

The

# Implications of European Security

and

# Defence Identity

for

# Future Air Force Structure 2015-2030





The emerging and maturing European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) concept has gathered significant pace over the last 5 years, to the extent that its growth could well shape the future of our Armed Forces, especially within the period 2015 to 2030. The principle of collaborative European defence has been mooted since the years following the end of the Second World War but the formation of the NATO Alliance has meant that any such moves to promote a European Force was relegated to the 'back-burner'. However, since the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the resultant drawdown of force levels in Europe (particularly by US forces), the European Union (EU) has been forced to examine its own defence and security posture. The establishment of the Franco-German Eurocorps in 1992 spurred the EU into accelerating the ESDI concept. The Helsinki headline goal signed in Dec 1999, in which agreement was reached to form a 60,000 strong land force, has added to the speculation that future ESDI developments could have significant ramifications on the size and structure of European National forces. Recent proposals for greater European defence collaboration forwarded by the British Government during the last 3 years would lend significant weight to the prospect of the UK playing a major role in the ESDI's future expansion.






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Each single-Service vision paper<sup>1</sup> assumes that the UK will continue to seek its defence through NATO, but none seriously addresses the implications of ESDI in the 2015 – 2030 timeframe. As defence expenditure in real terms will probably continue to fall, although not at the rate seen over recent years, an emerging ESDI within the NATO framework may offer future Governments an alternative course of action so that it can match its defence requirement and capability within a diminishing budget. When the ESDI matures in to a credible defence and security platform for Europe, the collaborative nature of its combined forces and equipment will provide NATO with a ‘European pillar’ of military capability that up to now has been lacking. The effects of ESDI could, therefore, result in a number of significant changes to the way that the RAF conducts its operational business. By identifying the likely outcomes of ESDI, the RAF can play a key role in Europe’s ability to deliver air power. But what will this mean for the RAF’s force structure? If Europe adopts the golf-bag approach to equipment and air power roles, as I will argue, then the RAF needs to identify its expertise areas sufficiently early to ensure that it plays a leading role in the planning, contribution and execution of EU sponsored air campaigns and operations.

This article will fall in to two parts. Part One will examine the ESDI concept, look at the historical background to a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within Europe, explore the current trends within ESDI and highlight those treaties and agreements signed over the last 3 years that point towards the future of the ESDI. The paper will not address the ‘special relationship’ that the Government currently enjoys with our transatlantic allies, nor will it debate the arguments surrounding the



level of support that the US might or might not offer an EU sponsored and led operation. Part Two will identify some fundamental assumptions based on the future prospects for ESDI and use those assumptions to examine the implications for the RAF's force structure in the timeframe 2015 to 2030. By forecasting the ESDI's military policy, the article will develop the concept of mutualisation, where European Nations will individually contribute specialist air power roles rather than the current role sharing required by the Helsinki Headline Goal Task Force. In doing so, it will examine those capabilities that the RAF could contribute towards a potential European Air Force (Euroairfor) and highlight the challenges that the RAF could face.

## **PART ONE – EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY**

### ***Evolution of the Western European Union***

The debate over the nature, size and structure of the 'European pillar' of NATO has been driven by two primary concerns: the degree to which Europe can and should rely on the US to guarantee European security (and by doing so accept US leadership), or whether that burden should be divided amongst European Nations at the risk of US disengagement from Europe. Attempts to make Europe more self-sufficiently secure saw a select number of European nations establish the European Defence Council<sup>2</sup> (EDC) in May 1952, although French reservations over national sovereignty and a re-armed Germany led to rejection of the Treaty in 1954. The Brussels Treaty Organisation<sup>3</sup> first established in 1948, was enhanced in 1954, following the failure of the EDC, with the signing of the Paris Protocol which brought West Germany and Italy into the newly-formed Western European Union (WEU). However, the accession of West Germany into the NATO Alliance in 1955 and the UK's accession to the EC in 1973 saw much of the WEU's *raison d'être* evaporate over the following decade.

