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PRELIMINARY REPORT ON 'HUSKY'
OPERATIONS BY MALTA-BASED AIRCRAFT.

(July 9th to July 17th, 1943)

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REPORT OF OPERATIONS BY MALTA-BASED AIRCRAFTFOREWORD.

1. This report is preliminary. In substance it covers the operation of aircraft whether R.A.F. or U.S.A.A.F. under the control of A.O.C. MALTA during the period dawn July 9th to close of night operations July 17/18th.
2. During this period the invasion of SICILY was successfully accomplished and allied ground and air forces were firmly established on the Island. The initial stage of operation BUSKY was over.
3. The report does not attempt to cover the operation as a whole. It is confined to the part played by aircraft in MALTA, GOZO and PANTELLARIA in the invasion period. No attempt has, therefore, been made to draw any general conclusions about the success or failure of the operation as a whole or to deduce any general lessons from that operation. Certain tentative deductions relating strictly to the operations as carried out from MALTA are set out in Part IV.

Arrangement of the Report.

4. The report is primarily factual, designed to provide data for operational study. But to make intelligible the events recorded an introduction (Part I) covering briefly events and developments in MALTA leading up to the operations described is first given.
5. This introduction is followed by a general survey (Part II) of the direction and nature of effort and of some relevant factors bearing on the general employment of the MALTA Air Force.
6. Part III is a brief chronological narrative of the action, the object of which is to relate the part played by the Air Force to the developments in the ground and Naval situation.
7. Part IV consists of a brief summary and some tentative conclusions.
8. Part V consists of Appendices. They are as follows:
 - (A) Order of Battle of Operational Flying Units.
 - (B) (i) Summary of Day Fighter Operations.
(ii) Analysis of Day Fighter Operations.
 - (C) (i) Summary of Night Fighter Operations.
(ii) Analysis of Night Fighter Operations.
 - (D) Summary of Reconnaissance Operations.
 - (E) Comparative Tables of Losses - Allied and Enemy.
 - (F) Replacement Aircraft arriving in MALTA.
 - (G) Daily Strength, Serviceability and Sortie figures.
 - (H) Table of Operational Flying Hours.

PART I - INTRODUCTION

1. The siege of MALTA was raised in December, 1942. In January, 1943, before the HUSKY operation was even conceived, the A.O.C. MALTA received tentative authority to commence work on turning the Island into a base for future offensive operations. Work was at once begun.
2. It had three main features. The first was the extension and improvement of existing aerodromes on the Island and the addition of extra landing strips. It was planned to prepare five aerodromes or landing strips capable of housing and operating up to 25 Squadrons of fighters. The work was completed by June. In addition, during that month, a landing strip was constructed on GOZO by U.S. Army Engineers in the record time of 20 days, with the object of operating a further three squadrons of fighters from this satellite Island.
3. The second feature was the stocking and provisioning of the Island with adequate stores, supplies, spares and all the accessories and necessaries needed to operate and maintain an Air Force of the size contemplated.
4. The third feature was the improvement of R.D.F. cover and Fighter Control facilities. To this end a new Fighter Control Room was cut out of the rock and a new and larger Filter Room was got ready. Improvements were made to existing R.D.F. stations and a number of additional stations were set up.
5. As a result of these improvements in control facilities it proved possible at the height of the battle for the Fighter Control Room to operate 30 squadrons. These included day fighters and fighter-bombers, night fighters and intruder patrols, day and night reconnaissance squadrons and Air/Sea Rescue units. In addition excellent plotting was provided. A comprehensive picture of all aircraft, hostile or friendly within a radius of 100 miles of MALTA was continuously maintained and all shipping convoys within a radius of 50 miles were plotted steadily. Besides exercising direct operational control as stated, F.C.R. successfully controlled smoke screen operations; the balloon barrage and the Air Raid Warning system.
6. As an adjunct to these control facilities, for the battle period special arrangements were made for liaison with Army and Navy. A combined War Room was got ready, designed to provide an hour by hour picture of the developments on the ground, naval and air situations. Next to this room was located the Army Support Control. The Naval Co-operation Operations Room was set up next door to the Fighter Control Room.
7. In the result these arrangements worked smoothly and efficiently. Throughout the whole period of intensive battle operations, control was immediate and effective.
8. All these changes and improvements were carried out in scarcely six months. They were achieved only by most careful administration and detailed organisation, by unremitting hard work and by excellent planning. The stocking of the Island alone was a triumph of organisation in view of the fact that shipping had to be booked months in advance. But they succeeded and they changed MALTA from a besieged fortress, barely supporting 14 tired squadrons with one week's supply of petrol left them, into the most concentrated and powerful air striking base in the history of war.

9. At the opening of the battle, 12 squadrons possessing some 610 First Line aircraft were concentrated in MALPA, GOZO and PANTELARIA. The degree of their equipment, provisioning and servicing is best assessed in terms of the overwhelming success of the operation they were designed to support.

Pre-battle Training

10. By the beginning of June, arrangements were far enough advanced to permit the arrival of the reinforcing squadrons scheduled for the BASKY operation. Most were in by June 10 and the rest of the month was devoted to overhauling their supplies and equipment and bringing them up to establishment. Above all, however, special care was taken with their training. Each new squadron was gradually acclimatised to operating over the sea and in addition, over the terrain where the battle was to be fought. On average each squadron was given one task a day.

11. For security reasons, complete secrecy with regard to the forthcoming operations was maintained amongst the squadrons. Commanders of Wings were let into the secret a few days before D Day, but squadron commanders were told nothing until the night of D-1. This secrecy did not apparently interfere with the smooth working out of final operational and administrative arrangements. On the other hand, it quite obviated the risk arising if a too knowledgeable pilot had been shot down and captured over enemy territory.

12. Special attention was paid to the Air/Sea Rescue Organisation and in this respect close liaison was maintained with W.A.C.A.F. The Air/Sea Rescue Unit was based at Kalafrang. Its main aircraft included Volucres and Wellingtons. The crews were steadily practised in their duties.

13. Training was never over-done and engine-hours were carefully watched. In the result the MALPA Air Force went into battle, fresh and vigorous and with admirable experience of the battle area. The confidence of the pilots in themselves, their aircraft and the organisation backing them is best reflected in the universal and acute disappointment they all expressed at the relative feebleness of the enemy opposition.

14. The reduction of PANTELARIA in June by massed air attack, added another aerodrome to those to be operated by MALPA. The field was rapidly repaired and the U.S.A.A.F. 33rd Group (P.40's) was moved in. GOZO landing strip was made ready by U.S. Army Engineers in the remarkable time of 20 days and the U.S.A.A.F. 31st Group (Spitfires) was installed there.

15. By D-7 Day MALPA's own capacity to absorb aircraft was stretched to the limit. A complete order of battle is given at Appendix 'A' but shortly, 4 Spitfire Wings, possessing 20 squadrons, a G.R. Wing, No.248, with 4 flights of mixed aircraft, and a cluster of 5 Night fighter squadrons or flights, Mosquitoes, Beaufighters and Hurricanes, were installed on the Island. Moreover, ground personnel of three fighter-bomber Wings had also arrived, their aircraft being still on the mainland almost literally awaiting space in which to set down.

Maintenance and Repair.

16. The maintenance of all these aircraft on a very small Island, worked smoothly. Carefully balanced stocks, accumulated steadily during half a year, simplified repair and servicing work and no troubles were experienced then or later on that score.

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17. With the virtual destruction of the repair hangars at Kalafurni during the siege period, the NIAFA Maintenance Wing had been dispersed. Major repair work was no longer undertaken. The Wing personnel however, were brought up to strength and servicing parties were provided at each station for the HUSKY period.
18. The maintenance plan provided for a high rate of wastage which in the result was fortunately never realised. No. 214 Group at Foggia was responsible through 117 M.U. for all replacement aircraft needed by the R.A.F. forces on the Island. The U.S.A.A.F. forces at GOZO and PANTELLARIA were looked after by the Servicing Centre at Souda.
19. For repair purposes, damaged aircraft were classified as those which could be repaired on the Island and those which could not. The latter comprised all aircraft needing more than 7 days for repair and were classified as Category IIIA or B. Category IIIA were those which could be patched up enough to enable them to be flown out; Category IIIB those so damaged that they had to be shipped out.
20. Those aircraft (Category I) which could be repaired within 7 days and therefore remained on the Island were repaired by the squadron itself up to 48 hours. Repairs needing longer than 48 hours were handed over to the station servicing party.
21. These arrangements worked well and would undoubtedly have maintained squadron serviceability at the high level it kept, even had casualties proved very much larger.
22. As an additional precaution a reserve pool of 50 Spitfires was flown into the Island by D Day. Scarcely a dozen of these were, in fact, called on.

The Servicing Commandos.

23. The maintenance of the American Spitfire squadrons on GOZO was undertaken by the R.A.F. Servicing Commandos. A unit No. 3231 was moved into the satellite island before the U.S. Group arrived.
24. These Commando units, specially trained for the HUSKY operation, were designed to move into SICILY almost with the Army spearhead. They were to take over captured airfields at once and provide a servicing party for aircraft as soon as they landed. In this way delays in bringing a captured aerodrome into use were to be cut to a minimum. But the Commandos' operations are outside the scope of this report.

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PART II - GENERAL SURVEY OF AIR EFFORT
IN RELATION TO HUSKY PLAN.

1. HUSKY was the code name selected "for an operation to attack and capture SICILY. The operation is to be executed by sea and airborne assault forces assisted by air and naval action. Air Forces will be flown into the Island immediately airdromes have been occupied and prepared".

2. In this plan the role of the Air Forces operating from MALTA was laid down as follows :-

- (i) The destruction or neutralisation of enemy air forces within range of operations.
- (ii) Air operations intended to prepare the way for the assault and assist its execution.
- (iii) Support of naval operations.
- (iv) Protection of the assault convoys.
- (v) Air attack on enemy shipping and naval forces.
- (vi) Participating in the cover plan and in diversionary operations aimed at keeping the enemy air forces as widely dispersed as possible.

3. The operation was divided into four phases.

Phase I was in two parts; a preparatory period from the end of the Tunisian campaign to D - 7 and a secondary period from D - 7 to D - 1.

4. Phase II was the period of the assault. Phase III the period covering the attack on Catania and Phase IV the period covering the reduction of the remainder of the Island.

5. Aircraft based on Malta would obviously participate in each of these four phases, but it was evident that intensive fighter operations from the Island would end with Phase II.

6. The general scheme provided for an Air Task Force to operate, when installed in Sicily, in support of the army Eastern Task Force, mainly the 8th Army. & Western Task Force, the U.S. 7th Army, would be supported by aircraft mainly derived from Tunisia.

7. As aerodromes became vacant, fighter squadrons from Malta were to be moved in. Their places in the Island were to be taken by fighter bomber squadrons. As soon as found for these in Sicily, in turn their places were to be taken by light bombers. The operations of the latter were not to be directly controlled by A.O.C. Malta but by the A.O.C. of the Air Task Force working through Tactical Bomber Force Headquarters.

8. This brief picture of the overall plan is offered for the purpose of making a record of the events more comprehensible. But the later stages of these operations are beyond the scope of this report, which ends with the beginning of Phase III.

Preparatory Work during Phase I.

9. From the end of the Tunisian campaign up to D - 7.

fighter squadrons in Malta both those of the original garrison and of the new arrivals were steadily employed against the enemy on land and sea and in the air. A large part of the effort was devoted to cover and close escort work for the bombers of the 9th USAAF and NASAF in their raids on Sicilian aerodromes.

10. Fighter escort was provided for all raids on targets within 100 miles radius of Malta and fighter diversion was laid on for raids on targets beyond this radius. Periodic offensive sweeps were carried out and Spitfire bombers attacked enemy airfields in the southern area of Sicily.

11. Despite this trailing of the coat, enemy reaction was slight and combats were relatively few, but the effort gave excellent training to all pilots and served to reduce enemy air power or prevent him from building it up against D Day.

12. Malta's effort in this matter was part of a larger plan embracing air forces as widely separated as those in the U.K. and Egypt. Attacks from all directions and in all areas forced the enemy to keep his already strained air forces dispersed and denied him the chance of concentrating against the coming assault.

D - 7 to the Assault.

13. From D - 7 the tempo was speeded up. Bombers of the 9th USAAF and the NASAF mounted a concentrated and steadily increasing assault on the enemy's airfields in Sardinia, Sicily and Southern Italy as well as his terminal ports, and his lines of communication. Malta fighters were called on for increased escort work. Squadron effort during this period rose to 1½ to 2 missions a day.

Reconnaissance.

14. A constant watch was kept on enemy strength and movements. For a period, a detachment of NAPRW operated from the Island assisting the work of No. 248 Wing which, as well as providing almost daily routine cover of all Sicily and Southern Italy, supplied special reports and photographs for the use of the Husky planners.

15. This cover was continued after the opening of the assault (see Appendix D). Tactical Reconnaissance was provided by 40 Squadron SAAF which moved into the Island with 244 Wing and operated daily from Luga.

16. Excellent strategical and tactical targets were made available by all this work and an invaluable picture of the enemy's strength and dispositions was daily put at the disposal of army, navy and air force staffs.

The Attack Period.

17. D Day was July 10. The seaborne invasion was scheduled to reach the beaches at dawn. The area of Sicily selected for the attack was the south-east corner. Eight beaches were chosen, and each was given a code name. They were as follows :-

- (i) ACID North - from Cape Murro di Porco to Avola.
- (ii) ACID South - from a point south of Avola to a point half way between Calabernardo and Marzamemi.

- (iii) BARK East - a short stretch of coast northwards from Marzamemi.
- (iv) BARK Middle - from Cape Passero to Cape Correnti.
- (v) BARK West - from Pozzallo eastward to a point on the coast south of Pachino.
- (vi) CENT - from Marina eastward up the coast for some 20 miles.
- (vii) DIME - a short stretch of coast on either side of Gela.
- (viii) JOSS - a longer stretch on either side of Licata.

18. The armada bearing the invasion forces converged on Malta during the morning of July 9, D - 1 Day. Some 2,000 ships ranging from battleships and huge troop transports to L.C.T's and motor launches, moved steadily towards the Island from the West, the South and the South-east. As each convoy came within 50 miles, so fighter cover was provided continuously throughout the hours of daylight. The skies for a large radius round the Island swarmed with Spitfires but no enemy air attack materialised.

19. Some two-thirds of the available day fighter force was employed continuously on this work of shipping protection. The remainder was used in close escort and top cover to bombers operating from Libya or Tunisia against enemy aerodromes.

The Forward Control Links.

20. After nightfall the protection of the convoys was taken over by fighter intruder patrols which throughout the night ranged over enemy airfields in Sicily and Southern Italy. An interesting experiment was tried out in controlling these intruder aircraft, Beaufighters and Mosquitoes. Three G.C.I. Stations, mounted on Tank Landing Ships, off ACID, BARK and DIME, were used as forward links for the G.C.I. Malta. The control proved extremely effective both on this night and subsequently when enemy aircraft were operating in numbers against the beaches and shipping.

21. In addition to the floating G.C.I.s, "Headquarter Ships" acted as forward fighter controls, thus:

- (i) ACID - "BULOLO"
- (ii) BARK - "LARGS" (with "HILARY" in reserve).
- (iii) CENT - "ANCON"
- (iv) JOSS & DIME - "MONROVIA" with two subsidiary ships "BISCANE" and "SAMUEL CHASE".

These Headquarter Ships directed fighters mainly by the "informative" method, passing information from R.D.F. plots, or visual observations, supplemented by "Y" information. They played a similar role after darkness, handing the night fighters over to the G.C.I.s, either floating or ashore, as necessary. The fighter controllers were linked to Malta and the other Headquarter Ships by R/T.

22. The Senior Fighter Controller of one Headquarter Ship stated in an official report "The above method of con-

Control proved satisfactory and, with the exception of MR.109s proceeding from north to south, under protection of the hills, below R.D.F. cover and attacking out of the then western sun, it is doubtful whether better results could otherwise have been achieved. It is pertinent to observe that 'Y' service amplified the filtered plot and often adequately filled in the inevitable gaps.....It is also worth mentioning that at certain times during D Day and D plus 1, when BARK Sector was due to be without fighter cover for, say, half an hour, fighters then on patrol, although warned that their allotted half hour had expired, remained on patrol almost until the relief arrived."

Airborne Assault.

23. The seaborne assault, timed to begin at dawn on July 10th, was preceded by an airborne invasion. Some 450 transport aircraft and gliders operating from the Kairouan area, unloaded paratroops and airborne troops throughout the night of July 9/10th. For these aircraft, Malta provided visual and radio aids to navigation.

24. Additional to the protection provided automatically for this aerial armada by Malta's night fighters, a special force of cannon Hurricanes of 73 Squadron preceded the aircraft transports across the Sicilian coast. Their targets were searchlights which they were ordered to attack, but few were seen.

25. Two of these Hurricanes failed to return. The pilot of one however, was picked up eight days later by a Catalina 180 miles south of Malta. He was very weak and exhausted but quickly recovered fully. On his return from Sicily he lost the control and missed Malta completely. He was forced down by lack of petrol but floated his K-type dinghy successfully and in this he lived until spotted by the crew of a Baltimore who positioned him with some accuracy. The Catalina was despatched in view of the distance involved, located him successfully, alighted and picked him up.

The Effort on D Day.

26. The seaborne invasion arrived off the beaches on scheduled time. There is no doubt that a tactical surprise was achieved. The task of Malta's fighters for this day was to protect the ships, the beaches and the unloading craft plying between them from enemy air attack.

27. It had been decided that patrols should operate at one squadron strength, 12 aircraft, in view of the expected enemy reaction. With this strength of patrol, no continuous cover of all beaches throughout 16 hours of daylight was possible. The following schedules of cover were therefore carefully worked out in advance :-

- (i) Fighter cover over at least two beaches was continuous throughout daylight.
- (ii) All landing areas were given continuous protection for the first two hours of daylight, from 1030 to 1230 hours, from 1600 to 1730 hours and for the last one and a half hours of daylight. These periods, it was anticipated, would be the likeliest times for enemy attacks. The anticipation proved right.
- (iii) A Reserve Wing was kept at a high degree of readiness to reinforce patrols as needed in any area.

28. In order to regulate the employment of the fighters as closely as possible the following allocations of strength were made :-

<u>BEACH</u>	<u>FORCE</u>	<u>BASE.</u>
ACID	5 Spitfire Squadrons	Malta.
BARK	5 do. do.	do.
CENT	5 do. do.	do.
DIME	1 (F) Group (U.S.).	Gozo.
JOSS	1 do. do.	Pantelleria.

Reserve Wing.

5 Spitfire Squadrons Malta.

29. The cover proved successful. The Navy was prepared for a loss of up to 300 ships during D - 1 and D Day. In fact, up to nightfall on D Day only 12 ships had been successfully attacked from the air. Most of these casualties occurred in the JOSS and DIME areas.

30. There were two reasons for this fact. In the first place, the enemy air attack on this day was stronger in those areas than elsewhere. In the second place, the ships anchored too far out - about six miles - and the fighter patrols were thereby over-stretched enabling the enemy to get through the screen.

Recognition Difficulties.

31. An unfortunate feature of this day and later days was the extent to which ships fired on the patrolling fighters. Patrols were ordered at 5000 ~~ft~~ to 8000 feet but at this height the aircraft were continuously engaged by A.A. fire. They were thus forced up to 10,000 to 14,000 feet. Even then they were often fired upon. Ships gunners are, and rightly, very light triggered where aircraft are concerned, but it is surprising that Spitfires, a most distinctive type of aircraft, were so persistently taken as hostile. No Spitfires are known to have been shot down but a number were hit and damaged.

32. During D Day the Reserve Wing was not called upon for assistance in shipping protection but it provided cover for medium bombers attacking the south Sicilian airfields.

33. By the evening of D Day, a G.C.I. station had been disembarked and came into operation that night. This station and the others still operating from L.S.Is proved of great help in forward fighter control, effectively extending the range of the Malta control. This extension was of increased value when enemy night bombers began to operate in growing numbers, against Syracuse and Augusta and the ACID beaches. Malta's night fighters were extensively employed on intruder work in this area from the night of July 10/11 onwards.

Night Bombers Tangle.

34. On the other hand, medium night bombers from Tunis were frequently employed against Catania, Messina and San Giovanni. In a relatively small area were mixed up streams of night bombers and fighters, our own and the

enemy's. It was inevitable that the exact filtering of all these plots occasionally broke down and several times our night fighters were vectored onto our own bombers, once or twice with fatal results. Control would have been simplified if Malta had been kept fully informed of projected night bomber operations by our forces. Lacking this information, mistakes were inevitable.

35. From D + 1 onward the scale of enemy effort by day steadily declined as his effort by night mounted. He made no attempt to attack Malta or the numerous ships plying the seas between there and Sicily but continued to concentrate on Syracuse, Augusta and the South East beaches. This played into our hands to an extent, for there was our best area of control and both controlled and free lance fighters scored successes, on one night shooting down no fewer than 13 enemy aircraft.

Close Support.

36. From July 11th to July 15th the chief task of Malta day fighters was still the protection of shipping and the beaches. But as enemy opposition declined, the strength of the patrols was cut down and they were eventually reduced to four aircraft. Continuous cover could therefore be provided throughout daylight for all beaches and this was laid on to include Syracuse and Augusta. So weak did the enemy opposition become by July 15th however, that standing patrols over BARK beaches were discontinued.

37. Increased numbers of fighters were therefore available for escort and top cover for bomber forces as needed. A wing of Kittybombers, No. 239 Wing had been brought forward from the mainland at the request of General Montgomery for close support work on D Day. Very few calls were, however, made by 8th Army.

