other NATO aircraft as part of a wider NATO intervention in the country: Operation Allied Force. Blair, who viewed the campaign as part of his 'Doctrine of the International Community', provided the will to action, while the US offered the majority of the resources which made it possible.[90]

Operation Allied Force was designed in the image of its precursor in Bosnia, Deliberate Force, though notably without any ground presence which, it was feared, would destabilise the alliance.[91] It was intended to be a short campaign – only a few days at most – but intense. Planners envisaged debilitating strikes against a limited number of Serbian military targets, after which the Serbian government under Slobodan Milosevic would request a ceasefire and re-enter negotiations over Kosovo's political status.[92] But despite the aggression of the initial NATO air campaign, far more robust than any humanitarian intervention of the past decade, it was wrought with difficulties. Planners had underestimated the importance of Kosovo to the Serbian military and people, and their target selection was hampered by political disagreements between the leaders of NATO's member states. This meant that the level of force directed against Serbia was, at first, insufficient to coerce them into returning to negotiations with the West.[93] Yet there was serious concern that if the air campaign were to expand its target list beyond military forces – the sort of strategic targeting that had formed the core of Operation Desert Storm – it would inspire a form of negative 'CNN Effect' in

Western public opinion, turning the operation from an armed humanitarian intervention into 'terror bombing' of Serbia by NATO.[94] Nonetheless, the Western leadership was keen to see results, and the air campaign was consequently expanded to include strategic targets in and around Belgrade, including key production industries and infrastructure (this was the approach desired by the Combined Force Air Component Commander, USAF Lieutenant General Michael Short, from the beginning of Allied Force).[95] Escalation eventually brought Milosevic to negotiations, though not without a concerted diplomatic effort accompanying the intervention and the initiation of planning for a ground invasion.[96] On 10 June 1999, air strikes against Serbia were halted. The same day, the Security Council passed UNSCR 1244, establishing UNMIK (the United Nations Interim Administration for Kosovo).[97] It would be supplemented two days later by KFOR (Kosovo Force), a NATO peacekeeping mission intended to maintain the security which Operation Allied Force had introduced to Kosovo.[98] The NATO intervention had been extremely aggressive. It had lasted for 78 days, far longer than initially planned, during which time 38,400 sorties were flown (60% by the US), of which 10,484 were strike sorties (80% by the US) and a total of 26,614 air munitions were expended.[99] Operation Allied Force was the air-centric armed humanitarian intervention towards which Western thought had been gravitating for the previous decade.

That is not to say that it transpired smoothly. The Kosovo Report questioned whether the intervention did alleviate ethnic cleansing in the province, noting that huge population displacement did occur and that up to 10,000 Kosovars were killed, while many more were wounded, raped or assaulted.[100] It is difficult to judge whether the human suffering would have been even greater had NATO not intervened, but the campaign can claim some success in having forced Milosevic to an accord which granted autonomy to Kosovo and withdrew Serbian military and police units from its territory.[101] A more ominous weakness of Operation Allied Force was that it closed off the permissive space which had made it possible in the first place. Co-operation within the international society had heretofore placed armed humanitarian intervention at the heart of the legitimate use of force. But NATO had exploited the goodwill underpinning that approach. It had endeavoured to act so swiftly against Serbian abuses in Kosovo that it had pre-empted any UN authorisation for its actions. It was to a degree vindicated by the post-conflict Kosovo Report, which famously called the intervention 'illegal but legitimate',[102] and its subsequent inclusion alongside the UN in the peacekeeping process.[103] But, ultimately, NATO's air campaign raised questions about how the West's strategy of armed humanitarian intervention could be reconciled with traditional principles of state sovereignty.[104] Moreover, it eroded trust between the West and Russia and China, both of which were deeply troubled by what they perceived to be NATO's aggressive posture in a country beyond its own collective borders.[105] Indeed, the Russians had attempted consistently throughout the intervention to bring the fighting to an end through their own diplomatic initiatives.[106] Though more profound divisions in the international society were on the horizon, the aftermath of the Kosovo intervention

hinted that the West's freedom to develop its strategy of armed humanitarian intervention was about to be rapidly curtailed in the face of international opposition.

