Air Power Review

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The Illusion of Victory: How War is Won or Lost in the Mind of the Observer
Squadron Leader Tim Fawdry-Jeffries

Libya – The Responsibility to Protect and the Use of Military Force
Wing Commander Mark Phelps

Politics and the Limits of Responsibility to Protect
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Politics and Military Advice: Lessons from the Campaign in Greece 1941
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Viewpoint
Professor Wyn Rees

Book Review
Group Captain Shaun Harvey

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The first contingent of RAF reinforcements for Greece disembarks from a British cruiser and assembles on the quay at Piraeus in late 1940.

Royal Air Force Tornado GR4 and Typhoon aircraft prepare at Gioia Dell Colle, Italy, as part of Operation Ellamy, the UK contribution to help enforce the No Fly Zone over Libya in support of UN SCR 1973.

RAF personnel approach Short Sunderland T9048/DQ-N of 228 Squadron in a rowing boat off Kalamata, during the evacuation from Greece in 1941.
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Royal Air Force VC10 from 101 Sqn at RAF Brize
Norton in preparation for a No Fly Zone over Libya.

The Tornado line at night at Gioia del Colle.
Welcome to the Autumn/Winter edition of Air Power Review, the Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies’ (RAF CAPS) triannual journal. Since its inception in 1998, 51 editions of the journal have been published and this, the 52nd, takes an in-depth look at the political, ethical and legal landscape surrounding the use of air power over the past decade, before contrasting the political complexities of its application in the Greece Campaign during the Second World War. These political, ethical and legal dimensions are especially timely in light of the public debate and apparent engagement on the use of air power, against the current backdrop of Islamic extremism in Iraq and Syria. With the UK due to conduct its next Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) in 2015, it is noteworthy that public consciousness in Western Democracies of the political and strategic ramifications of military intervention appears to be well honed, though sometimes misinformed. It is the role of both the air power practitioner and academic, to inform and shape the public debate in order to cut through the preconceptions that many now harbour on the application of military power, following the recent campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya.

The first article of our Autumn/Winter volume is written by Squadron Leader Tim Fawdry-Jeffries, a serving RAF officer. The article is distilled from the author’s recent dissertation undertaken whilst studying on the Changing Character of War programme at the University of Oxford under the CAS’ Fellowship Scheme. The Illusion of Victory: How War is Won and Lost in the Mind of the Observer! offers an examination of the perception of victory and how observers and participants consciously (or subconsciously) judge the outcome of a given conflict. Fawdry-Jeffries walks the reader through a number of historical examples to highlight his thesis that perceived outcome is not exclusively synonymous with objective success or failure across the four levels of war. Instead, the author offers a ‘new model’ for victory and uses a comparative case study (that of the Second Lebanon War of 2006 and the Gaza War of 2008-09) focusing on the actions and reactions of the Israeli state in both conflicts. In concluding, Squadron Leader Fawdry-Jeffries suggests that the perceived outcomes of these wars were arrived at through the political and military methodologies applied rather than any objective measure of military and strategic outcomes. Collective consciousness and understanding due to the influence of traditional and social media, today, more than ever, have a pivotal role in arriving at this understanding.

Our second article moves us into the legal sphere of military intervention within the borders of a sovereign nation state with an examination of the principle of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ – or R2P – and the use of air power in Libya by NATO in 2011. Written by Wing Commander Mark Phelps - a serving RAF Lawyer currently working at the UK MOD Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) - Libya – The Responsibility to Protect and
the Use of Military Force examines the criticisms that this Western-led intervention had regime change at its heart, evidenced through the highly kinetic NATO campaign which escalated the civil war. Phelps argues that NATO acted within the ‘letter and spirit’ of the UN mandate whose Security Council Resolution 1973 authorised the use of military force to prevent the massacre of civilians by the Gaddafi regime.

Operation Unified Protector is described as important, in that it was the first instance of a UN Security Council Resolution allowing for the use of force, for the security of citizens in what was a functioning state. Phelps argues that the development of air operations over Libya followed a logical, legal path and framework that naturally resulted in the toppling of the Libyan Government rather than an overstepping of the mandate. The author brings clarity to what is a difficult, often inaccessible subject area, namely, that of international law, human rights and the international community (or UN’s) assumed responsibility to protect the vulnerable.

Developing the discussion of R2P further, Dr Peter Lee of the University of Portsmouth and Royal Air Force College, Cranwell, provides us with an ethical and political perspective on its origins, development, limits and shortcomings. Lee’s article provides an interesting ethical and political counter-point to Phelps’ paper. The author, who specialises in the politics and ethics of war and military intervention, tracks the progress of R2P as a concept across three, distinct stages; from the early 1990s and the atrocities in the Balkans and Rwanda through to the Kosovo War in 1999 and what Lee calls the ‘high water mark of responsibility to protect’ in 2005 following the UN World Summit Outcome Document. By 2011 and the subsequent disintegration of Syria into civil war over the following 3 years, the author suggests that R2P had reached its limits. Lee argues that national interest and public opinion, along with overriding geostrategic priorities, has seen the political distance between the 5 permanent members of the UNSC increase more than ever, meaning that it is conflicting political interests that render R2P legally impotent, despite continued support from Western countries.

Our final article for Autumn/Winter is written by Squadron Leader Dave Stubbs, a recently retired RAF aviator and air power specialist. Continuing the theme of political and military friction, the author’s paper Politics and Military Advice: Lessons from the Campaign in Greece 1941 takes a fascinating, in-depth look at how the British intervention in Greece during the early part of the Second World War was a political imperative that was not militarily achievable given the paucity of resources – not least of which were air assets. The contemporary pull through for military practitioners, academics, civil servants and politicians alike is manifest at a time when air forces are being reduced in size and capability but political demand for air power is increasing.
Our Viewpoint this time is written by Professor Wyn Rees, an expert in International Security at the University of Nottingham's School of Politics and International Relations. His paper, *The British Military and the ‘Special Relationship’*, looks at how the senior ranks of the British Armed Forces have prioritised cooperation and integration with their US counterparts over any other relationship. But against a backdrop of increasing ambivalence and cynicism in some quarters about the transatlantic relationship, stemming from 13 years of unwavering support for Washington's Global War on Terror post 9/11 and costly military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the author examines the risks and drawbacks of the relationship.

APR concludes with a book review of a title that was included in the Chief of the Air Staff’s Reading List 2014. *Boyd: The Fighter Pilot who Changed the Art of War* (written by Robert Coram) is reviewed by Group Captain Shaun Harvey. Group Captain Harvey is effusive in his review of the book, not least because it straddles a myriad of relevant themes for those interested in air power thought and practice. Combining the personal as well as the professional insights of Boyd, the portrait of a man of immense intellect, depth and conviction is depicted, blighted and blessed (in equal measure) with an outspoken, forthright and honest disposition that was not always palatable to his military superiors but who, nevertheless, had a far-reaching influence on his Service and on air forces and militaries across the world.
Notes on Contributors

Squadron Leader Tim Fawdry-Jeffries is an Engineer Officer in the Aerosystems sub-specialisation. Having graduated from Engineer Specialist Training with both the Beckworth Trophy and The Institution of Mechanical Engineers Prize, Tim entered the Training Aircraft Project Team (PT) at RAF Wyton as a Project Officer. He swiftly moved to RAF Lyneham as a C-130K Junior Engineering Officer where he also completed 2 detachments as the C-130 Engineering Detachment Commander on Op HERRICK. This was followed by a tour as OC Typhoon Maintenance School at RAF Coningsby and, subsequently, as a Desk Officer in the Sentinel PT at RAF Waddington. On promotion to Squadron Leader, Tim was posted to RAF Henlow where he undertook a tour in Information Exploitation and following Staff College he was selected for a Trenchard Fellowship on the Changing Character of War Programme at Oxford University. Here he conducted research predominately into the 2nd Lebanon War and Gaza War. Squadron Leader Jeffries is currently a Staff Officer working for No2 Group Chief Air Engineer at Air Command.

Wing Commander Mark Phelps was called to the Bar in 1994 working in private practice until he joined the Directorate of Legal Services RAF in 2001. Since joining the RAF he has developed a specialism in operational law, a role in which he has served as the designated lawyer to the Special Operations Command and Control Element in Kabul, Afghanistan and led the operational law cells in both of NATO’s Joint Force Command Headquarters. Whilst serving in Headquarters Joint Force Command Naples he commanded a multinational legal team in both the planning and execution of the 2011 NATO led intervention in Libya.

Dr Peter Lee is a University of Portsmouth Principal Lecturer in Ethics and Political Theory who specialises in the politics and ethics of war and military intervention, the ethics and ethos of remotely piloted aircraft (drone) operations, and the politics and ethics of identity. In November 2012 Peter transferred from King’s College London after four years in the Air Power Studies Division and continues to lecture across a range of diverse subjects, from international relations to terrorism and insurgency. In 2012 he published his first book, Blair’s Just War: Iraq and the Illusion of Morality (Palgrave Macmillan), and is due to publish Truth Wars: The Politics of Climate Change, Military Intervention and Financial Crisis, also with Palgrave Macmillan, in November 2014.

Squadron Leader David Stubbs was the RAF’s Generic Education and Training Centre Air Power specialist. He is an experienced maritime and airborne early warning and control aviator with over 6,400 flying hours with the RAF and the USAF. He has taught on the RAF’s Higher Air Warfare Course and the Air Battle Staff Course and gained his MA in Air Power: History, Theory and Practice at the University of Birmingham in 2012. A version of his dissertation: A Blind Spot? The Royal Air Force (RAF) and Long-Range Fighters, 1936-1944 was published in the Journal of Military History in April 2014. Now in resettlement, he has established his own company to provide Air Warfare and specialist training advice.
When a state embarks upon war it is essential at the outset to clearly articulate the desired objectives, both militarily and strategically. These objectives may evolve over the course of the conflict but they are, nonetheless, necessary in order to define the type of activity that will be engaged in and to persuade the public that this activity is, indeed, worthwhile. However, there is one objective that is eternal, immutable and prime over all others and yet rarely stated overtly; that objective is to win. The concept of winning in war is most usually characterised as victory, but what is victory and what is its relationship to objective reality? This paper seeks to demonstrate through a literature review that the concept of victory is a social construct that is only partially based upon the tangible outcome of war and, moreover, can be artificially engendered through a judicious combination of military power and information operations. This thesis is tested through a case study comparing the 2nd Lebanon War with the Gaza War where the outcomes of each conflict appear to contradict objective reality. In disentangling victory from the simple achievement of military and strategic objectives it becomes possible to determine its true value and to what extent it shapes the socio-political settlement that follows armed conflict.
Introduction

‘You ask, what is our aim? I can answer with one word: It is victory.’¹

Some would like us to believe that victory in war is an anachronism and that it is now more appropriate to focus on tangible outcomes rather than something as nebulous as victory. David Cameron, for instance, has been accused of trying to ‘redefine what winning means’ in Afghanistan in order to ameliorate what is, in the words of one commentator, ‘a complete and utter disaster.’² However, the idea and semantics of victory have tremendous resonance and the term is unlikely to fall from popular use even if our politicians increasingly baulk at using it.³ But by what metrics is victory determined? Even following those wars popularly considered to be decisive there is still ambiguity over the outcome. Referring to the First World War Winston Churchill observed that ‘victory was to be bought so dear as to be almost indistinguishable from defeat. It was not to give security even to the victors.’⁴ Words such as success, win and victory tend to be used interchangeably, with those using them clearly assuming that such elementary terms are self explanatory. Robert Mandel goes further; ‘it is most common for the concept of victory to be bandied about quite loosely, with a tacit assumption that everyone understands what it means and yet without any precise definition at all.’⁵ Where a definition of victory is proffered it is usually the author’s idealised conception of how victory could or should be measured often leading to gross discrepancies between the popular view and that of the author.

This paper seeks to understand how observers, and groups of observers, cognitively decide whether an antagonist has won or lost in war; this will be referred to as the perceived outcome. The central thesis of this paper is that the perceived outcome of war has as much, if not more, power to influence events than the objective outcome and that this perception is not simply a product of what is achieved so much as how it is achieved. In order to verify these assertions the paper is formed of two parts; a conceptual exposition followed by a comparative case study.

Part 1, the conceptual exposition, begins by citing a number of historical case studies to demonstrate that the perceived outcome is not necessarily synonymous with objective success or failure at any of the four levels of war. This is followed by a comparison of how the concept of victory has been rationalised by contemporary theorists including Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tearney in Failing to Win, Robert Mandel in The Meaning of Military Victory and Richard Hobbs in The Myth of Victory. Part 1 will finish by proposing a new model for victory and will explain why the perceived outcome of war is more important than ever.

Part 2, the comparative case study, seeks to verify and extrapolate the proposed model by using the Second Lebanon War of 2006 and the Gaza War of 2008-09 as detailed case studies. This paper argues that despite broadly similar objective outcomes the Second Lebanon War has been perceived as a defeat for Israel whereas the Gaza War has generally been perceived
as a victory. In order to explain these contradictory outcomes the military and political methodologies of Israel have been evaluated under five headings: the four levels of war followed by Information Operations (IO). For reasons of brevity the comparative case study largely omits activities undertaken by Hamas and Hezbollah, concentrating primarily on Israel as the common denominator in both conflicts.

Part 1 - Conceptual Exposition

Historically, there are a myriad of examples of formally agreed treaties where the question of victory has been settled fairly conclusively. In such cases the perceived outcome has usually been rendered synonymous with the military outcome. According to Clausewitz ‘the ultimate object is the preservation of one’s own state and the defeat of the enemy’s; again in brief, the intended peace treaty, which will resolve the conflict and result in a common settlement’. Unfortunately, it is simply not credible that war with non-state or quasi-state actors such as Hezbollah or Hamas et al will always culminate in anything as convenient and gentlemanly as a ‘peace treaty’. Victory in the discretionary conflicts of today and tomorrow is likely to be subjective, mutable and divisive. With belligerents unlikely to agree between themselves as to who is the victor, and with no trans-national body able or willing to arbitrate on their behalf, it is essential to understand how the perceived outcome is likely to be formed.

Perceived Outcome and the Levels of War

It is perhaps reasonable to assume that the perceived outcome is primarily derived from some aggregation of tangible outcomes. According to Clausewitz victory is simply ‘the preservation of one’s fighting forces and the destruction of the enemy’s’. The Second World War offers a clear template of such a Clausewitzian victory whereby the Allies’ military and industrial superiority resulted in victory both military and perceived. However, such an unambiguous correlation between the military outcome and perceived outcome is less common than one might suppose. The military and, indeed, political outcomes are most usually evaluated using the levels of war. British defence doctrine recognises three such levels; tactical, operational and strategic, with ‘military strategy’ being ‘the military contribution, as part of an integrated approach, to the achievement of national policy goals’. The British distinction between ‘military strategy’ and ‘national strategy’ is often recognised in other models through the division of the strategic level into two distinct levels; military-strategic and grand-strategic. This paper will, therefore, consider four levels of war: tactical, operational, military-strategic and grand-strategic. Plenty of historical examples demonstrate that objective success can be achieved at any, or even a combination of, the four levels of war without necessarily generating a perception of victory. In Another Bloody Century Colin Gray exhorts us to ‘remember Indo-China! Recall Vietnam! And do not forget Algeria, where the French colonial army won the warfare, but lost the war and the subsequent peace’. Gray’s three examples have all been widely perceived as defeats for the US and France despite clear success at both the tactical and operational levels of war. History is also rich with examples in which success at the military-strategic level has still not resulted in perceived victory. Most recently in the War in Afghanistan the military strategy of
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The Coalition Forces has been extremely successful at disrupting and displacing Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and yet it has not yielded anything like perceived victory for the Coalition Forces. This failure has been attributed to many factors including ‘Icarus’ like ambition and a vacillating grand-strategy. But, even success at the grand-strategic level of war is no guarantor of perceived victory as the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 demonstrates. In the aftermath of this conflict all levels of Japanese society viewed the outcome as a defeat despite the Imperial government clearly achieving its grand-strategic aims. Instead, the dominant perception of defeat was formed from a belief that the reparations extracted from the Russian Empire were not commensurate with the level of sacrifice endured. In his narrative of the conflict J.N. Westwood captures the Japanese national mood following the Russian surrender:

‘Some newspaper offices put out flags bordered with mourning crepe. In Yokohama only two people were said to have hoisted flags to celebrate peace, and they were both Frenchmen.’

The examples above demonstrate that there is no direct causality between any of the four levels of war and the perceived outcome. In fact, there appears to be no objective common denominator linking all perceived victories in war, other, perhaps, than an absence of failure at all levels. Even then, the Russo-Japanese war demonstrates that success can be achieved at all four levels and that a perception of defeat among some groups of observers can nevertheless ensue.

Three Models for Victory

The examples above indicate that the perceived outcome of war is not simply a product of either military or political success. This has become especially evident in light of ambiguous outcomes in Iraq, Afghanistan and, more recently, Libya. In Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Relations, Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney identify that the perceived outcome of war often appears to bear little relation to any tangible outcome, stating that observer’s perceptions of who won and who lost in a war or a crisis often diverge widely from the reality on the ground. Their treatment of the subject focuses not simply on conflict but also on international relations, citing the Cuban missile crisis as one of a number of detailed case studies. This case study asserts that, objectively speaking, the Cuban missile crisis was ‘a draw with gains and loses on both sides, but it was almost universally perceived as a triumph for the US.’ Johnson and Tierney propose a compelling and detailed model for how such perceptions are formed, using sport as a useful analogy. Their model is a composite of two frameworks entitled ‘scorekeeping’ and ‘match-fixing’; it is asserted that for any dispute one of these frameworks will be dominant. Where ‘scorekeeping’ is dominant the perceived outcome will be determined fairly objectively through a rational comparison of ‘material gains and aims’. Conversely, where the ‘match-fixing’ framework is dominant, the perceived outcome will be skewed away from objective reality by psychological and sociological factors including ‘mind-sets, salient events, and social pressures.’ Whilst the model is meticulously researched and extremely coherent it has aspects that remain problematic. First, the model
can be applied retrospectively to justify the outcome of almost any dispute; in this way it is self-fulfilling. For example, if the outcome is consistent with objective reality, then the scorekeeping framework is said to be dominant; if not, then the match-fixing framework is said to be dominant. Johnson and Tierney propose so many factors in the match-fixing model that a dispute is practically guaranteed to display one or more factor, and hence the resulting perception will have been explained.

Second, the model seeks to act as a general dispute model and treats war as a dispute much like any other. In so doing it applies the same logic to war as it would, say, to a presidential election or foreign policy dispute. Consequently, neither the scorekeeping nor the match-fixing framework fully considers the way in which a military campaign is conducted, focusing instead on outcomes and whether these outcomes are subsequently skewed by sociological and psychological forces. Military methodologies are considered to be irrelevant to the scorekeeping framework as they are deemed ‘important only inasmuch as they are a means to a material end, and it is this end that we evaluate’. Military methodologies are also largely excluded from the match-fixing model which concentrates on forces such as ‘leader’ and ‘societal manipulation’. As such, *Failing to Win* largely disregards the visible way in which military activity is conducted and how this comes to be perceived by observers.

Johnson and Tierney’s model is put forward as a ‘complete theory’ which seeks to explain the rationale behind any perceived outcome whether it reflects objective reality or not. This marks a huge step forward in the understanding of how perceptions of victory and defeat may be formed but any claim that such perceptions can be fully rationalised is perhaps overstated. As Clausewitz noted ‘the conduct of war branches out in almost all directions and has no definite limits; while any system, any model, has the finite nature of a synthesis. An irreconcilable conflict exists between this type of theory and actual practice’.

In *The Meaning of Military Victory* Robert Mandel also seeks to deconstruct what it means to win in war and how this can be achieved. However, Mandel takes a very different approach to Johnson and Tierney. Mandel also recognises that victory is measured subjectively; ‘across time, circumstance, and culture, victory has had dissimilar and often unclear and contradictory meanings for winners and losers’. However, whilst Johnson and Tierney focus on explaining how the perceived outcome is formed, Mandel seeks to cut through the ‘definitional morass’ by proposing his own authoritative definition of victory, splitting it into two components: military and strategic. In this way his proposition is consistent with the view espoused by Brian Bond in *The Pursuit of Victory* that to triumph militarily, no matter how decisively, is of no value unless followed by political efforts to secure an enduring and advantageous peace settlement; even then the ‘benefits may be disappointing or even illusory’.

Mandel associates military victory with ‘war-winning’ where ‘a state attempts to bring a war to a successful military conclusion, affecting the mode of battle in terms of how one fights and whether one continues or ceases to fight’. He goes on to associate strategic victory...
with ‘peace-winning’ where ‘a state attempts to reap the payoffs of war, affecting the mode of post-combat activities in terms of how one manages the transition afterward and whether one stays in or leaves the area where the fighting occurred’. Mandel’s attempts to objectively define victory provide useful metrics by which military and strategic success may be measured. However, the model, whilst coherent and methodical, is nevertheless Mandel’s personal view of what constitutes military and strategic victory. It is, therefore, frequently not consistent with the judgement of history and sheds little light on perceived outcomes.

Mandel cites four recent campaigns, each of which he deems, using his parameters, to be military victories but strategic defeats: Operations Desert Storm, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Whilst his logic is sound he makes no attempt to explain the resultant dichotomy, namely that Desert Storm and Allied Force have both been widely perceived as victories for the US whereas Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom clearly have not. As noted by Sanu Kainikara in *Pathways to Victory*, ‘no two conflicts follow the same model and, therefore, there cannot be a definition of victory that encompasses all variables’. Mandel’s definition of military and strategic victory are essentially synonymous with military-strategic and grand-strategic success respectively, but history shows that neither is always coincident with perceived victory. Mandel’s own examples do, however, serve to demonstrate that the perceived outcome has the power to influence events often to a greater degree than the objective outcome, be it military or strategic. Mandel may be correct that Desert Storm and Allied Force were strategic failures but they have both been generally perceived by commentators, academics and the public alike as victories and this has resulted in very real (albeit in some cases short-lived) outcomes. These outcomes include the vindication of air power used for strategic effect and the justification of liberal interventionism. Conversely, popular perceptions of defeat in Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have severely curtailed the appetite of the US and its allies to again commit military forces to open-ended operations or nation-building. Despite Mandel categorising each of the four operations as a military victory but strategic failure, it is clear that two have been perceived as victories and the other two as defeats. It is also clear that these perceived outcomes have had profound consequences.

Writing at the height of the Cold War Colonel Richard Hobbs sought to delineate between victory and total victory and concluded that both are as destructive to the victor as to the vanquished. In his polemical work *The Myth of Victory: What is Victory in War?* he asserts that during the 19th and 20th Centuries the rise of total war had been accompanied by a concomitant desire for total victory. This he sees as being typified by the Second World War, where the only outcome deemed acceptable to the Allied Forces was the ‘unconditional surrender’ of the Axis Powers. He concludes that ‘as long as man tries to impose his will on his fellow man, there will be war. As long as there is war, there will be a quest for victory’. However, he views victory itself as a ‘siren drawing men onto the rocks of war’ and victory in nuclear war, in particular, as ‘a chimera’. To him ‘victory gained from pushing war to its upper limits is illusory and not commensurate with its terrible cost’ and even in a guerrilla or limited
war it can be ‘exorbitantly expensive’.\textsuperscript{35} Hobbs asserts that ‘through patient and sincere efforts, there can be peace without victory’, but ‘there is more apt to be victory without peace’.\textsuperscript{36}

It is clear that for Hobbs the term victory refers specifically to what Mandel defines as military victory. Like Mandel and Bond, Hobbs also concludes that victory through winning the war does not necessarily equate with winning the peace. Hobbs, however, goes further than Mandel by asserting that, as the totality of the military victory increases, so the likelihood of strategic victory actually diminishes. Hobbs does concede that ‘to some extent, victory may be psychological’ but he does not extrapolate this in the way that Johnson and Tierney do, by recognising that victory as it is perceived by the observer can be uniquely different from either military or strategic victory.\textsuperscript{37} Hobbs asserts that war can be a necessary and worthwhile activity but that the quest for victory itself often has a deleterious effect on any potential benefits. Hobbs’ view, however, is not consistent with history which demonstrates that being perceived as victorious does tend to confer benefits upon the victor. Nonetheless Hobbs highlights a profound truth: that victory of any sort is only valuable if it confers benefits upon the victor.

\textbf{A New Model for Victory}

The three models outlined above are, ostensibly, incompatible but they all share elements of commonality and can, therefore, be reconciled into one consistent model. First, all three models recognise that a better understanding of victory as a concept is important to the study of war. Second, they propose that victory takes more than one form. Third, they concur that victory has often been popularly accorded to actors despite objective outcomes to the contrary. Fourth, they identify that widely held perceptions can themselves generate real outcomes. These models can be reconciled first by acknowledging Mandel’s assertion that military and strategic outcomes are different and can be measured objectively. However, it seems illogical to refer to military or strategic victory when this is so often at odds with the perceived outcome. Instead, the military and strategic outcomes would be more meaningfully referred to in terms of military and strategic success or failure. After all, it would be perverse to talk of military victory for an antagonist that was clearly deemed by the majority of observers to have generally ‘lost’ or been ‘defeated’: the US in Vietnam for example. The second way to reconcile the three models is to acknowledge Johnson and Tierney’s assertion that the perceived outcome is discrete from the military and strategic outcomes and is, in essence, a social construct. It is reasonable to measure this perceived outcome in terms of victory and defeat as these terms are most often used when expressing this social construct. The third way to reconcile the models is to acknowledge Hobbs’ assertion that victory of any form is only as valuable as the benefits that it confers upon the victor.

The new model, therefore, recognises three broad outcomes of war: military, strategic and perceived. The military outcome is an objective description of the achievement of military objectives and of military gains and loses. The strategic outcome is an objective description of the achievement of political objectives and of political gains and loses. The perceived outcome,
however, is a social construct and a description of how observers believe an antagonist to have performed. The first two outcomes are best measured on a scale ranging from failure to success and the third outcome is best measured on a scale ranging from defeat to victory. This model, therefore, asserts that the terms victory and defeat are only truly meaningful when used to describe the perceived outcome of war. Clearly the perceived outcome will be influenced by the military and strategic outcomes but the examples given in this paper demonstrate that it is not only a product of these outcomes. Instead, it is proposed that the perceived outcome is a product not only of what is achieved but also how it is achieved. In other words, the military and political methodologies applied.

In identifying three outcomes of war a further question is raised: which outcome is most important? This question can only be answered through recognising that the military, strategic and perceived outcomes are only important in terms of the benefits that they result in for the antagonist. Each outcome is likely to result in its own associated benefits (or, conversely, disadvantages) and it is ultimately for leaders to decide which benefits best serve the national interest. Indeed, Part 2 of this paper uses the Second Lebanon War and the Gaza War to show how in the latter conflict Israel’s leaders appeared to specifically pursue perceived victory at the expense of greater military and strategic success. If this assertion is true then it can be deduced that those leaders considered that the disadvantages that would ensue from a perceived defeat would have outweighed any benefits that were likely to be gained from military or even strategic success. Such a decision is logical if deterrence is the primary benefit sought. Before considering this comparative case study, however, it is necessary to explain why the perceived outcome of war is growing in importance and through what media it is most influenced.