38. Tactical reconnaissance was almost continuous, and together with reports brought back by the pilots of fighter bombers and their escorts, proved of great value to the army and air staffs.

39. Malta was acting as liaison filter for all calls being made on the tactical bomber force. Whenever such calls were accepted Malta Spitfires provided the necessary escorts.

40. Again calls were very few. Unfortunately several operations by medium bombers were carried out without Malta being informed, and no escort or fighter cover was provided.

41. The heavy bombers operated even less in the battle area, very few targets being suggested for them and most of these were disallowed, but again, once or twice, heavy bombers operated without Malta being informed and operated, therefore, without escort.

42. In view of the distances involved, the separation and the numbers of the various H.Qs concerned, and obvious difficulties with signals traffic, such occasional breakdowns in liaison were inevitable. They never seriously affected operations.

Movements of Malta Squadrons.

43. By July 15th enemy air opposition was completely broken. The whole of the south-east corner of Sicily was

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firmly in our hands and already two fighter wings had moved into Sicily from Malta, a fighter group (USAAF) from Pantellaria and another from Gozo.

44. As other wings moved out of Malta so space was provided for further fighter-bombers and later for light bombers. By the end of the period covered by this report, however, these moves were not complete.

Air Defence of Malta.

45. No squadrons of day fighters were specially retained for the air defence of Malta. It was rightly estimated that the enemy's power to attack during daylight was almost non-existent, but had he possessed that power, Malta during the period under review, presented a most astonishingly rich and concentrated target. Her harbours were packed with naval and merchant ships of all types and sizes, her airfields with aircraft.

46. Despite intensive building of pens during the period of preparation, so numerous was the air force that many aircraft had to rely only on dispersal for protection against attack. By nightfall, aircraft were massed all over the airfields.

47. In consequence, a proportion of night fighters was always maintained at high readiness to deal with enemy night bombers that might attack such a profitable target. No night attack, however, materialised until July 20/21, when 25 plus bombers demolished some houses in the Valetta - Sliema area but did no military damage at all.

Enemy Aircraft Disposition.

48. Although on D - 1 there were probably two hundred JU.88s within range of the theatre of operations (concentrated largely in the heel of Italy and as far north as the Rome area) photographic evidence shows that fighters were evenly spread over south-east and north-west Sicily, the toe and the heel of Italy and the Naples area, while Sardinia retained its quota. By D + 7, the main changes in disposition showed concentrations of fighters in the heel of Italy and between Naples and Rome, and can be accounted for partly by withdrawals from the extreme north of Italy and from other fronts.

49. Photographs continued to show approximately the same numbers of fighters on the remaining Sicilian aerodromes, which were by then, partly or wholly unserviceable. A large number of these aircraft were probably damaged. By this date the bomber strength in the heel had been doubled, night fighters had appeared in the toe and about forty Stukas had been photographed in the foot of Italy. But no attempt had been made to withdraw aircraft from Sardinia.

PART III - CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE OF EVENTSRole of the fighters.

1. The role of the fighter squadrons was divided into three main phases :-

- (a) To provide cover as soon as the invasion fleet came within effective range on D - 1.
- (b) To fly continuous protective patrols over the invasion beaches and occupied ports during the establishment of bridgeheads and disembarkment of troops and supplies.
- (c) To operate offensively in close support of the ground forces.

How effectively the fighters succeeded in their primary aim of denying the air to the enemy will be shown in the following narrative of events.

2. On D - 1 Spitfires and P.40s flew 413 sorties over the massed invasion flotillas steaming towards SICILY, while Spitfires made another 176 sorties as escort for bombers of M.A.A.F. and 9th U.S.A.A.F. attacking South-east SICILIAN aerodromes and other targets. The enemy remained surprisingly passive and made no attempt to interfere with our shipping until after the armada arrived off the invasion beaches. In fact, the only Axis aircraft encountered throughout the day were half a dozen FW.190s and Me.202s near AUGUSTA, of which Spitfires shot down two and probably destroyed one.

3. During the night, Mosquitoes intruded against enemy bomber aerodromes in SICILY and ITALY to screen the approaching invasion forces. Hurricanes operated against searchlights in South-eastern SICILY to cover parachute landings and Beaufighters and Mosquitoes flew covering patrols off the South SICILIAN Coast. Although two Hurricanes failed to return, no enemy reaction was reported.

Enemy Nervousness.

4. On D Day the fighter effort was switched to continuous covering patrols over the invasion beaches from Cape Murro di Porco to Licata. Spitfires and P.40s made 1092 sorties on these operations. The absence of effective opposition in the opening stages of the assault suggested that complete tactical surprise had been achieved. Nor were signs lacking of enemy nervousness at the magnitude of the expedition. For example, at midday German aircraft over AUGUSTA were heard anxiously enquiring where to land and whether their aerodromes were still serviceable.

5. Shortly after first light, weak enemy ground opposition had been largely countered although American forces to the west met with stiffer resistance and the success of the initial assaults, covered by heavy fire from naval units and preceded by airborne and parachute troop landings (the latter hampered by high winds) was already assured.

6. PACHINO landing ground captured by 10.00 hours was found to be badly ploughed, but an emergency belly landing strip was quickly made serviceable. By the end of the day almost the entire coastal region from LICATA to SYRACUSE, including GELA/PARELLO landing ground was in our hands.

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The fact that SYRACUSE port installations were found to be practically undamaged suggested that the enemy had been too demoralised by the speed of our advance to make any attempt at demolition.

7. In the meantime, although the enemy recovered in some degree from his early inaction and carried out a few dive-bombing attacks on our shipping, which met with little success, many of our fighter pilots returned disappointed from patrol to report that they had seen no signs of the enemy in the sky. Only just over a hundred Axis fighters were reported airborne on interception during the day, and of these Spitfires shot down twelve, probably destroyed three and damaged eleven. Our losses were eleven Spitfires.

8. The same story was told by Spitfires which flew 37 sorties escorting N.A.A.F. and 9th U.S.A.A.F. bombers. Only three enemy fighters were seen and these avoided combat. Mosquitoes intruding against SICILIAN and ITALIAN aerodromes during night 10/11 July likewise reported no enemy activity, but Beaufighters on defensive patrols south of SICILY shot down two Ju.88s and a Cant. Z.1007 and probably destroyed another two Ju.88s.

Bridgeheads firmly established.

9. On July 11th, with bridgeheads firmly established, our troops made further progress in the coastal area. The fighter effort was gradually relaxed day by day as operations proceeded and opposition diminished. Spitfires and P.40s made 872 sorties on covering patrols over the SICILIAN beaches on 11th July, when enemy combat casualties began to rise sharply. For the loss of only one Spitfire and one P.40, our pilots shot down a mixed bag of twenty-eight aircraft, probably destroyed five, and damaged sixteen.

10. Kittybombers which had moved in to provide close support for our ground forces went into action for the first time with bombing and machine-gun attacks on enemy transport vehicles on the road between AUGUSTA and CATANIA, making 58 sorties. Spitfires flew 22 sorties as escort. The Kittyhawks continued to operate during succeeding days, but owing to scarcity of suitable targets, Army calls were few.

11. The Spitfire effort on 11th July also included 23 sorties as escort to N.A.A.F. bombers operating against the GERBINI strips.

12. During the night 11/12th July Mosquitoes and a Hurricane continued intruder operations over the enemy's air bases in North-eastern SICILY and Southern ITALY. One unidentified bomber was shot down over CROTONE aerodrome, but little other activity was seen. Enemy bombers were, however, active against our shipping off the landing beaches, and our night fighters shot down two Ju.88s and a He.111 and damaged a P.108.

13. The important airfield at COMISO was occupied by 7th Army troops during the night and work was at once started by moonlight.

The Capture of AUGUSTA.

14. With Italian morale remaining at an extremely low ebb and the Axis ground forces lacking cohesion generally, our advance successfully continued. PONTE OLIVO landing ground to the north-east of GELA was captured on the 12th July, and work on the landing ground at LICATA had advanced sufficiently to provide operational facilities for one fighter squadron.

(Continued..... 14

Meanwhile the 7th and 8th Armies made contact in the RAGUSA area and Allied naval units entered AUGUSTA harbour, which had previously been subjected to bombardment from the sea. Enemy troops had not then evacuated the town, which was actually occupied at 03.00 hours on 15th July, when the installations were found to be almost intact.

15. The main air effort on 12th July was again directed to the provision of fighter cover for the landing beaches and for shipping in the occupied harbours, Spitfires and P.40's flying 897 sorties on these duties. Enemy losses continued to mount, the day's bag amounting to twenty-four aircraft destroyed, nine probably destroyed and twenty-one damaged at a cost of eight Spitfires and one P.40.

16. One combat which provided a noteworthy example of our supremacy in the air occurred when 72 Squadron Spitfires encountered a single JU.52 strongly escorted by German and Italian fighters near AUGUSTA. The Spitfires shot down the transport aircraft in flames, together with six of the escorting fighters, without loss to themselves. The same squadron accounted for five other enemy fighters shot down during the day. Enemy morale, never particularly high among the Italians, had sunk to a low level. As one situation report summed up: "There is considerable evidence of panic among the German aircraft at sight of our Spitfires".

17. Spitfires also flew twelve sorties on escorting 35 Kittyhawks attacking gun positions and other targets on the SYRACUSE - AUGUSTA road, while twenty-one Spitfire sorties were made as escort to W.A.A.F. bombers which continued pounding the GERBINI satellites.

A Remarkable Night's Hunting.

18. On night 12/13 July, Mosquitoes, Hurricanes and Beaufighters attacked enemy communications in SICILY and Southern ITALY and flew interception patrols off the SICILIAN coast. Operating in clear moonlight Beaufighter and Mosquito pilots had a remarkable night's hunting in which they shot down five JU.88s, three HE.111s, two Caet. Z.1007s and one DO.217. Another JU.88 was probably destroyed.

19. The following day was noteworthy as the date on which the first fighter squadrons flew into SICILY. 244 Wing (less 417 Squadron) left for PACHINO at first light, 417 Squadron following on 16th July. COMISO airfield and PONTE OLIVO landing ground were both reported ready for use, and in addition, BISCARI airfield to the north-east of COMISO fell into our hands.

20½ In four days the enemy had been deprived of six airfields and landing grounds, in addition to the seaplane base at SYRACUSE. With CATANIA airfield and the GERBINI strips rapidly becoming untenable, the enemy's few remaining air bases in SICILY were huddled in the western corner.

Enemy Resistance Broken.

21. Our air effort on 13th July was again devoted to covering patrols, Spitfires and P.40s flying 732 sorties during which twenty-four enemy aircraft were shot down, three probably destroyed and twenty-five damaged. One outstanding Victory was scored by 243 Squadron which, encountering twelve unescorted JU.87s near GERBINI, shot down five of the enemy and

damaged the remaining seven without loss. This proved to be the last day on which the enemy put up any real show of resistance, and thereafter our fighter pilots roamed the skies almost completely unchallenged.

22. In addition to routine patrols, Spitfires flew thirty-one sorties on offensive sweeps over south-east SICILY on 13th July; forty-one sorties on escorting N.A.A.F. bombers attacking CATANIA and GERBINI, and thirty sorties as escort to fifty-four Kittybombers operating against the enemy communications between SAN MICHELE and GRAMMICHELE and at CARLENTINI and LENTINI. Our losses for the day were four Kittybombers and a Spitfire.

23. CATANIA aerodrome was subjected to one of the periodic bombardments by the Navy, which meanwhile had been exacting a heavy toll of Axis submarines and facilitating generally the shuttle service to SICILY.

24. Intruder operations over enemy territory and interception patrols off the SICILIAN coast were continued by Beaufighters and Mosquitoes during night 13/14 July, 73 Squadron Hurricanes having returned to North AFRICA. In the course of these operations, two JU.88s, two HE.111s, one P.108 and an unidentified aircraft were shot down, while another JU.88 was probably destroyed.

25. Enemy ground resistance continued along the whole front the following day, but our troops continued to extend their gains. Although German counter attacks reached AUGUSTA harbour in the early morning and cut off a brigade in the town, the position was restored by noon.

Closer Air Support.

26. Air support for the Army became even more effective as more fighter squadrons began operating from the captured airfields. Three squadrons of 324 Wing (43, 93 and 243) flew into COMISO on 14th July, followed by 72 and 111 squadrons the following day, while the 33rd U.S.A.A.F. Group from PANTELLARIA were installed at LICATA.

27. Spitfires which flew 451 sorties on covering patrols during 14th July, found the enemy's opposition dwindling to negligible proportions. Only some forty enemy aircraft were reported airborne, and of these four were shot down, two probably destroyed and one damaged without loss to ourselves. The usual escorts were also provided for N.A.A.F. bombers, Spitfires flying twenty-one sorties. In addition eighteen sorties were flown on escorting fighter-bombers. Attacks by a total of thirty-four Kittyhawks operating against targets in the CALTAGIRONE and LENTINI areas were supplemented by the bombing of enemy transport vehicles near LENTINI by 24 P.40s of 64 and 65 squadrons, making their first appearance of the campaign.

28. Operations by Mosquitoes and Beaufighters on intruder and interception patrols during night 14/15 July, when attacks were made on railway and shipping targets in ITALY, were notable for a bag of twelve enemy aircraft destroyed, including nine JU.88s, two HE.111s and one Cant. Z.1007. In

addition, another JU.88 was damaged.

29. On 15th July two squadrons of the 31st U.S.A.A.F. Group (308 and 309) left GOZO for PONTE OLIVO landing ground, 307 squadron having moved to LICATA.

30. The main Spitfire effort involving 171 sorties, was devoted to offensive patrols over the CATANIA and GERBINI areas. Enemy air resistance had finally been broken and not a single Axis aircraft was seen during these operations, although Spitfires which flew nineteen sorties on escort to forty six Kittybombers attacking N.T. targets near GERBINI and RADDUSA, sighted a total of 21 German and Italian fighters in the region of AUGUSTA. The enemy were engaged with inconclusive results. Spitfires also made thirty-two sorties as escort to N.A.A.F. bombers.

Night Fighter Pilot's Exploit.

31. The outstanding feature of Mosquito and Beaufighter operations over eastern SICILY during night 15/16 July, was the remarkable exploit of a 256 Squadron Mosquito who accounted for five out of the six enemy aircraft destroyed. His personal bag consisted of four JU.88s and a Cant. Z.1007. The remaining victim was a ME.111. Other Mosquitoes intruded against aerodromes in SICILY and Southern ITALY where no enemy activity was seen.

32. Although the area South of CATANIA remained the scene of bitter fighting, our ground forces continued to make satisfactory progress elsewhere on 16th July, when an American Ranger battalion entered PORTO EMPEDOCLE. The beaches were still being used for unloading stores but AUGUSTA, which had temporarily been closed owing to minelaying, was re-opened by 17th July.

33. Spitfires which flew 126 sorties on offensive sweeps over the CATANIA and GERBINI areas on 16th July, encountered a few ME.109s, of which three were shot down, one probably destroyed, and three damaged, again without loss to ourselves. Spitfires also made sixty-one sorties on providing cover to naval units, and eight and sixteen sorties respectively on escorting nineteen Kittybombers and N.A.A.F. bombers attacking enemy communications in eastern and central SICILY.

34. Beaufighters and Mosquitoes continued their noteworthy run of successes during interception patrols over eastern SICILY after nightfall, eclipsing their previous victories by shooting down thirteen enemy aircraft, including six Cant. Z.1007s, five JU.88s, and two ME.111s. Two additional aircraft were shot down by the A.A. defences at AUGUSTA, which was twice raided during the night and damage caused to a ship in the harbour. Mosquitoes intruded against aerodromes in SICILY and Southern ITALY, but again reported no enemy activity during the patrol periods.

35. Spitfires flew 109 sorties on offensive sweeps over the CATANIA area on 17th July while 12 Spitfires made cannon attacks on Gotha 242 gliders, sighted on CATANIA aerodrome. Enemy fighters betrayed their usual shyness, but of the few encountered during the day, three were shot down, one probably destroyed and four damaged for the loss of one Spitfire. Spitfires also flew twenty-two sorties as escort to bombers from North AFRICA and thirty-three sorties on covering patrols over naval units.

36. AUGUSTA was again raided during night 17/18 July, without any damage resulting. One enemy aircraft was destroyed by A.A. fire from shipping, while one SU.64 and two unidentified aircraft were shot down and a JU.88 probably destroyed by Beaufighters and Mosquitoes on interception patrol over eastern SICILY. Mosquitoes also intruded against aerodromes in the ROME area and in Southern ITALY, and effectively attacked aircraft on the ground.

37. Much valuable work was accomplished by the reconnaissance squadrons during the period under review. Tactical reconnaissance Spitfires, strategical reconnaissance Mustangs (which operated from North AFRICA during the opening stages and were based in MALTA), P.R.U. Spitfires and sea reconnaissance Wellingtons and Baltimores all played a vital part in building up a daily picture of enemy activity, while Air/Sea Rescue aircraft searched daily for missing pilots.

38. Throughout the period of July 9th to July 17th Spitfires, Kittybombers and P.40s flew a total of 5892 sorties. 24 Spitfires, 4 Kittybombers and 2 P.40s were lost. In addition, night fighters made a total of 276 sorties; two Hurricanes, one Mosquito and one Beaufighter were lost. Our day and night fighters, however, together destroyed 158 enemy aircraft (including 46 JU.88s, and 30 ME. 109s), probably destroyed 30 and damaged a further 83.

How the Plan was Implemented.

39. At the conclusion of this brief review of events, it is interesting to examine how closely operations had proceeded in accordance with the air plan, in the following assumptions were made :-

- (a) The airfield at PACHINO should either be captured or denied to the enemy by D plus 1 (11th July).
- (b) The airfields at PONTE OLIVO, BISCARI, COMISO and LICATA, should also be captured or denied to the enemy by 12th or 13th July.
- (c) By 12th July aircraft should be operating from PACHINO, PONTE OLIVO airfield might be ready to receive aircraft on 12th or 13th July and BISCARI and COMISO airfields by 13th or 14th July.
- (d) By 14th July, the use of CATANIA and GERBINI airfields should be effectively denied to the enemy, and attacks on the remaining (western) airfields can be still more concentrated.
- (e) By 16th July, CATANIA and GERBINI might be in our hands and ready to receive aircraft the same day or the day after. When this stage has been reached air superiority over the battle area should be assured.
- (f) The airfields at SCIACCA, CASTELVETRANO, TRAPANI/MILIC, BO RIZZO and PALERMO/BOCCA DI PALCO may be occupied by 24th July if things go well.

40. ^{been} All the above objectives scheduled in (a) to (d) had/substantially reached according to timetable, Thus:

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- (a) PACHELINO was captured on 10th July.
- (b) PONTE OLIVO was captured on 12th July, BISCARI on 13th July, COMISO on night 11/12th July and LICATA on 10th July.
- (c) PACHELINO was fully operational on 13th July and PONTE OLIVO and COMISO were ready for use on the same date. BISCARI, however, was still unserviceable owing to bomb damage.
- (d) CATANIA airfield and the GERBINI strips were untenable for the enemy by 14th July.

11. As to the rest, CATANIA was still grimly holding out, while the conquest of Western SICILY lies outside the scope of this report.

(Continued.....19.

PART IV - SUMMARY AND TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS.The Enemy's Low Morale.

1. The success or failure of the seaborne invasion of SICILY depended entirely upon the adequacy of the air power supporting the operation. From the point of view of the MALTA air force engaged, there never was any doubt as to its effectiveness.
2. The concentration of 23 Spitfire squadrons, both R.A.F., and U.S.A.A.F. in MALTA and GOZO established, before the battle opened, a moral supremacy over the enemy which, amongst other things, cut our losses to a small proportion of those that might reasonably have been expected. Of these aircraft, a comfortable number were Spitfire IX's and there is satisfactory evidence of the superiority of this type of machine over even the best type of enemy fighters. Their high performance at great altitudes gave them advantages even over M.E. 109's, and instances of enemy fighters "jumping" our own were very rare. On the other hand, the top cover provided by Spitfire IX's was extremely successful in picking off enemy fighters.
3. And the enemy was aware of all this. The SICILIAN campaign brought out no "Battle of Britain" spirit amongst his pilots. It is true they faced a vastly superior air force - in all the Central Mediterranean area on D-1 day there were barely 1250 Axis aircraft, and their serviceability was low. None the less they had excellent airfields available, particularly in the GERBINI area, and good support behind them. Yet they entered the battle half-beaten and, at least by day, rapidly collapsed. Cases of enemy fighters avoiding combat are as numerous as those in which they accepted it. Without doubt they were acutely "Spitfire-conscious".
4. The extent of the enemy air opposition is best revealed by an analysis of the MALTA fighter effort during the period under review. On D day for example, no less than 1143 day fighters sorties were flown. Of these 1092 were on beach patrols. By July 14th (D plus 4) the effort had sunk to 560 sorties, 451 on beach patrols, and by July 17th (D plus 7) to only 155, no beach patrols operating at all. Yet this steadily diminishing effort proved more than sufficient to counter everything the Axis air force could, or was prepared to do.

According to Plan.

5. On the whole, the operation from MALTA's point of view went reasonably according to plan. Certain confusions in the movement of air stores from beaches to the LICATA airfield delayed the opening up of that field. Additionally, the stubborn German defence of CATANIA denied us longer than was hoped, the use of the GERBINI airfields and deranged the planned moves of squadrons into and out of MALTA.
6. Certain confusions resulting from divided commands have already been referred to in Part II of this report. They never had very serious results but should have been avoided with better liaison. In this matter an increase in signals facilities would have proved helpful. The channels

Linking the various interested H.Q.'s spread between CAIRO and ALGIERS, were inevitably limited and frequently overloaded. Drastic restrictions on the non-operational use of these channels was essential and was enforced. In the result, communications under very difficult conditions for the Signals staff, worked well on the whole.