Nor did Operation Allied Force necessarily represent the dominance of air power as a tool of force in international relations. The air campaign over Kosovo occurred in a unique context. Massive quantities of air power could be rapidly deployed because of the proximity of Serbia to NATO's European infrastructure.[107] Selection of both strategic and tactical targets was relatively easy (political micro-management aside) thanks to Serbia's developed state, prevalence of infrastructure, and conventional fielded forces (although prosecuting Serbian fielded targets in Kosovo once they had been selected was to prove difficult).[108] And Western strategy could still be employed within a permissive environment in the lead-up to the conflict.[109] But these factors were not immediately transferrable to other cases of humanitarian emergency. Western forces (notably not under the control of the UN, but operating with its authority) would conduct two further armed humanitarian interventions in the immediate aftermath of Operation Allied Force. In neither instance did air power play as decisive a role as it had done over Kosovo and Serbia, and in both cases ground troops were relied upon as the primary *supported* element.

The first of these interventions occurred in East Timor from late-1999 to early-2000. INTERFET (International Force for East Timor) was a UN-authorised, Australian-led multinational force deployed to the territory to assist its transition to independence. Air power was used sparingly, relying on Royal Australian Air Force and Royal New Zealand Air Force C-130s, Caribous and F-111s for transport, reconnaissance and deterrence against Indonesian intervention.[110] The UK's contribution to INTERFET – primarily elements of the Royal Gurkha Rifles[111] – was indicative of a preference amongst the Western states of the coalition for a physical ground presence as the best way to restore stability to the area. Furthermore, unlike in the NATO intervention in Kosovo, INTERFET was deployed in support of a political solution which had already been reached,[112] obviating the need for a significant application of force which had been required to bring Milosevic to negotiations.[113] The second operation in which air power was relegated to a *supporting* role was the UK intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000, in support of a faltering UN operation there. Intervening in a civil war against a poorly-equipped and -trained enemy in difficult terrain, air involvement was limited to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, performed by thirteen Harrier GR7s operating off HMS *Illustrious*.[114] Additionally, the operation saw C-130s and Chinooks used in the air transport role and in direct support to special forces (indeed, special forces Chinooks facilitated Operation Barras, a hostage-rescue mission whose success fatally undermined rebel forces).[115] Both the INTERFET mission in East Timor and the UK intervention into Sierra Leone were successful in that they respectively preserved and restored peace without undue disturbance to the international order. Interestingly, too, both handed post-conflict duties over to UN missions (the same template which had

been employed in Kosovo). But neither had made as extensive use of air power as NATO had done in either Bosnia or Kosovo. It seemed that a strategy of armed humanitarian intervention did not require air-centric campaigns as a prerequisite to success.

However, by the turn of the millennium, a Western strategy of armed humanitarian intervention was apparent, the result of an eventful development over a decade of conflicts. Moreover, air power had at least demonstrated that it could, in certain circumstances, be the decisive force component in a given campaign, as it was in Bosnia and Kosovo. Neither of these developments in international relations was without its limitations: in the smaller interventions in East Timor and Sierra Leone, air power was not the defining contribution to military success, and the 1999 campaign in Kosovo and Serbia had engendered some opposition to the broader strategic direction of Western foreign policy. But efforts were being made to better integrate armed humanitarian intervention into the institutional processes of the international society, most notably by the *International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*,[116] the *Independent International Commission on Kosovo*,[117] and the UN-led *Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*.[118] It would take a significant shock to global politics to alter the West's strategic trajectory.

AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: AIR POWER AND REALIGNMENT

The 11 September 2001 terror attacks not only brought unheralded tragedy to the US. They also altered the dynamics of the international society. Western strategy, which had been focused around armed humanitarian intervention up to that point, required a radical re-evaluation in the face of a changing balance of threats. This final section explores the invasions and post-war counter-insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and their implications for humanitarianism and air power. It argues that the permissive space for armed humanitarian intervention was closed following those campaigns, the result of a normative gap between certain interventionist Western states and purportedly non-interventionist rivals (compounded by disagreements between Western governments). It also touches on how air power reacted to the growth in ground-centric counter-insurgency as a result of strategic realignment. In the wider context of a Western strategy of armed humanitarian intervention, this second decade of the post-Cold War years represents a decline in support for – but not the end of – the concept.

The invasion of Afghanistan under US Operation Enduring Freedom began on the evening of 7 October 2001. It involved waves of US bombers (B-1B Lancers, B-2 Spirits and B-52 Stratofortresses), fighters (F-14s and F/A-18s), electronic attack aircraft (EA-6Bs) and Tomahawk cruise missiles (also launched by Royal Navy submarines). These were supported by C-17s which air-dropped supplies to Afghans fleeing cities, and by US KC-135 and KC-10 and RAF Tristar and VC10 tankers.[119] Their targets were Taliban early warning radars, command and control sites and Al Qaeda training camps,

with the stated objective of securing air supremacy in order to provide unmolested assistance to Northern Alliance ground forces and create conditions for future US and allied intervention in Afghanistan.[120] Following the design of Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force in Iraq and Kosovo, Operation Enduring Freedom opened with an overwhelming application of force against enemy air defences. But beyond that opening phase, no strategic targets were identified or attacked. Instead, large numbers of ground forces were deployed as part of an effort to rebuild Afghanistan and support a post-Taliban government (they also pursued such open-ended objectives as '[preventing] the re-emergence of terrorism and [providing] support for humanitarian assistance efforts').[121] In reality, this amounted to an unforeseen and lengthy counter-insurgency campaign. US and, subsequently, NATO commanders (the International Security Assistance Force – ISAF – superseded Enduring Freedom from December 2001) quickly realised the doctrinal issues of applying air power in this new operational environment. In early efforts, air power was not employed effectively: for close air support of ground troops; for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance across the country's mountainous terrain; or for attack against dispersed and well-concealed Taliban and Al Qaeda forces.[122] These shortfalls prompted a shift in operational thinking amongst NATO air planners, such that concepts of air-land integration (ALI) took prominence over strategic targeting. The transformation of air power into a supporting role proved successful, with the British Army suggesting that 'the military has emerged from a 10-year campaign highly proficient in ALI'.[123] Compared to the air-centric campaigns in the First Gulf War and Kosovo, though, it represented a significant decline in air power's dominance as a force component.

Less successful were the strategic ends to which air power was employed in the Afghanistan War. The motivation for Western action no longer presupposed a humanitarian purpose but centred around traditional notions of self-defence (expanded to include counter-terrorism) and international stability. In the immediate aftermath of the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, the Security Council passed UNSCR 1368, which defined terrorism as a threat to international peace and security.[124] It also authorised 'all necessary steps' in response.[125] The following month, NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty,[126] permitting 'individual or collective self-defence' to 'secure or maintain the security of the North Atlantic area'.[127] Certainly, conspicuous efforts were made during the initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom to accommodate humanitarian concerns in the air campaign, largely by air-dropping blankets and food to Afghans fleeing the bombing,[128] but the documented international response to the 11 September attacks shows that the purpose of intervention into Afghanistan was evidently to prevent further terror attacks against the US or its Western allies, not to alleviate any perceived human rights abuses. Even after US forces handed responsibility to ISAF – a UK-conceived mission – human rights were never explicitly stated as the aim of the Western presence there. Resolution 1386, which established the international force, was simply 'welcoming [of] developments in Afghanistan

[towards] inalienable rights and freedom' and stressed that 'all Afghan forces must adhere [to] human rights law'.[129] Its *actionable* clauses limited international assistance to 'the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas' in support of the Afghan Interim Authority.[130] Beyond taking an approach which treated humanitarianism as a secondary issue at best, the war in Afghanistan also demonstrated a trend in Western foreign policy that would come to worry other states and, consequently, reduce the permissive space for further intervention. USAF General Wald, the Combined Force Air Component Commander in Operation Enduring Freedom, explicitly noted in his mission statement that the aim of the initial bombing campaign against Afghanistan was to 'set the conditions for regime removal and long-term regional stability'.[131] The intervention did not yet dramatically split the international society, but it did set the precedent for a new Western strategy which prioritised the security of states over humanitarian concerns (regardless of how rationally threats to security had been assessed) and conflated regional stability with regime change.

