

R E P O R T

B Y

WING COMMANDER T. S. TULL O.B.E.

O N

O P E R A T I O N S A L E K M A S T I F F

M I D - J A V A

10th SEPTEMBER to 15th DECEMBER 1945.

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REPORT ON OPERATION "SALEX MASTIFF" IN MID-JAVA
BETWEEN 10th SEPTEMBER AND 15th DECEMBER, 1945.

INTRODUCTION

At the end of August the Royal Air Force Airborne Control Unit had twenty Parachuting Teams ready to take part in operation ZIPPER, either with the Clandestine Forces or with the 44th and 6th Airborne Divisions. The offensive role for which these teams had been prepared having fallen into abeyance, the resources of the Unit were offered by Headquarters Air Command South East Asia to Headquarters Allied Land Forces South East Asia, to participate in parachuting operations for the protection and release of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees.

The Royal Air Force Airborne Control Unit was ordered to have at readiness twenty teams, five in Calcutta for operations in Siam and French Indo-China, nine in Colombo for operations in the Netherlands East Indies and six in reserve at SECUNDERABAD. Having disposed these forces in the right places with their equipment, I obtained permission from the Senior Staff Officer at Headquarters Air Command South East Asia to proceed on an operation myself. I was then ordered by Mastiff Control at Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia, to prepare a team to drop at MAGELANG in Mid-Java.

Composition of Team

The standard Mastiff team consisted of four personnel, one Executive Officer to command the team, a signaller if required, a Medical Officer and Medical Orderly. The team took in, apart from its personal equipment, supplies of medical equipment and foodstuffs up to the maximum carrying capacity of the aircraft. In many cases Mastiff Teams did not require to take a W/T station with them, since Clandestine Teams and other agents, who had been in the field before the capitulation of Japan, had often moved to the nearest P.O.W. or Internment camp with their W/T equipment. In the case of Royal Air Force Teams ground to air communication was invariably carried, so that the dropping of supplies could be assisted and messages passed to reconnaissance aircraft.

My team for the Mid-Java operation, the code name of which is "Operation Saalex Mastiff", was intentionally larger than the standard team, since it had to cover a very large area. It consisted of the following personnel:

W/Crd.	T.S. TULL	--	Officer I.C.
F/Lt.	F.M. BALL	--)	Executive Officers.
F/Lt.	R. TRIGG	--)	
F/Lt.	R. HALLIDAY	--	Medical Officer.
Lt.	SENGER	--	Dutch Liaison Officer.
Sgt.	THOMSIT	--	Wireless Operator.
Cpl.	THURLOW	--	Wireless Operator.
Cpl.	FRANKISH	--	Wireless Operator.
LAC.	KING	--	Medical Orderly.

The equipment carried was as follows:-

- 1) Two "B"2 Wireless Sets
- 2) Two AN/TRC 7 V.H.F. Sets
- 3) One month's rations
- 4) Medical equipment
- 5) Personal equipment for each member of the party being 50 lbs.

Intelligence Available
in Ceylon

At this stage very little was known about Java in Ceylon by Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander. Java had only recently, as a result of the Potsdam Conference, come within the area of the South East Asia Theatre. Moreover it had been out of aircraft range for a large part of the war, and therefore practically no agents had been introduced. 24,000 APWIs were believed to be at MAGELANG. Information was available from pre-war sources regarding most of the airfields, and photographic reconnaissance had been

...ied out from the Cocos Islands, as a result of which we knew, for example, that there were forty Japanese light training planes on the airfield at JOGJAKARTA, and these had had their propellers removed in accordance with the terms of the Rangoon Agreement. Nothing was otherwise known about the attitude of the Japanese or the extent to which they were accepting the capitulation terms. Some information was available about a Nationalist movement in SUMATRA, but the reports concerning it said that it was not very strong or well organized and that the leaders of it had mainly been non-combatants under the Dutch regime.

My orders in Ceylon were necessarily therefore ill defined. I was to establish myself at or near the main internment camps and do my best to guard and help the APWIs until the arrival of the Allied Forces due to accept the Japanese surrender. I was to use my discretion in contacting the local Japanese Authorities and was given the names of certain other parties who had recently dropped into Java or were due to be sent there. I was informed that the M.S. "CUMBERLAND" would arrive in Batavia either just before or at the same time as my arrival, with RAPWI personnel on board and that ultimately I should be expected to contact them.

Arrival at MAGELANG

Our departure by Liberator from China Bay took place on 14th September. We took off from the Cocos Islands at 0100 hours on the 15th, but while less than half an hour's flight away from base, the starboard outer engine cut, before the pilot had time to feather it. We were carrying an overload of several thousand pounds with the result that we began to lose height at the rate of about 1000 ft. per minute. The Captain of the aircraft, which was from 357 Squadron, behaved admirably in this crisis and by jettisoning the bomb-bay petrol tank and almost all our equipment and stores was just able to reach base safely. While the aircraft was having an engine-change we were therefore delayed about four days in the Cocos Islands. By that time we had received new "B"2 sets but nothing else. In consultation with the P.O. Liaison Officer I decided to proceed with the operation without waiting for further kit or V.H.F. sets. The rest of the aircraft load was made up of standard containers of food and medical supplies, and on the 18th September at 0100 hours we carried out the sortie successfully and were stopped at MAGELANG on a disused light plane strip at 0800 hours. Six of the Liberators that day dropped supplies for the internees at the same spot. Many of the containers and packages broke away from their parachutes due to the aircraft dropping at too great a speed. Moreover the dropping of aircraft which had been switched suddenly from Bomber to S/D duties was often inaccurate. This, combined with the fact that a large crowd of potential witnesses in the area, meant that only 50 to 60 per cent. of the stores dropped were recovered.

We were met on arrival by representatives of the local Red Cross Committee and shortly afterwards by Japanese Staff Officers whose attitude was perfectly correct. We learned that the internment camps were not at MAGELANG though the Military Hospital there had been handed over by the Japanese to the Red Cross for the use of sick internees and was being prepared for their reception. At AMBARAWA and BANJOEBIROE, twenty-five miles to the north, there were six camps containing over 14,000 people and the five camps at SEMARANG contained approximately similar number. In the jails both at SEMARANG and AMBARAWA there was a large number of political prisoners of various nationalities including many P.O.W's.

Later that morning, after the stores had been collected, I requested a meeting with Gen. Nakamura and his staff. Gen. Nakamura commanded the Command Force Corps in Java, with his Headquarters at MAGELANG and his main garrisons at MAGELANG, JOGJAKARTA, SEMARANG and PEKALONGAN. He had altogether about 15,000 troops under his command. At this meeting the attitude of the Japanese appeared co-operative. I explained our mission and the type of help which we required the Japanese to provide. Our own attitude at this meeting was correct but reserved, in accordance with the S.A.C.S.E.A. Directive. That afternoon I proceeded by road to AMBARAWA and SEMARANG. At AMBARAWA I met W/Cdr. A.D. Groom who had been a P.O.W. and political prisoner since the Japanese occupation of Java, but had been released after capitulation from AMBARAWA jail and had done fine work in assisting his former fellow prisoners

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in negotiating with the Japanese for the provision of resources (M.R. food) for the newly formed Red Cross Committee at AMBARAWA which was providing a considerable measure of assistance to the camps.

10. In SEMARANG I met Captain Wishart and members of his staff. Captain Wishart had originally parachuted into SINGAPORE and when his job there was completed, had been attached to Colonel Dewar on the staff of No. 6 RAPWI Control at Batavia. Owing to the delay in the arrival of my team, H.M.S. "BERBERLAND" had reached Java before we did and Colonel Dewar had sent Captain Wishart to form a RAPWI organization to look after the camps in SEMARANG, AMBARAWA and BANJOEBIROE. I telephoned Batavia and agreed to proceed there as soon as possible. I returned the same evening to MAGELANG.

11. The same afternoon I had sent Lt. Senger to do a reconnaissance of JOGJAKARTA Airfield. He encountered some difficulty in JOGJAKARTA owing to the fact that he had hoisted the Dutch flag on his car, but was able to report that the airfield was in good condition and that many of the aircraft could quickly be made serviceable.

12. The following day Groom and I proceeded to JOGJAKARTA and flew to BATANGKALIA via BANDOENG in two of the Japanese light aircraft. This was a somewhat unpleasant journey owing to bad weather and the fact that we had no maps but we arrived safely and reported to Colonel Dewar, O.C. RAPWI, BATAVIA.

Division of Responsibility
Central Java

13. That night we attended a conference presided over by Rear Admiral Patterson and explained the situation in SEMARANG and AMBARAWA. W/Cdr. Groom and myself recommended that the camps at AMBARAWA and BANJOEBIROE should come under the control of a separate RAPWI Team, since they could be effectively looked after by RAPWI SEMARANG, whose hands were already full. This recommendation was accepted and my final orders, a copy of which was sent to Japanese Headquarters in BATAVIA and Gen. Nakamura at MAGELANG, were as follows:-

- (a) That I should form a separate Team at AMBARAWA responsible to No. 6 RAPWI Control Staff at BATAVIA for the camps at AMBARAWA and BANJOEBIROE and the Hospital of MAGELANG.
- (b) That I was responsible for all dealings with Gen. Nakamura and his staff.
- (c) That I should protect the interests of internees in the Mid-Java area generally south of SEMARANG.
- (d) That I should be ready to receive stores or personnel flown in at JOGJAKARTA or elsewhere.

14. These orders were subsequently somewhat modified and the area was placed under RAPWI SEMARANG with regard to evacuation policy and the provision of stores and medical equipment from outside the area. In one respect later RAPWI SEMARANG, in a sense, came under me, since, following a meeting on board the Netherlands Cruiser "TROMP" presided over by its Captain, it was confirmed that I was responsible for using the Japanese to ensure the security of the whole area including SEMARANG.

Part One

SITUATION IN MID-JAVA AT THE TIME OF ARRIVAL.

Geographical

15. The places in Mid-Java vital to the Allies were SEMARANG, AMBARAWA and MAGELANG. These last two are at an altitude of about 1100 feet and 1500 feet above sea level and are twenty-five miles and fifty miles respectively from the north coast port of SEMARANG. Their climate is very

much better than that of SEMERANG and in pre-war days LABARJA had been a centre for T.R. patients and MAGELANG had also been a big military hospital centre. MAGELANG itself is in the middle of an extensive and fertile plateau surrounded by high volcanic mountains. In the foothills of these mountains were several hill stations such as BANTOEKIN, SOEMOVONO and SOENG. To the west, the other side of the mountains, stretched the DIENG Plateau, the main centre of which was the hill station of WONOSOBO. To the east the ground was slightly lower and SOEMARITA is at a lesser altitude than MAGELANG. Similarly to the south JOGJAJARTA is only slightly above sea level.

16. The vital lines of communication in this area were the SOEMARITA-MAGELANG-JOGJAJARTA road and the SOEMERANG-SOEMARITA-JOGJAJARTA road. A small mountain railway connected LABARJA, MAGELANG and SOEMARITA. The key point to anyone wishing to hold Mid-Java was therefore LABARJA and MAGELANG, particularly the latter, which was the reason why it was the headquarters of Gen. Nakamura.

Political

17. There was ample evidence on all sides of the highly developed colonial system of the Dutch. In suitable, schools, roads, drainage, water supply - in fact, all public utilities were infinitely superior to those, for example, in India or Ceylon. This system, however, under the Japanese had been allowed to deteriorate. The roads were seldom, if ever, repaired. Rolling stock from railways had been removed out of the island for military purposes. The water and electricity systems had received little or no maintenance. Civilian hospitals were hopelessly short of medical supplies and schools were for the most part empty. The only education which had in fact flourished had been under the auspices of the Japanese and their Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Scheme. A large number of youths of the semi-educated and educated classes had received this latter form of training and some in fact had even been sent to Japan. Military training had also flourished and the numbers of the ANGELIN PERKOR (or LEIKO) had been estimated as great as 80,000 for the whole island. These had all received disciplinary and recruits training, with emphasis on physical development. Large numbers had received proper military training and had been employed on guard duties in various capacities in the island. Some had even been given advanced military training in the handling of modern weapons including artillery and a mere handful had been taught to fly. Similarly many posts in the police force and jails had been filled by young Indonesians.

18. The civil administration of the country had been carried out by Japanese political and administrative officers, both military and civilian. The organization of the civil administration had been altered very little from the Dutch model. Civilian posts up to and including Agent were still held by Indonesian Officials; the posts of Resident and Governor were normally held by Japanese. The posts of Controller were often held by Indonesians, though under the Dutch this was rarer. The Governor of Mid-Java was a Japanese General, answerable to the Governor-General at BATAVIA, who in his turn was responsible to the Japanese Ministry which corresponds to our own Colonial or Dominions Office.

Economic

19. The economy of the country had been allowed to a large extent to run down-hill. This was for the most part inevitable, since the Japanese had neither the shipping nor the technical staff sufficient to run those industries which had mainly been erected for export trade. In large areas in Mid-Java coffee and other estates had been abandoned and the plants all cut down.

20. The rural economy of the country had not changed very much. The areas under cultivation for primary foodstuffs remained very much the same and the difficulty here was one of transportation rather than production. Even where transport facilities were available, the peasant was not always willing to release his products freely owing to the general lack of confidence in the currency. This was particularly noticeable just before and shortly after the capitulation when the Japanese currency began to depreciate very rapidly and when there was little on the market, either in the way of cloth or other manufactured goods, on which the peasant could use this currency, even if he accepted it.

21. Certain Japanese trading firms such as MITSUBISHI had established themselves strongly in the island and in the period immediately after the Japanese conquest had done a roaring trade, mainly away from the island, in those resources essential for the Japanese war effort. They had helped in the question of imports, but these were mainly for the use of the Japanese occupation forces in Java. In the last year before the Japanese capitulation their turnover had dwindled to a mere trickle owing to the shortage of Japanese shipping.

Military

22. At the time of the capitulation the Japanese were in complete and effective military control of the whole island. Two steps were however, immediately taken either just before or after the capitulation, which radically altered the situation. The first was a political measure, namely, the Declaration of Indonesian Independence and the gradual assumption by the Indonesians of all departments of civil government. At first this handing over, which took more than six weeks to complete, began in the sphere of local government. The next step was the assumption of all public utilities by the Indonesians, the post office, telegraph and telephone systems and electricity and water supply. This stage was completed by September 15th in Mid-Java. The third and final stage due to be completed by October 1st involved the assumption of many departments of a semi-military nature (i.e. railways, food distribution and policing). This stage took place without incident except in the assumption of control over and the disarming of the Japanese Military Police (the Kempai Tai). Since these men were universally unpopular they naturally disliked losing their weapons and in some cases resisted, while in others resistance was pre-arranged, so that it might appear that the weapons had been handed over as a result of force majeure. Concurrently with this assumption of power all the high positions of the civil administration were taken over by the Indonesians, notably those of Resident, where the Residents had previously been Japanese, and those of Governor. Thus on or about October 4th Mr. Soeroso, the Resident of KEDOE, was appointed Governor of Mid-Java.