Success of Night Fighter Intruders.

7. A total of 276 night fighter sorties was made during the period under review. Of these 72 were on intruder patrols and 190 on interception patrols. The offensive use of these intruders over enemy aerodromes undoubtedly seriously limited his air offensive by night. And the interception patrols, flown for the most part over enemy territory, exacted a high price for his shipping attacks.

8. A large part of the success enjoyed by these interception patrols must be attributed to the speedy setting up of a forward G.C.I. station and the additional help provided by those installed on I.S.Ts.

Some Tentative Conclusions.

9. The following short list of possible lessons to be learnt from the operations already concluded is deduced from a preliminary analysis of the events:-

- (a) Several air forces can operate against a relatively concentrated target area, from widely scattered bases, without a very high degree of centralised control. But quick and efficient liaison is essential to successful co-ordination of effort.
- (b) A relatively very small aerodrome area, can with proper organisation be made to maintain and operate a very high concentration of aircraft.
- (c) With a high standard of ground control and flying discipline at least 25 squadrons can be operated successfully from four almost contiguous airfields or landing strips without serious risk of collision or taxiing accidents.
- (d) With proper equipment and trained staff, one fighter control room can successfully handle a mixed force of 35 squadrons including day and night fighters, fighter-bombers, tactical reconnaissance aircraft, bomber escorts and shipping protection patrols.
- (e) Combined operations even of peculiar hazard can be successfully directed, provided only that one central operational control for all forces involved is established.
- (f) A short period of intensive training in the actual battle area, for the squadrons scheduled to take part in the operation is invaluable. This training can be given without forfeiting tactical surprise.

MOST SECRET.

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- (g) G.C.I.'s can be successfully mounted and operated from relatively small ships, e.g. L.S.R's. They are immensely valuable as forward night fighter control units, provided the organisation throughout is good.
- (h) In amphibious operations involving a high degree of air cover over ships and beaches, personnel manning A.A. defences on ships or shore must display a much higher standard of aircraft recognition. Possibilities are :-
- (i) When density of A.A. defences permits, the area should be declared a Gun Defended Area and the guns permitted freedom to fire up to 6 or 8,000 feet.
- (ii) Where conditions are less favourable, a simple yard-stick of recognition should be applied, e.g. (in the case of these operations) no S.E. aircraft to be engaged by A.A. fire unless positively identified as hostile: all T.E. aircraft to be engaged unless positively identified as friendly.
- (j) Where invasion ships are required to unload by small craft on to beaches, it is imperative that the ships anchor in as close to the shore as possible if full value of air cover is to be realised.

TAILPIECE.

Full assessment of the effort by MALTA-based aircraft in the opening stages of Husky Operation cannot yet be made. The following comment on that effort, is not, however, without interest. It is extracted from a signal received by A.O.C. MALTA from General EISENHOWER :-

"It is obvious to every individual in the Allied Command that, except for the MALTA air force and for the constructive accomplishments of the whole MALTA Command during the past year, the current attack could scarcely be classed as a feasible one. In spite of the fact that these things cannot now be published, I should like the officers and men of your Command to know of my profound obligation to them and to be assured that as soon considerations of security permit, these will be accorded public as well as official credit for their outstanding services. Please tell them in my name that during my recent hasty visit to your Command, I was impressed by the universal evidence of exemplary efficiency, enthusiasm and fighter spirit. With cordial regards."

(Signed) Eisenhower.

(Continued.....22.)

PART V - APPENDICES.

APPENDIX "A".ORDER OF BATTLE OF OPERATIONAL FLYING UNITS AS AT D - 1.

HAL FAR	-	<u>324 Wing</u>	(Spitfires)		
"	-	43 (F)	Squadron - Comiso	14	July
"	-	72 (F)	Squadron - "	15	July
"	-	93 (F)	Squadron - "	14	July
SAFI	-	111 (F)	Squadron - "	15	July
HAL FAR	-	243 (F)	Squadron - "	14	July
<hr/>					
TA KALI	-	<u>322 Wing</u>	(Spitfires)		
"	-	81 (F)	Squadron		
"	-	152 (F)	Squadron		
"	-	154 (F)	Squadron		
"	-	232 (F)	Squadron		
"	-	242 (F)	Squadron		
<hr/>					
LUQA	-	<u>244 Wing</u>	(Spitfires)		
"	-	1 (F)	Squadron S.A.A.F. - Pachino	13	July
"	-	92 (F)	Squadron - "	13	July
"	-	145 (F)	Squadron - "	13	July
"	-	417 (F)	Squadron R.C.A.F. - "	16	July
"	-	601 (F)	Squadron - "	13	July
"	-	40 (A.C.)	Squadron S.A.A.F.		
<hr/>					
<u>Malta Wing (Spitfires)</u>					
SAFI	-	126 (F)	Squadron		
KRENDI	-	185 (F)	Squadron		
"	-	229 (F)	Squadron		
"	-	249 (F)	Squadron		
SAFI	-	1435 (F)	Squadron		
<hr/>					
VALLETTA	-	<u>248 (G.R.) Wing.</u>			
LUQA	-	69 (G.R.)	Squadron (1 Flight) (Baltimores)		
	-	221 (G.R.)	Squadron (1 Flight) (A.S.V. Wellingtons)		
TA KALI	-	815 (FAA.)	Squadron (1 Flight) (Albacores)		
	-	826 (FAA.)	Squadron (Albacores)		
LUQA	-	683 P.R.	Squadron (Spitfires)		
<hr/>					
LUQA	-	23 (F)	Squadron (Mosquitoes)		
"	-	73 (W.F.)	Squadron (1 Flight) (Hurricanes) - La Sebala		13 July
"	-	108 (W.F.)	Squadron (1 Flight) (Beaufighters)		
"	-	256 (F)	Squadron (Mosquitoes) (1 Flight)		
"	-	600 (W.F.)	Squadron (Beaufighters)		
KALAFRANA	-	230	Squadron Det. (Sunderlands)		
HAL FAR	-		Air/Sea Rescue Comm. Flight (Misc.)		

CAMP NO. 6. - 239 Wing (Kitty Bombers)
 TA KALI - 3 (F.B.) Squadron R.A.A.F.
 SAPI - 112 (F.B.) Squadron
 HAT FAR - 250 (F.B.) Squadron
 CAMP NO. 6. - 260 (F.B.) Squadron
 " " - 450 (F.B.) Squadron R.A.A.F. } Personnel only.

CAMP NO. 5, - 57 Pursuit Group U.S.A.A.F. (P.40)
 " - 64 (F.B.) Squadron }
 " - 65 (F.B.) Squadron } Personnel only.
 " - 66 (F.B.) Squadron }

CAMP NO. 5, - 79 Pursuit Group U.S.A.A.F. (P.40)
 " - 85 (F.B.) Squadron } Personnel only -
 " - 86 (F.B.) Squadron } Later left for
 " - 87 (F.B.) Squadron } Sicily.

GOZO - 33 Pursuit Group U.S.A.A.F. (Spitfires)
 " - 307 (F) Squadron - Licata 15 July
 " - 308 (F) Squadron - Ponte Olivo 15 July
 " - 309 (F) Squadron - " " 15 July

PANTELLARIA - 33 Pursuit Group U.S.A.A.F. (P.40)
 " - 58 (F) Squadron - Licata 14 July
 " - 59 (F) Squadron - " 14 July
 " - 60 (F) Squadron - " 14 July

ORDER OF BATTLE OF OPERATIONAL FLYING UNITS AS AT D PLUS 7.

TA KALI - 322 Wing (Spitfires)
 " - 81 (F) Squadron
 " - 152 (F) Squadron
 " - 154 (F) Squadron
 " - 232 (F) Squadron
 " - 242 (F) Squadron

Malta Wing (Spitfires)

SAPI - 126 (F) Squadron
 KRENDI - 185 (F) Squadron
 " - 229 (F) Squadron
 " - 249 (F) Squadron
 SAPI - 1435 (F) Squadron

VALLETTA - 248 (G.R.) Wing
 LUQA - 69 (G.R.) Squadron (1 Flight) (Baltimores)
 " - 221 (G.R.) Squadron (1 Flight) (A.S.V. Wellingtons)
 " - 272 (G.) Squadron (Beaufighters)
 TA KALI - 815 (FAA) Squadron (1 Flight) (Albacores)
 " - 826 (FAA) Squadron (Albacores)
 LUQA - 683 P.R. Squadron (Spitfires)

LUQA	- 23 (F) Squadron (Mosquitoes)
"	- 108 (N.F.) Squadron (1 Flight) (Beaufighters)
"	- 256 (F) Squadron (Mosquitoes) (1 Flight)
"	- 600 (N.F.) Squadron (Beaufighters)
"	- 40 (A.C.) Squadron S.A.A.F. (Spitfires)
KALAFRANA	- 230 Squadron Det. (Sunderlands)
HAL FAR	- Air/Sea Rescue Comm. Flight (Misc.)

LUQA	- <u>239 Wing</u> (Kitty Bombers)
LUQA	- 3 (F.B.) Squadron R.A.A.F.
SAFI	- 112 (F.B.) Squadron
LUQA	- 250 (F.B.) Squadron
"	- 260 (F.B.) Squadron
"	- 450 (F.B.) Squadron R.A.A.F.

CAMP NO. 5.	- <u>57 Pursuit Group U.S.A.A.F. (P.40)</u>
KAL FAR	- 64 (F.B.) Squadron
" "	- 65 (F.B.) Squadron
GOZO	- 66 (F.B.) Squadron

APPENDIX "B".

(1) SUMMARY OF DAY FIGHTER OPERATIONS.

Date	Off Patrol	Fighter Bombers	Escort to Fighter Bombers	Escort to Bombers	Beach Patrols	Convoy Patrols	Inter-ception Patrols	Misc. Sorties	Totals
9.	-	-	-	176	-	413	28	18	635
10.	-	-	-	37	1,092.	-	-	14	1,143
11.	-	58	22	23	872	-	9	-	984
12.	12	35	12	21	897	8	3	-	988
13.	31	54	30	41	732	-	-	-	888
14.	12	58	18	21	451	-	-	-	560
15.	171	46	19	32	-	-	-	-	268
16.	126	19	8	16	-	61	-	8	238
17.	121	-	-	22	-	33	-	12	188
TOTAL	473.	270	109	389	4,044	515	40	52	5,892

Squadrons and aircraft employed :-

Spitfires of 1 (S.A.A.F.) 43, 72, 81, 92, 93, 111, 126, 145, 152, 154, 185, 229, 232, 242, 243, 249, 417 (R.C.A.F.), 601 and 1435 Squadrons.

U.S. Spitfires of 307, 308 and 309 Squadrons U.S.A.A.F.

U.S. Warhawks (P.40) of 58, 59, 60, 64 and 65 Squadrons, U.S.A.A.F.

Kittyhawks (P.40) of 3 (R.A.A.F.), 112, 250, 260 and 450 (R.A.A.F.) Squadrons.

Note:- The following moves from MALTA took place during the period under review:-

13th July. 1(S.A.A.F.). 92, 145 and 601 Squadrons left for PACHINO.

14th July. 43, 93 and 243 Squadrons left for COMISO. 58, 59 and 60 Squadrons U.S.A.A.F. left for LICATA.

15th July. 72 and 111 Squadrons left for COMISO. 307 Squadron U.S.A.A.F. left for LICATA. 308 and 309 Squadrons, U.S.A.A.F. left for PONTE OLIVO.

16th July. 417 (R.C.A.F.) left for PACHINO.

(ii) ANALYSIS OF DAY FIGHTER OPERATIONS.

Part I. Interceptions and Engagements.

AREA.	DATE & TIME.	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS.	ATTACKS.
South of GERBINI.	1725 hrs. 9 July.	4 Spitfire IX's 1 Spitfire IXc 4 Spitfire Vc 1 Spitfire Vb 185 Squadron.	The Spitfires were escorting U.S. Mitchells (B.25's) of N.A.A.F. bombing GERBINI number seven landing-ground. After the bombing the Spitfire IX's flying at 25,000 ft. sighted 4 plus F.W. 190's and 2 plus MC.202's and combats took place near AUGUSTA. 1 FW.190 and 1 MC202 destroyed. 1 FW.190 probably destroyed. Weather and visibility good.
GELA-CAPE SCALAMBRI	10 July. 0450B- 0530B hrs.	2 Spitfire VB's 5 Spitfire VC's 4 Spitfire IX's 242 Squadron.	The Spitfires were providing covering patrols over landing operations. At 0450B hours one Spitfire VC sighted a HE.111 which was apparently machine-gunning the boats and shot it down in flames from 100 yards. At 0520B hours one Spitfire VC sighted a JU.88 head on 500 yards ahead slightly above and damaged it. At 0530B hours two Spitfire IX's sighted one JU.88 with two MC.200's above. One Spitfire attacked and damaged the JU.88, while the other engaged the MC.200's as they dived to attack the first Spitfire. One MC.200 was shot down in flames. Weather and visibility fair.
South of SYRACUSE.	10 July. 0500B- 0545B hrs.	4 Spitfire IX's 3 Spitfire V's 93 Squadron.	The Spitfires were patrolling at 6000 ft. over landing operations. One of the Spitfires attacked and damaged a single JU.88, which succeeded in escaping.
Cape PASSERO Area.	10 July. 0830B- 0915B hrs.	3 Spitfire V's 4 Spitfire IX's 145 Squadron.	The Spitfires were on patrol over the landing beaches. Eight ME.109's were seen. One Spitfire scored strikes on one ME.109 and saw pieces fly off. The enemy was claimed as damaged.
South of SYRACUSE.	10 July. 0900B- 1000B hrs.	4 Spitfire IX's 3 Spitfire V's 93 Squadron.	The squadron was on patrol over the landing beaches. Six MC.202's dived on the Spitfires and a number of combats ensued. One MC.202 was last seen diving at 10,000 ft. with flames and glycol issuing from the engine, and was claimed as probably destroyed.

AREA.	DATE & TIME	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS.	ATTACKS.
GELA-CAPE CALAMBRI.	10 July 1225B hours.	8 Spitfire V's 4 Spitfire IX's 254 Squadron.	The Spitfires which were patrolling at 9000 ft over landing operations, were attacked from astern by eight ME.109's from 10,000 ft. One ME.109 was shot down and one ME.109 was damaged. One Spitfire which was damaged in combat crashed landing. Pilot safe.
East of AVOLA.	10 July. 1500B - 1600B hrs.	8 Spitfire V's 4 Spitfire IX's 95 Squadron.	The squadron was patrolling over the landing beaches. The Spitfires engaged nine JU.88's escorted by one ME.110 and two FW.190's, which were attacking our shipping. One JU.88 was shot down and another damaged. One Spitfire is believed to have forced-landed at PACHINO.
PACHINO peninsula.	10 July. 1500B - 1600B hrs.	4 Spitfire IX's 8 Spitfire V's 92 Squadron.	The squadron was providing a covering patrol over the beaches on the PACHINO peninsula. Towards the end of the patrol 6 JU.88's escorted by 12 ME.109's were intercepted off AVOLA. 1 JU.88 was shot down and 1 JU.88 damaged. 2 Spitfires are missing. 1 pilot was subsequently rescued.
South of CAPE MURRO i PORCO.	10 July. 1605B - 1700B hrs.	7 Spitfire V's 2 Spitfire IX's 93 Squadron.	The squadron was providing cover over landing beaches. The Spitfires saw six plus JU.88's bombing our shipping. MC.202's were chased but no claims made. One Spitfire is missing and another was damaged by A.A. fire (Cat.2).
GELA-CAPE CALAMBRI.	10 July. 1635B hrs.	3 Spitfire VB's 4 Spitfire VC's 4 Spitfire IX's 242 Squadron.	The Spitfires were providing covering patrols over landing operations. Two Spitfires dived on eight ME.109's which appeared to be about to attack the boats and shot one down. Another Spitfire which is missing is believed to have forced-landed 3 miles Southeast of GELA with ammunition exhausted after being attacked by two ME.109's. Weather - Fair.

AREA.	DATE & TIME	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS.	ATTACKS.
SYRACUSE Area.	10 July. 1930 hrs.	5 Spitfire IX's 1 Spitfire VB 5 Spitfire VC's 1435 Squadron.	The squadron was on patrol over SYRACUSE area at 15,000 feet. 6 ME.109's were sighted at 13,500 feet and were attacked, also 6 plus FW.190 bombers attacking friendly shipping. A further 6 ME.109's also joined in the combat. 1 ME.109 was probably destroyed and 1 ME.109 and 1 FW.190 damaged. 2 Spitfire IX's are missing. 1 Pilot safe.
SYRACUSE Area.	10 July. 0620 hrs.	12 Spitfire V's 43 Squadron.	The squadron was on patrol over the beaches South of SYRACUSE at 10,000 feet when 2 enemy aircraft were reported below. 2 Spitfires dived on the enemy, 1 of them firing a 2 - second burst at 300 yards from astern at a FW.190. Hits were scored on the cockpit of the enemy, which burst into flames, rolled over and dived into the sea. Weather - Good with slight haze.
LICATA Area.	10 July. 1630 - 1700 hrs.	4 P.40 L 58 (U.S.) Sqdn. 4 P.40 L 58 (U.S.) Sqdn. 2 P.40 L 60 (U.S.) Sqdn.	The formation was on patrol over the beaches immediately East of LICATA when 12 to 14 ME.109's approached offshore shipping at about 8000 feet and dropped 3 bombs. The P.40s engaged the enemy and shot down 2 ME.109's and damaged 2 ME.109's. Weather and visibility - Good.
SYRACUSE Area.	10 July. 1930 hrs.	1 Spitfire VB 11 Spitfire VC's 229 Squadron.	The squadron was on patrol over the beaches south of SYRACUSE at 6,000 feet, when 8 MC.200's were seen ahead flying north almost at sea level. The Spitfires dived on the enemy and shot down 3 MC.200's into the sea, probably destroying 1 MC.200. Weather - Fair but some haze.
OFF SYRACUSE	11 July. 0505 hrs.	12 Spitfire V's 43 Squadron.	The squadron was patrolling over the landing beaches South of SYRACUSE. Two Spitfires sighted 1 ME.210 flying north at 5000 feet and destroyed it south west of Cape ARMI after a chase which lasted 50 miles. Weather - Hazy.

AREA.	DATE & TIME	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS	ATTACKS.
GELA area.	11 July 0625 - 0705 hrs	4 Spitfire V's 1 Spitfire VIII 3 Spitfire IX's 309 Squadron.	The squadron was on covering patrol when ten plus DO.217's, one HE.177, one plus JU.89 and two FW.190's were seen attacking shipping. One DO.217 was probably destroyed and another damaged. Two Spitfires were damaged (Cat.2) by A.A. Fire.
VITTORIA area.	11 July 0640 hrs	4 Spitfire IX's 4 Spitfire V's 242 Squadron.	The squadron was patrolling over the landing beaches South east of GELA. 1 JU.88 was intercepted by 3 Spitfires and forced to jettison its bombs near VITTORIA. The JU.88 was finally shot down near BISCARI.
GELA area.	11 July 0800 - 0845 hrs	6 Spitfire V's 2 Spitfire IX's 307 Squadron.	While on covering patrol over the landing beaches, Spitfires dived on four FW.190's which were approaching shipping. One FW.190 was shot down, but intense A.A. fire from the ships prevented the Spitfires attacking the other fighter-bombers.
GELA area.	11 July 0925 - 1000 hrs	6 Spitfire V's 1 Spitfire VIII 3 Spitfire IX's 309 Squadron.	The squadron was on covering patrol over the landing beaches. Two of the Spitfires shot down a single JU.88, which damaged one Spitfire (Cat.I) by return fire.
COMISO area.	11 July 1045 hrs.	1 Spitfire VB 7 Spitfire VC's 229 Squadron.	The squadron was on patrol over the beaches in the South east tip of SICILY and over troops further inland at 13,000 feet. 1 Spitfire intercepted a MC.202 at 13,000 feet over COMISO, firing one short burst from astern at 200 yards and shot it down in flames. Weather and visibility - Good.
GELA area.	11 July 1130 - 1200 hrs.	8 Spitfire V's 4 Spitfire IX's 307 Squadron.	While on covering patrol over the landing beaches, the Spitfires attacked two FW.190's which were approaching shipping, and forced the enemy to jettison bombs. One FW.190 was shot down.
South of SYRACUSE	11 July 1230 - 1300 hrs.	8 Spitfire V's 4 Spitfire IX's 93 Squadron.	The Spitfires were on covering patrol when they encountered a number of JU.88's escorted by two ME.109's, attacking shipping. Two JU.88's and ME.109 were shot down, the latter victory being shared by a P.38. One Spitfire believed to have landed at PACHINO, was heard over R/T to claim another JU.88 destroyed.

