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R.A.F. MONOGRAPH
(FIRST DRAFT)

ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION
IN THE AIR WAR
OVER NORTH-WEST EUROPE

AIR HISTORICAL BRANCH (1)

AIR MINISTRY.

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I

EMBASSY CONTACTS

Appointment of Two Additional United States
Air Attachés

Spring 1940

1. In the early weeks of 1940 the position in the European war was almost static. Four months had passed since Britain had declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939, but forces were still poised. There had not been any real trial of strength; it was a 'phoney' war. Against this background few events appeared less likely than that United States Air Forces would ever fly in active combat over the battle-fronts of Western Europe. Yet already there was a presage of things to come. It was merely a strengthening of United States Army Air Corps representation in London, but it can be seen now as a significant pointer.
2. Characteristically, the inspiration came from President Roosevelt. After visiting an Air Corps display he suggested to his Chief of Staff that the number of United States Air Attachés should be increased from two to four.(1) The idea was developed by his staffs, and it emerged that each of the two additional attachés would have specialist qualifications which would enable him to study, from his own particular angle, the machinery of air warfare as it had been built up in Britain.
3. It was the first move from across the Atlantic towards that closer Anglo-American air co-operation, which later, in its full development, was to provide the wherewithal for the ultimate victory over the Luftwaffe.
4. The President's suggestion was conveyed verbally to Air Ministry through the United States Military Attaché in London (General Miles).(2) It involved, of course, no real departure from the traditional methods of military contact. But in those early days any proposal which appeared to imply the reception of a formal mission was viewed - on both sides of the Atlantic - somewhat askance. Consequently, the implications of the President's proposal were considered carefully by the British Air Staff.(3) It was soon agreed, however, that little but good could come of it. It was agreed, in fact, that the United States representatives should be allowed access to much information which normally would have been denied to them. Agreement was also reached on the necessary procedures; and on 16 March 1940 the Assistant United States Military Attaché for Aviation (Colonel Martin F. Scanlon) was informed officially that the proposal had been approved.(4) "Two specialist officers of the Air Corps" would be welcomed, "if necessary as additional Attachés, for specialised work."

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- (1) A.M. File S.3871, Encl. 8A: Tel., No. 2132, Air Attaché, Washington to Air Ministry: 13 February 1940.
 - (2) A.M. File S.3871, Min. 1: D. of Plans to C.A.S: 7 February 1940.
 - (3) A.M. File S.3871, Various minutes.
 - (4) A.M. File S.3871, Encl. 16A: Ltr., D. of I. to Gen. Scanlon: 16 March 1940.

5. On 23 March 1940 Major F. O. Carroll, the Chief Engineer of the Materiel Division of the U.S. Army Air Corps and Lieutenant-Colonel Grandison Gardner who was in charge of Armament in the same Division of the Air Corps sailed from New York to take up these appointments.(1)

6. Their mission, as expressed by their Chief, Brigadier General Brett, in a letter on 19 March 1940 to the Chairman of the Anglo-French Purchasing Board in Washington (Mr. Purvis) was "to evaluate properly and correctly the progress being made in the aviation industry throughout England."(2) It was reflected in the list of British establishments which they expressed a desire to see. This list included the Air Ministry Branch of the Director-General of Research and Development (Air Vice-Marshal Tedder); the Royal Aircraft Establishment at South Farnborough; the Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment; a Bomber Station, a Fighter Station and an Armament Training Station of the R.A.F.; and finally various British aircraft factories.(3)

7. Between 24 April 1940 and 17 May 1940 Lieutenant Colonel Gardner and Major Carroll, accompanied on most of their journeys by the 'permanent' United States Assistant Military Attaché for Air (Major G. C. McDonald),(4) did in fact visit all the above establishments.(5) They were shown almost unreservedly the developments then in progress in their various spheres of interest and must have assembled a considerable amount of information.

8. Towards the end of their period of visiting, Lieutenant Colonel Gardner expressed an opinion on a subject which is pertinent to this narrative.(6) He felt that the time was not far distant when our bombing policy would have to be based on achieving concentration, from altitudes of over 28,000 feet, on industrial and fortified areas in Germany. To do this effectively, the use of four-engined bombers such as the Flying Fortress (the B-17), capable of covering long distances at a reasonable turn of speed, should be employed. For accurate bombing from such aircraft at high altitudes, he was not aware of any bomb-sight, other than the Sperry, with which they were then experimenting, which was comparable with their Norden sight. He suggested finally that if the United States should supply Britain with any of these aircraft, some experienced reserved pilots of the U.S. Army Air Corps should be released to act as instructors in Canada. Lieutenant Colonel Gardner's views are of considerable interest as showing the trend of thought on the subject of bombing policy in the Materiel Division of the U.S. Army Air Corps at that time.

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- (1) A.M. File S.3871, Encl. 18A: Ltr., 2097, U.S. Embassy, London, to Foreign Office: 26 March 1940.
 - (2) A.M. File S.3871, Encl. 30C: Ltr., Gen. Brett to Mr. Purvis, B.P.C.: 19 March 1940.
 - (3) A.M. File S.3871, Encl. 19A: Ltr., Col. Scanlon to D. of I.: 11 April 1940.
 - (4) Major McDonald had been on the staff of the U.S. Embassy in London since the spring of 1939. (A.M. File C.S.1244, Min. 1: D.D.I.(1) to D.C.A.S.: 8 May 1939).
 - (5) A.M. File S.3871, various minutes.
 - (6) A.M. File S.3871, Encl. 46A: Min., A.I.1(s) to A.I.1(f): 11 May 1940.

9. On 16 May 1940, the United States Embassy informed the British Foreign Office that "on or about" 1 June 1940 Lieutenant Colonel Gardner and Major Carroll would be succeeded as Assistant Military Attaches and Attachés for Air by Colonel Carl Spaatz, who at that time held the appointment of Director of Plans, Office of Chief of Air Staff,(1) and Captain B. S. Kelsey.(2)

10. An indication of what they would probably wish to see was conveyed to Air Ministry by the Acting Military Attaché (Colonel Scanlon) on 17 May, so that by the time that they arrived, about the appointed date, arrangements for a round of visits were well in hand.(3) Their first contact with Air Ministry was on 5 June, when they paid official introductory calls on the higher Air Staff Officers.(4) Five days later they began their tour, and for the rest of June they had a very full programme. Their main interest was flying training through all its stages, but in addition they wanted to see operational stations in the various commands. These interests were reflected in their programme: they visited the headquarters of Bomber, Fighter, and Flying Training Commands; some typical operational stations; Flying Training Schools (Elementary and Service); the Central Flying School; the Central Gunnery School; the Air Armament School; the Electrical and Wireless School; Initial Training Wings; Operational Training Units; and the Air Fighter Development Unit.(5) There was thus little in the way of training organisations which, by the end of June, they had not had an opportunity to study.

