

REPORT BY

AIR COMMODORE C.O.F. MODIN, C.B.E. D.S.C. R.A.F.

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## STATEMENT BY

Air Commodore Charles Oscar Frithiof MODIN, C.B.E., D.S.C., Air Headquarters, SINGAPORE.

Date of Birth: 25 Jan 89 Peacetime Profession: R.A.F.  
 Service: R.N.V.R. (LONDON) 1908-14 Private Address: Hedingham,  
 Royal Naval Division 1914-16 France Hill Drive.  
 R.F.C. and R.A.F. since 1916 CAMBERLEY,  
 Surrey.  
 Place & date of original capture: BANKA ISLAND, off SUMATRA, 16 Feb 42 CAMBERLEY 432  
 Liberated: HOTEN CAMP, MUKDEN, MANCHURIA about 20 Aug 45

1(a) CAPTURE.

Air Vice Marshal FULFORD, A.O.C., R.A.F. Far East, discussed with me, during the latter days of the Battle of SINGAPORE, the expediency of transferring my duties as A.O.A. from SINGAPORE to N.E.I., the majority of our aircraft having perforce been transferred to SUMATRA, the better to continue the air fight for the defence of SINGAPORE.

I had pointed out to him that there were many administrative details yet to be fixed up in SINGAPORE, while he himself had few or no Operational Units left in MALAYA to require his presence, and I was sufficiently senior and presumably competent to take the A.O.C.'s place, standing by the G.O.C. to the end. (My Deputy A.O.A., G/Capt. COGGLE, was already in SUMATRA).

I suggested that the A.O.C. should leave SINGAPORE, and proceed to Gen. WAVELL's Headquarters in JAVA, he knowing greater detail regarding the Administrative affairs to support those Operations.

Air Vice Marshal MALBY had been in SINGAPORE for some three weeks at this time, assisting Air Vice Marshal FULFORD, generally, but he left to take over the duties of A.O.C., R.A.F., N.E.I. on the morning of 10 Feb 42.

Acting in accordance with standing orders from Air Vice Marshal FULFORD, I had evacuated Royal Air Force Headquarters, Far East Command, from SIMS ROAD, SINGAPORE, a.m. 11 Feb 42, transferring them, as to "Operations", to a house called "SEVEN VALES" in SINGAPORE, with Administrative Departments in a house called "BEN NEVIS" close by. An interim Combined Air Force and Army Headquarters (with the Navy included, if they so desired) had been under preparation for some time at the Oil Tanks near the FORD Company Assembly Plant on the BUKA TIMAH Road, SINGAPORE /ISLAND.

..... SINGAPORE/

ISI ( ), This would have been ideal had not the enemy advanced so swiftly towards the BUKA TIMAH race course as to make that location quite untenable.

We were discovered in our new temporary Headquarters the very same afternoon, and the buildings and surrounds were dive-machine-gunned. It was only a matter of hours before we should be bombed out.

I therefore obtained the A.O.C.'s permission to transfer headquarters once more; this time to BORNEO MOTORS' Garage, quite close to FORT CANNING, where the Army Commander had already arrived, and was functioning, together with Rear Admiral, MALAYA (in FORT CANNING).

This move was made upon my recommendation in order to get the A.O.C. closer to the G.O.C. and to Rear Admiral, MALAYA, This for obvious reasons.

The G.O.C. was Lt. Gen. PERCIVAL, and Rear Admiral, MALAYA was Rear Admiral SPOONER, the latter since died, as has also Air Vice Marshal PULFORD himself. Both the latter succumbed on an Island called POELOE TOEDJOEH (SEVEN BROTHERS ISLANDS), North of BANKA STRAITS.

At 1200 hours on 12 Feb 42, after I had got what was left of Headquarters (the majority of the R.A.F. Staff had already been sent to the N.E.I.) satisfactorily settled in at BORNEO MOTORS, and while that area, as well as the interim Headquarters which we had just evacuated, were under sporadic enemy field gun fire, I was sent for by the A.O.C., who asked me "if my bag was packed?".

I replied "NO", as I saw no reason for doing so, in view of our previous conversation, and the fact that I had understood that SINGAPORE was to be held to the end. At this Air Vice Marshal PULFORD issued me with a direct order to transfer my activities to N.E.I. immediately, joining up with Air Vice Marshal MALTEY, already there, to continue my activities as A.O.A., R.A.F., FAR EAST.

I protested again that he should go himself, as my Deputy was already in the N.E.I., and I was myself well able to handle the delicate situation which was developing in SINGAPORE, as Senior R.A.F. Officer, standing by Gen. PERCIVAL to the end.

The A.O.C. was by this time an extremely weary and worried man, and I felt very keenly the desirability of his acting as I requested. He did, in fact, leave SINGAPORE after all, with Rear Admiral MALAYA, within forty-eight hours of myself leaving.

No communication aircraft remaining available in SINGAPORE, I was ordered

/to take .....

..... I was ordered/

to take passage in Air Sea Rescue Launch No. 105 which was proceeding from SINGAPORE to BATAVIA and from there to continue my duties as A.O.A. This I did, leaving SINGAPORE at 1715 hours on 12 Feb 42. Other passengers included W/Cdr. CHIGNELL of Fighter Group, since died, F/O FINLAY of Fighter Group, MALAYA, W/Cdr. WILLS-SANDFORD and G/Capt. BROWNSDEN-RICE, the latter being in command of No. 105, and of all other Air Sea Rescue craft. These came under his command in Fighter Group, MALAYA.

We left KALLANG PIER, SINGAPORE, at 1715 hours on 12 Feb 42, as stated, and the rest of the trip as far as the Island of MALANG TIGNE, is dealt with in the report by G/Capt. RICE, attached hereto, together with my supporting narrative thereon.

To recapitulate briefly, we had anchored on our first night in amongst the islands lying immediately South of SINGAPORE (i.e. night of 12/13 Feb 42).

Continuing South the next morning, we caught up with the small Flotilla of R.A.F. Marine Craft which, in company with the "ROMPIN" (?), had left earlier bound for BATAVIA, I understood.

In conformity with Orders given to G/Capt. RICE by Air Vice Marshal PULFORD, he ascertained that all was well with them and we proceeded on our way. All Marine Craft and Air Sea Rescue Craft came under the jurisdiction of G/Capt. RICE, Craft No. 105. He was consequently in charge, and I was merely to take passage to N.E.I. in her.

That second night we anchored in AMPHRITITE BAY. (13/14 Feb 42).

Leaving again at about 0700 hours on 14 Feb 42, we were attacked and dive-machine-gunned for twenty minutes by three Japanese single-float seaplanes, who then withdrew, presumably having run out of ammunition. No. 105 had put up a most spirited defence with her two forward twin Lewis guns, two after Lewis and two Tommy guns manned by F/O FINLAY and W/Cdr. CHIGNELL. I acted as Ammunition Feeder to the guns. No. 105 was extremely well handled, maintaining continuous and violent evasive tactics at over 30 knots. The 1st Coxswain, F/Sgt. KIRKNAIRD, being severely wounded, was attended by G/Capt. RICE and others below, and the 2nd Coxswain, then took over and continued splendidly.

When the enemy aircraft withdrew, No. 105 was run into the shelter of a littel bay of MALANG TIGNE ISLAND, partly to investigate damage which we knew was considerable, and partly to lie-up and take cover.

No sooner had we anchored than we were again attacked by three more similar

/Japanese . . .

..... similar/

Japanese aircraft, who bombed and machine-gunned us until No. 105 caught fire, burning fiercely from stem to stern.

G/Capt. RICE had already given the order to "Abandon Ship" a direct bomb hit having been made on the stern of 105, killing W/Cdr. CHIGNELL, the back of whose head was blown away. I saw his dead body floating in the sea, and later, after No. 105 had sunk, and the enemy aircraft had left, we buried him at sea off the Island.

When the order to "Abandon Ship" was given, I was on the forecastle, where I had gone with my haversack containing urgent papers, in order to catch the painter of our dinghy, which, with one airman pulling, was returning to No. 105 from the shore, after having landed the badly wounded coxswain (F/Sgt. KINNAIRD) and one attending airman.

Just before the dinghy bumped No. 105, the airman threw me the painter, and himself dived overboard to swim ashore with the rest.

I jumped into the dinghy, only to find that I could not reach high enough to get my precious haversack. By this time air bombing and dive-machine-gunning was continuing fast and furious and all but myself were swimming hard for the shore, across a strong current.

I was able to rescue G/Capt. RICE and W/Cdr. WILLS-SANDFORD, both of whom appeared to be somewhat distressed, while others, as they got tired, hung on to the gunwale of my dinghy.

In this fashion we finally reached the shore, and, to my amazement, without being hit.

Immediately after landing, we saw No. 105, which was burning furiously from stem to stern, blow up and sink in the fast running current.

With her went everything we had of every kind, for there was no possibility or opportunity to rescue anything, whether papers, clothing or food.

Nothing was left on the surface of the sea after No. 105 had sunk but a few charred fragments quite unrecognisable as to what they had originally been.

To our officers and men of Launch No. 105 who then mustered on the foreshore I explained that I now assumed command and responsibility for the party.

.....for the party./

The following is a list of the crew and passengers of Launch No. 105:-

CREW

Sgt. KINNAIRD (coxswain) R.A.F.

LAC CALDWELL

LAC MORGAN

AC 1 TIRWORTH (or TINSWORTH)

AC 1 DAVIS

Cpl. REEVES

LAC HALL

LAC BUNTON

AC 1 GARRETT (or GARNETT)

PASSENGERS

Group Captain BROWSDEN-RICE

In charge of all Marine Craft, and Air Sea Rescue Craft. (This officer has since died as a P/W).

Air Commodore C.O.F. MODIN

(On transfer from SINGAPORE to SUMATRA).

Wing Commander CHIGNELL

(On transfer from SINGAPORE to SUMATRA). (Killed in action in No. 105).

Wing Commander WILLS-SANDFORD

(For passage to SUMATRA).

Flying Officer FINLAY, R.A.A.F. (?)

(For passage to SUMATRA).

Hostile aircraft, which made one or two flights along the shore, presumably looking for us, who were under cover of the jungle, left the vicinity after a time. One enemy aircraft had flown down low over the water, close by the stern of No. 105, presumably to read her number or name, just before she sank.

In regard to the death of W/Cdr. CHIGNELL I should mention that we only decided to bury him at sea after a most careful discussion as to the advisability of burying him on shore.

The narrow, sandy foreshore was clogged with stones and rocks just below the surface of the sand, and only a shallow grave could have been dug, which we thought might have been promptly molested by wild animals on that uninhabited island. A deeper grave, within the jungle, was impracticable, for lack of tools.

The final burial at sea consisted of slitting the life-saving jacket and letting the body sink in the swift running current which must automatically have swept it out into the ocean. The actual burial was carried out at my orders by F/O FINLAY and one airman working from our dinghy after the attack was all over.

/All hands.....

.....all over./

All hands were now again mustered, and divided into two watches. An 'eternal' fire was lit with our few remaining matches at a position some distance from our own, for reasons of security, and one man set to watch constantly over it.

Attendants for the wounded man, cooks, food-searchers, look-outs, etc. were also organised on a two-watch basis.

After intensive search, a water-hole, fed by a small stream from the hilly jungle, was found; and from this, water was boiled in an old petrol drum which was found near-by the deserted ruin of a native fisherman's temporary wooden hut. In this hut we placed Sgt. KINNAIRD, the wounded Coxswain, for rest and such first-aid as we could continue to give.

Our first meal was of coconut and fish, the latter killed by the bombing of 105. Ample supplies of coconut and other fruit foods appeared to be growing on the island, sufficient for our subsistence for some time to come.

After a midday meal of fish and coconut, the word 'HELP' was spelt on the sand, with large decayed tree-trunks, these being covered with palm fronds, to hide them from sight until Allied aircraft, definitely identified as friendly, might pass overhead, when they would be exposed. Only one aircraft did so, and appeared not to see our signal but continued on his way.

The condition of Sgt. KINNAIRD became worse, and we, at his request, moved him down to our own position by the shore, and later, to the vicinity of the Camp fire, as he was feeling the usual cold chill following exhaustion. Further, I felt that the smoke would protect him from the tormenting mosquitoes.

As the sun was nearing its setting, an airman, who had made a direct crossing of the tiny island, through the jungle at top speed, reported to me that two small ships had been sighted approaching the Islands at slow speed against the tide.

By then C/Capt. RICE and F/O FINLAY had proceeded in our dinghy, to reconnoitre one of the two nearby islands, upon which was a trellis coastal-light, a largish evacuated native house, and a fair-sized boat, pulled up under cover of the trees. No sign of living humans being still present, however, was seen, either on that island or on our own. The above two officers did not land, but waylaid and intercepted the oncoming ships.

I had also ordered two R.A.F. Marine Section airmen to take a very small native canoe, which we had found, and head off the approaching ships. This they eventually

/did.....

.....they eventually/

did, just as G/Capt. RICE and F/O FINLAY did likewise in their dinghy.

As the sun was setting, a ship's boat pulled through the reef to our small bay and picked us up, the journey back across the strong current being very difficult with so crowded and clumsy a ship's lifeboat, with one large man, badly wounded, lying full length amidships.

Among the valuables lost by me was a bag of approximately three hundred old and undelivered 'E.M.'s' and other private cables, addressed largely to North and Central MALAYA. These had been handed by the Cable and Wireless Company's messenger to the penultimate Air Headquarters, R.A.F. FAR EAST, in the office of the BORNEO MOTORS Co. Ltd., SINGAPORE, and I had been requested to take them along at the last minute.

It had been impossible to get to them in their place of forward stowage in Launch No. 105 during the bombing, and they were unfortunately burnt and sunk with the vessel.

Eventually, half the party were embarked in the larger of the two rescuing vessels, the 'RANTAU' and the remainder in the 'RELAU'. It was easier to get a stretcher case over the low sides of 'RELAU' than over the high side of the 'RANTAU', so F/Sgt. KINNAIRD was placed in the former vessel. I believe that he has survived.

The crews of both vessels were 'volunteers', business men and other civilians from SINGAPORE. The 'RANTAU' was captained by the Marine Superintendent of the STRAITS STEAMSHIP Co., SINGAPORE (Captain BADDELEY) and the 'RELAU' by Captain CAMBERLAIN, Assistant to Captain BADDELEY. There was one civilian lady on board the 'RANTAU', wife of one of the business men from SINGAPORE.

Neither ship had any armament other than one shotgun in 'RANTAU' to which can be added our Service revolvers. A rifle was in 'RELAU'.

Captain BADDELEY invited me on to the bridge of 'RANTAU' and discussed our immediate programme. We agreed that both vessels should move off as darkness fell, and put in to MUNTOK, BANKA ISLAND, as Captain BADDELEY was anxious to refuel there for his onward trip to BATAVIA, for which port both vessels were bound.

Also, I myself hoped to get in touch with the Royal Air Force from the landing strip at MUNTOK and possibly even to fly the wounded man and perhaps also myself to JAVA, for obvious reasons.

Sunday, 15 Feb 42

We could not expect to make the trip in one night, as both ships were only

/capable

.....were only/

able of making five to six knots. We therefore decided to make the BERHALA Islands by dawn on Sunday 15 Feb 42, which we did without incident. Both vessels lay up there for the day, being joined by H.M.S. TAPPAN and R.A.F. Launch No. 36, both vessels carrying a mixed party of Service personnel.

I advised sending all hands ashore, under cover, during the day time, as, if discovered, I expected enemy aircraft to attack the undefended vessels. No sooner had all hands been transferred ashore than such an attack did, in fact, develop, being delivered by one single-float bi-plane seaplane, similar to those which had attacked Launch No. 105. A near miss was made on the 'RANTAU'. No more enemy air attacks took place.

Enemy aircraft flew along the island's coast line, apparently looking for us, but took no offensive action.

The 'RANTAU' and 'RELAU' sailed again that evening, and arrived off MUNTOK by early dawn. As daylight broke (Monday, 16 Feb 42), however, and the MUNTOK Lighthouse and coast showed up, we saw two destroyers proceeding at high speed on a reverse course to our own, although some distance away, between us and the shore. As they took no notice of us, and we could not discern any ensign, we could not decide their nationality, which might well have been Dutch or American. They did not look like British ships, but we had no warning of any enemy surface ships being in these waters.

Fine on the starboard bow, we saw what looked like minesweepers, in line ahead, steering towards the mouth of the PALMBAANG River; but again nationality could not be ascertained. Right ahead of us appeared a large destroyer, or small light cruiser, stopped, and bows-on, making her ensign, and making it difficult to tell her nationality. As she swung gradually off the bows-on position, she gave a kick of her propellers, to straighten herself again into the bows-on position. She was obviously waiting for us.

At this, and in view of the fact that the 'RANTAU' and her consort 'RELAU' astern of her, were both purely unarmed, civilian vessels, carrying civilian 'volunteer' crews, and one woman, and only having Service personnel on board by virtue of rescuing them from MALANG TIGER Island (and, in the case of 'RELAU', having picked up shipwrecked persons from the water during the night) I suggested to Captain BADDELEY that the 'RANTAU' should stop engines, and hoist the International Code Signal 'I WISH TO

/SPEAK YOU'.....

.....'I WISH TO/

'ASK YOU' to make the stranger disclose his identity. This was done, and our signal had hardly reached the masthead, when the strange ship ahead hoisted International 'K' 'STOP IMMEDIATELY'.

We had already stopped engines, and the strange ship now moved towards us. As she came alongside, bow and stern, we saw that she flew the Japanese War Ensign, and was packed with Japanese Navy seamen.

We were hailed from the bridge as to our nationality, name, last port, and destination, etc., and peremptorily ordered to proceed to anchor in MUNTOK BAY, under the guns of the Jap destroyer and Jap-manned shore batteries. In the Bay we found six or seven large Japanese troop transports, flying the Japanese Ensign, together with a motley crowd of other craft, including many British ships, vessels and boats, which continued to be sent in during the day.

Japanese aircraft were low-flying over MUNTOK town, and military landing craft were busy passing between the Japanese transports and MUNTOK beach, transferring troops, horses, etc. and other military stores.

It was observed that these motor military landing craft were most efficient and quite fast.

Anti-aircraft guns, manned by Japanese, were seen along the front at MUNTOK and these opened fire when three British bombers appeared and bombed the transports, apparently without obtaining a direct hit, however.

Further, there were quite a number of Japanese bi-plane single-float seaplanes pulled up on the beach at MUNTOK. These were similar to those which had attacked Launce No. 105 and were busy working from the MUNTOK beaches as we arrived, and continued to do so.

The Japanese co-operational technique between air and surface craft appeared to be controlled by a four-funnel cruiser believed to be the 'SENDAI' acting as Flak ship and operating a destroyer search and attack for nearer Allied craft, and aircraft for search and attack of more distant Allied surface craft.

Later in the forenoon of this day, Monday 16 Feb 42, we observed a fresh lot of large transports - 14 in number - headed by a screen of three destroyers, with two flanking destroyers, coming from behind BANKA ISLAND straight towards the entrance of the PALEMBANG River, which they entered.

Apparently, this was the Japanese invasion force which occupied PALEMBANG after the preliminary attack by parachute troops on the aerodrome and Oil Refinery

/on Sunday.....

.....Oil Refinery/

on Monday 15 Feb 42.

A Japanese Naval guard had boarded the 'RANAU' and ordered all hands peremptorily on to the poop, the Officer of the Guard going on to the bridge deck to interview Captain BADDELEY. The latter explained that he had myself and other R.A.F. personnel on board, i.e. rescued BRITISH Service personnel, and his own volunteer (civilian) crew and one woman, wife of one of the 'crew'. The Japanese Naval Officer of the Guard caused a search to be made of the ship and personnel, and after saying that we would be collected by a Japanese Army Launch, he departed.