AREA.	DATE & TIME	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS.	ATTACKS.
GELA area.	11 July 1515 - 1600 hrs.	30 P.40 L 60 (U.S.) Sqdn.	The squadron was on patrol over the beaches immediately East of LICATA when 25 plus Ju.88's attacked shipping off the GELA beaches. The P.40's were warned by G.C.I. too late to prevent the bombing attack but intercepted the JU.88's on their return journey over PONTE OLIVO aerodrome. 4 JU.88's were shot down and one JU.88 damaged. On returning to the LICATA beaches the P.40's engaged 6 to 8 ME.109's. 1 ME.109 was probably destroyed. 1 P.40 is missing. Another P.40 was damaged. Weather - Good.
GELA area.	11 July 1550 hrs.	2 Spitfire IXs 4 Spitfire V's 92 Squadron.	The squadron was on patrol between Cape SCALAMBRI and GELA, with Spitfire V's at 9000 feet and Spitfire IX's at 13,000 feet. When the squadron was flying South west over the coast 5 miles South East of GELA, A.A. bursts were seen 3 miles South of GELA and 12 JU.88's at 10,000 feet diving North escorted by 30 unidentified fighters stepped up to 15,000 feet. The Spitfires intercepted the bombers over PRIOLO and shot down 4 JU.88's, probably destroyed 1 JU.88 and damaged 1 JU.88. 1 Spitfire missing. Weather and visibility - Good.
GELA area.	11 July 1600 - 1630 hrs.	4 Spitfire V's 2 Spitfire VIII 2 Spitfire IXs 309 Squadron.	While on covering patrol over the landing beaches, the Spitfires climbed to intercept a single ME.109, which was shot down.
GELA area.	11 July 1630 - 1655 hrs.	2 Spitfire V's 4 Spitfire IXs 308 Squadron.	The squadron was on covering patrol over the landing beaches. Six DO.217's, with top cover, were attacked as they were commencing to dive-bomb shipping. The majority jettisoned bombs. One DO.217 was shot down and another damaged. One Spitfire was damaged (Cat.I) by return fire.
North of VIZZINI.	11 July 1810 - 2011 hrs.	2 Spitfire IXs 6 Spitfire VCs 243 Squadron.	The squadron was escorting Kittyhawk fighter-bombers over GERBINI. 2 MC.202's flying at 9000 feet were attacked North of VIZZINI. 1 MC.202 was damaged. Weather - Hazy.

AREA.	DATE & TIME.	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS.	ATTACK.
NORO area.	11 July 1625 - 2015 hrs.	4 Spitfire IX's 1 Spitfire VB 3 Spitfire VC's 126 Squadron.	The squadron was patrolling at 14,000 to 16,500 feet over the NORO area when 20 plus FW.190's ME.109's and MC.202's were seen approaching offshore shipping at 14,500 feet. The Spitfires engaged the enemy, broke up their formation and shot down 1 MC.202, probably destroyed 2 MC.202's and damaged 5 ME.109's and 1 FW.190.
SYRACUSE area.	11 July 1920 hrs.	5 Spitfire IX's 5 Spitfire VC's 1 Spitfire VB 111 Squadron.	The squadron was patrolling over the beaches between SYRACUSE and CAPE PASSERO. An air fight was seen over SYRACUSE with 8 enemy aircraft patrolling above. 5 Spitfires joined in the air fight, while the remainder engaged the top cover. 2 ME.2001's, 1 MC.202 and 1 FW.190 were destroyed and 1 ME.2001 and 1 MC.202 damaged. 1 Spitfire was damaged and had to land at PACHINO landing-ground, where it struck a tree.
South of SYRACUSE.	11 July	4 Spitfire IX's 3 Spitfire VC's 72 Squadron.	The squadron was on patrol over the landing beaches South of SYRACUSE and intercepted a formation of Mc.200's. 3 MC.200's were shot down and 2 MC.200's damaged.
AUGUSTA area.	12 July 0525 - 0655 hrs.	3 Spitfire V's 72 Squadron.	While on patrol over the landing beaches, the Spitfires encountered about seven enemy fighters: one ME.109 and one MC.202 were shot down and one ME.109 was probably destroyed. One Spitfire is missing.
SYRACUSE area.	12 July 0625 - 0835 hrs.	3 Spitfire IX's 2 Spitfire VB's 5 Spitfire VC's 126 Squadron.	The squadron was patrolling over the SYRACUSE area at 10,000 to 15,000 feet, when 4 plus ME.109's were seen making a low level attack on road traffic west of SYRACUSE. The Spitfires dived on the enemy and shot down one ME.109, damaging another. A further 6 plus ME.109's which were seen flying South at 6000 to 7000 feet South of SYRACUSE turned back and avoided combat.

AREA.	DATE & TIME.	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS.	ATTACKS.
PONTE OLIVO area.	12 July 0630 - 0710 hrs.	4 Spitfire V's 4 Spitfire IX's 307 Squadron.	While on covering patrol over the landing beaches, the Spitfires dived on a single FW.190 which was shot down.
AUGUSTA area.	12 July 0630 hrs.	12 Spitfire V's 43 Squadron.	The squadron was on covering patrol North of SYRACUSE. 1 ME.109 was seen at 3000 feet near AUGUSTA Harbour and was chased by 1 Spitfire. The guns of the Spitfire jammed when it had closed within 200 yards and it had to abandon the pursuit.
SYRACUSE area.	12 July 0720 - 0855 hrs.	4 Spitfire IX's 6 Spitfire VC's 1 Spitfire VB. 1435 Squadron.	The squadron was patrolling over the SYRACUSE area when 30 plus enemy aircraft were seen to the West at about the same height. The squadron engaged the enemy and broke up their formation, destroying 2 ME.109's, probably destroying 1 ME.109 and damaging 2 ME.109's.
South of SYRACUSE.	12 July 0730 - 0830 hrs.	6 Spitfire V's 4 Spitfire IX's 1 S.A. Sqdn.	While on covering patrol over the landing beaches, the Spitfires dived on four ME.109's and were in turn attacked by six German and Italian fighters. The combats were indecisive.
CAPE SCALAMBRI area.	12 July 0755 - 0835 hrs.	4 Spitfire IX's 4 Spitfire V's 81 Squadron.	The Spitfires were providing covering patrols at 10,000 feet over the beach north west of Cape SCALAMBRI. 2 ME.109's attempted stern attack on one section of 3 Spitfires but dived away as the Spitfires turned. All three Spitfires fired, but no claims were made.
East of GELA.	12 July 0915 hrs.	8 Spitfire VC's 852 Squadron.	The squadron was on patrol over the landing beaches southeast of GELA and was directed to intercept enemy aircraft approaching from the north east. An air fight was seen near COMISO aerodrome and the Spitfires joined in, destroying 1 ME.109, the pilot of which escaped by parachute. Two Spitfires are missing. Another Spitfire forced-landed in enemy territory, the pilot escaping to our lines. Weather - Good with slight haze.

AREA.	DATE & TIME	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRON.	ATTACKS.
SOMERSO Area.	12 July 0920 hrs.	1 Spitfire VB 10 Spitfire VC's 229 Squadron.	The squadron was on patrol cover over the beaches north west of Cape SCALAMBRI at 17,000 feet, when about 21 ME.109's, FW.190's, MC.202's and ME.110's were seen flying south at 10,000 feet. The Spitfires dived on the enemy and broke up their formation. 2 ME.109's and 1 ME.110 were shot down and 2 ME.110's damaged. 1 Spitfire is missing. Weather and visibility - Good.
SYRACUSE area.	12 July 1940 hrs.	2 Spitfire IX's 10 Spitfire VC's 93 Squadron.	The squadron was on patrol between BELVEDERE and NOTO at 14,000 feet. About 6 ME.109G's were seen at approximately 2000 feet and were attacked by two Spitfires. 2 ME.109G's were damaged. One Spitfire which had lost a tyre on take-off had to make a crash-landing and was damaged (Cat. I) Weather - Good.
LICATA area.	12 July 1050 - 1127 hrs.	11 P.40 L 58 (U.S.) Sqdn.	The squadron was on patrol at 6000 feet over the LICATA beaches when 2 groups of 4 and 3 ME.109's respectively attacked from above from different directions. 2 ME.109's were shot down. 1 P.40 is missing. Another P.40 was damaged. Weather and visibility - Good.
AUGUSTA area.	12 July 1200 - 1220 hrs.	8 Spitfire V's 4 Spitfires IX's 72 Squadron.	While on covering patrol over the landing beaches, the Spitfires engaged one JU.52 with an escort of thirty plus German and Italian fighters. The JU.52, five MC.200's and one ME.109 were shot down, one MC.200 probably destroyed and four MC.200's, two ME.109's and one FW.190 damaged. One Spitfire was damaged on landing (Cat.2).
SYRACUSE area.	12 July	8 Spitfire IX's 4 Spitfire V's. 601 Squadron.	The Spitfires were escorting Kittyhawks to bomb MELILLI. Two of the Spitfires fired at a single ME.109 without apparent result.

AREA.	DATE & TIME.	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS.	ATTACKS.
AUGUSTA area.	12 July 1300 - 1330 hrs.	8 Spitfire V's 2 Spitfire IX's. 601 Squadron.	The squadron was on patrol over the landing beaches. Of eight JU.87's encountered, one was shot down, two probably destroyed and three damaged. One missing Spitfire pilot was heard to say he would attempt to land at PACHINO.
AUGUSTA area.	12 July 1430 - 1630 hrs.	4 Spitfire IX's 8 Spitfire VC's 243 Squadron.	The squadron was on patrol over the landing beaches South of SYRACUSE. 3 MC.202's were attacked near LENTINI. 1 MC.202 was probably destroyed. Weather and visibility - Good.
CARLENTINI area.	12 July 1555 - 1705 hrs.	8 Spitfire VC's 4 Spitfire IX's 72 Squadron.	The squadron was on patrol over the landing beaches. The Spitfires, attacking a number of German and Italian fighters, shot down two ME.109's and one MC.202, probably destroyed two ME.109's and damaged three ME.109's.
AUGUSTA area.	12 July 1930 hrs.	2 Spitfire VB's 10 Spitfire VC's 229 Squadron.	The squadron was on patrol at 16,000 feet over the coast between SYRACUSE and AUGUSTA, when it was attacked out of the sun by 10 ME.109's. 1 ME.109 was shot down. Weather and visibility - Good.
SYRACUSE- AUGUSTA area.	12 July 1820 - 2010 hrs.	4 Spitfire IX's 3 Spitfire VB's 5 Spitfire VC's 1435 Squadron.	The squadron was on patrol between AUGUSTA and SYRACUSE and engaged 10 ME.109's and 15 MC.202's. 1 MC.202 was probably destroyed. 1 Spitfire is missing. 2 Spitfires were slightly damaged. (Cat.I).
South of SYRACUSE.	12 July 0424 - 0631 hrs.	3 Spitfire IX's 6 Spitfire VC's 1 Spitfire VB. 243 Squadron.	The squadron was on patrol over the landing beaches south of SYRACUSE. One Spitfire sighted two ME.109's and attacked one at 200 yards range. Flashes were seen on the starboard side of the ME.109, which was last seen in a steep dive at 3000 feet. No claim was made, as the Spitfire pilot was uncertain whether the flashes on the ME.109 were cannon strikes or reflected sunshine. Weather - Good.
SYRACUSE area.	13 July 0500 hrs.	3 Spitfire IX's 1 Spitfire VB 8 Spitfire VC's 111 Squadron.	The squadron was on dawn patrol over the landing beaches between MOTO and AUGUSTA. Almost exactly at first light 6 JU.88's were silhouetted against the horizon and were intercepted about 5 miles south of SYRACUSE. 2 JU.88's were shot down, 5 of the crews being seen to escape by parachute. 1 Spitfire VC was damaged by return fire.

AREA	DATE & TIME	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT AND SQUADRONS.	ATTACKS.
GERBINI area.	13 July 0650 - 0842 hrs.	4 Spitfire IX. 6 Spitfires Vc's 243 Squadron.	<p>The Squadron was on patrol over the GERBINI area.</p> <p>12 JU.87's flying northwards in line abreast without a fighter escort were intercepted at 10,000 feet near GERBINI.</p> <p>5 JU.87's were shot down and 7 JU.87's damaged.</p> <p>1 DO.217 was subsequently attacked over CATANIA and shot down into the sea.</p> <p>4 ME.109's which were circling CATANIA aerodrome were also attacked.</p> <p>1 ME.109 was probably destroyed and one ME.109 damaged.</p> <p>1 Spitfire IX was damaged (Cat.1) by return fire.</p>
South-east of GERBINI	13 July 0715 hrs.	4 Spitfire IX's 2 Spitfire Vb's 2 Spitfire Vc's 242 Squadron.	<p>The squadron was on patrol over the landing beaches south east of GELA, later making a sweep inland to the north-east.</p> <p>The Spitfire IX's intercepted 10 ME.110's at 10,000 ft near GERBINI, destroying 4 and damaging another.</p> <p>At 0720 hrs the Spitfire V's intercepted about 8 more ME.110's flying low west of SYRACUSE.</p> <p>1 ME.110 was shot down and 2 damaged.</p> <p>Weather and visibility good.</p>
CATANIA	13 July 0730 hrs	10 Spitfire Vcs 95 Squadron.	<p>The Spitfires were on patrol in the AUGUSTA area.</p> <p>Several enemy aircraft were seen landing on CATANIA aerodrome, and these were attacked with the following results :-</p> <p>1 HE.111 destroyed, 1 JU.88 probably destroyed, 2 HE.111s damaged.</p> <p>In addition, 1 Mc.202 in a blast shelter was damaged.</p> <p>One Spitfire was shot down over the aerodrome, the pilot escaping by parachute.</p> <p>After the Spitfires had left the aerodrome, the following engagements took place :-</p> <p>1 Spitfire made a stern attack on 4 ME.109s which appeared to be about to attack 2 Spitfires out to sea off CATANIA and destroyed 1 ME.109.</p> <p>1 Spitfire intercepted a single JU.87 south of CATANIA and destroyed it.</p> <p>2 Spitfires engaged 3 ME.109s and destroyed one.</p> <p>Weather good.</p>

AREA	DATE & TIME	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS.	ATTACKS.
South of AUGUSTA.	13 July 0800 - 1005 hrs	3 Spit. 1X's 1 Spit. Vb. 8 Spit. Vc's 111 Sqdn.	The Squadron was on patrol over the beaches between AUGUSTA and NOTO at 10,000 feet. A few FW.190's were intercepted. 1 FW.190 was destroyed and 1 FW.190 damaged.
AUGUSTA area	13 July 0930 - 1100	5 Spit. Vc's 4 Spit. 1X's 72 Squadron.	The Spitfires were on patrol over the landing beaches. Combats resulted with a number of German and Italian fighters, of which one ME.109 and one Me.200 were shot down.
AUGUSTA area	13 July 1115 hrs	2 Spit. 1X's 9 Spit. Vc's 93 Squadron.	The Squadron intercepted 7 Mc.202's while patrolling over the AUGUSTA area. 1 Mc.202 was shot down, 1 Mc.202 probably destroyed and 4 Mc.202's damaged. Weather - Good.
AUGUSTA area	13 July 1200 hrs	2 Spit. 1X's 8 Spit. Vc's 243 Sqdn.	The Squadron was patrolling off AUGUSTA. About 12 Mc.200's were seen to dive-bomb 2 cruisers in the vicinity. The Squadron attacked destroying 2 Mc.200's and damaging 1 Mc.200. 1 Mc.202 which attempted an attack on the Spitfires was also damaged. 1 Spitfire was damaged (Cat.1) by return fire.
BISCARI area.	13 July 1350 hrs	2 Spit. 1X's 6 Spit. V's 81 Squadron	The squadron was on covering patrol over the beach north west of Cape SCALAMBRI at 5,000 feet when 3 ME.109s were seen approaching head on at the same height. The Spitfires engaged the enemy, two of them being able to position for stern attacks. 2 ME.109's were damaged. Weather and visibility - Good.
SYRACUSE area.	13 July 1500 - 1650 hrs	2 Spit. 1X's 10 Spit.Vc's 93 Squadron.	The Squadron was attacked by two Mc.202's at 7,000 feet while patrolling in the SYRACUSE area east of CANICATTINI. 2 Spitfires were damaged and landed at PACHINO landing ground.
GLIA Area	13 July 1845 - 2030 hrs	2 Spit. 1X's 2 Spit. Vb's 8 Spit. Vc's 1435 Sqdn.	The Squadron was on patrol over the GLIA area at 15,000 feet. 8 ME.109's which were seen east of GLIA took evasive action. The Spitfires were unable to close and opened fire from extreme range with unobserved results. A single RE.2001 was intercepted and damaged by one Spitfire.

AREA.	DATE & TIME.	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS.	ATTACKS.
LENTINI area.	13 July 1900 hrs.	6 Spitfire IX. 1 Spitfire Vb 5 Spitfire Vc 249 Squadron.	<p>The Squadron was escorting Kittyhawk bombers over LENTINI flying at 12,000 ft. to 15,000 ft. when 5 FW.190's were seen flying due east in line astern and slightly below after the bombing.</p> <p>2 Spitfires dived on the enemy, which went into a steep dive to port.</p> <p>1 Spitfire got in 2 short bursts at 300 yards range at 1 FW.190, observing hits on the root of the port wing. The FW.190 then turned sharply to port and burst into flames.</p> <p>Considerable A.A. fire was experienced from CATANIA.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
AUGUSTA area.	14 July 0745 hrs.	9 Spitfire Vc. 2 Spitfire IX. 72 Squadron.	<p>While on patrol over the landing beaches, the Spitfires were dived on by a number of ME.109's of which three were shot down, one probably destroyed and one damaged.</p> <p>One Spitfire was damaged (Cat.2.)</p>
LENTINI area.	14 July 1430 - 1520 hrs.	5 Spitfire IX's 5 Spitfire V's 31 Squadron.	<p>The Squadron was on patrol over the landing beaches south of SYRACUSE. 1 Section of Spitfire IX's intercepted 6 ME.109's over LENTINI at 8,000 ft. 1 ME.109 was probably destroyed, being left at 1,000 ft. with glycol and smoke pouring from it after the Spitfire's guns had jammed.</p> <p>Another Section of Spitfire IX's intercepted 5 MC.202's south of GERBINI at 9,000 ft., the enemy diving away to the north. The Spitfires chased the enemy and destroyed 1 MC.202 after it had come down almost to the ground level.</p>
BIANCA-- VILLA area.	15 July 1110 - 1200 hrs.	1 Spitfire Vb 7 Spitfire Vc 1435 Squadron.	<p>The Spitfires were escorting Kittyhawk bombers over the BIANCA-VILLA area at 14,000 ft. to 15,000 ft.</p> <p>2 Italian ME.109's which attempted to attack over the target were driven off.</p> <p>A third ME.109 made an unsuccessful attack near AUGUSTA.</p>
LENTINI area.	16 July 0755 hrs.	4 Spitfire IX. 3 Spitfire V's 31 Squadron.	<p>The Squadron was on offensive patrol between AUGUSTA and CATANIA, stepped up between 11,000 and 14,000 ft.</p> <p>12 ME.109's seen flying West at 11,500 ft. over LENTINI were engaged. 1 ME.109 was shot down in flames, 1 ME.109 was probably destroyed.</p> <p>Weather - Good.</p>

AREA.	DATE & TIME.	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS.	ATTACKS.
CATANIA area.	16 July 1840 hrs.	3 Spitfire IX. 8 Spitfire Vs. 232 Squadron.	<p>The Squadron was on offensive patrol over the CATANIA area at 13,000 ft.</p> <p>Between 16 and 20 ME.109's were seen flying at 15,000 to 16,000 ft. north of CATANIA. The Squadron climbed and engaged the enemy, with the Spitfire IXs flying at 21,000 ft. and the Spitfire Vs at 15,000 ft.</p> <p>2 ME.109's were shot down and 3 ME.109's damaged.</p> <p>Weather - Hazy.</p>
CATANIA area.	17 July 0900 hrs.	6 Spitfire IXs. 6 Spitfire Vs. 154 Squadron.	<p>The Squadron was on offensive patrol over the GERBINI-CATANIA area, stepped up from 17,000 to 19,000 ft.</p> <p>6 ME.109's and 3 MC.202's and MC.200's were intercepted at 19,000 ft. south of CATANIA. The enemy turned away and dived towards CATANIA out to sea, followed by the Spitfires.</p> <p>1 ME.109 1 MC.202 were shot down, 1 MC.200 was probably destroyed and 2 ME.109's and 1 MC.202 were damaged.</p>
CATANIA area.	17 July 1200 - 1400 hrs.	3 Spitfire IX. 8 Spitfire V's 232 Squadron.	<p>The Spitfires were on offensive patrol over the CATANIA area.</p> <p>A Gotha glider seen on CATANIA aerodrome was attacked from 100 ft. and damaged.</p> <p>While flying towards AUGUSTA at 20,000 ft. the Spitfires intercepted 7 ME.109's and followed them down to sea level and back over CATANIA aerodrome.</p> <p>1 ME.109 was destroyed. 1 Spitfire is missing. Intense light A.A. fire was experienced from CATANIA aerodrome.</p>

Part II - Ground Attacks.