11. From the escorting officer's report, it would appear that Colonel Spaatz and Captain Kelsey were extremely interested in all phases of the R.A.F. service training system, but especially in the initial training stages.(6) They were in fact so favourably impressed with the initial training organisation that they submitted a report to War Department advising the adoption of similar methods in the U.S. Army Air Corps.

12. On one occasion, towards the end of their tour, they expressed to the escorting officer some interesting views on R.A.F. Bombing and Gunnery Schools. These views, since they represented the impressions of United States Officers gained as a result of actual observation, are summarised below:

(a) They were not in favour of the method of instruction practised at the R.A.F. Bombing and Gunnery Schools, by which one officer instructor was in charge of a certain number of personnel right through the course. They preferred the method in use by the U.S. Army Air Corps, by which individual instructors were assigned to each subject.

(b) They felt that the estimated margin of error in aerial bombing as practised by the R.A.F. was very large; in fact, they even went so far as to doubt whether night bombing was

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- (1) A.M. File C.5408, Encl. 11A: Note from U.S. Embassy: 5 July 1940.
(2) A.M. File C.5408, Encl. 8A: Ltr., 2313, U.S. Embassy, London to Foreign Office: 16 May 1940.
(3) A.M. File S.5004, Encl. 1A: Ltr., A.M.2223, Col. Scanlon to D. of I.: 17 May 1940.
(4) A.M. File C.5408, Encl. 9A: Min., A.I.1(f) to S. of S. for Air, V.C.A.S., D.C.A.S., and D. of Plans: 4 June 1940.
(5) A.M. File S.5004. Various minutes.
(6) A.M. File S.5004, Encl. 38B: Report by A.I.1(s): 24 June 1940.

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really effective. They claimed that their own aerial bombing in recent exercises in the United States when the Norden bomb-sight had been used, had been shown to achieve considerably greater accuracy.

13. Captain Kelsey returned to the United States on 7 July.(1) Colonel Spaatz, however, remained in Britain until the early days of September. But before turning to record his activities during July and August, a note must be made of some discussions with Air Ministry in which he took part soon after his arrival in England.

(1) A.M. File C.5409, Encl. 10A: Ltr., 2428, U.S. Embassy, London to Foreign Office: 22 July 1940.

THE UNITED STATES AIR CONTRIBUTION

IN EUROPE

Tentative Views

June 1940

14. Colonel Spaatz's activities in Britain were not confined to the observation of R.A.F. training methods; the course of contemporary events inevitably decreed otherwise. It was June 1940 - a grim month for the Allied cause. The British Army had retreated through the Low Countries; then came Dunkirk. With barely a pause the Germans swept on into France. Italy declared war. The Germans entered Paris. Finally on the 22nd there followed the French capitulation. The developing seriousness of this situation led Colonel Spaatz and his colleagues at the United States Embassy in London to go so far as to speculate on the possibility and nature of a direct United States air contribution to the war in Europe.

15. They arrived in fact at tentative conclusions - conclusions on which, they felt, they might usefully exchange views with the appropriate British authorities. With this purpose in mind Major McDonald visited Air Ministry on 13 June to discuss the subject with the Director of Intelligence (Air Commodore Boyle). Briefly the proposal outlined by Major McDonald was that, assuming the "almost inevitable" entry of the United States into the War, perhaps in the near future, plans should be prepared for the dispatch of some fifty Flying Fortress aircraft to the United Kingdom as soon as possible. Assuming that the proposal were favourably received in the United States, pilots could be trained and special targets and objectives studied.

16. The Director of Intelligence passed on the suggestion to the Director of Plans (Air Commodore Slessor) who was "all for it in principle". The outcome was that three days later, on 16 June, the proposal was discussed fully at a conference between Major McDonald, Colonel Spaatz and the Director of Plans. It was agreed that an outline plan should be prepared for the reception, accommodation, and operation of one United States heavy bomber group consisting of four Squadrons of Flying Fortresses (Boeing 17 B's), and one group of single-seater fighters. The plan should include arrangements for airfields, signals, routing on arrival, etc. etc. The essential nucleus of ground personnel should travel to Britain in a fast ship, and the R.A.F. would provide the balance of personnel required for the operation of the Group. The requested target intelligence could be assembled and handed to Major McDonald forthwith.

17. The matter was thereupon referred to the appropriate Air Ministry branches in order that each should contribute its share to the composite plan. No definite recommendations on administrative or organisational aspects appear to have been made however, before the whole plan was overtaken by the march of events. Nevertheless opinions were expressed on how the United States air contingent should be fitted into the combined striking force and on what should be its mission. Briefly these were:

(a) Command

It was felt that while it might be desirable in the long run for United States squadrons to operate under their own

Group Headquarters and for them to take over and run their own stations, it would seem most practicable that at first they should operate under R.A.F. Groups and should share R.A.F. Stations. Only thus would they gain the necessary operational experience.

(b) Possible Objectives

In order of priority the targets recommended were (1):

- (i) Oil plants at Vienna, Regensburg, Leuna, Stettin and Magdeburg. Oil targets as a category had been subjected to systematic bombing by the R.A.F. but the plants suggested as targets for the B-17 B's were not within reach of the R.A.F. Heavy Bomber Force under cover of darkness.(2) It was believed however that these plants might be suitable as targets for the B-17 B's using high-flying tactics by day.
- (ii) Aircraft factories at Munich, Berlin, Magdeburg, Dessau, Kassel etc. Aircraft factories were less susceptible to air attacks because they were small and thus difficult to locate. However, factories producing complete bomber engines might prove the best targets to utilise the long range and the heavy bomb load capacity of the B-17 B's.
- (iii) Targets in Italy. Since the loss of the French bases, targets in Italy had been difficult to attack. They would however still be within range of the B-17 B's.

(c) Possible Limitations

But while making the above recommendations on possible targets for day bombing, the Air Staff at the same time expressed doubts as to whether it would be found practicable in the event to use the B-17 for such bombing. They felt that, in spite of its high-altitude potentialities and its powerful armour, the Fortress might prove vulnerable to the Me.110, and that experience might indicate that the aircraft would have to be operated, like the R.A.F. heavy bombers, by night.