In October 1984, the WEU was revitalised by the Rome Declaration in which Ministers: '*underlined their determination to make better use of the WEU framework in order to increase cooperation between member states in the field of security policy*'.<sup>4</sup> Also in October 1987, the WEU Ministerial Council adopted the 'Hague Platform' on European security interests declaring that: '*an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence {and the need to} strengthen the European pillar of the {North Atlantic} Alliance*'.<sup>5</sup>

The Gulf War, which followed closely on the heels of the post-Cold War shift in European security focused on the contribution of the European Allies to the potency of the Alliance in more specific terms. Having noted that the Gulf crisis highlighted how modest the European contribution was, Manfred Wörner, former Secretary General of NATO, stated: '*the Gulf War proved that the US needed Allied support and multinational cooperation...what is essential, however, is that a European Security and Defence Identity evolve into more than a political concept. A pillar must carry something, which implies that all its members should be available for essential security tasks and willing to share roles, risks and responsibilities equitably, including the military domain*'.<sup>6</sup>

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### **A Common Foreign and Security Policy for Europe**

The Maastricht Treaty, signed in December 1991, was a milestone in establishing a Common Foreign and Security Policy for the EU. The WEU assumed responsibility for the defence component of the EU and, in doing so, went some way to address the political rhetoric of previous years by providing a concrete structure to ESDI. However, the Franco-German formation of Eurocorps, independent of the WEU/NATO framework in 1992, provided the spur for the WEU to articulate a formal agreement on those military tasks that they could conduct. At a Ministerial meeting in Bonn, in June 1992, the 'Petersberg Tasks' provided the WEU with the authority to conduct humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, peacemaking and crisis management. NATO endorsed the Petersberg Tasks and offered the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept as a means *'to allow limited autonomy to some European forces...{but which}...will facilitate the mounting of NATO contingency operations, the use of separable but not separate military capabilities in operations led by the WEU'*.<sup>7</sup> At the NATO Summit held in Brussels in 1994, the Alliance Heads of State sanctioned the use of NATO assets for use by the WEU in pursuit of their CFSP goals.

More recently, the thrust of the Brussels Summit was further expanded at the Berlin Summit in June 1996. Taking full advantage of the approved CJTF ideals, the ESDI concept was founded *'on sound military principles... supported by appropriate military planning {which} permits the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU'*.<sup>8</sup> Again, the theme of 'separable but not separate forces' was reiterated, although it was



evident that the ESDI was evolving as an extension of the NATO Alliance and not an independent military force. Indeed, the Berlin Summit provided the guidelines for the coordination between NATO and the WEU by outlining the scope, objectives, planning and command of forces for illustrative WEU-led operations, which were submitted through the Military Committee and North Atlantic Council to the WEU for review and approval.

## Current Trends

The Treaty of Amsterdam signed in October 1997, effectively began the process whereby the EU could assume responsibility for the military tasks undertaken by the WEU, if so directed by the European Council. In doing so, the Council would be able to take decisions on the whole range of political, economic and military instruments at its disposal when responding to a crisis situation. The 1998 St Malo bilateral agreement, signed between the UK and France, provided further proof of the resolve amongst leading European countries to pursue the establishment of a European force capable of complementing the NATO Alliance. Further still, at a later Franco-British summit held in London, attention was focussed on EU plans to create its own reaction force. The proposal for *'some 50,000 troops (12 – 15 brigades) to be capable of deploying within 60 days for a commitment of up to 2 years, on or around the European landmass'* was a pre-cursor to the 1999 Helsinki agreement. However, France's vision was more ambitious: *'a force of up to 60,000, growing to 100,000, with 300 – 500 aircraft and a dozen warships. Whatever its shape, the force should be up and running by 2003'*.<sup>9</sup> The St Malo bilateral gained widespread support within both Europe and the NATO Alliance and resulted in the WEU ministerial in May 1999 and the EU's Cologne summit in June 1999 during which it was agreed to the general absorption of the WEU within the EU. Thus the Union would finally be able to unite its CFSP with the military means to support the management of crises beyond its own territory.