This Army Launch collected us at about 1800 hours that day, Monday 16 Feb 42, before we had had time to eat the supper we had been preparing.

Only the minimum quantity of hand baggage, immediately available, was permitted to be taken.

Meantime, the 'RELAU' had also been captured and sent in to MUNTOK BAY.

We, of the 'RANAU' were disembarked from the Japanese Army Launch at MUNTOK Pier, BANKA ISLAND, from where we were eventually sent to temporary internment accommodation the following day.

1(b) CAMPES IN WHICH IMPRISONED

MUNTOK	BANKA ISLAND	16	-	26 Feb 42
PALMBANG	SUMATRA	27 Feb	-	17 Jul 42
CHANGI	SINGAPORE	21 Jul	-	16 Aug 42
HAITO	FORMOSA	21 Aug	-	7 Sep 42
KERENKO	FORMOSA	8 Sep 42	-	2 Apr 43
TAMASATA	FORMOSA	2 Apr	-	5 Jun 43
KERENKO	FORMOSA	5	-	7 Jun 43
SHIRO KAWA	FORMOSA	8 Jun 43	-	6 Oct 44
CHENG TAI FUN	MANCHURIA	14 Oct 44	-	20 May 45
MUKDEN (HOTEN)	MANCHURIA	21 May	-	10 Sep 45

2(a) ATTEMPTED ESCAPES (Personal)

Nil

2(b) ATTEMPTED ESCAPES (Others)

I have knowledge of only two attempted escapes. The details are as follows:-

(a) A Naval Commander, named, I think, ALEXANDER, escaped from captivity at the beginning (i.e. in Feb 42) in BANKA ISLAND, before the Japanese realised that they had got him, but I have never heard of him since.

(b) Lt. Col. DALLY, Assistant Chief of Police, SINGAPORE, escaped in a similar way from the same place at a considerably later date, but was recaptured in JAVA some weeks later. Here again, the Japanese in BANKA ISLAND probably never even realised that they held

/Col. DALLY

.....they held/

Col. DALLY, and were probably oblivious of his escape. Upon his recapture in JAVA, his second Japanese captors probably had no idea that he had ever been a Prisoner of War before.

Col. DALLY informed me that he intended, as an ex-Senior Police Official, au fait with conditions in the Far East, to make known to the Authorities at home, in his opinion, virtual impossibility of anyone, other than of similar attributes to himself, having the slightest chance of getting away at all, except possibly from CHANGI CAMP, SINGAPORE, during a certain period early on. Stature, language, colour, etc. were all against it; whilst the natives, especially those under the domination of the Japanese, were either too frightened of repercussions should they harbour an escaper, or else were desirous of collecting the 'Head Money', which the Japanese apparently gave to those who betrayed escapers.

3. ESCAPE COMMITTEES

Organisation of Intelligence

I personally had little to do with this matter except in the first year of my captivity, namely in SUMATRA.

In PALEMBANG I operated two activities of this nature, namely:-

- (a) The sending of secret information home to the Air Ministry.

This was done in the following manner:-

S/Ldr. HOWELL, a P/W in MULO SCHOOL CAMP reported to me that he had been instructed in a method of incorporating information in normal private letters sent home by him. Also that he had been ordered to make known this fact to the Senior R.A.F. officer present should he ever have the misfortune to be captured. During this period Mar/Jul 42 I was able to send through S/Ldr. HOWELL about three separate lots of information, such as:-

- (i) The approximate numbers of British P's/W of all Services, and British civilian internees captive in SUMATRA.
- (ii) The estimated strength (or, one might say, 'weakness' of the Japanese forces apparently at that time holding the PALEMBANG area.
- (iii) Requirements in medical stores, drugs and extra food for prisoners and internees in PALEMBANG.

NOTE: It is unknown if the Japanese ever forwarded these letters.

/(iv).....

(iv) The captured women and children.

(b) I also arranged:-

- (i) Collation of data, in as much detail as possible, as to personnel, P's/W or civilian internees, and the circumstances of their capture.
- (ii) The interrogation of P's/W coming into MULO SCHOOL CAMP, in an endeavour to elicit any vital information which they might have.

(c) In addition, I wrote a letter to Gen. WAVELL, which I passed through the Japanese, asking them to drop it by air in JAVA, before JAVA capitulated.

In this letter, I represented strongly the dire straits we were in for lack of medical stores, adequate clothing, etc. and referred to the women and children in the women's camp for whom I asked that they might be exchanged in a 'Mercy Ship' for Japanese internees from, say, AUSTRALIA, such 'Mercy Ship' being guaranteed safe passage by all belligerents.

I gave as good an indication as I could of the numbers involved, but I never heard whether the Japanese did actually try to have that letter delivered, either by the method suggested, or in any other way.

(d) Further, a very considerable quantity of records, narratives, nominal rolls, graves' registrations, and so on, were accumulated secretly in my Camp Information Bureau, and I made arrangements that one copy of everything should be buried at a spot in PALEMBANG now made known by me to the late Dutch Governor General of the N.E.I., the late Dutch Governor of SUMATRA and a Dutch officer, fellow P/W with me, named Lt. ROSENWALDE. (This officer had been a Dutch officer in subordinate command of Dutch shore batteries on the PALEMBANG River).

(I can give the exact location of this cache upon request.)

For the rest, as regards Intelligence, I found a complete system working in CHANGI CAMP, SINGAPORE, to the secret 'bureau of information' of which I gave several lists of names of P's/W and civilian internees in SUMATRA, qualifying them in categories as far as was known at the time, upon my removal to SINGAPORE from PALEMBANG in Jul 42.

/I also.....

.....in Jul 42./

I also made a verbal report to Lt. Gen. PERCIVAL there on Prisoner of War conditions in SUMATRA, and particularly stressed the need for trying to improve the conditions for the women and children interned there, as well as the question of the British MALAY seamen of the Royal Navy imprisoned there. (These men also reported to Capt. MULLOCK, R.N., senior Naval Officer P/W in CHANGI CAMP, SINGAPORE, when I reached SINGAPORE on my way to FORMOSA early in Aug 42).

Lastly, we compiled as best we could a list of the ships, vessels, launches and boats which were captured or sunk in the BANKA STRAITS during the 'Black Period' about 12/19 Feb 42. (See Appendix 'J'.)

Against these ships' names we have endeavoured to quote names of Captains, Ship's Officers, passengers and personnel rescued by any such ships, a copy of same being attached hereto.

As to Intelligence in FORMOSA and MANCHURIA, it was already in hand by P's/W before I arrived, and was collated and organised to a considerable extent by Air Vice Marshal P.C. MALBY from the date of his arrival in these respective countries.

I had no particular part in this, other than to assist him where possible.

#### Radio

I know of no radio P/W facilities other than the following:-

- (a) In BANKA ISLAND, nothing as far as I know.
- (b) In SUMATRA, radio was only available for one glorious week, when the Japanese handed a captured radio set to us to repair. These repairs were completed on the day of receipt, but we managed to pretend that they were not, and actually used the wireless, hidden inside the back of a storeroom, for about one week, when the Japanese demanded it back, repaired or not repaired. I gathered that the Japanese had little luck with it henceforward.
- (c) In CHANGI CAMP, radio news reached prisoners from a P/W source or sources unknown to me, and as to which it was a point of honour not to enquire.
- (d) At no time did I hear of any radio used in FORMOSA.

(NOTE: I must report that when Sir Mark YOUNG, Governor of HONG KONG, reached KERENKO, he brought with him a radio set, which up to then he had, I understand, been allowed by the Japanese to retain, but it was taken away from him immediately upon arrival at KERENKO.)

/(●).....

.....at KERENKO.)//

(e) There was a minor radio set operated by an American P/W in MUKDEN CAMP, MANCHURIA, but this set was not always able to receive, nor had it great range. Nevertheless, it did keep us informed generally as to the trend of the War, until we were released by the American 'rescue squad', and the Russian Red Army, after which, of course, we had proper radio news service, as freed men, provided by the Americans.

The foregoing are the only radio activities I personally know of, although as regards MUKDEN, we also got considerable news from the Chinese factory workers employed in the same factories as were certain American and British P/W O.R.'s from our Camp. The Chinese told our men, and our men told us, when they got in at night.

#### Newspapers

We never had any newspapers in BANKA ISLAND or SUMATRA, but in FORMOSA, both in KERENKO CAMP and SHIRO KAWA CAMP, we had some copies - in English - of the 'NIPPON TIMES' (ex TOKYO TIMES) which gave us news of the war, although, of course, as seen through Japanese eyes.

I am not sure whether they had any newspapers or not in CHANGI CAMP, SINGAPORE.

I have no recollection of receiving any newspapers when I was in MANCHURIA. In fact, receipt of newspapers was finally stopped back in early SHIRO KAWA days, i.e. approximately about May 44, since when we had no more.

#### 4. SABOTAGE (Personal and Others)

I had no opportunity of effecting sabotage personally, but, on one occasion in SUMATRA, when I was British prisoner in charge of PALEMBANG CAMP in 42, I was able to direct British Army personnel to carry out sabotage. The circumstances were as follows:-

One day, after I had been moved to PALEMBANG, SUMATRA, on 26 Feb 42, the Japanese visited me to say they wanted military artificers, etc., to try and repair captured British A/A guns, and to teach them the drill.

As usual, as on all such occasions, I pointed out that this was not permissible under the Convention and Rules of War generally; but they over-ruled me and went past me, to take certain A/A gunners (O.R.'s) out of Camp for a sufficient number of days to effect the task.

I was, however, able to catch these men before they left and obtained their promise that:-

(a).....

.....promise that;-/

(a) They would not instruct the Japanese how to fire the guns unless forced to do so at the 'point of the bayonet', and then incorrectly, and

(b) in any case that they would do all that they could to damage the guns if opportunity offered, so as to make them dangerous after one or two practice rounds had been fired, whether after repairs by our own men, under duress, or repairs by the Japanese themselves.

They promised me that, in any event, they would do their utmost so to re-assemble the guns that they could not continue to fire more than one or two shots without coming to a standstill, or breaking up the breach-mechanism or recoil arrangements, etc. This was to be effected by leaving out certain vital studs or pins, and by omitting to fill essential lubrication components, and so forth.

In addition, I made a strong personal protest to the Japanese, and, in order to frighten them, I asked them particularly to remember that I had warned them that these men were not the artificers they thought them to be, and if they forced them to repair these guns, I personally should be very sorry to be anywhere nearby when they were fired; 'so don't blame me if you get blown up'. When the Japanese ordered these men to parade for duty, I was present, and insisted that, while they might appear to be English gunners, they were in fact merely members of an A/A Battery employed actually as tractor drivers, battery cooks, signal-man and the like. I said that there were no guns' crew, nor artificers. Everything we could do to hide the fact that there were any skilled artificers amongst the men was done by all concerned.

With regard to these men, I understood that they had manned their guns to the last during the invasion of PALEMBANG and were only taken prisoner when the last round, both of gun and rifle ammunition, had been fired.

I knew of no other actual cases of sabotage myself, but realise that extremely few opportunities ever presented themselves for useful sabotage, in SUMATRA, anyhow.

5. OUTSTANDING ACTIONS (Others)

See Appendix 'E'

6. CAMP CONDITIONS & TREATMENT - GENERAL (Service and civilian personnel)

As I have reported at all my interrogations since release, treatment by the Japanese throughout my captivity (the whole time with the senior Officer of P's/W of the three British Services plus, most of the time, also the Governors of SINGAPORE,

/HONG KONG.....

.....of SINGAPORE, /

HONK (NG, etc.), consisted of applying a policy of humiliation of senior officers, general rudeness and lethargy in regard to any but the most urgent requests, beatings-up of senior officers in some camps I was in, insufficient and unsuitable food in most cases, with reduction to semi-starvation diet on many occasions, enforced 'voluntary work', in that we were reduced to the lowest possible rations if we refused to volunteer, and when we did volunteer, we were subject to the strictest guarding by Japanese armed sentries, with a good deal of 'hustling', and 'impudent' interference during our work. The latter consisted of so-called 'farm work', which involved quite heavy labour, with heavy iron hoes, spades, etc., while the resultant produce of the agricultural farm was taken principally by the Japanese themselves.

To put it simply in narrative form, my treatment when first captured at MUNTOK, BANKA ISLAND, was extremely harsh, and with totally inadequate food, and most insanitary and foul accommodation for the most part.

After capture at sea, off MUNTOK, BANKA ISLAND, on 16 Feb 42, large numbers of Service and civilian internees, of both sexes, were held with me from about 1800 hours on the night of 16 Feb 42 until about 1000 hours on the morning of 17 Feb 42, on MUNTOK PIER, without cover, or accommodation, or food, of any sort, except a little milk which certain Japanese sentries brought for the babies, so I understand.

There were many wounded, some fatally (mostly native Service personnel) and certain of these died during the night, despite the best attention that I personally could give them with water from water-bottles, etc., in which certain ladies helped me valiantly.

Sanitary conditions on that pier were foul, and the captives, including the women and children, had to use the stair-ways leading from the pier to the water, for sanitary purposes, watched all the time by a mob of impudent, amused Jap troops.

We were forced to work on the extension of the landing strip at MUNTOK, also unloading lighters of rice, etc., at the quays in MUNTOK BAY, etc., etc.

Not all of the P's/W and civilian internees in MUNTOK were sent out to work, and, although, as a result of my continued protests and representations to the Japanese, I became looked upon as 'spokesman', as well as the senior officer, of the captives there I made a point of personally accompanying all working parties.

We were hauled out before daylight, without being able to see to wash or look decently after ourselves in any way at all, taken out to work, and kept out until

/long,.....

.....out until/

after dark.

On one occasion my working party did not turn in until after 0200 hours, after a most gruelling day in the heat, and when we did turn in, it was only to lie down in our clothes as we were, on coolie sleeping-'shelves' in dark rooms, or on the floor of the 'Main Hall'.

At MUNTOK, during the ten days I was there, a large number of sick and wounded were housed in a disused cinema, on the water-front, with practically no sanitary accommodation at all, except the sea-shore.

We gradually got these sick and wounded men into our main accommodation at the Coolie Assembly Station, where British and Dutch Service Doctors did their utmost, with virtually no medical equipment or drugs. They were assisted by a noble volunteer party of ladies, who worked hard to assist the British Service nurses (Australians), who were available, irrespective of social rank or status.

At MUNTOK, the civilian women and children internées were accommodated with us in the native coolie Labour Assembly Station, males being with the Service personnel on one side of the building, and the females on the other. Food at first consisted of only two meals a day, one at about 1100 hours and one at about 1700 hours, of rice and a cup of weak tea, with now and again a 'little extra', obtained from I don't know where. Later, meals were increased to three a day, but all equally scanty.

Treatment at the Assembly Station was not too bad, although the ladies sent me a protest that the Japanese sentries insisted on watching them while they took their shower-baths, at which I immediately paraded and protested to the Japanese guard who, I must admit, promptly had it stopped.

In addition to those accommodated in the Assembly Station, some three hundred Service N.C.O's and men, captives, were incarcerated in the Native Civil Gaol at MUNTOK together with about three hundred Chinese coolies, understood to be forced labour from HONG KONG, who occupied one side of the prison, cramped beyond description, and with only sanitation accommodation for about a dozen men.

These coolies were in a terrible state of semi-starvation and illness, with running sores, etc., which made me fear an epidemic of some sort, such as dysentery, which might have spread to our British Service captives quartered in the Prison.

These latter slept on bags of pepper in a store-house of the prison, through the roof of which the water poured, in the tropical rains.

/Working.....

.....tropical rains./

Working parties were drawn from this prison, as well as from the Assembly Station, and I always accompanied them both, and managed to actually inspect the Prison conditions myself, against the orders of the Japanese. These conditions were beyond description.

The only water supply was one tap in the Central Compound, used by everybody for every purpose. Cooking facilities were virtually nil. The Chinese coolies were so far gone that they would not keep themselves decently clean, and did the necessary in the open, refusing to clean up after themselves.

In a desperate endeavour to save epidemic, British Service P's/W not only cleaned up after themselves, but had to do so after the coolies, also.

In the whole of this report it must be remembered that some British and Dutch native personnel and Chinese British, were included. Also a certain number of Dutch Europeans.

I had a somewhat difficult time with truculent and unsympathetic Jap officers, especially when I formally demanded better housing accommodation and the removal of all prisoners from that filthy gaol.

At one time, one of the few 'friendly-disposed' Japanese sentries whom I ever met, and who could speak a little English, came to me in a great state, saying, as I understood, that he 'feared for my life as the Japanese officers were getting so fed-up with my persistent protests and demands'.

In the Assembly Station, the civilian internees, functioned under Mr. GREGSONI, late of SINGAPORE Harbour Board, but now, I am given to understand, dead. Mr. GREGSONI handled these civilians in co-operation with myself, as Senior British Service officer P/W at MUNTOK.

SUMATRA

I was suddenly informed late one night (26 Feb 42) that, together with certain Senior Naval and Military officers, P's/W, I was to be transferred to PALEMBANG, SUMATRA, there to prepare reception facilities for all the prisoners from MUNTOK.

I was hauled out at 0300 hours and housed in the guard-room (without any 'unpleasantness') and we moved off to the Port of MUNTOK later in the morning, embarking in a Japanese ship before dawn.

After dawn, we sailed across the BANKA STRAITS to PALEMBANG, arriving late that evening.

We spent our first night crowded into some buildings of a Dutch Fort at PALEMBANG which appeared to have been occupied by troops of all Services, of

/both.....

.....of X

b sides, and were in a very filthy condition.

Later we were driven in a lorry to MULO SCHOOL, PALEMBANG, which we found in a filthy state, and already occupied by a hundred or so British soldiers, and others, captured in the PALEMBANG fighting.

The Japanese continued to deal through me, as Senior P/W, and I immediately organised a clean-up of this school, in which we were to have somewhere about three-hundred-and-fifty prisoners in due course.

I have a plan of this school, which can be produced if necessary. Some thirty to fifty prisoners were squeezed into each room, most of them lying on the bare floor. This was very hard on the elderly Chief Petty Officers, R.N., etc., and others, for all of whom I eventually managed to make sleeping-racks of bamboo for from four to eight men apiece, thus getting all hands off the floor.

In the beginning, there were a certain number of wooden double-bunks, one above the other, and although officers were given these, the remainder were not permitted to be used by white P's/W, but were given to native British and Dutch P's/W. This, as a general insult to the whites.

At first, Japanese guards were adamant as to locking all doors at night, and closing all windows, making conditions within intolerable for the over-crowded captives there. Finally I persuaded them to let the windows be opened, also one door for each set of communicating class-rooms, to allow the rooms to be ventilated, and the men to go out for hygienic purposes, especially at night.

This consent I obtained by agreeing to be personally responsible for compliance with orders at peril of myself receiving punishment for any breach of discipline.

Through the wonderful loyalty of all my fellow P's/W and internees, cause never arose for me to be thus 'punished', although I was ticked off more than once.

Medical arrangements at MULO School were virtually nil, in that no drugs or medicines existed, nor did the Japanese show the slightest inclination to provide any. They said they had not got any, themselves, which I think was a lie.

(It is only right to say that at both MUNTOK and PALEMBANG the Japanese had only just arrived and were themselves to a certain degree very short both of food and of medical stores for a while).

I discovered that in PALEMBANG there were to be four other Camps, as follows:-

/PALEMBANG 1. .....

.....as follows:-/

PALEMBANG 1.

This Camp was on the Main aerodrome, where eventually some five to six hundred British and Dutch P's/W were forced to work on the extension of the runway all through the heat of a tropical summer, some without shoes or boots, and altogether a desperate affair.