18. But thought on the problems of closer Anglo-American collaboration in the radically changed war conditions was naturally not confined to the staffs of the United States Embassy and of Air Ministry. Other, and more highly-placed, persons had also been thinking on similar lines. Already feelers were being extended regarding the possibility of fully-authorized Staff Conversations at which the wider aspects of the subject could be explored.

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- (1) These recommendations were contained in a memorandum dated 22 June 1940, which was prepared by Plans Staff and was entitled "Notes for U.S.A. Air Attaché on the Selection of Bombing Objectives". In addition to these recommendations it contained a passage to the effect that targets for the Heavy Bomber Squadrons of the R.A.F. had been selected after an exhaustive study over a period of years of the German economy, industries and resources. The original document seems to have been accompanied by full details of the targets recommended, including dossiers, maps, etc.
 - (2) It should be noted that the R.A.F. "Heavy Bombers" of that time were two-engined aircraft of the type subsequently classified as "Medium Bombers", e.g. Wellingtons, Hampdens and Whitleys.

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III

PREPARATIONS FOR HIGH-LEVEL
UNITED STATES-BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS

June - August 1940

19. On 17 June 1940, the British Ambassador in Washington reported that he had put to the President the proposal that Staff Conversations should take place as soon as possible to discuss how the British and United States navies and, if necessary air forces, should deal with the various situations which might arise in the near future, and reported, too, that the President was in agreement with the proposal.⁽¹⁾ Thereupon the British Chiefs of Staff recommended that in the reply to Lord Lothian it should be suggested that the venue of the conversations be London, and that the discussions should cover both Air Force and Naval subjects.⁽²⁾

20. For various reasons, however, it seemed possible that the conversations might become predominantly naval. Lord Lothian was accordingly instructed to indicate to the President that it was assumed that air matters would be discussed in addition to purely naval matters, and that it might, therefore, be an advantage if a United States officer qualified to discuss air matters were nominated.⁽³⁾

21. On 20 July, Lord Lothian reported that he had been informed that an Admiral and a General had been appointed for the delegation, and that he had pressed for the addition of an "air expert".⁽⁴⁾ The outcome was that Major General Delos C. Emmons,⁽⁵⁾ the Commanding General of the United States G.H.Q. Army Air Forces, accompanied Admiral R. L. Ghormley, United States Navy, and Brigadier General G. V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, United States Army, to Britain. From the composition of the delegation, it is apparent how much importance the United States authorities attached to the conversations; on the British side, the Prime Minister gave instructions that they should be conducted in an atmosphere of complete frankness.

22. The exploratory discussions which had been caused by Major McDonald's proposals grew almost imperceptibly into definite preparations for the Staff Conversations. As early as 20 June, the Director of Plans notified the various other Air Ministry Directorates of the proposed conversations and called a conference to discuss the implications.⁽⁶⁾ The British Joint Planning Subcommittee also set to work and produced an aide-memoire on the subject.⁽⁷⁾ In the weeks which elapsed before the arrival of the delegates, however, this paper was amended and brought up-to-date.

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- (1) C.A.S. Folder No. 607 (Part I): Tel., 1019, Lord Lothian to Foreign Office: 17 June 1940.
(2) C.O.S. (40) 198th Mtg.: 28 June 1940.
(3) C.O.S. (40) 538 (J.P.): 9 July 1940.
(4) C.A.S. Folder No. 607 (Part I): Tel., 1444, Lord Lothian to Foreign Office: 20 July 1940.
(5) Major General Emmons had visited Britain in 1939, prior to the outbreak of war. (C.S. 1244, Min. 13: D.D.I. (1) to D.C.A.S.: 19 July 1939).
(6) A.M. File S.5145, Encl. 4A: Min., D. of Plans to D.H.O., D.N.O., D.O.O., D.D.W.O., D. of S., D. of I., D.D. Plans (Op.), D.C.A.S.: 20 June 1940.
(7) C.O.S. (40) 496 (J.P.) = J.P. (40) 276: 27 June 1940.

In its final version it contained a full statement of British views both on the current situation and on proposed strategy. (1) Copies of it were sent to the United States Embassy on 19 August to provide the delegates with background information prior to the actual discussions. (2) From the air standpoint, the relevant paragraph was that entitled "Lessons of the War: Air Operations". (3) In the British view, there were four outstanding lessons evident from a study of air operations to date:

- (a) The ascendancy of the up-to-date fighter over the bomber by day; to such a degree that day bombing, unless covered by fighters in great strength was so costly in casualties as to be uneconomical and usually ineffective. Even with fighter escorts, the day bomber was considered to be liable to a very severe loss ratio; witness the current German attacks on the British Isles.
- (b) The efficacy of night-bombing with highly trained crews and comparatively insignificant cost in casualties.
- (c) The importance of fire-power in the fighter, as shown by the devastating effect of the eight guns in the Hurricane and Spitfire.
- (d) The need for a high standard of armament (power-operated turrets, for instance) and for self-sealing tanks in bombers even at the expense of the bomb-load.

(1) S.A.(J).1: C.O.S.(40) 629 (J.P.) = J.P.(40) 385:
14 August 1940.

(2) Copies numbered 26, 27 and 28 were sent to the U.S. Embassy.

(3) S.A.(J).1, para. 47.

CONTINUED EMBASSY CONTACTS AND COLONEL DONOVAN'S MISSION

July - August 1940

1. Activities of the United States Air Attaches

23. The fact that Staff Conversations on a high level were shortly to take place was not, however, allowed to affect the normal contacts between Air Ministry and the United States Embassy where the Attaches continued to pursue their accustomed duties. Colonel Spaatz still held the appointment of an Assistant Attache for Air, and had been joined, after the return of Captain Kelsey to the United States, by Colonel F. O'D Hunter. (1)

24. Colonel Spaatz's main interest during his series of visits to R.A.F. units in June with Captain Kelsey had been the study of British methods of flying training. An indication of what he wished to study next was given in a letter which the Assistant Military Attache (Colonel Scanlon) sent to the Director of Intelligence, Air Ministry, on 26 June. Colonel Scanlon requested that, "if not incompatible with Air Ministry or Royal Air Force policy", arrangements might be made for Colonel Spaatz, Colonel Hunter, Major McDonald and himself to be assigned to some operating units for a period of a week or two. (2) To agree to this request, of course, involved some departure from precedent since it was not standard practice to allow representatives of foreign powers to stay for prolonged periods of R.A.F. units owing to the difficulties of ensuring adequate supervision. However, Air Ministry's way was made easier by the atmosphere of mutual confidence then prevailing in Anglo-American relations - as evidenced by the decision to hold the Staff Conversations - and the request was readily granted.