23. The second factor which altered the situation was the disbanding of the ANGKATAN PERKOTA and all other Indonesian levies trained and employed by the Japanese. This took place in the second half of August and meant that between forty and eighty thousand young soldiers, many of them with weapons, returned to their towns and villages where they immediately proceeded to organize the youth of the country for the impending revolution. At first this Youth Organization was formed with small bands armed with bamboo spears and a variety of primitive weapons. Later many of these bands were absorbed partially or entirely into the B.K.R. (Badan Keamanan Rakyat) and later the T.K.R. (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat).

24. A further factor which contributed to the general unrest was the release of criminal prisoners from the jails. Many of these, to be with, took over the posts previously occupied by the Japanese in the jails. All of them later associated themselves with the bands of semi-organized youth who were beginning to assume mob-law. In KEDOE the number of ex-jail officials and released criminals amounted to over 500; most of them were at liberty by the time of my arrival and caused many of the later difficulties and dangers.

25. There were further considerations which made it difficult later for the Japanese to enforce law and order. At the time of the capitulation all their best troops had been withdrawn for the defence of the home-land or to reinforce Malaya. Those who remained were not tactically disposed for maintaining internal security or for protecting the PW's. Moreover a fairly large proportion of the available forces (twenty to twenty-five per cent.) had been withdrawn to places such as BOJOLALI and SOERABAYA, to prepare Japanese self-internment camps and a large part of the available transport was used to build up supplies of all kinds in these camps.

26. Thus by the middle of September, when we arrived in MINGLING, there was already a large mob in the town who, on the very day that we landed, looted some of our stores and in the course of subsequent supply drops became increasingly effective in their looting until finally they began attacking my Red Cross workers engaged on collecting the stores, with knives and bamboo spears, with the result that we had to signal Ceylon requesting them to discontinue supplying us.

RAFWI

27. Although the local Red Cross at AMBARA particularly, and also at SOERABAYA, BALIKPAPAN and MINGLING, had done a very good job and the amount and quality of food supplied to the camps had improved considerably, the position was still far from satisfactory. Five of the six camps at AMBARA and BALIKPAPAN had under the Japanese been purely for women and children, boys above the age of twelve to fourteen years having been removed to men's camps. A small Dutch Military Staff had been placed in the camps just before my arrival to assist in the administration of the camps and numerous men, who had walked out from BANDUNG or BATAVIA, had come to rejoin their families but the bulk of the camp population was still predominantly feminine. Though they had under the Japanese been forced to work for themselves and maintain some degree of order and sanitation, after the capitulation they suffered more or less from a mass nervous breakdown. The result was that the condition of the camps, particularly of those in BANJOEBANG was foul and with the arrival of the monsoon, outbreaks of epidemics, such as dysentery, were feared.

28. A further factor which complicated the RAFWI problem was the fact that many of the big firms, notably the B.P.M. and K.P.M., had begun their own arrangements for evacuation and had sent large parties to places such as, BALIKPAPAN and BANJOEBANG in my area and SOERABAYA outside it, without regard to the political and military situation. Many other people, particularly those whose husbands had come from elsewhere to rejoin them, had walked off without orders to their own homes anywhere in Java.

29. Supplies of food in the camps were small, only about one week's stocks being held. Apart from the limited supplies received by parachute from the Cocos Islands nothing from outside Java had been sent. An adequate diet could only be maintained if large supplies of fresh foodstuffs could continue to be obtained locally. Medical supplies were being provided by the Japanese, but their own stocks could supply very little modern stuff, such as penicillin, sulpho-namide drugs, and medicines to cure vitamin deficiency.

30. One further action by the Japanese just before the capitulation should be mentioned here. A large number of Eurasians (Indo Belanda) had been interned by the Japanese. When it became obvious that the war was going to end, they offered these people the option of returning to their homes. A small percentage through pride did not wish to make their mixed origin obvious by accepting this offer, but the great majority returned to their homes everywhere in the island. These people later formed about twenty-five per cent. of the refugees (I R T U) who flocked to the British for protection once fighting had broken out in any particular area.

C O N C L U S I O N

31. It will be seen from the above that on our arrival all the ingredients existed in the political situation for a period of anarchy or revolution. The Japanese at this time had retained their morale. In fact, it would be true to say that their discipline in defeat was astounding. They were, however, extremely loth to undertake effective action against the mob when out of control. I requested them to stop the looting of stores when dropped from aircraft, but they did this in a half-hearted manner. On one occasion they did take effective action and killed or wounded two or three people in ILGELANG, but appeared afraid to exercise the degree of force necessary to keep the situation in control. There was, however, no evidence at this stage that the Military Forces were in coalition with the Indonesian or intended to break the terms of the Rangoon Agreement.

32. On the Indonesian side evidence of the strength and purpose of the Nationalist movement existed everywhere. Not a house, nor a public building lacked its Indonesian flag. Scarcely an inhabitant of village or town went outdoors without wearing the Red and White favour. The press and radio were pouring forth a continuous stream of subtle and effective propaganda. In fact, it was hard to find any gap in the Indonesian ranks. The whole country was in a ferment and normally quite peaceful people, whose memories of the Dutch regime could only have been pleasant but whose feelings had been exacerbated by three and a half years of Japanese rule, stood forth now as opponents of any form of Dutch infiltration and as champions of their own "MERDEKA" (Freedom).

33. It must also be remembered that the local population had seen the Dutch armed forces in this island completely routed and that thereafter until the capitulation they had witnessed every form of humiliation and ill treatment extended to Europeans. Moreover, the Dutch on their return to Java did not return as conquerors as the Japanese in the same degree as we did in Burma and Malaya.

Part Two

DEVELOPMENTS UP TO THE TIME OF THE ARRIVAL OF
THE BRITISH FORCES, SEPTEMBER 20th to OCTOBER
18th, 1945.

Relations with the Japanese

34. While in BATAVIA I was given some indication of the delay to be expected before the arrival of the Allied Forces in sufficient number. It became apparent therefore that if we were to expect the Japanese to continue to maintain law and order and protect and supply the Allies, we would have to be most careful in our dealings with them. For this reason on my return I issued instructions that everyone should treat those Japanese with whom they had official dealings in as courteous and pleasant a manner as possible. When a few days later an officer arrived from BATAVIA to investigate Japanese war crimes on the spot, we sent him back to BATAVIA as quickly as possible since, had the purpose of his visit been known, we would have expected no further co-operation.

35. In like manner when making requests on the Japanese for the provision of facilities for RAPWI, I was most careful to see that my demands were not so exacting that the fulfilment of them would have placed the Japanese in a situation where they could not carry out their normal military duties.

36. The result of this policy was that the Japanese in all respects co-operated fully with us. I made my Headquarters at MBARAWA since the main Allied interests were there. Gen. Nakamura provided me

with Major Katch as a Liaison Officer and with an appropriate subordinate staff. He obtained forty lorries and forty cars from areas in Eastern Java where there was no RAPWI problem and from which they could be spared. He improved the provision of fresh foodstuffs for the camps and augmented the AMBARAWA garrison at my request. The Japanese also provided me daily with accurate intelligence regarding events in the whole Mid-Java area and by the end of the month had carried out fully the order which I had given immediately on return from BATAVIA, that they should stock the camps with at least a month's supplies for the existing camp strength. (This order was also given by RAPWI SEMARANG at, I believe, a slightly later date.) At JOGJAKARTA airfield they formed on my orders a Communication Flight working originally to BATAVIA via MAGELANG and SEMARANG, but later operating only on the MAGELANG-SEMARANG route since twin-engine aircraft had been organized at BANGGONE within a few days for the BATAVIA-SEMARANG-SOURABAYA run.

Flight-Lieutenant Trigg was posted to JOGJAKARTA with Corporal Frankish and a W.M.F. set and soon had the Japanese working most efficiently for us. Lieutenant Senger was left in SEMARANG as my Liaison Officer and assisted in the preparation of the No. 1 Hospital there. With him I left the RAAF W/T station, which within a day or two, owing to the excellent work of W/Sgt. Thomsit and Cpl. Thurley, was in contact with the Cocos Islands. Various signals were passed over through this set to Mastiff Control at Colombo, informing them of our safe arrival and the condition and location of the internees and requesting news of the reinforcements which No. 6 RAPWI Control Staff had sent for on my behalf. Our main intelligence and other reports were, however, of course always sent to SEMARANG and BATAVIA.

relations with the Indonesians

38. At first there was little necessity in order to carry out the RAPWI tasks, for contacting the Indonesians. My first contact was endeavour on my part to amalgamate the International Red Cross in MAGELANG with the Indonesian Red Cross and to obtain co-operation in the international sphere of Red Cross, medical and other relief work. For this purpose I arranged a meeting with Dr. Djokro Atmodjo. I paid a courtesy call on him at his bungalow and explained the work that RAPWI were trying to do, and he promised his assistance. Little effective co-operation resulted from this visit and my main request that the Indonesian nurses and other hospital staff who had raised on when the hospital was handed over to us by the Japanese, should return to duty, was not fulfilled. Three days later therefore I requested a meeting with Mr. Soeroso, the Resident of KEDOE, which Gen. Nakamura convened at his Headquarters. Mr. Soeroso also promised assistance and his promise was more effective since a certain number of the hospital staff returned to work. The Dutch members of the MAGELANG Red Cross Committee and the Indonesians, however, never really got together satisfactorily.

39. These contacts stood me in good stead later when the situation deteriorated. Similarly at AMBARAWA I quickly made effective contact with the Chairman of the National Committee, Dr. Wirjono and his No. 2, Dr. Soesman, and with the District Officer and the Chief of Police. W/Cdr. Green paid goodwill missions to SAIATIGA and SOERABAYA and established contacts with the Red Cross Committees there, both which were receiving assistance from the Indonesian Moderates.

40. Shortly after, on September 27th, I contacted Mr. Wongsonogoro, Resident of SEMARANG, who had great influence at that period in the area and with whom Captain Wishart had already established amicable relations.

41. There is no doubt that initially the moderate Indonesian leaders after their initial suspicions had been satisfied, were prepared to help the British and protect the RAPWI organization, so long as we

took no action which infringed the sovereignty of their de facto Government. Moderates like Mr. Wongsonogoro and Dr. Wiroreno were fully alive to the damaging effect on their cause that outrages against the RAPWI or other unprotected sections of the population would bring about. They realized the necessity for maintaining favourable relations with the world press and Mr. Wongsonogoro, on hearing that a party of Allied War Correspondents was due to visit SEMARANG and AMBARAWA, had arranged a reception in their honour, to which Captain Wishart and I were invited. Even Extremist leaders like Mr. Soeroso held the same views about not offending world opinion. The trouble in all cases was that as the tempo of agitation and the flow of propaganda worked up to a climax, they became increasingly unable to control their own followers and the mob. We on our part did our utmost to appear impartial as between the Dutch and the Indonesians and regarding the future status of the country.

Organization of RAPWI in Mid-Java

48. A chart of our office organization as at the beginning of October can be seen at Appendix "A". By this time the office was installed in its own premises and was beginning to work efficiently. The RAPWI Organization was largely and publicly proclaimed throughout Java as being non-political in character. In fact at all stages, until the mounting number of atrocities committed by the Indonesians had entirely alienated the sympathies of RAPWI Officials throughout the island, it tried to remain neutral. In the case of AMBARAWA, however, owing to the dual nature of my duties, it was impossible not to be involved in politics. As head of the RAPWI I had to have an organization capable of controlling and administering the camps. By virtue of the duty imposed upon me of ensuring the security of APWI in Mid-Java, I had in addition to fulfil the functions of a non-official British agent. Thus on my staff I had a Japanese Section, a Dutch Section and a Malayan Section with an adequate number of translators and interpreters. In addition, I had people in the camp engaged on monitoring all radio broadcasts in English, Dutch and Indonesian; so that apart from the information provided me by my own team in various places and by the Japanese intelligence system, I was able to know what was happening throughout Java. This miniature chancellery worked extremely efficiently and I was generally able to anticipate the course of future events and take whatever measures lay within my power, before these events occurred.

49. In addition to the political work there was of course a very big task of controlling and administering the camps and endeavouring as far as possible to liquidate them to better places. The staff for this, as in the case of political work, was found from Dutch Military and Civilian Officers both within the area and from outside it, obtained through the good offices of RAPWI SEMARANG.

50. As the scope of our interests in MAGELANG extended, it became necessary to build up a similar staff there to look after the hospitals and convalescent centre. Elsewhere in the area at WONOSOBO, PALATIGA and SOERABARTA, our work was accomplished through the Red Cross Committees who constantly applied for a British Officer to be posted on the spot to carry out negotiations with the Indonesians. Unfortunately, I had no Officers to spare, since the thirty-eight personnel from the R.A.F. Airborne Control Unit were delayed in their departure from Ceylon and when they arrived at Singapore were diverted to other duties, owing to a signal sent by A.L.F.S.E.A. to No. 6 Control Staff not being actioned and to the action of a Wing Commander on the Air Staff at A.C.S.E.A. who considered that these personnel were being mis-employed and therefore ordered them back to their Unit in India where they have ~~remained~~ remained doing nothing ever since

Evacuation Schemes

51. The policy from BATAVIA and SEMARANG at this time was to evacuate at least 10,000 to SOERABAYA by train. In SOERABAYA there was a RAPWI

Contact Team who had done good work in preparing accommodation, but whose composition was entirely Dutch, with the result that they did not make any contact with the Indonesians. Four train-loads were evacuated to SOURABAYA, totalling 1800 persons 900 of whom were from the camps at BANJONGBIROE, which had priority for evacuation within my own area, since in sanitation and hygiene they were far worse than the AMBARINA camps. Thereafter fighting broke out between the Indonesians and Japanese in SOURABAYA, the Indonesians eventually assuming complete control and disarming the Japanese. It became impossible to pursue this scheme any further, and in fact the 1800 persons who had been evacuated plus over 1000 internees who had gone to SOURABAYA from all over Java under their own arrangements, were in terrible danger and distress.

