Deception Operations
&
Air Power

All the business of war; and indeed all the business of life, is to endeavour to find out what you don't know from what you do; that is what I called guessing at what was at the other side of the hill. The Duke of Wellington [1]

All warfare is based on Deception Sun Tzu [2]

These two quotations highlight the symbiotic nature of the relationship between intelligence, deception and the conduct of warfare. The selection of the words of Sun Tzu, in addition to being brief, highlights the all-embracing span of these concepts over time, geography and cultures. The inclusion of any one of a myriad of examples from the Bible would, arguably, extend the compass of the subject to include religion into the whole.

The trinity of deception, intelligence and the use of force is, however, not totally pervasive. There has been a segment of British history in which the acquisition of knowledge of the enemy's intention – spying – has been considered to have been positively ungentlemanly. And the whole concept of trying to trick an opponent was just not the sort of thing that could be mentioned in polite society – or even to one's troops or servants. In his comments on the role of deception in a historical context, Handel points out that societies with fixed notions of chivalry were loath to embrace these tactics in marked contrast to their less learned or enlightened opponents.[3] The reverse, however, was not necessarily true. Beyond the cultural dimension, military planners have often had recourse to deception operations when they have not had the overwhelming strength necessary to bludgeon their foes into submission, or to coerce them without fighting. In the Palestine Campaigns of World War I, General Allenby did not have the assets for a major confrontation with overwhelming force and therefore had recourse to 'cunning'. Deception operations have, for this reason always been part of Soviet doctrine given the length of their potential front. This remains important today in that the disciples of Soviet doctrine, such as Iraq and Serbia, still adhere to its tenets. It is worth adding, that deception operations are of more limited value in small-scale conflicts where the costs in blood and treasure are limited in proportion.

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The lessons of the Napoleonic era convinced both Jomini and Clausewitz that decisive victories could only be achieved with maximum concentration of force; deception operations therefore removed assets from where they were most needed.[4] Clausewitz had the following to say:

'To prepare a sham action with sufficient thoroughness to impress an enemy requires a considerable expenditure of time and effort, and the costs increase with the scale of the deception. Normally they call for more than can be spared, and consequently so-called strategic feints rarely have the desired effect. It is dangerous, in fact, to use substantial forces over any length of time merely to create an illusion; there is always the risk that nothing will be gained and that the troops deployed will not be available when they are really needed.'[5]

'The textbooks agree, of course, that we should only believe reliable intelligence, and should never cease to be suspicious, but what is the use of such feeble maxims?…Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain.'[6]

A combination of the influence of Clausewitz and Jomini, the changing nature of warfare and an unhealthy dose of chivalry left deception operations in abeyance, certainly through much of the First World War. After the initial combat of 1914, the static front line gave little scope for intelligence scoops or innovative deception operations. The need for a wire-cutting artillery barrage of several days' duration telegraphed the impending offensive; the scale of the ensuing conflict ensured that attrition was the order of the day and seemingly mutual exhaustion the likely result – at least until 1918 when it became increasingly evident that the German war machine was the more depleted.[7] Critically, the advent of air power contributed to the revitalisation of intelligence capabilities with the growth of reconnaissance (visual and later photographic). The corresponding need to shield one's activities from prying eyes in the third dimension led to the need for control of the air on at least a local level, and if necessary, over a designated time period. It also led to a resurrection of deception techniques, albeit at a basic tactical level with the use of camouflage techniques and decoys.