25. Colonel Scanlon and Colonel Hunter accordingly spent ten days (9 July to 18 July) at the R.A.F. Fighter Command Station at North Weald, (3) while Colonel Spaatz and Major McDonald went for the same period to the R.A.F. Bomber Command Station at Feltwell. (4) At each station the United States officers were given every facility to study the whole organisation of the station just as they wished. Ten-day periods such as these obviously gave them time to absorb much more of the detail of R.A.F. organisation than had been possible when Colonel Spaatz, Captain Kelsey and Major McDonald made their round of one-day visits.

26. On 22 July and the following day Colonel Hunter accompanied Colonel Spaatz and Major McDonald on a revisit to the R.A.F.

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- (1) Colonel Hunter, it may be noted had been appointed United States Military Attache for Air in Paris only a few days prior to its occupation by the Germans, and had just managed, through the good offices of the British Air Attache in Paris, to get away from France in a British troopship via St. Jean de Luz. He left Paris on 10 June 1940 and sailed from St. Jean de Luz on 22 June, (A.M. File C.5408, Encl. 12A: Min. by A.I.1.(f): 5 July 1940).
- (2) A.M. File S.5185, Encl. 6A: Ltr., A.M.2253, Col. Scanlon to D. of I.: 29 June 1940.
- (3) A.M. File S.5185, Encl. 22A: Report by A.I.1.(f): 19 July 1940.
- (4) A.M. File S.5185, Encl. 12A: Postagram, Air Ministry to H.Q. R.A.F. Bomber Command: 7 July 1940.

Bomber Station in order to observe the full procedure for a night's bombing operations. (1)

27. On 22 July permission was sought for Colonel Spaatz and Colonel Hunter to visit a Group Headquarters of R.A.F. Fighter Command, preferably in South-east England where active operations were in progress. (2) This was granted; and on 8 August Colonel Spaatz and Colonel Hunter proceeded to Headquarters, No. 12 Group, R.A.F. Fighter Command. On the following day they met the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (Air Vice Marshal Leigh-Mallory) and other senior Staff Officers. The whole of the organisation of the headquarters and the working of the Operations Control Room were fully explained. During the next few days (10 August to 14 August), the Attaches were taken to three of the operational stations of No. 12 Group, where they saw, among other things, the station control room, air combat films, the Defiant and Spitfire aircraft, the dispersal and messing arrangements at a satellite airfield, and in general the organisation of R.A.F. Fighter Command stations. They were also given a talk on the function and organisation of the Royal Observer Corps. (3)

28. Less than a week later (20 August) Colonel Spaatz and Colonel Hunter began another series of visits - permission for which had been sought by Colonel Scanlon on 2 August. (4) Three days were spent at an R.A.F. Bomber Command Station in East Anglia (Wattisham) in order that they might observe all the details of procedure in the operation of a day bomber station. (5) (In point of fact, at that time, though it was still normal practice to operate the Blenheims from Wattisham as day bombers, some experimental missions had recently been undertaken from the stations using Blenheims for night bombing during moonlit periods.) Shorter periods were spent at an Operational Training Unit, the Royal Aircraft Establishment (to see captured German aircraft and equipment), the Air Fighter Development Unit, an aircraft factory (to see the new single-engine fighter - the Typhoon), and the R.A.F. Experimental Station at Boscombe Down (to see the new four-engine bomber - the Stirling). (6) This last visit was made on 4 September.

29. Not long afterwards Colonel Spaatz returned to the United States. His period as Assistant Attache for Air had, however, by then extended to over three months. He had thus not lacked the opportunity to see and study the R.A.F. and the British air organisation from all angles. Perhaps most valuable, too, he had been able to see it at the time of what was probably its greatest test - the "Battle of Britain". So much is plain from Air Ministry documents. But the complete record of what he discussed with the many R.A.F. officers whom he met, high-ranking and low-ranking and of what impressions he formed is probably to be found only within the pages of his personal diary.


2. Colonel Donovan's Mission

30. Colonel William Donovan's mission was on rather a different

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- (1) A.M. File S.5185, Encl. 29A: Min., A.I.1.(s) to A.I.1.(f): 23 July 1940.
 - (2) A.M. File S.5185, Encl. 23A: Ltr., A.M.2270, Maj. McDonald to D. of I.: 22 July 1940.
 - (3) A.M. File S.5185, Encl. 36A: Report by A.A.C.1: 17 August 1940.
 - (4) A.M. File S.5902, Encl. 1A: Ltr., A.M. 2287, Col. Scanlon to D. of I.: 2 August 1940.
 - (5) A.M. File, S.5185, Encl. 38A: Report A.I.2.(d) to A.I.1.(f): 27 August 1940
 - (6) A.M. Files, S.5902 and S.5938: Various minutes and enclosures.

plane. He came to Britain in July 1940 as the special emissary of the Secretary of the Navy (Colonel Knox).⁽¹⁾ This status meant that he was given unusual facilities to see what he wanted in Britain. So far as Air Ministry and the R.A.F. were concerned, he had conferences with Air Staff officers from the Chief of the Air Staff downwards, and he was conducted on various visits by the Director of Plans personally.⁽²⁾ On his return to the United States, he reported direct to the President. In a letter which he wrote on 27 August 1940 to the Chief of the Air Staff he stated that he had stressed to the President four ways in particular by which the United States could afford help to the British air effort.⁽³⁾ They were: the release of a number of Flying Boats (Catalinas), the release of a number of Flying Fortresses (B.17), the release of the Norden bombsight, and the establishment of training camps in the United States. There is no doubt, too, that on his return Colonel Donovan was instrumental in infusing a new enthusiasm into the United States industrialists, and that his efforts were directly responsible for an increased production of aircraft. Colonel Donovan undoubtedly exerted a very considerable power for good in the early development of Anglo-American air relations.

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- (1) C.A.S. Folder No. 553: Min., P.A.S. to C.A.S.:
17 December 1940.
 - (2) C.A.S. Folder No. 553: Min., A.C.A.S.(G) to
P.S. to V.C.A.S.
 - (3) A.C.A.S.(P) Folder No. 3: Ltr., Col. Donovan to
C.A.S.: 27 August 1940.



UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS

'The Anglo-American Standardisation of
Arms Committee'

August 1940

31. The United States delegates selected to take part in the Staff Conversations in London, the preparations for which have been referred to earlier, left for England on 4 August 1940, and arrived rather less than two weeks later. For obvious reasons it had been agreed that the conversations should take place under conditions of strictest secrecy. To provide an appropriate cover, it was decided that the meetings should be regarded as those of a fictitious "Anglo-American Standardisation of Arms Committee."⁽¹⁾ When the delegates arrived, the British Chiefs of Staff were temporarily out of London. They were therefore welcomed by the Vice-Chiefs.⁽²⁾ At this first meeting on 20 August 1940, little was done except to agree that the United States officers should be given an opportunity before taking part in formal discussions, of feeling the pulse of a country at war, and that the best way of achieving this would be by visiting the principal operational headquarters in Britain.

32. So far as the R.A.F. was concerned, this meant visits to the Headquarters of Bomber, Fighter and Coastal Commands. There is no doubt that on these visits informal and unrecorded discussions took place. Impressions would be gained moreover, of the functioning of the Command organisation. But each visit was brief and there was no time for real study.

33. After a week of visiting, the United States delegation met the British Chiefs of Staff on 29 August.⁽³⁾ The Chief of the Air Staff (Air Chief Marshal Newall), who was in the Chair, reviewed the current situation. In the course of his review he gave some details of the proposed expansion of the R.A.F. and stressed that such expansion could be achieved only by utilising the combined productive capacity of the United States and Britain. His remarks on this subject prompted General Strong to emphasise the vital importance of organising this productive capacity on a co-ordinated plan.

34. On 31 August, at another meeting, the Chief of the Air Staff spoke on future strategy.⁽⁴⁾ He deduced five main points as the basis of our strategy:

- (a) The security of the United Kingdom and of Imperial possessions and interests.
- (b) The intensification of economic pressure on Germany and Italy by means of naval action and control of materials at their source.

(1) During telephonic conversations, and for franking envelopes, the code word Buffalo was used.

(2) S.A.(J) 1st Mtg. = C.O.S.(40) 273rd Mtg.: 20 Aug. 1940.

(3) S.A.(J) 2nd Mtg. = C.O.S.(40) 285th Mtg.: 29 Aug. 1940.

(4) S.A.(J) 3rd Mtg. = C.G.S.(40) 289th Mtg.: 31 Aug. 1940. The briefs for S.A.(J) 2nd and 3rd meetings were papers S.A.6. and S.A.7, both contained in C.O.S.(40) 667 (J.P.) = J.P.(40) 401: 26 Aug. 1940. These papers were based on C.O.S.(40) 647 (J.P.) and C.O.S.(40) 592. The briefs were approved at C.O.S.(40) 283rd Mtg.

- (c) The control of sea communications.
- (d) The maintenance of and the intensification of an air offensive.
- (e) The building up of armed forces to an extent which would enable a major offensive to be opened as opportunity allowed.

35. After some discussion, Major General Emmons put to the Chief of the Air Staff a categorical question: he asked whether the British experience had indicated that it was desirable to have an independent air force, or air forces subordinated to the Army and Navy. The tenor of the reply was as follows:

The problem had been the subject of intense controversy in recent years, and, though it was not necessarily his personal view, he believed that a consensus of opinion would indicate that it was desirable, given unlimited resources, to have a separate Air Force, and that, in addition, the Army and the Navy should each be served by two additional Air Forces. In the absence of such resources the 'coat had to be cut to the cloth'. He thought all would agree that there should be a separate Air Force. Only under this condition was it possible to foster the requisite development of industry, science, research and technique. If the Air Force were subordinated to the Army and the Navy, freedom of development would inevitably be hampered. The problem might, however, be different in each country in relation to its geographical position; nevertheless, he felt that the establishment of a separate Air Force was the soundest policy. On this basis, and in the light of industrial and financial resources available, a decision could be reached as to whether the Army and the Navy should each have separate Air Arms.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the Chief of the Naval Staff endorsed these remarks.

36. It is pertinent to interpolate here a reference to the fact that Mr. Anthony Eden, then Secretary of State for War, apparently expressed to General Strong and General Emmons views on this subject which diverged somewhat from those of the Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Eden is understood to have said that a separate Air Force was not desirable, and to have enlarged on the essential need for the Army to have complete control of its own air arm. (1)

37. Reverting to S.A.(J) 3rd Meeting, Admiral Ghormley asked whether the British Chiefs of Staff, in formulating their plans for future action, were relying on receiving continued economic and industrial support from the United States and also whether they counted on the active co-operation of the United States. To this the Chief of the Air Staff replied that the British Chiefs of Staff were relying on United States support in an ever-increasing flow, and that such economic and industrial support was implicit in our strategy. No account, however, had been taken of the possibility of active co-operation; this was a matter of high political policy.

38. General Strong felt that the time had come when there should be a full exchange of intelligence on a regular basis. The Chief of the Air Staff promised to take this particular matter up with the Prime Minister. (2)

(1) D. of Plans O.R.B.: Min., D. of Plans to C.A.S.:
30 August 1940.


(2) See later: para. 82 et seq.

39. Following the broad surveys of current events and of strategy given at the meetings with the Chiefs of Staff, the United States delegates conferred each with the Director of Plans of his own service.⁽¹⁾ Major General Emmons had a conference with the Director of Plans, Air Ministry, on 2 September, but the discussion was in general terms only, and no record of it was kept.⁽²⁾

40. During their visit General Strong and General Emmons had thus been given the fullest opportunity to form impressions and obtain knowledge: they had visited operational units; they had heard authoritative statements on current events and on future strategy; they had talked with staff officers formally and informally; and they had been encouraged to be inquisitive - all in an atmosphere of utmost frankness. What they heard and saw must have influenced their future thinking; and since they were each highly-placed officers, it would seem inevitable that their thoughts should find some reflection in their future plans and projects on the other side of the Atlantic.

(1) J.P.C. File, "Staff Talks : U.S.A., 1940" : Ltr., Sec. of J.P.C. to D. of Plans : 31 August 1940.

(2) Information obtained personally from A/C/M Slessor.



UNITED STATES AIR OBSERVERS IN BRITAIN

October 1940 - March 1941

41. Before the end of the Staff Conversations moves were being made in both London and Washington to establish military contacts on a semi-permanent basis.