The Growing Importance of the Perceived Outcome

In The Utility of Force Rupert Smith is emphatic: ‘however many tactical successes you achieve they will be as nought if the people do not think you are winning’. If we are to conclude that perceived victory is valuable then we must concede that it is worth pursuing in conjunction with military and strategic success. In fact, historical trends indicate that the perceived outcome is not only growing in significance but is also becoming ever more difficult to control.

The invention of the semaphore visual telegraph by Claude Chappe in the late 18th Century enabled ‘the transmission of information at a speed of over 500km/h’. The advent of the electrical telegraph would, by the outbreak of the American Civil War in 1861, make practically instantaneous communications a reality. However, whilst the speed of communication had reached its physical limit, the pervasiveness and sophistication of communications has continued to develop apace. During the siege of Constantinople in 1453, for example, it took weeks before the outcome was fully known by the then crowned heads of Europe; that the eastern bulwark of Christianity had fallen to Mehmet II then took months to filter down to the peasantry of Christendom. Perhaps the first truly informed view of this epochal event was proffered over three centuries later in The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.
by Edward Gibbon; a man who had the means and time to examine records from multiple observers and set them within a broader historical context.\textsuperscript{41}

Prior to the modern era persons empowered by the state had the time, means and influence to retrospectively mould the perceived outcome of war by promulgating whatever version of the truth was most beneficial to them and their cause. Over time the state’s supremacy in influencing this perception has been usurped through innovations such as the printing press, newspapers, radio, television, the internet and, most recently, the smartphone. Today, the ability of the state to define perceptions \textit{postbellum} is trivial compared with that of social media. As identified by Kanikara and Parkin ‘victory is now a volatile combination of politics, economics, social and cultural needs, made ever more interconnected by dependence on the favourable perception of the watching world’.\textsuperscript{42} This development appears now to be approaching its zenith where practically every man, woman and, increasingly, child on the battlefield has the ability and means to communicate their views and experiences unfettered across the globe. Such views are cascaded ceaselessly, without verification or provenance and stripped of context. The perceived outcome of war, therefore, is no longer dominated by the reflective judgement of historians or governments, nor is it consumed credulously by the masses. Governments and strategists who once had the luxury of time and method with which to control perceptions must now accept that the perceived outcome should be considered as part of the campaign plan rather than as a post-conflict activity. As Sun Tzu noted in \textit{The Art of War} ‘victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win’.\textsuperscript{43}

\textbf{Part 1 Summary}

This paper asserts that war has three outcomes; military, strategic and perceived. The military outcome is an objective description of the achievement of military objectives and of military gains and loses. The strategic outcome is an objective description of the achievement of political objectives and of political gains and loses. The perceived outcome, however, is a social construct and a description of how observers believe an antagonist to have performed. This paper also asserts that the military and strategic outcomes are best measured on a scale ranging from failure to success, whereas the perceived outcome is best measured on a scale ranging from defeat to victory. It is also proposed that each of the three outcomes will result in benefits or, conversely, disadvantages for the antagonist and that understanding the likely benefits or disadvantages will help enable leaders to determine the best course of action. Finally, this paper has asserted that, due to the increasing pervasiveness and sophistication of communications technology, the perceived outcome is growing in importance and must, therefore, be considered at the earliest stages of campaign planning.

\textbf{Part 2 - Comparative Case Study: The Second Lebanon War and Gaza War}

Israel’s activities in the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, more usually known as the Second Lebanon War, have become synonymous with military incompetence and strategic failure.\textsuperscript{44} Military practitioners and academics (along with the Israeli authorities themselves) have queued
up to postulate where the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) went wrong, and how a quasi-state actor such as Hezbollah could triumph over the most competent and well equipped fighting force in the Middle-East.\textsuperscript{45} Israel’s performance has been decried variously as a failure of air power, doctrine, training, intelligence, leadership (both military and political) and more besides.\textsuperscript{46} The ensuing perception of defeat within Israel led to national introspection accompanied by a palpable loss of national confidence and prestige.\textsuperscript{47} Indeed, shortly after the war the heads of Mossad and Shin Bet, Meir Dugan and Yuval Diskin respectively, told the Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, that ‘the war was a national catastrophe and Israel suffered a critical defeat’.\textsuperscript{48} Hezbollah, on the other hand, was elevated to an almost mystical level of military competence being heralded as nothing less than the prototype of a ‘modern Hybrid challenger’ with its Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, ordained as ‘the most popular Arab leader since Nasser’.\textsuperscript{49}

Less than three years after its ‘defeat’ at the hands of Hezbollah, Israel was once again at war; this time with Hamas in Gaza. Much as in its previous engagement in Lebanon, the IDF was pitted against a radical Muslim quasi-state actor which had the very destruction of Israel as one of its avowed aims.\textsuperscript{50} The enemy, again enmeshed amongst civilians, sought to emulate Hezbollah’s success by mimicking its Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) and deploying much the same military materiel.\textsuperscript{51} The operating environment was, if anything, even more complex, described by Ron Tira in \textit{The Nature of War} as ‘one big minefield, IEDs, traps and tunnels in almost every block’.\textsuperscript{52} It appeared that Israel was about to stumble into yet another costly military misadventure. However, just three weeks after it had began, the Gaza War culminated in what has subsequently been viewed as a landmark victory for the IDF.\textsuperscript{53} Those same voices that had lambasted the IDF after the Second Lebanon War now heralded its latest triumph as a paragon of institutional learning and urban warfare.\textsuperscript{54}

Closer inspection of the two conflicts, however, unmasks a quandary. When viewed objectively the outcomes of the Second Lebanon War and Gaza War were scarcely different and, it could be argued, actually more favourable to Israel following the earlier conflict. In both conflicts neither Hezbollah nor Hamas had been destroyed or even fatally disrupted, and the rocket attacks that had precipitated both conflicts continued to emanate from Gaza but practically ceased from Lebanon. In fact, attacks by Hamas returned almost to pre-conflict levels within three years, whereas those by Hezbollah have been negligible. According to figures released by the IDF, annual rocket attacks from Gaza peaked at 3278 in 2008 reducing to 774 in 2009 and reducing further in 2010 to 231.\textsuperscript{55} However, these attacks then increased to 627 in 2011 and again in 2012 to 2248, resulting in the Israeli reprisal operation, Pillar of Defence.\textsuperscript{56} Conversely, following the Second Lebanon War the ‘once volatile border has enjoyed the longest period of relative calm in four decades’.\textsuperscript{57} Moreover, Hezbollah opted to stay on the sidelines during the Gaza War. What is clear is that Israel’s \textit{perceived} defeat in the earlier conflict resulted in very real outcomes including a raft of high profile resignations including those of the Defence Minister, IDF Chief of Staff and Israeli Navy Commander-in-Chief. So why were the perceptions so different despite similar objective outcomes? Moreover, is it possible to emulate
the success enjoyed by the IDF in the Gaza War simply by pursuing perceived victory at the expense of greater military and strategic success? In answering these questions the four levels of war will be used to evaluate some significant aspects of Israel’s modus operandi in Lebanon and Gaza. In addition, Israel’s approach to Information Operations (IO) will be considered. First, however, it is necessary to demonstrate that the Second Lebanon War has, indeed, been perceived as a defeat for Israel and the Gaza War perceived as a victory.

Assessing the Perceived Outcomes of the Second Lebanon War and the Gaza War

This paper asserts that for the Second Lebanon War the dominant perception is that Hezbollah were victorious and Israel defeated. It also asserts that the perceived outcome of the Gaza War is that Israel was deemed to be victorious and Hamas defeated. In order to support these broad assertions a literature review was conducted, the results of which are summarised in Annex A. This literature review covered 30 sources in which some assessment of the outcome of the two conflicts is made; these sources include books, journals, articles, papers and reports both in printed and electronic forms. For each source and for each war an assessment has been made as to whether the author(s) deemed the outcome to be positive, negative or unclear for each of the antagonists. An assessment was also made as to whether the author(s) acknowledged, even tacitly, a dominant perception of the outcome against which their own judgement was framed.

In the case of the Second Lebanon War, 50% of sources concluded that Hezbollah had achieved a positive outcome compared to just 3% for Israel. In contrast, no source was found to consider that Hezbollah had achieved a negative outcome, whereas 47% considered that Israel had suffered a negative outcome. Moreover, 90% of sources acknowledged a dominant perception that Israel had suffered a negative outcome, with none acknowledging a dominant perception that Hezbollah had achieved a negative outcome. Conversely, no source was found to acknowledge a dominant perception that Israel had achieved a positive outcome, with 90% acknowledging a dominant perception that Hezbollah had achieved a positive outcome. 33% of sources considered that the outcome for Hezbollah had been unclear and, likewise, 33% considered that the outcome for Israel had been unclear. In several instances no discernible opinions on the outcome or perceived outcome could be identified and these were classified as ‘no opinion’.

In the case of the Gaza War no source was found to consider that Hamas had achieved a positive outcome compared to 69% for Israel. In contrast, 75% of sources were found to consider that Hamas had suffered a negative outcome whereas none was found to consider that Israel had done so. Moreover, only 6% of sources acknowledged a dominant perception that Israel had suffered a negative outcome, with 75% acknowledging a dominant perception that Hamas had done so. Conversely, 75% of sources were found to acknowledge a dominant perception that Israel had achieved a positive outcome with just 6% acknowledging a dominant perception that Hamas had achieved a positive outcome. 6% of sources considered that the
outcome for Hamas had been unclear and 12.5% were deemed to consider that the outcome for Israel had been unclear. Again, in several instances no discernible opinions on the outcome or perceived outcome could be identified and these were classified as ‘no opinion’. It must be conceded that an element of subjectivity was used in assessing the views of the authors. However, in most cases the views are unambiguous and where ambiguity exists an unclear outcome was recorded.

The results of this literature review overwhelmingly indicate that the Second Lebanon War was deemed by commentators and academics alike to have resulted in an unclear or positive outcome for Hezbollah and an unclear or negative outcome for Israel. It also shows that the Gaza War was deemed to have resulted in a clear positive outcome for Israel and a clear negative outcome for Hamas. Strikingly, almost all sources acknowledge a dominant perception that Hezbollah had achieved a positive outcome in Lebanon and Israel a negative outcome. Similarly, almost all sources acknowledge a dominant perception that Israel had achieved a positive outcome in Gaza and Hamas a negative outcome.

A study of relevant opinion polls would also be illuminating; however, this paper has chosen to avoid such sources as they are only likely to indicate the views of specific groups of observers such as the Israeli or Lebanese public. Instead, a literature review was chosen so that an aggregated international view could be identified.

Israel’s Grand Strategy in Lebanon and Gaza

This paper takes the definition of grand strategy to be synonymous with that of the strategic level of war as given in British Defence Doctrine. Here it is defined as ‘the level at which national resources are allocated to achieve the Government’s policy goals’. In order to dissect, therefore, the grand strategy of Israel during the Second Lebanon War and Gaza War it is essential to first understand Israel’s national policy goals at the time of each conflict.58

In the case of the Second Lebanon War the Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, stated in a speech to the Knesset that his goals were to include (but were not restricted to) ‘the return of the hostages’, ‘a complete ceasefire’ and ‘expulsion of Hezbollah from the area’.59 Conversely, the stated objective of Israel in the Gaza War was ‘to strike a direct and hard blow against the Hamas while increasing the deterrent strength of the IDF; in order to bring about an improved and more stable security situation for residents of southern Israel over the long term’.60 The stated aims of Israel during the two conflicts were markedly different in their character despite describing similar outcomes. The Lebanon statement consisted of measurable and ambitious objectives which provided ample opportunity for demonstrable failure. Conversely, the Gaza statement consisted of modest and difficult-to-measure objectives such that any accusations of failure would be easy to refute. For example, in Lebanon an avowed objective was to ‘expel Hezbollah’ whereas in Gaza the comparable objective was ‘to strike a direct and hard blow against the Hamas’. It was practically inconceivable that Hezbollah would be expelled in toto from Lebanon, having, as it did, popular support in the region and representation within the
legitimate Lebanese government. On the other hand it would be relatively straightforward for the IDF to strike a ‘direct and hard blow against Hamas’.

In his Lebanon statement Olmert went on to say that Israel would ‘insist on’ the ‘deployment of the Lebanese army in all of southern Lebanon’. Again, this augured poorly for the IDF which was unlikely to achieve such a radical outcome. In the Gaza statement, however, the equivalent objective was to ‘bring about an improved and more stable security situation for residents of southern Israel over the long term’. No mention was made of socio-political change within Gaza and it stressed that the improved situation would be ‘over the long term’ rather than immediately. The final, and perhaps most foolhardy, objective of Israel in the Second Lebanon War was to secure ‘the return of the hostages’. Hezbollah simply had to retain the two kidnapped soldiers in order to demonstrate Israel’s failure. In fact, it later transpired that both soldiers, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, had been killed or fatally wounded at the outset of the conflict. Olmert had unwittingly set an objective that was actually impossible to achieve, thus assuring failure against his own yardstick.

Israel’s stated objectives for the Second Lebanon War, being quantitative yet wildly unrealistic, sowed the seeds of perceived defeat at the very outset of the campaign. Moreover, their inevitable and ongoing lack of fulfilment probably protracted Israel’s involvement until the UN intervention in the form of Security Council Resolution 1701. This UN brokerage exacerbated the already fermenting perception that Israel had once again become ‘bogged down’ in Lebanon and was, as such, unable to cease hostilities on its own terms. The Gaza objectives, on the other hand, being qualitative and achievable, provided Israel with the latitude to announce a unilateral ceasefire after just three weeks, confident that its stated objectives had been satisfied and even exceeded. In limiting the duration of military activity as far as possible and avoiding external arbitration, Israel precluded any accusations of being ‘bogged down’ in Gaza. Terminating the Gaza campaign in this way implied that Israel had already achieved its national goals; in other words, victory.

To summarise, at the grand-strategic level the objectives set by the Israeli government set the conditions for defeat in Lebanon and victory in Gaza. By setting quantitative and unrealistic objectives in Lebanon the bar was set high; too high in fact. But by setting qualitative and achievable objectives in Gaza the bar was set low and was easily exceeded. The objective outcomes of both wars were largely similar, but for the observer the outcomes were not compared against each other but, rather, against the objectives set at the outset of each campaign.

The IDF’s Military Strategy in Lebanon and Gaza

British Defence Doctrine disentangles military-strategy from strategy per se by defining the former as ‘the military contribution, as part of an integrated approach, to the achievement of national policy goals’. It has been shown how the grand strategy employed by Israel in the Gaza War enabled the IDF to cease military activity at a time of its own choosing. Conversely, in
Lebanon the IDF was saddled with unrealistic objectives which necessitated tangible outcomes before victory could be convincingly claimed. Seen in this light it becomes clear why the military-strategy employed in Lebanon appeared to vacillate compared to that employed in Gaza, which seemed to be executed without deviation. Even the operational monikers selected by the Israeli Operations Directorate acted to reinforce this perception. In Lebanon the Israel Air Force (IAF) began the conflict with Operation Specific Gravity but this was swiftly superseded by Operation Change of Direction. As the campaign ground on, and with victory looking ever more elusive, operational plans were updated until, finally, the ill-fated Operation Change of Direction 11. The name ‘Change of Direction’ was intended to convey the notion that the direction of events in the Middle East would change in Israel’s favour but instead it conveyed the notion that Israel’s campaign plan had changed direction as much as eleven times. In the Gaza War, however, the Operations Directorate assigned the name Operation Cast Lead, never adding any numerical suffix, referring instead to stages 1, 2 and (the never initiated) 3. This conveyed a notion of certainty and continuity, almost as if the strategy itself was figuratively ‘cast in lead’. Indeed, the fact that the entire three-week campaign was characterised by just one operation created the perception that the plan required no refinement; many authors even refer to the entire war as Operation Cast Lead, signifying the IDF’s dominance over events.

Even when one disregards the unfortunate choice of operational names it is clear that Israel’s military strategy in Lebanon was one of constant change. In Gaza, by contrast, the IDF appeared to enact a well-rehearsed military set-piece from beginning to end. In fact, this is exactly what it did do. Unencumbered by bothersome measurable objectives and given the limited timeframe of just three weeks, the IDF could operate in Gaza with minimal improvisation. In the run-up to the Gaza War ‘IDF soldiers trained in a mock Arab city built on a base in southern Israel. To add realism and to test asymmetric principles, role players were used for civilians, combatants and the media’. Ron Tira cited ‘training, training, training’ as being essential to Israeli success in Gaza but perhaps ‘rehearsal, rehearsal, rehearsal’ would be a more apt description.

It has been reported that during the Second Lebanon War at least 900 Lebanese civilians and 500 Hezbollah fighters were killed as well as 119 Israeli service personnel and 42 Israeli civilians. During the Gaza War, by comparison, at least 700 Palestinian civilians and 225 Hamas fighters were killed, in addition to around 230 Palestinian policemen; Israeli losses were reported to be 10 service personnel and 3 civilians. These figures demonstrate that Hezbollah and Hamas losses in the two conflicts were remarkably similar, as too were Lebanese and Palestinian civilian fatalities. It is notable that Israeli losses in Lebanon were significantly higher than in Gaza and, it must be conceded, this will have made a significant contribution to the ensuing perceptions.

To summarise, at the military-strategic level the IDF appeared in Lebanon to be shambolic and incoherent whereas in Gaza it appeared to be ultra-competent and unified. This was due, in part, to the operational names chosen but, even more, to the levels of improvisation required
in the two campaigns. In Lebanon, activities were extended further and further into Lebanon in a futile attempt to satisfy the unachievable objectives. Conversely, in Gaza a well-rehearsed plan was executed almost flawlessly. In both conflicts the IDF achieved military successes but in Lebanon it looked bad whereas in Gaza it looked good.

The IDF’s Operations in Lebanon and Gaza

British Defence Doctrine gives the operational level of warfare as the ‘level at which campaigns are planned, conducted and sustained, to accomplish strategic objectives and synchronise action, within theatres or areas of operation’. It has been shown how Israel divided its effort in Lebanon into a number of operations including Specific Gravity, Just Reward and Change of Direction. This reflected the changing strategy beginning on 13 July 2006 with an exclusive air power campaign using Effects Based Operations (EBO) principles similar to those applied by NATO in the Kosovo war. When this offensive did not yield the desired results on 17 July 2006 the IDF launched land operations in a number of border towns, with the intent of engaging and suppressing the enemy. On 31 July 2006 the Israeli Cabinet approved a plan to establish a security zone several kilometres wide along the Israeli-Lebanese border and on 11 August 2006 this was extended to include incursions towards the Litani river. Meanwhile the IAF continued to engage strategic targets such as Katyusha rocket launchers and tunnel networks in the forlorn hope that this would significantly reduce rocket attacks and critically disable Hezbollah.

The use of air and land components in Lebanon as largely disparate elements fomented the growing perception that the IDF was not operating as a coherent force. This view was exacerbated by the fact that the Israeli reserve forces were not called up until 21 July 2006 and even then their mobilisation was ‘handled chaotically’. An impression grew that the air offensive was intended to be decisive, that it had failed and, as a result, an ad-hoc ground offensive had been initiated. However, the perceptions created by the way in which operations had been managed somewhat clouded the truth. The air operations in Lebanon were actually hugely successful, with practically all Zelzel rocket launchers, firing medium to long range missiles, destroyed within a few days. Kainikara and Parkin point out that:

At the operational level, the IAF excelled. They flew in excess of 8000 fighter sorties and 2000 attack helicopter sorties without any combat loss. Tactically they were extremely effective and the weapon delivery accuracy was reported to be approximately 10 metres. There is unanimous agreement from the land forces that close air support was very responsive and well coordinated with artillery support.

In fact, initial air operations in Lebanon were objectively no less successful than in Gaza which also began with an air campaign. Not only was the initial air offensive in Gaza similar in length to exclusive air operations in Lebanon (7 days as opposed to 4) but also, as in Lebanon, once complete, ‘rockets and mortars continued to strike Israel’. However, whereas the initial air campaign in Lebanon was conceived and viewed as a stand alone operation, the air offensive
in Gaza was pointedly described by Ehud Olmert as ‘just the first of several stages’. As such, despite the initial air-only phases in Lebanon and Gaza having similar durations, objectives, TTPs and levels of success, the former was perceived to be a failure and the latter a success simply due to the way in which they were framed within the overall campaigns.

At the end of the first stage of Cast Lead an Israeli communiqué was released which reiterated the overall goals, summarised the activity to date, outlined stage 2 and its objectives, prepared the home front and issued a warning to would-be ‘terrorists’ in Gaza. This communiqué was a masterful example of shaping the narrative and in one fell swoop precluded any perception of the ‘fecklessness’ that had dogged the IDF in Lebanon. The communiqué stated that ‘a short while ago IDF forces began to implement the second stage of Operation Cast Lead. Land forces have begun to manoeuvre within the Gaza Strip’. It also outlined the various land forces that would take part and that they would be supported by ‘the IAF, Israel Navy, Israel Security Agency and other security agencies’. The inescapable perception created by this communiqué was that Israeli forces were operating as a coherent entity and that the campaign plan was proceeding in a business-like fashion. Objectively, however, the situation was much the same as it had been at the equivalent point in Lebanon.

To summarise, at the operational level IAF was, objectively speaking, outstanding in both Lebanon and Gaza, achieving as much, if not more, than could have been reasonably expected. However, in Lebanon there was, from the outset, an expectation that an air-only campaign could achieve decision, whatever that might look like against a hybrid adversary. In Gaza, however, the Israeli government was very clear from the outset that the initial air offensive was a precursor to joint operations, thereby precluding any similarly unrealistic expectations. When the air offensive in Gaza achieved similar results to those in Lebanon, it was, consequently, deemed to be a great success rather than a ‘failure of air power’. Similarly, the tardy call-up of the reserves in Lebanon created the perception that things were not going well, whereas the early call-up in Gaza precluded such perceptions.

The IDF’s Tactics

British Defence Doctrine gives the tactical level of war as ‘the level at which formations, units and individuals ultimately confront an opponent or situation within the Joint Operations Area (JOA)’. It may appear initially that the determination of victory owes more to the strategic and, perhaps, operational levels of war than the tactical level; after all, even the most adroit tactical performance in battle is unlikely to ameliorate a poorly conceived military or grand strategy. The perceived outcome, however, being a subjective and abstract conception, is formulated in the mind of the observer, and is based upon any salient information assimilated. Today this information is likely to have been promulgated largely through newspapers, television and, increasingly, the internet. The type of equipment and munitions used, and the manner in which they are deployed, is likely to have a significant bearing on how a campaign is portrayed and, therefore, perceived. An outstanding example of this occurred in the Second Lebanon War during a televised speech given by Hezbollah Secretary General, Hassan
Nasrallah. A UN observer, Augustus Richard Norton, recalls ‘Nasrallah invited listeners to look to the sea, and with perfect theatrical timing an explosion on the horizon rocked the Israeli Naval Ship (INS) Hanit, an Israeli naval vessel that was hit by an Iranian-produced C-802 guided missile’. Four crew member of the INS Hanit were killed in the attack but the notional effect went far beyond this, raising as it did the spectre of a naval blockade on Israel. Nasrallah had demonstrated how one weapon, skilfully used, could, with the help of the media, provide a significant fillip to a perception of victory.

In the Gaza War the IDF deployed a raft of new vehicles and weapons, some of which were not simply novel but unique. Furthermore, this materiel was not used haphazardly and ineffectually, as new equipment so often is, but with considerable expertise and confidence. The press and, latterly, military writers could not help but be awed by the **hutzpah** of the IDF. Novel weapons were accompanied by proven technology used in new and imaginative ways. For instance, militarised Caterpillar D-9 bulldozers were used to demolish obstructions in built-up areas, thereby creating new routes of infiltration into the dense urban environment. These enabled the IDF to bypass likely areas of ambush or Improvised Explosive Device (IED) emplacements, putting Hamas squarely on the back foot. Whilst drawing criticism from some quarters as being heavy-handed, the D-9, and its remote-controlled counterpart ‘Black Thunder’, visibly demonstrated that the IDF had the tools, ingenuity and, more importantly, the resolve to make contact with the enemy in its own stronghold. The D-9 was further supplemented by anti-structure munitions such as the shoulder-launched Man-portable, Anti-Tank, Anti-Door (Matador) weapon. This was used primarily for wall breaching in order that doors and windows could be avoided. When access had been gained, specially trained dogs in ‘Oketz’ units were often used to secure the building prior to ingress. Robotics were also used to further enhance situational awareness. One such device was the ‘Bulls Island’, a self-righting camera mounted inside a transparent ball able to relay panoramic imagery to nearby portable terminals. All of these capabilities not only enhanced the effectiveness of the IDF but were also lauded by those commenting on the war, acting as totemic examples of Israel’s military superiority; some commentators even likening them to those used by James Bond. Of course, not everything employed by Israel acted to engender positive perceptions; the acknowledged use of White Phosphorus and the alleged use of Dense Inert Metal Explosive (DIME) munitions, in particular, continue to court controversy.

To summarise, at the tactical level the IDF used mostly conventional TTPs and material in Lebanon against what has latterly been described as a hybrid adversary. This resulted in accusations of an ‘ends/means mismatch’ and has been cited by many as being instrumental in the IDF’s ‘poor performance’. Conversely, in Gaza the IDF very visibly used myriad novel TTPs and equipment which not only improved its objective performance but also became totemic examples of Israeli superiority and institutional learning. In fact, it can be argued that the image of those totems became more powerful than their actual contribution to the outcome.
The Illusion of Victory: How War is Won or Lost in the Mind of the Observer!

Israeli Information Operations in Lebanon and Gaza

Not only did the IDF procure novel equipment and revamp its TTPs in the period between the two conflicts but it also completely overhauled its approach to Information Operations (IO). Cognisant, perhaps, that in Lebanon the narrative had been dominated by Hassan Nasrallah, in Gaza the IDF went to extraordinary lengths to influence perceptions across all forms of media. Following the Second Lebanon War the Winograd Commission had been highly critical of the extent to which sensitive information had leaked from IDF personnel to the press and directly onto other platforms. It found that a dearth of policy on the use of modern communications had resulted in information incontinence. Not only was information on military operations leaked but so too were the views and experiences of military personnel, many of which were unfavourable or inconsistent with the desired narrative. The ubiquity of smart phones and pervasiveness of social media led some to believe that it would be impractical to take any meaningful action but the IDF nevertheless took draconian steps to maintain Operational Security (OPSEC) in Gaza. According to Michael Snyder, ‘the Israelis sealed off Gaza to the press, tightly regulated the interaction between soldiers and the media, and banned the use of cell phones by the military’. But Israel was to go much further than simply maintaining OPSEC, seeking not just to restrict the release of information but also to co-opt modern communications in order to promulgate its own narrative. The Directorate of National Information was created on 8 July 2007 and given a mandate to use all forms of media in order to collect, manage and disseminate information which accorded with Israel’s strategic message or ‘hasbara’, Hebrew for ‘explaining’. Social media, websites and blogs were extensively used to court the growing demographic who shun traditional media in favour of sources such as YouTube and Facebook. IDF Combat Camera teams were deployed into Gaza and their (carefully vetted) footage was uploaded along with footage from Remotely Piloted Air Vehicles (RPAV). The result was total Israeli dominance within the information domain. This, however, was not to be achieved without criticism. The decision to restrict the press from Gaza in particular served only to exacerbate already existing enmity between reporters and their hosts; this is likely to have manifested itself in less favourable reportage in the international press.