That new strategy would visibly divide international opinion in a second intervention into Iraq in 2003, led by US, UK and Australian forces. The 2003 intervention exacerbated the changes to Western strategy and air operations which had been implemented in Afghanistan. In doing so it significantly reduced the scope for *any* future Western intervention (humanitarian or otherwise) and accelerated the realignment of air power towards ALI and away from strategic targeting in the second post-Cold War decade. A discussion of UK air power's role in the conflict – Operation Telic – appears elsewhere in this journal, but of concern to this paper's argument is the justification provided for the intervention. It is notable that the Western countries involved offered different reasons for action. The American government argued that they were acting (without explicit UN authorisation) in 'preventive self-defence', lest Iraqi weapons of mass destruction be targeted against the US, particularly through state-sponsored terrorism.[132] The UK and Australian governments referred back to UNSCR 678 which had authorised the use of force against Iraq in Kuwait, and extended that mandate to a continued right of collective security against Saddam's Iraq in 2003.[133] They also claimed that they had the right to use force to apply Security Council resolutions (notably UNSCR 1441 which stipulated 'serious consequences' should Iraq not comply with an inspections regime)[134] even if those resolutions did not explicitly authorise such force.[135] Whatever the merits of their arguments, the UK, American and Australian intervention took place against broader international opposition – in contrast to the First Gulf War. It was one of the most overt examples of US and UK over-reach in the eyes of Russian and Chinese governments, who were beginning to strain against US hegemony.[136] And it heralded a divergence from other Western states such as France and Germany, whose interests when determining the strategic shift away from armed humanitarian intervention had not been considered. They were unsupportive of the Iraq War, and angry at being diplomatically sidelined by the US.[137] The moral authority of the West in general and of the UK and the US in particular had been sullied, and

their freedom to employ force with the implicit consent of the international society was subsequently hampered. Iraq had exposed the extent to which Western strategy had over-reached itself in the rapid changes since Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION

The story of post-Cold War international relations in the two decades from 1991 to 2011 had much to do with the development of a Western strategy of armed humanitarian intervention. This paper has framed that development within a few broad themes: the expansion and decline of the permissive space for intervention, the role of humanitarian motives in Western foreign policy, and the influence of air power in operationalising strategic ends. Observing the period from a wide perspective, it has noted the inconsistencies in implementing armed humanitarian intervention, and it has also determined that a fatal shift in thinking (and resultant disagreement) about the purpose of force in Western foreign policy occurred after the terror attacks of 11 September 2001. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq did not represent an end to the strategy, but they did equate it with US aggression and exposed a growing divide within the international society over the perceived irreconcilability of inviolable state sovereignty with principles of intervention.

Such has been the rate of decline in support for armed humanitarian intervention, that NATO's 2011 operation in Libya – Operation Unified Protector – which might have heralded a new beginning for the strategy, instead marked another setback. It was the first time that the interventionist pillar of the internationally-agreed *Responsibility to Protect* had been invoked. It was an example of an air-centric campaign which applied rapid and devastating force to human rights abusers. And it did indeed prevent the catastrophe that had inspired it in the first place – the assault by Gaddafi's forces on Benghazi. But Operation Unified Protector overstepped its mandate in the eyes of many non-NATO countries (although certain Arab states, notably the UAE, participated to a significant degree). It engaged in regime change and once again proved the risks of permitting the West to use intervention to flout the norms of state sovereignty. It prompted an almost immediate sense of post-conflict regret from numerous Western and non-Western states which had acquiesced to the intervention and, in doing so, it widened the normative gap between supporters of armed humanitarian intervention and its critics. The *Responsibility to Protect* had already been condemned as a justification for Western adventurism overseas. The intervention in Libya confirmed that view, and resulted in the most restrictive scaling-back of the permissive space for intervention since the Cold War.[138]