42. In Washington the suggestion came from the Secretary of the Treasury (Mr. Morgenthau). In an interview with the British Under Secretary of State for Air (Captain H. H. Balfour) on 1 September 1940, he expressed the view that if more people in positions of authority in the United States - including such people in the Army, Navy and Air Force - could visit Britain and be shown everything, the better it would be in every way for Anglo-American collaboration.⁽¹⁾ In particular, he was anxious that a United States Army officer should accompany the first delivery to Britain of P-40 aircraft. The United States authorities could then have first-hand information on its performance under battle conditions.

43. In London the United States Military Attaché and Attaché for Air (Colonel Raymond E. Lee)⁽²⁾ had taken certain steps in the same direction. He had approached War Department with the proposition that a number of specialist United States officers should be sent to Britain to study specific questions of technique and operations. War Department had instructed him to ascertain the British reaction to the proposal, with the result that on 30 August 1940 he wrote to Air Ministry and to War Office asking for their views.⁽³⁾

44. The arrival in Britain of what amounted to a Mission, involved questions of higher policy. The matter was therefore referred to the Prime Minister. It was regarded favourably and as a result approval was given not only for the visits of United States officers to Britain but also for the mutual exchange of staff officers.⁽⁴⁾ This decision was conveyed to Colonel Lee on 17 September⁽⁵⁾; and to the authorities in Washington, through the British Ambassador there, on 1 October.⁽⁶⁾

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- (1) A.M. File S.6300, Encl. 1B : Note of interview Mr. Morgenthau - Capt. H. H. Balfour : 1 September 1940.
 - (2) Col. Lee officially succeeded Gen. Miles as U.S. Military Attaché and Attaché for Air in London at the beginning of July 1940 (A.M. File C.5408, Encl. 12A : Note by A.I.1(f) : 5 July 1940).
 - (3) A.M. File S.6070, Encl. 1A : Ltr., A.M. 2309, Col. Lee to D. of I. : 30 August 1940.
 - (4) D. of Plans Folder, 'Miscellaneous American Papers' : Min., P.S. to V.C.A.S. : 12 September 1940.
 - (5) A.M. File S.6070, Encl. 5A : Ltr., S.6070/A.I.1(f), D. of I. to Col. Lee : 17 September 1940.
 - (6) A.M. File S.6070, Encl. 9A : Tel., 2429 (R), Foreign Office to Lord Lothian : 1 October 1940.

45. Shortly afterwards the following United States officers were ordered over to Britain:

<u>Name of Officer</u>	<u>Particular interest</u>
Major General J. E. Chaney Captain Gordon Saville(1) }	Organisation of Fighter Command, etc.
Major General Barton Yount	Training and Organisation.
Major Alfred Marriner	Radio and Radar.
Major James G. Taylor	Aircraft : technical aspects
Major Robert Williams	Night Bombardment Units.
Major Reuben Curtis Moffat	Night Pursuit Units.
Major W. R. Taylor	Day Pursuit Units.
Captain Frank A. Armstrong(2)	Day Bombardment Units.
Major Robert Douglas	Coastal Command.
Major Paul S. Edwards	Air Corps Communications and Radio.

46. Very few limitations were placed upon the facilities offered to these observers - and, later, others - to obtain such information as they required. Just what in all it amounted to, however, is not easy to determine. Even at the time, in November 1940, when the Director of Intelligence, Air Ministry, was asked for a 'factual' statement of the intelligence exchanged with the observers, he could only say:

"..... it would be impossible to give a list of what has been given without long research and the results would not be complete even then, since the Americans have had access to many Departments and all Commands frequently..... it would be easier to say what they have not had than what they have had."(3)

And after this was written, United States air observers continued for several months to pay visits to Britain. It is therefore quite evident that they had ample opportunity to form impressions of how the R.A.F. was organised, how it functioned, how it was equipped, and of how R.A.F. officers were thinking and planning.

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- (1) By May 1942 Captain Saville had become the Director of Air Defence in War Department, and was responsible for the preparation of U.S. Pursuit Groups intended for Europe (A.C.A.S. (Ops.) Folder No. J.3.B : Tel., Marcus 112, Evill to Slessor : 12 May 1942).
- (2) Major F. A. Armstrong was the 'Operations Officer' in the nucleus Staff of twelve officers which, in February 1942, came over with Gen. Eaker to form the initial echelon of Hq., U.S. Bomber Command.
- (3) A.M. File C.S. 7867, Encl. 1A : Ltr., P.S. to C.A.S. to War Cabinet Offices (Col. Edwards) : 2 December 1940.

THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
ON AIR MATTERS WITH THE UNITED STATES

Policy and Procedure during 1940

47. The narrative has already inevitably contained constant allusions to the exchange of information and intelligence concerning the prosecution, or the ways and means of prosecuting, the war against the Axis. It will be recalled how, through the Embassy contacts and various missions, and the activities of the United States air observers in Britain, there had already been something more than a trickle of such intelligence flowing across the Atlantic for many months previously, and how in August 1940, during the Staff Conversations, even such highly secret matters as future strategical plans had been discussed with United States delegates. The purpose of this Section will be to weave the strands into a more connected pattern, and to try to discern the underlying policies.

48. Between two countries one of which is engaged in a struggle for its very existence, while the other remains a non-belligerent, the exchange of military intelligence - using the term in its broadest connotation - is bound to be a delicate problem. So it was between the United States and Britain in 1940. On the one side the United States were inclined to be fearful lest any secret vouchsafed to Britain - especially any cherished new technical device - might through an unfortunate accident of war fall into enemy hands; on the other side Britain had no less fears lest the peacetime security regulations of the United States might prove insufficiently rigorous to protect her secrets once disclosed. At the same time there is no doubt that each was conscious of the countervailing advantages which would accrue from a pooling of intelligence and other secret information. Negotiations to this end were, therefore, in progress in one guise or another, almost continuously - with varying results.

48A. The information - from the air standpoint - in which interest was especially centred may be conveniently divided into three categories:

- (a) Technical and Scientific Information affecting the Air War.
- (b) Operational Air Intelligence.
- (c) Information on Aircraft Supply Programmes and Production Plans.

This division also conveniently sets the pattern for the Section.