Far greater use was made of deception operations during the Second World War with Operation Fortitude as the most frequently cited example – this involved reinforcing the German perception that the Allied invasion would come to the

Pas de Calais area of France. But as Handel points out, the germs of many of the ideas and techniques were tried and tested by Wavell when he was on Allenby's staff in the Palestine Campaigns.[8] The strategic level deception was designed to convince the Turks that a major invasion was planned for Northern Syria in the hope that they would be duped into tying down a significant counter force. It failed when reconnaissance showed the Turks that no such force existed – as foreshadowed by Clausewitz's warning that substantial assets would be required for a worthwhile ruse. The operational level deception plan succeeded, contributing considerably to the overall success of the offensive. Allenby sought to convince the Turks that the real offensive was merely a diversionary activity; it worked, not least because it was coincident with the Turks' own assessments. Finally, at the tactical level, techniques that were to be become the stuff of legend in World War II (including 'the man that never was') were first used. These featured such ploys as the loss of 'haversacks' containing vital plans and the like. From the air power perspective, General Wavell's own commentary sets the scene for the development of intelligence gathering, deception operations and air warfare of later generations:

> *'All these devices to mislead the enemy would have been of much less avail had not the new squadrons and more modern machines received from home enabled our Air Force in the late autumn to wrest from the enemy the command of the air which he had enjoyed for so long in the theatre. After a few trials of strength had convinced the German aviators of the superior speed and performance of the Bristol Fighters, they came over only at a very respectful height, and by the beginning of the operations had been almost driven out of the skies.'*[9]

Wavell went on to say in respect of a later offensive:

> *'But it was above all the dominance secured by our Air Force that enabled the concentration to be concealed. So complete was the mastery it had obtained in the air by hard fighting that by September a hostile aeroplane rarely crossed our lines at all.'*[10]

This brief introduction has set the scene from a historical perspective taking the First World War as something of a watershed in the parallel, but connected, developments of the formalisation of the intelligence processes,[11] the resurrection of deception operations and the advent of air power. The article will go on to look more closely at the acquisition and absorption of intelligence material and then the formulation of deception operations. The paper will then examine practical aspects of planning, commanding and controlling the process. The importance of air power – or more correctly in the 21st Century – **aerospace power** will be seen to run as a common theme throughout the discussion.

INTELLIGENCE

The simplicity of a single word sub-heading belies the complexity of the morass of conflicting definitions as to what intelligence is, how it is gathered and what use can be made of it (not least where some material is so highly classified that few can read it and even fewer refer to it in planning). *The Concise Oxford Dictionary* defines intelligence, inter alia, as being 'information, news

especially of military value'. Academic sources immediately refine these terms with information being the material – both secret and open – that is gathered, arrives unbidden, or is merely there in the mass of 'stuff' that can be tapped from a wide variety of sources. The raft of open source academic material, media articles and the advent of the Internet have expanded the potential gold mine in which the nugget hunter can search. This vast array of information can be termed 'source material' or the raw material of intelligence'.[12] Material from the range of sources only becomes **intelligence** after it has been consciously sifted for relevance, accuracy, consistency, timeliness and value. This variety of sources can be problematical because human nature is such that secret information that is available to an exclusive few can appear to be of more importance than what is open to all – especially when the relative quantities are taken into consideration by harassed staff with limited capacity and time available. Irrespective of the sources chosen, the actual selection of specific material by the intelligence analysts therefore vests it with its own special endorsement. The classification of the whole, and its subsequent use and distribution, will be based in part on the highest level of source protection needed (ULTRA in the Second World War as a classic example), and also on the value inferred by its selection and by staff comment that is added. The fact that this intelligence (i.e. sifted source material) may often form the basis for the formulation of government policy, high level military planning or merely simple tactical action emphasises the potential importance of the process itself even though the original material may have all been open source.