46. In MAGELANG, as had already been mentioned, one hospital had been handed over by the Japanese to us before the arrival of my team. Eventually 778 people were evacuated to this hospital, of whom over 600 were serious hospital cases. There remained, however, another 900 hospital cases and nearly 1500 people who required constant medical treatment but not necessarily in hospital. These were classified as convalescents. Neither of these two categories could have been adequately looked after in the camps where dirt, overcrowding, noise and lack of medical facilities made it practically impossible for them to recover, despite the increases in diet which had taken place since the Japanese capitulation. In MAGELANG the Japanese had prepared adequate accommodation for over 3000 troops, in anticipation of the arrival of Allied Forces. Their preparations had been thorough and there were complete stocks of bedding, cooking utensils, etc. In these former Dutch barracks the conditions were as good as any that I have seen in the East.

47. I therefore prepared a "Mid-Java Evacuation Scheme", which consisted largely in evacuating the sick and convalescent people to MAGELANG and other places in the area where I considered they would be safe. This scheme was forced upon us by medical necessity and was approved by RAPI Mid-Java. It was also planned to evacuate to SALATIGA, SOERABAYA, WONOOSOBO and other areas. One hundred and ten people were evacuated by us to WONOOSOBO Hill Convalescent Centre both to SOERABAYA and SALATIGA internees had been sent before my arrival and I allowed one batch of thirty to proceed to SOERABAYA the day after I assumed command in AMBARINA. Thereafter, although preparations went on in these areas, I stopped further evacuation indefinitely because of the political and military situation.

48. In addition to the above evacuations a small number of people, totalling not more than sixty-eight, were evacuated by air from SEMARANG to BATAVIA and BANDONG to rejoin their families. It will be seen that evacuation was a very difficult problem. Difficult military decisions had to be made regarding the safety of internees in any particular area. Initially on instructions from RAPI BATAVIA it was sufficient if the Japanese guaranteed that they could protect the internees in any area. When, however, the Japanese power began to crumble their guarantees became worthless and our restrictions on evacuation were undoubtedly wise. The MAGELANG evacuation scheme had been criticized since six weeks later it involved the troops in heavy fighting. It was difficult at this time, however, to anticipate that the Allies would be unwilling or not sufficient in numbers to garrison MAGELANG, which had always been a large garrison centre and whose tactical position would enable the occupying forces to control Mid-Java. In isolating 110 people at WONOOSOBO we did, however, make a grave mistake.

49. The main thing, however, both in the interests of the evacuees themselves and in the maintaining of the morale of those who remained in the camps, was that some evacuation, on however limited a scale, should continue to take place. The concentration of hospitals at MAGELANG did provide a cleaner and better life eventually for over 2500 people and the high medical standard of these hospitals saved

many lives and lessened the hardship of helpless people who, for more than three long years of Japanese rule, had suffered every form of privation, humiliation and unhappiness.

Political Prisoners

50. One class of prisoners, the care of whom devolved on RAPWI, deserves special mention since their case was somewhat different from that of the bulk of the APWI. The political prisons were filled with people who in some way or another had offended the Japanese regime. There were a few P.O.W.'s in these prisons, mostly men who at some stage since their capture had stood up to their captors, either on their own behalf or on behalf of those under them. There were a variety of other races including Indonesians. All these people had suffered ill treatment at the hands of their jailers, both Japanese and Indonesians, and many hundreds in each jail had died. W/Cdr. A.D. Groom had already effected the release of his fellow prisoners in the ALBARRAN Penitentiary, and cared for them in a most efficient and high-minded manner. When orders were received from Rear Admiral Patterson allowing political prisoners to be released provided they reported to the nearest RAPWI centre, W/Cdr. Groom, at his own request, went on tour and freed the prisons at SOLO and JOGJAKARTA. He then proceeded further eastwards, freeing, it is believed, other prisons en route, and eventually found himself in SOURABAYA at the height of the trouble there. On orders from Captain Suiser, Royal Netherlands Navy, he stayed on in SOURABAYA negotiating on behalf of RAPWI and gave excellent service there in the same way as he had done at ALBARRAN during his ten days as my second-in-command.

The Sourabaya Incident

51. As early as September 23rd I had heard from a reliable Dutch agent that an uprising was due to begin in earnest on October 1st. It was to take the form of one hundred per cent. boycott of all Europeans, Eurasians, Ambeinose, Monadonnose, in fact of the whole minority population. They were forbidden access to bazaars or any public vehicle, either rail or road. Their property was liable for confiscation. A few days later notices appeared in the press that the "People's Army" had declared war on the minority population. As a result of this information we were able to lay aside adequate foodstuffs against the emergency.

52. In fact, both in Middle Java and East Java, the rising had been planned for the 1st of October. It took place between the 1st and the 4th of October in SOURABAYA; and although the planning had been done in SOERABAYA and JOGJAKARTA, the strongholds of the Extremist resistance, for a number of reasons with many of which my team was concerned, the uprising did not start in Middle Java until October 13th.

53. The SOURABAYA incident and the great danger into which the internees fell as a result of it, was for us the writing on the wall. The key to the whole situation lay with the Japanese. If they kept their weapons, even though they did not use them adequately to enforce internal security, there would be rioting, looting and occasional bloodshed before the arrival of the Allied Forces, but those forces when they arrived would not find the situation completely out of hand.

54. I therefore adopted a different policy from my previous one of making contacts merely in those areas where we were vitally concerned with administering and helping the APWI (SEMARANG, AMBARAWA and MAGELANG). Instead I adopted a policy of trying to keep the trouble in Mid-Java away from these areas. As the Senior Allied Officer in Mid-Java I paid a series of official visits to JOGJAKARTA, SOERABAYA, BALATIGA and WONOSOBO. These journeys became increasingly difficult to make owing to the growing number of road blocks at many of which one would be surrounded by bands of the B.M.R. boys and their satellites both with and without weapons.

55. A description of some of these visits as shown in quotations from my daily SITREPS might be of interest here:-

Official Visits to JOGJAKARTA
and SOERABAYA

56. (A) First visit to JOGJAKARTA:

"In the afternoon I flew to DJOCJA, for a meeting with the Sultan. DJOCJA itself is peaceful, but entirely under the control of the Indonesians, who themselves are fairly well disciplined. Quite a parade was laid on, presumably in order to impress me, since I was the first Senior Allied Officer to visit the place. A heavy escort of armed Indonesians in six or seven cars and trucks and armed Indonesian troops facing inwards and outwards every fifty yards, as though for an official procession. The Sultan was unwilling to have any internees in DJOCJA on the grounds of great food shortage. The present ration for the population is only 150 grams a day. He urgently requires 150 tons of rice, which he cannot get from SOLO, owing to transportation, this to arrive by October 28th the latest. There was a large number of Indonesian Nationalist Officials present and also members of the press. I explained the non-political character of our work, the co-operation I was receiving from Messrs. Manosogoro and Soeroso, (the latter of whom is now Governor of Mid-Java in addition to his duties as Resident of MAGELANG). The Sultan agreed to help people in transit, but I did not press as I intended to take over the Japanese managed hotel, which is now three quarters empty. The Sultan had obviously thrown in his hand pretty effectively with the Nationalists, but the other prince at DJOCJA, who was also present, seemed ~~intransigent~~ whole-hearted but was not allowed to open his mouth. There will not be much trouble at DJOCJA, until after the arrival of Allied troops."

57. (B) First visit to SOERABAYA (SOLO): (A copy of the report referred to here is attached at Appendix "B").

"At the request of the Red Cross Committee at SOLO, and as the result of reports received from an RAF Officer who has been taking over medical stores from the Japanese there, I visited SOLO and was officially received by the National Committee, and by the two leading princes. A separate report on the situation there is being forwarded by this mail. The policy of keeping troubles at the frontiers of Mid-Java, is, I think, wise and will be continued."

58. (C) Second visit to SOERABAYA:

"I tried hard all morning to contact Col. Asjes or Col. Dewar at SEMBRANG, to find out whether the proposals I had made regarding SOLO had been approved or not. I had fixed a meeting in SOLO with the Indonesians at three o'clock, and was obliged eventually to go there. I took up the same line regarding arms as I had adopted in this area and issued an order to the Commander of the Japanese troops regarding his duties, a copy of which, with a covering letter, I handed to the President of the National Committee. Very great pressure had been put on the Japanese Commander, urging him to hand over his weapons, which amount to several thousands, and the recovery of which would have cost a large number of Allied lives later. If I had not paid these two visits to SOLO, I feel certain that the arms would have been handed over, since

- a) The Japanese General at SOERABAYA had, in fact ordered the Commander at SOLO, to take the same action as himself and

- " b) Gen. Nakamura issued similar orders from LANGKANG, via an Indonesian intermediary. I have enough documents and other evidence to get the General courtmartialled later for double-crossing us, but intend to do or say nothing about it now.

I later saw the Red Cross Committee in SOLO and at 7 p.m. made broadcast of a strictly non-controversial nature, translation into Malay being read out by the announcer, after I had finished.

In order to ease the political situation both here and at DUNGA, I had ordered certain primary foodstuffs to be handed over by the Japanese to the National Committees at SOLO and DUNGA, a copy of my order is attached."

59. (D) Second Visit to JOGJAKARTI:

"At the request of the Sultan at DUNGA and the National Committee, I flew there in the afternoon and held a meeting with them. The sending of medical stores and food has caused a good impression and the airfield there is unmolested. There are three alternative courses of action regarding the Japanese naval personnel on the airfield:-

- a) Hand over the arms to the Sultan to be kept on behalf of the Allies.
- b) Send me a further British Air Force officer to accept the surrender of this personnel and to be responsible for these arms.
- c) Leave matters as they stand and hope for the best.

At the moment Corp. Frankish is at the airfield performing prodigies of diplomacy and P/Lt. Trigg flies there more or less daily. Frankish has the keys of the armoury with him, authorizes all flights on behalf of the Allies, has succeeded in rescuing 17 Navy personnel from the local jail, and, in fact, has arrogated to himself functions more normally held by a Wing Commander or Group Captain."

Deterioration of the Situation

61. In the meantime the struggle as to whether or not the Japanese were to retain their arms was continuing. Gen. Nakamura had by October 5th decided to throw in his hand with the Indonesians. The first incident regarding the disarming of the Japanese occurred on this day and resulted in the disarming of the garrison at SOERABAYA. The Japanese at JOGJAKARTI airfield, however, retained their weapons. Already at WERADESI fighting had broken out and seventeen Japanese been killed, the remainder being beleaguered by large crowds of Indonesians. As a result of this on the 5th October Mr. Wongsongoro, accompanied by the Regent of SEMARANG, called on me to try to secure my agreement to the peaceful handing over of the Japanese weapons. His visit was described in my DIARY dated the 5th October as follows:-

"The real reason for his visit was to try to get arms for the local Indonesian police in order 'that they should be able to control the mob by firing at it.' I pointed out the extreme unlikelihood of Indonesian police at that moment opening fire on any section of the Indonesian population, and I said that I had strict orders that the only people entitled to disarm the Japanese were the Allied Forces when they arrived. I explained to him the measures that I had taken locally to alleviate the tension of the situation, and that I would refer his request for arms to BATAVIA, but did not expect that it would be granted."

Similarly delegations from the local National Committee kept approaching me at all hours of the day and night on the same subject.

61. On the 6th Gen. Nakamura came to visit me and explained and apologized for the fighting which had taken place at JOGJAKARTA. To make the position perfectly clear I issued written instructions to him regarding the responsibility of the Japanese to take all measures in their power to retain their weapons. The text of this letter and that of the accompanying letter which I issued to Mr. Soeroso and Mr. Wongsongoro on the same subject are as follows:-

1. "Dear Mr. Soeroso, Ambarawa, 7/10/45.

HANDING OVER OF JAPANESE ARMS

I attach a copy of an instruction which I have issued to General Nakamura making quite clear the orders that have been received from the Supreme Allied Command, on the question of Japanese arms.

I already explained clearly what these orders were to Mr. Wongsongoro/day before yesterday and to /the local Indonesian officials late last night. I also explained measures I had taken locally by disarming my officers and by using Indonesian guards, to alleviate the political situation.

I can assure you that the Japanese will not now offer any provocative actions unless an attempt is made to take away their weapons by force.

I therefore request your full co-operation to ensure that such actions do not take place. If they do take place and bloodshed occurs, the responsibility can only now rest with officials of the Indonesian Republic.

Incidents and bloodshed must be avoided at any cost and I am certain you will agree with me, that if they occur, the cause which you represent may well be prejudiced after the arrival of the Allied Troops.

As you realize, the only people entitled to disarm the Japanese are the Allied Forces, whose instructions your Leaders at DJAKARTA have already agreed to obey. Any attempt, therefore, to disarm the Japanese locally, is a direct infringement of the order of the Supreme Allied Commander. -- (Sgd.) W.Cdr. T.S. Tull, Commanding No. 5 RANWI Contact Team."

2."

Ambarawa, 7/10/45.

HANDING OVER OF JAPANESE ARMS

The orders of the Supreme Allied Commander are quite clear regarding the responsibility of the Japanese Army to retain their arms until the arrival of the Allied Forces responsible for accepting the Japanese surrender. This means that the Japanese are, under no circumstances, to hand over weapons to any section of the population of Indonesia except on Allied orders.

The Japanese Army are to ensure that their troops and officials offer no kind of provocation to the local population. When isolated Japanese officers or soldiers move from place to place, in areas where it is likely that they may be disarmed, it is better that they should not carry weapons.

The Japanese Army are to see that their weapons are properly concentrated and efficiently guarded and are to take all measures within their power to ensure that they maintain control of these weapons.

Mr. Wongsongoro from SEMARANG and local Indonesian leaders have already approached this Headquarters on this subject and the Allied orders have been clearly explained.-- (Sgd.) W.Cdr. T.S. Tull, Commanding No. 5 RANWI Contact Team, AMBARAWA, MAGELANG."

62. So the struggle continued and for many days we were able to stay off the handing over of these weapons. Once they fell into the hands of the Indonesians, complete anarchy was likely to break out and the life of everyone would be horribly threatened.

63. In the meantime our other difficulties increased continuously. Road blocks appeared everywhere. Officers and M.C.O.'s were molested and searched; others were taken to the police station, where F/Lt. Ball in AMBARAWA and F/Lt. Trigg in MAGELANG carried out prolonged and difficult negotiation to secure their safe release. Our trucks were seized and the drivers of them disappeared when they went outside AMBARAWA or MAGELANG. Stores in transit were held up and distributed, and supplies of fresh foodstuffs to the camps gradually diminished as the Japanese lost the power to obtain and transport them safely. At every hour of the day and night there were some fresh troubles which required all our patience and steadfastness to solve. A similar situation had arisen in SEMARANG when Captain Wishart and his staff were extended to the full in trying to keep their organization going.