The Helsinki proposals, signed in December 1999, provided the formal foundation to the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). EU Ministers agreed to adopt the Headline Goal as its fundamental policy. It states: *'by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily they {the member states} will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty...up to corps level (50,000 to 60,000 persons). These forces should be self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities...and additionally, as appropriate, with air and naval elements. They should be able to deploy within 60 days...and must be able to sustain operations for at least one year'*.<sup>10</sup> The UK's initial response to this proposal has been the production of a catalogue, in parallel with similar responses from the other 14 EU partners, detailing the single Service contribution to the Headline Goal Task Force.<sup>11</sup>

ESDI has received widespread support amongst most European nations and, as a concept, the ideals first declared over 50 years ago are now fast becoming a reality. Events over the past 10 years, from the Gulf War to more recent events in Bosnia and Kosovo have forced European leaders to examine closely the contribution and capability of the European effort to coalition and allied operations. ESDI will not replace NATO, that has never been in question, but the foundation of a European pillar of NATO, with greater emphasis on EU sponsored military actions within the European theatre, will mean less reliance on the US to provide the major contribution to European security and defence matters. So will the momentum, signalled by a number of significant treaties and agreements over the last 3 years continue, or will it simply fade into obscurity? There is another major factor that I believe will drive ESDI to fruition: money.

Defence expenditure throughout Europe has been on the decline since the demise of the Warsaw Pact. To use the UK as an example, expenditure peaked at 4.52% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the 1980-84 period. During the 1990-94 period it dropped to 3.56% and over the last 5 years has progressively fallen each year to its 1999 level of 2.63% of GDP. The US in the same period has seen defence expenditure drop from 6.01% of GDP to 3.18%. Defence expenditure across Europe has shown progressive decline over the last 10 years and, apart from Greece (4.9%) and Turkey (5.7%), France has the highest level of expenditure at 2.9%.<sup>12</sup> The general trend of defence expenditure has been on decline over recent years, but there is nothing to suggest when the decline will stop or at what level: 2½%, 2%, 1¾%? However, one conclusion can be drawn from these statistics, that the increasing cost of new systems coupled with a shrinking 'pot of gold' may lead the Government to seek a collaborative spending effort with its European defence partners. European defence expenditure has, in the past, been completely disparate with the result that 'value for money' has not been achieved. European NATO countries collectively contribute the equivalent of 60% of the overall NATO budget but do not get close to the value in terms of equipment capability when compared to the US. *'In the post-Cold War context, 60% should be more than enough to deal with contingencies inside and along the periphery of Europe... conversely, the Europeans do not get anything like 60% of the US capabilities from their defence spending. This is what the Kosovo campaign so starkly highlighted. Most of the European allies have defence budget structures, which are out of sync with the requirements of the post Cold-War era. Collectively, NATO's European members field standing forces of 2.4 million...but spending on equipment and firepower is at US \$11,000 per soldier in Europe compared to US \$36,000 per US soldier.'*<sup>13</sup> Clearly, if Europe can harmonise its defence spending, then the European pillar of NATO will become an extremely well funded and capable military force. However, progress in the immediate future will not be swift and the reluctance of some countries to accede to a common European currency will stall budgetary union. Until this particular hurdle can be overcome, then common defence structures will take some time to come to fruition, although given the time frame of this paper, it is not unrealistic to assume that by 2015 even Britain will have subscribed to a single European currency. However, collaborative effort relies on more than just financial unity, *'if the EU countries as a whole moved to best European practice (currently in the UK), the money available each year for research and development and equipment would jump from 34bn euros to 48bn euros, without any increase in overall defence spending.'*<sup>14</sup>



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The coordinated effort required to bring ESDI to realisation is not insurmountable. The solution, however, is clear: *‘The Europeans need to improve the efficiency of their defence spending through a combination of approaches: defining force goals (this was done...at the Helsinki summit); improving budget structures (so called ‘input criteria’); and pooling of key capabilities (what the French call ‘mutualisation’) such as air transport assets, in order to reduce the overhead costs and inefficiencies associated with having individual national armed forces’.*<sup>15</sup> More generally, *‘the difficulties...will be about overcoming the tremendous changes the {ESDI} will mean for each military establishment in each EU country. As a matter of analogy, the adoption of the Euro has radically altered the traditional role of national Central Banks becoming an adjunct to the European Central Bank. The full fruition of any relevant ESDI within the present budgetary constraints will probably call for functional specialisation in defence matters.’*<sup>16</sup> Options for the EU are clear: ESDI must come to the fore as the European pillar of NATO if it is to overcome the shortfalls in its collaborative defensive efforts evident over the past decade. The lack of a focussed military capability, able to contribute fully to coalition or allied operations must be overcome if NATO is to survive simply because Europe cannot rely wholly on the US to provide the majority effort each time a crisis occurs within, or on the peripherals of, Europe. The ‘second pillar’ can be achieved but it will require a radical approach: it must embrace ‘mutualisation’ to achieve economy of effort and, therefore, realise its true military potential. In other words, European Nations will need to evolve from the role sharing required by the Helsinki Headline Goal Task Force to specialise their contributions to Euroairfor so that Nations will be individually responsible for providing specified aspects of air power.