The potential deception operations planner (or deceiver in simple garb) must therefore have an accurate appreciation of how his target receives source material; how it is prioritised (some analysts, for example, have an aversion to signals intelligence in favour of human intelligence, many shun open sources); with what material it is cross-referred for consistency; and how the analysis is distilled and distributed to planners and decision makers. The deceiver would also, ideally, wish to know the bias, sympathies or persuasion of the members of the analytical team in order to assess any likely spin.[13] It is obviously difficult to make more than sweeping generalisations in this area, but diplomats, for example, tend somewhat naturally to eschew secret reporting in favour of information gleaned through the normal diplomatic channels. Likewise, the military arm of the intelligence community tends to favour technical means of acquiring raw material. The deceiver would also wish to know how the decision makers and planners view the intelligence community of his target organisation (it need not be a state). British attempts to deceive the Japanese in World War II failed, not because of a poorly thought out plan, but because the Japanese senior military leadership held their intelligence system in such low esteem that the advice based on the deception was simply ignored – along with the rest of their product.[14] A more common trait, especially (but not exclusively) among less democratic regimes, is for the senior leadership to ignore any advice, analysis or assessment that does not accord with their prejudices or pre-conceived notions. Hitler's unwillingness to listen to possibly contradictory advice is well documented; indeed his conviction that the Allied landings would take place in the Pas de Calais area contributed considerably to the success of Operation Fortitude – contrary to the thinking of close associates such as Speer.[15] This can be exacerbated by ideological preconceptions. Wegner makes this point in respect of German attitudes to Soviet Russia prior to Hitler's decision in Summer 1940 to invade Russia.

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Sparse intelligence material allied with the misconception that Russia was a 'tottering giant' unable to 'shake off the yoke of the Jew' inevitably resulted in erroneous assessments of the likely resistance.[16] This inability to view a problem through the eyes of enemy will almost certainly make a bad situation worse by clouding issues with one's own perceptions. American tendencies to apply their own national value sets to Vietnam resulted in many examples of poorly applied targeting.[17]

An intelligence process cluttered by prejudice (ideological and possibly racial or religious), stubbornness, and bigotry is doomed to a problematic future – at best. It also offers the deceiver considerable room to manoeuvre, provided – and this is a huge caveat – that his own intelligence apparatus is sufficiently capable, and has enough resolution, to be able to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy system. This becomes absolutely vital when the deceiver is building his deception plan with its essential feedback loops covering target reaction to the bait. The Allies' ability to monitor German traffic through the ULTRA decrypts was an important factor in following the deception process during Operation Fortitude. It is, however, important to stress that extremely high-grade material such as that available through ULTRA – or in the modern context, satellite imagery – must not be allowed to cloud the judgements of the analysts or the deceivers. At the end of the day, the deception plan works through its impact on the minds of the enemy analysts, planners and decision makers.

DECEPTION

Again at the simplest level, the Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the act of deceiving as the process of making someone believe what is false, by misleading purposefully; deceit is a dishonest trick or stratagem. In a more contextual format, Handel defines deception as a 'purposeful attempt by the deceiver to manipulate the target's decision makers in order to gain a competitive advantage'.[18] At first sight, it must appear somewhat obvious that deception has considerable potential as a force multiplier. Furthermore, if care is given not to over-invest men and materiel in the process as suggested by Clausewitz (note 5 refers), it is almost cost free. As intimated earlier, however, the very dishonesty of the process has not been without its critics.

The realities of campaigns, however, where assets are at premium encourage the leader to join cunning and daring. In one of his few significant references to deception, Clausewitz goes on to say:

> *'However, the weaker the forces that are at the disposal of the supreme commander, the more appealing the use of cunning becomes… The bleaker the situation, with everything concentrating on a single desperate attempt, the more readily cunning is joined to daring.'* [19]

It could very easily be argued that the mind set prevalent in the United Kingdom during the Second World War was such that the would be deceiver stood a very reasonable chance of his plans being utilised in either the desert campaign or Overlord. The awareness that the British (and Commonwealth) army was effectively a single shot weapon must have concentrated Montgomery's mind. The same must also have been true in the lead up to the Gulf War where the limitations on men and materiel were hugely compounded by the fragility of the coalition.