AREA & DETAILS OF TARGET.	DATE & TIME OVER TARGET.	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE SORTIES, AIRCRAFT AND SQUADRON.	MISSING AIRCRAFT, NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES AND REASONS.	BOMBS DROPPED BY TYPES.	ATTACKS.
CATANIA-LENTINI road. M.T. on road.	11 July 1015-1115 hrs.	11 Kittyhawk 111 112 Squadron 11 Kittyhawk 11 3 Squadron 9 Kittyhawk 111 250 Squadron Escort of 10 Spitfires 243 Squadron.	1 Kittyhawk 112 Sqdn. and 2 Kittyhawks 250 Squadron returned early owing to technical troubles.	58 x 250 lb.	<p>The Kittyhawks were despatched to attack M.T. vehicles on the CATANIA-LENTINI road.</p> <p>A total of 22 vehicles only was seen.</p> <p>15 stationary M.T. vehicles south of CATANIA were bombed, near misses being scored.</p> <p>4 M.T. near CALENTINI were attacked, 2 of them receiving direct hits, while other bombs burst on the road.</p> <p>About 3 other M.T. were bombed between CATANIA and LENTINI, but no hits were scored, the bombs bursting near the road.</p> <p>Slight light A.A. fire was experienced.</p> <p>Weather - Good with some haze.</p>
LENTINI-VIZZINI area.	11 July 1915-1930 hrs.	Nil.	12 Kittyhawks - 3 Sqdn. 12 Kittyhawks - 250 Sqdn. Escort 12 Spitfires 1435 Squadron.	Nil.	<p>The Kittyhawks were despatched on offensive reconnaissance of the LENTINI-VIZZINI area.</p> <p>Ground visibility was bad owing to dust and haze and no suitable targets were located.</p>

AREA & DETAILS OF TARGET.	DATE & TIME OVER TARGET.	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE SORTIES, AIRCRAFT AND SQUADRON.	MISSING AIRCRAFT, NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES & REASONS.	BOMBS DROPPED BY TYPE.	ATTACKS.
6/8 M.T. on road 5 miles South west of PALAGONIA.	12 July 0755-0835 hrs.	1 Spitfire 81 Squadron.	8 Spitfires - 81 Squadron.	NIL.	<p>The Squadron was attacked by 2 ME.109's while providing covering patrols over the beach north west of Cape SCALAMBRI. The enemy fighters appeared to be patrolling over the PALAGONIA-CALTAGIRONE road, over which 1 Spitfire flew at 1,000 ft. Fairly well dispersed M.T. were seen moving south along the whole length of the road. The Spitfire attacked a convoy of 6/8 vehicles, consisting of 1 mounted gun, lorries drawing guns and troop transports. Hits were observed on one vehicle and enemy troops were seen to scatter. Intense light A.A. fire was encountered near VIZZINI.</p>
PRIOLO area Gun positions.	12 July 0755 hrs.	9 Kittyhawks - 3 Squadron. 10 Kittyhawks - 250 Squadron. 12 Kittyhawks - 112 Squadron. Escort 12 Spitfires 601 Squadron.	2 Kittyhawks - 3 Squadron returned with bombs. 2 Kittyhawks 250 Sqdn collided and crashed in sea. 1 pilot safe.	72 x 250 lb.	<p>The Kittyhawks were despatched to bomb enemy gun positions which were holding up the army's advance towards PRIOLO. Bombing was carried out from heights between 3000 ft and 1500 feet. Haze and dust made observation of results difficult but one fire which gave off black smoke was started. A direct hit was scored on a building, while 2 M.T. were destroyed by machine-gun attacks.</p>

(continued..41

AREA & DETAILS OF TARGET.	DATE & TIME OVER TARGET.	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE BOMBERS, AIRCRAFT, AND SQUADRON.	MISSING AIRCRAFT, NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES & REASONS.	BOMBS DROPPED BY TYPES.	ATTACKS.
					<p>Later reconnaissance reported explosions and fires, apparently from ammunition dumps, in the area.</p> <p>Slight heavy A.A. fire from target area.</p> <p>Weather good but visibility poor owing to ground haze and dust.</p>
CARLENTINI Area. Railway Station and M.T. on roads.	13 July 1515 hrs.	9 Kittyhawks - 112 Sqn. 12 Kittyhawks - 260 Sqn. 12 Kittyhawks - 450 Sqn. Escort 12 Spitfires. 229 Sqn.	3 Kittyhawks 112 Sqn missing.	19 x 250 lb.	<p>12 Kittyhawks bombed the railway station at CARLENTINI, starting 1 large fire.</p> <p>21 Kittyhawks bombed M.T. on the road between LENTINI and CARLENTINI, scoring 2 direct hits on vehicles and 1 hit on a building.</p> <p>4 M.T. were set on fire by machine-gun attacks.</p> <p>Considerable heavy and light A.A. experienced from target area.</p> <p>Weather - Good.</p>
PIAZZA ARMERINA Area. Vehicles moving South east from town.	13 July 1055 hrs.	10 Kittyhawks - 250 Sqn Escort 10 Kittyhawks 3 Squadron.	1 Kittyhawk - 3 Sqn returned early. 1 Kittyhawk 3 Sqn missing.	20 x 250 lb.	<p>The Kittyhawks bombed native vehicles moving South east down the road from PIAZZA ARMERINA. One cart was set on fire and 1 A.A. gun silenced.</p> <p>The escorting Kittyhawks machine-gunned the vehicles destroying 6, damaging about 20.</p>
LENTINI area. M.T. on road.	13 July 1855 hrs.	8 Kittyhawks - 3 Sqn. Escort 6 Spitfires. 249 Squadron.	N I L	16 x 250 lb.	<p>The Kittyhawks bombed stationary M.T. on the road north of LENTINI. No direct hits were scored, but 3 bombs burst on the road.</p> <p>Two bombs burst in the railway sidings and on a factory in LENTINI town.</p>

AREA & DETAILS OF TARGET.	DATE & TIME OVER TARGET	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE SORTIES, AIRCRAFT AND SQUADRON.	MISSING AIRCRAFT NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES & REASONS.	BOMBS DROPPED BY TYPES.	ATTACK
					Slight heavy A.A. fire experienced from North of LENTINI. Weather - Good but hazy.
South of AGIRA. About 200 M.T. moving north.	14 July 2000 hrs.	5? Spitfires. 81 Squadron.	4? Spitfires did not attack.	NIL	The squadron was on patrol over the beaches south of SYRACUSE and inland. 200 M.T., some camouflaged with bushes, were seen moving north along the road from the river DITTAINO to AGIRA. Part of the squadron attacked with cannon and machine-gun fire. Details of damage were unobserved. Weather - Hazy, visibility poor
LENTINI area. 150 M.T. north of town.	14 July 1740 hrs.	12 P.40 - 64 Sqn. 12 P.40 - 65 Sqn. Escort 6 Spitfires. 1435 Squadron.	N I L	12 x 500 lb. 24 x 250 lb.	The P.40s were despatched to bomb a concentration of 150 M.T. north of LENTINI. On arrival over the target area only about 20 M.T. were found and these were well dispersed. Bombs were dropped from 2000 to 3000 feet. Details of results were unobserved.
RADDUSA area, M.T. on roads.	14 July 1240 hrs.	8 Kittyhawks - 3 Sqn. Escort 6 Spitfires. 126 Squadron.	2 Kittyhawks - 3 Sqn returned early. 12 Kittyhawks 250 Sqn found no target	16 x 250 lb.	The Kittyhawks were despatched on offensive reconnaissance of the roads north of CALTAGIRONE. 8 Kittyhawks bombed M.T. passing through a defile 5 miles south east of RADDUSA. At least 3 M.T. were damaged and the road was thought to be blocked. No opposition. Weather good.

AREA & DETAILS OF TARGET.	DATE & TIME OVER TARGET.	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE SORTIES, AIRCRAFT AND SQUADRON.	MISSING AIRCRAFT, NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES AND REASONS.	BOMBS DROPPED BY TYPES.	ATTACHES.
LENTINI area. M.T. on roads.	14 July 1800-1945 hrs	N I L.	12 Kittyhawks - 260 Sqn Escort 5 Spitfires 249 Squadron.	NIL	The Kittyhawks were despatched on offensive reconnaissance of the roads in the LENTINI area. No targets were found.
North of LENTINI Stationary goods train.	15 July 0900 - 1105 hrs.	4 Spitfire IX's 2 Spitfire VB's 6 Spitfire VC's 111 Squadron.	N I L	NIL.	The squadron made an offensive sweep over the CATANIA-GERBINI area. No enemy aircraft were seen. A stationary goods train near a small station north of LENTINI was attacked with cannon and machine-gun fire. Details of damage were unobserved.
RADDUSA area M.T. on roads.	15 July. 1200 hrs.	10 Kittyhawks - 3 Sqn 12 Kittyhawks -450 " Escort 11 Spitfires. 152 Squadron.	1 Kittyhawk - 3 Sqn missing.	46 x 250 lb.	The Kittyhawks were despatched on offensive reconnaissance of the roads north of GALTAGIRONE. 10 Kittyhawks bombed 200 M.T. moving east along the road west of RADDUSA. Two bombs burst near the road. 12 Kittyhawks bombed 100 M.T. dispersed and stationary along the road east of RADDUSA. 3 vehicles were hit and a near miss was scored on another. The formation was twice attacked by enemy fighters and 1 Kittyhawk is missing. Medium heavy and light A.A. was experienced east of RADDUSA. Weather - Hazy.

(Continued....44.)

AREA & DETAILS OF TARGET.	DATE & TIME OVER TARGET.	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE SORTIES, AIRCRAFT AND SQUADRON.	MISSING AIRCRAFT, NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES AND REASONS.	BOMBS DROPPED BY TYPES.	ATTACKS.
West of CATANIA. M.T. on roads.	15 July 1540 hrs.	11 Kittyhawks - 250 Sqn 9 Kittyhawks - 112 Sqn Escort - 8 Spitfires 1435 Squadron.	1 Kittyhawk - 250 Sqn 2 Kittyhawks - 112 Sqn returned early.	40 x 250 lb.	The Kittyhawks were despatched on offensive reconnaissance of the roads west of CATANIA. 9 Kittyhawks bombed M.T. immediately east of RADDUSA, hitting 4 vehicles, scoring 1 direct hit on road. 7 troop carrying M.T. were attacked with machine-gun fire. 11 Kittyhawks bombed M.T. moving north from GERBINI area, scoring 4 direct hits. 12 troop carrying M.T. were machine-gunned near SPERRIC. Intense light A.A. fire experienced GERBINI area. 1 Kittyhawk forced-landed in SICILY. Pilot safe. Weather and visibility - Good.
PATERNO area. M.T. on roads and railway sidings.	16 July 1000 hrs.	9 Kittyhawks - 3 Sqn 10 Kittyhawks - 260 Sqn Escort 8 Spitfires 242 Squadron.	NIL	38 x 250 lb.	The Kittyhawks were despatched on armed reconnaissance over the PATERNO area. 9 Kittyhawks bombed the railway sidings at CATENANUOVA from 2000 feet. Results were unobserved. The remainder bombed the sidings at SPERRIC with unobserved results.

(Continued....45.)

AREA & DETAILS OF TARGET.	DATE & TIME OVER TARGET.	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE SORTIES, AIRCRAFT AND SQUADRON.	MISSING AIRCRAFT, NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES AND REASONS.	BOMBS DROPPED BY TYPES.	ATTACKS.
					<p>12 M.T. near PATERNO were bombed with unobserved results A train of 40 trucks was also bombed in sidings north of PATERNO. 4 trucks appeared to be damaged. Intense light A.A. fire and slight inaccurate heavy A.A. fire experienced at CATENANUOVA. Weather - Good.</p>

(Continued.....46.

APPENDIX "C"(1) Summary of Night Fighter Operations.

Date.	Intruder patrols	Interception patrols	Ground attack	TOTALS.
9/10 July	9	18	6	33
10/11 July	11	16	-	27
11/12 July	10	21	2	33
12/13 July	8	21	6	35
13/14 July	8	20	-	28
14/15 July	8	22	-	30
15/16 July	6	24	-	30
16/17 July	7	25	-	32
17/18 July	5	23	-	28
TOTALS	72	190	14	276

SQUADRONS AND AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED :-

23 Squadron	-	Mosquitoes.
73 Squadron	-	Hurricanes (1 flight) *
108 Squadron	-	Beaufighters (1 flight)
256 Squadron	-	Mosquitoes (1 flight)
600 Squadron	-	Beaufighters.

* Note :-

73 Squadron returned to NORTH AFRICA
on 13th JULY.

ANALYSIS OF NIGHT FIGHTER OPERATIONS.

Part 1: Interceptions and Engagements.

AREA	DATE & AREA	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT AND SQDNS.	ATTACKS.
CASTELVETRANO area.	10/11 July 0001 hrs.	1 Mosquito (F) 11 - 23 Squadron.	<p>The Mosquito made an intruder patrol over the ROME area without incident. On the return journey the Mosquito sighted a JU.88 with its navigation lights on near SAN FELICE CIRCEA. The Mosquito followed the JU.88 south east to CASTELVETRANO, where it closed in to 200 yards and attacked from astern with 4 short bursts of cannon fire, hits being scored along the starboard wing. A piece of burning material fell away and the navigation lights were extinguished. The JU.88 was not seen again.</p> <p>This aircraft was claimed probably destroyed.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
ff AUGUSTA	10/11 July 0420 hrs	1 Beau-fighter VI. Mk. VI1 equipped. 108 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the south east coast of SICILY and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft north of AUGUSTA. The aircraft was identified as a JU.88, 2 bursts were fired, the first without effect, while the second scored hits along fuselage and port wing of the JU.88, which dived away to starboard. This aircraft was claimed as probably destroyed.</p> <p>At 0440 hours a second contact was obtained off CATANIA, the enemy being identified as a JU.88. The Beaufighter fired 2 bursts, the first having no effect, while the second caused an explosion on the port wing, which caught fire. The JU.88 dived away to starboard with the port wing burning.</p> <p>This aircraft was claimed destroyed.</p> <p>Weather - Good with some haze.</p>
AUGUSTA area.	10/11 July 0450 hrs	1 Beau-fighter VLP. Mk 1V equipped. 600 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off southern SICILY at 10,000 feet and was vectored on to hostile aircraft 30 miles to the north east. Contact was made at 0500 hours on aircraft about 4,000 feet below, but was lost, although the Beaufighter came down to the same height. Immediately after losing contact, the Beaufighter saw a JU.88 about 1 1/2 miles ahead and closed in behind, opening fire at 300 yards range. Hits were seen on the starboard wing of the JU.88. which returned fire, but was shortly afterwards seen to crash into the sea, with the starboard engine on fire.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>

AREA	DATE & TIME	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS	ATTACKS.
East of SYRACUSE	10/11 July 2145 hrs	1 Beaufigh- ter VI Mk. VIII equipped 108 Squadron	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the south east coast of Sicily and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft, later identified as a Cant. Z.1007. The Beaufighter attacked from dead astern and below, firing three cannon bursts, following which the enemy burst into flames and crashed into the sea.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
South of SYRACUSE	11/12 July 0420 hrs	1 Beaufigh- ter VII Mk.IV equip- ped. 600 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the south east coast of SICILY and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft, obtaining contact at 5,000 feet and a visual at 3,000 feet.</p> <p>The Beaufighter closed to 250 yards, identifying the aircraft as a HE.111, and opened fire. Hits were seen on the port wing of the HE.111 which exploded, went into a steep dive and crashed about 10 miles south west of SYRACUSE.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
East of SYRACUSE	11/12 July. 0445 hrs	1 Beaufigh- ter VI. Mk. VIII equipped 108 Squadron.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the east coast of SICILY. It was vectored on to a hostile aircraft east of SYRACUSE which was later identified as a JU.88. The Beaufighter opened fire at 600 feet, following which the JU.88 disintegrated in the air. The tail unit and part of the fuselage struck the Beaufighter head on. As the aircraft immediately became unmanageable, it was abandoned by the crew. The pilot was rescued by H.M. ship. No trace was seen of the observer.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
South west of Cape SPARTIVEN-TO.	11/12 July 2200 hrs	1 B' fighter VI. Mk VII equipped. 108 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the east coast of SICILY. Contact was obtained at 3 miles range on a hostile aircraft, which was later identified as a P.108.</p> <p>The Beaufighter made a stern attack from below at 150 feet range, firing 3 bursts. Hits were scored on the wing and the starboard inner engine, the latter exploding. The enemy fired 2 bursts at the Beaufighter but scored no hits. The Beaufighter had to break off the combat, as it was approaching the coast of southern Italy and was fitted with Mark VII A.I. equipment.</p> <p>The P.108 was claimed as damaged.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>

AREA	DATE & TIME	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS	ATTACKS
South of GELA	11/12 July 2200 hrs	1 Mosquito XII Mk. VIII equipped. 256 Sqn.	<p>The Mosquito was on interception patrol south of SICILY and was vectored into the vicinity of a hostile aircraft, later identified as a JU.88, obtaining a contact at 6 miles and a visual at 15,000 feet.</p> <p>The JU.88 immediately dived to port followed by the Mosquito, but contact was lost.</p> <p>Contact was regained at 8,000 feet range near GELA. The Mosquito closed to within 7800 feet and fired one burst. Hits were scored on the port fuselage and engine, the latter catching fire.</p> <p>The JU.88 then dived away to starboard, eventually crashing and blowing up.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
CROTONE area	11/12 July 2257 hrs	1 Mosquito VI. 23 Sqn.	<p>The Mosquito was on intruder patrol over REGGIO and CROTONE aerodromes. No activity was seen at REGGIO.</p> <p>The aerodrome lights at CROTONE were on, but were extinguished as the Mosquito approached. The Mosquito continued up the coast and returned towards the aerodrome from the north. The lights were again illuminated and aircraft navigation lights were seen in circuit. The Mosquito followed into circuit and fired a 5 second burst at 300/500 feet from above and astern. The enemy aircraft (unidentified, twin-engine) caught fire along the starboard fuselage and starboard nacelle, turned to port and crashed into the ground.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
South of SYRACUSE	12/13 July 0020 hrs	1 B ¹ fighter VIP. MkIV equipped. 600 Sqn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the east coast of SICILY, and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft eight miles south east of SYRACUSE, obtaining an A.I. contact. The aircraft was identified as a Do.217 at 1200 feet, and the Beaufighter got in a 2 second burst from 800 feet above, observing hits along the fuselage. The Do.217 returned fire and took violent evasive action, but later turned into attack. A deflection shot set fire to the starboard engine of the enemy, which then glided into the sea.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>

Cont.....50.

AREA	DATE & TIME	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS	ATTACKS
East of SYRACUSE	12/13 July. 0300 hrs	1 Mosquito XII. Mk. VIII equipped. 256 Sqdn.	<p>The Mosquito was on interception patrol off the east coast of SICILY and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft, later identified as a JU.88, obtaining a contact dead ahead at 4 miles.</p> <p>The Mosquito closed in on the JU.88 which took evasive action, obtaining a visual at 1500 feet range at 8,000 feet. The JU.88 continued violent evasive action but the Mosquito was able to close in to 500 feet range at 4,000 feet and get in a 2-second burst, setting fire to the starboard engine, following which the JU.88 crashed into the sea in flames.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
North of SYRACUSE	12/13 July 0345 hrs	1 B'fighter VI. Mk. IV equipped. 600 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the east coast of SICILY and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft to the north, obtaining a contact at maximum range. A visual was obtained at 4,000 ft, and the Beaufighter closed in, identifying the enemy as a He.111. A 2½ second burst was fired, following which a brilliant flash was seen from the fuselage of the He.111, which lost speed and burst into flames. The enemy then turned on its back and dived vertically into the ground near AUGUSTA.</p> <p>Weather - Good with some haze.</p>
South of Cape PASSERO	12/13 July 0420 hrs	1 B'fighter VI. Mk. VII equipped. 108 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off south east SICILY and was vectored on to hostile aircraft approaching from the north. A contact was obtained at 2½ miles range and, on closing in, the Beaufighter identified the aircraft as a He.111. Two short bursts were fired from dead astern at 150 yards range, following which the He.111 burst into flames and crashed into the sea.</p> <p>Weather - Good but hazy.</p>
South of Cape SCA-LAMBRI.	12/13 July 0440 hrs	1 B'fighter VI. Mk. VII equipped. 108 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the south coast of SICILY. A contact was obtained near Cape PASSERO, but this was shortly afterwards lost.</p> <p>A second contact was obtained at over 1 mile range further west, the aircraft eventually being identified at 200 yards as a JU.88. The JU.88 opened fire first, and a running fight ensued, during which the enemy took violent evasive action. The Beaufighter got in 3 or 4 cannon bursts from 150/300 yards, scoring hits on the starboard engine and mainplane, causing smoke to pour from the former. Eventually the JU.88 dived steeply to port with the starboard engine and port mainplane on fire and was lost to view. This aircraft was claimed probably destroyed.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>

AREA	DATE & TIME	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS	ATTACKS
AUGUSTA area	12/13 July 2145 hrs	1 B' Fighter VIF. Mk. IV equipped. 600 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off south east SICILY. Contact was made on a hostile aircraft, which was eventually identified at 1000 ft as a JU.88.</p> <p>The Beaufighter closed to within 150 yards and fired a 2-second burst, following which the JU.88 caught fire, went into a spiral dive and crashed in flames into the sea north of AUGUSTA.</p> <p>At 2220 hours, the Beaufighter obtained a contact on a second hostile aircraft at 10,000 feet range and obtained a visual at 2,000 feet. The enemy probably saw the Beaufighter, as it dived away steeply, with the resulting loss of visual contact, although A.I. contact was maintained. While following the enemy, the Beaufighter obtained a contact on another aircraft approaching from starboard, eventually identifying it as a He.111 at 300 feet range. The Beaufighter withdrew to 150 yards and fired a 1-second burst, setting fire to the fuselage of the He.111 which went into a spiral dive and crashed into the sea north of SYRACUSE.</p> <p>Weather good with slight haze.</p>
East of SYRACUSE	12/13 July 2200 hrs	1 B' Fighter VIII. Mk. VII equipped. 108 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the south east coast of SICILY and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft. A.I. contact was obtained at 1/2 mile range, but the aircraft gradually drew away to 4 miles. The aircraft then turned to port, and the Beaufighter was able to close in to 1,000 yards, when a visual of a JU.88 was obtained. The Beaufighter closed in to 400 feet and opened fire, following which the enemy's starboard engine exploded and it rolled over to starboard and dived vertically into the sea.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
East of SYRACUSE	12/13 July 2205 hrs	1 Mosquito XII. Mk. VIII equipped. 256 Sqdn.	<p>The Mosquito was on interception patrol off the east coast of SICILY and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft, later identified as a JU.88, obtaining a contact at 2 miles.</p> <p>The Mosquito closed to visual range and fired a 1-second burst at 150 feet range from dead astern.</p> <p>The JU.88 then exploded and crashed into the sea.</p> <p>At 2310 hours the Mosquito was vectored on to another hostile aircraft, later identified as a Cant Z.1007, and obtained a contact at 3 miles. The Mosquito closed to 50 feet and fired a 1-second burst, setting fire to the port engine of the enemy, which, however, returned fire. The Cant Z.1007 dived steeply, but a second burst from 1,000 feet set it well alight, while a third burst from 200 feet caused it to explode and dive into the sea.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>