To summarise, in Lebanon Israel’s strategic message or narrative was weak, inconsistent and compromised; it was, therefore, overwhelmed by that of Hezbollah which combined message discipline with adept use of new media. In Gaza, however, Israel took extraordinary steps to purify its strategic message and saturate all forms of media both new and traditional. It did this by centralising into one government body the responsibility for managing and promulgating information and limiting the effect of any competing sources. The resultant effect was that, regardless of what was happening on the ground, it was Israel’s version of events that was being consumed by the majority of observers.

Israel’s activities during the Second Lebanon War and Gaza War have been analysed under five headings; the four levels of war and Information Operations. Using the model proposed in Part 1 of this paper a number of assertions can be now made. First, looking at the military outcomes Israel was militarily more successful in the Second Lebanon
War as similar losses were inflicted upon the enemy in a shorter time-span and with far fewer friendly losses. In short, the level of disruption suffered by Hamas was similar to that suffered by Hezbollah but at lower cost to Israel. Second, looking at the strategic outcomes, Israel was strategically more successful in the Second Lebanon War than in the Gaza War as Hezbollah proved to be objectively less active than Hamas did in the years following the conflicts. In short, the primary strategic objective of both campaigns was to eliminate or reduce rocket attacks upon Israel; this was achieved for Lebanon but patently not for Gaza. Third, looking at the perceived outcomes, Israel was indeed victorious in the Gaza War but defeated in the Second Lebanon War simply because this is clearly the dominant belief amongst the majority of observers. The perception of victory in Gaza was carefully and skilfully cultivated by the Israeli authorities and those who were responsible deserve credit for actively managing an outcome of war that has previously been left largely to chance. There is much to learn from their success. However, the model described in Part 1 also asserts that it is not really the three outcomes that are important but the benefits or disadvantages that each outcome results in for the antagonist. It is difficult to assess which of the two wars has been most beneficial for Israel; the Second Lebanon War resulted in greater security for many Israelis whereas the Gaza War resulted in the IDF once again being seen as competent and effective. Perhaps only the leaders of Israel can say which of these is most beneficial.

Conclusions

The ideas of victory and defeat in war have a persistence that is unlikely to diminish. Those who wage and prosecute war may come to the conclusion that victory per se is immaterial; however, the observer and, ultimately, history will always seek a victor. This perceived outcome is likely to result in benefits or disadvantages for the antagonist, just as the military and strategic outcomes do. There have been numerous attempts to rationally define what it means to win in war but no objective definition can always concur with the judgement of history. In this paper it is argued that the terms victory and defeat are essentially social constructs and, as such, only truly meaningful when used to measure the perceived outcome of war. Furthermore, it is argued that the military and strategic outcomes can only be meaningfully measured in terms of success or failure. For example, the Coalition Forces may have achieved objective military success in Afghanistan but it would be perverse to talk about military victory when the dominant perception is that the Coalition has failed. This paper demonstrates that neither military nor strategic success necessarily leads to perceived victory. Instead it asserts that perceived victory is a product of not only what was achieved but also how it was achieved.

In the Second Lebanon War Israel suffered what has been described as a ‘national catastrophe’ whilst in the Gaza War it rediscovered its sense of military superiority and reaffirmed its policy of deterrence. This paper asserts that these perceived outcomes were largely a product of the military and political methodologies applied rather than the objective military and strategic outcomes which were, in any case, broadly similar.
The Second Lebanon War provides a salutary lesson on how unachievable objectives, bungled Information Operations and vacillating strategy can engender an inescapable perception of defeat. Conversely, the Gaza War is an exemplar of how modest objectives, total dominance of the information domain and politico-military cohesion can conspire to foment an irresistible perception of victory in spite of questionable achievements.

It is an inescapable fact that war is now fought not just on the battlefield but on television and across all forms of new media. These 'information' and 'cognitive' domains are the crucible in which perceptions are formed and in these domains the truth is often subservient to belief. In this paper it has been demonstrated that victory is an abstraction; an illusion which defies any method of objective measurement. But this illusion of victory is a powerful one and one which has the power to influence opinions, policy and, ultimately, events.
### Annex A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of Source</th>
<th>Type of Source</th>
<th>Year Published</th>
<th>Author’s perception of outcome for Israel</th>
<th>Author’s perception of outcome for Hezbollah</th>
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Notes


7 Whilst this paper tends to use the spelling Hezbollah there a number of other acceptable spellings in use, the most common alternative being Hizbollah. This alternative spelling has been included in some quotations and citations. The direct translation of Hezbollah / Hizbollah is 'party of God'.

8 Clausewitz, On War, 484.


15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.


18 Ibid., 94 - 126.

19 Ibid., 286.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., 33.

22 Ibid., 70-75.

23 Ibid., 79.

24 Clausewitz, On War, 134.
52 Ibid.
54 Matthews, Back to Basics.
56 Ibid.
58 Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, 2-8.
62 Ehud Olmert, Address to the Knesset, July 17, 2006.
66 Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, 2-8.
68 Ibid, 32.
69 Matthews, Back to Basics, 5.
71 Matthews, Back to Basics, 22.
73 Dr Noor ul Haq, Israeli Assault on Gaza (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2009), 89.
74 Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, 2-9.
76 Matthews, Back to Basics, 14.
77 Biddle and Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare, 32.
80 Matthews, Back to Basics, 16.
81 Marrero, Back to Basics, 84.
82 Kainikara and Parkin, Pathways to Victory, 76.
83 Matthews, Back to Basics, 27.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, 2-9.
93 Michele K. Esposito, “The Israeli Arsenal Deployed against Gaza during Operation Cast Lead.”
95 Marrero, Back to Basics, 93.
96 Esposito, “The Israeli Arsenal Deployed against Gaza during Operation Cast Lead,” 181.
98 Marrero, Back to Basics, 97.
100 Marrero, Back to Basics, 94.
101 Ibid, 97.
106 Ibid.
107 Caldwell, Murphy and Menning, Learning to leverage new media, 2-10.
108 Snyder, Back to Basics, 127.
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110 Ibid, 126.
111 Caldwell, Murphy and Menning, Learning to leverage new media, 7.
113 Ibid.
114 Dominic Waghorn, “They kept us out of Gaza and Israeli officials spun the war,” The

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The Illusion of Victory: How War is Won or Lost in the Mind of the Observer!
Libya – The Responsibility to Protect and the Use of Military Force

By Wing Commander Mark Phelps

Although the 2011 Libya intervention was militarily successful it has been the subject of sustained criticism centered on allegations that NATO went beyond its mandate to effect regime change. This paper will look at the criticisms made placing them within the context of both UNSCR 1973 and the subsequent conduct of the NATO led intervention. Focusing exclusively on the air campaign, it will be argued that NATO prosecuted the mission in accordance with the letter and spirit of the mandate and that whilst regime change was not a strategic objective it was the logical consequence of the actions taken to protect the civilian population taking into account the wider context of the ongoing civil war. In light of the above it will be contended that the criticisms made of the campaign are misdirected and may be seen as indicative of an unresolved tension between the concepts of human security and sovereignty as anything other than inviolable.
Introduction

UNSCR 1973 (2011) on the situation in Libya was hailed as the “first time that the Security Council had authorised the use of military force for human protection purposes against the wishes of a functioning state.”¹ Advanced within the framework of the nascent Responsibility to Protect, the Libyan intervention was seen to epitomise the change in international ethos from a culture of sovereign impunity towards a politic focused on the protection of the victims of mass atrocity crimes.² Central to this changed politic was the concept of human security shifting the focus from the territorial or state entity to securing the individual citizen.”³

Following the passing of UNSCR 1973 a coalition of the willing commenced military action in March 2011 that gave way to a NATO led operation that was to prove as successful in preventing the massacre of Libyan civilians as it was controversial for the way in which it was conducted. Criticisms of the intervention have broadly centred upon allegations that NATO went beyond the authority provided by the UN mandate, implemented a highly kinetic military campaign at the expense of escalating the existing civil war and ultimately pursued regime change as a strategic end-state. Such criticisms have gained currency in the post Libya discourse on the future of the Responsibility to Protect contributing to a marked hesitance evident within some sections of the international community to pursue coercive measures and more specifically the use of military force within its framework.

This paper will begin by introducing the doctrines of the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (Protection of Civilians) and the Responsibility to Protect before discussing the mandate provided in UNSCR 1973. It will be argued that in UNSCR 1973 the UN affirmed the Responsibility to Protect within a thematic Protection of Civilians mandate. This contributed to ambiguity as to the authorities granted which underpinned the criticisms subsequently made of the operationalisation of the mandate. This paper will then discuss the prosecution of the NATO led air campaign excluding the no-fly zone and the way in which it responded to the positioning of civilian protection at the strategic heart of the mission. Turning to the criticisms made of the intervention, consideration will be given to whether they are well founded through placing them within the context of the mandate. Finally this paper will look at the Brazilian sponsored concept of the Responsibility while Protecting to consider whether this initiative could offer a way acceptable to the international community to utilize military force within the framework of the Responsibility to Protect to halt human suffering in the most egregious of circumstances.

The Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict and the Responsibility to Protect

The horrors witnessed in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Somalia at the end of the 20th Century shocked the conscience of the world and gave impetus to a refocusing of the international community’s attention on human security. This resulted in both a reappraisal of peacekeeping operations within a Protection of Civilians framework and the emergence of the new doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect.⁴
The Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict

Born out of the interstate wars of the 19th and 20th Centuries, the doctrine of the Protection of Civilians is established in both Treaty law and state practice. Despite its historical foundation, the post Cold War surge in UN mandated peacekeeping exposed flaws in the application of the doctrine particularly where civilian populations were targeted by belligerent parties. The humanitarian interventions in the 1990s were characterized by their focus on providing food and medical supplies to those in need whilst largely failing to address the root causes of their vulnerability.

The inability of peacekeepers to address human security may be traced directly to the founding principles of the doctrine foremost amongst which is the requirement that deployments only take place with the consent of the relevant parties. To gain and retain such consent deployments had to maintain an impartial stance to the political dynamics found in theatre giving them little opportunity to be proactive in the protection of vulnerable groups. This was further complicated by the fact that peacekeepers lacked proactive rules of engagement due to a prohibition on the use of force save in self-defence or in defence of the mandated mission objectives. The inability of peacekeepers to protect the vulnerable was underlined when deployed to regions where peace had yet to be established as their maintenance of impartiality was exploited to devastating effect by belligerents.

The re-evaluation of peacekeeping strategies culminated in the Brahimi Report. Whilst the report did not endorse military intervention for civilian protection purposes it redefined the concept of impartiality for such operations as an “adherence to the principles of the UN Charter” together with an acceptance that the equal treatment of all parties at all times could “result in ineffectiveness and in the worst cases may amount to complicity with evil” concluding that “no failure did more to damage the standing and credibility of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor.”

As a consequence of this re-evaluation the protection of civilians became an explicit responsibility and primary operational task of UN peacekeeping operations resulting in more robust mandates expanding the remit given to peacekeeping operations whilst concurrently placing peacekeepers under increasing pressure to tread the fine line between protecting civilians and supporting the peace process. Thus the doctrine was developed beyond its traditional framework providing the Security Council with credible response options in circumstances of widespread and systematic violence and to deal in depth with the ways in which it could achieve the direct protection of human rights against third party threats.

The Responsibility to Protect

While the process of reassessing the doctrine of the Protection of Civilians was ongoing the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was brought together under the auspices of the Canadian government. The remit of the ICISS was to consider the “so-called right of humanitarian intervention” and the question of “when, if ever, it was
appropriate for a state to take coercive – and potentially military – action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state.” The ICISS presented its report entitled The Responsibility to Protect\(^\text{\textsuperscript{11}}\) to the UN in 2001. In their report the ICISS sought to redefine the terms of the discourse taking place to move away from a claimed right of humanitarian intervention toward a new definition of sovereignty as a “dual responsibility, externally to respect the sovereignty of other nations and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state.”\(^\text{\textsuperscript{12}}\) This redefined concept constituted a paradigm shift in thinking on sovereignty bonding human security to responsible governance and introducing the accountability of states for their actions.

Placing the state at the heart of the Responsibility to Protect, the ICISS proposed a three-stage approach to human security, (i) to prevent human suffering, (ii) to react should preventative measures fail and (iii) to rebuild following any intervention. Within the reactive pillar the ICISS envisaged the application of widely drawn measures both non-coercive and coercive tailored to the situation. At the heart of the ICISS recommendations lay four basic objectives; (i) to establish clear rules, procedures and criteria for determining whether, when and how to intervene, (ii) to establish the legitimacy of military intervention when necessary where all other approaches had failed, (iii) to ensure that military intervention was carried out for the purposes proposed, in an effective manner and with proper concern to minimise human costs and institutional change as a result, and (iv) to help eliminate the causes of conflict while enhancing the prospects for a sustainable peace.\(^\text{\textsuperscript{13}}\)

The concept of threshold criteria was central to this framework to be applied on a sliding scale dependent upon the nature of the intervention contemplated ensuring that any intervention was legitimate in principal, workable and acceptable in practice.\(^\text{\textsuperscript{14}}\) Mindful of the sensitivity of such measures the ICISS proposed six criteria for military intervention which can be summarised under the headings; (i) right authority, (ii) just cause, (iii) right intention, (iv) last resort, (v) proportional means and (vi) reasonable prospects. It is notable that the ICISS was pragmatic in its consideration of the issue of right intention for military intervention concluding that while the primary purpose of the intervention must be to halt or avert human suffering, the humanitarian motivation may not be the only consideration operative upon the states taking part. In an effort to try to ensure that the right intention criterion was satisfied the ICISS recommended that military intervention always take place as a collective or multinational enterprise and that the opinions of regional organisations were taken into account before any authority to act was provided.\(^\text{\textsuperscript{16}}\)

While the ICISS adopted a traditional concept of right authority placing primacy on the Security Council within the UN construct it also recognised that the Security Council could find itself paralysed by the national interests of the permanent five members and their use of the veto. Thus, the ICISS proposed a code of conduct for the permanent five to undertake not to use their veto powers in matters where their vital state interests were not involved and thereby agree not to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorising military interventions for human
protection purposes for which there was otherwise majority support.\textsuperscript{17} To emphasis this point the ICISS recommended that in circumstances where the Security Council failed to act the support of the General Assembly for military action could be sought under the uniting for peace procedure.\textsuperscript{18}

Four years after the ICISS report, the UN General Assembly adopted a modified version of the Responsibility to Protect in Resolution 60/1 of 2005, also known as the World Summit Outcome document. Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document record the acceptance by Member States of the principle that “each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” and that this responsibility encompassed the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through “appropriate and necessary means.”\textsuperscript{19} Whilst the primary responsibility lay with the domestic state, the global nature of human security was reflected in the acceptance of a responsibility to act “through the United Nations […] to help protect populations” from the specified mass atrocity crimes.\textsuperscript{20} If preventative measures proved insufficient the international community declared itself to be committed to act in accordance with the direction of the UN Security Council to be, “prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner […] on a case by case basis and in cooperation with the relevant regional organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations” from the four specified mass atrocity crimes.\textsuperscript{21}

While the General Assembly adopted the central principle of the Responsibility to Protect, consensus was only achieved at the expense of the ICISS criteria for intervention together with a narrowing of the remit of the doctrine to four specified mass atrocity crimes. This crime centric approach mirrored the terms of the Rome Statute albeit with the addition of ethnic cleansing and the omission of the interstate orientated crime of aggression. This narrowing of the doctrine was further evident in the vesting of implementation authority for the more coercive measures solely in the Security Council with no articulation of a code of conduct for the use of the veto in the Security Council or of the ability of the General Assembly to make recommendations under the uniting for peace procedure.

The further implementation of the doctrine was effectively deferred as it was immediately returned to the General Assembly to “continue consideration of the responsibility to protect […] and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law.”\textsuperscript{22} This was consistent with the view later expressed that it was premature to advance the concept in Security Council documents given the “complex compromise that was required to reflect that issue in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document.”\textsuperscript{23} The “complex compromise” required may be seen as founded in the uneasy relationship between the nascent doctrine, state sovereignty, and the principle of non-intervention as embodied within the UN Charter. Although the \textit{raison d’être} of the Responsibility to Protect was morally unassailable, its practical application particularly in the more coercive measures raised difficult issues.
While relatively benign when pursued by way of preventative measures in support of consenting states, the implementation of the doctrine encompassed a more confrontational stance in situations where mass atrocity crimes were alleged to have taken place. This is so because the commission of atrocity crimes infers a perpetrator to be held accountable, should that perpetrator be the government of a state, the use of force to protect the civilian population carries obvious implications for the traditional concept of sovereignty. This presents the UN with difficulties in reconciling the sovereign equality of all states and the corresponding norm of non-intervention with the impact of human rights norms and the shift from a culture of sovereign impunity to one of national and international accountability.

While it is arguable that such controversy is founded in a misunderstanding of the Responsibility to Protect given that the doctrine relies upon a “positive affirmation of the concept of sovereignty as a responsibility” it is a recurrent theme within the discourse and a fundamental flaw in the perception and application of the Responsibility to Protect in all but the most benign of circumstances.

Since its adoption, the Responsibility to Protect has provided the focus of a series of annual reports presented by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to the General Assembly. In his inaugural report on the subject, Ban set out a framework for the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect within a three-pillar structure. Retaining the parameters set out in the World Summit Outcome Document, the first pillar addressed the primary protection responsibilities of the state, the second, the role of the international community in providing assistance in capacity building whilst the third pillar considered the more coercive measures available in the face of the manifest failure of a state to meet its pillar one responsibilities. Within this formulation Ban was at pains to present the three pillars as equally important to the implementation of the doctrine; however, in reality the subsequent discourse has concentrated heavily on the less contentious aspects of the doctrine and has failed to address in any meaningful way what a military intervention under a pillar three mandate would look like and how far the international community would be prepared to go in the pursuit of the principle of human protection. This constitutes a major omission in the development of the doctrine underlying the perceptual difficulties for, and criticisms of, NATO following the Libyan intervention.

Summary
The commonalities between the Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians are clear in their shared “concern for civilians suffering from mass induced violence;” however, the two doctrines are different in a number of aspects. The doctrine of the Protection of Civilians is wider in its application reaching beyond the specified atrocity crimes that are the basis for the Responsibility to Protect but the Responsibility to Protect is not bound to times of armed conflict and may serve as a framework for action to prevent or halt the specified mass atrocity crimes regardless of whether they occur within the context of hostilities. It is also clear that the two doctrines are fundamentally different in their orientation as the Protection of Civilians concerns itself with the protection of individuals while the Responsibility
to Protect addresses the vulnerability of populations. However, the most fundamental difference between the doctrines concerns the potential for Responsibility to Protect mandates to lead to direct confrontation with states identified as perpetrating mass atrocity crimes upon their own populations. Such confrontation cannot be accommodated even within the post Brahimi definition of impartiality in peacekeeping as while it is contended that peacekeepers can and should develop an atrocity prevention lens to inform their protective stance, it is conceded that they cannot be enlisted into any non-consensual coercive action against states. It was the confrontational nature of the coercive measures undertaken within a pillar three mandate that marked the Libyan intervention as both controversial and highly politicised.

**Libya: A Test of International Resolve**

Whilst military force had been used against the protesters in Tunisia and Egypt, the collective will of the people had achieved political change without overt outside intervention. This was not to be the case in Libya where the full force of the military was deployed against unarmed civilians as the inflammatory rhetoric of Col. Muammar Al Gaddafi (Gaddafi) signalled his intent. In language reminiscent of that employed during the genocide in Rwanda, Gaddafi incited the Libyan people to “get out of your homes, to the streets, secure the streets, take the rats, the greasy rats out of the streets.” Faced with mounting evidence of regime brutality and a developing humanitarian disaster the international community reacted within the framework of the Responsibility to Protect.

As envisioned by the General Assembly, regional organisations led the call for action to be taken to protect the people of Libya. This was echoed by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, whilst the UN Secretary General’s Special Advisors on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect, Francis Deng and Edward Luck, added their condemnation of the Libyan regime’s use of military force and noted that actions had been reported that if confirmed may constitute crimes against humanity. This firmly placed the situation in Libya within the context of the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect, an association further advanced by the Security Council in its call to the Libyan government to meet its responsibility to protect its own population. In adopting the language of the Responsibility to Protect the Security Council also stressed “the need to hold accountable those responsible for the attacks, including by forces under their control, on civilians.” The African Union Peace and Security Council also issued a communiqué condemning “the indiscriminate and excessive use of force and lethal weapons against peaceful protesters, in violation of human rights and international Humanitarian law” while the UN Human Rights Council adopted resolution A/HRC/5-15/1 which employed the language of the Responsibility to Protect, explicitly identified the Libyan government as responsible for the incitement of violence against the civilian population and called for the creation of an international commission of inquiry to “investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in Libya.” Thus, from
the very beginning of the repression of protests in Libya regional organisations and the wider international community were clear in their condemnation of the regime.

Faced with the evidence of massive human rights abuses and the increasingly isolated position of Gaddafi a number of Libyan diplomats distanced themselves from the regime. On the 25 February 2011 Abdel Rahman Shalgham, the newly defected Libyan Ambassador to the UN, made an impassioned plea to the Security Council calling for “a decisive, rapid and courageous resolution.” The following day a draft of what was to become UNSCR 1970 of 2011 was placed before the Security Council.

UNSCR 1970 and the Build up to Military Intervention

Specifically discounting the use of military force, UNSCR 1970 closely followed the Security Council’s previous statements on Libya noting the “Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population” and the “need to hold to account those responsible for attacks […] on civilians.” The evidential foundation for the evocation of the Responsibility to Protect was also firmly established in the assertion that “systematic attacks […] against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity.” Having established the doctrinal and evidential basis for the resolution the measures imposed sought to address the immediate protection of the Libyan people and coerce the regime in an effort to counter irresponsible governance hiding behind a claimed right of sovereignty. Thus, the Security Council imposed a general embargo on both the importation and exportation of arms and related material and underlined the accountability of those responsible for the commission of atrocities through a referral of the situation in Libya to the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Additionally a travel ban was imposed on 16 named members of the regimes inner circle and the assets and holdings of 6 members of the Gaddafi family were frozen.

Although UNSCR 1970 demonstrated the international community’s condemnation of the actions of the regime, it ultimately lacked an enforcement mechanism in the face of the increasing intransience of the Libyan regime. As the international community watched on, the Libyan military began to mass its forces in Brega in preparation for an assault upon Benghazi, the seat of the opposition movement and home to over 600,000 civilians. Faced with the increasingly precarious position of Benghazi and the escalatory rhetoric of Gaddafi the international community galvanised itself to take action amidst a growing acceptance that diplomacy alone would not prevent a massacre.

On the 7 March 2011 the Gulf Cooperation Council “demanded that the UN Security Council take all necessary measures to protect civilians, including by enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya.” This was followed by the Organization of the Islamic Conference invoking the language of the Responsibility to Protect to support the call for a no fly zone but at the same time positioning itself against any outside military intervention. Although this position may seem inherently contradictory given that the enforcement of a no-fly zone
would necessitate outside intervention, it is perhaps indicative of a recognition that air power has the unique capability to selectively intervene and then rapidly withdraw.

While reach, speed and agility have long been recognised as the essential qualities of air power, the military response options that it can provide cannot be overestimated. Within the context of the polarisation of the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds an exclusively air centric strategy allowed regional powers to support the principle of intervention for humanitarian purposes without having to endorse a western led land campaign. Thus, the presentational difficulties associated with the foreign occupation of territory could be largely mitigated and the resolution of the political situation left to be determined by the Libyan people. Equally for those countries willing to take part in an intervention the prosecution of an air campaign provided a means by which the UN mandated mission could be supported without committing politically or militarily to an enduring deployment. In such circumstances air power provided an option to pursue a centrally controlled incremental strategy through the engagement of nationally approved target sets whilst allowing those directing the battle apparent strategic flexibility through the re-tasking of air assets within the proscriptions provided. The pursuit of an air campaign also offered a proportionately lower risk option in terms of mass casualties to alliance forces as the application of air power placed relatively few friendly forces in harms way. Conversely the committing of ground troops would have had far wider ranging implications as such interventions have historically been lengthy, expensive and left the contributing states vulnerable to an enduring follow-on commitment to stabilisation missions in the aftermath of hostilities.

On the 10 March 2011 the Gulf Cooperation Council issued a second statement insisting that the Gaddafi regime had lost all credibility and encouraging the Arab League to establish contact with the Libyan opposition now represented by the National Transitional Council, a step that had already been taken by the European Union, France and Italy. On the 11 March 2011 the UN sent special envoy Abdul Khatib to Tripoli to assess the situation on the ground followed on the 12 March 2011 by a Ministerial level meeting of the Arab League that resulted in the production of Resolution 7360 dealing with the implications of the events in Libya and the Arab position.

Resolution 7360 called upon the Security Council to take the necessary measures to impose an immediate no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure whilst respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring states. This Resolution has been described as crucial in bringing about a change in American foreign policy causing it to move away from rapprochement to support the calls made by regional organizations and Britain and France for the imposition of a no-fly zone.

Thus, in light of the support of regional organisations for further action to be taken and the evident failure of lesser coercive measures contained within UNSCR 1970, a second draft
resolution was placed before the Security Council. Backed by the USA and sponsored by the UK, France and the Lebanon the new resolution was introduced by French foreign minister Alain Juppe who challenged the UN Security to take action concluding; “if we are careful not to act too late, the Security Council will have the distinction of having ensured that in Libya law prevails over force, democracy over dictatorship and freedom over oppression.”

Draft Resolution 1973 (2011) subsequently received Security Council assent albeit with 5 members, Brazil, Germany, India, China and Russia abstaining.

**UNSCR 1973**

Like its predecessor UNSCR 1973 was couched in the language of the Responsibility to Protect; however it once again failed to further develop the doctrine containing no statement of condemnation of the manifest failure of the Libyan regime to meet its responsibility or of the international communities responsibility to act in consequence thereof. This is an important omission as the resolution went on to provide authority for a military intervention within a pillar three framework. However, this omission must be seen in the wider context of the determination that the situation in Libya constituted an internal armed conflict. This determination enabled the Security Council to specifically affirm the Responsibility to Protect within the context of a Protection of Civilians mandate, an affirmation that was consistent with the nature of both doctrines as where mass atrocity crimes are alleged to have been committed within the course of an armed conflict the overlap between the two is effectively complete.

While the dual doctrinal foundation of the mandate did not impact its legitimacy, it generated differing interpretations of the scope of the authorities provided. This was not assisted by the way in which the mandate laid out a statement of enduring political intent as the end-state and failed to address how this was to be militarily achieved. Thus paragraph 4 of the Resolution provided authority for the taking of; “all necessary measures […] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory […]”

The prohibition on an occupation force was also influential in the conduct of the intervention as whilst the prohibition provided no legal bar to the deployment of land forces respecting the sovereignty of Libya NATO adopted a more restrictive interpretation resulting in the direction that no land forces under command would be deployed anywhere in northern Africa. This resulted in NATO lacking any ability to protect the civilian population by separating it from the regime's military and created the circumstances in which air power was to play the preeminent role in protecting Libyan civilians through the attrition of regime military capacity.