Whilst Clausewitz does not wax lyrical on the subject of deception, his words still have some resonance even now. Warfare in the 21st Century has matured to the point where limits in assets available coupled with aversion to casualties – whether they be friend or foe – is such that deception must be an integral part of any campaign. The tenets of the manoeuvrist approach to warfare, in which the aim is to shatter the enemy's overall cohesion and will again make deception operations fundamental to any campaign.[20] Within this campaign it is axiomatic that the air power characteristics of reach, speed of response, ubiquity and flexibility will, almost certainly, form a significant part of the plan as they are inherently manoeuvrist in nature. [21] Critics of air power have long argued that its impermanence is a significant disadvantage. Modern warfare with a political reluctance for long-term commitments is such that this reduced footprint has become a significant virtue – in its own right.[22] Furthermore the evident virtues of air power make it a superb tool in the hands of the potential deception operations planner. The flexibility of response, lack of footprint and speed of utilisation become hugely flexible attributes, considerably increasing the range of available options. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) will therefore be a major contributor to the deception elements of the plan.



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Deception planning can take a number of formats and the campaign planning team may decide to use one, or a selection, of these options. Integral to this is a sound understanding of the enemy intelligence organisation and the decision-making structure that it supports. The fault lines therein can then be exploited. In compiling the deception plan, as an integral part of the whole enterprise (and not a later add-on), the campaign planners must decide what **effect** they wish to have on their foe. The deception may be designed to divert enemy attention leading to misplaced effort on his behalf. The prevention of concentration of forces to oppose the Normandy landings is a classic example of this at the operational level. Similar strategems were used nightly by Bomber Command (and the USAAF VIIIth Air Force) in their raids on Germany with diversionary tactics designed to lure night fighters away from main target areas.

The counter effect to this was again used in the Bomber Offensives by both sides. The effect desired is to dissipate the enemy effort by the use of decoys. During the Luftwaffe night raids, Battle of Britain airfields were darkened and diversionary fires lit some distance away. Similar tactics were used to deceive Bomber Command later in the War. The development of radar brought with it a whole new range of deception measures including Window (Chaff) and active jamming.[23] Modern extensions of this include the sacrifice of cheap and easily replaceable unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) both to cause an enemy to expend ready load surface to air missiles prior to a main raid, or to exhaust stocks; the evident risks in such ploys highlight the vital interaction between intelligence staffs and deception planners. Likewise, luring an enemy into firing expensive precision weaponry at decoys can be an extremely cost effective counter (as the coalition found to its cost during Allied Force). A level of sophistication up from this is the use of a drone aircraft to alert an enemy air defence system thereby triggering radar emissions that can be collected by the friendly electronic reconnaissance system. A further area of deception in this field would be to cause an enemy to research and develop a counter to a fictional terror weapon. The efforts expended by the Allies to counter the V Weapons (Operation Crossbow) and the on-going United States anti-ballistic missile ventures illustrate the potential in this field. While it may be argued that a ‘spoof’ on this scale would be hard to perpetrate, particularly in western democracies, the realities of the American so-called black programmes coupled with the voracious appetite of the media for such material, leave it a real possibility. The potential to overstretch a whole enemy Research and Development programme, and even their economic well-being, at the strategic level is considerable.



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The third effect that deception operations can achieve is complementary to the laws of war and that is to achieve surprise. This requires friendly strength, capability and, most importantly, intentions to be masked. The use of high speed, low level aircraft is an immediate method by which this could be achieved, especially if done in radio (and electronic emissions) silence. These missions allied with cruise missile attacks against high value targets with little or no notice would be a useful combination in a campaign plan designed around a manoeuvrist approach – shattering will and cohesion. An extension to this would be the use of an unpredictable asymmetric approach in which the nature, or extreme violence of the attack, achieved overwhelming surprise. This can obviously be played by both sides. Concerns over future warfare are often centred on the potential of such attacks, almost irrespective of their likelihood.[24]