64. In AMBARAWA the trouble at first started on the 3rd October when a large scale riot took place which I reported as follows:-

"There was considerable trouble at AMBARAWA this morning, arising out of an incident where a Japanese soldier beat a young Indonesian boy. A large crowd armed with a variety of primitive weapons gathered outside the Red Cross Office and stoned it. I sent F/Lt. Ball to try and smooth over the situation but his car was taken away from outside the Red Cross Office in which he was investigating the situation and has not yet been recovered. I then sent Maj. Katch the Japanese Liaison Officer in my office, but he was attacked and disarmed receiving minor injuries on his head. I then went myself with an Indonesian doctor, Dr. Tjokro Atmodjo, who was visiting me on his way to SOLO with F/Lt. Halliday to collect medical stores. I talked to the crowd and what I said was translated, and they agreed for four delegates to search the Red Cross premises with me to show that the Japanese soldier was not hiding there. He was eventually found in the Toa Shokai (Distribution) office and got away quickly by car to the Indonesian police station, where he is safely incarcerated. I then proceeded to the police station before which the crowd had now regathered, got his uniform returned to Maj. Katch and after further speeches the crowd dispersed and Maj. Katch returned to my office. I agreed that if after investigation, the Japanese soldier was found at fault, he would be punished, but not by the Indonesians."

65. On the 5th a band of armed Indonesians broke into our office, in my absence, disarmed the Japanese and held up the rest of the staff. F/Lt. Ball by his tact and coolness averted a nasty situation and eventually handed them (the Indonesians) over to the Chief of Police.

66. From that time until the 10th the trouble was continuous. On the 10th a full scale boycott originally intended for the 1st, broke out. By then, however, we had been able to take certain alleviating measures in the whole area, agreed upon by Captain Wishart and me. These were as follows:-

- a) Disarming all British and Dutch staff of RAPWI.
- b) No National flags of any description be flown by RAPWI personnel.
- c) All APWI personnel confined to camps both day and night.
- d) (In AMBARAWA and MAGELANG) Indonesian guards placed alongside the Japanese guards of the camps.
- e) Indonesian police to escort all trucks moving outside the AMBARAWA area (this arrangement broke down after two or three days)
- f) I had removed Lt. Senger, my Dutch Liaison Officer, who was looking after our interests at MAGELANG and he was replaced by F/Lt. Trigg from JOGJAKARTA early in October.

67. These measures could only delay the final crisis and not stop it. In my SITREP of the 11th October I reported as follows:-

" The trouble is that the younger elements are completely out of control (B.K.R. and ex-HEHO and gangs of boys and released criminals led by former jail warders) and the National Committee and the Chief of Police are unable to control them, even if they wanted to. There was a bad burglary from Camp 8 last night and also from the compound of my house. Beatings of Eurasians, of Javanese, who are not whole-hearted for the revolt, and of others, are taking place. Within a week or ten days, the situation will be completely out of hand, despite the help that leaders sometimes give us.....

In all cases the reason given for the action taken by the Indonesians, is stated to be the violent feelings roused with the Indonesians by the arrival of Dutch troops and M I C A in Java. From the point of view of our work, the sending of these troops at the moment is most inopportune and should any danger or injury occur to the women and children under my care, I cannot really be held responsible now. Needless to say, we will do our best to protect and help them but this becomes more difficult every day."

The estimate of a week or ten days was in fact accurate, since the first shot was fired in AMBARAWA nine days later.

The Final Crisis at SEMARANG and ALBARAWA

68. Matters soon reached a climax when on October 13th I paid a second visit to JOGJAKARTA. I was able to stall for a few days longer there regarding the disarming of the Japanese on JOGJAKARTA airfield. On my return Gen. Nakamura requested an interview and informed me that he had been "forced" to hand over all arms in MAGELANG. I already know this and could do little beyond pointing out that I was not satisfied that he had been "forced" and that his action was a direct contravention of the Supreme Allied Commander's order. About the same time the Japanese Commander in SOERABARTA was jockeyed into a position where he had to allow his garrison to be disarmed, although it was much against his will.

Developments in AMBARAWA

69. The final crisis occurred at first light on October 14th and the sequence of events is clearly shown in the following quotation from my SITREP of the 19th:-

(i)" I was awakened by a telephone call at 0630 hours from the Japanese interpreter at SEMARANG that the whole RAPWI and Red Cross staff and all Europeans and Eurasians outside the camps, had been put in jail. Later first Captain Soltau and then in the evening Captain Wishart were released. I was able to telephone Soltau and asked him to try and secure the release of Corp. Thurlow from my staff who had been carrying mail to SEMARANG that morning and a hundred thousand guilders to be exchanged, and had presumably been captured. We destroyed all compromising documents (i.e. SITREPS) and advised everyone to move into the camps, except the RAPWI staff, which most of them did. We also distributed all our funds and surplus Red Cross stores to the camps. I visited the National Committee and claimed diplomatic status for my house and my office.

I received information that day of a plan formed by the Extremists whose H.Q. is in the jail, to deprive the camps of food and water until such time as the Dutch were removed from BATAVIA and BANDOENG. I summoned my

"Japanese Liaison Officer, Maj. Katoh, and confirmed with him the truth of this report and the seriousness of the situation, requesting him to do his duty in assisting us, despite the orders he had received from Gen. Nakamura. He agreed to help in every way possible and, as later events proved, his help was most effective. The only thing that stood between us here and complete anarchy, was the presence of 200 Japanese, of which 100 were armed. In SEMARANG similarly, there was a garrison of 500, who had still got their arms. He said he would discuss the matter with other Japanese officers and then would form a plan, but that I must trust him to take the wisest course open to them. (Since I had claim on Maj. Katoh, having previously rescued him from the mob and got him back his sword and uniform, I believed in his sincerity).

During that night the Red Cross lorries were stolen and other cars and drivers disappeared and there were constant disturbances and arrests which we were powerless to stop.

(ii) Monday 15th Oct. The following morning at dawn, I was awakened by a delegation of Japanese officers, who informed me that fighting had already broken out in SEMARANG, but that with the small number of troops at their disposal they could not protect the camps and were therefore, going to surrender. The bungalow was then surrounded by armed Indonesians and they were carried off. Shortly afterwards, the Chairman of the National Committee phoned me to tell me that three lorry loads of Japanese troops had left for SEMARANG and had broken through the barricades at AMBARAWA, killing one Indonesian and wounding three. There was a state of a complete chaos in AMBARAWA with people being dragged off to jail and widespread looting. All the Japanese and RAPWI vehicles were taken away, mainly to the jail.

I went with Mrs. Lotichius, my secretary, to the Headquarters of the National Committee and saw the Chairman, Dr. Wiroreno and other members including Dr. Soesman. They thought that I had sent the troops to SEMARANG, which was in a sense true, since I had given the Japanese clear orders to retain their weapons and protect us. The National Committee cross-questioned me at great length on this point but I was able eventually to satisfy them. In the meantime, the second line troops, totalling over two hundred were removed to the jail, where they were exposed to every form of ill treatment and one of them murdered in cold blood.

These events had taken place without the knowledge of the National Committee. I explained to them that the safety and health of the people in the camps was now an Indonesian responsibility and should any harm befall anyone their Cause would be discredited in the eyes of the world and there would be a terrible vengeance from the Allied troops. The moderates on the Committee, with whom I was dealing, agreed with this, admitted that there was a state of anarchy and helped me to get away F/Lt. Ball to MAGELANG, whence he would fly to BATAVIA to inform RAPWI H.Q. of our plight.

At the same time we decided to try and get the train of sick and convalescent internees away to MAGELANG, since an action of that kind would tend to restore confidence and normal conditions. This was a grave risk to take but it was justified in the event. My own car and two lorries were all we could raise and through the devoted work of the five ladies on my staff, who stayed loyally at their posts, 97 people were evacuated, including over 40 stretcher

"cases. Dr. Wirreno and Dr. Soesman, to their own great personal risk, went with the train to ensure that it got through. In the meantime light and water had been cut off from the camps and food stores were being looted. In Camp 9 (BANJOEBIROE) particularly, which has no wells, the situation was very grave. I drove Mr. Suffii, a member of the National Committee round all the camps and the same evening lights went on and the following day water had begun to come through intermittently. Telephone communications with the outside world were now impossible. That evening Sgt. Thomsit came down from MAGELANG to take F/Lt. Ball's place.

I went to the office which had been barred up and got away our safe and files, the safe containing half a million guilders. Captain van Gelder, Head of the Executive section of my staff with three other members were also put in jail. Mr. Jilderda and two other men from the Red Cross office were taken away to jail. A Dutch doctor, 6 medical orderlies doing night duty in the local Indonesian hospital, plus two walking patients (men) were also incarcerated. Eight mechanics from Camp 8 were taken away to jail, presumably to maintain the vehicles stolen by the Indonesians.

(iii) Tuesday 16th Oct. By now we had an Indonesian Food office started with Mrs. A. Scharrenberg from my own staff, working on it. A limited number of outside food supplies were got into the camps, but there was constant trouble caused by the looting of camp food stores. Most camps had had the sense to disperse their food inside the camps, but Camp 9 had left theirs in the former Japanese office and a large part of it was looted, before we were able to arrange that it should be moved into the camp. The other major difficulty of that day was an attempt made by the Indonesians to remove all the male staff from the women's camps. In Camp 8 they had already rounded up all the men under a large armed guard attended by a horde of bamboo boys when I arrived, having previously protested to the National Committee. I told the Indonesians guarding these men, that the Committee had agreed to their staying in the camps (which was not true) and then ordered the men back to work. The bluff succeeded and the Indonesians did not open fire on us. Later a compromise was reached with the National Committee and Camp 8 was searched for weapons by a small party which included Sgt. Thomsit.

By now it was clear what the Japanese plan to help us had been. They were offering the maximum resistance in SEMARANG and the battle there which was very fierce, drew off large parties of B.K.R. from as far afield as AMBARAWA, MAGELANG, DJOCJAKARTA and SOLO. At the same time, before leaving, the Japanese had let it be known that after winning in SEMARANG, they would return to AMBARAWA to reestablish law and order. The result of this was that the bad elements concentrated about 10 kilometers from AMBARAWA in an enormous road block to stop the return of the Japanese. I do not know what has happened to the camps in SEMARANG but it is at least possible that the Indonesians were too occupied to molest them (this was in fact true). One hundred and twenty-three Japanese casualties have been reported and it is presumed that the Indonesian casualties were very much heavier. A certain amount of vegetables, eggs and fuel was again sent to the camps.

(iv) Wednesday 17th Oct. The water at BANJOEBIROE was again cut off but after negotiations was turned on again. The food stores of Camp 6 were looted, but the bulk of the food had already been removed into the camp, only a small amount having been left as a blind. Mr. Suffii has promised to ensure that the looted food is ultimately, by devious ways, returned. I attempted to go into the jail to see the prisoners but was forcibly stopped and taken to the police station

"from which I eventually secured my release. I let it be known that if anything happened to the prisoners, the Allied troops would take most severe action when they arrived. We also arranged with Mr. Suffii, that the feeding of the prisoners in jail (totalling now over 750 including Japanese, Dutch and Eurasians) would be carried out by his office, in addition to the work of this office for the camps.

(v) Thursday 18th Oct. We received permission for a further sick transport to go to MAGELANG and 193 people were safely evacuated. Again we had only one passenger car and two lorries. The bulk of these people were taken from BANJOEBLING and their transportation was carried out by Sgt. Thomsit and the ladies on my staff.

I myself managed to get through to MAGELANG, though at this stage there were nearly eighty road blocks on the way. Conditions there are still calm and two enormous the hospitals functioning admirably. Trigg is doing good work there and Mr. Soeroso has kept his promise that there would be no "second Sourabaya" at MAGELANG. Trigg explained to me the surrender of arms at DJOCJAKARTA airfield and, although I myself have never agreed to the Japanese handing over a single weapon, I think the compromise that Trigg effected was the wisest course. Information that the garrison at SOLO had already surrendered, which I had heard some days previously, was also received.

I saw Dr. Tjokro Atmodjo and was able to stave off any further concessions by mentioning the near arrival of Allied troops.

A Catalina dropped pamphlets over the camps and town regarding the arrival of Allied troops in SEMARANG and the establishment of Allied Military Government. It was also announced over the radio that they had already arrived at AMBARAWA, but so far I had not succeeded in tracing any, except Sgt. Thomsit and myself.

When troops arrive here, the main problem will be the jail, which is an old fort offering strong defensive possibilities, in which there are large concentrations of armed criminals and B.M.R. and which has already been heavily defended. The best policy would be, without any negotiations, to attack the jail immediately and try to establish entry to it, otherwise the 750 prisoners in it, will be used as hostages and this may prevent the speedy establishment of law and order."

70. Such was the situation by the time the first Allied troops arrived in SEMARANG. F/Lt. Ball had been able to reach BATAVIA safely and Lt. Trigg, on his own initiative in case F/Lt. Ball was not successful in getting through, had sent the Dutch Officer, Lt. Koreimer. These two officers between them had persuaded the British and Dutch authorities respectively of the very great danger that confronted the 20,000 internees in Mid-Java. As a result of this a battalion of infantry 3/10 Gurkha Rifles under Lt. Colonel Edwards had been the diverted to SEMARANG. On their arrival in SEMARANG, they advanced in tactical formations into the town and after some brisk fighting with the Japanese before the identity of each party was established, had eventually found themselves in control with their Headquarters in the Governor's palace.

Developments in SEMARANG.

71. The situation in SEMARANG had developed favourably for the Allies. The Japanese opened the fighting themselves, attacking a few hours before they were due to be attacked. At first the fighting proceeded without any great casualties on either side, until the Japanese succeeded in recapturing the jail where nearly two hundred of their own number, who had been disarmed a few days previously, were incarcerated. They found there a scene of indescribable horror. Over one hundred and thirty Japanese had been butchered in cold blood and horribly mutilated.

They had been concentrated in four or five large cells and the enemy had cut them down and shot them with every variety of weapons. Some corpses were hanging from the roofs and from the windows. At this stage the Japanese went fighting mad. They swept through the town, regardless of dangers or their own losses like one of the Mongolian hordes of Genghiz Khan or Tamerlane. They took no prisoners and everyone with arms or suspected of carrying arms was captured and killed. Whole lorry loads of prisoners with their hands tied behind their backs were driven out into the countryside and never heard of again. As the numbers of captured weapons increased they armed the Japanese civilians and those soldiers who did not possess weapons until their fighting forces reached the total of over 1100. In the course of fighting over two thousand Indonesians were killed. This figure was authentic since I obtained it not only from the Japanese but also from reliable Indonesian sources, who had no reason or inclination to exaggerate their defeat.

72. In the course of their fighting the Japanese, who fought with incredible gallantry despite losses which with most troops would have been prohibitive, in all cases protected the internment camps from molestation and released numerous Dutch and Eurasian captives from the jail. There were no casualties of any description in the camps.