## **PART TWO - CHALLENGES FOR THE ROYAL AIR FORCE**

### **Assumptions**

Based on the arguments contained in the first part of this article, and within the timeframe of 2015 to 2030, it is assumed that:

- The NATO Alliance will remain as the authoritative body for European collective defence.<sup>17</sup>
- Future UK Governments will remain heavily involved with, and be instrumental in, the evolution of ESDI through to its culmination as the European pillar of NATO.
- The UK’s defence spending will not fall below 2% of the GDP and so opportunities to fund new systems may be limited.
- UK Armed Forces will be required to support two concurrent medium scale operations, one warfighting and the other non-warfighting.
- ‘Mutualisation’, and the formation of a Euroairfor, will be endorsed by the UK Government as a method of matching its air power requirement against its military tasks.
- As a function of ‘mutualisation’, the RAF’s force structure will be subject to fundamental change.

To enable a future Government to achieve value for money, the attraction of mutualisation within the European pillar will, I believe, become too great an incentive to ignore. The contribution that the UK has identified under the Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue is now based on role-sharing but the next progressive step will be to coordinate the collaborative effort of each Nation within the EU and so offer those EU Nations the opportunity to embrace mutualisation. Furthermore, the potential for coordinated collaborative defence spending amongst EU nations will help counter any reduction in 'real term' national defence spending over the next two decades. What needs to be examined is what the Government will be able to afford and what it will be willing to offer towards the establishment of a Euroairfor. However, one thing is certain, attempting to determine our future shape will require a breakaway from traditional thinking about force structure and within the timeframe of 2015 to 2030 some fundamental questions need to be addressed. What happens when the RAF can no longer afford what we consider to be the full range of air power roles that we achieve today? Will the RAF still need a manned aerial reconnaissance force? Do we need to pursue an offensive Suppression of Enemy Air Defences capability? Should we aspire towards establishing the best Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance force in Europe? Should we provide the European pillar with the majority of its strategic and tactical airlift capability?

Assuming that mutualisation will become UK policy, we must attempt to harmonise now what we contribute to ESDI through Euroairfor and what air power roles the RAF will need for future UK contingency operations. In doing so, this article will attempt to highlight the force structure needed in the 2015 – 2030 era.

### **Command and Control**

Future operations within or on the periphery of Europe will be characterised by the multi-national cooperation of EU member states, and a successful European crisis response will only be achieved through effective force packaging. The ability to lead multi-national operations within a collaborative framework will remain vital and those key capabilities that support C4ISR should be developed further, such as the UK TACCS/TJF.<sup>18</sup> The ability to contribute command and leadership of the scale and quality needed to fill key appointments within Euroairfor, with trained and experienced commanders and staff, must be maintained. If these requirements are not met, then the RAF could lose the ability to lead a Euroairfor operation which, as one of the primary contributors, would prove unpalatable.

### **Airlift**

To support the 60,000 strong Eurocorps, the EU will require a collaborative European airlift capability. The German Government, as a stepping stone towards the establishment of greater cooperation between European Air Forces, has already identified this requirement: *'German proposals...centre on developing a European strategic airlift reserve from the present Franco-British Euro*

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*Air Group.*<sup>19</sup> None of the current EU nations individually possess the quantity of airlift capability that the RAF can offer. The Government's future investment in strategic airlift, with leased C-17 until procurement of the Future Transport Aircraft (FTA) and, potentially SkyCat,<sup>20</sup> will provide the RAF with both a strategic and tactical airlift capability that will see the RAF take the lead in Euroairfor's transport capability.