**Libya and the use of Military Force**

Two days after the passing of UNSCR 1973 a coalition of 15 nations commenced military
operations. This phase of the Operation has become known by the designator given to it by the United States; Operation Odyssey Dawn (Odyssey Dawn).

Odyssey Dawn initially concentrated on achieving air supremacy over the major Libyan population centres and military bases located near the coast before moving on to target command and control facilities and ground forces. Just ten days after the commencement of operations Vice Adm. Gortney, Director of the US Joint Staff, stated that; “Gaddafi has virtually no air defences left to him and a diminishing ability to command and sustain his forces on the ground. His air force cannot fly, his warships are staying in port, his ammunition stores are being destroyed, communication towers are being toppled and his command bunkers are being rendered useless.” Thus, the scene was set for NATO to assume command of all alliance operations including the protection of civilians on the 31st March 2011 under the designator Operation Unified Protector (Unified Protector).

**Operation Unified Protector: The Protection of Civilians and Civilian Populated Areas**

The influence exerted over the conduct of Unified Protector through the placing of the protection of civilians at the heart of the mandate cannot be over-stated. While the doctrinal foundation of the mandate did not give rise to a more onerous legal framework, it arguably placed an enhanced moral duty upon those enforcing it. This was evident in all aspects of Unified Protector but was most keenly felt in the targeting enterprise. While it is always incumbent upon the military to distinguish between combatants and civilians taking no direct part in hostilities, the law of armed conflict recognises that civilians may be killed or injured as a result of a lawful attack if such deaths are considered proportionate to the direct military advantage anticipated. However, during Unified Protector, any suggestion that the lives of civilians could be sacrificed in furtherance of the mission specifically mandated to protect them was considered an anathema and was reflected in the direction that no target, deliberate or dynamic, could be engaged unless the expectation of civilian casualties arising as a result could be mitigated to zero.

Having assumed command of the operation NATO initially concentrated on addressing the immediate threat to the civilian population posed by the regime’s military. This focus prioritised the maintenance of an enduring air presence in the east in order to engage fielded regime forces and thereby protect the population of Benghazi with any additional capacity tasked with providing air cover for other besieged towns including the port of Misrata. The protection of Benghazi was operationally and politically critical for Unified Protector as it was Libya’s second city and the only one specifically mentioned within the UN mandate. Benghazi was also strategically important within the context of the ongoing civil war as the stronghold of the fledgling National Transitional Council. Thus, by adhering to the terms of the mandate, Unified Protector placed itself in direct opposition to the regime’s military frustrating its efforts to take the city and secure victory against anti Gaddafi forces.
The concentration of the air campaign in the east resulted in regime forces directly threatening Benghazi being largely fixed in Brega by the middle of April 2011. However, although successful, this strategy effectively consigned the air campaign to a largely reactive role which when pursued with limited ISR and strike assets underlined the potential infeasibility of curtailing air to attacking perpetrators in the act of committing atrocities. Furthermore, although the threat posed by regime military forces was contained in the east the defence of Benghazi did nothing to address the wider vulnerability of the civilian population across Libya.

On the 14th April 2011 NATO Ministers met in Berlin, a meeting that was to ultimately clarify NATO’s strategic position and provide Unified Protector with a potentially verifiable military end state. The Ministerial resulted in the assertion of three objectives to be achieved before there could be a scaling down of military operations, (i) an end to the attacks and threat of attacks against civilians and civilian populated areas; (ii) that the regime verifiably withdraw to base all military forces including from all populated areas that they had forcibly entered, occupied or besieged throughout the whole of Libya; and (iii) that the regime permit immediate, full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to all people in Libya in need of assistance.

The Berlin Ministerial was immediately followed on the 15th April by the publication of an open letter jointly signed by Prime Minister Cameron and Presidents Obama and Sarkozy. In the letter the three leaders stated their view that any action that resulted in Gaddafi remaining in power would constitute an “unconscionable betrayal” of the people of Libya and reaffirmed their belief that “so long as Gaddafi remained in power, NATO and its coalition partners must maintain their operations so that civilians remain protected and the pressure on the regime builds. Then a genuine transition from dictatorship to an inclusive constitutional process can really begin, led by a new generation of leaders.”

Whilst the setting of conditions for the cessation of hostilities was consistent with the prosecution of a developing coercive military campaign, the terms articulated both at Berlin and in the open letter provide evidence of a growing tension between political and military objectives. This was clear in the conditions articulated at the Berlin Ministerial as whilst the first and third conditions put forward were grounded in the wording of UNSCR 1973, the requirement that regime forces withdraw to their bases was not. In this respect the Berlin Ministerial went beyond the wording of the resolution to incorporate a condition that had first been articulated by the National Transitional Council as a condition precedent to any ceasefire during its meeting with the UN Special Envoy to Libya on the 2nd April 2011. Thus, the incorporation of this condition placed the interests of the National Transitional Council onto the political agenda to the detriment of the regime. The effect of this condition was manifest as it was very difficult for the regime to accommodate as while it could have observed a ceasefire within the terms of the resolution without suffering harm to its tactical position, to withdraw its forces to their bases without a similar undertaking from anti regime forces would have resulted in it conceding territory within the context of the ongoing civil war. Although the
withdrawal of regime forces was necessary to protect civilians from continuing attack, the conditions set at Berlin left the regime with little incentive to comply particularly at a time when anti-regime forces were perceived as weak, disorganised and seemingly posed little credible threat militarily in the absence of the NATO air campaign.

The NATO air campaign continued to develop exploiting the coercive effect of air power through engaging command and control and logistics facilities in order to isolate the regime’s military hierarchy from its forces. The evolution of the strategy from a largely reactive to a proactive air campaign resulted in criticism premised on the assertion that in interdicting targets other than those immanently engaging civilians Unified Protector had extended its operation beyond the mandate provided. This objection fails to address the practical application of force both within the stated terms of the resolution and in response to the situation on the ground. The broad political mandate articulated in the resolution to protect civilians and civilian populated areas provided the object and purpose of the mandate forming the basis of, and providing the authority for, all action subsequently taken. Importantly the resolution contained no statement as to the conditions to be met for the end-state to be achieved, thus, in the absence of further guidance, the UN may be seen as having delegated the exercise of its Chapter VII powers and the task of developing a vision of the end state, together with the actions required to achieve it, to those implementing the mandate. Such delegation is wholly consistent with the pragmatic practice of the UN in recognition of its inability to generate forces to enforce its own mandates.

The absence of any qualification placed upon the authority to use military force in furtherance of the mandate also freed Unified Protector from pursuing a purely reactive campaign. More specifically the lack of any requirement in Article 4 of the mandate that the threat be immanent permitted an expansive interpretation that provided authority for the development of the air campaign towards the prosecution of targets with the intent of coercing the regime by degrading its capacity to project force against civilians at a future date. Such an interpretation was wholly consistent with the letter and spirit of the mandate and interpretive convention that requires resolutions to be read in a manner consistent with, and to give effect to, their objective and purpose.

In order to fully exploit the coercive effect of air power it was necessary to understand the rationale behind the regime’s actions and decision-making process. Such an understanding was fundamental to effective exploitation of the second and third order effects of the application of lethal force cogniscent of the fact that it was ultimately the Libyan regime that would decide whether or not to comply. Therefore the motivation of the regime was key; did it consider itself to be acting in self-defence against an internal threat to its existence or was it instead intent on exterminating all opposition to it at any cost and with no compulsion towards political settlement? The answer to this question would have clear implications for Unified Protector as the possibility of political settlement would lend itself to a coercive approach through the gradual escalation of air power thereby seeking to reduce the vulnerability of the
population by modifying the regime’s intent to commit atrocities.\textsuperscript{65} However, the pursuit of a graduated effects based approach to operations presented difficulties for Unified Protector as the political imperative to establish and maintain a high operational tempo from the start of the campaign had left little, if any, capacity to increase the weight of attack. Therefore, while maintaining its capability to respond dynamically to events on the ground, Unified Protector shifted its focus towards Tripoli to provide a credible escalatory option.

As Unified Protector developed its air campaign regime forces adopt increasingly asymmetric tactics abandoning the outward signifiers of their military status in order to conceal themselves amongst the civilian population. Although these tactics rendered such forces unable to prosecute large-scale operations they continued to terrorise the population at close quarter. As the air campaign against regime communication facilities gained pace regime forces occupied civilian buildings from which to direct the battle serving to further blur the distinction between the belligerents and the civilian population. Such tactics presented additional challenges for the application of air power as it became increasingly difficult to manage perceptions as ostensibly civilian buildings were struck. The inherent difficulties for air power in pursuing ground forces hiding in amongst the population are manifest as air power is ultimately limited in the civilian protection role by its physical separation from those it seeks to protect. Technological advances in optics seek to mitigate spatial separation; however, whilst the latest thermal imaging technologies can determine the presence of personnel within a structure they cannot take that extra crucial step to distinguish between the civilian and soldier. In such circumstances the lack of a land component under command has historically increased exponentially the operational risk to the civilian population and consequently the mission; however, during Unified Protector the risk to civilians was effectively mitigated through a reliance on timely actionable intelligence, the professionalism of the aircrews and the exclusive use of precision-guided munitions.

Advanced munitions, particularly low collateral, inert and fused weapons such as Hellfire, dual mode seeker Brimstone and Paveway IV,\textsuperscript{66} proved crucial in providing both accuracy in delivery and precision of effects to mitigate civilian casualties and collateral damage to the greatest degree possible. Images published in the world’s press bore witness to air power’s ability to prosecute the range of military objectives from subterranean bunkers to specific floors within high-rise buildings in order to neutralise the threat posed to civilians whilst leaving adjacent structures intact.\textsuperscript{67}

Leaflet drops, radio broadcasts and social media sites carried messages reiterating NATO’s commitment to its mandate to protect civilians, calling for unity amongst the population and condemning the human rights abuses carried out by the regime. The strategic communications effort also provided warning of attack to civilians directing them to distance themselves from military equipment and facilities so as to spare them the consequences of the air campaign.\textsuperscript{68} The synchronization between the lethal targeting and information campaigns was to prove crucial in informing and maintaining the support of the Libyan people
and the wider international community. This was vital as it was clear from the inception of the campaign that Unified Protector would be conducted in the full glare of the world’s media and its success ultimately judged not on the lives saved, but on those lost in consequence of its actions. Whilst no military can ever be complacent about the death of, or injury to, civilians, the 60 civilian fatalities and 55 injuries alleged to have been caused by NATO air strikes during the course of Unified Protector must be placed in context of the fact that during the air campaign over 9,700 strike sorties were flown delivering over 7,700 weapons and destroying over 5,900 military targets. Whilst critical of NATO’s inability to investigate allegations of civilian casualties, the UN mandated International Commission of Inquiry on Libya concluded that the conduct of the NATO campaign demonstrated concern to avoid civilian casualties and that NATO took extensive precautions to ensure that civilians were not killed.

**Unified Protector and Subsequent Criticisms**

Despite the success of Unified Protector in averting the anticipated massacre of Libyan civilians, the intervention has been the subject of much criticism. Such criticism may be seen as founded in the persistent disconnect between the policy level at which UNSCRs are drafted and the operational level where operations are designed and implemented. As this paper has endeavoured to portray, UNSCR 1973 was drafted in such a way so as to give those enforcing it the maximum flexibility to act. Thus, it would appear incongruous that the subsequent controversy has focused on NATO’s adoption of an expansive interpretation of the mandate particularly as it was ultimately to prove successful in achieving the political intent of protecting civilian life. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the most vociferous criticism of Unified Protector has come from the BRICS states all of who were represented in the Security Council at the time of the passing of resolutions 1970 and 1973. Given that they were represented, the BRICS nations all had the opportunity to place constraints upon the use of military force through the imposition of clearly defined objectives and time scales if they considered such imposition consistent with the intent of the mandate and reflective of the will of the international community. This was even more emphatically the case in respect of Russia and China both of whom could have deployed their respective vetos rather than abstaining from voting in respect of the resolutions.

While a number of criticisms have been made of the conduct of Unified Protector the major concern expressed is founded in the issue of regime change. However, it is crucial to note that this concern is not limited to application of force in the context of Libya but rather goes to the heart of the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect and the continuing tension between the respect for state sovereignty, pressure to protect victims of mass atrocity crimes and the desire for justice.

Within the context of Unified Protector, a number of factors would seem to provide evidence that a regime change agenda was followed. Such factors include inter alia the recognition of the National Transitional Council as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people by many taking part in the intervention, the increasingly overt political agenda evident in Western
Libya – The Responsibility to Protect and the Use of Military Force

capitals, the sending by some nations of advisors to assist the National Transitional Council and the death of Gaddafi at the hands of anti regime militia following a NATO airstrike on his convoy. However, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the political agenda pursued by some states and the operational mandate provided to NATO.

However, it is important to place this in the context of the build up to UNSCR 1973 that followed the framework envisioned within the UN construct for a Responsibility to Protect mandated mission. The condemnation of the Libyan regime by regional organisations and the wider international community placed the regime firmly in the role of aggressor and perpetrator of mass atrocity crimes upon its own population. The measures thereafter mandated in UNSCR 1970 evidenced an attempt to protect the civilian population without the resort to military intervention and when such measures proved unsuccessful the Security Council proceeded to authorise the use of force within UNSCR 1973. The subsequent operationalisation of the mandate by Unified Protector through the targeting of the Libyan regime’s ability to project force was both consistent with the authorities provided within the resolution and the logical consequence of the prosecution of the mandate. To do otherwise would have undermined NATO’s ability to be proactive in furtherance of the protection mandate whilst placing civilians at greater risk of harm by prolonging the campaign. In the absence of any evidence of modification in regime behaviour, Unified Protector acted within the mandate provided by the international community. Whilst actions taken in furtherance of the mandate were to have consequences for the regime’s ability to project force within the context of the civil war this is not the same as actively pursuing regime change as a strategic objective.

The Future for the Responsibility to Protect, the Responsibility while Protecting and Military Intervention

While allegations of regime change have dominated the post intervention debate there have been initiatives seeking to codify the operationalisation of the Responsibility to Protect. Preeminent amongst such initiatives has been the concept advanced by Brazil as the Responsibility while Protecting.

Just 9 days after the conclusion of Unified Protector the Brazilian President Dilmu Rousseff delivered a statement to the General Assembly expressing the view that the international community should display a high level of responsibility while exercising the Responsibility to Protect. This was followed by a concept note entitled: Responsibility while Protecting: elements for the development and promotion of a concept.77 Within the concept note Brazil proposed a set of criteria for military intervention, a monitoring and review mechanism to assess the implementation of Security Council mandates and a renewed emphasis on capacity building to avert crises before they take hold.78 When considering the use of military force the concept of the Responsibility while Protecting returns to the ICISS’ reliance upon a set of criteria to be considered before a mandate can be authorised and a monitoring and review mechanism to ensure that the implementation of the mandate is “seriously debated.”79
The criteria put forward for consideration draws upon just war theory in much the same way as was originally envisaged in the ICISS report. Thus, the use of force is always to be considered a measure of last resort, the authorisation of force must be a proportionate response to the threat perceived and any application of force must abide by the law of armed conflict. While these principles may be seen to have been operative before and during the intervention in Libya by dint of the application of international law and UN procedure, the Responsibility whilst Protecting goes further to signal a retreat into the language of impartiality seen in peacekeeping missions. This is evident in the proposal that the use of force must produce as little violence and instability as possible and under no circumstances can it generate more harm than it was authorised to prevent. Such criteria may be interpreted as a clear rejection of all risk but most notably the risks associated with the use of military force. This ignores the fact that in some albeit extreme circumstances acceptance of a risk of harm in the short term is the only way to work towards enduring protection of civilians and progress recognition of their most fundamental human rights. If this premise is correct then the total prohibition on an acceptance of risk would be a formula for inaction in the most pressing circumstances of human vulnerability. The assumption of risk is inherent to the application of military force therefore to discount the acceptance of any level of risk would be to deny that the best outcome for those in need may be achieved through a military intervention that recognises that risk and takes all practical measures to mitigate it.

In this respect the Responsibility while Protecting also ignores the fact that in some circumstances the military offers the only viable method by which to deter or halt the continuing commission of mass atrocities and that diplomacy without a credible threat descends into posturing while civilians pay the cost of international community inactivity with their lives. This was evident in Libya where the failure of diplomatic efforts to bring to an end the attacks perpetrated by the regime on the civilian population left the international community with a stark choice between military intervention and inaction. To do nothing would have resulted in the massacre of innocents and prematurely consigned the Responsibility to Protect to history through the failure of the international community to meet its responsibility to the peoples of the world.

The final two criteria put forward within the concept of the Responsibility while Protecting propose the establishment of enhanced Security Council procedures to monitor and assess the manner in which resolutions are interpreted and implemented. This would ensure adherence to the responsibility while protecting and underline the accountability of those to whom authority to act is granted. It is argued that such a procedure would ensure the legitimacy of any action undertaken as authorised by the Security Council enabling the wider membership to be informed about, and maintain scrutiny of, the way that the mandate is interpreted.

While this proposal appears to have merit it lacks detail as it fails to identify who would provide an authoritative interpretation of the mandate both initially and in the case of dispute and what the consequences would be for those that fail to adopt the consensus approach.
Furthermore, the imposition of a high interpretive authority independent of the country or alliance undertaking the mandated enforcement action would be extremely difficult to accommodate within the framework of military planning which derives its authority to act through its own political institutions. The acceptance of an outside interpretive authority would also require a political commitment to subject the intervening military authority to evaluation by it and ultimately the Security Council and thereafter act upon their findings and recommendations or presumably face as yet undefined sanctions. This could clearly have the effect of discouraging states from contributing forces to such operations for fear that the agreed interpretation and subsequent scrutiny could conflict with national interest.

Even if achievable the production of an agreed interpretation of the mandate and a consensus on the application of force fails to address the potential infeasibility of predetermining the most effective way to implement a mandate within a developing scenario. The placing of such restrictions upon the exercise of military strategy would also deny those implementing it their greatest weapon, the flexibility to react to the situation as it evolves and thereby take the initiative and those measures necessary to achieve the stated political objective. Furthermore, such measures fail to address the reality of the composition of the UN Security Council and the use of the veto by the five permanent members as any agreed interpretation would have to be the product compromise both in terms of political accommodation and military efficacy. Even if such difficulties could be overcome the Responsibility while Protecting whilst placing more regulation and oversight on the Responsibility to Protect ultimately fails to address the root cause of the controversy that surrounds the doctrine as this resides not in the application of military force but in the failure to accept that regime change can sometimes be the legitimate aim or consequence of action taken to spare the victims of the mass atrocity crimes.

**Conclusion**

Unified Protector demonstrated that military intervention can be employed to protect the victims of mass atrocity crimes and that air power has matured to the point that it can stand alone in delivering the effects required with both accuracy and precision. However, Unified Protector also laid bare the inherent flaw in the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect in exposing the unresolved tension between an acceptance of the concept of sovereignty as a dual responsibility and the reality of military intervention for human protection purposes in breach thereof. This tension was not unforeseen as the ICISS report acknowledged that action to halt or avert human suffering may necessitate the disabling of a regime's capacity to harm its own people. 

Whilst the ICISS report did not go on to define what the end state would be in such circumstances it would appear at best naïve and at worse disingenuous to consider that acts leading to the disabling of a regime capacity to harm would take place within a political vacuum. This is the essential dilemma of the Responsibility to Protect as whilst centred on the protection of the victims of mass atrocity crimes the international community has evidenced an unwillingness to accept that even in the breach the concept of sovereignty is anything other than inviolable.
In addition to the political difficulties inherent to the doctrine the Responsibility to Protect there are practical challenges posed for the application of military force. This is evident in the very concept of the responsibility as the protection of the civilian population is not a military objective but rather a statement of enduring political intent. In trying to operationalise the concept to meet the terms of UNSCR 1973 NATO had two options - separate the people from those who would harm them or take steps to eliminate the threat to the population at source. Although the first option may be the preferred model for those wishing to maintain a strict distinction between the Responsibility to Protect and regime change through the adoption of a largely passive/reactive role, it comes at a price in terms of international community commitment through the large-scale deployment of land forces. Such manpower intensive operations can be costly in terms of both blood and treasure, require an enduring political commitment and are unlikely to find favour at a time of fiscal austerity. However, the model pursued during Unified Protector provides a successful example of limited engagement through the exploitation of the primary strengths of air power to strike at the root of the identified threat to be deterred. Whilst Unified Protector has been criticised the fact of the matter is that anti-Gaddafi forces were able to capitalise on the actions taken by NATO in pursuit of the Responsibility to Protect mandate, this is a fundamentally different proposition to the allegation that NATO pursued regime change per se. To assert that NATO pursued regime change as the strategic end state is not only unsubstantiated on the facts but also fails to acknowledge the role of the indigenous uprising and the commitment of ordinary Libyan citizens to a new political order.

Care must be taken not to portray the intervention in Libya as a model for all future missions under the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect as intervention for human protection purposes is not synonymous with confronting the ruling elite. However, where the regime is identified as the perpetrator of mass atrocity crimes intervention on behalf of the victims requires the international community through the Security Council to be clear that the consequence of military intervention is to take a side and in so doing abandon all pretense of impartiality. Taken a step further, while regime change may not have been a stated objective of UNSCR 1973, it was arguably a legitimate means to fulfill the mandate as where the regime is the primary perpetrator of ongoing mass atrocities, changing the regime may be the most effective way of ending the commission of such crimes.

Acceptance of this proposition would necessitate recognition of the radical nature of the Responsibility to Protect in its most coercive guise and a consequent commitment to both the ideal and practice that legitimacy of sovereignty is dependent upon an enduring commitment to human security. Failure of responsible governance within such terms would, in the most extreme of cases, be met with a recognition that regime change can be a lawful consequence of legitimate measures taken to protect victims or even the legitimate means by which this can be achieved. If this is not the case then military intervention to discharge the international community’s self-proclaimed responsibility to protect the most vulnerable will remain subject to allegations of straying beyond the mandate in circumstances where regime change results
from actions taken in the cause of human protection. Failure to meet this challenge will consign the Responsibility to Protect to history and result in the abandoning of any pretense of sovereign accountability even in the most extreme of circumstances allowing gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity to go unanswered.

Notes

1 Bellamy, A. J, (2011) Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm, *Ethics and International Affairs: First View Articles*. Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs. New York, USA. It is arguable that UNSCR 1973 was not the first time military force had been so authorized as the UK, France and the USA all relied upon an interpretation of UNSCR 688 (1991) as providing the legal foundation for the no-fly zones imposed in Iraq following the first Gulf war in 1991 although it should be noted that UNSCR 688 made no specific reference to the imposition of a no-fly zone and the Secretary General of the UN at the time questioned their legality.


39 Charter of the United Nations Article 41 provides that the Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and may call upon Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.


42 UNSCR 1970, Article 9, supra


45 Ihsanoglu, E, (2011) Statement of Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu OIC Secretary General to the Meeting of the Permanent Representatives on the Situation in the Libyan Jamahiriya, 8 March 2011. Available at: http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/LCIL/documents/
See, Lessons Offered From The Libya Air Campaign, Royal Aeronautical Society Specialist Paper, (2012), The Royal Aeronautical Society, London England. This perception was also evident in the debate on military intervention in Syria following reports of the alleged use of chemical weapons by the regime, whilst no action was ultimately taken it is interesting to note that the Prime Minister Cameron together with President Obama discounted the use of land troops from consideration.

Arab League Resolution 7360, (2011), The outcome of the Council of the League of Arab States meeting at the Ministerial level in its extraordinary session on the implications of the current events in Libya and the Arab position 12 March 2011, Cairo, Egypt. Available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%207360.pdf (Accessed: 7 December 2013)


Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised. Art 42, Hague Rules 1907. Available at: http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=01D4268B0086089BEC12563CD00516887 (accessed 17 October 2013)


The international law recognizes that civilian injury and death may be the foreseen consequence of a lawful military strike if those deaths or injury are proportionate to the concrete military advantage anticipated – see Protocol 1 to The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (1977) Article 51(S)(b) prohibits an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201125/


It is necessary to set out the terms of the coercive campaign to inform the opponent of the steps that they must take to bring hostilities to an end. Pape. R.A, (1996) page 67. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, Cornell University Press, New York, USA.


See note L


See The Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, (1969), Article 31 and 32 which provide the framework for the interpretation of international treaties. Article 31 sets out the main principle that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”


See, Article 57(2)(c) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), 8 June 1977. Available at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl/4e473c7bc8854f2ec12563f60039c738/50fb5579fb098faac12563cd0051dd7c?OpenDocument (accessed 17 August 2013)


73 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

74 Whilst initially positioning itself with the other BRICS states to abstain, South Africa ultimately voted in favour of UNSCR 1973.


76 France, Qatar, Italy, Jordan, Spain, the UAE, Canada, Bulgaria, Belgium, The USA, the UK, Greece, Romania, and Sweden all recognized the TNC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people during the course of operation Unified Protector.


78 Welsh, J, Quinton-Brown, P, and MacDiarmid, V, (2013) Brazil’s Responsibility While Protecting


84 ICISS Report, paragraph 4-33 (Right Intention)


87 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Policy Brief, 21 June 2012. Available at: [http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/The%20Relationship%20between%20R2P%20and%20POC%20in%20Armed%20Conflict%20Brief%202011%20June%202012.pdf](http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/The%20Relationship%20between%20R2P%20and%20POC%20in%20Armed%20Conflict%20Brief%202011%20June%202012.pdf) (accessed: 17 November 2013)

88 Annan, K, (2000), page 48, *We the Peoples, The Role of the UN in the 21st Century*, UN Department of Public Information, New York, USA.

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**Media**


Politics and the Limits of Responsibility to Protect

By Dr Peter Lee

At the UN World Summit in 2005, world leaders agreed an outcome document that formalised the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as ‘an emerging international security and human rights norm’. When UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced that the world had taken ‘collective responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’, it appeared that a new era in international cooperation had arrived.