As indicated above, the deception operations planning staff, still in concert with the intelligence staffs and the operational team, must attempt to envisage potential options through the eyes of the enemy. Having determined the effect to be achieved, the planners can look at the specific areas to analyse how this effect can be achieved. The first of these is strength of friendly forces. This can either be exaggerated or concealed.[25] Human nature is such that decision makers and planners prefer to deal with quantifiable issues; they are happier with numbers of men, divisions, tanks, aircraft and ships. This is evident in planning terms where arcane symbology creeps over terrain maps with little regard for capability. It is equally identifiable in the aftermath of an engagement where success is measured in terms of body bags or tanks plinked with little allowance for the overall effect achieved. There is therefore considerable scope for the deceiver to influence significantly enemy perceptions over strength. The size of friendly units can, for example, be exaggerated by generating extra radio or signals traffic or concealed by the imposition of radio silence. Aerial or satellite reconnaissance can be allowed over some areas, or actively prevented over others.[26] Decoys and camouflage are again equally useful.

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

The deceiver may also seek to dupe his foe as to the capability of his forces, and again this can be via exaggeration or concealment. The American efforts to preserve the secrecy of stealth technology, to the extent with the B2 of only operating from Continental US is indicative of the lengths to which some forces may have to go. At first sight, this may seem merely to be a normal question of security; rather it highlights the intrinsic nature of deception operations to all military activity. Capability can be masked through the use of so-called black programmes, or through care in what is released into the public domain. Again this encompasses normal security procedures, but the effect on a putative enemy can be enhanced by concealing a specific characteristic that may have strategic or manoeuvrist impact. The 617 Squadron dams raid is an example of this potential.

Capability is also relevant at the next level up in that the deceiver may seek either to mask, or exaggerate, just what his formations are capable of achieving. Morale, training, rehearsal, equipment, tactics and all arms co-ordination are all factors that can be considered under this heading. Again, what may appear to be obvious, especially in terms of concealment, merely serves to highlight how much this thinking should be second nature and therefore part of every campaign plan. The synergy that may result from well conducted joint and combined operations, or the scope for an utter shambles, are areas that could be exploited.

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The next opportunity for deception operations is arguably the most contentious as it encompasses the most risky and yet potentially the most rewarding. This covers the area of **intentions** and can range from relatively simple matters such as the timing of an attack, the axis of advance through the likely targets, the effects sought and so forth. At the end of the spectrum, there is scope for the achievement of strategic effect with coercion of the enemy without recourse to combat. The concept of using air power as an instrument of coercion is immediately attractive in its simplicity; the flexibility, reach and versatility of air delivered weapons offer the policy maker a universal remedy – the ultimate panacea. A massive air presence with evident air supremacy, ample precision weaponry and the scope for an overwhelming bombardment illustrate the immediate potential in this arena.

The literature on the theory of coercion is extensive and it is beyond the scope of this article to do more than touch on key tenets and highlight the ferocity of the debate. It is, however, worth emphasising that in campaign planning terms, there is considerable overlap between coercion and deception. Yet there is also an evident demarcation between the two. What is important is that both deal with behaviour, perceptions and psychology. This requires a sophisticated interface with the intelligence analysts and must be part of the whole campaign plan.

The *Concise Oxford Dictionary* offers us the following definition of coercion: ‘to persuade or restrain (an unwilling person) by force’. Yet Professor Freedman cites the Oxford English Dictionary, presumably with approval, as defining coercion as ‘the application of force to control the action of a voluntary agent’.[27] Freedman goes on to highlight the tension between control and the voluntary status of the victim. This accords with the tension between the two definitions. The degree of willingness to change of the object of our attentions is therefore at the heart of the debate. Inevitably, it is hard to measure, difficult to achieve and therefore all the more desirable if strategic or operational goals are to be reached. It is axiomatic in this that willingness to alter behaviour is heavily dependent on perceptions and psychology.