This paper has cantered through 20 years of intervention and air power. Every conflict referenced deserves far more attention than has been offered here. But this overview has hopefully provided one possible lens through which to view the immediate post-Cold War world and air power's role within it. If this idea of fluctuating periods in air

power's history – shaped by events beyond its own theoretical constraints – is to be pursued, then perhaps the rest of this edition of *Air Power Review* will provide insight into the coming age. As in the First Gulf War, the RAF now has access to phenomenal new technologies which must be integrated and adapted to the changing world. The opportunities and limits this entails are explored in the following articles, culminating in a viewpoint by Lieutenant General David Deptula (Retired) who, 28 years ago, helped to plan the first great intervention of the post-Cold War age from the Black Hole in Riyadh.

NOTES

[1] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton University Press, 1976) 87.
[2] Edward H. Carr, *What Is History?* (Cambridge University Press, 1961) 62.
[3] Ibid.
[4] David J. B. Trim, "Humanitarian Intervention," in *The Changing Character of War*, eds. Sibylle Scheipers and Hew Strachan (Oxford University Press, 2011) 151.
[5] The 'international society' here refers to two or more states whose decisions must account for the behaviour of one another and who interact within a shared set of rules and norms. In this instance, the international society encompasses the global community of sovereign states, and one of the institutions by which change is managed within this society is armed conflict. For a discussion on the international society and its 'institutions' in the sense used here, see Hedley Bull's *The Anarchical Society* (1977).
[6] John R. Ballard, *From Storm to Freedom: America's Long War with Iraq* (Naval Institute Press, 2010) 1.
[7] Supremacy here is viewed as the freedom of action to pursue foreign policy without being impeded by international opposition. This article contends that such was the situation faced by Western governments at the beginning of the post-Cold War period, to a far greater degree and geographical scope than they experienced in the bipolar Cold War international order.
[8] The period following the First Gulf War includes the Western-led No-Fly Zones over Iraq – Operations Haven, Provide Comfort (I and II), Northern Watch and Southern Watch – between March 1991 and March 2003, though they are not discussed further in the article.
[9] Security Council Resolution 660, UN Doc S/RES/660 (2 August 1990).
[10] Security Council Resolution 661, UN Doc S/RES/661 (6 August 1990).
[11] Security Council Resolution 665, UN Doc S/RES/665 (25 August 1990).
[12] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations* (24 October 1945) Ch. VII, Art. 2.
[13] Security Council Resolution 678, UN Doc S/RES/678 (29 November 1990).
[14] United Nations, *Charter*, Ch. II, Art. 1-2.
[15] Norrie MacQueen, *Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations* (Edinburgh University Press, 2011) 19-38.
[16] Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (Harper Collins, 1993) 817.
[17] Ballard, *From Storm to Freedom*, 4.