AREA	DATE & TIME	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS	ATTACKS
Off Cape SPARTIV-ENTO.	12/13 July 2307 hrs	1 B'fighter VI.F. Mk.1V equipped. 600 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the east coast of SICILY and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft, which was later identified at 1500 feet range as a Cant Z.1007 bis (Mod.) The Beaufighter opened fire at 600 feet, blowing the starboard engine off the enemy, which crashed into the sea and was later seen burning on the surface.</p> <p>At 2330 hours the Beaufighter obtained a contact on another enemy aircraft east of SYRACUSE and identified it as a JU.88. The Beaufighter opened fire from below and shot the JU.88 down in flames into the sea.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
East of SYRACUSE	13/14 July 0215 hrs	1 Mosquito XII. Mk. VIII equipped. 256 Sqdn.	<p>The Mosquito was on interception patrol off the east coast of SICILY and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft, later identified as a JU.88 carrying what appeared to be 2 torpedoes, one on each side of the normal external bomb stowage position.</p> <p>The Mosquito obtained a contact at 3 miles and closed to within 50 feet, dropping back to 100 feet dead astern, from which position a 1-second burst was fired. Sparks were seen to issue from the cockpit of the JU.88 and, following another 2-second burst, the enemy exploded, the starboard wing breaking off and the remains crashing into the sea.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
North-East of SYRACUSE	13/14 July 2150 hrs	1 B'fighter VI.Mk.VII equipped. 108 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the east coast of SICILY and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft, obtaining A.I. contact at 2 1/2 miles range. After a short chase the Beaufighter closed in to 2,000 feet and identified the enemy as a He.111. A 3-second burst was fired from very close range, following which the He.111 exploded and dived into the sea.</p> <p>At 2200 hours a second contact was obtained at a range of 2 1/2 miles and a visual was obtained at 2500 feet, the enemy being identified as a JU.88. Two bursts of 3 and 4 seconds respectively were fired, the enemy catching fire and crashing into the sea.</p> <p>Shortly afterwards a third contact was obtained at 3 miles, a visual at 3000 feet identifying the enemy as a JU.88. The Beaufighter closed in, but the JU.88 turned hard to port, diving steeply. A long burst was fired and hits were seen, following which the JU.88 disappeared into haze above the sea. A few minutes later a fire was seen on the surface of the sea.</p> <p>This JU.88 was claimed probably destroyed.</p> <p>Weather - Good with haze up to 3000 ft</p>

AREA.	DATE & TIME.	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS.	ATTACKS.
East of SYRACUSE	13/14 July 2230 hrs	1 B'Fighter VI Mark VII equipped 108 Squadron.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the south east coast of SICILY and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft, obtaining A.I. contact at 3½ miles range. The Beaufighter closed in and identified the aircraft as a Piaggio 108. A long burst was fired from 350 feet, hits being scored all over the fuselage and inboard engines, following which the enemy caught fire. As the Piaggio 108 continued to fly level, the Beaufighter closed in again and fired a second burst, after which the aircraft crashed in flames into the sea.</p> <p>3 Parachutes were seen descending. Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
North of CATANIA	13/14 July 2315 hrs	1 B'fighter VIF Mark IV equipped 600 Squadron.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the east coast of SICILY and obtained a contact on a hostile aircraft going north from CATANIA. The Beaufighter closed in and identified the enemy as a He.111 from 150 yards. The Beaufighter fired a 1-second burst, scoring hits on the port engine and the root of the port wing, which caught fire. The He.111 then spiralled slowly to port, rolled over on its back and dived vertically into the ground near RIPOSTO. One parachute was seen descending.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
LECCE South aerodrome	13/14 July 2320 hrs	1 Mosquito VI 23 Squadron.	<p>The Mosquito was on intruder patrol over aerodromes in the TARANTO area and an unidentified aircraft was seen in circuit with its navigation lights on at LECCE South.</p> <p>The Mosquito closed range and delivered four attacks with cannon and machine-gun fire. Hits were observed on the aircraft, which was later seen burning on the ground.</p> <p>All the aerodrome lights were immediately extinguished.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
Cape PASSERO area	14/15 July 2335 hrs.	1 B'fighter VIF Mark IV equipped 600 Squadron.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the south east coast of SICILY and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft going towards Cape PASSERO. Contact was gained at maximum range and the enemy was identified as a JU.88 at 200 yards. The Beaufighter fired a 5-second burst, setting fire to the starboard wing and engine of the JU.88 which went down in flames, near PACHINO.</p>

DECLASSIFIED

AREA.	DATE & TIME.	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS.	ATTACKS.
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At 2350 hrs, the Beaufighter was vectored on to a second aircraft which was identified as a JU.88 at 200 yards. A 5-second burst set fire to the cockpit of the JU.88 which crashed into the sea just west of Cape PASSERO.

Shortly afterwards the Beaufighter was vectored on to a third enemy aircraft and identified it as a JU.88 at 50 yards. A 2-second burst was fired, following which the tail of the JU.88 caught fire and it crashed near NISCEMI.

Weather and visibility - Good.

CATANIA area.	14/15 July 2205 hrs	1 B'fighter VIF Mark IV equipped 600 Squadron.
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The Beaufighter was on interception patrol along the east coast of SICILY. A contact was obtained at extreme range on a hostile aircraft in the GERBINI area, which was subsequently identified as a JU.88. The enemy aircraft apparently saw the B'fighter and broke away smartly, the B'fighter only being able to get a snap shot at 250 yards. Hits were seen on the port wing and tail. This aircraft is claimed as damaged.

At 2220 hrs another contact was obtained on a hostile aircraft, at extreme range, this being later identified as a JU.88. The enemy saw the Beaufighter and a short engagement ensued, the Beaufighter getting in 3 bursts, the third of which was at 250 yards as the enemy was doing a steep left hand turn. The port engine of the JU.88 was set on fire and the aircraft crashed in a deep gorge near MILITELLO.

At 2240 hrs a third contact was obtained at maximum range on a hostile aircraft northwest of AUGUSTA. The Beaufighter closed in identifying a JU.88, and fired one burst following which the enemy turned away with the port engine on fire. It was seen going down with the engine well alight south of AUGUSTA, but was not seen to crash. Another Beaufighter saw an aircraft crash in this area at 2245 hours, and the JU.88 is therefore claimed as destroyed.

Shortly afterwards a fourth contact was obtained on a hostile aircraft at maximum range south of SYRACUSE. This was identified from 200 yards as a JU.88. The Beaufighter fired one burst from 250 yards, following which the JU.88 exploded in the air.

At 2359 hrs a fifth contact was obtained at 8,000 yards on a hostile aircraft flying north west from AUGUSTA.

(Continued.....55.

AREA.	DATE & TIME.	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS.	ATTACKS.
			<p>The Beaufighter closed in and identified it as a JU.88. The remaining cannon ammunition was fired from 150 yards, setting fire to the port engine of the enemy, which went into a flat glide and crashed 20 miles south west of CATANIA. 3 parachutes were seen descending.</p> <p>Weather - Good with slight haze.</p>
West of CATANIA	14/15 July 2235 hrs	1 B'fighter VI Mark VIII equipped 108 squadron.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol, and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft approaching from the east. Contact was obtained at 6,000 feet range and the Beaufighter closed in very quickly, identifying the enemy as a Cant. Z.100%. Fire was opened from 300 feet, hits being scored on the fuselage and port engine following which the enemy caught fire and crashed into the sea.</p> <p>At least 1 parachute was seen descending.</p> <p>At 2315 hours, a second contact was obtained at 2$\frac{1}{2}$ miles range north east of SYRACUSE. The Beaufighter went in very close and identified the enemy was a He.111, after which it withdrew to 300 feet and fired a 3-second burst, Hits were scored on the fuselage, and several large pieces broke off from the He.111, which then caught fire and crashed into the sea.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
South of SYRACUSE	14/15 July 2250 hrs	1 B'fighter VI Mark IV equipped	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the south east coast of SICILY and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft, identifying it was a JU.88 from 400 feet. The Beaufighter fired a 2-second burst from behind, following which the JU.88 blew up in the air, the remains falling to the ground 5 miles south of SYRACUSE.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
East of SYRACUSE	14/15 July 2345 hrs	1 Mosquito XII Mark VIII equipped. 256 Squadron.	<p>The Mosquito was on interception patrol off the east coast of SICILY and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft, later identified as a He.111, obtaining a contact at 5 miles and a visual at 1500 feet.</p> <p>The Mosquito closed right in and fired a 1-second burst as the He.111 was diving to starboard. The starboard engine of the He.111 burst into flames lighting up the sky for about 10 seconds while the enemy dropped towards the sea.</p> <p>At 2359 hrs a second contact was obtained on a hostile aircraft at about 5 miles. The Mosquito chased the enemy for about 10 minutes, finally identifying it as a JU.88 from 1500 ft. Hits were scored on the port wing, which was set on fire, and the JU.88 went down into the sea in a spin.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>

AREA	DATE & TIME	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS	ATTACKS
South of SYRACUSE	15/16 July 0300 hrs	1 Mosquito KLI. Mk. VIII equipped. 256 Sqdn.	<p>The Mosquito was on interception patrol off the east coast of SICILY. Contact was obtained at 3½ miles on a hostile aircraft later identified as a Cant Z.1007 bis. The Mosquito closed to 100 feet and fired a 1-second burst from dead astern, following which the tail of the Cant Z.1007 broke off and the aircraft crashed into the sea in flames.</p> <p>At 0335 hours a second contact was obtained north east of SYRACUSE on a hostile aircraft, later identified at 50 feet as a JU.88. Following a 1-second burst from 30 yards the rudder of the JU.88 broke off the aircraft blew up and crashed into the sea in flames.</p> <p>Shortly afterwards a third contact was obtained north of AUGUSTA on a hostile aircraft at 3 miles. The Mosquito closed to visual range and identified enemy as a JU.88. The enemy commenced evasive action and the Mosquito got in a 1-second burst, causing the cockpit of the enemy to explode, following which it went into a vertical dive.</p> <p>The Mosquito did not actually see the JU.88 hit the sea, but blazing wreckage was seen on the surface and the aircraft was therefore claimed destroyed.</p> <p>At 0414 hours, a fourth contact was obtained at 2½ miles north east of AUGUSTA, the Mosquito closing to 500 feet, from which the enemy was identified as a JU.88. A 1½-second burst from close astern set the starboard engine and fuselage alight. After another 1-second burst, the JU.88 burst into flames, turned on its back and crashed into the sea. 2 parachutes were seen descending.</p> <p>At 0440 hours, a fifth contact was obtained at 5000 feet range north east of SYRACUSE. The Mosquito closed in to 100 feet identifying the enemy as a JU.88, and fired a short burst from dead astern, following which the enemy exploded and crashed into the sea.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
OFF GELA	15/16 July	1 B'Fighter VIF Mark IV. equipped. 600 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the south coast of SICILY, and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft, obtaining a brief visual but contact was lost as the Beaufighter over-shot the enemy, the speed of which was less than 100 m.p.h.cont.</p>

AREA	DATE & TIME	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS	ATTACKS
South coast of SICILY	15/16 July	1 Beaufighter VI.F.Mk.IV equipped. 600 Sqdn.	<p>A few minutes later a second contact was obtained on an enemy aircraft circling shipping in the Gulf of GELA. The Beaufighter closed in, identifying the enemy as a He.111, and fired two 4-second bursts, following which the He.111 exploded and crashed in flames into the sea close inshore.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p> <p>Note:- Time of this combat unknown. Aircraft was airborne between 2240 and 0220 hours.</p>
South coast of GELA.	15/16 July 2300 hrs	1 Beaufighter VI. Mk.IV equipped. 600 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the east coast of SICILY and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft, contact being obtained at 11,000 feet. The Beaufighter closed in and identified the enemy as a JU.88, which took violent evasive action and returned fire. The Beaufighter got in a burst during a diving turn and saw some hits, following which bombs were seen exploding on the ground beneath. No claim was made, however.</p> <p>Three more contacts were made on different hostile aircraft, a visual being obtained in each case. All 3 were identified as JU.88s. In each case the enemy escaped by violent evasive action.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
GIBBATA area.	16/17 July 0200 hrs	1 Beaufighter VI. Mk.IV equipped. 600 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the south coast of SICILY. A contact was obtained at 2,000 feet range on an aircraft going south west 20 miles south west of GELA and the Beaufighter closed in to identify, but was uncertain whether the aircraft was a Do.217 or a U.S. Mitchell B.25. While attempting to identify, the Beaufighter was fired on by the aircraft from 400 yards, and although unable to catch up, it fired many bursts at long range at the enemy which escaped by diving down into low cloud over the sea.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p> <p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off south east SICILY, and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft, obtaining a contact at maximum range. A visual was obtained at 1500 feet, the enemy being identified as a Cant Z.1007 bis. As the Beaufighter closed in, the enemy commenced evasive action. Fire was opened from 450/600 feet, and the central engine of the Cant Z.1007 was set on fire, following which the aircraft went down out of control into the sea.</p> <p>cont....</p>

AREA	DATE & TIME	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS	ATTACKS
			<p>At 0210 hours, the Beaufighter was again vectored, obtaining contact at maximum range on 2 hostile aircraft. The Beaufighter followed 1 of these which was on a northerly course, and obtained a visual at 2000 feet, identifying it as a He.111 at 1000 feet. At 750 feet the Beaufighter opened fire exploding the port engine of the He.111 which went down into the sea.</p> <p>During the chase, the second aircraft fired on the Beaufighter without effect.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
ALTA-IRONE area.	16/17 July 0210 hrs	1 B'fighter VI. Mk.IV equipped. 600 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol over south east SICILY and obtained an A.I. contact on a hostile aircraft followed by a visual at 2000 feet. The Beaufighter closed in to 600 feet, recognised the enemy as a JU.88 and opened fire. Both engines of the JU.88 burst into flames and it went down out of control.</p> <p>Ineffective return fire was experienced during the engagement. This JU.88 was claimed destroyed.</p> <p>At 0235 hours, the Beaufighter was again vectored on to a hostile aircraft to starboard. At the same time a second enemy aircraft was contacted to port and the Beaufighter decided to attack this. A visual was obtained at 5000 feet range, the enemy being identified as a JU.88 at 600 feet. At this range the Beaufighter opened fire. Only 1 cannon fired, but the starboard engine of the JU.88 began to glow and it took violent evasive action going down to 2000 feet. The Beaufighter fired a number of short deflection bursts, following which the JU.88 caught fire and crashed.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good although bright moonlight made the outlines of aircraft always hazy with consequent difficulty in identifications.</p>
SYRACUSE area.	16/17 July 0230 hrs	1 Mosquito III.Mk.VIII equipped. 256 Sqdn.	<p>The Mosquito was on interception patrol over the SYRACUSE area and obtained a contact on a hostile aircraft at 3 miles range. A visual was obtained at 3000 feet, the enemy being identified as a JU.88 at 250 yards. The JU.88 commenced evasive action and the Mosquito opened fire without visible effect. A second burst at 400 feet set fire to the port engine and, following a third burst, the JU.88 crashed in flames into the sea.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>

AREA	DATE & TIME	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS	ATTACKS.
SYRACUSE area.	16/17 July 0215 hrs	1 B'fighter VI Mk.Vall equipped. 108 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off south east SICILY and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft flying north from SYRACUSE. A.I. contact was obtained at 2½ miles, and, although the enemy was flying very fast, the Beaufighter was able to close in and identify it as a JU.88 at 2500 feet. The Beaufighter opened fire at 600 feet, scoring hits on the fuselage, which burst into flames, and the JU.88 crashed into the sea.</p> <p>At 0300 hours, the Beaufighter was vectored on to a second hostile aircraft flying north. A.I. contact was obtained at 3 miles range and a visual at 3000 feet, the enemy being identified as a JU.88. The Beaufighter closed to 600 feet and fired a 3-second burst, scoring hits on the fuselage and engines, following which the JU.88 burst into flames and crashed into the sea.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
AUGUSTA area.	16/17 July 0225 hrs	1 B'fighter VI Mk.IV equipped. 600 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the east coast of SICILY. Contact was obtained at maximum range on 3 aircraft in the AUGUSTA area. The Beaufighter closed in to within 1500 feet of 1 aircraft and identified it as a He.111. When the Beaufighter had closed in to 800 feet, the He.111 went into a stall turn to port. The Beaufighter fired a full deflection burst, following which the He.111 burst into flames and went down into the sea.</p> <p>During the combat the He.111 fired one small burst at the Beaufighter without effect.</p> <p>At 0330 hours, the Beaufighter was vectored on to a hostile aircraft north east of AUGUSTA. After a long chase, during which the enemy took mild evasive action, it was identified as a Cant. Z.1007 bis modified. At 600 feet, the Beaufighter fired a ½-second burst from astern and slightly beneath, setting the central engine on fire. The enemy went into a shallow dive and the fire went out. The Beaufighter followed, closing in to 300 feet, and fired a 1-second burst, following which the Cant Z.1007 exploded and crashed in a field north west of CATANIA.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>

AREA	DATE & TIME	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS	ATTACKS
AUGUSTA area.	16/17 July 0325 hrs	1 Mosquito XI1.Mk.VIII equipped. 256 Sqn.	<p>The Mosquito was on interception patrol north east of AUGUSTA, when it was vectored on to a hostile aircraft. A.I. contact was obtained at 6 miles, the enemy being identified at 150 feet as a Cant Z.1007 bis modified. A short burst was fired from dead astern, setting fire to the fuselage and port engine. 2 parachutes were then seen descending, and the enemy aircraft went down in flames, crashing a short distance west of AUGUSTA.</p> <p>At 0336 hours, a second contact was obtained on a hostile aircraft at 5 miles range, the aircraft being identified as a Cant Z.1007 at 150 feet. The Mosquito fired a 2-second burst from dead astern, setting fire to the port engine, fuselage and tail unit, after which the Cant Z.1007 crashed on land south west of AUGUSTA. Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
North east of SYRACUSE	16/17 July 0415 hrs	1 Mosquito XI1.Mk.VIII equipped. 256 Sqn.	<p>The Mosquito was on interception patrol in the SYRACUSE area and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft 25 miles north east of SYRACUSE. Contact was obtained at 3 miles and a visual at 1500 feet, when the enemy was identified as a Cant Z.1007.</p> <p>The Mosquito closed to 400 feet and fired a 3-second burst, scoring hits on the fuselage and setting the port engine on fire. The enemy aircraft went spinning down in flames from 1500 feet and crashed into the sea. Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
AUGUSTA area.	16/17 July 0415 hrs	1 Beaufighter VI. Mk.VIII equipped. 108 Sqn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off south east SICILY and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft. A.I. contact being obtained at 5 miles range. A visual was obtained at 3000 feet, the aircraft being identified as a Cant. Z.1007 bis. The Beaufighter closed in to 300/450 feet and fired a short burst from astern. A large explosion took place on the Cant Z.1007, and bits of the aircraft broke off, some of them hitting the Beaufighter. The enemy dived steeply to starboard, burst into flames and crashed into the sea about 1/2 mile off shore. Weather and visibility - Good.</p>

AREA	DATE & TIME	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS	ATTACKS.
Off south east SICILY	16/17 July 2035 - 0050 hrs	1 B'fighter VI. Mk.IV equipped. 600 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the south east coast of SICILY and observed bomb explosions to port. On turning to port the Beaufighter immediately obtained A.I. and visual contact on an enemy aircraft which was identified as a S.79 at 300 feet range. Several bursts were fired from dead astern at ranges from 600 to 150 feet without visible effect.</p> <p>The Beaufighter broke off the engagement on reaching the north coast of SICILY.</p> <p>No claims were made. Weather and visibility - Good.</p>
CATANIA area	17/18 July 2220 hrs	1 B'fighter VI. Mk.VIII equipped. 108 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the east coast of SICILY and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft in the CATANIA area, A.I. contact being obtained at 3½ miles range. A visual was obtained at 2000 feet, the aircraft being identified as a JU.88 at 600 feet. At 500 feet the Beaufighter opened fire but the cannons jammed, and the action was continued with machine-gun fire. Hits were observed along the fuselage. A second burst was fired at 400 feet, hits being scored on the starboard engine, from which smoke and a small quantity of flame was seen to issue. The JU.88 then went down to starboard, but was not seen to hit the sea.</p> <p>This aircraft was claimed probably destroyed. Weather and visibility - Very good.</p>
AUGUSTA area.	17/18 July 2355 hrs	1 B'fighter VI. Mk.VI equipped. 600 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the east coast of SICILY, when it was vectored on to a hostile aircraft flying south near AUGUSTA. A.I. contact was obtained, followed by a visual at 2,500 feet, the enemy being identified as a S.84 at 800 feet. At 750 feet the Beaufighter opened fire, hitting the starboard engine, and the S.84 began to lose height. 2 deflection shots were fired, both missing, followed by a 1-second burst which scored hits. The S.84 then dived to port and visual contact was lost. With the aid of A.I. visual contact was regained at 3000 feet altitude, and another burst hit the port engine, following which the S.84 crashed in flames into the sea east of AUGUSTA.</p> <p>Weather and visibility - Good.</p>

AREA	DATE & TIME	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT & SQUADRONS	ATTACKS
CATANIA area.	17/18 July 2250 hrs	1 B'fighter VI.Mk.VIII equipped. 108 Sqdn.	<p>The Beaufighter was on interception patrol off the east coast of SICILY and was vectored on to a hostile aircraft east of CATANIA. A visual was obtained at 2 miles range and after closing in the Beaufighter identified the enemy as a JU.88, which took evasive action, diving almost vertically to port. The Beaufighter chased for 4 minutes, getting in one burst. No hits were scored.</p> <p>Contact was eventually lost. Weather and visibility - Very good.</p>

(Continued.....63.