73. The effect of this savage battle on AMBARAWA was to draw off the bad elements to a large concentration at OENGARAN where they established extensive road blocks in order to prevent the Japanese from advancing on AMBARAWA to fulfil their threats of cleaning it up. Although therefore looting and rioting still continued, it never reached those violent proportions that it might otherwise have done.

74. The events of the following two days are recorded in my SITREP of 23rd October, which needs no explanation:-

(i) " Friday 19th Oct. The condition remained very much the same, every kind of difficulty being put in our way by the local Indonesians. The jail is still barricaded and I am not allowed any access to it. I was, however, able to get a letter through to Captain van Gelder, Head of the Executive section on my staff, promising him that assistance was on its way.

(ii) Saturday 20th Oct. Having heard that the troops had arrived at SEMARANG, and in fact that Mr. Wongsonegoro had summoned the leaders of the National Committee at AMBARAWA to go to a conference in SEMARANG, I decided to go myself with them. I met them half way but they were afraid to go on further since there was a large Japanese force blocking the southern exit from SEMARANG. I therefore went on alone with a single Indonesian policeman and eventually got through the Indonesian and Allied lines and reported to Col. Edwards. He was prepared to send a company of troops on an extended reconnaissance, but at that time the situation was so bad here, that I preferred to have merely a platoon as a token force, since a company alone could never have disarmed the Indonesians and established law and order, while at the same time protecting the camps. I arranged for this platoon to come the following morning and took back with me Capt. Mount from Col. Edwards' staff, so that he could escort the Indonesians for a conference at SEMARANG.

I returned safely and went around the BANJOEBIROE camps with Capt. Mount and we got a very good reception from the internees. On the way back we were stopped by a party of armed B.K.R. engaged on looting and rioting, explained that we were English officers (there was a Union Jack over the bonnet), but as we drove off we were fired at. The bullet unfortunately did not kill a B.K.R. man to whom we had given a lift but went through the petrol tank. Mrs. Lotichius, who acts as interpreter for me, was also in the car. Shortly afterwards my

"house was invaded by the B.K.R., but we managed to get rid of them without incident.

I explained the situation very fully to Capt. Mount who took back a list of demands that I wished Col. Edwards to make on my behalf with the Indonesians. The main point in these demands was to get the Dutch and Eurasian men out of jail. Subsidiary points were that the Indonesians were still responsible for law and order, that the Allied troops were only there to help RAPWI and would only open fire in self-defence. Any attack on them would be considered an act of war.

I also explained to Capt. Mount the need of keeping Japanese forces, south of the city of SEMARANG, armed as a constant threat to the Indonesians here who are in mortal dread of the Japanese since the SEMARANG battle."

75. Lt. Harcastle arrived with his platoon on the 21st October and was safely installed in the Red Cross building next to my house without incident.

Conclusion

It will be realized from the above account which ends with the arrival of about forty Gurkhas in AMBARAWA, the remainder of the battalion being heavily occupied in SEMARANG, that the key to our safety, which lay with the Japanese, had been well and truly used. If the Japanese had not fought, the same kind of atrocities as occurred in SOURABAYA would have befallen the internees in SEMARANG and AMBARAWA. Moreover the small force of British, the purpose of whose coming was in no doubt since pamphlets had been extensively dropped both in SEMARANG and AMBARAWA before their arrival, stating that they were going to disarm the Japanese, would possibly have met with the same fate as the 49th Brigade in SOURABAYA. Since their number was so small they might well have been isolated and decimated. As it was, the Gurkhas in SEMARANG met with a favourable reception since their coming meant the end of the Japanese fighting.

77. Our main difficulty throughout this stage was our complete isolation. My W/T link to the Cocos Islands had been closed down since 5th October, despite my urgent representations to Mastiff Control, Group "B", Force 136 that it should be retained for emergency use, since telephone lines were cut and the situation becoming increasingly critical. It was not resumed until October 25th after F/Lt. Ball had taken spare crystals to BATAVIA and opened a link with N.O. 23 Division. F/Lt. Trigg flew over the area daily from MAGELANG and dropped local messages or mail which we were sometimes able to collect before the Indonesians got them. Otherwise until I managed to get through to MAGELANG and instituted a daily mail run by a British N.C.O., we were completely cut off and MAGELANG was almost as bad a way as ourselves.

78. The situation of the British Staff became increasingly dangerous, since it was widely known that I had ordered the Japanese to fight, if necessary, to retain their weapons. It was suspected also that I had engineered the fighting in SEMARANG and as the fighting thus became more bitter, the power of the moderates to protect our bogus diplomatic immunity and defend us from the extremists became very doubtful. The lid finally nearly blew off when the pamphlets were dropped on AMBARAWA before the arrival of Allied Forces.

79. During this harrowing period the conduct of all those under my command was irreproachable. In AMBARAWA where only the British could move around freely, Sgt. Thomsit in the absence of F/Lt. Ball, acted as my second in command and performed invaluable services. The ladies of my staff, particularly Mrs. H. Lotichius and Mrs. A. Scharrenberg, refused to return to the camps and continued working in conditions of great danger. The Dutch military personnel in the camps, although unarmed, continued with their difficult tasks of keeping the camps going despite every kind of difficulty, interference and danger and set a very fine example to those under them. In particular, Lt. Commander Zeewald, R.N.N., Lt. Nuver, R.N.N., Captain van den Arend and Lt. Wotboom, performed valuable services. The

lady Camp Commanders showed great determination and courage, notably Mrs. Jilderda and Mrs. De la Rambalij; but above all the patience and courageous acceptance of their difficulties and dangers by the women in the camps themselves would, had we needed it, have acted as an inspiration to us all and kept us steadfast in our duty.

Part Three

A PERIOD OF UNLAWFUL TRUCE
21st October - 21st November.

Arrival of British Troops at AMBARAWA

80. The arrival of a small platoon under Lt. Harcastle gave immediate improvement in the situation. They brought with them five 15-cwt. trucks and helped us in a variety of tasks round the camps and in the evacuations which were still taking place to MAGELANG. Whenever there was trouble a section of them appeared as if by magic on the spot and took up tactical positions in the threatened area. The Indonesians had not yet been fully prepared for a clash with fighting troops and were uncertain what attitude to adopt. So it will be seen that the section was used more as a diplomatic weapon than as a fighting force, since it was impossible with such a small number to give them any guard duty other than that of protecting their own base. The Indonesian guards continued at the camps but their lawlessness became less of a nuisance.

81. Similarly in SEMARANG the Indonesians were only too glad to have a respite in which to collect and bury their dead and lick their wounds.

Visits of Press Correspondents

82. During the whole of the previous three weeks practically the only weapon which I could use was the threat of world opinion. I was not able to put this threat into effect. A party of Press Correspondents consisting of Mr. A. Vesey (The Chicago Times), Mr. T. Vairhold (The Sydney Times), Mr. R. Osbiston (The Sydney Daily Mirror), Mr. G. Coniston (The New York Times) and Mr. Frank Rostron (The Daily Express) had contacted me whilst I was in SEMARANG and I arranged with them to visit us. The very great help that they gave is described in my SITREP for the 21st and 22nd October:-

(i)" I explained the whole situation to them (i.e. the Press Correspondents) and the manner in which I had been using the press as a weapon with the moderate leaders. They backed me up at a meeting with the Indonesians which had a very good effect. They also visited the camps. I arranged with them to come up the following day, since the situation was deteriorating in MAGELANG, and I thought a visit by them would give some backing to my negotiations. In MAGELANG practically all the transport from the hospital had been taken away and numerous arrests carried out.

(ii) Monday 22nd Oct. The Chairman of the National Committee and Dr. Soesman visited me and explained that a large meeting would take place at eight o'clock, so that the agreement reached between them and Col. Edwards could be explained to the people. The meeting took place and was attended by 3,000 people, but was quite orderly. At its conclusion the Press Correspondents arrived just as we were leaving for the jail to secure the release of RAPWI and Red Cross workers. They accompanied me and my escort to the jail, where we found the Dutch and Eurasian prisoners living in indescribable squalor. They had been exposed to every form of ill treatment and there were many sick and wounded among them. The fact that the jail was visited by War Correspondents gave me a very powerful lever in dealing with the Indonesians and I ordered the immediate release of all the sick and wounded.

"Seventy-nine people were released and placed in Camp 7 and a few in Camp 6.

- (iii) Immediately afterwards F/Lt. Ball arrived, having been detained at BANDOENG.
- (iv) I left with the Press Correspondents and an escort of Gurkhas for MAGELANG, where I summoned the Resident and the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the National Committee to the hotel for a conference. I explained the situation was deteriorating in MAGELANG and we were concerned at this, and that if things went worse, we would be obliged to put in a large force of troops immediately. I told them, however, that I appreciated the help that they had given us up till now, but it was obvious that they could no longer control the younger elements adequately. They agreed to release the prisoners from the jails under arrangements with F/Lt. Trigg and also to receive a platoon of Gurkhas whose function would be to help F/Lt. Trigg in the same manner as my platoon are helping me. We then visited the two hospitals. As we were leaving Corp. Frankish flew from DJOCJAKARTA and stated that the Indonesians were preparing to take over the airfield and exact vengeance on the disarmed Japanese there for the heavy casualties in SEMARANG.
- (v) In addition to the trouble at DJOCJAKARTA, there is also considerable trouble at SOLO, the Red Cross Committee there, sending me daily telegrams asking for me to visit them. There are, at least, 400 Dutch people there and I propose to go there within the next two days in order to safeguard their interests. They went there mainly from my camps, all except thirty of them before I arrived."

33. The successful bluff which enabled us to release a grand total of over 470 people from the jail, with only twenty Gurkhas guarding our base and twenty escorting us, caused a tremendous improvement in the morale of the internees, for many of the women had relatives among the prisoners and it was widely known that there were over two hundred armed Indonesians in the jail. From this time forward there was never any question of ALPWI orders to the camps being disobeyed and, although it meant considerable hardship, internees seldom again infringed my order confining them to the camps day and night. It was still not safe to send these prisoners back to their homes, so they were lodged in Camp 7, which had room for them after all the convalescents had been evacuated to MAGELANG.

34. The position now was that gradually I was able to hand over most of my diplomatic and intelligence duties to the soldiers. Initially Lt. Hardcastle and his platoon had been placed under my command. On 24th October the rest of the Company of which this platoon formed their part arrived in AMBARAWA and Lt. Hardcastle moved with his men to MAGELANG, to carry out duties there similar to those which he had performed with me. Major Meikle commanded his own troops but, until the outbreak of the fighting, was placed under my policy direction. I was, however, left with a large discretion for negotiations both inside and outside AMBARAWA by Colonel Edwards and later by Brigadier Bethell after the arrival of the C.R.A.'s Brigade. The negotiations outside AMBARAWA were mainly conducted with a view to securing the release of isolated pockets of internees

General Situation

35. The general situation at this time can be seen from my SITREP of the 24th October:-

" This morning early I phoned F/Lt. Trigg and confirmed that the transport had arrived safely at MAGELANG and that the people were installed in the convalescent centre without

"incident. He has also managed already to secure the release of some of the Dutch and Eurasians who were thrown in jail during the last few days and was hoping to get back some of his transport to-day. Lt. Hardcastle held a flag hoisting parade watched by a large number of Indonesians without incident.

This morning Major Meikle and I released 279 Japanese prisoners from the ALBARA jail and sent them under armed escort to SEMARANG. One of the Japanese prisoners had been killed and several badly injured.

The release of a further two hundred Dutch, Eurasian and Ambonese prisoners from the ALBARA jail is taking place at the moment to Camp No. 7. The situation of the families of the Eurasian and Ambonese prisoners is critical, since they are entirely without food and the boycott prevents them from making purchases in town. A certain amount of rice from the camps has been distributed to them and I am making arrangements for them to be listed by the Red Cross.

The food situation in the camps remains adequate and they can keep going on their existing stores for a further fortnight or three weeks. After that time the position will become very difficult since there is a general scarcity in AMBARA and the area. The National Committee is endeavouring to arrange importation of rice or other food stuffs from other places such as BANDOENGAN and held a meeting there yesterday to discuss the position.

There are now considerably fewer armed men in the vicinity. I received a deputation of the National Committee in my house late last night and it is obvious that no resistance is being planned now in this area, but that arms and vehicles are being withdrawn to

- a) MAGELANG and then to DJOCJAKARTA, the latter of which will be their main resistance centre.
- b) certain places in the hills from which guerilla warfare is being planned.

The Japanese have prepared for themselves internment camps in places like SOERONGNO, which, of course, are still under an armed Japanese guard and it is possible also that resistance will be carried out from these places unless they are quickly taken over by the Allies. Immediately prior to Gen. Nakamura's surrender to the Indonesians, a large number of trucks were employed in transporting stores etc., to these areas. On one occasion we saw truck loads of comfort girls moving away for the delectation of the troops.

The other main resistance centre will be SOERAKARTA (SOLO). Mr. Soeroso, who for a few days was Governor of Mid-Java, from MAGELANG, after his success in winning over Gen. Nakamura, was appointed High Commissioner of the Indonesian Republic for SOLO and DJOCJAKARTA. Mr. Soeroso is an extremely capable man and a well-known extremist from pre-war days. It seems that he was selected for his new post in order to co-ordinate the insurrection, from these two areas, where the bulk of the Japanese arms are concentrated.

I attach a copy of Cpl. Frankish's report on the surrender of the DJOCJAKARTA airfield. It is difficult to say how many people have been interned from here by the Nationalists. The number of 1500 is mentioned and if this includes Eurasians and Ambonese, it is probably accurate. The number of pure Dutch does not, I think, exceed a hundred, from DJOCJAKARTA, but a fortnight ago I received information that two hundred Dutch civilians who had left the camps in the BANDOENGAN area without permission, were in grave distress at some place sixty kilometers south-west or west of DJOCJAKARTA. I endeavoured at a meeting with

"the Sultan of DJOCJAKARTA and the National Committee to secure safe conduct for F/Lt. Trigg there, they promised to provide it but when he arrived there next day he was not met and could not get any assistance."

86. Cpl. Frankish's final report on events at DJOGJAKARTA is given below so that the excellent work carried out by this N.C.O. can be appreciated.

"

SITUATION IN DJOCJAKARTA

On 22nd October I arrived at NAGOEWA airfield at approximately 1630 hours and found on arrival that, shortly before I arrived, several truck loads of heavily armed Indonesians had confronted the Japanese Navy Policemen who were on duty at the main entrance.

They delivered an ultimatum, that unless all the men and equipment were surrendered to them immediately every man would be shot. Commander Hagano, knowing that it was important that the aerodrome did not fall into Indonesian hands, ordered that four aircraft should be immediately bombed up. This was carried out immediately. His plan was to attack the Indonesians before they could occupy the airstrip area. I was informed by him of the situation and his wish was that I fly immediately to MAGELANG to report the situation to F/Lt. Trigg. I took off shortly after 1700 hours and was fired at as I left. The other four aircraft left soon after.