From a national perspective, the RAF's airlift capability will dovetail neatly into the Future Army concept of Rapid Effect, as the military component of Early Effect.<sup>21</sup> The ability to deploy forces early in to any spectrum of operations from a low-level Non-combatant Evacuation Operation, to large-scale warfighting is a principal requirement of Early Effect, which applies force with reaction through Rapid Effect. An extension of the Rapid Reaction concept already employed within NATO's ARRC, Rapid Effect will rely heavily on strategic and tactical airlift to ensure that appropriate level of response, at up to Divisional level, is deployed speedily and efficiently. To balance National requirements with European aspirations, the RAF will need to pursue the full implementation of its present and future airlift capability.



The UK's Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) triad<sup>22</sup> will be essential to any EU-led operation. NATO's current reliance on organic US systems creates an ISR void that must be addressed. The issue of releasability of US derived intelligence information will always dictate the quality of information made available to EU nations and, therefore, it will continue to be a major constraint in any EU-led military effort. To provide an ISR force that possesses credibility, the RAF should aspire to supplement its current ISR force with an offensive EW capability as well as supplementary intelligence gathering roles, such as Elint. Space-based systems will also need to be explored; whether that is achieved through close cooperation with the US or with independent European systems is an area that will require military guidance and political direction. Certainly, the Spanish can contribute much with their existing Satellite Intelligence Centre at Torrejon and the recent 3-way venture between Germany, Italy and France '*could give Europe a strong and independent military space capability by mid-decade*'.<sup>23</sup> But to overcome the ISR void will require a continued and significant collaborative EU effort to resource space-based intelligence systems capable of providing comparable levels of information currently obtained from the US.

However, if Euroairfor's ISR capability is to achieve any credibility within NATO, then it must pursue a joint venture to ensure that it matures within the 2015 – 2030 timescale. In the meantime, the RAF can and should take the lead for all ISR matters, but key drivers in this area will remain the availability of US originated information and, currently, the EU's determination to provide their own comprehensive ISR matrix. Tactical reconnaissance does not strictly fit within the ISR triad capability but, nonetheless, it requires comment because it raises a fundamental question. While the



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function of tactical reconnaissance will continue to be required, will manned or unmanned air vehicles better achieve it? With the advances in, and availability of technology – especially within the UAV/satellite field – then manned tactical reconnaissance could be made obsolete within the next two decades. However, the principle of providing the man-in-the-loop decision-maker will remain paramount but I believe that the tactical reconnaissance man-in-the-loop will be sited on the ground and not in the air. By surrendering the manned tactical reconnaissance role – currently three flying squadrons – then the RAF could cycle a greater degree of funding towards the UK's ISR matrix and contribute towards closing the information void that might be left by the US.

### ***Suppression of Enemy Air Defences***

But perhaps a more fundamental area needs to be examined: does the RAF need to pursue an offensive Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) capability? Do we really need to invest in the capability or can the UK afford to leave this particular field to another EU nation or nations to provide the assets required? The question hinges on the need of UK forces to use offensive SEAD during unilateral operations. I believe that none of the envisaged UK unilateral operations of the future will require an offensive SEAD capability. Although predicting where the UK is likely to operate autonomously is extremely difficult, likely unilateral operations will be at the lowest level, at the NEO or peacekeeping levels, and any other scenario ascending to higher levels of conflict will generate an allied or coalition response. The potential for future unilateral warfighting scenarios, such as on the scale of the Falklands, are an extremely low risk, and any such prospect needs to be weighed up against the investment needed to replace Air Launched Anti-Radiation Missile (ALARM) and acquire and sustain a complete offensive SEAD capability. Furthermore, a number of European Countries have already invested in offensive SEAD and some have already expressed interest in the US LEWK concept system<sup>24</sup> to provide a cheap, effective alternative to a manned aircraft offensive SEAD capability.

Employing Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs), however, will bring with it its own problems, particularly the legal and moral implications of introducing a UCAV in to warfighting. The 'man-in-the-loop' decision-maker and C2 will, by implication, take on a much greater significance. However, the concept of using UCAVs has enormous benefits. Not only will UCAVs be cheaper and more economical to operate than manned aircraft, but also the risk to aircrew is nullified – a factor which, in the politically sensitive climate of today (and certainly that of the future), will become a major issue in determining the use of UCAVs.