If the enemy is denied the use of his means of waging war, he will inevitably be required to amend his behaviour – either by surrender, negotiation or resort to asymmetric means

In the mid-60s, the work of Tom Schelling [28] and Alexander George [29] examined the theory of coercive diplomacy with the latter in particular concentrating on why the USAF bombing of North Vietnam was not producing the expected results. These studies have provided the cornerstone of work in the field. This has been followed more recently by Professor Freedman's collection of cases [30] as well as relevant papers by, inter alia, Professor Mike Clarke [31] (co-panellist) and Group Captain Andrew Lambert.[32] Also of immediate interest is Robert A Pape's treatise entitled *Bombing to Win – Air Power and Coercion in War*;[33] this work is sufficiently controversial to have been considered worthy of formal challenge in a volume shortly to be published by Cass. Pape's central conclusions are, nevertheless, worthy of note. He contends that the use of air power as a means of punishment does not work at a conventional level because modern nation states have high pain thresholds.[34] This has been shown to be true during the Second World War, in Vietnam, Iraq and most recently in Serbia.[35] Furthermore Pape suggests that air power will not succeed as a means of decapitation even in the narrow sense of severing strategic command and control. Rather he postulates that the desired end result is best achieved by attacking – or denying use of – enemy fielded forces and operational level command and control.[36]

This provides a relatively straightforward military approach to a military problem. If the enemy is denied the use of his means of waging war, he will inevitably be required to amend his behaviour – either by surrender, negotiation or resort to asymmetric means. Coercive use of military force on the other hand, which is more in concert with the tenets of manoeuvre warfare, requires either a tacit agreement between the two sides or at least some form of psychological pressure. To this end, the use of military force whether it be nuclear or conventional, air power, maritime or land are towards one of the spectrum that starts with routine diplomacy. Implicit within this is that the bigger the stick that a given nation, or collection thereof, wields the more convincing its posture becomes as the scenario degenerates into coercive diplomacy and thence into the use of force. But as James Gow points out in the context of Bosnia, although air power as a coercive tool may well be the 'most forceful and penetrating means of coercion' it does require an overall coherence of approach at all levels.[37]

Exposure to this debate is critically important for the campaign planners whether they be would-be deceivers, coercers, intelligence analysts or operational planners. Although not specifically mentioned hitherto, it is equally vital that the information operations planners and the media operations team are either part of the whole, or at the very least, the key personnel in all areas have sight of the whole. Furthermore, the scope for manipulating the media as unwitting tools in deception operations has long gone with the range of conflict, the level of analysis prevalent in the research teams and the relatively low level of 'national interest' involved. If the Joint Task Force Commander permits parallel activity, the result will, in the horrid but sadly appropriate modern jargon, be anti-synergistic.

COUNTERING DECEPTION

At face value, the immediate counter to deception is to be aware of the scope for such action. At the heart of matter is an understanding of the enemy or target psychology and mind set. The ability to see things from the enemy perspective is paramount. This can be particularly difficult if one is not aware, either in peace or the asymmetric situation, that a given group, organisation or state is a potential deceiver.

From an organisational perspective, the intelligence and operational planning community, up to and including the most senior decision makers and, where appropriate the interface between them and the political level, must be aware of its own fault lines. This can best be achieved through audit and red/blue war-gaming. More importantly, the culture of the organisation must encourage an active willingness to challenge orthodoxy, to seek 'out of the box' ideas and to challenge vested interests – in essence to speak bluntly where it is least welcome. This culture of analysis, challenge and free thought may then have the flexibility to spot, for example, where an intelligence picture is almost too perfect, or fits together too well.[38]

Deception can also be countered by improving friendly knowledge of enemy strength, capabilities and where possible, intentions – Wellington's opening words for this article bear repetition: 'endeavour to find out what you don't know from what you do; that is what I called guessing at what was at the other side of the hill'. Wavell's early experience of air power is even more apposite today with sophisticated satellite and aerial reconnaissance, AWACS, JSTARS, Astor and equivalent platforms. The increase in the scope for network centric warfare increases the potential for information to be shared across the battlespace thereby reducing the possibility of deception.[39]

Closely allied to countering deception is the possibility of failure. This can occur where the enemy fails to spot the bait that has been offered to him. The resolution of his gathering system may not be adequate or what may appear blindingly obvious to the deceiver has no visibility at all to the target. The bait may be spotted but deemed to be below threshold levels and ignored. Alternatively the enemy may avoid the potential ruse through identification of it as such. This can be potentially damaging as it could be turned to his advantage. There is also considerable danger in the enemy reacting to one element of

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the deception and unravelling the whole by surprise action. The use of allied air platforms would hopefully be alert to such a possibility.