The Indonesians, however, attacked from the area of the railway immediately behind the airfield building. They quickly intermingled with the Japanese ground crews and therefore the aircraft were unable to bomb. Also they feared reprisals on their own men if they did so.

The Japanese were unarmed, for, as you know, the weapons were handed over four days ago when we received an assurance that this would guarantee the safety of the airfield. Knowing this the Indonesians apparently thought that the time was right for them to fight the type of battle to which they are most suited. As the last aircraft left the area the destroying of the remainder of the aircraft by the Indonesians had begun. Every available pilot, five in all, brought away an aircraft. These flew to MAGELANG, still complete with bombs, and landed there. F/Lt. Trigg was able to arrange a uniformed police guard on the aircraft. The pilots slept in RAPWI houses and by 0630 all five aircraft were in the air and flew to SEMARANG where all landed successfully.

A Japanese technical officer, the only Navy man who survived uninjured the prison slaughter, was quickly contacted and taken to SEMARANG airfield. He was able to make a quick inspection of the aircraft and to find fuel and other necessities. These five aircraft are flying to BANDOENG, there to undergo a long overdue inspection and then, when this is completed they will return to SEMARANG and ~~will~~ themselves in readiness there. In all, seven aircraft will shortly be at the disposal of RAPWI.

The situation at DJOCJA, before my somewhat hurried exit, was that the Dutch male civilians, with the exception of the over fifties have been removed to two sugar factories between DJOCJA and the coast. I have reliable information that one of the camps, POENDOENG, is a bad malarial area, and, so far as my informant ~~knows~~, the knows water supply is negligible. The women and children left in the town are at the mercy of organized looters, amongst whom are released prisoners, robbers, murderers etc., and are still forbidden to buy food. Besides this, very few have any money.

old

" The majority of my personal kit remains in DJOCJA as well as my automatic, I hope to be able at the first opportunity to re-enter DJOCJA in a very different manner from the one in which I left.

I hope my actions have met with your approval.
I remain, Sir, your obedient servant.

(Sgd.) Frankish Cpl."

Final Visit to
SOERAKARTA

87. A few days later on the 27th October I carried out my final mission to SOERAKARTA. I went there as Brigadier Bethell's official representative accompanied by Mr. Wongsonogoro, the Governor of Mid-Java, Lt. Commander Leland and Mrs. Lotichius, my Japanese interpreter, since I intended if possible to contact the Japanese garrison commander at SOERAKARTA, Lt. Col. Mase. Lt. Commander Leland was to act as my Dutch interpreter and to hold a watching brief on behalf of the C.R.A. Since this visit had important results, the text of my report is quoted more or less in full as follows:-

(i)" In accordance with Brigadier Bethell's orders, I visited the Authorities at SOLO as his representative, in order

- a) to ensure that the 400 Dutch ex-internees in SOLO were being properly looked after
- b) to ensure that the Eurasian/Ambonese population was not being terrorized
- c) to discover the present location and strength of the Japanese
- d) to report generally on the political and military situation.

We were received officially by Mr. Soeroso, High Commissioner for the Indonesian Republic at SOLO and DJOCJA and by about forty other representatives of the B.K.R., the T.K.R., the ANKRATAN MOEDA and the National Committee. The Soesochoenan was also present but in a very subordinate capacity.

(ii) PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AT SOLO: My Medical and Red Cross staff have paid frequent visits to SOLO and assisted the Red Cross Committee in every way. This Committee is extremely representative and was functioning well when we last had news of it. We secured thirty truck loads of medical stores from the Japanese supply dumps at SOLO to equip the new hospital at MAGELANG and for distribution to Indonesian medical agencies as a political gesture.

I visited SOLO twice.....(These visits have been described in Part Two of this report and will not be repeated here.)

On the 12th October Mr. Rod, Head of the Red Cross, came through by car to report that the Japanese had lost control of their weapons and stores. Col. Mase, commanding the Japanese forces at SOLO, had tried repeatedly to get through to me for help but without success. "Thereafter almost daily I received telegrams from Mr. Rod asking for me to come and for help.

(iii) PRESENT SITUATION: As a result of the meeting with the Indonesian leaders referred to in Para 1 and subsequent visits paid by us to the Red Cross office, internment camps and hospital and later to the Japanese internment camp, near BOJOLALI, the following conclusions regarding the present situation have been reached.

- a) Dutch ex-internees: These are all safe and being well looked after. Male Dutch civilians have been interned in the former H.Q. of the Kompeitai, in conditions very much better than the camps at AMBARAWA. The Indonesians argued that it was in their own interests that they should be concentrated and there is some

- " truth in that.
- b) Red Cross Organization: This has been protected by the Indonesians and is still functioning admirably. I agreed to provide them with certain medical stores, both for their own and Indonesian uses, which are in short supply.
 - c) Eurasian and Ambonese: Male Eurasians and Ambonese have also been interned in the Kempeitai H.Q. Their families are not boycotted, and are allowed to visit them.
 - d) Gilingan Camp: A small internment camp which has survived from the Japanese regime, was discovered, in which there are about 280 women and children, of Eurasian or Ambonese origin, constituting for the most part families of men who had been interned by the Japanese elsewhere. This is really more a poor house than an internment camp. The people in it are safe and forty of the women work in the Red Cross organization and others are employed on weaving in the town.
 - e) Location of Japanese Forces: Two thousand two hundred of the Japanese garrison are located at Baras Tampir (?) near BOJOLALI. They have retained sufficient of their arms for guard duties, although the Indonesians claim that external guarding is their responsibility. They have three months' supply of food and are self-supporting in all respects. They do not, I think, constitute a menace to anyone and the problem of moving them elsewhere can be delayed until a later date. The other 800 making up the SOLO garrison are stayed by Col. Mase to have been ordered by Gen. Iwabe, to SOURABAYA and elsewhere, prior to the breaking up of Japanese power in SOLO. There are forty-three Japanese officials of the Kempeitai in jail at SOLO whom I think we should move elsewhere and can do this next Monday, if Allied H.Q. agree. Two Kempeitai officers were killed and over a dozen others unaccounted for.

Major

(iv)" The circumstances of the Japanese capitulation can be summed up as follows:- At the time of the capitulation there were over two thousand armed Indonesians in SOLO including drafts from DJOCJA and elsewhere, whose weapons were already handed over. The Japanese Commander was ordered by the political officers, who had formerly been in charge of the administration, to attend a conference at their H.Q. and was promised safe conduct. While there the whole H.Q. was surrounded by armed Indonesians and his own H.Q. and barracks were also similarly surrounded. Col. Mase did his best to stave off the crisis but was powerless. Eventually he was forced to agree to the Indonesians taking over the guarding of the city. No mention was made regarding the handing over of weapons. On his return to his H.Q. he was followed in by bands of armed Indonesians who started taking away weapons and ammunition and he was unable to stop it. In all, the Indonesians took away two thousand rifles, ten machine guns and a few small mortars and armoured tractors. There was a small arsenal and ammunition dump containing other weapons which were also lost. The estimate that I gave previously that there were a total of six thousand firearms of all kinds in SOLO, is probably not far wrong, since numerous isolated pockets of Japanese were disarmed anywhere

"within fifty miles and the weapons had flowed into SOLO. Moreover certain police and native Auxiliary troops and other officials had been armed by the Japanese before the end of the war.

(v) GENERAL, POLITICAL and MILITARY SITUATION: SOLO and DJOCJA are the main centres of extremist resistance but the Headquarters of the T.K.R. and other political and military organizations are all at DJOCJA. Mr. Soerose is a brilliant man and has both SOLO and DJOCJA completely under his control. He realizes that world opinion must not be offended and has played more or less fair regarding internees and the minority population, in the same way as he did at MAGELANG. He has now been only six days in SOLO, but the people are completely under his control and there is no looting or rioting. Mr. Soerose in conversation with me broadly hinted that anyone who tried to take over SOLO, including the Allies, would meet with armed resistance. This resistance will be fairly considerable and will be properly organized under competent military commanders. Already there are big road blocks being build and gun positions constructed on the outskirts of SOLO and BOJOLALI and also at ANPEL, which will be the scene of the first stand. The B.K.R., which was formerly an ill-disciplined mob, some equipped with arms which they did not know how to use and the rest with banboos, is gradually being absorbed in the TENTERA KEAMANAN RAJAT, i.e. the National Army, and this is being properly organized and trained on the Japanese model. We saw squads of boys undergoing recruits training with fervour and parties of trained and armed moving around the city in a disciplined manner.

The young Soesochoenan has been reduced in power and is a mere puppet exercising control of his palace and household only. He feels this humiliation very deeply, his Prime Minister having been kidnapped four days ago because of suspected NICA sympathies. During the luncheon Lt. Cdr. Leland sat next to the Soesochoenan, who informed him that the Nationalists were extremely annoyed with him for endeavouring to give assistance during the interpretation at the conference. He suggested that during the course of luncheon conversation between Lt. Cdr. Leland and himself should be kept to a minimum.

During luncheon Mr. Wongsonogoro mentioned that he had been severely taken to task for trying to stop the fighting in SEMARANG.

Mr. Soerose maintained that all the troubles in Java were caused by the arrival of NICA and Dutch troops and that once the Allies secured their expatriation from the island, everything would be quite peaceful. Until that time, Indonesian Nationalists must take all weapons and do everything in their power to defend their country.

On the economic side, Mr. Soerose is concerned about the devaluation of the Japanese currency and angled to obtain information about future financial policy of the Allies. I said I was not competent to speak on such matters but agreed with him that should it be reduced to a point where it has no value, there would be famine caused by the peasants holding on to their stocks. He also suggested that where the Allies took over the food-stuffs from the Indonesians, they should pay by bartering cloth.

(vi) CONCLUSION: On our return we were enabled with Mr. Wongsonogoro to visit the officials at SALATIGA. The two hundred Dutch ex internees in the hotel are quite safe and well looked after. I anticipate that those few Eurasians and others who have been interned, will shortly be released. The Red Cross Committee there is still functioning and receiving local assistance!

Decisions Taken by Allied Commander
In view of General Situation

88. Following on this report and meetings held with the C.R.A. and his staff at SEMARANG, the C.R.A. definitely adopted a very moderate policy towards the Indonesians and did not attempt to enforce the harsh terms laid down in the pamphlets dropped over SEMARANG and AMBARAWA before the arrival of the Allied troops. No attempt was made to take away vehicles stolen by the Indonesians, nor did the C.R.A. carry out the disarming of Indonesians in any of the areas occupied by Allied troops. Allied Forces were in fact insufficient properly to disarm the Indonesians, which would have involved a house to house search and would have precipitated hostilities. He insisted, however, that arms should only be carried by authorized police, B.K.R. or T.K.R. officials and that these should be properly listed. The C.R.A. himself and his staff established cordial relations with Mr. Wongsenogero and the leading Indonesians, as a result of which status quo was maintained for some weeks in SEMARANG and AMBARAWA at any rate.

89. The C.R.A. eventually followed the same policy with regard to the Japanese, which Col. Edwards had previously adopted. Initially he sent a whole ship load of Japanese out of SEMARANG to BATAVIA. He disarmed Major Kido and his garrison but allowed them to retain the guarding of their own armouries. The Allied Forces were very thin at this time and Major Kido and his gallant troops had proved their worth and loyalty effectively. Later when conditions became critical he was obliged to rearm them and call on them to assist in protecting the internees and refugees.

Gen. Hawthorn's Visit
to AMBARAWA

90. In the meantime the RAPWI office, once those members of the staff who had been jailed had recovered from their ordeal, had begun functioning again in AMBARAWA. The C.R.A. within a day or two of his arrival visited the camps at AMBARAWA and hospitals at MAGELANG and quickly appreciated the difficulties of the situation and the help that was required. On 30th October Maj. Gen. Hawthorn himself visited AMBARAWA and at a conference held that evening in SEMARANG future evacuation policy was decided. It was proposed to continue evacuating to MAGELANG and to build up the garrison there to battalion strength. It was also decided to take over the Japanese barracks in SEMARANG and send 1800 people from BANJOEBIROE to them, pending further disposal. It was also decided to form transit camps in SEMARANG for people waiting to be shipped away. Requests for additional M.T. and sanitary and engineering facilities were made, which were later implemented. Events in SOURABAYA were already reaching a climax, so it did not seem that it would be possible to evacuate further people there.

Food Supplies

91. One of the best results of our moderate policy in AMBARAWA and the cordial relations established with the Moderate Indonesians, was the success with which we were able to supply the camps with fresh food through the Indonesian Food Office in which a member of my staff was working. The situation gradually improved and the amounts and quality of the foodstuffs supplied are shown clearly in Appendix "C"

THE MAGELANG BATTLE

92. In the meantime the tragic events which were taking place in SOURABAYA were beginning to have their effect on the Mid-Java area. 49th Brigade had landed on October 25th. They had not, however, been briefed to regard their landing as an assault operation, but instead had split up into small parties to occupy key points in the harbour, airfield and town. Before their supplies could be

transported to them from the docks, the Indonesians whose attitude had been made even more hostile by yet another ill-timed dropping of pamphlets, attacked them in force. There were over 15,000 armed Indonesians in the town and heavy casualties were caused to our troops, who eventually had to submit to an ignominious truce. The APWI in SOURABAYA also suffered terribly, receiving many casualties on the spot. Many hundreds of them also were driven out of the town and had not been heard of since. The Indonesians wildly proclaimed this to be a major victory and urged their brethren in Mid-Java to adopt the same fighting policy. The extremists at JOGJAKARTA, whose leaders had played a large part in causing the events in SOURABAYA, needed little prompting. Hardly three companies of the 3/10 Gurkhas had arrived at MAGELANG before the garrison was attacked, many hundreds of "PEKOEDAS" having infiltrated into the town from the direction of JOGJAKARTA and elsewhere.

93. Luckily previous warning of the impending attack was received by Col. Edwards, since the Indonesians had sent a broadcasting van widely round the area calling on all patriots to attack the MAGELANG garrison. Although it is true to say that the main cause of the fighting was the Allied loss of face in SOURABAYA, there were other incidental causes of a local nature. A Dutch officer in command of the convalescent centre had been gaining extensive intelligence of the names and influence of local extremists and had been in contact with large numbers of Ambonese and Eurasians in the neighbourhood. I had already at this time decided to replace this officer, and Lt. Williamson who had been chosen to take over from him, was already handing over his duties in AMBARAWA. On the night of 29th/30th October this officer had left his post to go out as guide with a patrol of Gurkhas to stop the beating of an Ambonese woman in a neighbouring Kampung. The patrol was fired on and returned the fire wounding two Indonesians. The husband of the woman was subsequently murdered. It was widely believed in MAGELANG that this patrol had been under the command of a Dutch officer. Similarly in MAGELANG a stronger attitude was taken regarding the return of APWI and Red Cross vehicles. The local chief of police had helped the Allied Forces in requisitioning vehicles that were now under the control of the Indonesians and was kidnapped on 30th October.

