


The image is a composite. On the right side, there is a close-up of a soldier's face in profile, wearing a camouflage bucket hat and a uniform with a name tag that reads "RAF REGIMENT". The soldier is looking towards the left. On the left side, there is a faded, historical-style illustration of a battle scene, showing soldiers in various poses, some on horseback, and a landscape with buildings and trees. The overall color palette is muted, with a lot of greys and browns, and a slight blue tint.

Ten Strategic Factors

*For Those Who Aspire to Direct,
Command and Control*

UK Military Power

(with due respect to 'the principles of war')




1 **Inevitably.** There have always been wars, there will always be wars, but their scale and strategic impact are extremely variable: large, small, surprise, even ‘phantom’ or ‘cold’ (the latter self-evidently more difficult to analyze, with less certainty over the success of differing policies). Read Matthew Chapter 24 for a prophetic account of things to come. Sound diplomacy, backed by a credible threat of force, could prevent bloodshed being the inevitable result of every crisis.



Never forget that real warfare is ugly, destructive and remembered fondly only by those who survived it without getting too close or those who revel in blood and chaos

However, even though we may go through periods of relative peace, so-called 'Ages of Reason', talk of long-term peace is wishful thinking. Therefore, some of those good old clichés come into their own: only the dead have seen the last of war; the more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war; if you want peace, prepare for war; train as you intend to fight and then fight how you train. Never forget that real warfare is ugly, destructive and remembered fondly only by those who survived it without getting too close or those who revel in blood and chaos.



2. **An Aim.** Focus: clear, achievable, with a vision of the desired end-state which includes a concept of how to measure ‘success’. Many hours will be spent on developing ‘Mission Statements’, ‘Implied’/‘Specified’ Tasks, all of which discipline is a good thing as it avoids confusion over something as (theoretically) simple as the *Strategic Aim*. The difficulty in the modern world is that the Aim must be understood by both the fighters and the onlookers, with the latter having a previously-unimagined level of political clout as they armchair-commentate in front of their TV. Remember the populist, ‘sound-byte’ aim, so expertly expounded by Churchill with this intuitive ability to capture the mood of the moment: “Victory... whatever it may cost”.

3. **Defensive Action.** There must be an intrinsic ability and will to survive. If one suffers the first strike – a likely outcome in non-expansionist democracies – then sufficient security must be in place to take cover, re-group and fight back. Intelligence (‘Indicators and Warnings’ devised and pursued by deep-thinking strategists) is needed, camouflage, concealment, deception, hardening, good equipment to protect against any type of attack, and downright courage (physical *and* political).

4. **Psychological Warfare.** Typical pre-match banter between opponents, reaching out to an opponent’s intellect or fears. This ‘weighing-up’ of the opposition can be enough to convince one side that it is worth making more effort to find peace. Leaflet ‘bombs’, loudspeakers, radio and TV bulletins to reduce resolve (which is why the global transmission of CNN can be so pervasive an ‘agent’). However, while offensive, Lord Hawhaw-style broadcasting is counter-productive; consider the thought process of an Argentine conscript when he discovers that there are SAS and Gurkha soldiers coming his way. But, it may be appropriate to offer/create for the enemy a way out with honour – humiliation is unlikely to pay in the longer term.




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5. **Leadership.** Motivating, visionary, morale-enhancing, tactically brilliant, courageous, blessed with drive and determination, trusted and/or feared in the role of 'the boss' (Unity of Command) accessible and unencumbered by vast staffs and HQs, capable of ensuring the right level of co-operation from other Services, nations and politicians. The vast majority of 'the troops' will be pretty average; they can be made match-winners by the right leaders at the different 'levels' (a Churchill, General Montgomery, Wg Cdrs Guy Gibson and Bob Braham, Col H Jones, General Schwarzkopf, or even Castro). Some people may lead by offering hard cash or instigating a regime of fear – shoot anyone who is not totally loyal and replace with a member of your own family. This can be very effective in small doses but, other than the use of a very loud voice, is not usually the Western democratic way! Some leaders may emerge only when the situation demands and people are willing to accept that kind of style (NB the rise and fall of Messrs Churchill and Thatcher). It is the leader's task to instil a passion, even an obsession, for excellence and quality (because few opponents will pay attention to 'the mediocre'), without making the workforce turn its eyes to heaven, in horror, at the very sound of these management-claptrap/familiarity-breeds-contempt descriptors. Finally, there has to be that willingness *to be led* and an eradication of that so-common cynicism and unwillingness to support/follow (a widespread trait particularly when the threat is not instantly definable by 'the common man'). It may take a few disasters before minds are appropriately focused and ready to be told what to do next.




...the Israelis were not so proactive when it came to 1973, having ignored the Intelligence assessments which had cried wolf too many times before; when it really mattered, nobody was listening

- 6. **Information/Intelligence.** Well-interpreted information by sharp, strategic-thinking Intelligence and Operations' staffs: spies, *accessible* recce and surveillance systems, the media propaganda war. The 7-day War was a classic pre-emptive strike in response to hard Intelligence indicating a dire threat – but then one has to be prepared for the public outcry after committing the first hostile act. Not surprisingly, the Israelis were not so proactive when it came to 1973, having ignored the Intelligence assessments which had cried wolf too many times before; when it really mattered, nobody was listening.
- 7. **Offensive Action.** Nobody ever won a war by being passive. The initiative needs to be wrested from the enemy, whilst protecting one's own forces, taking into consideration:
 - a. **Surprise.** This is little more than an enormous disparity in initiative between two forces: audacity, secrecy, wrong-footing the enemy. However, recall General Von Moltke's wise counsel: 'I notice that always there are 3 courses open to the enemy, and that he usually takes the fourth'. But how often are we ever allowed to use Surprise these days, in those operations short of full war, when political brinkmanship has telegraphed our every move?
 - b. **Smart Targeting.** Consider why exactly the enemy is fighting. Doubtless he thinks he can win, or he perceives himself to be right and to hell with the consequences. *Analyze the source of his power*, the 'centre of gravity' – if indeed it is possible to find just one. Without getting too wrapped up in esoteric Campaign jargon, it may be that there are several