This article has stressed the importance of deceptions operations being an integral part of the campaign planning process from the outset. They should be considered to be an add-on or an additional extra. Allenby's successes and those evident from Fortitude show the potential bonuses of getting this right, making the whole concept essential. The interaction of intelligence, warfighting, deception and information operations is absolutely vital; the respective planners must be co-located and aware of each others' capabilities and intentions throughout the process. Given that air power can have such a profound influence in each of these fields, it is essential that not only is JFACC co-located, but is also an integral member of the planning team.

Deception (and information) operations, especially where they overlap with coercion, are inherently about perceptions, behaviour and psychology. It is therefore difficult to predict the outcome of these operations and imprecise to measure the results later. These factors, however, should not preclude the use of these potentially war winning measures. The fact that they can be a force-multiplier should make these operations an essential option to every Joint Force Commander in an era when men and *materiel* are perpetually in short supply. The true impact can only be realised, however, if the planning staff are completely open minded about the process, are aware of the precedents and the pitfalls and have the ability to see events through the eyes of the foe – on an ongoing basis. If these preconditions are not met, the irony of the Codeword used to protect Overlord planning – BIGOT – may well be realised.

NOTES

1 Cited in *AP3000, British Air Power Doctrine*, 3rd edition, HMSO, London 1999, page 2.4.1, as the head note to Chapter 4 entitled 'Information Exploitation'. This secondary source has been cited deliberately to highlight the contemporary doctrinal use of the quotation.

2 Sun Tzu, *The Art of War (With a forward and translated by James Clavell)*, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1981, Chapter 1 (Laying Plans), page 17. Sun Tzu's rather ruthless approach to the use of spies would not be to contemporary taste (outside conspiracy theories) as they frequently involved execution of ones own people – see Book XIII.

3 For a detailed discourse on the role of deception in history see Michael I Handel, 'Introduction: Strategic and Operational Deception in Historical Perspective', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol 2, No 3, July 1987, page 2 *et seq*. See also Chapter 1 of Jon Latimer, *Deception in War*, John Murray, London, 2001. The reference to outdated notions of chivalry stems from the trial of Penguin Books over their publication of *Lady Chatterley's Lover*; the trial judge invited the jury – in October 1960 – as to whether this was the sort of book that they would give to their servants to read.

For an authoritative account of intelligence operations during the Second World War, see F H Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War (Abridged Version)*, HMSO, London, 1993. For deception operations, see Michael Howard, *Strategic Deception in the Second World War*, Pimlico, London, 1992.

4 Handel, 'Introduction: Strategic and Operational Deception in Historical Perspective', page 5. See also John Ferris and Michael I Handel, 'Clausewitz, Intelligence, Uncertainty and the Art of Command in Military Operations', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol 10, No 1 January 1995, pages 1 & 2. Ferris and Handel add the clear health warning that what was applicable to a Clausewitzian era may not be as relevant to our own period. Arguably, this is true about many selective uses of the quotations of the strategists.

5 Clausewitz's original comments on deception and intelligence respectively are taken from Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, NJ, 1976. Book 3, Chapter 10, 'Cunning', page 203.

6 Clausewitz, Book 1, Chapter 6, 'Intelligence in War', page 117.

7 See John Terraine, *To Win a War, 1918 the Year of Victory*', Cassell, London 1978.

8 Handel, 'Introduction: Strategic and Operational Deception in Historical Perspective', page 6.

9 Colonel A P Wavell CMG MC, *The Palestine Campaigns*, Constable, London, 1928, pages107 – 108.

10 Wavell, ibid, page 201.

11 See Christopher Andrew, 'Secret Intelligence and British Foreign Policy 1900 – 1939', in Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes (Eds), *Intelligence and International Relations 1900-1945*, Exeter University Publications, Exeter, 1987. Hitherto Sloops of war had crept into Napoleons anchorages and Frigates had been the eyes of the Fleet. Spying was only indulged in by the unscrupulous few with means so to do.