1. Technical and Scientific Information
affecting the Air War

49. Notable among the technical devices which became the subject of the earlier negotiations was the Norden bomb-sight. In this piece of aircraft equipment the British were naturally very interested. If it was as effective as was claimed by its United States users, then it would indeed form a valuable addition to the equipment of British bombing aircraft. So far as obtaining the use of it was concerned, it was thought that the United States authorities might possibly consider releasing the secret of it if, in exchange, information were offered on the technical details of certain British equipment on the secret list, such as aircraft

turrets. Negotiations on this basis were in fact undertaken by the British Ambassador in Washington at various times from the outbreak of the war in Europe until about March 1940.(1) As, however, the United States authorities always wanted an assurance that the bomb-sight, if given to Britain, would not fall into enemy hands, and as Britain did not feel able to give this assurance, nothing came of the negotiations.

50. The subject was nevertheless raised again in June 1940.(2) The Ambassador brought it up with the President. The President's reply was, however, that as soon as the British could capture a German aircraft containing a sight which was approximately as efficient, or could manufacture one themselves, and send either over to the United States, he would have no difficulty in persuading Congress to release the Norden bombsight. Nor would there be any difficulty then in accelerating its production by concentration of manufacture. But until such time, he felt sure that Congress would not agree, for the security of the Norden bombsight would remain in their eyes a vital factor, and in order to safeguard its security the manufacture of its component parts would continue to be spread over some five firms.

51. Later again, in July, the release of the Norden bombsight was one of the four means of assisting Britain which Colonel William Donovan after his visit to Britain, urged upon the President (see para. 30).

52. Subsequently however, attention came to be focused on another type of bombsight - the Sperry - rather than the Norden. By the end of August 1940, the Sperry firm had evolved a bombsight which was reputed to be a great improvement on their earlier models, and even an improvement on the Norden sight. The Secretary of the Treasury mentioned this bombsight to the British Under-Secretary of State for Air during an interview on 1 September 1940.(3) He said that he had put forward the view to his colleagues that if any bombsight were released to the British it should be the new Sperry version. Such a policy had been contested by those who wanted to release only the older Sperry sight, but he had, he said, in spite of this opposition maintained his position on the question.

53. Developments during September 1940, were closely linked with negotiations as to whether a limited additional number of United States aircraft could be released to Britain, and in order to place events in their appropriate sequence and give them due significance, the two subjects of the release of the bombsight and the release of the additional aircraft will be considered together.

54. The story centres upon the Boeing B-17 (Flying Fortress), the Consolidated PB4Y (Catalina), and later the Consolidated B-24 (Liberator) types of aircraft. It begins during August 1940, at the time of the well known destroyers/bases deal - when discussions were taking place regarding the possible transfer to Britain of a number of over-age United States destroyers in return for the lease to the United States of bases in certain British territories in the Western Atlantic area. In the earlier stages of the discussion it seemed possible that other British needs might also be

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- (1) A.M. File S.5799, Encl. 33A: Note by S.6.: 25 July 1940.
(2) A.M. File S.4474, Encl. 56C: Tel. 1202, Lord Lothian to Foreign Office: 1 July 1940.
(3) A.C.A.S.(P) Folder No.361 : Min., U.S. of S. for Air to S. of S. for Air and P.U.S.: 6 September 1940.

considered in conjunction with the destroyers/bases deal, and accordingly on 8 August 1940 the British Ambassador thought it advisable to indicate to the President what these British needs were. Among them he included Catalina and Vought-Sikorsky dive bomber aircraft.(1) Various legalistic difficulties surrounded the whole transaction, and they applied no less to the additional desiderata than to the destroyers/bases. However, the Secretary of State (Mr. Hull) assured Lord Lothian on 28 August that the question of their release would at least be dealt with in the same spirit as that which the President had shown towards the destroyers/bases deal(2); and, in fact, when the matter came before the President he put it into more definite terms by saying that he thought that the United States could supply, among other things, five Flying Fortresses and five Catalinas.(3)

55. As things happened however, mainly it seems through misunderstandings between various officers in the United States Administration, these aircraft and the other additional items were not in the end included in the provisions of the destroyers/bases agreement - which meant that separate negotiations to obtain them had to be initiated and the legalistic difficulties confronted afresh.(4) The handling of these negotiations fell to Lord Lothian and Mr. Purvis, and during September they were both persistent - almost, they felt, to the point of importunity - in their appeals to the United States Administration to find a way around the various problems involved. Even so, it was not until late in the month that there was any real progress.

56. On 27 September, however, the Secretary of the Treasury was at last able to inform Mr. Purvis that:

(a) Releases had been authorised which would result in Britain (i) getting alternate deliveries with the United States Navy of the new type of Catalina (the PBV-5) which would mean an important acceleration in deliveries and an increase in numbers, and (ii) having the right to order the newest Sperry bombsight with all the improvements.

(b) The outlook in regard to the release of Liberator aircraft was good.(5)

57. A few days later, on 2 October, came the additional good news that:

(a) Twenty-six additional Liberator aircraft were to be delivered to Britain by April 1941, and

(b) Forty of the new Sperry bombsights would be released out of stock, in addition to which priority would be granted on a further ninety-seven which would probably mean that they would be delivered to Britain by the end of January 1941.(6)

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- (1) A.H.B. Folder No. II F2/10 : Tel., 1653, Lord Lothian to Foreign Office : 8 August 1940.
 - (2) A.H.B. Folder No. II F2/10 : Tel., 1857, Lord Lothian to Foreign Office : 28 August 1940.
 - (3) A.M. File S.5613 (Part II), Encl. 272B : Tel., 2062, Lord Lothian to Foreign Office : 20 September 1940.
 - (4) A.M. File S.5613 (Part II), Encl. 241A : Tel., Pursa 90 : 10 September 1940.
 - (5) A.M. File S.5613 (Part II), Encl. 293A : Tel., Pursa 117, Purvis to Salter : 27 September 1940.
 - (6) A.M. File S.5613 (Part II), Encl. 315A : Tel., Pursa 125, Purvis to Salter : 2 October 1940. The Liberator aircraft would be released as follows: October - 3; November - 5; December - 3; January - 3; February, March and April - 4 each.

Thus at last the long negotiations over the release of the United States bombsight had been crowned with partial success.

58. It is doubtful, however, whether the Sperry bombsight would have been released but for its being part of the equipment of the Liberator aircraft; in any event the relaxation was not extended to the Norden bombsight. This remained a closely guarded United States secret. It appears, in fact, that it was mainly because the Norden sight was an essential piece of apparatus in the Flying Fortress that the United States authorities evinced such reluctance to release any of this type of aircraft to Britain. The United States Army, in particular, regarded any such proposal with considerable disfavour.⁽¹⁾ In all there was so much opposition that the proposal did not materialise and the Liberators were offered instead.