Col. HILL was senior P/W at PALEMBANG 1. and had a very bad time. On one occasion the Japanese informed me that they intended to shoot him the next morning for 'insulting the Japanese Army', and only after strenuous requests on my part did they allow me to see him. At first they said I could do so, in their company, at the Japanese Gestapo Headquarters in PALEMBANG, but later they refused this, but brought Col. HILL himself to me at MULO SCHOOL. There, by question and answer before the Japanese, I was able to convince them that Col. HILL had at no stage intended to 'insult the Japanese Army', and his life was thus spared, although I believe he was punished in some minor way or other later.

No doubt Col. HILL will be reporting on conditions in PALEMBANG 1, but, from the sick prisoners sent to my MULO SCHOOL Camp for 're-cuperation', I know that working conditions were pretty harsh, the test for fitness for work being whether one could stand or not, while punishments were severe and harsh in the extreme, even for petty offences. The two following are suitable examples:-

(a) There were two British sailors who had got out of MULO SCHOOL Camp to appropriate some house furniture from a dump nearby (upon which the Japanese had thrown any unwanted articles from the private houses which they occupied) and who were caught in the act. I was immediately had up to the office of the Japanese guard commander (an officer), and given a pretty unpleasant time, while I was informed that these men had been caught trying to escape, and that, as 'I was responsible for their good behaviour', both they and I must be severely punished. After some hours I convinced the Japanese that these men were in fact only trying to procure some furniture for their bare rooms, and so they were let off, provided I punished them myself. This I did, by giving them a good 'tick-off' upon their tactlessness, pointing out that this might have had serious repercussions on both themselves, and their fellow P's/W. Here I should mention, as stated in previous

/Allied.....

.....in previous/

Allied interrogations, that I honestly do not consider that there was any possible chance of escaping, with any prospect of success, at any time through my experiences in captivity, except possibly from CHANGI Camp, SINGAPORE, and MUNTOK itself in the very first days of captivity, when the Japanese really did not know whom they had got. Even then, for anyone in a conspicuous position, as I was myself, escape was out of the question. One would have been missed within a few minutes.

(b) The following example was told to me by a man from PALEMBANG 1, an eyewitness.

A Naval C.P.O., whose so-called offence was that he went to wash himself on return from work when this was not permitted, was punished by being forced to turn out every morning to face a Japanese officer, or Warrant Officer, who sat in a chair in full view of everybody, while the C.P.O. was forced to crawl on hands and knees up to him and bow his head to the ground. This is as reported to me in 42, and I have no reason to doubt its veracity.

#### MULO SCHOOL

I was kept rigidly within Camp bounds at MULO SCHOOL, the Japanese refusing me permission to visit other camps, saying that I was 'dangerous in that I was sure to organise the prisoners'.

I did get out on one or two occasions. Twice to hold burial services over dead persons, including one lady. There was no Padre available. (My report on my efforts to keep records on all graves is given in paragraph 3.)

From MULO SCHOOL a certain number of prisoners were taken to work at the docks on most days, but the treatment was not really bad, and they received a little 'pay' for their labour. With some of this pay, voluntarily subscribed by the men themselves, the Japanese finally allowed me to run a very small Canteen, selling such stuff as native sugar, tangerines, nuts, coconuts and such like, which I was allowed to buy from a native contractor through the Japs. At the mens' request such trifles were not only for purchase by individuals, but also available in bulk 'if desired' for use for the benefit of all prisoners in MULO Camp by giving a little flatour to their meals of rice and thin vegetable soup.

#### WOMENS' AND CHILDRENS' INTERNMENT CAMP - PALEMBANG

The women and children arrived in PALEMBANG from MUNTOK about a month

/after.....

.....about a month/

af I did, and I was suddenly told to accommodate them for one night in my already over-crowded MULO SCHOOL Camp. I was also to feed them although the extra food might have to come out of our own rations until the Japanese made it up.

By squeezing my fellow-prisoners into two thirds of the school, in which action they willingly helped me to the best of their ability, I freed certain rooms and lavatories, etc., for these women and children, segregating them entirely from the males.

They arrived late one night absolutely tired out, and next morning were forced to march along the road to their new Camp, although I did manage to extract one lorry out of the Japanese to take heavy baggage, the very sick and the old. (One woman was over seventy, but refused to use the Japanese lorry, anyhow, as a point of principle.) The night they spent with me we got them a decent supper (they said that they had had nothing to eat since soon after dawn that day), made our two shower baths and certain lavatories available to them, gave them some eating-utensils, plates from our small private belongings, and made them as comfortable as possible for sleeping, although they had to lie on the bare floor, not a square inch of which was unoccupied that night.

It was then that the Australian senior Sister brought another Australian sister to me, as the only survivor of a massacre near MUNTOK of some twenty-two Australian nurses, when they landed from boats after their ships had been sunk by the Japanese.

It was a very painful interview, as to which I have reported separately, both to the Australian authorities, and our own. I understand the Sister in question has now given her own personal report in AUSTRALIA.

After the women and children had left MULO CAMP I was not permitted to visit them, to ascertain their welfare, or to have anything to do with them.

However, the Senior Japanese Officer of the Guard, Lt. SEKI (?), was more amenable than most, and upon one occasion allowed me to send to the womens' camp a sack of Dutch female clothing salvaged from dumps, plus some shoes and children's coats, all of which we had saved up for them.

We also subscribed contributions of eggs, etc., individual gifts from prisoners in MULO SCHOOL, which amounted to quite a reasonable quantity.

In obtaining permission to send them I explained to the Japanese that I was very worried about the women, particularly as I understood that they had no

/Canteen, very little . . .

. . . they had no/

C<sup>an</sup>en, very little fire-wood, and what fire-wood was given to them was of the iron-wood variety, difficult enough for a man to chop up, let alone a woman.

After the despatch of gifts to the womens' camp, the Japanese forbade me to send anything more to them, as they said that they had already started a Canteen for them. Later I discovered that this Canteen was only a visiting van once a week, from which women with money might purchase articles, while women without money were granted a certain number of items free.

At no time was my repeated request to supply O.R. working-parties to chop firewood for them, etc., entertained.

As to accomodation, I believe that this consisted of a horseshoe-shaped collection of small bungalows, centered round a small ornamental pond, each bungalow being intended normally to house a small family of three or four. Inside each, an average of fifteen women and children were now squeezed.

When I finally left PALEMBANG, Lt. SEKI actually invited me to "supper" the night before my departure, and, taking his tunic off, told me to do the same, and said:-

"We are now not guard and prisoner, but just two men, and I want to tell you that I am sorry that you have got to go, but that I will look after your people after your departure, as far as I have been able to do during your presence."

In this connection, however, I must state that I was later on greatly worried when I learned from a prisoner source that the Japanese had had certain women internees to their office, saying that they were starting a Japanese Officers Club, and wished a number of the European women to volunteer as "hostesses" there. I am glad to say that all the women are understood to have stood out firmly against this, and as far as I know, the matter was eventually dropped by the Japanese. I am not sure whether Lt. SEKI was party to this suggestion, or whether it was the Japanese Gestapo officers who were responsible.

On my departure from PALEMBANG, the Japanese Colonel commanding all camps said good-bye to our little party on the quay, saying to me, "God help you", apparently poor English for "Good Luck". At the time, we thought it very apt.

Actually, I understand that conditions in the Camps in SUMATRA did not improve after I left, particularly in MULO CAMP, and that there was a considerable number of deaths.

/CHINA SCHOOL . . . .

. . number of deaths/

CHINA SCHOOL.

CHINA SCHOOL was a School in PALEMBANG town itself, in which the Japanese eventually collected the majority of Dutch Service prisoners, including those originally in MULO SCHOOL.

The Camp came under a Dutch Gen. de FREMERY, who worked in close collaboration with me in policy, and served several years of imprisonment with me before our release. Doubtless the General will have forwarded his own reports through the correct channels.

PALEMBANG CIVIL GAOL.

In this gaol were concentrated those civilian internees captured and brought from MUNTOK, BANKA ISLAND, together with several others, unknown to me, as time went on.

In the beginning, their plight was deplorable. The Japanese seemed to treat civilian internees worse than Service Prisoners of War. At first they had nothing to cook in but empty oil drums, which they had to clean out themselves. I have no doubt that representative civilians from that gaol will have rendered their own reports, through the channels open to them.

DJAMBI (SUMATRA, North of PALEMBANG).

This was a place further North in SUMATRA from PALEMBANG, and was far away from any influence I might have been able to exert.

From an airman prisoner, however, who eventually came to MULO CAMP from DJAMBI, I learned that conditions there were very bad. It seems that there were mostly civilian prisoners at DJAMBI, who were, including women, even of middle-age, forced to work in the fields, (paddy fields and otherwise), bent double over their task, in the heat of a tropical sun, and this without pay or recompense of any sort, apparently. There was said to be a Scottish civilian nurse, an internee, working in the improvised prisoners' Sick Bay there, together with three Eurasian nurses, as to whose "moral" safety I felt very perturbed.

I understand that a Japanese Warrant Officer was the senior enemy rank there, and that he was extremely harsh, and sarcastic, not to say brutal. He was reputed to have knocked the Scottish nurse down, and kicked her, saying that "he would break her spirit for her", which apparently he never did. She was apparently of middle age, and very "solid".

/This Warrant Officer

. . . and very "solid"./

This Warrant Officer was also said to have enquired about the airman's wounds, which, when ordered to display them (legs), the Warrant Officer kicked him so hard on the shins or knee-caps, that the airman collapsed on the floor. I regret that I cannot remember the name of this airman, these records being among others which I had to destroy when minutely searched by the Japanese.

GENERAL.

Speaking generally, one might truthfully say that, whereas I was able to assist outlying PALEMBANG Camps here and there, yet my chief activities were to administer the prisoners in MULO CAMP, for their personal benefit, but under the Jap.

My means of communication with outside Camps were through the improvised P/W Hospital at CHARITAS Convent, PALEMBANG, where hundreds of our people must have been cared-for during the period of captivity. The Nuns were perfectly wonderful, in spite of the fact that the Japanese would not allow me to supply any working parties to relieve them of cleaning, fire-wood chopping, etc. Indeed they imprisoned in the gaol the Dutch Bishop himself, and the "Lay Brothers", leaving all work in the improvised Hospital to the unaided Nuns. The Doctors in this Prisoners' Hospital were a Dutch civilian, a Eurasian civilian and a German lady Doctor, wife, I understand, of a civilian Doctor of SINGAPORE, the which lady worked nobly for the cause of humanity, irrespective of her original nationality.

In a separate report I am pressing for recognition by the British Government, or by the Ministries of the three Services combined, of the wonderful work carried out by these civilian Nuns, the names of whom I already hold in my possession. I am hoping that the appropriate authorities will call upon me for further detailed information regarding the work of CHARITAS P/W Hospital, PALEMBANG, and consult me as to the form of recognition I have in mind.

(I have already mentioned this unofficially to the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiralty, (Vice Admiral Sir Roderick McGrigor), who is an old ship-mate of mine, when he had lunch with me recently).

TREATMENT AFTER LEAVING N.E.I.

I reached CHANGI CAMP, SINGAPORE, in late Jul, or early Aug 42, and I understand that Air Vice Marshall P.C. MALBY, C.B., D.S.O., A.F.C., R.A.F., the Senior British Officer P/W from FORMOSA, onwards, has submitted a full and detailed report. As we were together from the date of his arrival in KERENKO, FORMOSA, I consider it redundant to enlarge upon treatment mutually experienced

/after his joining .

.....mutually experienced/

after is joining up with us.

Actually, before the Air Vice Marshal joined us we had experienced very bad treatment, at HAITO CAMP and during the early days in KERENKO CAMP.

In both the latter places, forced labour, harsh treatment, humiliation, beatings-up and general gross unpleasantness of the guards was practiced.

#### Exhibition March

When leaving the Port of TAKAU for HAITO CAMP, on first arrival in FORMOSA, we were subjected to a 4 - 5 mile 'exhibition march', carrying such kit as we had, and helping along the sick, and those who could not carry their gear. Dense crowds lined the sides of the road for most of the way, although very few showed open hostility to us. We were marched in blazing sunshine from a Port Station to the outskirts of KATOW, when we could have been entrained at the Port. Numerous armed guards closely guarded our flanks and rear. The same thing happened from the railway station to KERENKO, upon arrival there.

#### Food

As to food, although at HAITO the one saving grace was plentiful food, of a sort, for the rest, we mostly went hungry, and frequently half-starved. Prisoners lost weight consistently on many occasions. I myself went from about twelve stone (my average weight when captured) to under eight stone at one time.

#### Accommodation

Generally congested and over-crowded in most camps. In SHIRO KAWA Brigadier ranks and above were better off, being two to a room. The same applied to certain more senior officers, P's/W, at CHIN TAI TUN, MANCHURIA. But below the rank of Brigadier, or equivalent, all prisoners were always over-crowded, in badly lighted, badly ventilated rooms, and completely deficient of any privacy.

Lavatories were crowded, foul, and often over-flowing, a source of perpetual worry to our senior British P's/W as to possible epidemic, dysentery, etc., due to contagion by flies. The latter were very bad in the hot weather in certain camps.

In conclusion, one might truthfully say that the Japanese, did as little as they could for P's/W both as to food, accommodation and treatment; while they constantly held back our mail (although we knew that there was some for us), and withheld newspapers, and/or any other news, in the latter one-third of our captivity.

It is of interest that, upon releast at MUKDEN, a quantity of unissued letters, unissued American and British clothing, plimsoles, shoes, boots and such-like

/were.....

.....and such-like/

unearthed in the Japanese Camp store-house, despite the fact that P's/W had not had any of these things for months.

7. LIBERATION

On Monday, 6 Aug 45, our Prisoner of War factory workers in MUKDEN CAMP told us that the Chinese factory hands were 'all in a huddle', and the barter of goods between the men and the Chinese, which normally went on underground, gradually faded to nothing.

The Japanese Camp Commandant appeared to be closetted in his office, with armed sentries to keep people away, and it was rumoured that the Japanese were 'packing up'. The following day, Tuesday, 7 Aug 45, only a very few Japanese aeroplanes were seen about.

On Wednesday, 8 Aug 45, the monthly (?) observance of "Rescript Day" went unobserved, nor were the Japanese flags displayed at the main entrance of the Camp, as had always been done hitherto on similar occasions.

On Thursday, 9 Aug 45, a practice air raid warning was sounded by the Japanese at 0430 hours, and air raid precautions were observed all that day. (We had already been drilled in air raid precautions, and slit trenches had been dug by us, for us, as well as for the Japanese).

On the night of this Thursday, all prisoners of war were turned out to take shelter in the trenches, although there was no sign of the approach of Allied aircraft.

On Friday, 10 Aug 45, all P/W factory hands went to work as usual, and we heard a rumour that the Japanese had "received an ultimatum", which was to expire on the night 8/9 Aug 45. There were also rumours of fighting on the Northern border of MANCHURIA, presumably between Russians and Japanese, although we did not then know that RUSSIA had come into the war, until at 2000 hours on this Friday we heard a strong rumour that "the Russians had declared war".

On the next day, Saturday 21 Aug 45, the P/W factory workers went to work as usual, but were hurriedly sent back to Camp very soon after, with the Japanese appearing to be in somewhat of a panic.

Our P/W bakers were ordered by the Japanese to make a large extra number of the small bread-rolls which, in MUKDEN Camp, took the place of rice, and we "sensed" that a forced march for P's/W was in the offing, it being rumoured that we were being sent into the Mountains of KOREA, and, no trains being available for P's/W, it looked like the promise of another "Bataan March". (However, release came before that

/could materialize

.... before that

could materialise.)

Excitement became intense, although everybody strove successfully to remain outwardly "ignorant" and calm.

On Sunday 12 Aug 45, the Japanese Duty Officer was very late for the morning muster parade. A very much bigger breakfast had been given us, but the Roman Catholic Church party, who held their service before the other Denominations, were kept waiting for an hour, when their Service was "washed out" by the Japanese, who stated also that the Protestant Service could not take place either.

"Too busy, go away!" said the Japanese, and our tails went higher up still.

A very few key men of the P/W factory-workers were sent out this day, in order to unbolt, for removal, certain heavy machinery, I was given to understand.

Barter, in the Black Market, as it were, had completely ceased, there was nothing doing. The Japanese made a special issue of two packets of cigarettes per man!

I cannot remember as for Monday, 13 Aug 45, but on Tuesday, 14 Aug 45, we heard again that extra rolls of bread had been ordered for baking.

On Wednesday 15 Aug 45, at 0920 hours, the air raid alert was again sounded, and remained in operation until 1100 hours.

A few Ps/W again went out to the factories, one of them being brought back, having been injured in an accident.

The Chinese were reported to be in an even bigger "huddle", than latterly and rumours of "Ps/W from outlying camps coming in", were rife.

These actually did come in, by small lorry loads.

Rumour also was that all Japanese Nationals in the vicinity, including Japanese Army wives and families, and so on, were being collected within the precincts, or adjacent to, our MUKDEN Camp.

We next heard that Martial Law had been declared in MUKDEN City, and the Japanese called for a list of names of the P/W batmen to all P/W senior officers.

Was the forced-march of Ps/W into KOREA about to commence?

Rumours of a MANCHU revolt! Every P/W checking up his meagre gear, and washing his clothes. Extra rations issued to the cookhouse for tomorrow.

Next day, Thursday, 16 Aug 45, all Ps/W imprisoned in the Japanese "Guard House" were released, without explanation (except one, who was released the following day.)

/ On this day . . . .

following day)./

On this day, 16 Aug 45, what was thought to be an American plane was seen to drop parachutes, some apparently carrying men, and others bundles, near the Camp. (These were actually the American "Rescue Squad" before mentioned, who had flown to us from Central CHINA. The greatest admiration was felt, and expressed to them by all Ps/W, later on).

Great excitement, well concealed.

Later, the above American "Rescue Squad" were seen to enter the Camp, still carrying their arms and accompanied by their parachutes, and being politely received by the Japanese Camp Staff.

It was obvious that the end had come.

Ps/W could not sleep, and small parties remained up all night, chatting, under suppressed excitement. The Japanese sentries, which had been doubled, were now hardly in evidence at all, and those that were, took no notice of the "breaches of discipline" being practiced by the Ps/W, but tried to be friendly, and offer cigarettes.

They were obviously rattled.

Two more packets of Japanese cigarettes issued per man to-day.

Friday 17 Aug 45 - wild rumours flying about that the war ended at 0900 hours to-day. That an Armistice had been signed, etc., etc.

Later in the morning the three senior officers of us American, British and Dutch, were sent for by the Japanese Camp Commandant, (I think his name was HAYSKI).

The Japanese Colonel in Command of Prison Camps in MANCHURIA was there, and informed our three senior officers that the war was over, an Armistice signed, but that the Japanese remained in charge of the camp for the meantime. All Ps/W were paraded by nationalities, and informed accordingly.

Later, Major HENNING, O.C. American Parachute Party, confirmed "unconditional surrender", and said that the atomic bomb had "done the trick".

The American parachutists gave us all the news, and, setting up the radio set which they had brought with them, communicated with American General WIEDERMEYER's Headquarters in HSIANG, in Central CHINA, asking for supplies of those things of which we were most in need.

These came promptly by American plane from Central CHINA, OKINAWA and GUAM, in generous quantities.

/We were told that . .

... generous quantities/

We were told that the sick were to be flown out quickly. All Ps/W spent another night of excitement and "quiet celebration". Mail was issued, some of which was known to have been held by the Japanese for months, if not years. I myself received about eight letters, one of which was dated 1942. This mail had been seized and issued by our own people.

I cannot remember exactly the sequence of what followed.