[18] Ibid.
[19] MacQueen, *Humanitarian Intervention*, 49, 62.
[20] Nikolai Zlobin, "Iraq in the Context of Post-Soviet Foreign Policy," *Mediterranean Quarterly* (Spring 2004) 89.
[21] Lilian C. Harris, "The Gulf Crisis and China's Middle East Dilemma," *The Pacific Review* 4, No. 2 (1991) 116.
[22] Harlan W. Jencks, "Chinese Evaluations of "Desert Storm": Implications for PRC Security," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 6, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 1992) 447.
[23] Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress* (United States Government Printing Office, 1992) 69.
[24] Ibid. 120-1.
[25] James A. Winnefeld et al., *A League of Airmen: US Air Power in the Gulf War* (RAND, 1994) 68.
[26] Ibid. 66-68.
[27] Ballard, *From Storm to Freedom*, 38.
[28] Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*, 118.
[29] United States Air Force, *Gulf War Air Power Survey* (United States Government Printing Office, 1993) 151-2.
[30] Richard S. Lowry, *The Gulf War Chronicles: A Military History of the First War with Iraq* (iUniverse Star, 2003) 2-10.
[31] General Accounting Office, *Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign* (United States General Accounting Office, 1997) 194.
[32] Winnefeld et al., *A League of Airmen*, 127.
[33] Stephen T. Hosmer, *Psychological Effects of US Air Operations in Four Wars, 1941-1991* (RAND, 1996) 153.
[34] Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, 813.
[35] Ballard, *From Storm to Freedom*, 34-5.
[36] Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*, 45.
[37] Sebastian Ritchie, "Operation Granby: Maritime Air Reconnaissance," *Air Power Review* 19, No. 2 (2016) 206-228.
[38] Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*, 152.
[39] Ballard, *From Storm to Freedom*, 42, 62-3.
[40] Hosmer, *Psychological Effects*, 152-7.
[41] Ibid. 155.
[42] Winnefeld et al., *A League of Airmen*, 174-5.
[43] David E. Johnson, *Learning Large Lessons: The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post-Cold War Era* (RAND, 2006) 24-6.
[44] Ken Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations* (Routledge, 1993) 232-3.
[45] MacQueen, *Humanitarian Intervention.*
[46] Ibid.
[47] Security Council Resolution 733, UN Doc S/RES/733 (23 January 1992).
[48] Security Council Resolution 751, UN Doc S/RES/751 (24 April 1992).

[49] Security Council, *Report of the Commission of Enquiry Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel Which Led to Casualties Among Them*, S/1994/653 (1 June 1994) 12.
[50] Security Council Resolution 794, UN Doc S/RES/794 (3 December 1992).
[51] MacQueen, *Humanitarian Intervention*, 62.
[52] Christiane E. Philipp, "Somalia – A Very Special Case," *Max Planck Yearbook of International Law* 9, No. 1 (2005) 535.
[53] Ibid. 538.
[54] Security Council Resolution 814, UN Doc S/RES/814 (26 March 1993).
[55] Gary Anderson, "UNOSOM II: Not Failure, Not Success," in *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, eds. Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (Palgrave Macmillan, 1995) 268.
[56] Security Council, *Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II*, 26-33.
[57] Anderson, "Not Failure, Not Success," 268.
[58] MacQueen, *Humanitarian Intervention*, 108.
[59] Ibid. 111-112.
[60] Ibid. 112.
[61] Security Council, *Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II*, 32-3.
[62] Security Council Resolution 954, UN Doc S/RES/954 (4 November 1994).
[63] Benjamin Armstrong, "Precision Approaches: Leadership Targeting and the Helicopter as a Strategic Strike Asset in Small Wars," *Defence and Security Analysis* 25, No. 3 (2009) 275.
[64] Security Council, *Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II*, 27.
[65] Armstrong, B. (2009) 'Leadership Targeting and the Helicopter as a Strategic Strike Asset in Small Wars' in *Defence and Security Analysis*, Vol. 25, No. 3, Routledge, pp.274-5.
[66] In one such intelligence failure, US forces launched an air assault against the UN Development Programme headquarters in Mogadishu, taking its staff prisoner. By opting for a heliborne assault, they missed the large sign in front of the building which designated it as the UNDP offices. The story of the raid is recounted in *The Independent* (1993) **https://www.independent.co.uk/news/raid-fiasco-focuses-us-doubts-over-role-in-somalia-1464352.html**, last accessed on: 16/11/2018.
[67] Security Council, *Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II*, 32.
[68] Armstrong, "Precision Approaches," 275.
[69] Anderson, "Not Failure, Not Success," 278.
[70] MacQueen, *Humanitarian Intervention*, 111-2.
[71] Gregory H. Stanton, "Could the Rwandan Genocide Have Been Prevented?" *Journal of Genocide Research* 6, No. 2 (2004) 211-228.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Alan J. Kuperman, *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda* (Brookings Institute Press, 2001) 40, 44-51, 93.
[74] Ibid. 1-2.