Part II - Ground Attacks.

AREA AND DETAILS OF TARGET.	DATE AND TIME OVER TARGET.	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE SORTIES AIRCRAFT & SQUADRON.	MISSING A/G NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES AND REASONS.	BOMBS DROPPED BY TYPES.	ATTACKS.
GROTTAGLIE area Lighted buildings and lights on road.	9/10 July. 2350 hrs.	1 Mosquito VI. 23 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	<p>The Mosquito was on intruder patrol over the TARANTO area.</p> <p>Lights were seen on GROTTAGLIE aerodrome and the Mosquito investigated. No enemy air activity was seen.</p> <p>Lighted buildings north of GROTTAGLIE and lights on the road east of GROTTAGLIE with cannon and machine-gun fire.</p> <p>No results were seen.</p> <p>Inaccurate heavy and light A.A. fire was experienced from GROTTAGLIE and further heavy A.A. fire from TARANTO.</p> <p>Weather and visibility good.</p>
CASTELVETRANO area. M.T. east of town.	9/10 July. 2351 hrs.	1 Mosquito VI. 23 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	<p>The Mosquito was on intruder patrol over the NAPLES area.</p> <p>No enemy air activity was seen.</p> <p>On the return journey the Mosquito attacked M.T. east of CASTELVETRANO in SICILY with unobserved results.</p> <p>Weather and visibility good.</p>
SYRACUSE area. 2 horizontal searchlights.	9/10 July. 0001 hrs.	1 Mosquito VI. 23 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	<p>The Mosquito made a special reconnaissance over Southeast SICILY.</p> <p>Cannon attacks were made on two horizontal searchlights north and south of SYRACUSE respectively, the latter being extinguished.</p> <p>Inaccurate heavy and light A.A. fire from SYRACUSE.</p> <p>Weather good but hazy.</p>

AREA AND DETAILS OF TARGET.	DATE AND TIME OVER TARGET.	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE SORTIES AIRCRAFT & SQUADRON.	MISSING A/C. NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES & REASONS.	BOMBS DROPPED BY TYPES.	ATTACKS.
PONTE OLIVO A.A. position.	9/10 July. 2310 hrs.	1 Hurricane IIC. 73 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	<p>The Hurricane made an anti-searchlight patrol in the GELA area to cover the landings of parachute troops. No searchlights were seen. An A.A. position near PONTE OLIVO aerodrome was attacked with cannon fire, details of damage being unobserved. Weather good but hazy.</p>
VILLA LITERNO. Railway Junction.	10/11 July. 0035 hrs.	1 Mosquito VI. 23 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	<p>The Mosquito made an intruder patrol over the NAPLES and MONTE CORVINO areas. No enemy aircraft were seen. On the return journey the Mosquito attacked the railway junction at VILLA LITERNO with cannon fire. Hits were scored on buildings, but details of damage were unobserved. Weather good, visibility fair.</p>
TARANTO area. Red light moving east along road south of AVETRARA. 10 M.T. approaching TARANTO from the east.	11/12 July. 0003 hrs.	1 Mosquito VI. 23 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	<p>The Mosquito made an intruder patrol over enemy aerodromes in the TARANTO area. No air activity was seen. A large dull red light moving east along the road south of AVETRARA was attacked with cannon fire. Hits were observed but no other results seen. A line of 10 transport vehicles approaching TARANTO from the east was also attacked, hits being observed on all the vehicles. Considerable fairly accurate light A.A. fire and some heavy A.A. fire was experienced from GALLIPOLI. Weather and visibility good.</p>

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AREA AND DETAILS OF TARGET.	DATE AND TIME OVER TARGET.	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE SORTIES AIRCRAFT & SQUADRON.	MISSING A/C. NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES AND REASONS.	BOMBS DROPPED BY TYPES.	ATTACKS.
CROTONE. Red light near aerodrome building.	11/12 July. 2345 hrs.	1 Mosquito VI. 23 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	The Mosquito made an intruder patrol over aerodromes in the heel of ITALY. No enemy air activity was seen. On the return journey a red light near the aerodrome beacon at CROTONE was attacked with unobserved results. Weather and visibility good.
BISACQUINO area. 3 presumed blast furnaces. north of town.	11/12 July. 2331 hrs.	1 Mosquito VI. 23 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	The Mosquito made an intruder patrol over aerodromes in western SICILY. No enemy air activity was seen. The glow of 3 presumed blast furnaces was seen at the road junction north of BISACQUINO. 3 attacks were made with cannon and machine gun fire. 1 fire was started. Some small arms fire was returned from the furnaces. Weather and visibility good.
CATANIA area. 2 A.A. guns.	11/12 July. 2325 hrs.	1 Hurricane IIC. 73 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	The Hurricane was on intruder patrol over the CATANIA and GERBINI aerodromes. No enemy activity was seen. 2 guns firing light A.A. fire near CATANIA were attacked with cannon fire. No results were seen, but the guns ceased fire. Weather fair but hazy.
MENFI. Bright light on building in town.	12/13 July. 2215 hrs.	1 Hurricane IIC. 73 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	The Hurricane was on an offensive night reconnaissance over roads in south western SICILY. No movements were seen. A bright light flashed at the Hurricane from a building in the east

(Continued.....66)

AREA AND DETAILS OF TARGET.	DATE AND TIME OVER TARGET.	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE SORTIES AIRCRAFT & SQUADRON.	MISSING A/C. NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES AND REASONS.	BOMBS DROPPED BY TYPES.	ATTACKS.
PIAZZA ARMERINA. Parked M.T.	12/13 July. 2215 hrs.	1 Hurricane IIC. 73 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	<p>corner of MENFI town was attacked several times without visible result. Weather good with some haze.</p> <p>The Hurricane was on offensive night reconnaissance over roads in central SICILY.</p> <p>No movements were seen. Parked M.T. vehicles just north of PIAZZA ARMERINA were attacked without visible result. Weather good, some haze.</p>
SCIACCA area. 2 M.T. on road.	12/13 July. 2200 hrs.	1 Hurricane IIC. 73 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	<p>The Hurricane was on offensive night reconnaissance over roads in south west SICILY.</p> <p>Very little movement was seen. 2 M.T were attacked 1 mile east of SCIACCA. Hits were seen on both vehicles, but details of damage were unobserved.</p> <p>The jetty at SCIACCA was also attacked without visible result.</p>
RIBERA area. 1 M.T. vehicle.	12/13 July. 2340 hrs.	1 Hurricane IIC. 73 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	<p>The Hurricane was on offensive night reconnaissance over roads in southern SICILY.</p> <p>A single stationary M.T. vehicle on the road north of RIBERA was attacked with cannon and set on fire. Weather good but hazy.</p>

(Continued..... 67.

AREA AND DETAILS OF TARGET.	DATE AND TIME OVER TARGET.	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE SORTIES AIRCRAFT & SQUADRON.	MISSING A/C. NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES AND REASONS.	BOMBS DROPPED BY TYPES.	ATTACKS.
MENFI area 2 searchlights.	12/13 July. 2230 hrs.	1 Hurricane IIC. 73 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	<p>The Hurricane was on offensive night reconnaissance over roads in southern SICILY.</p> <p>2 searchlights north west of MENFI were attacked with cannon fire, 1 being extinguished.</p> <p>A number of M.T. vehicles parked under trees north of RIBERA were subsequently attacked with unobserved results.</p> <p>Weather good but hazy.</p>
RIBERA area. M.T. vehicles.	2250 hrs.				
SCIACCA area. 3 searchlights near town.	12/13 July. 2300 hrs.	1 Hurricane IIC. 73 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	<p>The Hurricane was on offensive reconnaissance over roads in south west SICILY.</p> <p>3 searchlights were attacked with cannon fire near SCIACCA, 2 being extinguished and the third destroyed. 3 other searchlights which were not attacked were also extinguished.</p> <p>M.T. vehicles moving towards SCIACCA from the west and a bridge north west of PORTO PALO were attacked with unobserved results.</p> <p>Accurate Breda fire from bridge not intense.</p> <p>Weather good but hazy.</p>
M.T. on roads. Bridge west of town.					
North west of OSTUNI. Railway goods train.	12/13 July. 2305 hrs.	1 Mosquito VI. 23 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	<p>The Mosquito made an intruder patrol over aerodromes in the TARANTO area. No enemy air activity was seen.</p> <p>A goods train was attacked north</p>

AREA AND DETAILS OF TARGET.	DATE AND TIME OVER TARGET.	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE SORTIES AIRCRAFT & SQUADRON.	MISSING A/C. NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES AND REASONS.	BOMBS DROPPED BY TYPES.	ATTACKS.
South of CATANZARO. Railway train.	12/13 July. 2345 hrs.	1 Mosquito VI. 23 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	<p>west of OSTUNI and hits were observed on all the trucks, although no hits were seen on the engine.</p> <p>Details of damage could not be observed.</p> <p>Weather and visibility good.</p> <p>The Mosquito made an intruder patrol over CROTONE aerodrome. The navigation lights of one aircraft were seen in circuit, and the Mosquito gave chase, but the lights were extinguished and nothing more was seen.</p> <p>There were no further incidents during the remainder of the patrol over CROTONE.</p> <p>On the return journey the Mosquito attacked a railway train 5 miles south of CATANZARO. Hits were observed on the engine from which a flash was seen.</p> <p>Weather and visibility good.</p>
CEGLIE MESAPICA area.	12/13 July. 0042 hrs.	1 Mosquito VI. 23 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	<p>The Mosquito made an intruder patrol over aerodromes in the TARANTO area. No enemy air activity was seen.</p> <p>A train travelling north from CEGLIE MESAPICA was attacked with cannon fire, but no definite results were seen, although the train stopped.</p> <p>One burst of light A.A. fire was experienced from a point near the train.</p> <p>Weather and visibility good.</p>

AREA AND DETAILS OF TARGET.	DATE AND TIME OVER TARGET.	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE SORTIES AIRCRAFT & SQUADRON.	MISSING A/C. NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES AND REASONS.	BOMBS DROPPED BY TYPES.	ATTACKS.
BAGLIO RIZZO area. Barrack building.	13/14 July. 2310 Hrs.	1 Mosquito VI. 23 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	<p>The Mosquito made an intruder patrol over aerodromes in western SICILY. No enemy air activity was seen.</p> <p>A barrack block 10 miles east of BAGLIO RIZZO was attacked, many hits being observed on the building. 20 minutes later, a searchlight was attacked north east of ALCAMO. The searchlight was extinguished. Weather and visibility good.</p>
CUTRO. Ground lights on railway area. Building near ST. LEONARDS.	13/14 July. 0150 hrs.	1 Mosquito VI. 23 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	<p>The Mosquito made an intruder patrol over aerodromes at CROTONE and VIBO VALENTIA. No enemy air activity was seen.</p> <p>Ground lights in the railway area at CUTRO and a building west of ST. LEONARDS were attacked. Hits were seen at both targets, although details of damage were not observed. Weather and visibility good.</p>
SOVERATO. Fishing boats in harbour and buildings in town.	14/15 July. 2315 hrs.	1 Mosquito VI. 23 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	<p>The Mosquito was on intruder patrol in the CROTONE area. No enemy air activity was seen.</p> <p>Fishing boats in the harbour at SOVERATO and buildings in the town were attacked hits being scored. Details of damage were unobserved. Weather and visibility good.</p>
VILLA LISTERNO. Train in railway junction.	14/15 July. 1355 hrs.	1 Mosquito VI. 23 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	<p>The Mosquito made an intruder patrol over aerodromes in the NAPLES area. No enemy air activity was seen. Three attacks were made on a train</p>

AREA AND DETAILS OF TARGET.	DATE AND TIME OVER TARGET.	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE SORTIES AIRCRAFT & SQUADRON.	MISSING A/C. NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES AND REASONS.	BOMBS DROPPED BY TYPES.	ATTACKS.
					in the railway junction at VILLA LISTERNA, hits causing a number of blue flashes. A number of small fires resulted from the third attack. Weather good with slight haze.
GALLIPOLI area. Convoy of 50 M.T.	15/16 July. 0015 hrs.	1 Mosquito VI. 23 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	The Mosquito was on intruder patrol over aerodromes in the TARANTO area. No enemy air activity was seen. A convoy of 50 M.T. moving south west 10 miles from GALLIPOLI on the LECCE road was attacked with cannon fire, hits being seen on vehicles. Details of damage were unobserved. Slight machine-gun and rifle fire was experienced from the convoy after the first attack. Weather and visibility good.
VILLA LITTERNO. Railway Junction.	16/17 July. 0155 hrs.	1 Mosquito (P) II. 23 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	The Mosquito was on intruder patrol over the NAPLES area. No enemy air activity was seen. The railway junction at VILLA LITTERNO was attacked, hits on trucks and buildings being followed by blue flashes. White smoke was seen south of the sidings after the attack. Inaccurate A.A. fire from 6/7 guns on high ground west of NAPLES. Weather and visibility good.
NAPLES area. Parked M.T. and level crossing box.	16/17 July. 2335 hrs.	1 Mosquito VI. 23 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	The Mosquito made an intruder patrol over aerodromes in the NAPLES area. No enemy air activity was seen. A number of parked M.T. vehicles were attacked, hits being scored

AREA AND DETAILS OF TARGET.	DATE AND TIME OVER TARGET.	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE SORTIES AIRCRAFT & SQUADRON.	MISSING A/C. NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES AND REASONS.	BOMBS DROPPED BY TYPES.	ATTACKS.
					<p>followed by 1 large blue flash. 5 minutes later a level crossing box near MONDRAGONE was attacked, hits being scored. Weather fair, visibility good.</p>
CIAMPINO aerodrome. Aircraft in pens.	17/18 July. 0056 hrs.	1 Mosquito VI. 23 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	<p>The Mosquito made an intruder patrol over aerodromes in the ROME area. No aircraft were seen airborne. About 8 to 10 aircraft were seen in pens on CIAMPINO aerodrome, and these were attacked, hits being observed. 1 of these aircraft was left in flames. Considerable light A.A. fire was experienced.</p>
CISTERNA LITTORIA aerodrome. Aircraft on aerodrome.	0105 hrs.				<p>5 or 6 single-engined aircraft parked in the open on CISTERNA LITTORIA aerodrome were attacked, hits being observed on all of them, although no fires were started.</p>
CAPUA aerodrome. Aircraft on aerodrome.	0134 hrs.				<p>5 or 6 twin-engined aircraft parked in the open were attacked. 1 aircraft burst into flames. Weather and visibility good.</p>

APPENDIX "D".

SUMMARY OF RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS.Land Reconnaissance.

KEY :-

LAND.
HARBOUR.

SQUADRON.	AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED.	TAC/R & P/R.	STRAT/R & P/R.	P/R & V/R.	TOTALS.
40 S.A.A.F.	Spitfires.	122			122.
683.	Spitfires.			28 38.	66.
1437 Flight.	Mustangs.	10.			10.
TOTALS.		132.		28 38	198.

List of Places Photographed:-

ACQUINO	GROTTAGLIE	STAGNONE
AUGUSTA	GUIDONIA	SYRACUSE
BAGLIO RIZZO	LECCE	TAORMINA
BARI	LEVERANO	TARANTO
BARLETTA	LICATA	TERMINI IMERESE
BISCARI	LITTORIO	TORRE ANNUNZIATA
BOCCA DI FALCO	MANDURIA	TORRE DEL GRECO
BOTRICELLI	MANFREDONIA	VIBO VALENTIA.
BRINDISI	MARCIGLIANA	
CALCINETTA	MESSINA	
CAMPO CASALE	MILAZZO	
CAPE SAN VITO	MILO	
CAPODICHINO	MONTE CORVINO	
CARCITELLO	NAPLES	
CASTELLAMARE DI STABIA	PACHINO	
CASTELVETRANO	PALERMO	
CASTELVUCRO	PATERNO	
CATANIA	PILAZZO	
CENTOCELLE	POMIGLIANO D'ARCO	
CIAMPINO	PORTICI	
CIAVOLO	POZZUOLI	
CISTERNA	PRAIA A MARE	
CIVITA VECCHIA	PRATICA DI MARE	
CLERAMPRE	PROCIDA	
COMISO	RAMACCA	
COLLEONE	REGGIO DI CALABRIA	
CROTONE	RIPOSTO	
FOGGIA	SALEMI	
FROSINONE	SALERNO	
FURBARA	SALINA GRANDE	
GAETA	SAN GIOVANNI	
GELA	SAN PANCRAZIO	
GERBINI	SAN VITO DEI NORMANNI	
GIOIA DEL COLLE	SCIACCA	
GRAZZANISE	SERRA DI FALCO	

Operations in Central Mediterranean.

TYPE OF DUTY.	NUMBER OF SORTIES.
Sea Reconnaissance.	27
Harbour Reconnaissance (see Table 3)	38
Shipping protection (see Table 1)	505
Anti - shipping (fighter)	NIL
Anti - submarine patrol (close cover)	1
Anti - submarine patrol (area)	8
Attacks on shipping (in harbour)	NIL
Attacks on shipping (at sea)	2
Attacks on submarines.	2
Mine laying.	NIL
Air/Sea Rescue sorties.	7

List of Harbours Photographed (see also Land Reconnaissance):-

AUGUSTA
 BARI
 BARLETTA
 BRINDISI
 CASTELLAMARE DI STABIA
 CATANIA
 CIVITA VECCHIA
 CROTONE
 GAETA

MANFREDONIA
 MESSINA
 NAPLES
 PALERMO
 PORTICI
 POZZUOLI
 PROCIDA
 REGGIO DI CALABRIA
 RIPOSTO

SALERNO
 SAN GIOVANNI
 SYRACUSE
 TAORMINA
 TARANTO
 TERMINI IMERESE
 TORRE ANNUNZIATA
 TORRE DEL GRECO.

Results of Attacks on Shipping at Sea.

TYPE OF VESSEL.	SUNK.	PROBABLY SUNK.	DAMAGED.	RESULTS UNKNOWN.	TOTALS.
Submarines.	Nil.	Nil.	1	Nil.	1.
Schooners.	Nil.	Nil.	2	Nil.	2.
Landing Craft.	Nil.	Nil.	1	Nil.	1.
Barges.	Nil.	Nil.	2	Nil.	2.
TOTALS.	Nil.	Nil.	6	Nil.	6.

(Continued.....74.)

DECLASSIFIED

Attacks on Shipping and Submarines at Sea.

POSITION COURSE, SPEED AND DETAILS OF TARGET.	DATE AND TIME.	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE SORTIES AIRCRAFT AND SQUADRON.	MISSING AIRCRAFT INEFFECTIVE SORTIES AND REASONS.	BOMBS TORPEDOES OR DEPTH CHARGES DROPPED.	ATTACKS.
GIARDINI Bay. 2 barges 1 landing craft.	12 July 1545 hrs.	2 Mustangs 1437 Flight.	Nil.	Nil.	The Mustangs were on tactical reconnaissance of the road along the east coast of SICILY. 2 barges and 1 landing-craft were seen in GIARDINI Bay and were effectively attacked with cannon and machine-gun fire.
West of GALLIPOLI. 2 Schooners.	16/17 July 2350 hrs.	1 Mosquito VI. 23 Squadron.	Nil.	Nil.	The Mosquito made an intruder patrol over enemy aerodromes in the TARANTO area. No air activity was seen. On the return journey the Mosquito saw a 3-masted schooner southbound 15 miles west of GALLIPOLI and a 2- masted schooner 8 miles further south. Both vessels were attacked with cannon fire, hits amidships being scored on each. Weather and visibility good with some haze over TARANTO.
37° 19' N. 16° 41' E. 1 large Italian submarine about 1,000 tons on surface. Course 060° Speed 5 knots.	17/18 July. 2159 hrs.	2 Wellingtons XI. 221 Squadron.	Nil.	11 x 250 lb. depth charges depth setting 25 feet. 3 x 100 lb. A/S bombs.	The Wellingtons were on an anti- submarine hunt in co-operation with destroyers off the east coast of SICILY. Aircraft 'K' obtained a contact and later a visual of a large Italian submarine about 1000 tons with large guns fore and aft of conning tower and 2 periscopes, in posn.

(Continued.....75.

POSITION COURSE, SPEED AND DETAILS OF TARGET.	DATE AND TIME.	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE SORTIES AIRCRAFT AND SQUADRON.	MISSING AIRCRAFT INEFFECTIVE SORTIES AND REASONS.	BOMBS TORPEDOES OR DEPTH CHARGES DROPPED.	ATTACKS.
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37° 19' N. 16° 41' E. at 2159 hours. 6 depth charges were dropped. The stick slightly undershot, but the last depth charge exploded under the hull of the submarine slightly abaft of the conning tower.