Our hearts were too full. In any case, somewhere about 19 or 20 Aug, a Russian Colonel, and Staff, arrived, arrested our Camp guards, disarming them and handing their arms to American soldiers, who were set on guard over their ex-captors. The Russian Colonel made a speech to us, telling us that he was pleased, in the name of the Russian Red Army, to declare that we were "free once more", and would be evacuated home as soon as possible, although it might be some days or even weeks, before the last B/W was sent home.

Under American control, but with Russian assistance, things gradually developed, and finally, on about 10 Sep 45, we left by train for the Port of DAIREN, near PORT ARTHUR, excepting always certain senior officers and sick, etc., who were flown out via CHUNG KING, and onwards, for obvious reasons.

Our main train parties, upon reaching DAIREN, embarked in the American Hospital Ship "Relief", which received us with floodlights, loud-speaker-radio, playing "The More we Are Together", etc., etc.; a marvellous reception.

In this Hospital Ship I accompanied my portion of our ex-Ps/W to OKINAWA. A typhoon warning arriving at the same time as we did, we had to put to sea again for twenty-four hours, after which we were landed at OKINAWA, spending one night in the ex-P/W reception Camp there. Just as in the "Relief", the Americans' treatment of us was marvellous, and they told us that they were flying out one thousand prisoners of war per day to MANILA. I was also flown out, and reaching MANILA, remained in the Australian Reception Camp there one week, where I was interrogated, etc.

From MANILA I travelled to VANCOUVER, BRITISH COLUMBIA, CANADA, in the British Aircraft Carrier, H.M.S. "IMPLACABLE".

I need not say that our life on board that ship was too marvellous for words, and our reception on arrival in CANADA, and during our journey by train across CANADA, deeply touched every one of us. We were welcomed, as if into their own hearts, and families, and were loaded up with Red Cross comforts of all sorts, as indeed we had been in MANILA and OKINAWA.

/Arriving . .

.....MANILA and OKINAWA/

Arriving at DEBERT CAMP, near HALIFAX, NOVA SCOTIA, the rest of my party later continued by sea to ENGLAND. I was again interrogated here (DEBERT CAMP).

I myself, accompanied by G/Capt. RIDGEWAY and G/Capt. COGGLE, flew across the ATLANTIC in a B.O.A.C. four-engined 'Liberator', reaching PRESTWICK, AYRSHIRE, SCOTLAND, in 11½ hours flying from MONTREAL, CANADA. I had a quick lunch in MONTREAL Airport at noon on the one day, and an early breakfast at 0530 hours at PRESTWICK in SCOTLAND the next morning.

From PRESTWICK, we three flew to COSFORD, WOLVERHAMPTON, where we were passed, with extreme rapidity and efficiency, through the Reception Centre, reaching our own homes the same night, 22 Oct 45.

8. CONCLUSION

The foregoing report, difficult of proper compiling in sequence after the lapse of years, should be read in conjunction with the other papers which I have prepared at the request of M.I.9.

The whole should give the 'complete picture' to the best of my memory and belief.

I have concentrated on BANKA ISLAND and SUMATRA, with some reference to CHANGI CAMP, SINGAPORE, and early days in FORMOSA. After the arrival in FORMOSA of Air Vice Marshal MALTBY from JAVA, since when we were continuously together, I ceased to play a leading part, and as I know his 'views', I understand that he has already submitted full reports, with which I am likely to be in full agreement, further amplification by me would seem to be unnecessary.

Each of the following surviving officers can testify to the general accuracy of my story:-

Capt.(E) CHAPMAN, R.N.  
Cmdr. READ, R.N.

Lt. Col. MILNER, Royal Corps of Signals  
Lt. Col. BEDFORD, Singapore Volunteers (?)

S/Ldr. HOWELL, R.A.F.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

I have submitted all my recommendations for honours and awards for personnel  
and Services to the Insignia Reports Section, Air Ministry.

WAR CRIMES.

a) Nil.

b) Torture, beatings or other cruelties.

Beatings of both Senior Officers, Junior Officers, and men were common in FORMOSAN P/W Camp, particularly HAITO, KERENKO, and (it was reported direct to me) in the Copper Mine Camp near KEELUNG. I saw several instances, personally, in the first named two camps, and spoke to, and saw the disgraceful state of, sufferers from the Copper mining Camp. They were sheer walking skeletons. So were many of the O.R.'s latterly at HAITO, which had a sadistic brute of a Camp Commandant, whose name I unfortunately do not know. I believe he was at HAITO Camp most, if not, all the time. Most beatings I saw were "slappings", "cloutings", and so on, but they were quite severe and "heavy" corporal punishment, apart from the humiliation. I was not actually beaten personally.

c) Imprisonment under improper conditions.

Imprisonment under disgraceful conditions of filth and malsanitation occurred when newly captured civilian refugees, and Service personnel, all from sunk or captured shipping in and around the BANKA STRAITS area, were herded together with several hundred Chinese coolies (forced labour ex: HONGKONG ?), in the native jail at MUNTOK, BANKA ISLAND in February and March 1942. Sanitation NIL and only one watertap. Others confined in the ex Coolie Labour Assembly Station were better off, but lack of sanitation, food, etc. was severe.

Many others were confined in an old cinema building by the shore, with NO sanitation facilities but the shore! All this was at MUNTOK, BANKA ISLAND.

I experienced above myself, and consider conditions at PALEMBANG, SUMATRA, and HAITO, FORMOSA, were also disgraceful, and sanitation "hopeless". Such facilities as there were, were totally inadequate when camps were crowded.

d) Nil.

e) Use of prisoners of war on enemy military works or operations.

At MUNTOK, BANKA ISLAND, Ps/W in Feb 1942 were forced to work at extention of landing strips, unloading barges, etc. being out from before daylight to after dark, daily, and on miserably inadequate food. It was reported to me in PALEMBANG that some 500 Ps/W were employed for months in 1942 extending PALEMBANG I aerodrome, and working under extremely harsh, and often brutal treatment.

/f) Exposure . . . .

f) Exposure of prisoners of war to danger of gunfire, bombing, torpedoing, or hazards of war.

Ps/W were employed as explained at answer to question (e) above, i.e. on legitimate bombing targets, while, when at MUKDEN in 1945, we were imprisoned right in the middle of the factory area and alongside an electric power station.

Before I arrived, one MUKDEN camp had been bombed by the Allied with some casualties including deaths to some Ps/W then there.

In the "hell ships" carrying us between ports, we were always open to risk of attack with little or no hope of escape, protection or rescue.

g) Transportation of prisoners of war under improper conditions.

All trips I made in Jap ships were under grossly crowded conditions and mostly with totally inadequate latrine facilities, often no washing facilities or water and no medical facilities.

400 men sandwiched into one hold, partially battened down with poor ventilation and only 18 inches space per man to lie down on double-tiered sleeping "shelves". Crowds of men squashed like sardines in the centre of the hold floor just able to lie down. Only allowed up on deck for fresh air for short periods at a time by batches. Jap guards completely deaf to requests for amelioration, etc.

h) Public exhibition or exposure to ridicule of prisoners of war.

At TAKOU in FORMOSA, upon arrival from SINGAPORE about 30.8.42, all Ps/W were marched in fours, weak and weary as they were from about 2 weeks journeying in a bad "hell ship", for over 4 miles through densely lined streets (civilians and school children marshalled two and three deep) to a railway station escorted from the one at the docks. A mounted policeman headed the procession: Jap officers led it, flanks were very heavily guarded, and Ps/W had to carry their kit. Lagging or straggling, though through weakness and weariness, met with very harsh "man-handling" to catch up. (I was one sufferer, carrying a box on my shoulder). Lt. Gen PERCIVAL and other high-ranking officers (and civilians) participated in this "exhibition march".

i) Failure to provide prisoners of war with proper medical care, food or quarters.

Medical care, so far as the Japs were concerned, was virtually NIL in the first camps I occupied. CHANGI (SINGAPORE) thanks to the unstinting efforts of our own P/W M.O.'s etc. was better. MUKDEN was best, for there and at CHENA TAI TUN (MANCHURIA) the Japs did assist medically. Other P/W camps were bad.

/Food was generally .

Food was generally inadequate in all camps, and most P/Ws lost much weight (I myself at the time went from 12 stone to below 8 stone).

Quarters and accomodation except in isolated cases were very overcrowded.

j) Collective punishment of a group for offence of others.

Failure of officers at CHEN TAI TUN (MANCHURIE) to "volunteer for work" resulted in moving us to MUKDEN with much overcrowded accomodation and insufficient food. Food was also reduced (to officers) when they declined "to volunteer for work" at SHIRO-KAWA, FORMOSA.

k) Any other atrocities not specifically mentioned above for which you think the guilty person should be punished.

NO. But Ps/W "worried" by long absence of letters: non-issue of letters known to have arrived: few opportunities of writing, and uncertainty of despatch. We now know that only a few of the letters we wrote were actually received, and many sent to us never came into our hands. I speak from personal experience.

Constant and sometimes continual pin-pricks, irritation and humiliation, irked Ps/W a lot. Forced work on inadequate diet and totally inadequate medical facilities (with the risks that incurred) ever weighed on the minds (and physique) of Ps/W.

#### HUMILIATION.

##### Censorship by Prisoner-of-War Other Ranks, by order of the Japanese.

Not least of the humiliating conditions to which officers, including the most senior officer Prisoners of War, were subjected, was that of all incoming, as well as outgoing, private letters to our people being "read" by Other Ranks.

These were mostly Americans, with some British, and they were ordered to do this work, being given a questionnaire on the lines of which they had to scan each letter, reporting if any of the items quoted in the questionnaire were referred to in any letters.

There were some 20 or more items, of which I chiefly remember that no mention must be made by us of food, treatment, accommodation, camp conditions, names or particulars of our fellow-prisoners in camp, ill-treatment, and so on.

Letters, both incoming and outgoing, were shamefully held up.

In my case, one letter I wrote to my wife in November 1944 was not given back to me for signature until March the following year, 1945.

Similarly, it came to our knowledge more than once that letters from home, addressed to us, had been received by the Japanese, but they would not issue them to

/us, saying that . . .

saying that censorship was "very difficult".

In one case, viz: when we were leaving SHIRO KAWA P.O.W. Camp, FORMOSA, to go to MANCHURIA, letters were definitely known to be at the Japanese Office, addressed to prisoners who were actually on the point of leaving.

Application was made to the Japanese Camp Commandant that these letters might be given to the prisoners concerned before they left, or at least placed in a sealed bag and permitted to accompany the prisoners, for issue to them upon arrival in MANCHURIA.

The Japanese Camp Commandant refused, and, to my certain knowledge in certain cases, those letters were never received at all by the prisoners concerned.

Actually, one of the British Other Ranks, who was employed in censoring and dealing with letters, showed at least one letter to a prisoner-of-war friend of mine, the latter having to return it immediately to the Other-Rank, to slip back into the Japanese Camp Staff Office, before it was missed.

Finally; in the latter part of our captivity, we had to submit our outgoing letters, not only for censorship, but for typing by the above mentioned Prisoners-of-War Other Ranks, after having been censored. Nor were we allowed to mention any date, either of the writing of our letter, or of happenings or events in our Prisoner-of-War life.

I am aware of the "doing-to-death" said to have occurred to W/Cdr. STEADMAN in N.E.I., and of the terrible massacre of twenty-two Australian nurses on the shores of BANKA ISLAND. Approximately fifteen men were bayoneted at the same time as these nurses were shot, and I believe that these fifteen men were British airmen, but I have no details.

While in MUNTOK, BANKA ISLAND, in February 1942, I saw prisoners brought in showing obvious signs of brutal treatment upon landing from the sea.

WELFARE.

Upon my arrival at Singapore on 10th June 1941 to assume the post of A.O.A. Royal Air Force, Far Eastern Command; the A.O.C. impressed upon me, and continued to stress the matter henceforward, of the urgent necessity of organising welfare for R.A.F. personnel in Malaya, and, indeed, in the whole Far East Command, on a generous and wholesale scale.

The A.O.C. wished me to give this matter highest priority, and I did so to his complete satisfaction, with the help of R.A.F. Padre Giles, of Headquarters, R.A.F. Far East, who worked thereon unstintingly and continuously under my direct instructions and organisation.

After the capitulation of Singapore, our welfare work was transferred to N.E.I., where I understand that Padre Giles continued on similar lines as before, although I personally remained in Singapore itself, until captured by the Japanese on my way by sea from Singapore to Sumatra 16-2-42. I had received orders from my A.O.C. to transfer my duties there, following the departure of my staff, which had left, piecemeal, until only myself and a few junior officers remained in Singapore, engaged on urgent duties.

After capture, I found myself at MUNTOK, Banka Island, in the Banka Straits, and remained there for ten days, i.e. until February 26th 1942.

Conditions were pretty grim, and I found myself senior officer of British Prisoners of War of all three Services, as well as many Civilian Internees from Malaya. These latter came under the immediate care of Mr. Gregsoni, of Singapore Harbour Board, also a P.O.W. and said to have since died, but myself included them in my forceful representations to the Japanese, when demanding cessation of harsh treatment, more food, and altogether more humane treatment.

I myself was never beaten-up on these occasions, but was more than once roughly handled, and "hustled up", when the Japanese got fed-up with my protests.

Lt. C.W. LYLE, Malayan R.N.V.R. informed me on 30 Jan 46

that he was a P/W in SUMATRA until 1945, and that the improvised P/W Hospital at CHARITAS Convent School, PALEMBANG, continued until about Jul 43. I left the area in Jul 42.

Consequent, apparently, upon a suspicion in the minds of the Japanese that the P/W 'Hospital' was involved in a widespread scheme or plan subversive to discipline in regard to the Japanese themselves, the latter closed down this 'Hospital', removing the nuns to internment in the Women's Internment Camp, PALEMBANG.

This does not alter the fact that they did marvellous work for our sick and wounded P's/W in PALEMBANG from approximately Feb 42 to the end of Jul 43, and my whole hearted recommendations already given above, still, therefore, hold good in every way.

However, those representations did seem to do some good, although life remained most unpleasant.

When, on 26th February 1942, the Japanese suddenly transported me to Palembang, Sumatra, I found myself ordered by them to act as "Representative of Prisoners of War" in that area, and deputed as British P.O.W. Camp Commandant of Mulo School Camp, Palembang, under the Japanese Officer of the Guards on Prisoners of War.

From a "welfare" point of view, I immediately got down to handling the matter openly in Mulo School Camp, and, through "underground channels", on behalf of the other P.O.W. and Civilian Internee Camps at "Palembang I Aerodrome", "China School, (all Dutch)" the Women's and Children's Internment Camp nearby, and the Civil Jail in Palembang, where many British Civilian Internees were incarcerated.

Naturally the bulk of "welfare" benefit accrued to Mulo School Camp, where I was myself personally present and able to see things through, but we did what we could in the "underground way" for the other unfortunates in the remaining camps.

The principal welfare, shared by all camps, was the devoted care and nursing afforded by the Nuns, of Charitas Convent Palembang who bravely stood their ground during the invasion of Palembang, and thereafter opened the School of their Convent, with Japanese permission, as a Hospital for wounded and sick P.O.W. and Civilian Internees of both sexes. The official Hospital in Palembang was taken over by the Japanese for their own use, and although Charitas P.O.W. improvised Hospital must have handled literally hundreds of cases during captivity, yet in the beginning, like in the Camps themselves, there was virtually no medicine, or drugs, instruments or any other Hospital equipment but what the devoted efforts of the Nuns and Medical Staff procured locally. Quite insufficient, anyway.

The Hospital doctors included a Dutch civilian doctor, a Eurasian male doctor and a lady doctor (of German origin) the wife of a civil doctor in Singapore, I understand, all of whom could not have done more than they did to relieve the sufferings, in some cases very severe, and many fatal, of the unfortunates in their care.

As to Hulo School itself and in the outlying camps, to a lesser degree, welfare, in the shape of employment to occupy the time and the minds of those who were not sent out on working parties to the local docks, etc, took the form of weekly sing-songs, for which I unexpectedly obtained permission from the Japanese; educational classes for officers and men, and those civilians who were with me and desired to participate, and a sort of miniature Staff Course, lasting six weeks, and intended for the further training of Junior Officers, particularly temporary officers, locally engaged.

I managed to carry this programme through in its entirety, despite the constant watchfulness of our Japanese guards, by camouflaging classes as Instructional Talks on allocation of work upon improvements within Camps, discussions as to possibility of organising a Canteen, instruction in the prevention of disease and epidemics, pretence learning of the Japanese language, and on other similar duties, subjects which we brought into play automatically on the approach of any Japanese guard. Actually, the Japanese never "twigged" what we were up to, and all the arrangements planned were carried through to completion satisfactorily.

The result was to cheer-up prisoners who, particularly some of them, showed signs of falling into a very despondent and depressed state of mind.

Later on, I obtained permission to start a small Camp Canteen with cheaper fruits, and such like purchased through the Japanese, with money contributed by members of working parties, which latter were paid a trifling daily rate of pay when at work. They generously insisted upon the Canteen Goods purchased by such small sums being employed for the benefit of all hands, whether detailed to work or not. Actually, as apart from the individual ability to buy the odd tangerine, cocconut and so forth, each prisoner received a small "flavouring" to the cereal rice at each meal, by the addition of a little pepper, native sugar, salt, half-an-egg, once in a while, and so on.

Within the camps, prisoners voluntarily carried out improvements to drainage, and sanitation generally, and in Mulo Camp, where we all slept on the bare floor at first, I managed to make sleeping racks, taking 4 to 8 men each, from big bamboos, which I got from the Japanese, and which were worked under the instruction of Dutch and native prisoners, skilled in the uses of bamboo.

By this means, we eventually got all "hands off the deck" to their greater comfort, and much satisfaction.

Finally, and to give hope and interest, I instructed prisoners to write a letter home once a month, also a twelve word radio message home, in case the Japanese agreed to receive and handle any such things.

Actually, they were unable to do so, but permitted me to take a great package of letters, and twelve word messages to Singapore, when they suddenly transported me there, in Jul 1942, and I was able to hand them over to the (unofficial) Red Cross representative there, with the request that he would try and get them forwarded by the Japanese authorities at the first opportunity.

This safety-valve of writing letters home, although we received none during my sojourn in Palembang, appeared to have a very cheering effect on those concerned.

After my departure from Palembang in Jul 1942 I gather that conditions generally deteriorated, and there were many deaths, but as to this, reports will no doubt be forthcoming from Commander Read, of the Royal Navy, and others who succeeded him in my place after I had gone.

Upon departure I issued an "Order of the Day", in which I bade "farewell" to all camps, adjuring them to "keep their tails up", and to hope for the best whatever happened, and to trust me, myself, to lose no opportunity afforded me at any time "until the end of captivity", to further their interests and improve their lot, and make known their plight.

I am given to understand that this "Order of the Day" did actually reach most, if not all, the prisoners and internees in

in the Palembang area, and that it did, in fact, afford them great comfort and hope.

When I reached Changi Camp, Singapore, in August 1942, I made a full verbal report to Lt. General Percival G.G.C. MALAYA, and also passed all the information I could to the Secret British "Information Bureau", which I found running very successfully there.

I held a Church of England Service myself regularly each Sunday in Mulo School Camp (Japanese guards being present throughout) and arranged for other denominations to enjoy such devotions as were possible.

I also ran a series of some 32 evening lectures on every subject under the sun, including suggestions for study for future careers after the war, descriptions of various parts of the British Empire, talks on trade, economics, navigation, historical subjects, and a variety of others.

I had managed to obtain permission for these lectures, after some trouble from the Japanese, who always had guards present, (and also frequently an interpreter) but we managed to refrain from any "dangerous" talking, whenever they were actually within earshot, or appeared to suddenly evince special interest.