[75] MacQueen, *Humanitarian Intervention*, 85.
[76] Kuperman, *Genocide in Rwanda*, 57-8.
[77] MacQueen, *Humanitarian Intervention*, 86.
[78] ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (ICISS, 2001) 1.
[79] Carl Ceulemans, *Reluctant Justice: A Just War Analysis of the International Use of Force in the Former Yugoslavia (1991-1995)* (Brussels University Press, 2005) 105.
[80] Ibid. 105-6.
[81] Security Council Resolution 816, UN Doc S/RES/816 (31 March 1993).
[82] General Assembly, *Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica*, A/54/549 (15 November 1999) 104.
[83] Johnson, *Learning Large Lessons*, 53.
[84] Ceulemans, *Reluctant Justice*, 107.
[85] Johnson, *Learning Large Lessons*, 54.
[86] Robert C. Owen, "The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 2," *Airpower Journal* (Fall 1997) 24.
[87] Ibid. 18.
[88] Tony Blair, "Doctrine of the International Community," speech given 22 April 1999, **https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/154/26026.html**, last accessed on: 08/11/18.
[89] Ibid.
[90] MacQueen, *Humanitarian Intervention*, 80.
[91] Johnson, *Learning Large Lessons*, 66.
[92] IICK, *The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned* (Oxford University Press, 2000) 92.
[93] Johnson, *Learning Large Lessons*, 65-6.
[94] IICK, *The Kosovo Report*, 93.
[95] Johnson, *Learning Large Lessons*, 77-8.
[96] IICK, *The Kosovo Report*, 95-6.
[97] Security Council Resolution 1244, UN Doc S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999).
[98] IICK, *The Kosovo Report*, 101-2.
[99] Ibid. 92.
[100] Ibid. 97.
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[103] Security Council Resolution 1244.
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[106] IICK, *The Kosovo Report*, 4, 269, 284.
[107] Andrew L. Stigler, "A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO's Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo," *International Security* 27, No. 3 (2003) 143.

[108] Benjamin S. Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo* (RAND, 2001) 38.
[109] IICK, *The Kosovo Report*.
[110] Royal Australian Air Force, *Australian Air Publication AAP 1000-H: The Australian Experience of Air Power* (Air Power Development Centre, 2013) 154-6.
[111] Revor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* (Oxford University Press, 2002) 289-90.
[112] Ibid.
[113] For a discussion on the impact of INTERFET on the development of armed humanitarian intervention, see Norrie MacQueen's *Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations* (2011). Rather than referencing the operation in East Timor as an addendum to an air power-based approach, MacQueen argues that it is the ideal implementation of armed humanitarian intervention.
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[115] Andrew M. Dorman, *Blair's Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone* (Ashgate, 2009).
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[117] IICK, *The Kosovo Report*.
[118] General Assembly, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305 (17 August 2000).
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[127] NATO, *North Atlantic Treaty* (4 April 1949), Art. 5.
[128] Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror*, 79-80.
[129] Security Council Resolution 1386, UN Doc S/RES/1386 (20 December 2001).
[130] Ibid.
[131] Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror*, 83.
[132] Gerry Simpson, "The War in Iraq and International Law," *Melbourne Journal of International Law* 6, No. 1 (2005) 171-3.
[133] Ibid. 173-6.
[134] Security Council Resolution 1441, UN Doc S/RES/1441 (8 November 2002).
[135] Simpson, "The War in Iraq and International Law," 173-8.
[136] Deborah W. Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy," *International Security* 34, No. 4 (2010) 63-95.

[137] Irwin M. Wall, "The French-American War Over Iraq," *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 10, No. 2 (2004), 132-4.
[138] For a discussion on the intervention in Libya and its destabilising impact on international norms, see Michael Doyle's *The Question of Intervention: John Stuart Mill and the Responsibility to Protect* (2015).