This article explores three stages of R2P development from the 1990s to the present: the events that led to the idea and implementation of so-called humanitarian intervention, including the words and actions of Prime Minister Tony Blair in relation to Kosovo in 1999; the disputes that shaped negotiations surrounding R2P, highlighting how political compromise is embodied in the Responsibility to Protect text as an inherent weakness; while the final section uses events in Syria between 2011 and 2014 to explore the conflicting political interests that render the legal dimension of R2P impotent despite the enthusiastic support of its advocates. The article concludes that unremitting mutual opposition between Russia and Western members of the Security Council over Syria – fuelled in turn by geo-strategic and national interests as well as humanitarian concern – means that agreement on R2P and military intervention on humanitarian grounds is as far away as it was at the time of Blair’s naively optimistic words in April 1999. The limits of R2P have been reached.
Introduction

At the UN World Summit in 2005, world leaders agreed an outcome document that formalised the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as 'an emerging international security and human rights norm'.¹ When UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced that the world had taken ‘collective responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity', it appeared that a new era in international cooperation had arrived.²

Presented separately as either a response to military, or humanitarian, interventions in the 1990s, or a further development of the ideals behind those interventions, R2P provided a framework within which geopolitical, economic or ideological self-interest on the part of the major powers could be resolved.³ At least in principle. The enduring legal and ethical tension at the heart of R2P is between the rights of states and state sovereignty as set out in the UN Charter, and the rights of individuals as set out in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, the tension is more apparent than real: the sovereign rights of states are protected in international law to a degree that human rights are not. For example, Article 2 of the UN Charter states: 'All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.'⁴ In contrast, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is referred to in UN documentation as 'complement[ing] the UN Charter with a road map to guarantee the rights of every individual everywhere'.⁵

The UN Summit Outcome Document attempts to extend or redefine the concept of sovereignty, setting out both the responsibilities of states to its citizens: ‘Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means.'⁶ It also identifies situations in which state sovereignty can be violated by the international community. Namely, where mass atrocities – genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity – against populations are occurring within a state whose government, assuming there is a stable government, is unable or unwilling to end the violence. However, as always with such documents it was the product of political negotiations which inevitably diluted the substance of the proposal to a lowest common denominator that can be accepted by all parties.⁷

Despite the scope and ambition of R2P and the desire of its proponents to see international law and the protection of populations enhanced by its adoption, significant challenges remain, most notably at the geopolitical level. The trajectory of this article will reflect three stages of R2P development up to the present. Section 1 will provide a broad context for the events that led to the idea and implementation of so-called humanitarian intervention, before going on to examine the words and actions of Prime Minister Tony Blair in relation to the 1999 Kosovo intervention as a precursor to the development of R2P. Section 2 will address the political disputes that shaped negotiations surrounding R2P, highlighting how political compromise
is embodied in the Responsibility to Protect text as an inherent weakness. Subsequently, the final section will use events in Syria between 2011 and 2014 to explore the conflicting political interests that render the legal dimension of R2P impotent despite the enthusiastic support of its advocates. Examples of those interests include the return of realpolitik and the pursuit of geopolitical interests by the great powers, as well as the unwillingness of electorates in Western liberal democratic states to mandate their leaders to deploy significant military force in the protection of others.

A New Responsibility – Humanitarian Intervention

The years following the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War brought new challenges to the international community. Russia entered a period of relative introspection following the demise of the USSR, its status as a world power significantly eroded. The Chinese economic miracle was yet to take place as it too, following the massacre at Tiananmen Square, reflected on its future direction. The US entered a period of unchallenged prestige as the remaining genuine superpower in what Charles Krauthammer called ‘the unipolar moment’. The 1991 Iraq War confirmed American military eminence as it came to terms, under the leadership of President George H.W. Bush, with its new place in the world. The following year President Bush was aware of growing tensions between Serbs and Kosovars and expressed a willingness to intervene should the Balkan war extend to Kosovo. The public maiming and killing of US Rangers in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993 reinforced American public unwillingness to tolerate the deaths of their soldiers when key national interests were not at stake: ‘peace operations in a permissive environment’ were acceptable while peace enforcement or combat operations were not. In the UK, Prime Minister John Major oversaw a downsizing of the British defence establishment as part of the post-Cold War ‘peace dividend’.

Then came Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995). Major atrocities – crimes against humanity – were perpetrated along ethnic lines despite the presence of small numbers of UN observers and peacekeepers. In October 1993 the UN Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to help implement agreements made between the mainly Hutu government and the Tutsi Rwandese Patriotic Front. When an aircraft carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi crashed in April 1994 it exacerbated existing tensions and precipitated a wave of ethnic-based killings that left between 500,000 and 850,000 people dead in little over three months. The small UNAMIR force of around 2,500 personnel came under attack, unable to broker a peace agreement and too militarily inadequate to enforce a ceasefire. Its numbers were rapidly reduced to 270 personnel, though this small force did manage to protect several thousand Rwandans who took refuge with them. Ultimately, despite ongoing negotiations at the UN and the adoption of Resolutions 912, 918 and 929 on 21 April, 17 May and 22 June 1994 respectively, the response of the international community had been too small, too slow and too ineffectual to prevent or even slow the genocide.

Echoes of this pattern of events reverberated the following year as the Balkan War reached its nadir. Between 10 and 20 July 1995 the Bosnian Serb Army killed approximately 8,000 Bosnian
Muslim men and boys in and around the town of Srebrenica. Mass killings in the East of Europe prompted recollections of events last seen in the Second World War. Complicating matters was the presence of a Dutch contingent of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR): too small a force, inadequately armed, and with insufficiently permissive rules of engagement to forcibly prevent the killings of the Bosnians. Further, General Mladic threatened that if air power was brought to bear against the Bosnian Serb Army ‘he would retaliate by shelling the Dutchbat compound.’ The official UN report refers to ‘atrocities,’ ‘mass executions,’ ‘mass graves,’ ‘horrors,’ and ‘massacres.’ Edward Herman argues that beyond the physical killings, Srebrenica has also been the locus of a restructuring of language; bringing terms like ethnic cleansing, genocide and humanitarian intervention to the fore in international discourse.

Herman’s point is that terms like ethnic cleansing and genocide here are not mere descriptions of events, they include additional emotive and political layers of meaning that constitute events as having a particular degree of seriousness and humanitarian horror. These terms would go on to inform responsibility to protect thinking in the years to follow. However, if the use of such terms is a political as much as linguistic act, to ignore such terms or actions – as will be seen in the Syria case – is a similarly political act that supersedes legal claims. Note also that ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’ confer an absolute judgement on the heinousness of the actions involved that does not necessarily compare with historical precedents. Relatively speaking, it should be remembered that the 8,000 deaths at Srebrenica equates to one per cent of the total deaths that occurred in Rwanda, and just over one thousandth of the deaths in the Second World War death camps to which it would come to be compared: the politics of death meets the politics of the discourse of death.

Discussion of Security Council Resolution 1004 at the UN on 12 July 2005 explicitly identifies the political context within which international law operates (or does not operate). The Nigerian delegate stated, “today in Bosnia there is no peace to keep and no political will to impose one. Herein lies the dilemma of the continued involvement of the United Nations with the situation.” The Russian delegation called for ‘the effective functioning of UNPROFOR’ but reminded the Council that the previous provision of a safe area at Srebrenica ‘precludes the option of using force’ by the UN personnel. Setting a pattern that would be repeated in the decade and more to follow, the US and UK called for more stringent UN action while the Chinese government expressed concern about the use of military force by the UN under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, whereby ‘the peacekeeping force could become a party to the conflict,’ losing legitimacy in the process.

By the time of the Kosovo war in 1999 the political and nascent legal aspects of military or humanitarian intervention had been articulated and rearticulated by opponents and proponents alike. However, the tensions in the UN Security Council and the incommensurability of the pro- and anti-interventionist positions remained. Continued threatened use of the veto by Russia and China blocked a UN Security Council Resolution on intervention in Kosovo: Russia motivated at least in part by historical links with Serbia, with China maintaining a strong non-interventionist stance. Negotiations between NATO and the government of Slobodan
Milosevic proved fruitless, with the latter opting to escalate his anti-Kosovar activities and fight rather than accede to the demands set out by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright at Rambouillet, France in February and March 1999. Highlighting the contentious nature of those events and the entrenched political viewpoints, former American diplomat Henry Kissinger was unequivocally critical of how negotiations were conducted. He said, ‘The Rambouillet text … was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing. Rambouillet is not a document that an angelic Serb could have accepted. It was a terrible diplomatic document that should never have been presented in that form.’ In contrast, Albright would later answer a question about starting military action without UN Security Council approval as follows:

Let me go back on something when you say, “Is it legal?” Frankly, again, to go back to Kosovo, kind of the system said that what we did there was not legal, but it was right. I have always believed that we are better off doing something multilaterally than unilaterally. But there are other ways to figure this out and get it out of the cul-de-sac of the (UN) Security Council.

Albright was echoing the arguments put forward by President Bill Clinton and Tony Blair at the time of the Kosovo intervention, which were based on moral concern in the absence of UN legal sanction. A month into the bombing campaign Blair gave a speech to the Economic Club in Chicago where he set out his justification for intervention in Kosovo:

While we meet here in Chicago this evening, unspeakable things are happening in Europe. Awful crimes that we never thought we would see again have reappeared - ethnic cleansing, systematic rape, mass murder … No one in the West who has seen what is happening in Kosovo can doubt that NATO’s military action is justified … We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand. We must not rest until it is reversed. We have learned twice before in this century that appeasement does not work. If we let an evil dictator range unchallenged, we will have to spill infinitely more blood and treasure to stop him later.

Having constituted Milosevic as evil and bracketed him with the actions and character of Hitler, Blair set out his justification for military intervention, not only the ongoing military action in Kosovo but for reorganising international institutions to make it easier to use military force to protect vulnerable people on humanitarian grounds in the future. He continued, and it is worth quoting at length:

the principle of non-interference must be qualified in important respects. Acts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter … So how do we decide when and whether to intervene. I think we need to bear in mind five major considerations. First, are we sure of our case? War is an imperfect instrument for righting humanitarian distress; but armed force is sometimes the only means of dealing with dictators. Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options? … Third, on the basis of a practical assessment
The first four considerations for humanitarian intervention coincide reasonably with criteria for war that have emerged in the Western just war tradition over many centuries: just cause, last resort, reasonable prospects and proportional means, all of which coincide with criteria for military intervention later proposed in the 2001 ICISS Report and which will be addressed in the next section. However, even whilst making his case for humanitarian intervention Blair kept ‘national interests’ as part of his considerations: the moral and legal arguments could not be isolated from the wider political interests, either then or subsequently. He also claimed in the same speech that ‘In the end values and interests merge,’ though it might be more accurate to say that he sought to subsume ‘values’ within interests to give greater legitimacy to the latter in the process of garnering public support for unpopular actions. Despite scepticism in a number of quarters about the scope of Blair’s ambition and the possibility of achieving the international consensus he desired, he had a powerful ally in the White House. Bill Clinton drew upon the discourse of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘genocide’ in the emergence of R2P:

if the world community has the power to stop it, we ought to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing … innocent civilians ought not to be subject to slaughter because of their religious or ethnic or racial or tribal heritage. And that is what we did but took too long in doing in Bosnia. That is what we did and are doing in Kosovo. That is, frankly, what we failed to do in Rwanda.”

Clinton and Blair were not motivated purely by altruistic concern for oppressed peoples – though it would also be unfair to describe their actions as entirely self-interested. Their approach to humanitarian intervention was also underpinned by renewed confidence in Western liberal democratic values and a desire to extend them to parts of the world where they were manifestly absent in the face of abuse of power by dictators.

In late 1999, several months after hostilities ceased between NATO and the FRY/Serbia, Ove Bring, Swedish Professor of International Law, argued for a new ‘doctrine of humanitarian intervention’ based on what he described as ‘the emerging international norm that gives precedence to the protection of human rights over sovereignty in certain circumstances’. Bring’s arguments continue the trajectory of thought on humanitarian intervention that were articulated by Blair and Clinton and would be taken forward into the formal annunciation of Responsibility to Protect. However, they were made in the face of continued Russian and Chinese opposition to the elevation of human rights – in what appears to be almost any circumstances – above state sovereignty. Consequently, a more apt description might be that as the twentieth century drew to a close there was an emerging Western norm regarding humanitarian intervention that was treated with caution, and occasionally scepticism bordering on derision, in other parts of the world. Further, Robert Mandel would later ask
whether liberal interventionism was given encouragement because of a misperception of success in Kosovo. That is, Kosovo was deemed to have been a success for NATO/US policy at relatively low cost, or at least low human cost on the NATO side. That low cost may have been interpreted to somehow be a manifestation of the innate superiority of the liberal democratic values that motivated leaders to intervene in the first place. However, such a reading may well have embued leaders like Blair and Clinton with a false sense of what liberal interventionism could achieve.

In 2000 the theme of intervention was taken up by Kofi Annan who, in his Millennium report, asked the following question:

> if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity? We confront a real dilemma. Few would disagree that both the defence of humanity and the defence of sovereignty are principles that must be supported. Alas, that does not tell us which principle should prevail when they are in conflict.

The inference to be taken from this UN report is that Annan and the UN itself wanted to resolve the tension between the protection of individuals and the protection of state sovereignty. Practically speaking, however, he avoided the harsh realities of realpolitik and political self-interest, for it is those that in large part dictate for individual countries which priority is granted at a particular time. If there was an emerging ‘norm’ regarding humanitarian intervention and a responsibility to protect, then its emergence was uneven and shrouded in an optimism that did not survive until 2013 and events in Syria that will be visited later in the paper.

**The Emergence of R2P**

Motivated by events in Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda – and prompted by Kofi Annan’s plea in the Millenium Report – the Canadian government established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in September 2000 and was charged with reporting its findings back to the UN. The report began: ‘This report is about the so-called “right of humanitarian intervention”: the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular military – action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state’. The document attempted to span the gap between ‘legitimacy’ and ‘legality’ through the use of jus ad bellum criteria: criteria that are socially, culturally and historically situated in the Western just war tradition and far from being universally accepted. The ‘right of humanitarian intervention’ was qualified by the phrase, ‘so-called’, because the existence or otherwise of such a right was the disputed political, legal and moral question to be explored and, ideally, resolved. Consequently, the emphasis was shifted to ‘the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation –
but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by
the broader community of states.\textsuperscript{33} This was not primarily a legal manoeuvre but a political
attempt to resolve the sovereignty/human rights dilemma by moving away from the language
of ‘the right of humanitarian intervention’ by third-party states towards the needs of potential
or actual victims of atrocities.\textsuperscript{34} The advantage of such an approach to sovereignty, individual
rights and possible intervention is that it put the onus on governments to protect the lives
and interests of their own people. With this change in emphasis, any violation of sovereignty
would be initially caused by the state concerned – through severe neglect of its population
or through violations of that population – and not by an external actor. This subtle difference
was designed to pave the way to make intervention easier to agree. However, while the report
is couched in legal terminology and aspiration, the classification of violent events would
continue to be as much a political as a legal act: with all the vested and competing interests
that have always been present in the international arena.

Regardless of the degree of nuance, diplomatic sleight-of-hand or legalist attempts to
emphasise the ‘norm’ part of ‘emerging norm’ rather than the ‘emerging’ aspect, the
incommensurability of state rights and individual rights remains. There is no conceptual
continuum where one eventually slides into the other, regardless of the desire of international
lawyers that it should do so: an incommensurability that holds sway because of geo-political
interests that will not surrender the freedom to exercise power and influence for the sake of
a true, codified ‘norm’ that could automatically trigger an unwanted intervention (unwanted
by the target state or a third-party power with interests in that state). This holds true for all
interventions but especially so where military force is involved – a point that will be analysed
further with reference to Syria in the next section.

Returning to the ICISS Report, the Commission proposed six criteria to be used for determining
when military intervention for the protection of populations experiencing atrocities or
war crimes can be justified. If these criteria could be codified and universally accepted,
judgements on when interventions could take place would move further from the political
domain to the legal domain. They are: ‘right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort,
proportional means and reasonable prospects’.\textsuperscript{35} Given the conceptual origins of humanitarian
intervention in the West in the 1990s, as well as the European origins of Westphalian notions
of sovereignty, it is perhaps not surprising that the six criteria set out by the Commission are
to be found in the Western just war tradition.\textsuperscript{36}\textsuperscript{37} Further, the first three criteria can be found
in exactly the order presented here as early as the work of Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth
century.\textsuperscript{38} Highlighting the conceptual continuity with the interventionism of recent years,
four of the six criteria set out in the 2001 ICISS report coincide almost identically with those set
out by Blair in his 1999 Chicago speech.

Such a close similarity between the humanitarian interventionism set out by Blair (and
supported by Clinton) and that proposed in the ICISS report has both strengths and weaknesses.
Positively, there would appear to be a continuity and development of thought on a crucial
international principle. Negatively, opponents of humanitarian intervention, most notably Russia and China, could point to the emerging responsibility to protect as a continuation of a liberal-motivated political ideology framed in legal terms.

Paul Williams et al argue from a legalist perspective for the establishment of ‘specific criteria that allow for the limited use of force when the Security Council fails to act’. This limited use of force could include the provision of safe havens, no-fly zones or other specifically protective – as opposed to aggressive – measures. At the heart of this argument is a desire to have a degree of ‘automaticity’ when it comes to the use of force on humanitarian grounds, even if that force is minimal. The establishment of criteria with automatic trigger points for intervention under R2P is attractive to two groups: those who seek to have R2P increasingly established as a ‘norm’ of international law; and advocates who are ideologically convinced – as Blair was – of the merits of humanitarian intervention. Opposing the principle of automaticity are two further groups: states who place a high value on state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in all circumstances; and states whose interests might be impinged upon in specific circumstances or who want to explore further options.

An example of the kind of tensions that shape political dialogue arose in 2002-2003 prior to the Iraq War, concurrent with the development of R2P before its adoption in 2005. Although the UK’s Attorney General told Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2002 and 2003 – and reiterated in evidence to the Iraq Inquiry in 2010 – that the Iraq invasion could not be justified using the ‘humanitarian crisis’ argument, the circumstances at that time highlight the significance of ‘automaticity’ in political discourse. In the days and weeks before the US and UK invaded Iraq the Security Council was split. A crude analysis says that the US and UK were in favour of intervention while Russia, China and France were vehemently opposed. However, the differences were more subtle. As the invasion approached, China and Russia were increasingly opposed to military action. France, in contrast, was prepared to be flexible. When on the eve of war on 18 March 2003 Tony Blair told the British Parliament that France ‘would veto a second [UN] Resolution [authorising the invasion of Iraq] whatever the circumstances,’ he misrepresented the French position. A few days previously the French Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin spoke to Jack Straw, the British Foreign Secretary, telling him that ‘France was still willing to consider any new proposals’ and a ‘solution based on benchmarks’. The summary of the conversation records: ‘Villepin willing to consider any new proposals which don’t contain automaticity’. While the UK and US governments felt that every reasonable option had already been explored, France did not.

There are limitations to the applicability of this example. In the year before the 2003 Iraq War Blair repeatedly argued a humanitarian dimension to the justification of the intervention:

Saddam has used these [chemical] weapons against his own people, the Iraqi Kurds. Scores of towns and villages were attacked … In one attack alone, on the city of Halabja,
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It is estimated that 5,000 were murdered and 9,000 wounded in this way … In the destruction of the marshlands in Southern Iraq, around 200,000 people were forcibly removed. Many died.45

Despite the historical accuracy of these humanitarian claims, they were not persuasive enough to win support to the interventionist cause, primarily because there was no imminent humanitarian disaster on the same scale: these events took place more than a decade earlier. Further, because of the associated accusations of dishonesty over Blair’s real intentions towards Saddam Hussein and Iraq and the way intelligence was used – perhaps abused is a better term – to support his case,46 Blair together with President George W. Bush impeded the emergence of R2P as an accepted international legal and ethical norm. His use of humanitarian arguments ostensibly as a pretext for a war that would still otherwise have taken place,47 has given succour to critics and sceptics who are concerned that R2P will be used as a ‘Trojan Horse’ to hide neo-colonialism or liberal democratic expansionism.48 It is for these reasons, or perhaps pretexts, that the leaders of major powers like the US, Russia and China have been and continue to be reluctant to surrender or limit their freedom of political manoeuvre by codifying rigid criteria for military intervention under R2P.

In a follow-up to the outcome of the UN Millennium Summit a High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change was convened at the Secretary-General’s behest to consider global security threats and how they might be addressed. One of the recommendations from the panel was to establish ‘criteria for the use of force’ in a ‘renewed system of collective security’.49 Ultimately these should lead to new agreement on ‘rules and norms governing the use of force’.50 However, the document also acknowledged the failure of the UN to resolve the tension between ‘sovereign inviolability’ and the right to intervene in order to stop severe human rights abuses.51

Central to the aim of protecting peoples, the report explicitly extends the notion of state sovereignty from its prima facie right to non-interference set out in Article 2 of the UN Charter52 to include protecting the welfare of its own peoples.53 This was the first step in attempting to shift the balance of relative rights from the state to the individual: where governments would not or could not protect its own citizens then the UN was claiming for the international community a degree of right to intervene, using means up to and including military force. The report went on to say:

The Panel endorses the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.54

Despite the nuanced diplomatic rhetoric, or the number of different ways it is stated, it is not possible to escape the tension between the long-established norm – an absolute norm as
far as many states are concerned – of sovereign inviolability with the *emerging* norm of the responsibility to protect. Put crudely, an emerging norm is not a norm. At best it would be an aspiration that is being actively pursued by a broad international constituency, including some or all of the major powers and Permanent Members of the Security Council. At worst it is a well-intentioned but vainglorious hope with very little political support from – or surrender of power by – the great powers.

For a brief period in 2011 there appeared to be a breakthrough on the part of R2P and its supporters when the Security Council authorised the use of force – from the air – in Libya to protect its civilians from attack by Colonel Gaddafi’s armed forces as he fought to protect his regime at any cost. However, it is tempting to posit too much of an advancement and acceptance of R2P in a situation where the political interests of the major powers were insufficiently strong to prompt the use of a veto in the Security Council. Further, accusations that the intervening NATO forces exceeded their UN mandate increased international wariness of military interventionism to protect oppressed peoples. Consequently, strategic self-interest would return to the centre of Security Council debate and division in subsequent years as the situation in Syria deteriorated to the point of human catastrophe and beyond.

**Syria and the Triumph of Realpolitik**

In the UN’s Millennium Report, Secretary General Kofi Annan highlighted the political, legal and moral tensions at the heart of the humanitarian dimension dilemma:

> Humanitarian intervention is a sensitive issue, fraught with political difficulty and not susceptible to easy answers. But surely no legal principle—not even sovereignty—can ever shield crimes against humanity. Where such crimes occur and peaceful attempts to halt them have been exhausted, the Security Council has a moral duty to act on behalf of the international community.

The adoption of the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome document and further development of R2P principles in subsequent years have provided a degree of (cautious) optimism in terms of international law and the emergence of new R2P norms that has not been matched by the political realities posed to the international community and the UN by events in several countries. To explore the tensions between R2P claims and aspirations and the political realities of self-interest and power politics, this final section will examine recent events in Syria to illustrate how the politics of humanitarian intervention – or non-intervention – continue to outweigh the still-emerging legal norms of R2P.

By 2009 there had been little progress made in the implementation of R2P:

> Nine years after those sobering reports [on Rwanda and Srebrenica] many of their institutional recommendations, including on early warning, analysis and training, have not been fully implemented, despite efforts to improve the prevention capacities of the
Organization. The United Nations and its Member States remain underprepared to meet their most fundamental prevention and protection responsibilities.  

This report from the UN Secretary General highlights the extent of the ongoing failure – at a political level – of the UN to facilitate the orderly and reasoned use of force in the protection of vulnerable citizens from the four criteria specified in the 2005 UN Summit Outcome document: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity. Despite the ICISS proposal of six criteria as the basis of determining when military force can and should be used to intervene on behalf of others, in the same 2009 UN document there were still appeals for ‘criteria relating to the responsibility to protect’ to be introduced to regional peer review mechanisms. These appeals served two purposes: first, an attempt to circumvent stalemates on the UN Security Council by somehow giving authority to regional organisations; and second, the pursuit of less contentious intervention criteria than those proposed by the ICISS document.

Preventative strategies and diplomacy are relatively non-controversial but they can only ever offer a very limited coercive effect when atrocities are being committed. The UN acknowledges the ‘hard truth’ that military action is needed in extreme situations while offering no solution to the problem of how it can be brought about where political will and/or military capability is absent. Put more forcefully: ‘there are substantial gaps in capacity, imagination and will across the whole spectrum of prevention and protection measures relating to the responsibility to protect. Nowhere is that gap more pronounced or more damaging than in the realm of forceful and timely response to the most flagrant crimes and violations relating to the responsibility to protect’. In its final section the Implementation Report concedes that the R2P edifice and the extent to which it can credibly be described as an emerging norm ultimately rests on ‘the policies and attitudes of states’.

In response to the political stalemate over Syria, Williams et al argue that a regional organisation or coalition should be allowed to use force in a limited way as a means of preventing or stopping atrocities. They acknowledge, however, that such a course of action would violate Article 2 and the sovereignty of the target state. In other words, the further development of an emerging legal norm would necessitate that violation of one of the fundamental legal norms on which the entire UN edifice has rested since its inception. Consequently, Williams et al propose that:

Recognized experts, such as leading academics and former prosecutors, can also play a key role in evaluating whether atrocity crimes are occurring within a sovereign state. The international community would be able to ensure objectivity in this process because it now has clear, well-defined standards by which to determine whether a state is committing mass atrocity crimes.

In theory, Williams et al are correct and put forward a strong case – previous and existing International Criminal Tribunals together with the ICC provide a sound basis in jurisprudence
for identifying mass atrocities against vulnerable populations. Yet again, however, the politics of self-interest and the interests of alliances introduce practical limitations. Take the most obvious: whose ‘recognised experts’, academics and prosecutors would assess situations for evidence of atrocities? The very appointment of such specialists is politically contentious and it is difficult to envisage any permanent members of the Security Council being willing to overlook a selection that would be detrimental to their interests. Evidence of atrocities in Syria, some anecdotal and some more robustly founded, has been forthcoming since 2011. Political interpretation of that evidence has so far outweighed legal analysis and claim when it has come to the vexed question of taking action. Further, as increasing numbers of atrocities are attributed to opposition groups it becomes even more difficult to identify a party or parties against whom military action could be taken whilst improving the situation on the ground. When those atrocities occur between rival opposition factions at the behest of sponsor governments elsewhere, any pretence at a regional alternative to the Security Council should be dropped.

A positivist legal perspective from Diana Amnéus adopts a more practical and pragmatic tone than that of Williams et al. Focusing on military aspects of humanitarian intervention she argues that ‘the international discourse on R2P has not at this point contributed to the evolution of legal customary rights or obligations to conduct humanitarian interventions outside the Security Council framework; neither by regional organisations, nor by individual states or coalitions of willing states’. A crucial step in Amnéus’s approach is to attribute to the word ‘norm’ – as in R2P as an ‘emerging norm’ – a broader social, political and ethical dimension in international relations and other discourses than is found in international law, which she prefers to refer to as a ‘rule’. Amnéus points out that resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly are not legally binding under international law. Consequently, this point of disputed interpretation explains why the UK and Russia could adopt diametrically opposed positions with regard to Syria in August 2013.

On 29 August 2013 the UK government published a summary of its legal position on military intervention in Syria as a response to the use of chemical weapons in that country. Identifying the use of chemical weapons as both ‘a war crime and a crime against humanity’, intervention on humanitarian grounds would provide the legal basis of any military action. Further, the British government position was that even in the event of the Security Council blocking military intervention it would still be allowed, under international law, to take exceptional measures in order to alleviate the scale of the overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe in Syria by deterring and disrupting the further use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. Such a legal basis is available, under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention...

In light of Amnéus’s warning about transposing loosely defined terminology from the political and international relations domains onto the more specific field of international law, the phrase...
‘doctrine of humanitarian intervention’ exposes a vulnerability in the UK government’s legal claim: a doctrine is neither a legal article nor a legal rule. David Cameron had barely started setting out his government’s case to the British Parliament when he was challenged by Caroline Lucas MP. She demanded to know why only a summary of the Attorney General’s advice had been published ‘when so many legal experts are saying that without explicit UN Security Council reinforcement, military action simply would not be legal under international law?’. Another significant voice making the same point was Lakhdar Brahimi, UN Special Envoy for Syria who, the day before the UK Parliamentary debate, said of the legal arguments surrounding military intervention in Syria: ‘I think that international law is clear on this. International law says that military action must be taken after a decision by the Security Council.’