These evening lectures were extremely popular and well attended as were the Saturday Night Sing-Songs, and resulted in welcome subjects for conversation at other times during the day.

Lastly, I ran a voluntary P.T. Class every morning, which class became more and more numerous in attendance as the weeks passed by. Of course only those physically fit to do so were allowed to take part.

Welfare at Changi Camp, Singapore, I found to consist chiefly in the spaciousness of the captivity zone, the freedom from perpetually seeing the Japanese guards, the existence of P.O.W. Canteens, on a much more generous scale than we had ever enjoyed before, much better rations than we had been used to and a variety of concerts, lectures, and so on, not to mention wide open spaces in which to walk about in comparative freedom, and visit friends in other barracks remote from our own.

On 9 / 42 together with a large party of ex-Changi Prisoners of War, I was taken to Singapore Docks for embarkation in a real 'Hell Ship', which was to take us to the Island of Formosa. The trip took 14 days, and in my case, was with 400 men stuffed into a dark hold, with only 18 inches space per man, lying head-and-foot, in rows on shelves, in terrific heat, and denied decent washing facilities of any sort, not to mention completely inadequate sanitation arrangements. "Welfare" on board this ship, as far as I was concerned, anyway, could merely consist of endeavouring to cheer up one's brother prisoners, and assisting to make their lot as bearable as possible under the shocking circumstances.

Upon arrival at the Port of Takau, in the Island of Formosa, we were held on board the ship for about a day, after which we were landed and forced to make an Exhibition March of about 4½ miles through densely thronged crowds of Japanese.

These people showed no open hostility to us, only a few adults laughing at the sorry sight of haggard and weary men, (including many very senior officers (Lt. General Perceval was there)) dragging along, carrying what kit they owned, and supporting and helping those sick or unable to carry their gear themselves.

Bearded, unkempt, weary and thoroughly disreputable we looked, and, in my case being very thin and weak, I found difficulty in carrying the small but heavy wooden box which I had upon my shoulders. When dropping a little behind at times, as the front portion of our column increased speed, I was several times so roughly pushed from behind by Japanese guards that I all but fell forward on the road. However, somehow or other, we managed to reach the railway station beyond the town of Takau, although the Japanese might quite easily have entrained us at Port Station on the quay.

We were led by a Japanese mounted policeman, followed by a senior Japanese officer with some juniors, and heavily guarded on both flanks and rear by armed Japanese sentries.

A repetition of this sort of thing occurred later, when we arrived at Kerenko, where again, several prisoners, including myself,

were roughly "hustled".

Upon arrival at Kerenko, we were all stripped completely naked, and everything we had thoroughly searched. Our boots were taken away, and we were given Japanese peasant wooden clogs to wear, and these clogs had to be stored in a central place away from our sleeping places at night.

Welfare, under such circumstances, as above, was, of course, quite impossible.

Upon arriving at Haito Camp, known to us afterwards as <sup>a</sup>/"Hate" Camp, the Japanese heaped every indignity upon us they could think of; the more senior one was, the more rude and bitter were the Japanese. The Camp Commandant, who remained the same man throughout, as far as I can remember, was a perfect beast. Food was, strange to say, fairly plentiful, of its kind, but all liberty, of whatsoever nature, was completely denied us, even when going to the latrine. For the latter, especially at night, we had to wait until ten men were ready to go to the latrine, before one man could go, and then only under immediate guard of an armed Japanese sentry. Medical arrangements in Haito Camp were virtually nil, and many deaths must have occurred there throughout the period of captivity. I passed through this camp again later on, when on my way from Shiro Kawa Camp to Manchuria, and the occupants looked in the last stages of emaciation, completely "cowed" and in a truly sorry state. Again, during our fleeting stay in Haito Camp on this occasion we were subjected to the rudest and grossest possible treatment and humiliation. Welfare, in Haito Camp could only consist so far as I experienced, of endeavouring to get a "bathing-pool" made in a nearby stream, and endeavouring to get the Japanese to ease-up on some of their irritating and vindictive petty irritations and annoyances.

To revert, I and the party I was with from Tokau passing through Haito Camp, where we stayed for about a week, finally arrived at Kerenko. (Sept. 42).

At Kerenko we had insufficient and unsuitable food; were forced to carry out so-called "voluntary labour" on a so-called

"farm", which amounted to quite heavy agricultural-labourers' work, morning and afternoon, on completely inadequate food.

Prisoners of war all got thinner rapidly and the weaker became seriously ill, some of them dying. So-called "extra food" in the shape of "work rice" was supposed to be given to us for every day we worked, but this was only five kilos of "extra" rice, or rice and barley, among all the some hundreds of men who worked (only 2/300 average.) Obviously ludicrous, and, in any case, the issuing Japanese H.C.O. weighed the wooden box containing the rice with that rice, making the whole show a weight of 5 kilos, of which the wooden box must have weighed at least 1 kilo if not more.

Added to this, beatings-up, humiliating punishments, and absurdly strict discipline were common features.

Welfare under these conditions was practically impossible. The only bright spot in an otherwise grim existence was the receipt of newspapers in English, viz the "Nippon Times" (late "Tokio Times"), which, while giving us some idea of the trend of events in the outer world, portrayed them in propaganda terms, as through Japanese eyes, of course.

We commenced to receive some "Prisoner of War money", in very small monthly sums, on ? and, with this money, we were allowed to apply for certain goods, chiefly tooth brushes, pencils, combs, and some musical instruments with which to form a band, etc., which were issued through certain Prisoner-of-War "representatives", selected for the purpose. Food, as such, - even fruit -, was not allowed, and the items boiled down to domestic commodities of the nature cited above, plus "flavourings" such as salt, sugar, (very rarely) dried fish powder etc. etc.

We were also permitted to write certain letters and, I think, actually received some, although as to this I cannot remember.

We were also permitted to send one message by radio approx. Nov 1942, which message my people at home received quite promptly. It was the first message of any sort that they had had from me since my capture, for I was officially posted as "missing" from February 1942 to January 1943, and it was not known whether I was alive or dead.

Being transferred from Kerenko to Tamasata, also in Formosa, (only the senior prisoners of war, including British, American and Dutch, together with senior civilian internees, such as the Governors of HongKong, Singapore, N.E.I. Sumatra, & etc), we experienced considerably better conditions generally, but it was only for a few months, for once again we were transferred to a new camp, this time to Shiro Kawa, Formosa,

"Welfare" in Tamasata was no more practicable than in our last camp at Kerenko, but when we got to Shiro Kawa, accomodation, so far as officers of Brigadier and above ranks were concerned, was much better, in that these senior officers were accommodated, two per room, the rooms being quite clean and reasonable. All P.O.Ws below these ranks were just as crowded and uncomfortable as they had ever been.

"Welfare" at Shiro Kawa was possible in so far as a canteen of sorts was permitted, although no eatables or food other than certain sweets and flavourings were allowed. The "Canteen" was actually an improvement on the so-called canteen at our previous Camp at Kerenko. If religion is counted as "welfare", then, throughout my captivity, I must confess that we were allowed to hold our religious services on most Sundays, although always with either Japanese officers, or armed sentries, in attendance.

Now and then, throughout the years, such religious services might be temporarily suspended, for in some camps work was carried out on Sundays like any other days, although not necessarily every consecutive Sunday.

The foregoing brings my narrative to the last days in Shiro Kawa, from which we were eventually transferred in great haste to Manchuria, owing, no doubt, to the Allies commencing the bombing of Formosa, and the fear of the Japanese that we might be re-captured by our own people.

Officers of Brigadier rank and above were actually flown, in Japanese military aircraft, from Formosa to Southern Japan, from there continuing by train through Korea and into Manchuria.

Officers below the rank of Brigadier also came to Manchuria, but proceeded by sea, in another typical "Hell Ship", undergoing

also the risk of bombing by Allied aircraft, which were attacking their port of embarkation in Formosa.

Those prisoners-of-war will have given their own narrative, and certainly there would have appeared to be no "welfare" possible in the "Hell Ship".

Upon arrival in Manchuria, we were first of all sent to a camp at Cheng Tai Tun, some 200 miles North West of Mukden. This camp consisted of stone barracks, within a reasonable exercise ground, the barracks having apparently originally been designed for the use of military railway guards protecting the South Manchurian Railway from the activities of bandits etc. "Welfare" here followed much the same lines as in previous camps, although the supplying of newspapers had ceased away back in Shiro Kawa Camp, Formosa, while incoming mails seemed to get more few, and far between.

Medical facilities at Cheng Tai Tun were an improvement on Shiro Kawa, Formosa, in which latter place, as I should have mentioned, the Camp Hospital was again an improvement on Kerenko days.

To revert to Cheng Tai Tun, the principal "welfare" was freedom from forced work, but it was not long before the Japanese pressed us to volunteer for "garden work", which we knew full well would develop into wholesale "farm labour", whatever the Japanese said.

As we refused point blank so to volunteer for work, we were shifted to the main Prisoners-of-War Camp in Manchuria, viz Mukden Camp (known as "Hoten" by the Japanese).

Conditions in Mukden Camp were grim. Situated as it was amongst a cluster of factories, and immediately alongside an electric power station, it had been bombed by Allied aircraft before we arrived, several Allied Prisoners-of-War being killed, and others maimed, or otherwise injured.

A high brick wall surrounded the grossly inadequate exercise space, this wall being surmounted by live electric wire.

The troops (P.O.W.) were employed in the local factories, and, although we had no newspaper or radio, through these troops

we did get a considerable amount of news, obtained by them from the Chinese, also employed in the factories, which Chinese were for the most part pro-Ally.

Canteen facilities here were practically non-existent, and our food rations grew worse and worse, although they had been good for the first few days after our arrival.

Eventually, happy release came to us in Mukden upon the arrival of an American Airborne "Rescue Squad", who, after risking their lives in so doing, convinced the local Japanese authorities that the war really was over, and were eventually permitted to mingle with us, and then explained the situation.

The Russian Red Army representatives followed quickly, and these freed us officially, arresting our Japanese Camp Staff and Guard, disarming them, and arming us with Japanese arms, and putting the Japanese under arrest under an armed American P.O.W. guard. American Transport-planes, of the latest design, flying from Central China, Okinawa Island, and Guam, dropped us more than a plentiful supply of food, "luxuries", medical stores, clothing, etc., and, finally, an American colonel arrived to take command of the Camp, and arrange for our evacuation home.

I should state that, from our earliest days in Formosa, our Camps had contained primarily American Prisoners of War, with only a smaller number of British, and a yet smaller number of Dutch, included. Everyone worked very happily together, despite the "mixed bag" (P.O.W.'s).

Welfare in Mukden Camp naturally became 100% in every respect after our "official release", although we did not actually get away on our homeward journey for some three weeks after that.

In conclusion, visits by representatives of the International Red Cross, and one visit by the Protecting Powers, took place in Kerenko, Tamaseta and Shiro Kawa, with a brief visit (unofficial) by Dr. Marcel Janerd (?), the new principle Delegate of the International Red Cross in Tokio. He and his wife were en route to Tokio to succeed his predecessor, who had died.

At most, if not all, these visits, with the exception of

of that by the Protecting Powers at Shiro Kawa, the whole thing was a perfect farce.

The Delegates were surrounded by Japanese officers, and if allowed to speak to prisoners at all, only did so under the most artificial and public conditions. Little, if any, private truth could be "put across". We were forbidden by the Japs to speak of food, treatment, etc. etc.

Actually, in Mukden, on the visit by Dr. Jurend, he was shown a building with a notice in English "Canteen" on it, and a show case displaying biscuits and other food stuffs and commodities, all carefully priced, which items had never been available to us at any time as canteen stores, nor were there any such items present at the moment, other than those exhibited in the show-case. The building itself was completely empty, behind the notice. This notice gave "hours of opening" for officers, and men, when, in fact, it never opened at all.

NOTE: Cigarettes were obtainable right through my captivity, either by Japanese issue, sometimes generous, sometimes meagre; or by the so-called "canteen" sales.

C O P Y

From:- AIR COMMODORE C.O.F. MODIN,  
Commanding British Palembang Draft,  
Australian Lines, CHANGI.

To:- Mr. ROBERTS, Australian Red Cross,  
Prisoner of War, CHANGI.

Date:- 11th AUGUST, 1942.

BRITISH PALEMBANG DRAFT - 12 word messages

I confirm conversation with you of yesterday, 10th August, 1942, when I reported that Brigadier LUCAS of MALAYA COMMAND informed me that LIEUTENANT OKASAKI stated that he was uncertain whether he could provide official post-cards upon which to send above 12-word messages.

2. Brigadier LUCAS mentioned that he had hoped to get the messages through to the International Red Cross in LONDON for onward transmission, but that also appears to be impracticable. Brigadier LUCAS asked me to ask you to ask Lieutenant OKASAKI about the subject of these 12-word messages and to follow it up on my behalf. This I know you will do and I thank you accordingly.

3. The best way would, of course, be to get the messages on to post-cards and include them if possible with those post-cards already permitted from Prisoners of War, SINGAPORE.

(sgd.) C.O.F.MODIN,

Air Commodore, R.A.F.  
Commanding,  
British Palembang Draft.

C O P Y

Australian Lines,  
Prisoners of War Camp,  
CHANGI.

11th August, 1942.

Dear Mr. ROBERTS,

BRITISH PALEMBANG DRAFT - MONTHLY LETTERS FOR JUNE AND JULY

Confirming conversation with you yesterday, herewith monthly letters for June and July from the British Prisoners of War in PALEMBANG.

2. As you know, the Japanese Authorities in PALEMBANG permitted me to take the letters with me under a pass, written in Japanese, which you now hold, informing me that they thought I might get a better chance of sending them from here or from Japan in due course.

3. I should add that the Japanese Authorities in PALEMBANG had already received our letters for March, April and May, the March ones going, I understood via SINGAPORE or JAVA (per Lieutenant MITANI), and the April and May ones going, per Lieutenant HASHIZIMI SHOI DONO, via BATAVIA.

4. I understand that Lieutenant OKASAKI thinks that I should not take the accompanying letters with me to Japan, but leave them with you, pending an opportunity to send them from SINGAPORE with Japanese permission.

5. Corporal CORNELIUS, therefore, now hands you these letters for June and July with my request that you will do the best you can for them, and accept the thanks of all my people for your kindness in so doing.

6. Thanking you for all your interest on our behalf, and wishing you the best of luck,

I remain,

Yours sincerely,

Please thank Lt. OKASAKI  
accordingly.

(Sgd.) C.O.F. MODIN

Air Commodore, R.A.F.

Mr. Roberts,

Australian Red Cross Commissioner,

Prisoners of War Camp, Australian Lines, CHANGI.

The following Report was made by Group Captain BROWNSDEN-RICE A.F.C.,  
of Commander No 224 (F) Group, MALAYA, following the sinking of  
Launch No. 105 and handed to Air Commodore MODIN for onward transmission  
to the Air Ministry, if and when possible.

British Prisoners of War Camp,  
'A' Camp, Mulo School,  
PALEMBANG,  
Sumatra.

Friday, 17th. July, 1942.

Sir,

Subject: LOSS OF R.A.F. HIGH SPEED LAUNCH No. 105  
BY ENEMY ACTION.

I have to report that High Speed Launch No. 105 sailed from  
KALLANG Pier in accordance with instructions issued to Officer  
Commanding 224 (F) Group by Air Officer Commanding, Headquarters,  
FAR EAST, at 1715 hours on 12 Feb 42. This launch formed part of the  
Air Sea Rescue craft in 224 (F) Group, and for the journey special-  
ly came under the command of G/Cpt. RICE, the Captain of the craft,  
who was ordered to proceed to PALEMBANG, these orders were later altered  
to read MUNTOK for refuelling, and then on to BATAVIA.

2. IMPREST ACCOUNT. - I was unable to obtain the sum of 2000  
SINGAPORE dollars which I had been authorised to obtain by Air Officer  
Commanding, owing to the crisis in SINGAPORE. I accordingly obtained  
1,200 dollars from my own personal account, and 400 guilders from  
cash I had in hand. This amount, lost when H.S.L. 105 was sunk, was  
for No. 105 and six other craft.

3. Sgt. KINNAIRD, Coxswain of No. 105 reported to me, in the  
absence of F/Lt. MOORE, who could not be located by either Air Sea  
Rescue personnel or 224 (F) Group between Wednesday, 11 Feb 42 and his  
arrival at MUNTOK (his absence was presumed to be due to enemy action  
during the blitz on Wednesday, mid-day 11 Feb 42 on SINGAPORE Harbour)  
that he had applied to the Naval Routeing Office at SINGAPORE for  
information regarding routeing and the coastal lights (as to whether  
the latter were on or off by night) and also for charts to BATAVIA:  
he was unable to obtain this information as the Officer concerned  
appeared to have ceased to function approximately two or three days  
before; as charts could not be obtained, Sgt. KINNAIRD and Sgt. BILLOCK  
Coxswain of Pinnace No 53, were instructed by me to make a tracing of  
the route and I would endeavour to locate charts, to be handed over,

together

/the Imprest Account.....

... handed over,/

with the Imprest Account at the rendezvous.

4. A rendezvous had to be arranged as No. 105 could not run in company with the other vessel as even at her minimum speed she was too fast. No. 105 therefore proceeded to the rendezvous reaching there at approximately 0900 hours on 13 Feb 42, and remained there all day. The other craft of Air Sea Rescue Section never appeared in sight, and apparently proceeded direct; this action caused delay which might or might not be responsible for the loss of No. 105.

5. I understood that we were not to use W/T except in grave emergency and I do not think that we received any warning or message of any sort thereon during the whole trip.

6. At about 0900 hours on Saturday, 14 Feb 42, we noticed patrolling single-float seaplanes flying over our area, and realised that they were enemy.

7. At about 0920 hours, three of these single-float biplane seaplanes approached us, and then breaking up, proceeded to dive-machine-gun us while we took constant and violent avoiding action at high speed, all our guns firing hard the while.

8. The conduct of the coxswain and crew was exemplary under fire, and it was most unfortunate that the coxswain, Sgt. KINNAIRD, should have received a very bad arm wound from machine-gun fire through the left biceps. The wound <sup>was</sup> caused by what afterwards I learnt from the Medical Officers was apparently an explosive bullet, and artery blood was spouting from it. Quickly a tourniquet and first aid was applied and second coxswain taking the wheel.

9. By this time the floor of the wheelhouse resembled a shambles, being covered with blood, and it seemed impossible that KINNAIRD could survive.

10. Meantime, the dive-machine-gunning attacks continued, and, although the boat was hit several times, fortunately no more casualties occurred.

11. With the idea of getting cover and lying up for that day, I further ordered the second coxswain to turn inshore into a little bay

.... in a lee/

o a little bay/.....

in a lee on the centre island, where we dropped anchor and immediately sent our small dinghy ashore with KINNAIRD and two men.

12. Meanwhile, a quick consultation was held, and the box containing the Imprest Account, certain food and valuables were brought up on deck for safe transfer ashore.

13. However, as the returning dinghy, with one man on board, neared the launch on the return trip, three seaplanes suddenly appeared from over the island and commenced intensive dive-bombing, scoring one direct hit and probably another, with many near misses. Heavy machine gun fire followed every release of bombs and the position on board was quite untenable. The dinghyman dived overboard, but did not secure the painter tightly enough, and the Air Commodore, passenger on H.S.L. No. 105 jumped into the dinghy with the idea of saving that at least; as a consequence the box containing the Imprest Account, food and valuables was left on board.

14. It was already reported to me that the petrol tanks appeared to have been pierced, and the machine-gun drums were almost empty, when the three seaplanes intensified their already heavy attacks, coming much lower, and thereby making it necessary for me to give the order to abandon ship. In all, there were two bombing attacks, seven dive-machine-gun attacks, and three dive-bombing-machine-gun attacks by three aircraft.