94. On 31st October at about 0900 hours the Indonesians encircled all the Allied positions and attacked. The course of the fighting needs only briefly be related here since this subject has been covered by other reports. One company was isolated at the hotel, but the remainder of the garrison fought strongly and inflicted over one hundred casualties, with only one or two of their men being wounded.

95. At the outbreak of the fighting F/Lt. Trigg managed to get to the airfield with Major Dunkley and flew him to SEMARANG where a relief force of a company of armed Japanese was organized, which reached AMBARAWA in the evening and fighting its way through to Battalion Headquarters the following morning. Shortly after its arrival it set out again and established contact with "A" company in the Hotel Montang which had been isolated. On the morning of the 1st November I reported on the situation as follows:-

" Situation MAGELANG very grave. Allied Forces very small whole area. Short of ammunition but inflicting casualties and receiving very few. Unless large reinforcements troops tanks M.T. and heavy air support forthcoming soon fear many deaths in hospitals due food shortage etc. Consider events have gone beyond possibility political/military compromise."

The situation was in fact grave, but was alleviated by the dropping of supplies and the provision of an air attack on enemy positions in the town and on reinforcements moving up from JOGJAKARTA. I was, however, wrong in considering that a compromise could not be effected.

since Dr. Soekarno ordered the cessation of hostilities over the radio and visited MAGELANG to ensure that the order was carried out.

96. Corporal Frankish again distinguished himself in this action, maintaining a day and night watch for seventy hours on the RAPWI W/T set alongside "A" company, thus enabling AMBARAWA and SEMARANG to know what was happening to this company. He also killed or wounded two snipers. The Medical Section and F/Lt. Halliday with Sgt. Bates and LAC. King did good work in the second hospital where the Battalion R.A.P. had been established and in between their spells of medical duties took offensive action locally. The amusing situation arose after the fighting was ended in which they found themselves tending and giving medical attention to Indonesian casualties which they had themselves wounded.

97. The RAPWI organization broke down for a few days after the fighting, but was eventually restored. The hospital staff themselves behaved magnificently, since there was constant sniping and firing into the hospitals, as a result of which one Timorese guard was killed and two women slightly injured. Numerous Dutch and Eurasian people living outside the hospital and convalescent centre were attacked. Several of them were murdered including two Red Cross workers, and two Roman Catholic Padres; many were thrown into the jail and there was widespread looting and terrorism of the minority population.

Evacuation Policy

98. As a result of this fighting and the reign of terror which followed it, it became obvious that MAGELANG could not be held indefinitely unless there were tremendous reinforcements of Allied troops in Mid-Java. It was therefore decided that MAGELANG should be evacuated as soon as possible and that the evacuation of 2500 RAPWI in MAGELANG should take priority over the AMBARAWA and BANJOEBIROE evacuations.

99. This decision caused heart-burning with the RAPWI staff. We felt that we had created something worthwhile in MAGELANG, where the hospitals and convalescent centre possessed really a pre-war standard of medical service and comfort. Moreover in the midst of this chaos we had contrived to keep the organization going there. The decision was, however, indisputably sound and the RAPWI staff were absolutely loyal in doing their best to carry it out. The evacuation, however, was made more and more difficult owing to the increasing non-cooperation of the Indonesians. Trains did not arrive at the right time and when they did, it often required complicated negotiations to secure their departure. Moreover the Medical staff at SEMARANG insisted that proper hospital accommodation should be available there before evacuation could take place. This led to a bottle neck in SEMARANG and although on all humanitarian grounds their attitude was correct, the situation was so critical that they should have been overruled. The result was that by the 19th November only 1500 had been evacuated from MAGELANG and there were still a thousand left, of whom four hundred or more were hospital cases. The bulk of the remainder were Medical and hospital staff.

100. At the same time as this evacuation had been carried out over seven hundred people were got away from BANJOEBIROE. Their places in the camps were filled by the increasing number of APWI and IFTU whom I was allowed to extricate by negotiation with the Indonesians. These subsidiary evacuations were carried out almost entirely without the use of troops.

101. F/Lt. Trigg on the orders of the C.R.A. had been replaced in MAGELANG by F/Lt. Ball. F/Lt. Trigg had done a good job in MAGELANG, particularly before the arrival of the Allied Forces, but since the MAGELANG fighting and his association with the Japanese relief column, the Indonesians were no longer prepared to deal with him.

The G.R.A.'s policy at this time was to deal as moderately as possible with the Indonesians and he therefore ordered F/Lt. Trigg to be replaced. Before F/Lt. Trigg left MAGELANG, however, he succeeded by negotiation in extricating the one hundred and ten internees from WONOSOBO where, since I had been responsible for sending them there, I had been very worried about their plight. Similarly by negotiations through the Red Cross Committee in SOERAKARTA, we were able to get sixty-eight APWI and ten Swiss evacuated from TAYANMANGGOE, a hill station adjacent to SOERAKARTA. Had there been a further time I feel certain that we would have secured the release of most of the internees from SOERAKARTA also, since the National Committee had agreed to send them too to SEMARANG. Eventually also over two hundred people were evacuated from BANDOENGL, though on the last two occasions the convoy had to go with an escort of troops.

102. The T.K.R. had now decided to include SALATIGA within their defended area, though previously their first outpost had been at ANPEL. There were large road blocks on the two roads north from SALATIGA and over a hundred T.K.R.s stationed at the BAWEN crossroads, threatening our L. of C. to SEMARANG. On the 6th November I visited SALATIGA with Sgt. Thomsit and a member of the ALBARAWA National Committee as my escort. In SALATIGA, however, the latter disappeared whilst I was contacting the Red Cross and visiting the Indonesian internment camp in which all male IFTU had been placed. The local police summoned me to the police station for an interrogation, but I was able to get safely back to ALBARAWA by a different road with the aid of a pass signed some weeks previously by Mr. Wongsonogoro. The following day Sgt. Thomsit took a letter through to the National Committee from me, but negotiations were held up and only finally solved through the help of the Swiss Vice Consul in SEMARANG. Eventually an unarmed British Officer (F/Lt. Trigg) together with Sgt. Thomsit was allowed to go through the T.K.R. lines with a convoy of non-military trucks and in three days got away 275 APWI. There remained a further 275 who had claims on the RAPWI organization plus numerous IFTU, but the situation deteriorated so rapidly that we could not get them away.

Increasing Tension

103. It became obvious now that a further crisis would take place soon. It had been hoped to isolate the fighting in SOURABAYA which took place after the landing of 5th Indian Division. The clearing of SOURABAYA took some time, since the Allies did not wish to cause undue destruction of property or loss of civilian lives. During this period there was a constant spate of propaganda from SOURABAYA, SOERAKARTA and JOGJAKARTA urging offensive action against the Allies in Mid-Java and violently threatening those Indonesians, such as Mr. Wongsonogoro, who had tried to co-operate with us. Since the political feeling in Eastern and Middle Java was enormous and the cohesion of the Indonesians within their own ranks almost one hundred per cent., it was no easier now than previously (before the arrival of the Allied troops) to isolate the fighting in any one area.

104. In ALBARAWA it became increasingly difficult to contact the National Committee, or the Contact Committee which had been formed for all dealings with the Allies. At the same time it was obvious that military preparations were being carried out, since the hospital adjacent to our own lines was evacuated by the Indonesians and the rail also partially evacuated. An increasing number of organized parties of ten or twenty boys were seen daily proceeding to BANDOENGAN and SOEMOWONO, the latter being certainly a guerilla training centre and also probably a T.K.R. centre.

105. Finally with the arrival in SEMARANG of two platoons of an M.T. Company, it became possible to carry out large scale evacuations by road and a total evacuation of MAGELANG which spread over four days was planned. Before this could take place, however, fighting broke

the neighbouring blocks which were threatened and extinguished the blaze whilst they themselves were under fire.

112. In the meantime the MAG LANG garrison had not enjoyed an easy passage. It had been severely ambushed and sustained about fifteen casualties whilst inflicting over 150.

Consolidation at AMBARAWA

113. The BANJOEBIROE garrison had a W/T link to AMBARAWA and we knew that the camps there were safe. On the afternoon of the 23rd November I was allowed to accompany the tanks and the infantry which cleared the BANJOEBIROE road, encountering opposition from enemy L.V.G.'s which were silenced. The BANJOEBIROE camps were found to be in good order.

114. Camp 8, however, on the MAGELANG road, had been completely isolated and the Garrison Commander felt unable to grant my repeated requests to establish contact with it. On the 21st he had sent a strong Japanese patrol to clear the area near this camp, which killed over twenty "P. KEDAS", but since that time there had been no military action in the area. Col. Edwards had also been requested to send forward a strong patrol to take over the guarding of the Camp 8, but owing to the ambushes in which he was involved, was unable to split his forces further. Thus it was that a terrible tragedy occurred in Camp 8 only one hour before the arrival of the MAGELANG relief column. My signal reporting this to BATAVIA is quoted in full:-

" Regret to announce savage and bestial attack
Camp 8 which was isolated from our garrison 221730
hours one hour before arrival MAGELANG relief column.
Two parties Incos approx. 10 each broke through ~~XXXX~~
rear fence armed with rifles pistols swords grenades.
Terrorized camp entered barracks butchered women
children. Did not attack unarmed Dutch male staff.
Death roll nine so far. Three dying, twenty wounded.
Casualties include children aged three to ten years.

On receiving rumours this atrocity proceeded
immediately with Ball to camp which was not yet
occupied own troops and was outside our own lines.
Organized evacuation wounded to small hospital in own
lines. Left Trigg there overnight and arranged
installation one platoon Gurkhas under British officer
to guard camp.

Women report one Jap in party.

Accidents like this should shock civilized world
into realization what British/Dutch are fighting against
in this country.

Nominal roll casualties and sitrep will follow."

115. The only information additional to this signal was that the two parties were organized properly as sections, with balanced fire power and presumably belonged to the T.K.R. Moreover the women and children were herded together with their hands up by the Indonesians into separate clumps on whom grenades were thrown or rifle or pistol fire directed. This tragedy affected us all deeply, particularly those Indian and Gurkha drivers who were sent up to remove the casualties. The following day this same camp was attacked in force, but our troops were ready and drove the enemy off inflicting terrible casualties. *

116. The fighting day and night had been so bitter, with casualties in all AMBARAWA camps from the incessant and deliberate mortar and small arms fire, that it became necessary to limit our defensive commitments. This could only be done if the jail was captured, since in the jail there was reasonable accommodation for over 2500 people. The other area where evacuation might safely take place was the Indonesian hospital adjacent to our own lines.

117. The enemy was driven out of the hospital first and then on the afternoon of 23rd November the jail was attacked by our own troops. First it was mortared heavily and then the tanks moved up into position and opened up heavily to cover the advance of our troops. Finally a 3-pounder and eventually a 25-pounder succeeded in blowing open the main gate and our troops went in and cleared the jail. I was detailed to accompany Major Mulroncy on this operation. Most of the Indonesians had made off while we were attacking and they sustained only one casualty.

RAPWI Re-organization

118. Before the fighting broke out those of RAPWI staff living outside the camp took up their quarters in the office, which continued to function efficiently throughout the battle. Since thearrison possessed inadequate medical and surgical facilities I ordered Lt. Van Hoytema, the Medical Officer on my staff at ~~SEMARANG~~, to form a small hospital in our own lines before fighting broke out. This hospital included an operating theatre and was given a staff of medical personnel from my team and from NICA nurses from ~~SEMARANG~~. In the course of the fighting it looked after over a hundred battle casualties and carried out over twenty operations. The staff of the hospital worked very well despite great difficulties and saved many lives.

119. In order ^{that} the jobs, such as foraging, collecting supply drops, loading luggage and undertaking camp guard duties, should be properly organized, I formed a pioneer company under Dutch officers and Dutch and Ambonese N.C.O.'s, which was organized as a proper military unit and provided with a number of captured enemy's weapons. This company under Captain Visscher did very good work and later assisted a good deal in the evacuation. It was withdrawn with last convey and has retained its identity in SEMARANG.

120. Once the troops had re-established supplies of fresh and drainage water for the camps, it became possible to re-organize the camps in safer areas. Camp 8 was withdrawn to the hospital and Camps 9 and 11 and part of Camp 10 to the jail. In addition a refugee camp (Camp 12) was formed in the jail to cater for the increasing number of IPTU who came to us for protection. Some of these IPTU had moved into the camps before fighting broke out, but many others had stayed in their own Kampongs throughout the area, their husbands in general, since we had secured their release from the jail, remaining in Camp 7. Accurate maps were drawn up showing the locations of these isolated families and Col. Edwards sent out numerous patrols to bring these people to safety.

121. In the meantime fighting had continued at the same tempo. Attacks mainly from the ~~MAGELANG~~ direction were beaten off, air strikes were called for and carried out successfully against enemy concentrations. Patrols were sent out and the town and the neighbouring Kampongs cleared, and the Kampongs burnt. Eventually the enemy brought 75 m.m. guns into position and harassed us almost daily. Camp 6 suffered the most casualties, six people being killed and seven wounded as a result of one shelling. The jail was incessantly shelled, but was so solidly constructed that the casualties were happily few. We made a point when the shelling began of going to the camp, which was being attacked, in order to keep up the morale of the internees and ensure that they took proper cover.

The Opening of the SEMARANG Road and Evacuation of ALBARAWA

122. Eventually by 29th November an Allied column fought its way through from SEMARANG and the Battalion of Mahrattas were established from BAWEN along the SALATIGA road and the Battalion of Rajputna Rifles at ~~OMNGGARAN~~; 49th Brigade took up its Headquarters at ~~OMNGGARAN~~ in order to control the road ~~and~~ the evacuation along it.
and

On the 1st of December the first convoy got through and Camp 10 was cleared, and the garrison withdrawn from BANJOEBROE. Thereafter daily over 1000 people were evacuated. In all between the 1st and the 13th of December, 9400 people were evacuated safely including 1095 Chinese and 1100 ether IPTU. All the surplus foodstuffs from the camps plus further stocks that had been rounded up locally were sent to SEMARANG where a famine was threatening. All the personal luggage of the internees was evacuated and the Chinese were allowed to evacuate over a hundred tons of their own food. In the course of these evacuations, not a single casualty was sustained on the road. By the 13th RAPWI were completely cleared from ANBRANA and on the 14th the garrison withdrew to SEMARANG. Right up until the end the enemy continued offensive activity and sustained heavy casualties. This in fact was a period of total war, no quarter being given on either side. The Indonesian casualties must have been over two thousand; our own did not exceed a hundred among the troops and seventy-five among the RAPWI including twenty-one dead. Had our own troops not taken the stern and effective measures which they took, the RAPWI losses would have been very much higher.