'Decisive Points', but focus efforts on those targets which should lead to irreparable collapse in the enemy's capability (be it a mad/brilliant leader, the main sources of its commercial success, an enormous army [invariably dependent on supplies and lines of communication], or even a strategic piece of land [such as the Golan Heights]), without forgetting that control of a strategic 'piece of Air' has possibly become more relevant in this day and age. Keep 'attacking' until the job is done (which is why the Russians chose 'Annihilation' as one of their Principles of War) – but traditional *physical* attack may not always be the preferred strategy (computer viruses?) If these approaches are not possible, prepare for the worst or 'give up' gracefully for the time being and prepare to fight another day, on *your* terms.

- c. **Concentration of Force.** Never meet the enemy in a fair fight but consider how to 'sell your strategy' to those in the comfortable position of commentating rather than fighting or having to take responsibility for policy-making.
- d. **Economy of Force.** Beware 'overkill' as there are usually more targets than combatants or weapons. Beware empire creation as large groups tend to stifle ideas and initiative. 'Small is beautiful' and can be very effective (Joshua at the Battle of Jericho). We in the UK can only ever be small these days and must learn to co-operate with others to be truly strong across a wide front. On the international stage, the UK can only ever be a contributor – the trick may be to provide key capabilities, which capture headlines and boost prestige in the race for post-war economic profits. Any one nation which dominates an operation, supposedly backed by the majority of the UN, still runs the risk becoming just as big a bogeyman as the original enemy. The future 'battlefield' may be entirely different, 'fought' in the council chambers of the EU, on the floors of international money market, within vulnerable, networked computer systems, or in the hands of a very few 'Special' Forces, individuals capable of creating undreamed-of mayhem with nothing like the mass of

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people which would have been required in the past, warriors who have seriously analyzed the ‘centre of gravity’ and discovered that its destruction/disruption is relatively straightforward. Although it may not suit the conventional military machine, a government may wish to invest more widely/wisely in future, yet still under the banner of ‘National Security’.

- e. **Mobility/Manoeuvre.** Attack, move/withdraw, attack, always keeping the enemy off balance. Accept the value of little victories – they boost morale, self-confidence and political support. Build up to that all-or-nothing assault. This mindset must be fostered in training, ‘under a man’s skin’, that readiness to move quickly and create organization out of chaos. In a guerrilla-type war, mobility is the key, albeit many other factors – like a secure place in which to re-group, re-arm and re-charge the batteries – are relevant. ‘Manoeuvre Warfare’ is a popular phrase but suffers from different interpretation, the victim of policy-makers with limited vision. Until we have leaders unfettered by their personal experience of fighting in tanks, ships and specific aircraft types, prepared to consider ALL the options for achieving that end-state (which MUST include non-military and/or non-violent means,) talk of ‘Manoeuvre Warfare’ is just hot air. Beware those who are still really pursuing the concept of Attrition Warfare, glossing up their outdated strategy with high-tech, sexy gadgets but merely creating the window dressing of speedy movement between those same old battles of attrition. True Manoeuvre Warfare is extremely demanding, for both fighter and planner, but endeavour to stay in the driving seat and never stop thinking/doing/analyzing.

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- f. **Conviction.** There must be the desire to win, that classic ‘hunger’ for victory encountered commonly in the sports arena, exemplified by the South African victory against the All Blacks in the Rugby World Cup. On the military side, when Shaka Zulu attacked other African tribes, that conviction was there – on both sides – so that the Zulu warriors just *knew* they would win and their opponents had a pretty shrewd idea that they were right.

- g. **Chance for Peace.** Remain mindful of the chance for real peace after any particular offensive action planned. Attacking overtly civilian or religious targets will foster long-term enmity, as is any disregard of the generally-accepted ‘Laws of War’. Beware action through passion rather than logical thought. After a war, this could leave bitter memories and the desire for revenge in many hearts – further conflict (whether on a battlefield or in a court of law) is inevitable. Time does not necessarily heal; it can build a most determined, war-fighting resolve in the next generation.



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8. **Technology.** This is a potential match-winner (nuclear in Japan in 1945 and arguably the F-117 in the Gulf). It is possibly true that most new weapons disappoint, in the early days at least, but just imagine what an F-15E would have done in 1939; do not under-invest in Research and Development.

9. **People in Support.** People win wars, ordinary people made extra-ordinary by some outside influence. However, the basic fighting man still needs support from numerous sources: the people at home (especially wives and families), the media, follow-up or reserve forces, and of course the logisticians and communicators. The troops cannot fight when their bellies, magazines and mail slots are empty, or if they feel public antagonism (Vietnam), or worse still, threats to their own families back home (the American Civil War). If these 'basics' are got wrong, morale will crumble and the war will be lost.





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10. **Luck.** The harder I work, the luckier I get. But we can all do with a few breaks: the right weather, the enemy's secret codes (Battle of the Midway), using deception (a 'cunning plan') and it actually working, gaining early success which encourages self-belief and enables a success-blessed momentum to gather pace. Equally, one must be prepared for the luck to turn, and avoid the destructive feeling that 'this is not going to be my day' becoming entrenched. How many times has a football team been losing 3-0 only to win 3-4? Not often perhaps, but it certainly doesn't happen if spineless people lose heart at the first hurdle.

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