15. During these attacks W/Cdr. CHIGNELL was killed by a bomb.

16. The return to the launch was out of the question, so the A/Cdr. rowed away, observing that the rest of the occupants of the launch were swimming for the shore; he proceeded to rescue W/Cdr. WILLS-SANDFORD and myself, and others who were tired hung on to the side of the dinghy whilst supporting themselves in the water.

17. Slowly across a strong current, we accomplished the trip of approximately 300 to 400 yards to the shore, and pulled the dinghy well up out of the water under the trees of the jungle, after seeing all ashore. I then placed myself under the command of A/Cdr. MCDIN.

18. The conduct of all ranks in H.S.L. No. 105 was exemplary. List of recommendations being submitted under separate cover for Honours

..... and Awards/

er for Honours/.....

and Awards.

19. A full report on other boats of the Air Sea Rescue Flight is being submitted by the Commanding Officer, F/Lt. MOORE.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient Servant,

Group Captain.  
lately Commanding 224 (F) Group.

The Secretary of State for Air,  
Air Ministry.  
LONDON.

I concur in the above Report.

(Sgd) C.O.F. MODIN.  
A/Cdr., Royal Air Force.

171742.

S T A T E M E N T B Y

Lt. J.W. STONOR - Argyll and Southerland Highlanders.

This officer was A.D.C. to Gen. PERCIVAL, and when Gen. PERCIVAL left SINGAPORE he lent Lt. STONOR for duty to Rear Admiral MALAYA (Rear Admiral SPOONER) and W.O.C.F.E. (Air Vice Marshal PULFORD)

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On Friday afternoon the 13th Feb: 1942 General PERCIVAL told me I could leave SINGAPORE that evening and go with Rear Admiral SPOONER and Air Vice Marshal PULFORD who were also both leaving then for BATAVIA. The Admiral, who was up at FORT CAMPING at the time, told me to come along with him and be his A.D.C.

I packed a bit of kit and at 1930 hours left FORT CAMPING with W/Cdr ATKINS and about ten wounded sick and airmen who had come from ALEXANDRA HOSPITAL and were being evacuated. We all went to the docks in three cars and tried to drive on to the wharf near Anson Road Stadium but could not get there as the road was blocked with burning go downs, so we came back to Clifford Pier and entered the docks. There was a crowd of men at the gates and the Military Police were examining passes before allowing anyone to enter. They seemed to have the place under control. We went through the gates and drove along as far as we could, then parked the cars and marched along to where the evacuation ships were lying. I left the airmen boarding the first evacuation ship into which they had been directed by a naval officer who was organising the evacuation and went myself to the end of the wharf where the Fairmile No. 310 was lying. There seemed to be no one about so I went on board and down into the wardroom where I met the Admiral and the Air Vice Marshal.

At 11.30 p.m. the Fairmile left the docks and, in company with one or two other small ships, sailed away from SINGAPORE. It was a dark night, starry, with no moon.

After about an hour or so the steering gear broke and we went round in a circle. This break was due to the steering cable having parted where it had been damaged by a bullet whilst the ship had been operating

off the West coast/.....

had been operating/

off the West coast. However, it was mended before the hand steering was put into operation and we sailed on again.

During the breakdown we must have drifted off our course a little because after about another hour we grounded on a reef. The tide was falling and we stuck fast. Lt. POOL, R.N., went off in the dinghy to see if any damage had been done but got two of his fingers badly squeezed whilst lowering the boat and this gave him a great deal of pain. As the tide went down the ship heeled over to port and we had to wait for the rising tide to take us off. We spent a very uncomfortable night trying to lie on the heeling deck and watching the fires burning at SINGAPORE and listening to the gunfire on the Island.

Next morning as the tide rose the ship righted herself and with the engines going full astern we got clear and sailed on again. We passed a few small ships and about 8 am we came to a group of Islands where we anchored and put up camouflage nets. We lay off there all day and in the evening set off again and steamed southward all night. There were 41 of us on board all together including the crew so many of us slept on deck as there was not enough room for us all below.

On Sunday morning we came to the SEVEN BROTHERS group of Islands and anchored. POOL's fingers were hurting him badly, so the Admiral decided to go on again at noon and see if we could get to MUNTOK and find a doctor to attend to them.

We were sailing along when about 2 p.m. the look-out saw mast heads appearing over the horizon which turned out to be Jap cruisers and not Dutch as we had thought at first. We turned round and sailed at full speed back to the group of Islands that we had just left. On the way we passed a yellow airmen's raft with three men on it but did not stop for them. We were soon spotted and a Jap destroyer followed us and opened fire but did not hit us. Then a flight of sea-planes came over and one broke away and dived down onto us. We opened fire with the anti-aircraft twin Lewis guns and the plane flew off and joined up with the rest of the flight.

/We reached the . .

.... rest of the flight/

We reached the group of islands and tried to sail in amongst them but ran aground on a shoal near a small village. The Admiral ordered everyone ashore and we swam and waded on to the beach. The skipper, Lt. BULL. N.Z. Div. and his first Lieutenant, Sub.Lt. HENDERSON, Aust. Div. stayed on board with ATKINS and POOL.

After a while the Jap destroyer came in fairly close to the island and fired a few shells over but did no damage. During this time I climbed up the hill in the middle of the island where there was a Dutch wireless and look-out station, manned by about a dozen Javanese troops. They had destroyed their set according to orders when they saw the Jap ships, so we got no more news and were unable to send off any message. From this hill I watched the Jap destroyer lower a boat which came alongside the Fairmile. Thenafter a while they sent our four officers ashore in the dinghy before going back themselves to their ship. I learned afterwards that the Jap Lieutenant had searched the ship and then taken away the charts and damaged the lubricating system of the engines. He had no idea that the Admiral and the Air Vice Marshal were on shore.

I spent that night sleeping on the beach under the palm trees along with a Sto. P.O. BAIL, who was the Admiral's driver, a marine orderly and an airman.

Next morning we all assembled together at the village and had a meal of hard boiled eggs and tea and biscuits, which had been brought off the ship. Most of the villagers had gone the day before in all <sup>the</sup> serviceable native boats when they heard the firing so now we had nothing but the ship's dinghy left that would float. During the morning a Jap seaplane came over and machine gunned and bombed the Fairmile as she lay on the shoal and then flew off again.

We started to settle ourselves into the village and for the first few evenings we went out to the ship and brought off all the food and other useful kit and stores. A hut on the beach was turned into a galley and all the food stored there. W.C. RICHARDSON, R.N. was put in charge of the galley.

After the first day it was decided to repair the best of the native boats and let Lt. BULL who had volunteered sail to BATAVIA to

/ get help.....

sail to BATAVIA to/.....

get  
/help. On the evening of the twentieth of February he set sail in the repaired native boat with his coxswain, one other rating and also the Javanese commandant from the wireless station and one of his men. They took fourteen days rations with them but we have never heard of them again.

After the party had gone we settled down to make ourselves as comfortable as possible till help should arrive. A permanent lookout was posted in the wireless station on the hill and they reported if any ships came near. The tin ed stores were rationed out to ~~last~~ for about three months. To help out these rations we used the rice which the villagers had left and got tapioca-potatoes and bananas from the island and a few pineapples and papaya.

The island itself was about one mile long and a quarter of a mile wide. There were a few wells and springs, but we always boiled all drinking water. The village had ducks and chickens. The ducks all died off through starvation, but the chickens laid quite well and on several occasions we shot the surplus cockerels for the stew.

For the first week or two the weather was fine and we treated the whole show rather as a picnic, but later when the rains started we all began to get fevers and chills and a depression seemed to set in amongst many of the men. The island was very malarial. The Air Vice Marshall and Commander FRAMPTON caught chills about the end of February and early in March the Commander died of pneumonia. Later the Air Vice Marshal died. He was very run down when he arrived and the fever was too much for him. HENDERSON also caught a chill early on and never got better. He died after about a couple of months. POOL had a great deal of pain from his damaged fingers but kept going all the time. ATKINS also had fever badly and for the last month had it practically every night and became too weak to do very much. I had a go of fever earlier on with very bad headaches for several days. After a terrific sweat one night I began to get better, but I was never really fit again. Admiral SPOONER died at the end of April. He had not been ill at all on the island but showed remarkable energy and optimism all the time. However, he suddenly became very

..... tired/

became very/.....

tired and could not sleep and died shortly afterwards from overstrain.

When we realised that we were not going to be rescued a large number of men seemed to give hope, which with fever was the cause of many deaths. After a time it became an awful effort even to do the ordinary camp work and bringing in of food. There was no doctor in the party and no one knew anything about tropical diseases except ATKINS. We had plenty of quinine which we all took regularly but even this did not keep the fever off altogether and only had the effect of weakening us. The chickens provided a few eggs and these with tinned milk were the only suitable diet we could give the sick except for occasional chicken broth.

We lost altogether through disease 19 officers and men on the island. On one day alone two men died and were buried together in the same grave. All the graves were dug in the same area under the palm trees to the east of the village. Three survivors from another ship were brought to our island very early on by some natives who had picked them up off a neighbouring island. They were a stoker, a Gordon Highlander and a civilian engineer from the SINGAPORE naval base. All three died later. During March and April the monsoon changed and brought heavy rain which made everything very depressing.

We were never short of food but the change to rice affected many people. The ships biscuits soon ran out as did the sugar. Occasionally a few of the villagers returned in their boats to try to salvage some of their gear and they used to catch fish for us and we paid them in Straits dollars notes. This fish and also turtle eggs helped out our rations.

Our daily menu was something as follows:-

- 0600. Tea with milk and bananas.
- 0800. One sardine on rice, an egg, fried tapioca chips, bananas and rice, tea with milk.
- 1200 Bully stew and rice, boiled tapioca potatoes, palm tree celery boiled papaya (tastes like marrow), bananas, grated coconut, coffee with milk.
- 1700. One sausage on rice or fish and chips, bananas, tea and milk.
- 1900. Chips and black coffee and perhaps turtle eggs.

/One one occasion.....

d perhaps turtle eggs/.....

On one occasion when the natives returned S/Sgts. GYNN and LOCKET of the R.E.'s volunteered to go back with them to BANKA Island and see if they could get in touch with any of the Dutch. W/Cdr. ATKINS fixed this up with the natives, as he was the only one who could speak their language. The two S/Sgts. set off, but we never heard of them again. On another occasion our Chinese cook boy went with the natives to SINKEP Island and came back saying we could get a boat from a Chinaman there. He went off again with some money but did not return.

When we realised that we would not be rescued Commander FRAMPTON began repairs on another of the native boats, but he died before the work had got very far and POOL carried on in charge. With the help of three sapper staff sergeants, GYNN, LOCKETT, and DAVIS and some of the ratings and a couple of 18 Div. M.P.'s the boat was eventually made seaworthy. There was a good supply of tools, rope, paint, canvas and other stores in the Fairmile which were all useful.. Eventually with the help of some of the villagers who happened to have come back, the boat was launched on rollers down the beach into the sea where she floated with only a slight list and hardly any leaks. One of the Div. M.P.'s had been an upholsterer in civil life and did the sailmaking.

On 14 May the boat was ready to sail. She was 30 feet long and rigged with foresail and mainsail. There were about eight of us still fairly fit and ATKINS decided that he, POOL, myself and five ratings would form the crew and sail north to SINKEP Island and there try to get medical aid from the hospital for the party. A/B. RICHARDSON was left in charge of the remainder practically all of whom were too weak and ill to do very much.

For stores we took a few days rations of bully, milk, tea, coffee sugar and M. and V, also a Primus and some cooking pots, a parang entrenching tool and rifle as well as our own kits which all packed into the boat. The kits were stored forward and in the stern.

.... The water chatties...../

1 in the stern/.....

The water chatties were lashed to the seats in the centre and the stores were in two tin trunks in the bottom of the boat. Before sailing I made about a hundred biscuits out of tapioca flour and grated coconut mixed with lard and egg to make the dough stick and cooked in a frying pan with a drop of coconut oil. We had them with and jam/tea which we brewed on the primus in the boat whilst we were at sea. A few days before we left POOL had chopped his fingers badly and these gave him a great deal of pain and inconvenience. The fingers that he had squeezed earlier on were now healing nicely.

On Wednesday 13 May POOL got the boat out into the deep water assisted by the locals who guided it through the reefs. Then on Thursday we loaded up and at 5.30pm, that evening we set sail north-towards SYA Island on which I had taken a bearing with my compass that morning. We towed a skiff behind us which we had found on the island. It had come with the survivors early on. Our plan was to reach SYA which was about 30 miles away by dawn and lie up there during the day and if necessary restow the gear.

We sailed all night on a compass course with a fair wind. A few squalls came up but they soon blew over and we only had to shorten sail for them. At dawn next morning 15 May we found that we were still about ten miles off. The wind dropped and we spent the whole day becalmed within sight of SYA. It became very hot in the boat and I had another go of fever. One of the ratings brewed some tea which we had with the biscuits and jam. During the whole day we saw no other ships or aircraft.

Towards evening the wind got up and we sailed towards SYA. It was after dark when we came near the shore and tried to anchor off the beach. Owing to the current we got carried on to some rocks and although we tried to pole ourselves we could not get clear. The boat just rubbed and ground on the rocks, bumping and scraping in the slight sea that was running at the time. This was about two a.m. on 16 May and as we could do nothing further we climbed out on to the rocks, got the kit and stores ashore and spent the rest of the night there.

..... In the morning/

of the night there/. . . . .

In the morning we found that we were not on SYA Island proper but on a small one alongside which had no water supply. There was a native fishing boat sailing nearby and W/Cdr. ATKINS arranged for it to take three of us to DATOH, the port of SINKEP Island, and then come back for the other five. Our boat was now useless and high and dry on the rocks.

During the morning the Wing Commander and two ratings took the skiff round to the main island and collected some water. It was very hard ~~an~~ work and we were all pretty exhausted by this time. At one p.m. ATKINS, POOL and one rating sailed off with the natives leaving myself and four ratings on the island, with most of the kit and stores to come on later. We arranged to meet <sup>at</sup> DATOH Hospital if possible. There was a very tiny hut into which five of us could just squeeze. We only went in if it rained, otherwise we lived in the open and slept on the beach. I found some tapioca potatoes and papaya and these fried, with the rations we had, were plenty to keep us going for several days. Our main trouble was water but this was overcome by a heavy storm. We collected the rain as it ran down the trees and stored all we could in chatties and water hottles. The water we collected in a sail was too salty to use for drinking. On both days we were on this island a small tramp passed sailing north.

The Malays returned on Monday 18 May and at three p.m. that afternoon we all left for DATOH, taking the rest of our kit with us in the boat. We arrived at one a.m. the following morning and as soon as we came alongside the jetty one of the MALAY boatmen went off to get transport. After a while a lorry came along and we saw that there were about half a dozen Javanese police in it all wearing Japanese badges. They loaded our kit into the lorry and then took us to Headquarters and from there to the Hospital where we met ATKINS and POOL again.

The Japs went to our island and brought off RICHARDSON and the rest of the party. Then a few days later they took us all up to CHANGI on 6 Jun.

The following is a copy, with my corrections, of Petty

ficer FAIRBANKS' list of the party of 45 on board the FAIRMILE No. 310 which left SINGAPORE on Friday 13th February and landed on CHUBIA Island of the SEVEN BROTHERS GROUP on Sunday 15 Feb 42.

Those marked \* are confirmed by me as having died, survived, etc.

<u>RANK.</u>	<u>NAME.</u>		
R/AM1.	SPOCNER.	R/Aml MALAYA.	Died.
A.V.M.	PULFORD.	A.O.C. F.E.	Died.
Cdr.	FRAMPTON.	R.N.	Died.
W/Cdr.	ATKINS.	R.A.F.	Survivor.
Lt.	POOL.	R.N.	Survivor.
Lt.	BULL.	R.N.Z. Div.	Sailed for BATAVIA.
Lt.	STONOR.	A & S/H.	Survivor.
Sub. Lt.	HENDERSON.	Aus. Div.	Died.
A/Sts.	RICHARDSON.	R.N.	Survivor.
P.O.	FAIRBANKS.	R.N.	Survivor.
P.O.	KEELING.	R.N.	Died.
L/S.	BROUGH.	R.N.	Sailed to Batavia.
AB.	HILL.	R.N.	ditto.
AB.	GIBSON.	R.N.	Died.
AB.	HAYWOOD.	R.N.	Died.
AB.	FLOWER.	R.N.	Died.
AB.	RUSSEL.	R.N.	Died.
AB.	OLDNELL.	R.N.	Survivor.
AB.	JOHNSON.	R.N.	Survivor.
	?	?	Died
Sto. P.O.	BAIL.	R.N.	Died.
Sto. P.O.	TOWNSEND.	R.N.	Died.
Sto.	LITTLE.	R.N.	Died.
Sto.	ODDEME.	R.N.	Survivor.
Sto.	TUCKER.	R.N.	Survivor.
M. Mec.	JOHNCOCK.	R.N.	Survivor.
Ord. Tel.	SMETHWICK.	R.N.	Survivor.
Ord. Tel.	TWEESDALE.	H.N.	Survivor.
Sgt.	HORNBY.	R.M.	Died.
Cpl.	SULLY.	R.M.	Died.
Pte.	ROBINSON.	R.M.	Survivor.
Pte.	ROBINSON.	R.E.	Survivor.
Pte.	DAY.	R.E.	Survivor.
Pte.	SNEDDON.	R.M.	Survivor.
S/Sgt.	GYNN	R.E.	Sailed to Batavia.
S/Sgt.	LOCKETT.	R.E.	ditto.
S/Sgt.	DAVIS.	R.E.	Died.
Sgt.	WRIGHT.	C.M.P.	Survivor.
Cpl.	SHERIFF.	C.M.P.	Survivor.
Cpl.	SHRIMPTON.	C.M.P.	Died in Singapore.
Cpl.	?	C.M.P.	Survivor.
Cpl.	TURNER.	C.M.P.	Survivor.
AC.	BETHANY.	R.A.F.	Survivor.
AC.	SMITH.	R.A.F.	Survivor.
Cook.	LI TENG.		Deserted.

contd.

RANK.

NAME.

The following three survivors joined on the Island:-

M.V.	DIMIT.	Engineer.	Died.
Sto.	SCAMMEL.	R.N.	Died.
Pte.	DOHERTY.	Gordons.	Died.

Died on the Island	19 (including 3 from the AQUALIUS)
Died in SINGAPORE.	1.
Sailed to BATAVIA.	3 (Now believed O.K.)
Sailed to BANKA	2 (Missing)
Deserted	1
Survivors	22 (Arrived CHANGI P/W Camp 7 Jun 42)
<u>Total.</u>	48.

Appendix "J" to A/Cdre. MODIN's  
Statement.

DATA OF ALLIED SHIPS AND VESSELS ETC. CAPTURED OR SUNK BY JAPANESE IN  
BANKA STRAITS IN FEB. 1942.