The rear gunner attacked with machine gun fire, scoring hits on the base of the conning tower followed by smoke.

25 minutes later the submarine was seen

still surfaced, circling slightly as if out of control and with considerable smoke still coming from the conning tower.

The Wellington attempted to call up the destroyer on R/T but received no reply. Destroyers were seen to pass near the position of the submarine.

At 0108 hours aircraft 'K' saw what appeared to be a large oil patch about 100 yards in diameter in position 37° 14' N. 16° 40' E.

Aircraft 'B' obtained a contact 8 miles off the port beam followed by a visual of a surfaced submarine about 1000 tons with 2 guns fore and aft of conning tower in position 37° 20' N. 16° 15' E. at 0320 hours. The Wellington dropped 5 depth charges and 3 anti-submarine bombs scoring one hit amidships on the port side of the hull and one near miss. The submarine was shadowed for 2½ hours after the attack and remained stationary for ½ hour then steered an erratic course north at 5 knots, leaving vast quantities of oil in the wake. The submarine was finally left in position 37° 45' N. 16° 17' E.

Aircraft 'B' attempted to call up destroyers but no reply was received.

The submarine was claimed damaged.

Each aircraft experienced one burst of light A.A. fire from the submarine.

Weather and visibility good.

APPENDIX "E"

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF LOSSES.

(i) Enemy aircraft Casualties.

DATE	DESTROYED	PROBABLY DESTROYED	DAMAGED.
9 July	1 FW.190 1 MC.202	2 1 FW.190	3 NIL
9/10 July	NIL	NIL	NIL
10 July	2 JU. 88 1 HE.111 4 ME.109 1 FW.190 4 MC.200	12 1 ME.109 1 MC.202 1 MC.200	3 5 JU. 88 5 ME.109 1 FW.190
10/11 July	2 JU. 88 1 Cant Z.1007	3 2 JU. 88	2 NIL
11 July	13 JU. 88 1 DO.217 2 ME.109 3 FW.190 1 ME.210 3 MC.202 2 RE.2001 3 MC.200	28 1 JU. 88 1 DO.217 1 ME.109 2 MC.202	5 2 JU. 88 2 DO.217 5 ME.109 1 FW.190 2 MC.202 1 RE.2001 3 MC.200
11/12 July	2 JU. 88 1 HE.111 1 unidentified twin-engined bomber.	4 NIL	1 P.108 1
12 July	1 JU. 87 13 ME.109 1 FW.190 1 ME.110 1 JU. 52 2 MC.202 5 MC.200	24 2 JU. 87 4 ME.109 2 MC.202 1 MC.200	9 3 JU. 87 1 ME.109 1 FW.190 2 ME.110 4 MC.200
12/13 July	5 JU. 88 3 HE.111 1 DO.217 2 Cant Z.1007	11 1 JU. 88	3 NIL
13 July	2 JU. 88 1 HE.111 1 DO.217 6 JU. 87 3 ME.109 2 FW.190 5 ME.110 1 MC.202 3 MC.200	24 1 JU. 88 1 ME.109 1 MC.202	3 2 HE.111 8 JU. 87 3 ME.109 1 FW.190 3 ME.110 6 MC.202 1 RE.2001 1 MC.200
13/14 July	2 JU. 88 2 HE.111 1 P. 108. 1 unidentified aircraft.	6 1 JU. 88	1 NIL
14 July	3 ME.109 1 MC.202	4 2 ME.109	2 1 ME.109 1

DATE.	DESTROYED.	PROBABLY DESTROYED.	DAMAGED.
14/15 July.	9 JU.88 12. 2 HE.111 1 Cant Z.1007	NIL	1 JU.88 1.
15 July.	NIL	NIL	NIL
15/16 July.	4 JU.88 6. 1 HE.111 1 Cant Z.1007	NIL	NIL
16 July.	3 ME.109 3	1 ME.109 1.	3 ME.109 3.
16/17 July.	5 JU.88 13. 2 HE.111 6 Cant Z.1007	NIL	NIL
17 July.	2 ME.109 3. 1 MC.202	1 MC.200 1.	2 ME.109 4. 1 MC.202 1 Gotha Glider
17/18 July.	1 S.84 3. 2 unidentified aircraft.	1 JU.88	NIL

SUMMARY BY TYPES :-

DESTROYED.

45 JU.88
13 HE.111
3 DO.217
7 JU.87
1 JU.52
30 ME.109
8 FW.190
6 ME.110
1 ME.210
1 P.108
11 Cant Z.1007
1 S.84
9 MC.202
2 RE.2001
15 MC.200
4 unidentified aircraft.

PROBABLY DESTROYED.

7 JU.88
1 DO.217
2 JU.87
10 ME.109
1 FW.190
6 MC.202
3 MC.200

DAMAGED.

8 JU.88
2 HE.111
2 DO.217
11 JU.87
30 ME.109
4 FW.190
5 ME.110
1 P.108
9 MC.202
2 RE.2001
8 MC.200
1 Gotha Glider

T O T A L S: 158

30

83

(Continued.....78.)

DATE.	ENEMY ACTION.					ACCIDENTS.	
	SHOT DOWN OR MISSING	DESTROYED ON GROUND.	CRASHED IN OWN TERRITORY.	DAMAGED CATEGORY 2 ON GROUND.	DAMAGED OR CRASHED IN OWN TERRITORY CATEGORY 2.	DESTROYED.	DAMAGED CATEGORY 2.
9 July	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	1 Spitfire	NIL	NIL
9/10 July	2 Hurricanes	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
10 July	11 Spitfires	NIL	NIL	NIL	3 Spitfires	1 Spitfire 1 P.40	1 Spitfire
10/11 July	1 Mosquito	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
11 July	1 Spitfire 1 P.40	NIL	NIL	NIL	4 Spitfires 1 P.40	1 P.40	1 Spitfire
11/12 July	1 Beaufighter	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
12 July	8 Spitfires 1 P.40	NIL	NIL	NIL	1 Spitfire 1 P.40	2 Kittyhawks 1 Spitfire	2 Spitfires 1 Kittyhawk 1 P.40
12/13 July	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
13 July	1 Spitfire 4 Kittyhawks	NIL	NIL	NIL	2 Spitfires	1 P.40	1 P.40
13/14 July	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
14 July	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	1 Spitfire	NIL	NIL
14/15 July	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
15 July	1 Spitfire	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	1 Spitfire	1 Kittyhawk

(Continued.....79.)

DATE.	ENEMY ACTION.					ACCIDENTS.	
	SHOT DOWN OR MISSING	DESTROYED ON GROUND.	CRASHED IN OWN TERRITORY.	DAMAGED CATEGORY 2 ON GROUND.	DAMAGED OR CRASHED IN OWN TERRITORY CATEGORY 2.	DESTROYED.	DAMAGED CATEGORY 2.
15/16 July	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
16 July	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	1 Spitfire	1 Spitfire
16/17 July	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
17 July	2 Spitfires	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
17/18 July	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
<u>SUMMARY.</u>	24 Spitfires 4 Kittyhawks 2 P.40s 2 Hurricanes 1 Mosquito 1 Beaufighter	NIL	NIL	NIL	12 Spitfires 2 P.40s	4 Spitfires 2 Kittyhawks 3 P.40s	5 Spitfires 2 Kittyhawks 2 P.40s
TOTALS :	34	NIL	NIL	NIL	14	9	9

TOTAL CASUALTIES (ALL CAUSES) :-

DESTROYED.

27 Spitfires
6 Kittyhawks
5 P.40s
2 Hurricanes
1 Mosquito
1 Beaufighter

DAMAGED.

17 Spitfires
4 Kittyhawks
5 P.40s

TOTALS :

42

26

APPENDIX "F"

REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT ARRIVING IN MALTA

Date	Spitfire V	Spitfire IX	Spitfire XI	Mosquito VI	Beaufighter VI	Baltimore III	Kittyhawk II	Kittyhawk III	Total.
July 9th	3	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	6
10th	54	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	61
11th	7	1	-	-	-	-	-	4	8
12th	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
13th	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
14th	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	3
15th	-	1 (PRO)	-	-	-	-	4	5	13
16th	3	-	-	1	-	-	2	2	9
17th	3	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	9
TOTAL	73	12	1	1	1	2	6	13	109

AIRCRAFT ISSUED FROM MALTA MAINTENANCE WING TO LOCAL UNITS

Date.	Type.	Total.
9 July	-	-
10 July	-	-
11 July	-	-
12 July	Mosquito VI	1
13 July	Baltimore IIIA	1
14 July	-	-
15 July	-	-
16 July	-	-
17 July	Wellington XI	1
	Beaufighter VI	2
		<u>5</u>

(Continued.....81.

AIRCRAFT STRENGTH, AVAILABILITY AND SORTIES

Key: A = Strength. B = Availability. C = Sorties.

SQUADRON.	9 JULY			10 JULY			11 JULY			12 JULY			13 JULY			14 JULY			15 JULY			16 JULY			17 JULY		
	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
126 Spitfire V Spitfire VIII Spitfire IX	9 11 5	6 2 5	20	9 11 5	9 11 5	34	9 11 5	8 11 6	34	9 11 5	7 11 5	34	9 11 5	8 11 5	34	10 11 5	9 11 5	30	10 11 5	8 11 5	12	10 11 5	7 11 5	23	9 11 5	8 11 5	10
185 Spitfire V Spitfire IX	9 6	7 6	17	9 6	7 6	38	10 6	10 5	28	10 6	10 6	32	10 6	10 6	28	10 6	7 5	31	10 6	7 5	24	10 6	9 6	32	10 6	9 5	18
229 Spitfire V	16	13	25	16	14	36	16	16	40	16	16	36	16	15	32	16	14	18	16	14	24	16	14	24	16	14	8
249 Spitfire V Spitfire IX	10 6	8 5	23	10 6	6 4	47	10 6	9 5	30	10 6	9 5	34	10 6	9 5	33	10 6	8 6	27	10 6	9 5	36	10 6	10 6	26	9 6	9 5	24
1435 Spitfire V Spitfire IX	11 6	10 5	16	12 6	9 5	36	12 6	10 6	28	12 5	11 5	36	12 5	11 5	21	11 2	11 2	20	12 2	11 2	18	13 2	9 2	18	12 3	12 3	18
272 Beaufighter I Beaufighter VI	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-
108 Beaufighter VI	15	7	6	12	7	4	11	5	6	10	10	6	10	9	7	10	9	8	10	6	8	10	6	8	10	7	7
600 Beaufighter VI	20	18	10	20	15	12	20	16	14	20	15	13	20	14	12	20	14	12	20	13	12	20	13	13	19	13	12
23 Mosquito II Mosquito VI	2 13	2 11	9	2 12	2 10	11	2 12	1 10	9	2 11	1 9	8	2 12	2 11	8	2 12	2 9	8	2 11	2 9	6	2 9	2 7	7	2 11	1 9	5

SQUADRON	9 JULY			10 JULY			11 JULY			12 JULY			13 JULY			14 JULY			15 JULY			16 JULY			17 JULY					
	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C			
256 Mosquito XII	5	4	2	5	4	-	5	4	1	5	3	2	5	4	1	5	4	2	5	4	4	5	4	4	5	4	4	5	3	4
683 Spitfire P.R.U.	15	12	6	15	6	9	15	9	8	16	10	10	16	8	7	15	7	7	15	8	6	15	9	7	15	14	6			
221 Wellington IX. Wellington XII.	5 4	3 2	2	5 4	3 2	2	5 4	4 3	2	6 4	4 3	2	4 4	3 3	2	4 4	3 3	2	4 4	4 3	2	4 4	2 3	4	5 4	4 2	4			
69 Baltimore III	6	5	1	6	5	-	6	5	2	6	5	1	6	5	1	7	6	1	7	6	1	7	7	2	9	9	5			
815 F.A.A. Albacore I.	2	-	-	4	-	-	4	2	-	4	2	-	4	2	-	4	3	-	4	3	-	4	4	-	4	4	-	4	4	-
826 F.A.A. Albacore I.	13	10	-	14	11	-	14	11	1	14	11	1	14	11	-	13	11	-	13	12	-	14	11	-	14	11	-	14	11	-
A.S.R. Walrus I.	4	2	1	4	2	1	6	3	1	6	3	-	6	3	-	6	3	-	6	3	-	6	3	-	6	5	-	7	3	-
A.S.R. Wellington IC.	2	1	2	2	1	-	3	1	1	3	1	-	3	2	-	3	2	-	3	1	-	2	1	-	3	1	-			
1 S.A. Spitfire V. Spitfire IX.	9 6	8 5	24	9 6	8 5	36	10 6	8 6	30	10 6	8 5	33	10 6	8 4	-	- 2	- 2	-	- -	- -	-	- -	- -	-	- -	- -	-			
40 S.A. Spitfire V.	15	14	12	16	16	22	14	12	18	14	14	14	14	13	14	13	13	12	15	15	10	15	14	10	17	17	10			

SQUADRON	9 JULY			10 JULY			11 JULY			12 JULY			13 JULY			14 JULY			15 JULY			16 JULY			17 JULY		
	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
43 Spitfire V.	17	15	32	17	16	35	17	14	35	17	17	36	17	16	46	15	13	22	16	13	--	-	-	-	-	-	-
72 Spitfire V. Spitfire IX.	9 6	9 6	24	10 6	10 6	16	10 6	10 6	44	10 6	8 6	32	10 4	8 4	40	11 6	9 5	32	10	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
81 Spitfire V. Spitfire IX.	10 6	9 5	28	10 6	8 6	12	11 6	9 6	39	11 6	10 5	23	10 5	8 2	29	8 6	7 2	27	9 6	6 6	12	8 7	8 5	12	11 5	9 5	12
92 Spitfire V. Spitfire IV.	9 6	7 5	23	9 6	8 6	41	10 6	8 6	20	10 6	8 4	39	10 6	9 6	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
93 Spitfire V. Spitfire IX.	11 5	10 5	24	11 5	10 5	57	11 3	10 3	12	13 2	12 1	12	13 3	10 3	43	12 2	11 2	16	14 3	12 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
111 Spitfire V. Spitfire IX.	10 5	8 4	12	10 5	10 4	36	10 7	10 5	36	11 6	10 5	34	11 5	9 4	34	10 5	7 2	32	10 5	8 3	12	3	-	-	-	-	-
145 Spitfire V. Spitfire IX.	10 6	9 6	32	10 5	10 5	45	10 5	10 3	28	10 5	9 4	31	10 6	8 5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
152 Spitfire V.	13	13	32	13	13	34	15	14	36	14	2	32	13	9	32	14	11	33	13	11	11	14	13	20	15	14	16

Cont.....84.

SQUADRON.	9 JULY			10 JULY			11 JULY			12 JULY			13 JULY			14 JULY			15 JULY			16 JULY			17 JULY		
	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
154 Spitfire V. Spitfire IX.	9 3	8 2	26	8 3	8 2	34	8 5	8 3	26	8 5	7 3	29	9 5	8 2	32	8 6	8 5	47	8 6	7 6	12	8 6	8 6	12	8 6	7 4	16
232 Spitfire V. Spitfire IX.	11 5	11 5	19	11 5	11 5	44	11 5	9 4	28	12 6	12 5	28	9 6	9 6	32	9 5	9 5	32	10 5	9 4	33	9 4	9 4	32	8 5	8 3	11
242 Spitfire V. Spitfire IX.	10 4	10 4	31	10 5	8 4	35	10 5	9 4	24	9 6	8 4	24	10 6	10 4	32	10 6	10 5	27	12 5	7 2	8	9 5	8 4	18	8 6	7 5	20
243 Spitfire V. Spitfire IX.	12 4	11 4	16	12 4	11 4	41	11 6	9 2	21	12 4	9 3	31	12 4	11 4	33	13 2	9 2	20	12 3	11 3							
417 R.C.A.F. Spitfire V.	16	15	12	16	15	36	16	15	40	16	13	24	16	14	12	16	13	33	14	9							
601 Spitfire V. Spitfire IX.	10 6	7 5	32	10 6	9 5	34	10 6	7 3	15	10 6	9 3	28	9 6	4 3		10 6	10 6										
3 R.A.A.F. Kittyhawk II.				12	11		12	12	23	15	14	11	15	10	20	14	11	10	12	12	11	10	9	9	15	15	
112 Kittyhawk III.				12	12		14	14	12	18	17	12	18	17	12	14	12		14	14	12	17	14		17	17	
250 Kittyhawk III.				11	11		11	11	23	15	15		13	13	10	14	14	12	16	14	12	15	11		16	16	
260 Kittyhawk III.													14	12	12	14	12	12	14	14		16	16	10	16	16	

SQUADRON.	9 JULY			10 JULY			11 JULY			12 JULY			13 JULY			14 JULY			15 JULY			16 JULY			17 JULY		
	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
450 R.A.A.F. Kittyhawk III													16	15	12	16	15		17	17	12	17	14		17	17	
73 Hurricane IIC.	6	6		9	8	6	7	6		7	6	3	7	7	6												
64 U.S.A.A.F. Warhawks.																16	16	12	16	16		16	16		16	16	
66 U.S.A.A.F. Warhawks.																											
307 U.S.A.A.F. Spitfires.		24			72			42			51			54			8										
65 U.S.A.A.F. Warhawks.																16	13	12	17	9		17	12		17	14	
308 U.S.A.A.F. Spitfires.		42			69			47			42			46			15										
309 U.S.A.A.F. Spitfires.		24			54			34			52			45			24										
58 U.S.A.A.F. Warhawks.		24			66			67			50			55													
59 U.S.A.A.F. Warhawks.		24			67			66			40			55													
60 U.S.A.A.F. Warhawks.		23			64			68			49			54													

NOTE: Strength and serviceability figures for American aircraft operating from GOZO and PANTELLARIA are not available.

APPENDIX "H"

OPERATIONAL FLYING HOURS

Squadron	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th	15th	16th	17th	Totals
126	29.15	52.25	59.10	53.10	42.20	51.10	14.40	41.45	20.20	364.15
185	22.25	54.05	51.55	54.50	51.09	56.09	38.50	50.05	33.25	412.53
229	39.20	57.25	68.25	59.05	56.50	28.15	48.00	22.30	10.00	389.50
249	29.00	77.15	48.10	59.30	55.50	49.40	59.05	62.35	40.00	481.05
1435	19.40	59.50	32.40	55.00	32.00	27.40	30.15	25.30	28.20	310.55
1 SA	27.20	57.35	45.55	55.55	34.25					221.10
92	33.45	66.40	25.45	66.05	19.15					211.30
145	39.50	76.00	45.20	55.05						216.15
417 RCAF	18.25	55.15	59.30	40.15	17.35	58.45				249.45
601	38.20	59.25	40.00	48.35						186.20
40 SA	16.05	26.20	25.20	18.45	20.00	18.40	14.10	14.10	16.00	169.30
61	48.40	18.45	61.35	40.40	47.57	49.55	18.30	15.00	19.00	320.02
152	59.20	62.30	51.40	48.00	56.40	62.15	22.55	40.00	28.00	431.20
154	55.20	48.00	35.25	41.45	45.30	80.10	24.00	20.00	27.00	377.10
232	42.35	65.35	40.00	42.20	57.40	52.00	52.45	44.00	21.05	418.00
242	56.15	56.20	36.55	36.55	57.50	46.30	12.00	31.20	34.24	368.29
43	99.15	52.30	53.05	54.35	69.45	38.50				368.00
72	44.00	28.20	77.10	66.00	75.25	38.55	24.00			353.50
93	42.10	117.0	50.20	40.40	84.25	26.00				360.35
111	24.00	65.00	18.20	60.20	59.40	56.50	22.30			306.40
243	26.20	76.40	48.05	53.45	57.15					262.05
3 RAAF			38.15	19.15	40.55	13.15	20.00	17.15		148.55
112			19.39	20.00	17.15	18.10	17.50			92.54
250			34.10	19.10	20.50	21.30	20.20			116.00
260					24.00	21.00	-	15.25		60.25
450 RAAF					37.20	-	20.00			57.20

(Continued.....8)

Squadron	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th	15th	16th	17th	Totals
54 USAAF						19.30				19.30
55 USAAF						19.30				19.30
307 USAAF	42.30	95.40	58.20	73.55	75.20	12.00				357.45
303 USAAF	61.30	88.05	64.43	56.40	67.05	13.52				351.55
309 USAAF	25.20	75.00	49.20	65.20	70.00	32.00				317.00
59 USAAF	58.00	144.40	134.55	130.40	98.12					566.27
59 USAAF	58.20	156.19	134.36	120.04	98.13					567.32
50 USAAF	58.20	136.05	140.24	126.48	101.0					562.37
23	30.30	36.45	29.00	34.10	34.10	31.20	23.10	24.58	21.10	265.13
69	05.17	-	12.02	06.45	06.35	06.30	05.44	12.10	29.23	84.26
108	09.40	12.45	15.10	15.10	13.17	19.25	19.15	23.58	19.00	147.40
221	18.40	15.36	19.45	18.23	18.50	18.30	19.29	38.36	43.56	211.45
256	03.40	Nil	03.00	05.35	03.55	04.00	12.05	12.55	12.45	57.55
600	25.45	28.00	37.40	39.05	36.05	35.35	35.35	37.55	35.40	311.20
683 PRU	18.25	23.50	23.00	27.55	23.25	21.07	20.25	19.45	18.05	195.57
826 FAA	-	-	03.15	03.45	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	07.00
A.S.R.	07.20	05.40	03.39							16.39
73	14.10		05.30	16.15						35.55
1437				03.20	04.00	04.10	03.40	Nil	04.10	19.20

T O T A L : 11,370.39.

Sorties 6,409. Average Time per Sortie - 1 hour 46 minutes.