

1-23

RESTRICTED
SECRET

AIR HISTORICAL BRANCH

TRANSLATION NO. VII/48

adm.
coll.
sollet. 1947

E 312547

RESTRICTED

SUGGESTIONS BY THE
GERMAN AIR FORCE OPERATIONS STAFF
FOR THE REGAINING OF
GERMAN AIR SUPREMACY.

Contained in a memorandum by
General Koller dated 19.5.44,
and addressed to Goering,
Milch and others.

TRANSLATED BY:

AIR MINISTRY. A.H.B.6.

14.10.1947

Consideration of the relative strengths of the German and enemy Air Forces, and the existing fact of ever-growing enemy air supremacy on all fronts, lead to recognition of the fact that all armament programmes have so far failed to take into account the actual needs of the German Air Force for the maintenance of dominance in the European theatre of operations.

It is indisputable that both the strategic and the tactical victories of the German Forces in the first years of the war were in large part due to the supremacy of the Luftwaffe and the success of its operations. The enemy was not slow in deducing the tremendous importance of air power when employed in close conjunction with other military weapons, and therefore accorded first priority in his armament plans to the aircraft industry.

German air armament production has remained largely static for some years, and with the exception of a certain improvement in technical performance, has done little to ameliorate our position in the air. This study cannot attempt to explore the causes of this trend; it can only endeavour to demonstrate the need for a rapid strengthening of the Luftwaffe.

The Luftwaffe Operations Staff believes the recrudescence of the Air Force to be the primary, if not the decisive condition for a German victory. Air power has determined the nature of 'total' war, and neither on the seas nor on land can the support of the Air Force be dispensed with. Of even greater significance are the operations of a numerically and qualitatively superior strategic Air Force, which, divorced from the actual course of surface warfare, are able to influence it profoundly.

The success or the failure of the German Air Force will therefore be a decisive factor in the outcome of the present conflict. With this conclusion in mind, the Operations Staff has undertaken research in order to determine which effectives are absolutely indispensable for the continued fulfilment of the Luftwaffe's commitments.

As a result, a plan has been evolved, which will have to be studied in the light of the overall armament position, bearing in mind the immense significance of the Air Force in the conduct of the war. The demands are for minimum requirements, which can it is believed be satisfied by a redistribution of existing raw materials, plants and manpower.

There can under present circumstances be no question of attaining German air supremacy on all fronts. I ask only for a Force strong enough to be able to achieve temporary and local supremacy, and to carry out its appointed tasks. It must be remembered that despite numerical inferiority, success can still be won by technical superiority. This will demand the highest concentration of effort by all.

The position is shown by the following figures of frontline aircraft:-

<u>Strength</u>	<u>Monthly reinforcement planned in Production Programme No. 1027:</u>	<u>Strength demanded by Operations Staff:</u>	<u>Monthly reinforcement after attainment of this strength;</u>
<u>15,544</u>	<u>4,913</u>	<u>14,384</u>	<u>6,034</u>

To keep pace with the increase in production, attention must be given to the following:-

- (a) Training of Flying, Maintenance and Repair personnel.
- (b) Increased provision of bombs and aircraft armament.
- (c) Expansion of aircraft fuel production.
- (d) Increased production of technical equipment.
- (e) Expansion of airfields and of all ground services, and of the supply system.

The aim of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff is to limit the aircraft industry to three basic types of aircraft. This will not immediately be possible, but must remain our long-term policy. We shall require a 'small' aircraft, (S.E. or T.E.), as a fighter, ground attack and close reconnaissance aircraft; a 'medium' aircraft, (T.E.), as a bomber, night fighter and light transport aircraft; and a 'large' aircraft, as a long range reconnaissance and bombing and heavy transport aircraft, (multi-engined).

The fundamental development requirements of the Luftwaffe will be as follows:-

- (a) The defence of the Reich and the escorting of our bomber and reconnaissance formations necessitate a rapid fighter aircraft with the greatest possibly flying duration, (at least 6 hours). Defensive operations against enemy fighters may appear to necessitate the employment of high altitude fighter aircraft, but this must be restricted to a few specialised types (e.g. jet-propelled fighters).
- (b) Offensive operations in the European theatre demand a bomber aircraft with a range of 1000m (e.g. JU.388). In view of the present situation regarding raw materials and fuel, the employment of heavy 4 engined bombers in this theatre would be uneconomic.
- (c) For deep penetration over enemy territory, for example in Russia and over the Atlantic, a long-range bomber and reconnaissance aircraft is necessary.

To sum up, it can be stated that the requirements stated in this report represent the minimum needs if the Air Force is to play a decisive part in the conduct of the war. It must be emphasized that these cannot be fulfilled out of the present resources in men and material available to the armament industry; a re-adjustment in favour of the Air Force will be required though the entire armament industry. It is for the Supreme Command to determine how far the demands of the Operations Staff can be satisfied.

(Signed); KOLLER

A.H.B.6. Distribution

C.A.S.
A.M.P.
A.C.A.S. (Ops)
A.C.A.S. (I)
D.S.T. (12 copies)
A.H.B.1. (2 copies)
A.H.B.5.

R.A.A.F. (Historical Records Section)

-
R.N.Z.A.F. (Air Historical Branch)

-
File