In his speech to Parliament Cameron referred to the responsibility to protect as a ‘doctrine … which commands widespread support’: not universal support but merely widespread support. Perhaps acknowledging the weak and problematic nature of the legal case Cameron deployed the words ‘legitimate’ and ‘legitimacy’ more than a dozen times. Eventually, however, despite the numerous and continuing atrocities in Syria, the British Parliament voted against military intervention.

Only a few days earlier a YouGov poll had offered the British public various options for potential UK military involvement in Syria. Maximum support was for the sending of defensive military equipment to the Syrian opposition: 19% of those polled. Only 9% supported the sending of British military personnel to fight against the Assad regime. Setting aside the contested legal basis for such action, when the complexities of the escalating military and security situation were placed alongside the humanitarian crisis in Syria, British parliamentarians voted against Cameron’s proposed intervention – with overwhelming public support. It seems reasonable to assume that at a time of Coalition government, with a general election not too far in the future and experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan weighing heavily on the UK, members of parliament were not prepared to expend political capital on a risky venture with no obvious positive outcome in view and numerous disastrous possibilities presenting themselves. Any moral and emerging legal aspects of responsibility to protect were side lined in London – as they were at the UN, Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Paris – by wider national and international political interests.

In a paper with a strong R2P advocacy tone, Kikoler says of political will and the great powers: ‘Much emphasis will have to be placed on building the political will of Security Council members to respond to the most extreme of cases,’ before going on to add that ‘Efforts should also be taken in keeping with the Secretary-General’s report to solicit agreement among the permanent five on withholding the use of veto.’ These are not additional factors to be considered: from a political perspective they are the e factors to be considered. No matter how much ‘emerging’ has taken place, if there is no political will for major powers to spend their blood and treasure in the protection of third-party citizens from atrocities in the pursuit of international peace and security, R2P might as well not exist.
In June 2014 the Chair of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic reported torture, beheadings, sexual abuse, war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated against Syrian citizens: some by government forces and some by armed opposition groups like Jabhat Al-Nusra and ISIS. Further, if more than 2.6 million refugees and 6.5 million internally displaced people within Syria cannot prompt Russia and other permanent members of the Security Council to accept and participate in a responsibility to protect through military intervention – as opposed to supporting either the perpetrating government of President Assad or opposition forces – then it is difficult to envisage how severe the activities would have to be to illicit such a response. In addition, Russia and China have repeatedly vetoed UN attempts to refer Syria and the perpetrators of war crimes to the International Criminal Court.

Mr Churkin, the Russian Federation delegate, made some pointed observations to the 7180th meeting of the Security Council, criticising France for putting forward the draft resolution on Syria and the ICC, ‘fully aware in advance of the fate it would meet’. He went on to further criticise Western states for offering talk, which is good for naïve people … their list of good guys now includes the Al-Nusra Front, which has openly confessed to a series of brutal terrorist attacks. The inherently politicized discourse not only constitutes the Al-Nusra Front as terrorists and potentially war criminals, it questions Western judgement and parallels the behaviour of opposition groups with the Syrian government forces. Churkin did not claim innocence on behalf of Assad and his regime, he merely drew attention to actions that make it difficult to make a moral judgement entirely in favour of one side over the other.

**Conclusion**

The 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document is the high water mark of responsibility to protect as a collective global commitment to populations who endure atrocities at the hands of their political leaders. A debate about the relative merits of humanitarian intervention was prompted in the 1990s by events in Rwanda, Srebrenica and elsewhere. From the 1990s through 2005 to the present, repeated attempts to define and apply new legal norms to the use of military force in the protection of third parties has been thwarted by the conflicting political interests – and the ideological underpinnings of those political interests – of the major powers. The 2005 statement was not a legal breakthrough and it did not resolve the incommensurabilities that play out regularly amongst the permanent members of the Security Council. It merely provided a minimalist, aspirational form of words that were seized upon in some legalist quarters as the beginning of the end for long-established understandings of state sovereignty and the Article 2 principle of non-interference across state borders.

In the absence of genuine political compromise a (Western) constituency in the field of international law has attempted a textual solution to a political stalemate. Its reasoning is that if the word ‘norm’ and the phrase ‘emerging norm’ is repeated enough times in sufficient numbers of UN and governmental documents – again, Western governmental documents – then R2P will eventually become reality. However, the approach has not gone unnoticed or
unopposed, either by political opponents in Russia and China or by international lawyers and academics who point out that legal language must be focused and specific in a way that the language of politics and international relations often is not. Furthermore, even where there is a degree of enthusiasm or willingness to intervene across borders on humanitarian grounds in London and Washington, the experiences of Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have left the respective populations of the UK and US both war weary and sceptical about the effectiveness and cost of using force to solve other peoples’ problems, no matter how serious. In addition, the legal finding on 16 July 2014 by a Dutch court which held that state liable for the deaths of 300 Bosnian men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995 (those who were handed over by Dutch UN Peacekeepers to Bosnian Serbs) will further discourage governments from committing their military forces in humanitarian interventions.⁸² Events in Syria – massacres, war crimes, the use of chemical weapons, mass displacements of people and so on – have not prompted co-ordinated, protective action. Rather they have reinforced the political chasm between Russia, the US, UK and France that is no closer to resolution today than it was when Russia vetoed UN Security Council-sanctioned military action in Kosovo in 1999. In light of this unremitting mutual opposition between Russia (and to a lesser extent, China) and Western members of the Security Council over Syria – fuelled in turn by resurgent geo-strategic and national interests as well as humanitarian concern – agreement on R2P and military intervention on humanitarian grounds appears as far away as it was at the time of Blair’s naively optimistic words in April 1999. The limits of R2P have been reached.

Notes

4 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1045, Article 2.4.
14 Id.
16 Ibid., p. 73.
17 Ibid., p. 72.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
24 For an extended analysis of Blair’s speech, the origins of the text and its consequences for Blair’s policies see Peter Lee, Blair’s Just War: Iraq and the Illusion of Morality (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) Chapter 1.
26 Id.
32 Amnéus, ‘Responsibility to Protect’, p. 246.
33 Ibid., p. VIII.
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34 ICISS Report, 2001, 2.28, p. 16.
37 While there is not the scope to explore the different traditions of war ethics in which some or all of these criteria can be found (Islamic tradition, Hindu tradition, Chinese tradition and so on), it is to the Western just war that the ICISS codification most closely conforms.
44 Id.
47 In a BBC1 interview on 13 December 2009 Fern Britton asked Tony Blair, “If you had known then that there were no WMDs, would you still have gone on?” He replied – recall that WMD was his casus belli – “I would still have thought it right to remove him. I mean, obviously, you would have to use … errm … deploy different arguments about the nature of the threat.”
48 Peter Wittig, cited in Saxer, 2008, p. 3.
50 Ibid., Para. 22.
51 Ibid., II, Para. 36.
53 Report of the UN Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2 December 2004, II, Para. 29.
59 ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect, 12 January 2009, Report of the Secretary General, I. 6, p. 6,
60 Ibid., II. 22, p. 13.
61 Ibid., IV. 56, p. 25.
63 Ibid., V. 68, p. 29.
64 Williams et al, p. 488.
65 Williams et al, p. 492-3.
66 Id.
68 Ibid., p. 242.
70 Id.
71 Id.
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74 David Cameron, 29 August 2014, House of Commons Debate: Syria and the Use of Chemical Weapons.
80 Id.
81 Id.
Politics and Military Advice: Lessons from the Campaign in Greece 1941

By Squadron Leader David Stubbs

This paper suggests that the British decision to become involved in Greece, with a token RAF force in November 1940, helped set in train a series of events which ultimately led to the disastrous joint and coalition venture, where the military desire to satisfy the political appetite for grand strategy caused some commanders to ignore their own assessments that intervention was likely to fail without adequate air support. The paper will show how political pressure was applied to the military commanders and how their objections were gradually eroded so that they began to ignore their own rational analysis and come to believe that the impossible was possible, with ruinous consequences in terms of men and equipment.
Introduction

In June 1940, shortly after the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk and France, the Bartholomew Committee, comprised of five army officers of one star rank and above, reported on lessons from the campaign. The Committee’s narrowly focused report reflected its single-Service composition and its evidence base: one RAF officer but over forty army officers. It concluded that given a reasonable fighting chance the British Army could fight the German Army with confidence of success in the future because ‘man for man the Briton was better than the German’.¹ The report’s analysis epitomised the British Army’s misunderstanding of German all arms warfare by mistakenly assuming that in the battle of France the German Army had controlled and directed the German Air Force (GAF) air assets as ‘organic’ elements. This misnomer caused the Committee to decide that one of the major factors in the defeat in France was the RAF’s failure to mirror the German practice of playing the supporting rather than an independent role. Though the vast majority of soldiers would never read the Committee’s findings their collective experiences in France led many to intuitively agree with its analysis and conclusions.² Despite the RAF’s heroics in the Battle of Britain most soldiers were not persuaded about the importance of controlling the air or denying the enemy air superiority. They questioned whether, without home advantage, the RAF could compete with the GAF and they worried that the RAF might be unable to give them the protection they felt necessary to fight what they still considered the most important battle: the land battle.

After the debacle in Norway in the winter of 1940/1941 the next opportunity on Europe’s mainland to test the Bartholomew Committee’s thesis occurred in the early months of 1941 when German forces threatened Greece by moving into neighbouring Romania and Bulgaria. Earlier in October 1940, when the Italians invaded Greece, the Greeks chose to fight the Italians without the support of the British Army because of their fear that extensive British support might provoke the Germans into attacking them. They did, however, ask for air support. So, when a few squadrons of mostly obsolete RAF aircraft were sent to Greece in November 1940 the British guarantee to Greece, made in 1939, was honoured. Nonetheless, when the Germans advanced into Bulgaria in 1941 the British became aware of their intentions with regard to Greece and became intent on sending land forces to Greece in the hope that with the aid of regional coalition allies Yugoslavia and Turkey they could trigger grand strategic activity to threaten the Germans from the south. They believed this might cause Germany to collapse due to their perceptions of German economic weakness.³

The German economy collapsed towards the end of the First World War and available industrial intelligence in the lead up to the Second World War led the British, Churchill and Eden in
particular, to conclude that getting a British foothold in Greece would create similar pressures to seriously weaken the German war effort. Such thinking, however, had underestimated the strength of German reserves in war materials and the impact upon their access to the resource base created by their victories in the West though the Germans were heavily reliant on the raw materials produced in Yugoslavia for their industrial and military needs and Hitler had worried that the RAF Force in Greece would threaten German access to Romanian oil. His diplomats therefore threatened to attack Greeks if they allowed the British to attack the Ploesti oil fields, from Salonika. The Greeks wanted to conclude the Greco-Italian war to their satisfaction in a way that enabled Greece to avoid any involvement in the wider World conflict. Therefore, they continued to engage in secret negotiations with the Germans while also sheltering under the umbrella of the British guarantee to Greece made in 1939. Consequently, the Greeks constrained RAF activities to the Italian front, ideally for them, in a close air support role.

The paper will describe why the RAF was sent to Greece as a token force in 1940 and will assess the impact its involvement had on the subsequent assessments of the potential for land forces to succeed against German forces attacking Greece through Bulgaria. It will show how the political desire to create a Balkan front against the Germans caused some of the leading military decision makers to provide irrational advice to the politicians at crucial moments when assessments for the prospects of the Greek campaign were being made. In this regard it will suggest that the Air Officer Commander-in-Chief, Sir Arthur Longmore was influenced to minimise his serious doubts about the prospects for the air campaign. In his memoirs Churchill claimed that intervention caused the delay of the German attack on the Soviet Union, but van Creveld has shown that the swiftness of the German victory in Greece caused only minor disruption to Barbarossa and that the main reason Barbarossa was delayed was because of the general shortage and slow distribution of transport to the eastern front. Joel Hayward has pointed out that even when the Germans secured access to Romanian oil they would continue to struggle to meet their oil demands in the ensuing campaign but apart from the excellent 'Diary of A Disaster' by Robin Higham, comparatively little has been done to uncover why British land forces were fielded against the proven German all arms capability without sufficient, state of the art RAF involvement.

By focusing on the land warfare considerations and the apparent failure of the Greeks to retreat to the agreed positions on the Aliakmon line most historians have concluded that the British Army’s position became untenable, that the RAF in Greece was too small to counter the German air threat during the retreat and that the rapidity of the German advance stymied any other options for a defensive line elsewhere in Greece. Some recent scholarly articles have challenged this interpretation of events. Peter Ewer has claimed that British planners thought Greek topography would prevent the Wehrmacht from repeating their air supported Blitzkrieg success seen in Western Europe and Craig Stockings and Eleanor Hancock have postulated that the GAF advantage in the air has often been overstated because the psychological effects of frequent air attacks led soldiers to incorrectly conclude that air attacks had been decisive despite their ineffectiveness in killing soldiers, damaging roads and destroying equipment.
Essentially, the argument they have put forward is that the planners thought that air power would only have a marginal impact upon the campaign and that the subsequent events proved them right.

However, there is evidence that, despite the relatively small amount of physical damage inflicted by the GAF during the campaign, the psychological impact of GAF hegemony was so significant that it greatly affected British soldiers’ will to fight: that air power did have a significant impact upon the outcome of the British campaign in Greece. Furthermore, a careful examination of the factors behind the politicians’ geo-political assessments that led up to the decision to commit the British Army to Greece highlights a number of issues that we need to consider. Firstly, it will examine the role played by the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill and Sir Anthony Eden, which gives context to the advice given by the senior Army and RAF commanders involved. Secondly, any increase in the British commitment to Greece must have recognized that the RAF’s involvement in Greece, which preceded any British army involvement by six months, had been conceived as a token gesture to fight against the Greeks’ considerably weaker Italian adversaries. Thirdly, in planning the Greek campaign the lessons from the defeat in France and the victory in the Battle of Britain were set aside or grossly misinterpreted when deciding whether British Army intervention was a viable proposition. Fourthly, a properly researched, articulated and distributed ‘estimate’ of the RAF’s regional capability would have identified that the RAF could not hope to successfully oppose the likely German onslaught in Greece in 1941 and that without air support the British and Greek armies were destined to lose the ensuing campaign.

In this regard we need to consider carefully the part played by the RAF’s senior commander in the region, Sir Arthur Longmore, focusing on the advice he gave after it became apparent from ULTRA derived intelligence that German intervention in Greece was inevitable. It will argue that Longmore recognised that the aircraft he had available for the campaign could not hope to deny the Germans control of the air but that after his repeated complaints about his lack of resources fell on deaf ears, due to misunderstandings about the number of aircraft his Command had received, he felt compelled, at Tatoi in February 1941, to acquiesce to political and joint pressures by setting aside his doubts and remaining silent. By doing so he helped to justify and compound the advice that misled political leaders to conclude that the proposed campaign in Greece against the Germans was viable when the evidence shows it never was.

**Politics, Strategy and Churchill’s Perception of Wavell’s Military Leadership**

Churchill’s relationships with his military commanders were often fraught. Some he disliked from the outset; one of these was the thoughtful and considered General Sir Archibald Wavell, his Commander-in-Chief of British Forces in the Middle East. Churchill thought him ponderous and lacking in dynamism. In July 1940 Churchill entrusted his friend, General Bernard Freyberg, to appraise the dead-alive way Wavell’s Middle East campaign was being run. After reading Freyberg’s report Churchill summoned Wavell to England in early August 1940 for ‘severe discussions.’ The report had led Churchill to believe that ‘a great reverse’ could be inflicted on
the Italians threatening Egypt and that Wavell was misusing the vast resources at his disposal. Churchill was so taken by the report that he even considered removing Wavell and replacing him with Freyberg. Such thinking may help explain why Wavell was directed to give Freyberg the command of British forces in Crete in May 1941, with disastrous results. On his return to Cairo Wavell received precise orders from Churchill, leaving him in no doubt that “Winston did not trust me to run my own show and was set on his own ideas.”

This sequence of events marks the beginning of the process by which steadily increasing political pressure was applied to Wavell to make him adhere to the military aspirations of his political leaders. It is in this context that the events described in this paper should be viewed.

Churchill was not at first the driving force behind British intervention in Greece and was not initially inclined to support the Greek cause. At the War Cabinet meeting on 27 October 1940 Leopold Amery, the Secretary of State for India and Lord Lloyd, the Colonial Secretary suggested the Greeks be supported with military aid, only for Churchill to rebuke them for ignoring the resource implications for such a venture. Events, it seems, changed his mind; the next day, when the Italians invaded Greece, Churchill, who was prone to running grand strategic ideas past the War Cabinet, thought that a geo-political Allied alliance could threaten the German right flank on their eastern front, in the Balkans. Despite his earlier worries about resources Churchill, on 4 November 1940, deliberately manoeuvred the War Cabinet into an early acceptance of a British military commitment to Greece in order to mitigate the effect of any later worries they may have had over the range and breadth of concurrent operations required. Churchill was fully aware, through a strictly personal cipher message from Eden, the Secretary of State for War, from Cairo of Wavell’s imminent plan for an offensive against the Italians in North Africa but he chose to hide this knowledge from the Cabinet.

Consequently, the Chiefs of Staff duly directed Wavell ‘to give Greece the greatest possible material and moral support at the earliest possible moment’ and to ‘put this plan in train at once.’

The result of Churchill’s scurrilous behaviour was that separate appreciations of the likely consequences of British Army involvement in a Greek campaign were carried out in London and Cairo and they came to very different conclusions about the likely outcomes. In early November 1940, however, the Greeks were reluctant to accept the British Army on their territory because of their fear of provoking the Germans. They thought they could compartmentalise their war with the Italians and avoid involvement in any wider conflict with the British against the Germans. Therefore, they wanted RAF support against the Italians because the Greek Air Force was very small.

Given the range of his commitments in Africa Wavell is likely to have been grateful that any demands for British support would fall on the RAF and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, Air Officer Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Middle East, not on the British Army.

The Royal Air Force in Greece 1940 – A Token Force

Longmore’s aircraft starved command lacked the resources necessary to provide the scale of support the Greeks wanted. He needed all the aircraft - he had at his disposal for the planned
campaign against the Italians in North Africa and could spare very few, if any, for Greece. He explained his difficulties to Eden, who five days after the Italians invaded Greece advised London:

‘To send such forces from here or to direct reinforcements now on their way or approved would imperil our whole position in the Middle East and jeopardise plans for offensive operations now being laid in more than one theatre.’

Yet, only twenty-four hours later Longmore signalled Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, the Chief of Air Staff (CAS), to acknowledge that the political imperative would require “some measure of assistance” to Greece. He was arranging for Wellington bombers to attack Adriatic ports and refuel at Greek aerodromes and, if necessary, would dispatch a Blenheim I Squadron to Greece. While waiting to take over as CAS Portal had thought about sending more fighter aircraft to the Middle East in a hand-written note, dated 16 October 1940, to the deputy chief Air Vice-Marshal Sholto-Douglas:

“You mentioned this evening that we now had lots of fighters in store and were just becoming well off for pilots. Are you satisfied that we have done all we should for AOC-in-C ME (I don’t mean necessarily that he should use them to help Greece)?”

At the time fears of another German attempt to invade Britain were pre-eminent and the priority was to maintain strong fighter forces at home, at the expense of the Middle East or anywhere else. Longmore was thinking practically and politically but may not have appreciated how his honest assessments were perceived and what impact they would have on Portal in the War Cabinet. He was even concerned that he might struggle to support the one Blenheim squadron he was directed to provision for Greece if their war with the Italians lasted more than ten days.

On 6 November 1940, Longmore moved Air Commodore John D’Albiac from Palestine to Athens to take command of RAF forces in Greece in what became known as Operation Barbarity. Nine days later D’Albiac, promoted to Air Vice-Marshal, was Air Officer Commanding British Air Forces in Greece. Any idea that the RAF’s token force would be supplemented by British Army involvement was scotched when Major General M.D. Gambier-Parry, the head of
the army section of No 27 Military Mission in Athens, was rebuked by the Chiefs of Staff on 9 November 1940 for considering the idea openly:

“You are entirely wrong in supposing that wind is blowing in direction of possible despatch of British military forces to Greek mainland, and you are expressly forbidden by any work or suggestion of yours to imply such a course is contemplated. To arouse false hopes would be disastrous.”

RAF Airfields in Greece 1940/41
Between 14 and 23 November 1940 two squadrons of Blenheim medium bombers, one mixed squadron of Blenheim medium bombers/two-seat fighters and one squadron of single-seat Gladiator fighters also arrived in Greece. In the first week of December another Gladiator squadron followed. In managing his forces D’Albiac endeavoured to abide by the direction given to him by Longmore’s deputy, Air Vice-Marshal Peter Drummond, the Senior Air Staff Officer in the Middle East, who directed D’Albiac:

“not to allow the bombers to be used as artillery or to participate in the actual land operations unless the military situation becomes so critical as to justify the temporary diversion of our bombers from strategic bombing to support the Greek land forces. Appropriate objectives for the Wellington bombers are points of disembarkation and concentration areas on the Albanian coast.”

Drummond’s direction tallied with RAF doctrine regarding operations in support of the army, which sought to avoid RAF involvement in costly close air support (CAS) missions. Given the paucity of available aircraft and the fact that the RAF’s opponent was the Italian Air Force the decision to send obsolete aircraft was rational, but this decision must have been made on the understanding that if the GAF became involved the RAF contingent would be seriously outmatched by the first class fighter aircraft at its disposal. Clearly, Longmore believed that RAF support to Greece was politically driven and in his biography he acknowledged that he might have to defer to the Air Ministry in setting the operational objectives for the aircraft under D’Albiac’s command. Only when it was clarified that his remit as Commander-in-Chief extended to incorporate Greece did he begin to exert operational command of his forces there, and only then did he direct that attacks should be focused on Italian communications with Albania, not close air support.

Wavell and Longmore wished to focus on preserving and concentrating their forces for Wavell’s Libyan offensive and initially they misread the intensity of the political desire to provide viable and effective support to the Greeks. The RAF’s token involvement was clearly evident and its sortie rates were, according to the Greek King, a fifth of those flown by the very small Greek air force. D’Albiac resisted Greek approaches to provide close air support to the front line troops despite a persistent press campaign led by Reuters to do so. It was October 1941 before D’Albiac acknowledged the impact close air support missions had on troops, and only then when crafting his complaints about ill discipline amongst British and Dominion forces during their withdrawal and evacuation when under such form of attack. Others were more perceptive about the motives for sending obsolete aircraft to help the Greeks: on 14 November 1940, Air Commodore Lionel Payne, remarked “It is really mere eye-wash therefore turning over Bleheims to Greece expecting them to get away with it.” On 6 January 1941, Churchill acknowledged the extremely modest support the RAF was giving to Greece.

Yet Wavell’s astonishing success against the Italians in Libya emboldened the Greeks to consider resisting the Germans. General Ionnis Metaxas, the Greek Prime Minister, naively hoped the
British could knock Italy out of the war and secure the Albanian front, without threatening German interests. To that end he denied the British the bases they desired in Salonika, which threatened German, not Italian, interests. When Metaxas died unexpectedly in January 1941 his successor Mr Koryzis continued to follow this strategy agreeing that British soldiers could only be sent to Macedonia if the Germans established themselves in Bulgaria.  But when, on 10 January 1941, Longmore was made aware of German intentions in Bulgaria and Romania he was convinced that the moves were a bluff to induce more support to Greece and denude RAF forces in Libya.  Clearly, Wavell and Longmore saw Greece as a ‘side-show’ to the main Libyan operational theatre and wished to limit the support provided to Greece as much as possible due to their lack of available resources.  D’Albiac did what he could with what he had while being subjected to repeated requests for more air support from the Greeks who, given their intent to deny the British airbases near Salonika, were lethargic in providing the RAF with the airfields necessary to expand its involvement.

**Grand Strategy**

The death of Metaxas afforded another opportunity to persuade the Greeks that a coalition of similarly minded states, comprising Yugoslavia and Turkey, could effectively combine with Greece and Great Britain in an alliance against the Axis powers in the Balkans. The initiative to involve the British Army in Greece coincided rather neatly with Wavell’s successful campaigns against Italian forces in Libya and Italian East Africa and with the intelligence that indicated the German intentions in Greece. In effect, there were two races running concurrently between the British and the Germans: one to influence the regional states to support their interests and one to position their forces in sufficient strength to enable the defence or defeat of Greece. Churchill’s desire for British Army intervention in Greece may also in part have been influenced by the involvement of Colonel William ‘Wild Bill’ Donovan, President Roosevelt’s emissary to the theatre. Though America was still neutral the British gave Donovan VIP treatment. He lodged with the British Ambassador, Sir Michael Palairet, in Cairo and, between January and February 1941, Donovan was escorted around the theatre by British Army Colonel Vivian Dykes. Roosevelt may have hoped that a Balkan Front against the Germans might weaken their hegemony over Europe. Consequently, Donovan shuttled between the region’s capitals to show that the Americans supported the idea of a regional coalition against the Germans, albeit to little avail.

So, in the context of the events described above, the Defence Committee’s decision on 5 February 1941 to commit the largest possible force to Greece appeared reasonable.
it was thought necessary to persuade the Greeks that it would be in their best interests as they were not read into ULTRA intelligence and their nervousness of provoking the Germans continued to influence their thinking. However, at that stage Wavell did not believe a campaign in Greece was militarily viable. On 27 January he had pointed out to Churchill the importance of logistics in modern war, that Army operations anywhere were entirely dependent on effective air support and that air reinforcement must continue to keep pace with any reinforcement of troops. He even suggested an alternative air-focused strategy by arguing that a more effective deterrent to any German advance in the Balkans would be knowledge that any infringement of Bulgarian neutrality would at once bring heavy air attack on Romanian oilfields.³³ After meeting with Wavell, Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, advised the War Cabinet that the idea of employing ground forces in Greece was untenable as “all the troops in the Middle East are fully employed and none available for Greece.”³⁴ This reinforced Churchill’s concerns about Wavell’s aggressiveness and judgement, and he allegedly responded to Dill by saying ‘What you need out there is a Court Martial!’

Churchill’s reaction is likely to have made a strong impression on Portal who was in his third month as the RAF’s Chief of the Air Staff. Henceforth he was careful to appear overtly cooperative, so that any objections he raised were understood to be significant and valuable. Portal, as a member of the Chiefs of Staff (COS), concluded that the defence of Turkey was more important than the defence of Greece; his rationale being that the ability of the RAF to bomb Romanian oil from Turkey might deter Germany from absorbing Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. Portal asked Longmore to be ready to send 10-15 squadrons to Turkey.³⁵ Understandably, given his previous concerns about his lack of resources, Longmore was aghast at the suggestion: he found it hard to understand why he should send so large a force to a neutral country when he could spare so few for the Greeks.