Much has been made of the RAF's current lack of a robust offensive SEAD capability. However, the prospect of the UK undertaking unilateral warfighting operations is, I believe, an extremely low risk and any risk assessment must be weighed against the investment required to establish and maintain a credible offensive SEAD capability. Within Euroairfor, other EU countries could take on the SEAD role for the European pillar, investing in both manned or unmanned air vehicles and which would, therefore, present realistic economies for the RAF and where funds could be re-directed into improving its defensive

SEAD capability. Conversely, if the concept of relinquishing an offensive SEAD capability proves unacceptable, then consideration should be given to investing in UCAV technology to provide a weapon system capable of Destruction of Enemy Air Defences or DEAD.<sup>25</sup>



### **Offensive/Defensive Air Capability**

The RAF's current and future offensive and defensive capability can provide Euroairfor with a level of technology that should enable the RAF to have a major influence over the employment of Offensive Air in the European theatre. Eurofighter and its associated array of air-to-air and air-to-ground weaponry, coupled with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and the Future Offensive Air System (FOAS) programme, could provide the strategic effect capability needed to attack an adversary's military-strategic and operational centre of gravity. But to lead such a role the RAF must demonstrate that it possesses the C2 required for such systems. Interoperability features, such as digital data-link and fully secure communications technology, must be available to support the sensor (E-3D/ASTOR/Ground radar/Space Based IR Systems) to decision-maker (ground or airborne C2) to shooter (Eurofighter/FOAS/JSF/UCAV) concept,<sup>26</sup> so that full system architecture is achieved.

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## **And Finally,**

The implications of ESDI on the RAF's force structure need further analysis but if the 'mutualisation' of Euroairfor, driven by Government spending limits, becomes a reality then I believe that the RAF needs to take stock of its position now and to assess what it can offer in the future. As a major contributor, the RAF must offer the preponderance of C2, strategic airlift, ISR and both an offensive and defensive air capability to Euroairfor but, I believe, can only do so at the expense of tactical air reconnaissance and an offensive SEAD system. Nor can UAV/UCAV technology be overlooked and its growth potential is enormous. Such is its significance that it could quite easily provide the basis of a separate paper, but I highlight it here because their utility could well have a major influence on the RAF inventory of the future, especially in the ISR and offensive air power roles.

The accelerated progress of ESDI over the last 5 years has indicated to NATO that Europe has the desire to contribute more towards its own Defence and Security. Within Europe, there has never been a more cooperative approach to EDSI and its future, more than ever, will continue to develop to achieve its goal as the 'second pillar' of European Defence. The CJTF concept adopted by the EU for its Petersberg Tasks has provided the backbone for the command and control of collaborative European forces. The Helsinki headline goal will come to fruition in 2003, with a 60 000 strong land force under command of European officers. The next logical step will be to establish equivalent maritime and air forces. Furthermore, as the level of defence spending across Europe will continue to decrease in real terms over the next generation, I believe that successive Governments will look more towards ESDI to provide a collaborative European response to any crisis that may develop in, or on the peripherals of Europe.

Such options may prove tempting for the Government, especially where collaborative effort within ESDI may provide an achievable and cheaper solution. The establishment of Euroairfor will have force structure implications for the RAF. While we are investing heavily in a number of systems that will provide our capability throughout the timescale of 2015 to 2030, competition for the decreasing 'pot of gold' will force the RAF to review its force structure. That is not to say that the quality of systems will be affected, but the way we do our business will come under much closer scrutiny. Therefore, I feel it is important for the RAF to put its 'markers in the sand', to pre-empt an examination of how we employ our forces, identify where our capability gaps exist and how we can best attack perceived shortfalls. Should future Governments endorse the Euroairfor concept, as I believe they will, what can the RAF 'bring to the party' in terms of mutualisation so that we retain a major role in the planning and execution of EU-led operations or campaigns.