123. During this period the morale of the RAPWI staff and the camps remained amazingly high considering the hardships and casualties that were sustained and the inadequate diet to which the internees were reduced. In particular Captain Van Gelder, by his efficiency and organizing abilities, rendered invaluable and unflagging services, which enabled our organization to compete effectively with all the difficulties which beset it. P/Lt. Ball, Lt. Lansveldt and Lt. Kweeda/~~work~~ hard and well up to the end and Lt. Notboom did a fine job in organizing the internees in the jail.
worked

124. It is only fitting to end this part of the report by paying tribute to the gallantry of all ranks of the garrison. Both Brigadier Bethell and Col. Edwards inspired the RAPWI just as much as their own troops with their fine example and it would be hard to find a better battalion on any front than the 3/10 Gurkha Rifles.

C O N C L U S I O N

125. It is perhaps not inappropriate to pass some comments of a general nature on the situation in Java at the conclusion of this report. The problem is still far from solution. Organized fighting by the F.R.I. still continues on the outskirts of SEMARANG, in BANDOENG and elsewhere. Guerilla bands have been formed and are training, and in many areas have already begun operating. Murder, kidnapping, terrorism and looting continue on an increasing scale. Economic distress grows daily. Above all the extremists still have tens of thousands of hostages, whose fate is unknown, in their hands, and tens of thousands of Japanese prisoners whom it is our duty to concentrate and evacuate from the island. The situation of the other minority population amounting in the whole island to nearly a million people is difficult in the extreme, since even if they are not interned by the Indonesians they are subjected to a vicious boycott and to every form of coercion.

126. The whole problem is not one that can be solved within a few months, however patiently the negotiations are carried out. It is a five-year problem and it will take at least that time before law and order is properly established in the island, the economic distress relieved and the vast industries and plantations of Java brought into full working order again.

127. At the moment the policy is to cut down military operations as far as possible, to hold BATAVIA, BANDOENG, SOURABAYA and possibly SEMARANG, and to attempt to carry out the evacuation of APWI and the Japanese by negotiations with the Indonesians. While these negotiations are proceeding it is hoped that the Netherlands Government and the Indonesians will arrange a satisfactory compromise

128. This policy which has been enforced on military commanders by world opinion is bound at some stage to break down. The Indonesians, to be sure, will carry out some evacuations, but they realize the value of their hostages and the extremist leaders are not particularly concerned with the economic distress of their own fellow countrymen, and will allow nothing to interfere with their national or personal ambitions. Eventually there will be every kind of difficulty and delay and only a percentage of the hostages will be released, leaving tens of thousands still unaccounted for. The British Forces will then be placed in a position where they either have to leave the island without accomplishing the purposes for which they came, or where they have to embark on further large scale military operations.

129. While these negotiations are proceeding to their own unsatisfactory conclusion, the seat of government will be transferred more and more to JOGJAKARTA or SOERABAYA and the Ministry of Mr. SHANER, if it does come to an agreement with the Dutch, will degenerate more and more into a political mission attached to the Allied Forces in BATAVIA and will lose even its present uneasy status as a self-styled de facto Government.

130. The argument is often advanced that after a lapse of time the Indonesians will lose their stomach for fighting and that their Nationalist Movement will cease to be such a menace. This argument is false. Their opposition in SOERABAYA, although by our standards poorly organized, nevertheless continued until the end. Similarly in Mid-Java there was no sign that Indonesian courage was flagging. On the contrary, after the evacuation of Allied troops from PAGELANG and APBARA, the Indonesians were able to claim a not entirely unjustified victory, since they had succeeded in their avowed object of forcing the Allies to evacuate towards the sea. With every month that goes by their potentiality of causing trouble and co-ordinating effective military resistance increases. Although their communications in the field are poor, nevertheless they possess complete control of the telephone exchanges and the broadcasting system in Java. Provided they do not lose their weapons, there is an indefinite pool of replacements for any casualties that are sustained. Moreover the T.A.R. and to a lesser extent the guerilla bands receive active backing from at least ten per cent. of the population and of the remaining ninety per cent., probably about half are more or less sympathetic towards the aspirations of the Nationalist Movement and the remainder are too frightened to oppose it in any way.

131. It will be seen then that ultimately it is only by force of arms that the problem will be solved. Over a year ago a similar situation faced the Allies in Greece where a Fascist-inspired regime organized on Fascist lines tried to seize control of the country. The government took strong action and although much criticized at the time its decisions have been proved wise and humane by after events. In Java too, however, sympathetic one may feel towards Nationalism as such, surely the Allies cannot tolerate a regime surrounded with all the pernicious paraphernalia of secret police and terrorism. It is against this kind of thing that we have been fighting for the last six years and the fighting is still continuing here. Moreover the anarchy and economic distress in Java unless quickly corrected, will have great repercussions throughout Asia.

132. The only real solution then consists in vigorous military action directed primarily against strongholds of JOGJAKARTA and SOERABAYA, with subsidiary operations against such places as MALANG and CEMERHO, for the evacuation of internees. These people can be saved, particularly if airborne forces are employed in sufficient quantities and the element of surprise is retained, for it takes the Indonesians at least a week to concentrate sufficient forces in any one area to be a real menace to our own troops.

Honours and Awards

133. Recommendations for honours and awards in respect of British personnel have been submitted at the request of Brigadier Bethell through his Headquarters. A list of recommendations for Dutch civilian and military personnel has also been submitted through Dutch sources.

T.S. Tull

(T.S. TULL) WING COMMANDER,
Commanding R.A.F. Airborne Control Unit,
South East Asia Air Forces.
(Attached to No. 6 RAAF Control Staff Java)

Batavia, 27th December 1945.

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix "A" Organization of U.S.A.P.I.
in A.G.A.


Appendix "B" Political situation at
BIRMINGHAM

Appendix "C" Food report on A.S.I.A. and
BIRMINGHAM.

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ORGANISATION OF THE RED CROSS IN AMBARAWA

Q.C. 1945 CONTACT 1945



IN PLO

DR. VAN

From: W. Gdr. T. S. Tull, Commanding
 RAPWI No. 5 Contact Team
 ALBARRANA - MAG. LANG.
 To: No. 6 RAPWI CONTACT STAFF
 BATAVIA.
 Date: 7th October 1945.

POLITICAL SITUATION AT SOERABARTA (SOLC)

Intention: To visit SOLO to contact leading Indonesians in order

- a) to ensure the safety of 200 internees who have made their way to Solo
- b) to arrange further limited evacuation to Solo
- c) to ensure that the Red Cross organization is functioning adequately
- d) to investigate report that the Japanese supply dumps and weapons were to be handed over to the Indonesians.

Military Situation: The Japanese Commander at Solo has 3000 troops in the area, of whom about 1300 are Infantry men and the remainder L. of C. troops. This Colonel was previously under the command of the Japanese General commanding the Eastern Defence Corps. This General and his staff have surrendered and informed the Colonel of the details of their surrender, without, however, specifically instructing him to surrender in a similar manner. The Colonel, having heard of my intended visit, had contrived to keep Indonesian demands in check until my arrival.

Political Situation: The Indonesians have taken over everything in the area except the Japanese barracks, weapons and stores. They have a strong National Committee, which completely controls the action of the two leading Princes. This committee received me very courteously and undertook not to take independent action regarding the Japanese, until I had referred the position to Batavia. They indicated, however, that at Solo there is a mob of about 10,000 which it is difficult to control. So far there have been no incidents or bloodshed.

Red Cross Organization: There is a strong Red Cross Committee led by two Swiss civilians, which is doing good work and has amicable relations with the local authorities and with the Indonesian Red Cross. The release of medical stores on a 50-50 basis to these two Committees, which was carried out recently on my instructions, has had a good political effect.

Dutch Internees: The 200 civilians internees are well looked after by the Red Cross, who also formed a small hospital for sick internees and ex political prisoners. The National Committee at Solo have agreed to assist the Red Cross to receive further internees later.

Conclusion: It is in the interest of the RAPWI Organization and also of the Allied Forces that there should be no fighting or bloodshed at Solo. It is possible to avoid such incidents, if the Indonesians are allowed to take over control of certain warehouses on behalf of the Allied Forces and if I am entitled, at my discretion, to issue certain non-military stores for the use of the civilian population. If no gestures are made by the Allies, at this moment, the Indonesians will undoubtedly try to take the law into their own hands and bloodshed will be unavoidable. The Japanese Colonel in command is a reliable officer and will obey

clear Allied Orders implicitly, provided he is given them immediately.

Immediate approval is therefore requested for the following measures:-

- a) The Japanese Armed Forces at Solo should be placed under the command of General Nakamura.
- b) I should be entitled to negotiate, at my discretion, on behalf of the Allied Forces with the National Committee.
- c) I should be entitled at my discretion to hand over the guarding of warehouses to Indonesians and to distribute stores of a non-military nature.
- d) I should be entitled to order the Japanese Commander, as I have ordered General Nakamura, to refrain from provocative incidents, to concentrate and guard their weapons with all the power at their disposal.

W.Cdr. T.S. Tull, Commanding
No. 5 RAAF Contact Team

Copy to RAAF Mid-Java

A P P E N D I X "C"

FOOD REPORT ON AMBARAWA AND BANJOEBIROE

When the Japanese capitulated the food situation in Ambarawa and Banjoebiroe was very bad. Immediately after the capitulation the Japanese increased the food rations, so that during the course of September sufficient vegetables, fruit, eggs, ducks and chickens were available for consumption. A fair amount of beans and milk were also delivered.

Shortly after the arrival of the Contact Team orders were issued to the Japanese to stock in each camp a one month's supply of the following commodities:-

Rice, tinned meat, flour, sugar, salt, coconut-oil, butter, tea.

In early October the Japanese godowns, which were some few kilometers from Ambarawa, were taken over by Indonesians and deliveries from them became non-existent. However, vegetables, fruit and eggs could still be purchased locally, also a very small amount of fresh meat and milk. No rice could be purchased.

In the second week of October the "Pemoedas" enforced a boycott in the markets of all Europeans (including R.A.P.F.), hence local purchases diminished and on the 13th and 14th of October were unobtainable. All camps were forced to draw upon their stock of one month's food.

On the 18th of October the Indonesians took over all food distribution and from then onwards we were compelled to deal with BARI (Badan Makanan Republik Indonesia). This organization was installed by the Indonesians for the purpose of controlling all food supplies. One of the first actions by this office was to set a very low price on essential commodities the result of which can be readily observed on the attached statement. During the second half of October and the first half of November supplies from BARI, though they improved, were not sufficient.

Fortunately several truck loads of milk-powder, Australian flour, chocolate, corned beef, biscuits and other luxury goods arrived from BARI Semarang which enabled us to create a more palatable diet.

The result was that after the final evacuation on the 9th of December a total of 150 tons of foodstuffs, together with about 100 tons belonging to the Chinese community, was transported to Semarang.

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1945
 PUBLIC ACCOUNTS OFFICE
 1945

DATE	CAMP STRENGTH	VEGETABLES Kg.		FRUIT Kg.		PORK MEAT Kg.		BEANS KG.		EGGS nos.		MILK lbs.	
		Total	per head	Total	per head	Total	per head	Total	per head	Total	per head	Total	per head
	Daily requirements per head:	0.500 Kg.		0.500 Kg.		0.100 Kg.		0.150 Kg.		2 nos.		1 lbs.	
1	10487	5279	0.500	4653	0.450	681	0.070	---	---	22259	2.1	492	0.470
2	10044	6140	0.610	4761	0.470	---	---	---	---	21600	2.1	456	0.450
3	9980	6082	0.608	5357	0.535	925	0.092	---	---	---	---	480	0.480
4	9990	5790	0.579	3900	0.390	---	---	684	0.070	50325	5.0	486	0.486
5	9957	3296	0.329	5210	0.521	---	---	3528	0.360	17550	1.7	414	0.414
6	9987	5127	0.512	4966	0.500	2750	0.270	---	---	12765	1.2	468	0.468
7	9985	4322	0.500	6100	0.610	---	---	1328	0.130	17150	1.7	438	0.438
8	9771	6457	0.660	5355	0.540	---	---	---	---	30235	3.0	396	0.402
9	9758	5823	0.600	7187	0.740	1631	0.165	4222	0.430	19630	1.9	432	0.432
10	9717	3225	0.330	6388	0.710	---	---	3218	0.640	44440	4.4	450	0.450
11	9588	3495	0.360	7270	0.760	---	---	466	0.050	12750	1.2	450	0.450
12	9586	2855	0.300	474	0.050	---	---	---	---	---	---	450	0.450
13	9583	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	450	0.450
14	9582	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	19750	1.9	450	0.450
15	9487	1612	0.170	---	---	---	---	352	0.040	---	---	450	0.450
16	9254	1209	0.120	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	450	0.450
17	9254	1227	0.120	337	0.040	---	---	2156	0.220	6625	0.6	450	0.450
18	9187	2486	0.250	571	0.060	555	0.060	265	0.030	11600	1.1	450	0.450
19	9187	3222	0.350	148	0.025	---	---	422	0.050	3162	0.3	450	0.450
20	9187	3222	0.350	226	0.025	---	---	743	0.080	3424	0.3	450	0.450
21	9187	3222	0.350	540	0.060	108	0.010	---	---	---	---	450	0.450
22	9157	7134	0.780	436	0.050	---	---	---	---	---	---	450	0.450
23	9070	1780	0.190	---	---	690	0.055	---	---	3275	0.3	450	0.450
24	9060	6923	0.760	1325	0.130	---	---	612	0.070	3775	0.3	450	0.450
25	9070	5302	0.610	---	---	477	0.055	---	---	2730	0.2	450	0.450
26	9070	3502	0.410	---	---	457	0.060	273	0.030	11030	1.1	450	0.450
27	9089	5027	0.550	1336	0.210	959	0.110	1660	0.190	10690	1.0	450	0.450
28	9068	5265	0.580	1022	0.110	---	---	332	0.040	13300	1.3	450	0.450
29	9068	5666	0.640	977	0.110	590	0.060	---	---	13400	1.3	450	0.450
30	9050	7987	0.910	1659	0.190	983	0.110	936	0.100	17700	1.7	450	0.450
31	8729	4012	0.450	---	---	1000	0.110	---	---	5950	0.5	421	0.421