Nevertheless, Churchill gave Eden (now the Foreign Secretary) plenipotentiary powers, in diplomatic and military matters, and dispatched him with Dill on a series of missions between Cairo, Athens, Belgrade and Ankara in an attempt to negotiate and organise a coalition of Balkan States to secure an alliance against the German right flank.³⁶ Their attempts at grand strategy ended in fiasco because they misjudged the ability of the Yugoslav military and misunderstood the implications of the German reliance on access to Yugoslavian natural resources. The Turks and Yugoslavs were fully aware of German regional strength and sought to avoid any commitment with Britain that might turn the German war machine on them. Longmore must have been relieved that his resources would therefore not be stretched by commitments made to Turkey. Churchill’s behaviour in these events was again determined
and threatening, and his overtly expressed concerns about Wavell’s military ability and judgement set the tone for later exchanges between Churchill, Eden, Dill and Wavell. Wavell may even have become worried that Churchill was thinking of replacing him with Freyberg and how such a change in command would play out in the various campaigns he was managing. This might have influenced his later behaviour.

In London, the political appetite for intervention in Greece had become so strong that the COS chose to disagree with the analysis in a report by their Deputy Director of Military Intelligence P.G. Whitefourd, who calculated the Germans might advance as rapidly in Greece as they had in other theatres, or progress at a sufficient pace to outmatch any force the British could assemble in time.³⁷ They also ignored a report by Military Intelligence 3, which concluded that Greece was likely to fall within weeks if the Germans attacked. Indeed, they were so committed to the idea of sending a force to Greece that they chose to disregard concerns over the shortage of available shipping to take the soldiers from Egypt to Greece and discounted the importance that a shortage of suitable airfields and communications to accommodate a larger RAF force would have on the campaign.³⁸ Instead, the COS concluded that ‘the pace of the German advance will be limited by the difficulties and dangers of crossing the Danube, and by the state of the roads at the time of the year.’

Peter Ewer has argued that the COS may also have been influenced by the optimism of Major General T.G.G. Heywood’s Military Mission in Athens. Heywood’s official role was to train Greek soldiers and facilitate supplies and preparations to destroy oil stocks in the event of a German attack.³⁹ After the debacle in Greece Heywood became a convenient scapegoat for the failure of British intervention and his death in an air crash in 1943 ensured he could not reply to the charges made against him. Heywood had correctly assessed that the Greeks were gambling on German non-intervention⁴⁰ and judged that the loss of Salonika and railway connectivity would isolate the Greek Northern Corps, slowing any redeployment to counter any German threat, which would place additional challenges on the atrocious Greek infrastructure.⁴¹ Brigadier Arthur (Guy) Salisbury-Jones, Heywood’s GSO1 in Athens, claimed that the Military Mission had warned Cairo about ‘the risks of the situation and the state of the Greek Army as regards equipment, morale and strength.⁴² Nevertheless, the Military Mission, composed of mostly army personnel, also advised the War Office ‘that the mountainous nature of the Balkan theatre did not give the same scope to German mechanised forces as did the country in Western Europe.’⁴³

The Joint Planning Staff in Cairo were set against intervention, believing it unlikely to succeed. But Wavell’s initial scepticism about the potential success of intervention in Greece began to recede as the political pressure on him, from Eden in particular, increased. He agreed with the COS in London that Whitefourd’s analysis that the Germans would advance quickly was ‘unduly optimistic’.⁴⁴ Wavell also brushed aside the warnings by Brigadier Shearer, Director of Military Intelligence for the Middle East, about the enormous dangers and risks of such a campaign.⁴⁵ Wavell was much taken by Donovan’s belief that if Greece was secured it could provide a
forward lodgement base from which to attack Germany from the south when the opportunity arose. In mid-February, Wavell advised Eden, Dill and the COS that ‘very few aircraft could be sent to Greece now that the Luftwaffe had appeared in force in the Mediterranean and losses were rising.’ Given Wavell’s earlier views the success of the land campaign in Greece would depend on effective air support it is surprising that so little importance was give to the RAF’s ability to compete against the well-equipped GAF units arranged against them, particularly as the importance of aircraft over the battlefield had so recently been etched into the minds of British soldiers. Wavell knew that the few RAF squadrons in Greece were composed of mostly obsolete aircraft, that they would be outnumbered and outmatched by the GAF, and yet he chose to ignore the reality that the RAF would be unable to provide the support the army thought necessary in the Bartholomew Report. It was 1949 before Wavell acknowledged that he had failed to see the impact GAF air superiority would have on the Greek campaign.

Wavell therefore disregarded the negative assessments coming from the Cairo-based Joint Planning Staff, his own intelligence experts and the RAF and instead choose to believe the positive assessments coming from London, the flawed appreciation of Eden and the grandiose opinions of Donovan, a non-allied foreign national. Instead, he agreed with the Military Mission assessment in concluding that the terrain in Greece would slow down any German advance, that his forces in Greece would have time to prepare the necessary defensive positions. All of which led him to the conclusion that British Army intervention in Greece should be supported: a *volte-face* that astonished and exasperated members of the Joint Planning Staff.

The extent to which his decision was influenced by the impact of Churchill’s concern about his ability and the option to remove him and replace him with Freyberg is difficult to determine, but it would be reasonable to assume that it had some impact on his evaluation of the positive and negative aspects of the proposed campaign.

**The British Army in Greece and the RAF’s Inability to Secure Control of the Air**

In February 1941 the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park broke the German Railway Enigma and the German intention to attack Greece became apparent. Though Longmore was not at that time aware of the source of the intelligence he had to determine whether the RAF’s small and obsolete forces in Greece could deny the GAF control of the air. Longmore’s command spanned Egypt, Sudan, Palestine and Transjordan, East Africa, Aden and Somaliland, Iraq and adjacent territories, Cyprus, Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Given the range and breadth of his responsibilities it is understandable that he felt constrained by his lack of resources. Moreover, D’Albiac had reiterated his complaints about the poor state of the airfields and their road access, which he felt were barely adequate to maintain and operate his small force, never mind grow it. Though the slowness in improving the Greek airfields might be explained by Greek concerns about provoking the Germans, they were also struggling with the poor regional infrastructure. In Bulgaria bridges were too weak to take the heavy equipment and had to be strengthened, impeding their speed of progress. In Romania heavy snow forced the suspension of all transport movements.
and the airfields were under water.\textsuperscript{51} Indeed, the roads were so bad that the German advance suffered an attrition rate in their motorized columns of 35% after only two weeksof hostilities.\textsuperscript{52} The problem therefore was to evaluate what could be done to mitigate the RAF’s weaknesses while recognising that increasing the number of RAF squadrons in Greece would compound the logistic and communications difficulties already encountered. On 21 February 1941, Longmore told Eden of his worries about the RAF’s qualitative and quantitative ability to match the GAF. Eden was sufficiently worried that this might tip the balance and make British army intervention in Greece untenable. He signalled Churchill with this message:

\begin{quote}
Gravest anxiety is not in respect of army but of air. There is no doubt that need to fight a German Air Force instead of Italian is creating a new problem for Longmore. Many good (troop)ers are still mounted on wretched horses. We should all have liked to approach Greece tomorrow with a suggestion that we should join with them in holding a line to defend Salonica but both Longmore and Cunningham are convinced that our present resources will not allow us to do this.\textsuperscript{53}
\end{quote}

Clearly, the key British representatives discussing possible British Army intervention in Greece were fully aware that the RAF would be unable to control the air over Salonika. On 22 February 1941 a conference convened at the Greek King’s Palace at Tatoi, outside Athens, with Eden, Dill, Wavell, Longmore, Heywood, two secretaries and three Staff Officers met King George, Kitrilakis - the Greek Premier and General Alexander Papagos in attendance.\textsuperscript{54} The Greeks were still nervous about provoking the Germans. To encourage them Eden directed de Guingand to manipulate the manpower and gun totals the British Army could commit to Greece in order to mislead the Greeks into believing they could expect stronger British Army support than was actually available.\textsuperscript{55} When Eden asked for a military appraisal of the proposed coalition operation Wavell took centre stage. Though his staff had advised that the campaign was not militarily viable he announced that British Army intervention in Greece was a reasonable military venture and reiterated General Wolfe’s famous dictum: “War is an option of difficulties. We go”.\textsuperscript{56} Longmore said nothing about the likely consequences of losing control of the air to the GAF. Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Longmore’s deputy, noted how the political desire to intercede had been carried forward with intent, like a baton, by the military.\textsuperscript{57} Operational and administrative orders for British Troops Greece (BTG), better known as ‘W’ Force, after their commander Lieutenant General Henry Maitland Wilson, were promulgated.\textsuperscript{58}

Longmore’s decision to stay silent and yield to the politicians’ desires on military matters was ‘in character’ as earlier he had shown his willingness to defer to the Air Ministry in deciding operational policy in the Greek theatre. He might have seen the impact of the political pressure applied to Wavell by Churchill and Eden and, given the response from Churchill and Portal to his complaints about the lack of aircraft his command received, may have simply chosen not to rock the boat. Eden was certainly intent on securing the intervention of British land forces in Greece and, according to de Guingand, he and his staff considered the agreement at Tatoi for British Army involvement a diplomatic coup.\textsuperscript{59} Wavell may also have
been influenced by Heywood's positive reports about the Greek army's performance against the Italians. The enduring perception of the meeting, as transmitted back to the War Cabinet, focused on Wavell's positivity about the prospects for the ensuing military campaign. Indeed, so strong was the positive impression generated that the decision to continue prevailed even after an option to stop the expedition, whilst it was in transit, presented itself.\textsuperscript{60} The British had forgotten to tell the Greeks that the Yugoslavs had chosen not to become involved and, instead, to exercise the 'do nothing option'. This delayed the Greeks’ move to the Aliakmon line.\textsuperscript{61} At a stroke this error ensured the British and Greek coalition lost the second race they were running against the Germans.

An Alternative Strategic Option – Attack Romanian Oil

The British knew that German reliance on the output of Romanian oil fields was a critical vulnerability because its Industrial Intelligence Centre (IIC) had identified Romania as the sole source from which Germany could meet her petroleum requirements.\textsuperscript{62} As early as 1939 a War Office department linked to the Special Intelligence Service (MI6), had set up sabotage organisations that had planned to disrupt Romanian oil supplies to Germany, but these small-scale operations failed\textsuperscript{63} and Romanian oil exports to Germany had steadily increased.\textsuperscript{64} In late May 1940 Wavell had proposed to London that British support for Greece should include an attempt to deny the flow of Romanian oil to Germany. In November 1940 the head of the Military Mission in Greece was told that one aim of British intervention was to facilitate the potential to attack the Romanian oilfields. Later that month the Secretary of State for Air was asked to report on the suitability of airfields in Greece as bases for possible action against Romanian oil.\textsuperscript{65} On 20 January 1941 Hitler, thinking the Russian threat greater than the British, told his generals ‘Now in the era of air power Russia can turn the Romanian oilfields into an expanse of smoking debris .... and the very life of the Axis depends on those fields.’\textsuperscript{66}

Britain’s Foreign Office thought the threat of losing Romanian oil might deter the Germans from attacking Greece.\textsuperscript{67} Therefore, when the Germans entered Romania the British persuaded themselves that they had done so to protect the oilfields until, that is, ULTRA revealed their intention was to pacify Greece.\textsuperscript{68} Why then, were the oilfields not attacked in 1941? The main reason was because the Greeks were still under the impression that they could compartmentalise and separate their war with the Italians from the wider World War: by fighting the Italians without having to fight the Germans. Hence, they told the British that only after a wider coalition with Yugoslavia and Turkey had been secured, and Italy defeated would they consider allowing the British to attack Romanian oilfields. Consequently, Churchill sought to secure Turkish support so that the oilfields could be attacked from its territory.\textsuperscript{69} On 21 February, a day before the Tatoi Conference, it was clear that the German invasion of Greece was imminent so the idea of bombing the German oil supplies in Romania reappeared on the agenda, but Dill told the War Office it could not happen because bad weather would make it necessary to violate Turkish airspace.\textsuperscript{70} As events accelerated to their conclusion the timing of any attacks against Romanian oil became important. On 24 February Eden and Dill received a brief at the British Embassy in Athens, which recommended a heavy night bomber squadron be sent out,
via Malta, to attack Ploesti oil targets between 6 and 20 March.\textsuperscript{71} An attack from Malta would not need Greek or Turkish approval. It was 3 years later, in the summer of 1944, before RAF Wellington bombers flew night missions against Ploesti, from Italy, in support of the USAAF daylight bombing operations.\textsuperscript{72} In 1941 Bomber Command crews might have lacked the technical ability to navigate to the target by night, but the risks of attempting a surprise attack would have been negligible in comparison with the losses suffered in the ensuing land campaign in Greece.

**Grand Strategic Thinking Meets Operational Reality**

It was April 1941 before the War Cabinet realised that only a quarter of the aircraft it thought it was sending to the Middle East actually arrived.\textsuperscript{73} This explains why, in March 1941, Longmore’s grievances that he did not have the number or quality of aircraft necessary irked Churchill. On 24 March 1941 Churchill told him ‘I have been concerned to read your continual complaints of the numbers of aircraft which are sent to you.’\textsuperscript{74} Though the RAF decided to extend the RAF’s presence in Greece to fourteen squadrons to arrive between 15 January and 15 April 1941\textsuperscript{75} D’Albiac only had eleven squadrons when the Germans attacked on 6 April 1941 and some of these were mixed types (6 Blenheim sqns; 2 Hurricane sqns; one and a half Gladiator sqns; a sqn of Wellontons and half a sqn of Lysander aircraft). Of the nominally declared 208 aircraft only around 80 were serviceable.\textsuperscript{76} The Australian official history recorded ‘Since the German attack opened the three squadrons of the Eastern Wing of the British air force had not only hampered the German advance but had been the most reliable source of information about the enemy’s movements.’\textsuperscript{77} The significantly outnumbered RAF did what it could with the mainly obsolete aircraft it had at its disposal but it was not enough.

So, given the relative imbalance of the forces positioned in Greece it should have been no surprise when the token RAF force, with its mostly obsolete aircraft, configured to fight the relatively weak Italian air force, were totally outmatched and destroyed by the GAF that confronted it. In the ensuing debacle D’Albiac struggled to react and respond to the GAF’s offensive counter air campaign to secure control of the air. Indeed, despite the hopelessness of the task he attempted to abide by his orders, received from Longmore on 11 April 1941, to keep his force fighting as long as the Greeks kept fighting.\textsuperscript{78} It was always an unequal struggle; in one raid alone the Luftwaffe destroyed sixteen Blenheim bombers on the ground and fourteen Hurricane fighters. On 13 April 1941 a formation of six Blenheim medium bombers from 211 Sqn, tasked to attack enemy transport were shot down by Bf 109s and two days later short-range German fighters destroyed all of 113 Squadron’s Blenheim aircraft at Niamata.\textsuperscript{79} Later that day D’Albiac personally saw two Hurricanes destroyed at Larissa.\textsuperscript{80} It became necessary for all RAF and Greek aircraft to be based outside the range of GAF short-range fighters, or be annihilated. After only a week of fighting D’Albiac’s force had dwindled from 200 to 46 aircraft and had ceased to be an effective fighting force. On 17 April D’Albiac decided to evacuate the surviving bomber squadrons to Crete and send the fighters to Athens.\textsuperscript{81} Four days later he ordered Air Commodore Grigson to take charge of the RAF fighter rear-guard in the Peloponnese and evacuate any RAF personnel who had missed the opportunity to leave Greece from the Athens area.\textsuperscript{82}
Grigson’s task was unenviable and it is clear from his subsequent report that his responsibilities in the evacuation, beyond general guidance to provide support for the army evacuation, were ill defined. Consequently, even though he must have been well aware of the vulnerability of the aircraft for which he was responsible, he felt obliged to keep them on the Greek mainland at Argos in an attempt to provide a degree of air cover for the Army’s evacuation to Crete and Egypt. Given the GAF did not fly at night when the Navy evacuated the Imperial forces from Greece it may have been more possible to provide a greater degree of cover, when the ships were in range, from Crete. Instead, Grigson ignored pleas from his fighter pilots to extricate the fighters to Crete with the entirely predictable outcome that fourteen Hurricanes were destroyed, thirteen of them while they were on the ground, on the afternoon of 23 April. It would have been difficult for Grigson to ignore his orders and dispatch the Hurricanes to Crete; he was more comfortable playing the hero, shooting at the German aircraft attacking Argos as though he were on a grouse moor. Grigson’s determination to meet his obligations had blinded him to the operational necessities. Only after the attack did he acknowledge that there was no hope of supporting the evacuations with his fighters based on the Greek mainland and sent the remaining seven Hurricanes to Crete. Blenheim ‘fighters’ covered the army’s evacuation. Hurricane losses at Argos affected the RAF’s ability to provide air cover in the defence of Crete. Nevertheless, despite serious losses to shipping the GAF failed to seriously disrupt the evacuations.

**RAF Hate - Blame and Resentment after German Victory**

Although Longmore’s warnings about the RAF’s inability to compete with the GAF were brushed aside by those who chose to think that air power would not be a decisive factor in the campaign, it was the RAF which came under the greatest immediate scrutiny for the defeat and evacuation in Greece. Before his ‘W Force’ had been committed to the campaign Wilson had told the American Ambassador in Athens, Lincoln MacVeagh, that the Greek terrain would even up the military ledger and that the Germans could not repeat their Polish and French successes on account of the terrain but his campaign report claimed it had been ‘quite wrong to attempt to compete with the German army without an adequate air force,’ … to be subjected to a ‘German air force allowed full liberty of action.’ As well as failing to acknowledge Longmore’s warnings that the RAF would be unable to compete with the GAF
to secure control of the air, Wilson also overlooked the appreciation provided by his ‘W’ Force staff which had concluded that the Germans could be beaten if proper advantage were taken of the terrain and that topographical features would mitigate the impact of German close air support and, in particular, the dive bomber. The reality, of course, was very different. David Belchem recorded that ‘by day the German Stukas and Messerschmitts hit us with complete impunity; one Australian convoy, on the road south of Thermopylae, was attacked from the air seven times in two hours. The effect on the steadiness of the troops, of the air superiority of the Luftwaffe, can be well imagined.’ Blaming the RAF for his Force’s failure may have been a convenient way for Wilson to attempt to retain his reputation.

Proportionately the RAF experienced almost four times the casualty rate of the British Army in the Greek campaign, yet a negative impression of the RAF’s fighting spirit and performance in Greece was allowed to fester. Some soldiers evacuated from Greece felt so aggrieved that the RAF was not protecting them that they instigated a number of ‘incidents’ in Alexandria against RAF personnel. The Australian Brigade was less severe in judging its own performance. In the Monastir Gap, a valley running from Monastir to the Greek city of Florina, the Liebstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Regiment and elements of the 9th Panzer Division dislodged the much larger 19th Australian Brigade, causing it to retreat in disorder. Significantly, the GAF only appeared after the rout began. A few Army officers were so convinced of the RAF’s failings that they chose to criticise it in writing. General Smith forwarded to Air Marshal Tedder three letters from senior Army officers complaining of the RAF’s poor dispersal plans. According to Brigadier Galloway aircraft were lost in the Larissa area ‘despite the fact that General Wilson personally warned the RAF of what was likely to happen.’ Another wrote that aircraft were lost at Argos through putting them in Olive groves where they were only half hidden.’ The third, Salisbury-Jones, complained about ‘the disastrous casualties to aircraft that had occurred in Greece, particularly at Argos.’

Clearly, the willingness to blame the RAF for its apparent absence, and for what had happened to the Army was widespread. RAF doctor, Flight Lieutenant Griffin, was so affected by the overt animosity he encountered that he reported Lieutenant Colonel Kerridge’s vitriolic verbal attack after Kerridge had stopped Griffin’s ambulance two miles North of Argos. It is interesting to speculate whether such attitudes were in some way responsible for the exclusion of nearly a thousand RAF ground crew and administration personnel from the distribution list of evacuation instructions at Argos and the way they were reported to be ‘getting out of hand’ as their hope of escape diminished and German air attacks increased. Whatever the feelings at the time it is clear, however, that Grigson’s decision not to evacuate the Hurricanes to Crete and their subsequent destruction reduced the RAF’s ability to protect some of the forces being evacuated and, ultimately, the defence of Crete. However, Tedder, when writing to VCAS Air Chief Marshal Wilfrid Freeman on 25 Apr 41, supported Grigson’s actions and claimed that the whole thing was a question of sheer numbers. His letter also expressed concern that there will be some bitter feeling against the RAF on the part of the soldiers. A month later, after the fall of Crete, Tedder remarked:
‘There is as I expected, a first-class hate working up in the Army against the Royal Air Force for having ‘let them down’ in Greece and Crete.’

Some Australian officers acknowledged that their soldiers exhibited considerable fear when encountering German aircraft and their willingness to place the blame on the RAF for their vulnerability was probably a consequence of the widespread psychological fear the German aircraft had induced. Morale can be understood as the willingness of an individual or group to prepare for and engage in institutionally encouraged actions. When morale is broken it can lead to a gradual, though distinct, erosion of the willingness to fight. It may be true that the German bombing of the retreating columns did not produce immediate results; the GAF failed to close the main road at Lamia, the main highway on which the retreat was concentrated. Nevertheless, it is clear that the psychological effect of the GAF attacks led the soldiers to believe that the GAF had been a decisive factor in the German military victory and to deduce that the RAF was responsible for their defeat. Troops from New Zealand amended the army’s choice of the RAF’s epitaph from Dunkirk ‘Royal Absent Force’ to ‘Rare As Fairies’. Clearly, the soldiers and sailors involved in the Greek debacle had appreciated the importance of gaining and maintaining control of the air, whatever the terrain. It was a very expensive lesson to have to learn: British losses in Greece were 903 killed; 1,250 wounded; 13,958 prisoners; 52 Light tanks and 52 Cruiser tanks; 40 AA guns; 192 Field guns; 164 anti-tank guns; 1,812 machine guns; 8,000 lorries of various types and virtually all radio equipment; 26 ships sunk and 209 RAF aircraft lost.

The Enduring Importance of Controlling the Air to Influence Behaviour

Some historians have argued that though the campaign in Greece was a defeat it was worthwhile because it delayed the German attack on the Soviet Union. Churchill and Eden wanted to attack the Germans through the Balkans and were happy to put pressure on the military commanders to find ways to do so. Churchill frequently visited the 11 Group operations bunker at the height of the Battle of Britain, so he ought to have known how the combination of modern fighters based at well-equipped airfields, coordinated by an integrated air defence system enabled the RAF to deny the GAF control of the air over England. Instead, he and the War Cabinet assumed the RAF would be able to repeat the heroics of the Battle of Britain, even though they were largely equipped with obsolete aircraft. Wavell appeared unconcerned about the impact of losing the air war when he underwent his volte-face. The Greeks fully understood the importance of the oilfields in Romania and worried how any RAF threat to them would play out, but the RAF’s interest in attacking Ploesti, despite its repeated reappearance on the agenda, was inexplicably lethargic. When more Wellington bombers became available in early March 1941 D’Albiac preferred to continue to attack targets in the Adriatic and in the War Cabinet Portal claimed that bombing Romania in March would be difficult due to poor weather.

Some recent analysis of the impact the GAF had on the campaign in Greece has concluded that air attacks were limited in their material effectiveness, making them largely ineffective in
producing results on the battlefield, but such arguments are excessively focused on the physical component of warfighting: measuring performance, in terms of the number of vehicles destroyed and the ability to close the main escape route. This paper has attempted to show how the inability of the RAF to challenge for control of the air enabled the GAF to inflict significant psychological damage on British and Dominion troops affecting their ‘will to fight’, helping the spread of panic, fear, confusion and hysteria during the retreat and subsequent evacuation out of all proportion to the damage caused by the actual attacks. A better measure of the effect air power had in the campaign in Greece, therefore, would be to assess the morale of those under attack and examine how this influenced their ‘will to fight’: the moral component of war fighting, because the will of an opponent to fight, when successfully undermined, is very ‘effective’ in delivering results. This British Army had had the same experience in France in 1940, as described eloquently by Marc Bloch:

It can so work upon the nerves that they become wrought to a pitch of intolerable tension whence it is a very short step to panic . . . No matter how thickly bombs may be sown, they never, in fact register hits on more than a relatively small number of men. But the effect of bombing on the nerves is far reaching, and can break the potential of resistance over a large area.  

Tangible proof of apparent GAF success might also acknowledge the soldiers’ reaction in blaming the RAF for allowing it to happen. Whether or not the attacks on the RAF and its personnel were an overt attempt to divert the responsibility for the poor performance of the British and Dominion troops in the Greek campaign they certainly re-ignited the ever-present but latent debate between the Army and the RAF about which organisation should own and control tactical air assets. The Army felt so aggrieved it reiterated its demand for its own organic air support. If the Army had control over the aircraft available in Greece it is extremely unlikely that the result would have been any different; all Army cooperation aircraft were shot down by the end of the second day of battle with the GAF. First, as Longmore repeatedly complained, the air resources were very limited; the Army would have had to contend with the same unequal fight. Second, when planning the Army intervention in Greece only Wavell amongst the Army commanders involved appeared to grasp the important impact air power would have on the subsequent campaign; that is before he conveniently decided to forget his own assessment. So, the analysis of the inter-service report on the campaign correctly concluded that the subordination of RAF elements to the ground commander in Greece would probably have made little difference to the outcome of the campaign.

Wavell and Longmore ought to have advised that the campaign in Greece was untenable, but both men were under pressure from Churchill and Eden and both ignored the reasoned advice of their staffs. Longmore’s reports about his lack of resources were accurate but he knew that repeating them irritated Churchill, sufficiently for Portal to admonish him and so he may have felt compelled to go along with the political desire to create a Balkan Front and to ignore his military judgement. The excessive and intrusive political pressure placed on Wavell,
together with Longmore’s willingness to fall under the influence of Eden, led to the ludicrous decision to send a British Army to Greece. Longmore, who hoped historians might judge his achievements favourably, was recalled to London, ostensibly to attend two Chiefs-of-Staffs meetings. He dined with Churchill who probably thought him another difficult general. He was sacked soon afterwards. Air Marshal Owen Boyd was chosen as Longmore’s replacement but on his way to the Middle East his aircraft became lost and landed in Sicily where he was taken prisoner. Tedder became C-in-C Air for the Middle East.

Concluding Thoughts

The British desire to honour the 1939 guarantee to Greece led them to offer a level of military support the Greeks did not really want because the Greeks feared significant British support might remove any chance of compartmentalising their war with the Italians and cause them to become involved in the wider war against the Germans, which was likely to result in defeat and occupation. Into this mix the British political leaders tried to impose their grand strategic illusions on the overburdened military leaders who were already fully engaged across many areas of responsibility. Churchill thought Wavell lacked dynamism, a consequence of their very different personalities and, to some extent, Freyberg’s disloyal analysis of his Middle East Command. This helped to create a toxic environment in which Wavell felt increasingly pressured to submit to the political will to intervene militarily although the objectives he attempted to achieve were unrealistic and unachievable.

The pressure on Wavell was further compounded by the arrival of Eden who appeared to relish his role of shuttle diplomat, trying to create a regional coalition against Germany. Eden badly misjudged the regional dynamics; despite persistent evidence to the contrary he believed that a coalition against the Germans was still possible. The War Cabinet, therefore, were drip fed positive military assessments of likely success which tallied with the aspirations of Churchill and Eden, until Eden eventually recognised the fallacy of his hopes for a regional coalition. By then the War Cabinet had been moved by Wavell’s apparent positivity to think the campaign entirely viable. Longmore should shoulder some of the blame for how this situation arose. Though he tried to advise Wavell, Eden and London of the dangers of losing control of the air over Greece he allowed his worries about the prospects for the air war to become marginalised and ignored. By not expressing his case with sufficient vigour he missed his chance to help avoid catastrophe by failing to articulate his concerns at the crucial meeting with the Greeks at Tatoi on 22 February 1941. Had Longmore been less deferential to Eden’s grand strategic illusions the Greeks might have rejected British assistance and Churchill, who had slowly but surely realised how tenuous the prospects really were when after the Greek troop repositioning debacle became apparent, might have managed to pass off the Greek collapse as the consequence of a grossly unequal struggle.