<u>KUNG WO.</u> Bombed and abandoned.	Lt. Cdr. TERRY and Lt. BROOKE R.N. (both ex P/W) and an English R.N. and Surg. Cdr. STEPHENSON. 120 others including: - Capt. STEELE (S. STAFFS) Capt. STEWART (A.I.F.) YEATS McDANIELL (War Corr: Ass. Press) Miss Doris Lim (Asst. News Reels Wong Photographs) F/Lt. DOWNER. R.A.F.
<u>ROMPIN</u> Engine disabled, captured at MUNPOK.	Lt. Cdr. SPAULL. R.N.R. F/Lts. MOORE and GOULD. P/O RUTHERFORD and YOUNG. McBURT. 12 R.A.F. O.R.
<u>KUALA.</u> } <u>TIEN QUON.</u> }	Mrs. THOMPSON M.D. G/Capt. and Mrs. NUNN. Nurses, Civilian women and children, R.A.F. O.R.'s Few Army O.R.'s.
<u>FAIRMILE 310</u>	R.A.M.Y. x A.V.M.
<u>IPOH.</u>	600 R.A.F. arrived BATAVIA 14 th Feb.
<u>DERRYMORE.</u>	About 400 R.A.F. Torp: or mined off BATAVIA 13 Feb. about 150 survivors under S/Ldr. FARMER, shipped on.
<u>EMPIRE STAR.</u>	G/Capt. BROWN 2,000 R.A.F. 100 A.I.F. and some nurses.
<u>H.M.S. DURBAN.</u>	6 R.A.F. Officers. } Reached BATAVIA.
<u>H.M.S. KEDAH.</u>	400 R.A.F. }
<u>A.S.R. LAUREL 105.</u>	A/Commodore MODIN and G/Capt. RICE.
<u>H.M. Tug YIN PING.</u> Sunk	Lt. WILKINSON R.N.R., Mrs. WILKINSON, Capt. ATKINSON R.N. Capt. (E) CHAPMAN, Cdr. DOUGLAS Mr. Leigh HUNT. C.E. and about 50 R.A.F. O.R.'s and 20 Army O.R.'s plus 10 crew.
<u>M.L. 432.</u>	Lts. BURK, HURD R.N.V.R. (Captured)
<u>H.M.S. TAPAH.</u>	Lt. HANCOCK and GRANSDEN plus 3 Off.
<u>H.M.S. FUN WO.</u> Beached & blown up.	Lt. ROBSON and COOK R.N.V.R.
<u>H.M.S. SIANG WO.</u> Bombed & beached.	Lt. GRANT and CROSSLEY.
<u>H.M.S. ROSE MARIE.</u> Captured.	S/Ldr. NEWBROMER.
<u>H.M.S. GIANG BEE.</u> Bombed & sunk.	S/Ldr. COLDWELL.
<u>H.M.S. DYONAS.</u> Captured.	A.B. ARMSTRONG and Corp PHILLIPS MARTIN.
<u>H.M.S. MATA HARI.</u> Captured.	Lt. CARSTON.
<u>M.L. 443.</u> Sunk.	Cdr. E. CRAVEN PHILLIPS. Ldg. Sto. ASHCROFT.
<u>S.S. HONG TAT.</u> Captured.	A/C WARING.
<u>A.S.R. Launch 36.</u> Captured.	Gnr. DAVIES.
<u>M.L. 1062.</u> Sunk.	L.A.C. WOOD.

contd. over.

H.M.S. TIAN KWAN.  
Captured.

Cpl. CORNELIUS.

H.M.S. JARAK.  
Sunk.

W.O. 1. HOSKINS.

H.M.S. POLAU SUGGI.  
Sunk.

S/Sgt. WILSON.

H.M.S. BLUMAT.  
Sunk.

Sgt. CRAEBS. Pte. GRANTHAM.

H.M.S. HONG KIAT.  
Sunk.

Grns. SCOTT and NEILL

H.M.S. DRAGONFLY.  
Sunk.

Lt. ILEY. 4 Off 100 crew (50% Malay)

H.M.S. GRASSHOPPER.  
Sunk.

Cdr. HOFFMAN. R.N. - do -

H.M.S. SCORPION.  
Sunk.

Lt. Cdr. ASHWORTH. M.R.N.V.R. - do - plus 50 Naval  
signal ratings.

TENGAROH.

PANJI.

PING WO.

BULAN.

KUNG WO.

KUALA.

BAGAN.

? Lt. Cdr. HEGATY.

RENTAU.

S. BADDELEY. Mar. Sup: plus 14 civilians.

RELAU.

F. CHAMBERLAIN Asst. - do - plus 14 civilians.

R.A.F. PINNAGE 53.

Sgt. BULLOCK.

" " 54.

Sgt. CHALT.

S&L. 257.

S.L. 258.

M.L. 941.

M.L. 310.

Lt. Cdr. CAMFRY. R.A.N.V.R.

M.L. 311.

Lt. Cdr. CLARK Col. HILL. Sub/Lt. STACEY.

PAHLAWAN.

Lt. CORK. M.R.N.V.R.

PANGLIMA.

LI WO.

Lt. WILKINSON. R.N.R. (killed) and 4 opp.

R.A.F. Refueller 1185 )  
- do - 1186 )  
Aircraft tender 328 )  
262 )

All in tow of ROMPIN (see preceding page)

contd. over.

Yac WHITE SWAN.

P/Off. MERTON BROWN.

H.M.S. VYNER BROOKE.

Lt. R.E. BORTON, R.N.R. 4 off about 230 passengers.  
about 60 saved. (of about 65 Aust. Nurses 32 saved.)

H.M. Tug TRANG.

Cdr. ALEXANDER Ran shore on PEAK ISLAND.

H.M.S. MALACCA.

Last seen by YIN PING on 14 Feb.

PINANG.

SOETI.

H.M. Tug ST. BREOK.

AUSTRALIAN SISTERS - BANEA ISLAND - LOSS OF.

1. With our official release last night 20/8/45 by the Russian officer representing the Red Army, I am free to put into writing, for the first time, the story of the massacre by Japanese troops of some 28 Australian nurses on or about February 15 or 16, 1942, on the north-west coast of the MUNTOK peninsula of BANEA ISLAND, SUMATRA. This story was given to me by the only surviving Australian sister in the party, Miss HULLWYNNE, upon her transfer from BANEA ISLAND to the new ladies' internment camp in PALEMBANG, SUMATRA, towards the end of March, 1942, when her party passed through my P/O/V camp at Mulo School in that town in the course of their journey.

2. Having requested an interview with me as Senior British P/O/V, SUMATRA, through her acting matron (or senior sister), Miss SULLIVAN, in the presence of her acting matron, stated that she wished to tell to someone in authority her sad story, and felt that I was the best such person, although as, so far as she knew, she was the only surviving sister of the massacred party and possibly the only living witness of the massacre, she desired me to promise, on my word, that I would not commit the story to writing, or mention her name, or publish the story generally, other than to such appropriate senior officers as I might meet during my captivity. This I actually did when making my verbal report to Lieut. Gen. A.E. FERGIVAL, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., G.O.C. MALAYA, on my transfer to CHANGI by the Japanese on or about July 22, 1942, when reporting also the matters of the women's camp in PALEMBANG, the bad case and condition of P/O/V officers and troops, the question of British Malay naval women and other P/O/V matters in SUMATRA requiring attention. In addition to General FERGIVAL, I informed the A.I.P. Colonel WHITE (Commanding 8th Aust. Gen. Hosp., who has the nominal roll of the victims of the massacre), RAYE (8th Aust. Div. Sigs), and KENT HURLES, the two last-named being on the staff of Major-General C.A. GALLAGHAN, C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D., G.O.C., A.I.P., MALAYA.

3. It must again be stressed how greatly Miss HULLWYNNE feared harmful reactions against her by the Japanese should her story come to their ears, and should they realize that she was the only survivor and witness of the massacre.

4. The acting matron (or senior sister) agreed with this, and, at my discretion, I informed Major TRENT, formerly Australian Liaison Officer in MALAYA, and at the time a P/O/V with me in MILC camp, and assisting me in looking after Australian interests. We were of the opinion that the Australian Government would themselves wish to take the matter up at the end of the war, and that meantime, only harm would come from discussing it too freely.

5. Miss BULLWINKLE stated, in the presence of the acting matron, that on or about February 15 or 16, 1942, (my memory fails me exactly on this point), a party of 22 or 23 Australian sisters landed in ship's boats from the U.S. "Wynar Breaker" on the coast of BAHIA ISLAND. Other "shipwrecked" personnel were with them; principally about 15 - 20 troops, mostly Royal Air Force.

6. Upon landing everyone gathered together, and discussions were held as to what to do next, as no one appeared to be about. After some hours, it was decided that certain personnel (including, I believe, Lieut. Commander WHITE, R.N., also a P/O/W in my PALEMANG camp, who might perhaps be usefully contacted) should try to reach the nearest town in order to ascertain the position and arrange for the reception of the party. Later on, however, a Japanese armed patrol of several men came along the foreshore, and to them, the senior members of the party reported. The result was that males and females were separated, the men being taken around a corner of a bluff, where they were butchered in cold blood by bayonetting with only two known survivors, namely a seaman, ? Ernest LLOYD, 2 Camp Road, Roeborg Weg, MANTJARD, Cape Province, SOUTH AFRICA, and ? an American civilian, E.H. GERMAN, 1 Massachusetts Avenue, BUFFALO, New York State, U.S.A. The agonised shrieks of the murdered men were plainly audible to the terrified women. Then the Japanese appeared, wiping the blood from their bayonets.

7. The Japanese explained to the matron in charge of the sisters that they were to turn, facing the sea, in extended order, and walk into the water. The matron protested, and pleaded with the utmost earnestness and dignity for the lives of her sisters, but the Japanese would not listen, and roughly ordered them on. Consequently, she, together with the sisters, entered the water. As they reached the breaking waves, they were shot in the back and killed, with the exception of Miss BULLWINKLE, who fell down with the rest, and feigned death. She was eventually washed up on the shore with the rest of the bodies, which were apparently left to their fate for some days.

8. Gradually, the Japanese party withdrew, and, when she thought it was safe, Miss BULLWINKLE crept into the jungle along the fringes of the shore. Found there by Ernest LLOYD, she and LLOYD tried to find a path to some habitation. In due course, they fell in with a motor car containing a ?? Japanese officer, although about this detail my memory is not clear. They were taken in the car to MURROK, where Miss BULLWINKLE came to the same accommodation as my party was in (males and females in different parts of the building) at MURROK.

9. I understand that it is Miss BULLWINKLE's intention to report the whole occurrence to the Australian Government, through the usual channels, on her release. In the meantime, she trusted me to respect her wishes earlier outlined, which I have done.

10. A copy of this report goes to:

Maj. Gen. G.A. CALLAGHAN, C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D.;  
Lieut. Gen. A.E. PERCIVAL, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.;  
British Air Ministry (through myself in regard to the airmen allegedly murdered).  
Gen. PERCIVAL's copy goes to him through Brigadiers TORRANCE and LUCAS.

11. I certify that the above is a true record, to the best of my memory and belief, after such a long period of captivity.

(A list of Australian Nurses Casualties is attached to this report)

EXTRACT FROM "NEWS OF THE EMPIRE", AUSTRALIAN ARMY EDUCATION SERVICE,  
3 AUSTR. P/W RECEPTION CP. VOL 1 NO. 5. 18 SEP 43.

MORE ABHORRIBLE TO LIST OF JAP BRUTALITY.

The true fascist nature of the Japanese militarists is becoming increasingly apparent as stories of more sadism and barbaric animalism are made public. The latest atrocity report concerns the treatment of the passengers of the Vinar Brook, a ship carrying refugees including 65 Aust nurses, which the Japs sank near Banca, an island off the South-east coast of Sumatra shortly after the fall of Singapore in 1942. Described as one of the worst accounts of Jap savagery ever made public, the report tells of how most of the survivors of the sinking were lined up facing the sea and shot. 21 nursing sisters were slain in this batch, while the extreme privation and severe conditions of the prison camp killed 8 of the sisters, leaving only 24 survivors, as 12 were drowned when the Vinar Brook went down. The story of the shooting on the beach was related by one of the surviving sisters who was among those to arrive in Australia yesterday after being released by air from a foul prison camp in Sumatra. She escaped the carnage by fleeing into the jungle, where she wandered for a fortnight before giving herself up. All over Australia people are horrified by the increasing list of such crimes, performed by a people whose fascist mentality has monstrously perverted all human values. Past tyrannies and wars have produced their share of barbarism, but never such a mass of insane and calculated terror, of destruction and torture for their own sake. The Jap must be taught a lesson in the Eastern fashion, the only fashion that they understand. Never again must the Japanese industrialists be allowed to build a machine to menace the world.

AUSTRALIAN SISTERS - CASUALTIES AT BATHA ISLAND.

Missing.

STR		RUSSEL	VX	10	16 Feb
MTN		PASCHE	"	"	
STR.	E.	CALMON	QK	"	
S/N	M.	CLAHIE		"	
"	G.	ELMES	NSW	"	
STR		KINGSBELL	VX	2/4	
"		DORSCH	QK	"	
STR		TREBERNY	"	13	
STR.		MCDONALD	QK		
STR		BATES	WY		

Shot.

MTN		DRUMMOND	QK	13	
STR		CARSON	"	"	
"		FAIRWEATHER	"	"	
"		McBLADE	QK	13	
"		KERR	"	"	
"		HARRIS	"	"	
"		BRIDGE	"	"	
"		BEARD	VX	"	
"		HODSON	"	"	
"		WIGHT (W)	VX	"	
"		CATHERBERTSON	(W) YK	10	
"		HALLIGAN	VX	10	
S/N	K	HEUSS (W)	"	"	
STR		STEWART	NSW	"	
S/N		KEATES	SA	"	
"	F.	SALMON	NSW	"	
"	G.	BENNIS		"	
"	M.	SCHUMAN		"	
STR		OGILVY	QK	2/4	
STR		WILMOT		"	
"		FARMANER	WX	"	
"		TAIT	QK	13	

Wounded.

STR.	H.O.	JAMES	10	VX	
S/W	A.B.	JEFFREY	"	VX	
"	I.A.	SINGLETON	"	"	
"	R.D.	FREEMAN	"	"	
"	B.	WOODRINGE	"	"	
STR	W.M.	DAVIS	XX	10	
S/W	J.	GRAND	XX	"	
"	J.	GUTHRIE	"	"	
"	K.C.	BLAKE	"	"	
STR.	J.G.	DOYLE	"	"	
"	P.B.	MITLEHOUSER	XX	"	
S/W	F.B.	TROTTER	"	"	
"	J.	TREDDLE	"	"	
"	J.T.	BLANCHE	"	"	
"	C.S.M.	OXLEY	"	"	
"	C.V.	DELFORCE	"	"	
"	A.J.	BYER	"	"	
BTR		HANKAH	XX	2/4	
"		RAYCHD	TX	"	
"		GARDAN	TX	"	
STR		ASHTON	XX	"	
"		SIMMONDS	ST	"	
"		HUGHES	VX	13	
"		OXAM	VX	13	
"		BULLWINKLE	VX	13	(Only Survivor)
"		CLAWCY	XX	13	
"		HARPER	WX	13	
"		HAMPSTEAD	XX	13	
"		SHORT	"	"	
"		MUIR	"	"	
"		SMITH	"	"	
"		ROSLINA	"	"	
STR		WILSON	VX	13	

'X' PARTY.

Previous to the War in MALAYA, I had been instructed by my A.C.C. on the subject of a certain considerable number of airmen, who had been sent out by the Air Ministry to SINGAPORE while sea transport was available, to await formation of certain new Units in Far East Command.

In the interim they were to be used to the best advantage of the Service, and many were, in fact, employed at R.A.F. Depot SELETER, etc. " supernumary".

There remained a balance, either non-technical or not required, which the A.C.C. asked me to train as 'Air Marines', to bolster up station defence parties at aerodromes otherwise weak in that respect, to provide a guard on the Combined Operations Room at Combined Headquarters, SIME ROAD, SINGAPORE, and similar duties.

An available strength of two hundred trained men was aimed at, but something over three hundred were actually trained at one time or another. They were encamped at our newly built 'transit Camp' adjacent to SELETER, and were intensively trained in infantry work by W/Cdr. G.R. GREGSON, commanding the transit Camp, who was assisted as to certain subjects by picked ARMY N.C.O. instructors lent for the purpose.

From these "spare men" had also been drawn a certain number to be trained as motor cycle despatch riders, and although these proved most useful during the short campaign, they had in fact nothing to do with 'X' Party, itself.

What is important now is the implementing of the promise made by the late A/V/M PULFORD, then A.C.C. R.A.F. Far East. This was made verbally in my presence, by the A.C.C. to the men of 'X' Party paraded at Headquarters, SIME ROAD for this purpose, and amounts to the following:-

"I understand that some of you men are diffident or disappointed about being drafted to 'X' Party, seeing that you are technicians, and that you fear that by such drafting and subsequent temporary absence from the practice of your trade, you may fall behind your contemporaries in remustering, reclassification, or promotion and so

/forth.....

and so/.....  
forth.

This is no time to waste in lengthy explanations, but I give you my word that the need is urgent and that I have asked the Air Ministry that if anyone of you suffer in that way, that you should be automatically advanced in parallel with your contemporaries, subject only to the proviso that, upon eventual re-posting to a vacancy in your technical trade, you ensure, by adequate study and preparation the while that you can pass sufficient qualifying tests to justify the advancement which you had been granted 'on account'.

I would suggest that, in view of the lapse of time since that promise was made, and remembering that the men themselves will not forget, as the letter is of such importance to their careers, that if W/Cdr. GREGSON, who trained and commanded the 'X' Party, and whose present address I understand to be:-

86 Adelpa Road, Nedlands, PERTH, Western Australia.

happens unfortunately to have lost or been forced to destroy the nominal roll of 'X' Party, it would be only right to endeavour to re-constitute this nominal roll by general instructions, through A.M.O.'s that all airmen concerned who are still serving, are to give their names and addresses, together with facts and dates, regarding their inclusion in 'X' Party in MALAYA during the MALAYAN Campaign. All such data to be forwarded through the usual channels to such department of Air Ministry as the Air Ministry may decide so that A/V/M PULFORD's promise may be carried out.

Appendix "M" to A/Cdre. MODIN's Statement.

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS SUBMITTED TO AIR COMMODORE MODIN BY P/LT. DOWDER, R.A.F., c/o AUSTRALIA HOUSE, STRAND, LONDON.

AIDE-MEMOIRE REGARDING ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY THE JAPANESE IN JAVA.

A. PRIOR TO CAPITULATION.

1. Kalidjati Aerodrome.

Approximately 30 Army personnel and some R.A.F. personnel were last seen fighting on the aerodrome on March 1, 1942. None have ever been heard of since in any P.O.W. camp, and it is believed that there were no survivors. After the capitulation, a working party of R.A.F. personnel under W/Cdr. FROW (deceased) reported a number of unburied bodies.

Colonel VAN HANSEN (N.S.I. Army Medical Corps) sent a party of Dutch officers and men to identify and bury the dead in the SOBANG-KALIDJATI area. Between about March 18 and 20, this party found a number of dead Dutch personnel wired together in a wood near SOBANG, and at KALIDJATI they saw a number of dead Dutch personnel but were forbidden by the Japanese to visit some parts of the aerodrome. They saw no British dead.

It is considered that Lieut. Gen. IMAMURA who established his headquarters at KALIDJATI is responsible for this incident.

Witnesses - Col. VAN HANSEN - in this camp.  
S/Ldr. WYLLIE, R.A.F.  
Dr. MOOY - N.S.I. Army Medical Corps ) Not in this  
Dr. HEYSTER - " " " " ) camp.

2. Sampang Incident.

On March 6, 1942, a train from PURNOCOROTO to CARONG with unarmed R.A.F. personnel was attacked. Wounded from this train comprising 2 officers and 20 other ranks and two unwounded other ranks as orderlies were left in a Chinese house approx. 6 kilos. from SAMPANG (southern Middle JAVA). The two orderlies were believed to have been shot. The wounded remained there for 2 days when a party of Japanese arrived and bayoneted them all. Two survivors, left for dead, are witnesses to this atrocity.