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The RAF must maintain its core leadership skills so that it retains control over the forces assigned to Euroairfor and provides the leadership required for a collaborative force. I believe that we could provide leading roles in both airlift capability and ISR functions. Our strategic airlift capability, with C-17, FTA and potentially SkyCat, will be extensive and cannot be matched by any other European country. The information void that could be left by the US would provide Euroairfor with a significant problem that can only be overcome by a collaborative effort. The RAF's planned investment in an ISR triad capability will provide the majority of information needed by European 'CJTF' C2 elements. However, by allowing other European countries to invest in space-based equipments (such as France, Germany, Italy and Spain) will enable the RAF to concentrate on the development of air-based sensors. Indeed, through our special ties with the US, releasability becomes a lesser problem should we need access to space-based technology for national operations. With the technology available, tactical air reconnaissance could be conducted by next generation UAVs, which could provide the opportunity to make significant savings from maintaining three manned flying squadrons.

With the UK unlikely to become involved in anything above national lower end-PSOs from a unilateral perspective, then we should question the need to pursue a SEAD capability. The capability gap currently identified could take many years and considerable investment to overcome, where I believe that this is a capability that could be provided by other EU nations within ESDI. A number of European Nations have already expressed interest in emerging US SEAD technology and should they continue, then I would question the need for the RAF to pursue an offensive SEAD system replacement. The UK will acquire an impressive offensive and defensive air capability but we must ensure that we have the correct system architecture in place to ensure that the sensor-decision maker-shooter concept can be used to its maximum capability in the European theatre.



## NOTES

1. Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations, Future Army Concept Paper and Future Air Capabilities.
2. EDC formed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Italy, the Netherlands and West Germany.
3. Comprising Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK.
4. Extracts from the WEU Council of Ministers' Rome Declaration, Rome – 27 October 1984.
5. Hague Declaration of WEU Ministerial Council, 1987.
6. Foreword to Jane's NATO Handbook, 1992.
7. Extracts from the WEU Council of Ministers' Petersberg Declaration, Bonn – 19 June 1992.
8. Extracts from the Final Communiqué of the NATO Berlin Summit, 3/4 June 1996.
9. European Defence: Momentum Regained. Edward Foster. RUSI Newsbrief Vol19 No 12 Dec 1999, Page 89.
10. Select Committee on Defence Eighth Report, 11 May 2000, Opinion, Para 50.
11. European Union Headline Goal – Initial UK Response to the Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue. NEPG/E/4/4 dated 6 Sep 00.
12. Select Committee on Defence Eighth Report, 11 May 2000. History of the ESDI, Para 29.
13. European defence takes a leap forward. Francios Heisbourg. Chairman, Geneva Centre for Security Policy. NATO Review Spring/Summer 2000 Page 8 – 10
14. ibid. Page 9.
15. Ibid. Page 9.
16. ESDI: from stalemate to fruition? Yves Boyer, Deputy Director Foundation for Strategic Research, Paris. RUSI Newsbrief 2000 Page 116.
17. It is not the intention of this paper to argue the case for or against the survival of NATO post-ESDI. It is assumed that the NATO Alliance will remain in tact and that the NAC will determine whether operations within, or on the peripherals of Europe will be led by the EU.
18. The Tactical Air Command and Control System equipped with Tactical JTIDS (Link 16) Facility will be able to support a regional CAOC and provide C2 facilities as well as an essential airspace surveillance and control capability.
19. European Defence: Momentum Regained. Edward Foster. RUSI Newsbrief Vol 19 No 12, Dec 1999, Page 90.
20. JDW, Vol 34, Issue 2 – 12 Jul 00 page 12. SkyCat is a strategic airlift concept based on an airship design. Demonstrators have already flown and the proposals include an airlift capacity increased to, potentially, 1000 tonnes (12 –16 MBTs plus supporting elements) at transit speeds of up to 110kts.
21. Rapid Effect was first highlighted in the Future Army Concept Paper, ECAB/P(99)21 dated 22 Nov 99. Early Effect is defined in the 1st Draft – An Early Effect Capability for the Future Army: D/DG&D/FD/08 (under development).
22. E-3D, Nimrod-R and Airborne Stand-Off Radar (ASTOR).
23. Article 'France, Germany and Italy set to make space pact' JDW, Vol 33 Issue No 25, 21 June 2000, Page 4.
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