12 See Edward Thomas, 'The Evolution of the JIC System up to and During World War II', in Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes (Eds), *Intelligence and International Relations 1900-1945*, page 219.

13 A classic example of this occurred in the lead-up the Falklands War; the Franks Report into the origins and ensuing intelligence failures highlighted the proclivity of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) to frame its theoretically neutral assessments so that they were in line with Foreign Office Policy. Until the Open Government initiative of John Major in 1994, the whole JIC process was shrouded in secrecy; the details of how the process works is now public knowledge and is even subject to a degree of Parliamentary oversight. *Falkland Islands Review: Report of a committee of Privy Counsellors. Chairman Rt Hon Lord Franks*, CMD8787, HMSO, 1983.

14 See J W M Chapman, ' Japanese Intelligence1918-1945: A Suitable Case for Treatment', in Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes (Eds), *Intelligence and International Relations 1900-1945*, Exeter University Publications, Exeter, 1987, especially page 172.

15 Cited in Ralph Bennett, *Behind the Battle, Intelligence in the War with Germany, 1939 –1945*, Pimlico, London, 1999, page260-261.

16 Bernd Wegner, 'The Tottering Giant: German Perceptions of Soviet Military Strength in Preparation for 'Operation Blau' (1942), in Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes (Eds), *Intelligence and International Relations 1900-1945*, Exeter University Publications, Exeter, 1987, page 295.

17 Mark Clodfelter, *The Limits of Air Power, the American Bombing of North Vietnam*, Free Press, New York, page 164.

18 Michael I Handel, *War, Strategy and Intelligence*, Frank Cass, London, 1989, page 310.

19 Clausewitz, *On War*, page 203.

20 *British Defence Doctrine*, JWP 0-01, 4.8 – 4.9. HMSO, London, 1996.

21 *AP 3000, British Air Power Doctrine*, 1.2.13.

22 See, for example, James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will, International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War*, Columbia University Press, New York, page 165.

23 Latimer, *Deception in War*, Chapter 8.

24 For a comprehensive discussion on this field see Professor Philip Sabin, 'Air Strategy and the Underdog', in Peter W Gray, *Air Power 21, Challenges for the New Century*, HMSO, London, 2000, Chapter 4.

25 For a detailed 'typography of deception' see Handel, *War, Strategy and Intelligence*, page 315. This has been extended for the purposes of this paper with an emphasis on air power throughout the examples.

26 Latimer, *Deception in War*, page 229.

27 Lawrence Freedman (Ed), *Strategic Coercion – Concepts and Cases*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, page 15.

28 Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966.

29 Alexander L. George and William E Simons (Eds), *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1994. Alexander's work was started in 1965.

30 Freedman, ibid.

31 Professor Michael Clarke, 'Air Power, Force and Coercion', in *The Dynamics of Air Power*, Ed Group Captain Andrew Lambert and Arthur C Williamson, RAF Staff College Bracknell, 1996.

32 Group Captain A P N Lambert, *The Psychology of Air Power*, RUSI Whitehall Paper No 30, 1994.

33 Robert A Pape, *Bombing to Win – Air Power and Coercion in War*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1996.

34 Pape, ibid, page 316.

35 Peter W Gray, 'Air Operations for Strategic Effect – theory and practice in Kosovo', *RAF Air Power Review*, Vol 3 No 1, Spring 2000, page 21.

36 Pape, ibid, page 56.

37 James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will, International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1997, pages 8 & 40.

38 Handel, *War, Strategy and Intelligence*, page 341.

39 See David S Alberts, John J Garstka, Frederick. P Stein, *Network Centric Warfare, Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority*, CCRP Washington DC, 1999.