Witnesses - No. 629804 Cpl. R. FINNING, R.A.F. ) Not in  
652942 Cpl. J.H. HORNBLOW R.A.F. ) this camp  
60598 P/Lt. G. CARR, R.A.F. )

/B. POST-CAPITULATION.

B. POST-CAPITULATION.

3. Breach of terms of capitulation.

On March 10, 1942, in preliminary negotiations with Maj. Gen. HANBUHARA, Air Vice Marshal MALTEY obtained his agreement to the treatment of prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention of 1929 regarding the treatment of prisoners of war. On March 12, 3 senior British officers, Air Vice Marshal MALTEY, Maj. Gen. SITWELL, Brig. BLACKBURN, A.I.F., and one senior American officer, Col. SEARLE went through a formal signing of the terms of surrender in BANDOENG, (A.V.M. MALTEY to produce a copy), in which it was clearly stated that the terms of the Geneva Convention of 1929 would be adhered to. Besides Gen. HANBUHARA, the following Japanese staff officers were present at the ceremony - Col. OKI, C.O.S., Major SAITO, 22 Interpreter, Lieut. TACHIBANA, A.D.C., and Mr. KHORE, assistant Japanese Consul at SOERABAYA, who had been interned by the Dutch at the start of the war. Col. SEARLE has a copy of the document and Maj. Gen. SITWELL buried a copy in JAVA. Brig. BLACKBURN's copy was taken from him by the Japanese.

Immediate Breach.

On March 20, Maj. Gen. SITWELL, A/Cdre. STATCH, Brig. PEARSON and G/Capt. BISHOP were summoned to BANDOENG for interrogation. These officers can all tell their own story. In refusing to give away military information, these officers were confined for 4 weeks less three days and subjected to considerable unpleasantness.

Medical witness - Col. VAN MANTEN.

Subsequent Breach.

On May 5, Major YAMAGI, Staff Officer to Maj. Gen. SAITO, i/c JAVA P.O.W. Organisation informed A.V.M. MALTEY that JAPAN was not bound by either the 1929 or the 1907 Conventions because of an alleged sinking of a Japanese hospital ship, but JAPAN, out of love for P.O.W.'s would do what she could for them.

Witness - Lieut. HOLSWORTH, N.E.I. Navy (not in this camp).

4. Withholding of Medical Supplies.

The Japanese refused to issue medical supplies for the treatment of sick P.O.W.'s - over 100 deaths occurred in first six weeks.

/Witnesses . . .

Witnesses - Brig. BLACKBURN, A.I.F. ) In this  
Sgt. VAN HANSEN, A.I.I. A.M.C. ) Camp.  
Lieut. Gen. MURPHY, R.A.M.C. Believed in JAVA.

5. Glendon Incident.

In April, 1942, 3 R.A.F. personnel, P/O SIDDELL, Sgt. SMITH and Sgt. LON attempted to escape from BATAVIA airport in a Hudson bomber. G/Capt. NOBLE was subsequently informed by the Japanese that they had been shot.

Witnesses - G/Capt. NOBLE, R.A.F. ) Both in this  
P/O TWEEDIE, R.A.F. ) camp.

6. Malang (Singosari aerodrome) incident.

On May 4, 1942, 43329 P/Lt. F. GORDON, 65030 P/O A.G.F. CHEERSWRIGHT, W/O C.A. KENNISON and 1116610 Sgt. D.M. POLARD were executed for attempting to escape. Jap concerned - Maj. MITSUI.

Witnesses - P/Lt. DOWNER in this camp.  
W/Cdr. WILSON not in this camp.

7. Tasik Malaja Incident.

On or about May 12, 1942, W/Cdr. E.B. STEEDMAN, R.A.F., is believed to have been executed at TASIK MALAJA aerodrome for refusing to comply with certain orders. The Japanese officer concerned was Lieut. MISHIMA.

Witnesses - W/Cdr. VINES, R.A.F. ) Neither in  
P/Lt. WILSON, R.A.F. Med. Service ) this camp.

8. Bourabaya Incident.

For an offence allegedly committed in BOURABAYA, W/Cdr. A.D. GROOM is believed to have been sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment and to be serving his sentence in a native gaol in BATAVIA.

Witnesses - Lieut. H.G. ALLEN, U.S. Army ) Both in this  
Capt. T.A. DODSON, U.S. Army ) camp.

9. Third Degree R.A.A.F. Officers.

All officers of No. 4 Squadron R.A.A.F., were subjected to from 3 to 6 weeks third degree to extract military information.

Witness - W/Cdr. DAVIS, R.A.A.F., in this camp.

10. No. 1 P.O.H. (10th Inf. Bn. Barracks) Batavia Incident.

About June 14, 1943, six hospital patients were severely beaten by Lieut. SONAI, the Japanese commandant, in full view of all the prisoners in the camp.

Witnesses - Lieut. Col. R.W. DOBBIN ) Both in this  
W/Cdr. R.H. DAVIS, R.A.A.F. ) camp.

11. Memorial Incident.



LIST OF PERSONNEL CONSIDERED BY AIR COMMODORE MODIN TO BE WORTHY  
OF FULL INTERROGATION.

P/O C.R. KNOWLES, R.N.Z.A.F.

c/o Commercial Bank of Australia, 12 Old Jury, R.C.2.

Has detailed information regarding SINGAPORE.

F/Lt. DOWNER, R.A.A.F.

c/o Australia House.

Has detailed information regarding JAVA.

S/Ldr. JULIAN, R.N.Z.A.F.,

c/o New Zealand House.

Has detailed information relating to MALAYA and JAVA and Fighter Operations in that area.

W/Cdr. FRANKLIN, R.A.F., S.I.S.O., MALAYA.

57 Madeira Road, Leytonstone, E.11.

Has detailed information of casualties in JAVA, etc.

Capt. J.C. JOHNSON, Kings Loyal Regiment.

Avecade Lodge, PROSPECT, Bermuda.

Was A.D.C. to the Governor of SINGAPORE. Has detailed information regarding atrocities at MUKDEN.

Cpl. CORNELIUS, R.A.F.

The Mill House, DAWLISH, Devon.

Has detailed information on BINKER ISLAND.

W/Cdr. T. KING.

Clephill, Bedfordshire.

May have details about MUKDEN.

P/O M.W.F. TWEEDIE,

Oak Bank, RYE, Sussex.

Has details regarding JAVA.

542818 Sgt. HEWLETT, R.R., R.A.F. (Sgt. Clerk, SIME ROAD).

Two Acres, Walton Bay, CLEVEDON, Somerset.

Has detailed information on BINKER ISLAND.

S/Ldr. PUCKERIDGE.

Intelligence work in CEYLON.

Ernest LLOYD.

2 Camp Road, KOEBERS VELD, Maitland, South Africa.

Has detailed information regarding 15 airmen who were killed with the Australian Sisters on BANKA ISLAND in Feb 42.

Lt. D. McMULLIN, R.N.V.R.

Sea View Crescent, PORTOBELLO, Midlothian, Scotland.

Has detailed information about PALEMBANG

P/O ARMITAGE, R.N.

Shore House, Rowmore, ISLE OF ISLAY, Scotland

Details regarding Civil Jail at MUNTOK.

G.P.O. H.M.S. REED.

72 Station Avenue, BEMDOWN, Isle of Wight.

Has information regarding jail at MUNTOK, BANKA ISLAND.

Sgt. SMITH, Royal Artillery.

Vieduct Villa, TRURO, Cornwall.

and

Col. TUFFREY.

Aneth Lane, No. 3 Trevethan, PALMOUTH, Cornwall.

May have details of names of A.A. Battery at PALEMBANG.

B/G FILLAY.

c/o Australian Broadcasting Commission, SYDNEY, New South Wales, Australia.  
and Gear Street, Ascot, BRISBANE, Western Australia.

Buried W/Odr. CHICHELL at sea.

Cnr. WRIGHT, 910946914, A.A. Prisoner of War.

May have details of names of A.A. Battery at PALEMBANG.

Lt. W.A. STONOR, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. (A.D.C. to  
Gen. PERCIVAL, was lent to R/Adml. SPOONER and A.V.M. TULFORD.)

Cox and Kings, Pall Mall, S.W.1.

Information regarding deaths of R/Adml. SPOONER and A.V.M. TULFORD.

F/Lt. R.C. MOORE, R.A.F.V.R.

Eastern Gate, Conway Road, BROMGROVE, BIRMINGHAM.

Details of Air Sea Rescue boats and rescue personnel.

Major MCXTON, R.A.F.

Openwood, TILFORD, Surrey.

May be able to supply list of A.A. Gunners at PALEMBANG - ref. Sabotage

S/Ldr. HOVIL.

10 Belvedere Drive, WIMBLEDON, LONDON, S.W.19.

Military information regarding PALEMBANG.

Paymaster Lt. Odr. KIRTON.

Military information regarding PALEMBANG.

Mr. HOWELL (245 Squadron.)

Has information regarding SINGAPORE.

NO. 101. ROLL OF ROYAL AIR FORCE STAFF OFFICERS, R.A.F. FAR EAST, FEBRUARY, 1942  
AIR HEADQUARTERS - SINGAPORE

G/Capt.	MALONEY	C.S.O.	
G/Capt.	MURRAY	C.A.	
G/Capt.	D.G. BODDIE	P.M.O.	
G/Capt.	TANSELY	C.E.C.	
G/Capt.	BARKS	C.A. & F.A.	
G/Capt.	GOLLINS )	Ch. Eng. A.M.V.D.	
G/Capt.	GOODE )		
W/Cdr.	S.E. VINES	Comb. Ops. Room	P.O.W.
W/Cdr.	BURGESS	(also 205 Sqn.)	P.O.W.
W/Cdr.	MARCHBANKS	'I'	
W/Cdr.	W.P. WELCH	Nav.	P.O.W.
W/Cdr.	R.A.H. RAE	Arm.	P.O.W.
W/Cdr.	N. CAVE	C.R.O.	P.O.W.
W/Cdr.	G. COFFEY	D.P.M.O.	P.O.W.
W/Cdr.	LEFEVRE	Chem. Warfare	
W/Cdr.	ROSS	Org.	
W/Cdr.	DAVIS	Org.	
W/Cdr.	OSBORNE	Movements	
W/Cdr.	FARROW	A.L.O., N.E.I.	
W/Cdr.	(MAY)	Met.	
S/Ldr.	BRIGGS	Org. (also Horgroup)	P.O.W.
S/Ldr.	C.G.R. LEWIS	Photos (also Training and P.N.U.)	
S/Ldr.	T. HEWAN	Liaison Off. N.E.I.	
S/Ldr.	TUCKER	D.C.F.O.	
S/Ldr.	HARDIE	Cmd. M.T. Off.	P.O.W.
S/Ldr. Rev.	A.S. GILES	Chaplain & Welfare	P.O.W.
S/Ldr.	(?)	A.I.D.	
F/Lt.	CHARLTON	Bomb Disposal	P.O.W.
F/O	FALL	Cmd. Catering Off	P.O.W.
F/O	MASON )	Plans - Movements,	P.O.W.
F/O	G. HOWELL	re-inforcing aircraft	P.O.W.
F/O	FARWELL	A.P.M.	P.O.W.
F/O	V.A.G. PRICE	Cmd. Fire Officer	
F/O	DAVIES	Defence Officer	
F/O	BAINBRIDGE	Cmd. C. of A.	
F/O	CLARK	Central Rec. Off. (B.P.S.O.)	

FIGHTER GROUP, SINGAPORE

W/Cdr.	DARLEY		(also K.L. & Sumatra)
W/Cdr.	WILLS-SANDFORD		P.O.W.
S/Ldr.	HOWELL	Ops.	P.O.W.
S/Ldr.	CLOUSTON	Ops.	P.O.W.
W/Cdr.	LESTER	Observer Corps	
F/O	GRUBBAR	Filter Room	P.O.W.
F/O	FINLAY	Filter Room	P.O.W.

NOBGROUP, KUALA LUMPUR

W/Cdr.	FORBES	C.O.	
S/Ldr.	BRIGGS		

STATIONS, MALAYA

SILHIES

G/Capt. H.M.K. BROWN (also SIMPLAK, JAVA)

SIBAWANG

G/Capt. McCauley, R.A.A.F. (also P.2 SIMATRA)

/KALLANG.....

KUALA LANGAT

W/cdr. G.B.H. BELL

P.O.W.

TERENGANI

W/cdr. R.A.R. RAE

P.O.W.

G/Capt. C.H. HUBLE (Ops. Room)

P.O.W.

S/Ldr. WRIGHT (also 4 A.A.C.U.)

KOTA BAHRU

G/Capt. C.H. HUBLE. c/o Naval & Military Club  
Alfred Place,  
MELBOURNE.

P.O.W.

ALOR STAR

W/cdr. FORBES (also Nongroup)

W/cdr. DUNCAN (also KOTA BAHRU)

GENG KEDAH

C & M Party (P/O BUIP. & P/O EDWARDS)

SUNGAI PATANI

S/Ldr. FOWLE (also 27 Sqn.)

BUKIT MERGASIH

C & M Party (S/Ldr. SCOTT Asst.)

JEHO

C & M Party (P/O Eng. 151 M.U.)

TAIPING

C & M Party

KUALA LUMPUR (Asst)

W/cdr. BARLEY, D.S.O. (also F.Gp.)

KUANTAN

W/cdr. COURSEL (also 205 Sqn.)

KLIAH

W/cdr. K. FOWELL (also P.1)

PORT SWINERTONHAM

C & M Party (S/Ldr. WIGRAM)

P.O.W.

BATA PAHAT

C & M Party

SQUADRONS MALAYA

1 Sqn. (R.A.A.F.) (B)	(B)	W/cdr. R.H. DAVIS	c/o Air Base BELLEBOURNE POW
8 (R.A.A.F.)	(B)	W/cdr. WRIGHT	
21 (R.A.A.F.)	(F)	S/Ldr. ALLSHORN	later ?
27 (R.A.F.)	(F)	S/Ldr. FOWLE	(also SUNGAI PARANI)
34 (R.A.F.)	(B)	W/cdr. LONGFIELD	
36 (R.A.F.)	(TB)	C.O. decd. F/Lt. ?	POW.
60 (R.A.F.)	(B)	W/cdr. ?	
62 (R.A.F.)	(B)	W/cdr. DUNGAN	in SUMATRA W/cdr. MCKERN
		(S/Ldr. KERRAN	
100 (R.A.F.)	(TB)	W/cdr. MCKERN	
205 (R.A.F.)	(TB)	(W/cdr. COWSE	(also KUANTAN)
		(W/cdr. BURGESS	(also Ops. HQ)
232 (R.A.F.)	(F)(Adv. Party)	C.O. decd. ?	
243 (R.A.F.)	(F)	S/Ldr. HOWELL	(also Ftr. Ops.)
488 (R.A.F.) (N.Z.)	(F)	S/Ldr. GLOUSTON	later ? (also Ftr. Ops.)
453 (R.A.F.) (Aus.)	(F)	S/Ldr. HARPER	
4 A.A.C.U.		S/Ldr. WRIGHT	(also TENGAH Ops.)
Wirraway Flt.		F/Lt. P. THOMPSON	
H.V.A.F.		S/Ldr. CHATTAWAY (RAF)	POW
P.R.U.		S/Ldr. G.C.R. LEWIS	

MAINTENANCE UNITS

151 M.U.	Q/Capt.	WALKINGTON	
152 M.U.	S/Ldr.	AYLWIN	(also A.S.F. JAVA)
153 M.U.	Q/Capt. M.W.C. RIDGWAY.	c/o Westminster Bank Lt..	POW
		99. High St.,	
		WANDSWORTH, S.W. 18	
2. M.U.	F/O	COCKS	
R.I. M.U.	S/Ldr.	CARTER	
R. & S.U.	S/Ldr.	DIXON	

MISCELLANEOUS UNITS - MALAYA

A.M.E.'s	W/cdr.	CAVE	C.R.O., A.H.Q.
Torp. Sec. SELLER	F/O	DAVIS	
Marine Sec. SELLER	C.O. decd.	W/O DRAPER	POW
Air Sea Res.	F/Lt.	SCORE	POW
N.Z. Const. Unit.	S/Ldr.	SMART (N.Z.)	
Transit Camp	W/cdr.	GREGSON	POW
Port Det.	F/Lt.	BURTON	
'TONG SONG'	P/O	BROADHURST	
'SHAKING'	P/O	P. JACKSON	

N.E.I.

BOMBER GROUP	A/Cdre.	HUYER	
FIGHTER GROUP	A/Cdre.	VINCENT	
FIGHTER WING	W/cdr.	MAQUIRE	POW

A.H.G.

Q/Capt	COGGLE	S.A.O.
W/cdr.	VINES	Ops.
W/cdr.	WELCH	Nav.
W/cdr. R.A.R. HAE		Arm.
W/cdr.	NICHOLS	Sigs.
W/cdr.	CAVE	C.R.O.
W/cdr.	COFFEY	P.M.O.
W/cdr.	WALKER	Equip.
W/cdr.	WIGHTWICK	A.M.W.D.
S/Ldr.	JAMES ))	Accts.
F/Lt.	SIMPSON)	

/STATIONS....

STATIONS - N.E.I.

PALEMBANG I	W/Cdr.	K. POWELL	(also KLJANG)
PALEMBANG II	G/Capt.	MCCABLEY, R.A.A.F.	(also SEREBANG)
BAKAM BAKTU	W/Cdr.	DUNNAN	
SABANG	C & M Party	F/Lt. SMITH, later	W/Cdr. TOOGOOD
MEDAN	C & M Party	F/O EDWARDS	
LINGGA	C & M Party	?	
LAKAT	C & M Party	G/Capt. NOBLE	
PADANG	C & M Party		
SERAPAN	G/Capt.	H.M.H. BROWN	
KALIJATI	C.O. dead.	(S/Ldr. WIGRAM, F/O CASTLE)	

SQUADRONS - N.E.I.

From SINGAPORE - 1, 8, 34, 36, 62, 100, 205 and H.V.A.F. plus:-

84 Sqn.	(B)	W/Cdr.	JUDWINE	(also S/Ldr. TAYLOR)	POW
211 "	(B)	W/Cdr.	BAFESON		
232 "	(F)	S/Ldr.	BROOKER, D.F.C.	(also S/Ldr. JULIAN)	
238 "	(F)	S/Ldr.	THOMPSON		
605 "	(F)	S/Ldr.	WRIGHT		POW

MISCELLANEOUS UNITS - N.E.I.

Base Control Officer	GUESTHAVEN	G/Capt.	NICHOLLETS		POW
Base Control Officer	GUESTHAVEN	G/Capt.	RIDGWAY	(also 153)	POW
Port Det.	PALEMBANG	S/Ldr.	HAYLIN		POW
Air Stores Park		S/Ldr.	AYLVIN	(also 152)	POW
Port Det.	BATAVIA	F/O	PETERS		POW
Port Det.	TJILATJAP	S/Ldr.	BRIGGS		POW

HONG KONG

W/Cdr. HERRY  
W/Cdr. SULLIVAN

following is a statement by Captain J.C. JOHNSON, Kings Loyal Regiment, Avocado Lodge, PROSPECT, Bermuda, who was A.D.C. to the Governor of SINGAPORE. This statement was made to A/Cdre. MODIN.

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The following particulars relate to MERDEN CAMP:-

<u>1943</u>	<u>DEAD</u>	<u>DAYS SINCE ARRIVAL ON 11 Nov 42</u>
23 Feb	186	105
8 Mar	194	123
12 Mar	195	126
17 Mar	196	131
20 Mar	197	134
23 Apr	199	137
6 Apr	201	151
6 Aug	206	268

Approximately 250 deaths in the whole camp including:-

3 executed

19 bombing casualties

1 factory accident

2 senior officers