The resultant military disaster was entirely predictable, yet by blaming the defeat on the absence of the RAF some in the Army tried to distance themselves from their own earlier analysis: that air and tank supported all arms warfare would have little impact on the campaign
due to the terrain. German control of the air had once again enabled unimpeded attacks against troops on the ground, which generated fear and induced feelings of helplessness and overmatch. German air attacks on British forces in Greece may not have caused significant loss of life or equipment but they helped induce psychological effects that enabled German victory and caused the British significant losses of personnel and equipment.

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Viewpoint

The British Military and the ‘Special Relationship’

By Professor Wyn Rees

Introduction

Within the politico-diplomatic world there are a variety of views about the value of the so-called Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’. Whilst British governments consistently extol the merits of the relationship, a powerful current of opinion within political elites and the media criticise the relationship and deny its ‘specialness’. It is castigated by some as a myth that props up a bygone era of British power, whilst to others it has subordinated this country to American interests. Even for those less ideologically hostile to amity with the United States it raises questions as to whether Anglo-American interests are compatible; whether we share the same priorities in regions of the world and how to overlook the rivalry that results inevitably from other aspects of the relationship such as economic competition.

Such ambivalence is absent from the senior ranks of the British armed forces. They do not debate whether the Anglo-American special military relationship exists or whether it is in British interests. There is near unanimity within the armed forces that it is highly desirable to operate alongside the United States, whether that is as part of an American-led coalition or an operation to which America lends its support. As a superpower, the US brings to an operation the largest, most technologically advanced and most capable armed forces. It also provides critical ‘enablers’ for its allies, such as satellite reconnaissance assets and remotely piloted vehicles, that provide unparalleled intelligence of the battlespace. Working in tandem with US forces gives the UK the best chance of prevailing against an adversary at a relatively limited cost. Thus the US military serves as a valuable force multiplier for any British military effort. As one senior officer summed up the attitude within the UK armed forces: ‘why would we not want to fight alongside US?’

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Britain’s partnering of the US has brought rewards in terms of leadership and influence within international organisations. As the second most important actor within NATO, the UK has enjoyed positions of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (D-SACEUR), Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation DSACT (formerly DACT) and lead country of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). In the conflicts against Iraq in 1990 and 2003, the UK held the second in command positions after the US and in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the UK has held the role of Deputy Commander. This has granted the British military a status second only to that of their ally.

A further advantage for the UK is that close cooperation with the US allows them to preserve particular defence capabilities that, through cost, they might otherwise have to forfeit. British armed forces have retained cutting edge capabilities bought ‘off-the-shelf’ at relatively affordable – in some cases highly advantageous - prices. The Royal Air Force purchased E-3 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS) aircraft from the US when the Nimrod programme failed and British forces also secured the highly capable AH-64 Apache Longbow helicopter. The UK is currently in the process of purchasing the Short-Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), working with the US as a Tier 1 Partner. In the strategic nuclear field the US has been willing to share first its Polaris and subsequently its Trident D5 nuclear missile technology. Unlike any other nation, the UK obtains the missiles for its submarines from a pool that is shared with the US Navy. The US has committed to making its successor system to Trident D5 available to the UK.

As a result of benefits such as these the UK armed services have been the custodians of the security relationship with the United States. They have nurtured it at every opportunity and have invested considerable energy in forging a broad range of linkages with their US counterparts. The British military act as the institutional memory of the Anglo-American security relationship and they are a powerful source of influence in its perpetuation. Nevertheless, this military relationship is entering a period of uncertainty. The strategic context in which the two countries have worked closely together is shifting and this will herald important changes for both sides. These facts render it timely to consider how the military to military contacts between the two sides are likely to fare and what the British armed forces can do to minimise the risk of their stagnation. At the same time, the military need to discern where national interests lie and appreciate that the relationship can also contain drawbacks. Because it is such a champion of preserving the intimacy over security between the two sides, the military may overlook some of the associated risks.

**Sustaining the Relationship Amidst a Changing Environment**

The transatlantic security relationship is facing a period of change. The end of the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan will represent the termination of the longest period of campaigning between British and American forces. No longer will there be an enduring operation on such a scale, in which their forces operate together. The experience of Afghanistan will also leave behind some bitter US-European memories: including differences over the nature of the
mission, national caveats and the size of national contributions. Even UK-US relations have not been immune to frictions such as over their approach to the heroin trade.

The drawdown in Afghanistan feeds into a broader reassessment of US strategic priorities. President Obama has made clear his reluctance to be drawn into conflicts that involve US ground forces and long term nation-building. The legacy from Afghanistan will deter future American presidents from protracted military campaigns. At the same time, the US administration has identified the Asia-Pacific region as a growing priority. Tensions between states in that region coupled with the growing military power of China and North Korea makes it a volatile area for American interests and this led in 2011 to President Obama announcing a re-balancing of its military assets towards potential contingencies there. Even the recent tensions with Russia over Ukraine, and over Islamic State in Iraq, are unlikely to alter fundamentally this American assessment of the changing equation between its European and Asian interests.

Reductions in defence impact on this evolving strategic environment. The 2010 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) was a response to a £38 billion deficit in defence spending identified by the incoming Conservative government. It resulted in swingeing cuts to Britain’s armed forces, including a 20,000 cut in the size of the Army, and reduced its ability to act alongside the US. The risk of strategic divergence between the two countries appears all too real.

Yet this would represent an excessively pessimistic view of the prospects for Anglo-American security relations. On earlier occasions the relationship has adjusted to altered strategic circumstances and fiscal constraints. The end of the Cold War, for example, presented a dramatically changed situation yet collaboration remained close and proceeded to deepen. New types of security challenges incentivised both sides to adapt their relationship and find new ways of working together. The experience of the first Gulf War was quickly overtaken by the need to develop new responses to conflict in the Balkans, such as peace building and peace enforcement. The desired ‘peace dividend’ following the Cold War made it ever more necessary to use defence resources wisely and to coordinate with allies. Contrary to expectations, post-Cold War conflicts served to draw the US and UK closer together.

Similar prospects are presented by the contemporary situation. Rising challenges in the Asia-Pacific theatre will stretch US military power and increase the significance of allied efforts. In those parts of Europe where the US may have to decrease its military presence, the UK can play a galvanizing role amongst its continental allies in filling the resulting gaps. British leadership and military prowess will become more valuable to the US. This potential is exemplified by the UK’s Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier project. Here the US has been providing the Royal Navy with a remarkable degree of help in re-learning the skills of flight deck operations. This is not least because the US is interested in how the UK might carry out future deployments that would release pressure on America’s own diminishing carrier fleet.
Even the US has been forced to confront reductions in defence spending. Cuts have come from two sources: planned reductions, on the one hand, and emergency cuts through sequestration, on the other. The latter resulted from the Executive and Congress being unable to agree upon a budget. In the coming decade the total of these cuts will amount to nearly a trillion dollars. As part of the process of conducting its own defence review the US has been eager to learn from the experiences of its British counterparts. Although the American defence review process is on a much larger scale, it has sought to benefit from the British experience as to how resources can be stretched further and tasks carried out more efficiently. Like any other country the US appreciates having allies to whom it can talk and exchange ideas. As the US shares so many cultural attributes and values with the UK it is the natural partner with whom to share a strategic dialogue.

In their efforts to preserve the intimacy that has been built up with the US, the British armed forces need to keep three factors uppermost in their minds. First, the fact that the US military is sufficiently big and diverse to necessitate fostering relationships with each of its Services: the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. After all, it is not possible to predict the kind of warfare that may occur in the future and which US Service could take the lead role. The relative intimacy between the different branches of the two armed services, in the past, has varied. That between the Royal Navy and the US Navy, for example, was very close throughout the Cold War and has continued since. Similarly, the Royal Air Force has preserved and deepened its ties with its American counterparts as a result of operations against Iraq and in Afghanistan. By contrast, the British Army and the US Army were less close during the Cold War because they were responsible for different stretches of the NATO front-line in Germany. The post-Cold War world has drawn them closer together but more in terms of coordinating their respective operations rather than integrating them.

There has never been a period when all three British Services have enjoyed such a close relationship with their US counterparts as they do now. These institutional linkages afford the British armed forces exceptional insight into the thinking of the US military; its doctrine, its manner of conducting operations and the capabilities of its equipment. With the end of the mission in Afghanistan, the US military are switching their attention to new roles and regions of the world. The US Air Force and Navy are re-focusing their attention on power projection capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, whilst the US Marine Corps are returning to their traditional emphasis on amphibious operations. For its part the US Army is switching from counter-insurgency to high intensity warfare and ‘forward engagement,’ by which its forces will be more attuned to the particular circumstances where they might have to fight. These new priorities will present problems for the UK: in the absence of shared operations they will have to ensure that their bonds with their US counterparts do not whither. Even the relationship built up over time by the Royal Navy will be challenged by the diminishing size of the fleet.

A key way of preserving this intimacy is for the British to expand the range of exercises and training that they carry out with US forces. Training together enables forces to understand how...
the other side prepares for conflict, the extent to which their forces operate jointly and how communication and command and control is applied to the battlespace. The UK is able to draw upon common NATO operating procedures with the US and has conducted regular joint exercises, such as the ‘Red Flag’ aerial training exercises in the Nevada Desert and submarine exercises between the two navies. This knowledge of the US ensures a smooth transition from peacetime to wartime operations, as illustrated in 1991 and 2003 when British contingents and the Royal Air Force were integrated into American battle plans. Future training will need to take the place of the operational relationships. Whilst training is both expensive and time consuming, it is vital if the UK is to maintain its position as America’s partner of choice.

Second, the British must strive to preserve their access to US defence planning and decision-making circles. The willingness of the US to grant this access has been one of the vital factors in Anglo-American relations because it has enabled Britain to participate in its planning process. British representatives have been able to speak their minds and offer criticism, sotto voce, to a much greater extent than an equivalent US officer within the normal chain of command. The UK currently has around 800 personnel, of all ranks, stationed within the US. These include officers in all the major US commands including Northern Command, Strategic and Cyber Command and Pacific Command. The most significant contingent of around 50 personnel, under a two-star general, resides in US Central Command in Tampa, Florida where US operations for the Middle East and Central Asia are planned. Some of these are embedded officers within the US chain of command, whilst others are British liaison officers whose role is to serve as the interface between the US and their UK masters. As US commands have prepared their operational or contingency plans it has afforded the UK unique insight into its ally’s direction of travel.

This will be one of the hardest things to retain once coalition operations in Afghanistan cease because the UK will no longer be able to argue that its presence as the second largest troop contributing nation justifies shared planning. In future the UK will need to work even harder to convince its ally that it has things to offer. This will come down to the quality of the personnel that it makes available to the US: the ability of individuals to ‘punch above their weight’ will determine the access that they enjoy with their American counterparts. Placing members of the armed forces with seniority and experience in liaison and embedded positions pays handsome dividends. It will also be necessary to look at the careers of individuals who have served alongside American forces in earlier training or operational environments. Friendships formed in the past can play an essential role in obtaining special access to American personnel and bonds forged during times of shared combat can prove to be remarkably enduring. Recent conflicts have left a whole generation of officers and men with experiences of close interaction with US forces, and this has the potential to be cultivated in the future.

In the face of a British military that is down-sizing and whose budget is shrinking, such subtle arguments can easily be overlooked. Amidst all the other demands made upon a smaller pool of talent, it will not be easy to find the people of appropriate quality to send to the US. It will
also be harder to justify the resources to allow people to travel across the Atlantic and preserve a regular dialogue with their opposite numbers. Nevertheless, it would be a false economy to cut back on these things or reduce the quality of the personnel. The disproportionate benefit that the UK enjoys from the relationship would be put at risk over the long term.

Third, the UK must retain the ability to make a meaningful military contribution to US-led operations. Although America rarely needs help, it has valued, and will continue to value, the support of allies that are dependable and prepared to shoulder some of the burden. This comprises both the political will as well as the military capability. In terms of the former, the US has prized the fact that the UK has largely shared its world view and has been willing to take on leadership roles. British forces operating alongside the US have accorded it a vital sense of legitimacy in the eyes of the world. The UK has never taken for granted that the US will provide security for its allies, hence it has always sought to make a contribution in order to persuade America that its responsibilities are being shared. It has tried to preserve an American role in European defence by actively contributing to those global security issues on which the US might otherwise stand alone. On matters like nuclear non-proliferation and ‘rogue’ states, for example, the UK has offered its support. This has contrasted with the attitude of many other European allies who have regarded such issues as lying outside the remit of the western alliance.

In terms of military capability, the US has appreciated the UK’s willingness to share all risks. British commanders have committed troops to operational environments without restrictions on how they can be used or where they can be deployed. In Afghanistan, for example, several European states sent their contingents with strict caveats that precluded their troops being involved in combat operations, patrolling at night or moving outside of their designated areas. By contrast the British, along with Dutch, Danish and Canadian troops, deployed to the most demanding operational environments. They took on the task to operate within southern Afghanistan in 2006 and, in doing so, the UK absorbed a relatively high proportion of casualties.

The US has also been impressed by the quality and professionalism of the forces that the UK has contributed to coalition operations. Although Britain’s forces do not possess the same level of technological sophistication as the Americans, they are nevertheless highly capable and very well trained. For example, British hunter killer submarines (SSNs) have been regarded by their US counterparts as equals in terms of the skill of their crews. Relatively few navies in the world operate such vessels and so the Royal Navy practices against the larger US Navy’s hunter killer force. The cooperation has always been intense and the two submarine forces use each other as foils to hone their skills and ensure that they can fight against potential foes.

The challenge of the future will be to discern what level of effort the US will regard as a meaningful contribution and being able to ensure its availability. This will depend in each case on the size of UK forces, the capability of the adversary and the breadth of the western
coalition. In the cases of the two wars against Iraq, a military power of considerable size, the UK contributed an armoured division on the grounds that this was a self-contained formation and one that justified the position of second in command. In the aftermath of the 2010 cuts to the armed forces it will be increasingly difficult for the UK to field such a force – although not impossible. The SDSR envisages a brigade sized contribution to most high-end military tasks with the option of mounting a larger operation for a short period of time.6

Perhaps of greater importance than the absolute size of the force will be guaranteeing its quality and interoperability with US units. In seeking to be able to operate alongside the US, the UK needs to privilege its expeditionary capacity and long-range strike, as well as the ability to supply and refuel its forces operating at great distances. The Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier and the Joint Strike Fighter are evidence that the government is committed to this approach. There are also capabilities and assets that the US has identified in the past as useful to them. These include British expertise in anti-submarine warfare, in mine counter-measures, in the conduct of anti-drug running operations and in the provision of its Special Forces. In addition, the British possess intelligence assets, such as the Government Communications Headquarters at Cheltenham and its base on Cyprus.

**Drawbacks of the Relationship**

There are potential drawbacks for the UK in being so closely associated with the US military. These drawbacks might not be readily acknowledged by the British armed services, because their priority is to perpetuate their close relationship with the Americans. But these risks exist and need to be borne in mind in the midst of the evolving strategic context.

One danger is that sustaining the relationship becomes an end in itself. Because the military have come to regard their privileged association with the US armed forces as so useful, this priority can become the over-riding objective. This runs the risk of being unwilling to disappoint American expectations and striving to please in all circumstances. Instead, the wider national interest of Britain needs to be asserted even if there is a price to pay in terms of the links of the armed services with the US. This may mean declining to be involved when the US wants the UK to be its partner in a particular operation. Undeniably, this will be a delicate balance to strike. The result could be US disengagement and a reluctance to act on behalf of its allies in the future. However, UK national interests must take precedence and there may be occasions when this country’s interests do not coincide with those of America. The vote by the House of Commons against military intervention in Syria, in August of 2013, was such an occasion. Despite the momentum for air strikes generated by the Obama administration, following the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime, the British government accepted that there was insufficient support for military action. The British armed forces could argue that this was a political decision and that it did not reflect on their close relations with the US military. Yet there may be instances in the future when the military themselves will need to advise policymakers that it is not in the interests of the UK to intervene
in a conflict zone even if the US is committed to act. The military must not put their interests in aligning with the US over the wider interests of the country.

By contrast, sentiment only goes so far in the American approach to relations with Britain. The US military grant the UK a privileged relationship because they believe it serves their own interests. In 2007 the British Army found itself dangerously over-extended, attempting to contain an ugly sectarian conflict in the south of Iraq whilst simultaneously engaged in an arduous counter-insurgency campaign in Helmand province. Even the Chief of the General Staff, General Richard Dannatt, described the Army as ‘running hot’. Yet when Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri-al-Maliki ordered his forces from Baghdad to confront and defeat the Shia militias in Basra, the US let it be known that they regarded the British as having failed to contain the situation effectively. The US has not hesitated to criticise or express its disappointment when it perceives the UK to have fallen short of expectations.

The US appears to view the relationship with the UK as robust rather than fragile. There will inevitably be times when the relationship stumbles over an issue and differences of perspective arise. The UK must learn to follow the American example and not be worried that every disagreement risks undermining the whole relationship. A tougher attitude might make British policymakers more willing to enunciate their own interests and accept that this will not always please their counterparts in the Pentagon. After all, Britain risked the ire of the US by refusing to intervene in the war in Vietnam and the relationship survived.

A second danger is that cooperation with the US over the course of several years can have the effect of shaping UK thinking. The close institutional relationship between the British and American military has helped to condition the former’s approach to threats. British officers have been drawn in and have come to share many American planning assumptions. It is unsurprising that threat perceptions on this side of the Atlantic have evolved in tandem with those of the US.

Britain has sought to preserve all its military roles on the grounds that it can contribute to the full spectrum of threats in which the US could become engaged. It has done so at a time when it has been paring down its actual defence capabilities. During the SDSR the government re-affirmed that the country would remain capable of carrying out the full range of military tasks despite its smaller size. This risks Britain indulging in tokenism; preserving a limited capability that it could not fulfil in any substantial way. It avoids making painful decisions about future roles that should be cut. Criticism of this stance was forthcoming from retired US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates. He warned that the UK might be unable to act alongside the US in certain operations, rendering it a less able partner. Gates referred specifically to the reductions in the size of the Royal Navy. These criticisms, coming from someone formerly so senior in both the Bush and Obama administrations caused acute embarrassment within the British security community.
The disadvantages of such a British policy are twofold: it can easily result in over-commitment and it closes off alternative policy directions. In the case of the former, the House of Commons Defence Committee questioned the government’s intention to preserve the same level of commitments while significantly reducing resources. Operating alongside a superpower, whose resource base dwarfs that of the UK, can easily expose the weaknesses of such a policy. Attempting to act as a partner and dependable ally of the US can result in the British military being stretched beyond its means, not least because the US operational tempo far exceeds its own. For example, the entry of the US Marine Corps into Helmand province, led to American criticism of the under-resourcing of the British effort. It was a sobering lesson for British commanders that the US carried out a similar mission with a far higher level of personnel and helicopters.

In the case of the latter, there has been a long-standing tension in British policy between defence cooperation with the United States - both bilaterally and within NATO - and within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union. The UK has been strident in its determination to avoid doing anything in a European context that could prejudice the transatlantic bond. It has supported the right of first refusal for NATO in interventions and has blocked any attempts to challenge American leadership on the continent. When France and Germany launched the idea of a European Union headquarters planning organisation in 2003, it was the most vociferous country in opposing the scheme.

Yet the opposition of the UK has ensured that the CSDP has remained emasculated and incapable of offering an alternative defence framework when NATO declines to lead. The UK has effectively sacrificed efforts to achieve closer European defence cooperation to preserve its privileged relationship with the US. This ignores the fact that part of the UK’s innate attractiveness to the US is that it straddles the Atlantic and brings links to allies in the European Union. The UK would be wise not to relinquish this alternative framework, even at the risk of provoking concern from the US. Maintaining relationships with European allies would be in the UK’s interest as demonstrated by the closer Anglo-French cooperation based upon the 2010 Lancaster House agreement.

A final danger for the UK is one of delusion. Anglo-American military cooperation has much to commend it – as this paper has already argued. Britain obtains substantial benefits from its close collaboration with the American military and this is amplified in times of conflict. Close friendships are forged between the military officers of the two sides and the UK has an ally against whom it can measure its own martial prowess. In turn, the US obtains an influential ally that thinks alike and grants it legitimacy in coalition operations. The professionalism of the UK military is admired by its American counterpart.

However, the UK should not mistake this close relationship for influence over American strategic decisions. Cooperation gives the UK insight into American thinking at an early stage but this should not be confused with an ability to steer its decision-making. There are very
few occasions on which the UK has changed US policy. One was Prime Minister Tony Blair’s influence over President George Bush to use the United Nations to try to obtain Security Council authorisation for the war against Iraq – although America’s determination to use force was undimmed. Another was the Anglo-French decision to use force in Libya which pushed the Obama administration into changing course on the crisis. On most issues the US has little need for allies, although it prefers to work, when possible, in conjunction with them. Policymakers in Washington take hard-headed decisions about what is in the interests of their country and they are unlikely to be swayed by arguments from another country.

Critics tend to see this in terms of the UK not getting anything back from the US, a lack of reciprocity. This is mistaken because the UK receives a disproportionate degree of benefit from cooperating with America. What they are really alluding to is the inability of Britain to shape US policy along lines that would suit British interests. This is unlikely to happen because the US is so much more powerful than the UK.

Conclusion
The Anglo-American security relationship has weathered changes before. Despite the pessimism of sceptics it has not disappeared once the international context has altered. The current international situation is a turbulent one and it will require the UK and the US to adapt their relationship to new demands. For the British military, which has worked so hard to foster cooperation with the United States, this will be a major objective of future policy. The fact that the US and UK Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee has resumed its meetings after a hiatus of 65 years is testament to the determination to preserve this bond. The presence of the American Chiefs of Staff in London for the second meeting in June 2014 indicates that they recognise its value and want to preserve it.

The American Chiefs of Staff appreciate that their country will not enjoy the same status as unchallenged hegemon that it experienced in the decade after the end of the Cold War. There are competitors emerging in Asia, as well as emerging security challenges such as failed states, nuclear proliferation, cyber-security and terrorism. Many of these threats are opaque and difficult to address. They will stretch American power at a time when the resources it devotes to defence are under pressure. It is likely that America will be rendered more vulnerable and thereby increase its desire for allies.

The result, ironically, may be to make the Anglo-American security relationship more important. America may place a higher premium on the UK’s ability to act as its partner of choice in expeditionary operations and its assistance in the building of ‘coalitions of the willing’. It may also value more highly its capacity to replace and backfill those roles that America relinquishes. This depends on the UK’s political will to devote the necessary resources to defence. If this political will can be found and the UK invests in preserving its existing intimacy with America, it may come to find itself an even more valued ally. Skilful policymaking may
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enable the UK to emerge closer to the US, more knowledgeable about its strategic direction and better configured to work alongside its forces.

Notes
1 Interview (2013) between the author and a retired senior British Army officer, London, 19 December.
12 Interview (2014) between the author and a retired senior Royal Air Force officer, email, 15 September.
Book Review

Boyd: The Fighter Pilot who changed the Art of War

By Robert Coram

Reviewed by Group Captain Shaun Harvey

Introduction

This is a biography of a fascinating officer and essential reading for all airmen. It will appeal to a wide variety of interests. Aircrew and would-be fighter pilots will enjoy the examination of the ultra-competitive ‘40-second Boyd,’ who at the Nellis Fighter Weapons School maintained the stunning record of defeating all-comers in air-to-air combat within 40 seconds. Readers with a technical bias will enjoy Boyd, the research pilot who developed and documented the first USAF fighter tactics manual and then a theory of air manoeuvre (against the express wishes of his chain of command) and marshalled his ideas up the steep dogmatic slopes of the USAF planning staff to deliver air superiority in fighters such as the F-16. Those who study leadership will discover Boyd the officer as a zealous maverick who demanded and received unflinching loyalty and commitment from his carefully-chosen acolytes. Finally, blue-sky thinkers will appreciate Boyd the visionary, who studied strategy and warfare and advanced a theory of winning that has helped transform our view of the use of air power, driven the US Marines’ theories of manoeuvre warfare and is still advancing the competitive philosophies of business gurus.

Col John Boyd is best known to us for his OODA loop, and this may be his greatest contribution to warfighting. But as this book reveals, there is far more to it than the linear, repetitive sequence of Observe, Orientate, Decide and Act that we tend to describe orbits around. Indeed, there is far more to Boyd than the OODA loop. Here, Coram presents us Boyd and his theories as a life-study in application, learning, adaptation and winning.
Readers wishing fully to understand OODA loops, fast transitions and Boyd’s other theories of combat will be offered a thorough and comprehensive introduction to the Col’s research, mindset and philosophy. However, Boyd regrettably published very little of his work, so to take the study of this man further, it will be necessary to research the material on the internet (including YouTube lecture material from Boyd himself) and the books of Frans Osinga (Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd. Routledge; 2006) and Grant Hammond (The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security. Smithsonian Books, 2004). Nonetheless, this Biography provides the perfect preface to further study.

Coram’s examination of Boyd’s behaviour in and out of work also makes for fascinating reading. From his propensity for ‘hosing’ Generals in his briefings to the way in which he encouraged his students and acolytes; Boyd’s approach embodies the term ‘maverick’. The ‘to be or to do?’ speech Boyd would give to his junior officers, is just as pertinent in today’s military as it was then in the USAF and justifies the book’s price tag alone. There is also the tale of the relationship Boyd had with his acolytes; those who surrounded and supported Boyd, fighting the ‘Pentagon Wars’. Without this unusual and eclectic mix of committed supporters, Boyd could not have achieved the influence he did over programmes such as the F-16 and A-10.

Robert Coram took nearly 3 years to write this book. His research is meticulous and his presentation clear, highlighting his journalistic roots. Importantly, he doesn’t shy from a critical examination of Boyd’s character as a maverick, obsessive genius and dreadful family man. While the story of Boyd’s early days is fascinating, it sets the conditions for the more exciting adventures to follow, especially those in the Pentagon. As Boyd collects his acolytes and wages his own war on those Generals he sees as dogmatic and negligent, the book gathers momentum and becomes a real ‘page-turner.’

Ironically, the USAF has yet to come to terms fully with the impact of John Boyd. For an officer whose theories shaped so fundamentally the tactics of air combat and the design of its platforms and weapon systems, Boyd is barely remembered by his own Service. There is a small building bearing his name at Nellis AFB, a road at Maxwell AFB called ‘The OODA Loop’ and during my last visit, I was surprised to find that the otherwise comprehensive bookshop at Wright-Patterson AFB stocked no copies of this biography. In contrast, the US Marines honour Boyd, base much of their combat thinking on Boyd’s work and still deliver his lectures to students at Quantico.

This is a must have book for all airmen. It forces the reader to think about what it is to be a warrior, an officer, change agent, colleague and a human being. An enjoyable read - try it and make up your own mind on this fascinating fighter pilot.