59. In point of fact, the British Air Staff were not at that time unduly concerned about the break-down of negotiations concerning the Flying Fortresses, since they had doubts whether the type of Fortress then available (the B-17B), on account of its vulnerability, would be of any great operational value.⁽²⁾ They were sceptical, too, about even the improved type of Fortress (the B-17C). However, the British representatives in Washington did make an effort to get priority for the future on an improved type of Fortress; a policy which, as it happens, accorded well with the long-term plans upon which the President and the Secretary of the Treasury were then working, for they were aiming to ensure that deliveries of aircraft to Britain would eventually be of a competent type of plane in adequate numbers.

60. But the difficulties surrounding the release of the Norden bombsight persisted. They were voiced again on 7 November 1940. On that date the President and the Secretary of the Treasury were discussing with Mr. Purvis the possibility of making further allocations of aircraft, especially heavy bombers, to Britain, and the President observed that, even though it was his policy to make arms and munitions available to Britain on a fifty/fifty basis, there would still be difficulties about the immediate release of the Flying Fortresses owing to their having the Norden bombsight installations.⁽³⁾

61. Within a month, however, means were found for overcoming all the objections, for arrangements were by then in hand for the release of twenty Flying Fortresses to Britain, subject only to the condition that facilities should be granted for "United States Observers to obtain direct information from the combat and maintenance crews of these bombers". These Observers, it was further stipulated, should be stationed at the actual scene of operations. With this condition, of course, the British Air Staff found no difficulty in complying.⁽⁴⁾ At last there was a prospect of Flying Fortresses operating from British bases. As things turned out, several months elapsed before the prospect gained substance, but that story will not be pursued at this point. This Section is concerned rather with the negotiations regarding scientific devices than with allocations of aircraft;

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- (1) A.M. File S.5613 (Part II), Encl. 293A: Tel., Pursa 117, Purvis to Salter: 27 September 1940.
 - (2) A.M. File S.5613 (Part II), Encl. 293B: Min., P.S. to P.U.S., Air Min. to P.U.S., Air Min. 28 September 1940.
 - (3) A.M. File S.5613 (Part III) Encl. 498A: Tel., Pursa 218, Purvis to Salter: 10 November 1940. The public announcement of this fifty/fifty policy was made by the President on 8 November 1940.
 - (4) S.6 Folder No. 7C: Tel., Briny 1856, Wilson to Beaverbrook: 10 December 1940.

the subsequent story of the Flying Fortresses will find a place later in the narrative. Here, we must turn to the events associated with another piece of scientific equipment which played an important part in the air war - R.D.F., as it was called at that time.

62. The value of some exchange of information on the progress of the developments in this field on either side of the Atlantic was stressed by the British Ambassador, in a message to his Government, as early as April 1940.⁽¹⁾ Prompted by Professor A. V. Hill, at that time a British scientific air attache in Washington, he suggested that the time was then opportune for initiating such an exchange. Research, he indicated, was proceeding apace, and would proceed still faster if the fruits of such research could be mutually shared. Such a course was eminently desirable from a purely technical standpoint; equally, he felt, it was desirable from the standpoint of general Anglo-American relationship. It would help to bring the services of the two countries into close liaison and sympathy regarding war preparations as a whole.

63. The Ambassador's proposal was considered by the War Cabinet and in principle was regarded favourably.⁽²⁾ Closer investigation of the various implications was left to the Air Ministry. Accordingly a meeting was held on 3 May 1940 at which the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (General) (Air Marshal Peck) presided, and at which were present, in addition to Air Ministry officers and scientific advisers, representatives of the War Office and Admiralty.⁽³⁾ The arguments for and against an interchange of information on R.D.F. were marshalled, and it was agreed that they should be embodied in a report for submission to higher authority.

64. A week after the date of the meeting there was a change of Government in Britain - it was on 10 May 1940 that Mr. Churchill took office as Prime Minister and became head of the Coalition Government which was destined to lead Britain to within sight of victory. The question of interchange of information with the United States consequently became overshadowed temporarily at least by other considerations.

65. However on 18 May the subject was discussed by the Chiefs of Staff and found their general approval;⁽⁴⁾ while on 20 May the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. A. V. Alexander) wrote to the Prime Minister urging that the pooling of technical information with the United States would be an admirable and timely gesture of good-will towards them, and pointing out that such a gesture would also add to the efficiency of the United States Forces if and when they entered the war.

66. In his reply on the following day the Prime Minister said he appreciated very forcibly all the First Lord's arguments but would prefer to wait a few days before coming to a decision.

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- (1) A.M. File S.4471, Encl. 6C: Tel. 595, Lord Lothian to Foreign Office: 24 April 1940. See also in same file Encl. 1D: Tel., 4232 Air Attache, Washington, to V.C.A.S.: 23 April 1940.
 - (2) W.M. (40) 104th Mtg.: 26 April 1940.
 - (3) A.M. File S.4471, Encl. 23B: Note of Mtg. held in Air Ministry: 3 May 1940. The Air Ministry personnel present were: A/M Joubert, A/Cdre Nutting, G/C Chappell, Sir Geo. Lee, Sir H. Tizard, Mr. Watson-Watt.
 - (4) C.O.S. (40) 138th Mtg.: 18 May 1940.

67. For a month or so afterwards, no further move was made. Then on 25 June the question was re-opened by the Secretary of State for Air (Sir Archibald Sinclair), again in a letter to the Prime Minister.⁽¹⁾ He adduced arguments similar to those of the First Lord but weighted them by reference to the opinions of Professor Hill who had just returned to London from Washington and had written a long memorandum on the subject.⁽²⁾ By now the Prime Minister was persuaded, and authorised the initiation of the necessary negotiations.⁽³⁾

68. As for the ways and means of achieving the aim in view, it seems to have been agreed that a small British mission sent out to the United States would probably prove the most satisfactory arrangement.

69. This trend of events was conveyed to the British Ambassador in Washington in a telegram on 6 July 1940.⁽⁴⁾ It was explained to him that the British intention in suggesting a general interchange of secret information on technical matters was based on a desire to show in a concrete manner a readiness for fullest collaboration; it was not wished to make bargains or to press the United States authorities to give specific undertakings prior to the opening of discussions. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Ambassador was instructed to approach the President on the matter.

70. On 22 July a reply was received from the Ambassador that the President would be glad if the special mission could leave for the United States as soon as possible.⁽⁵⁾

71. To decide who should go and what should be the general lines of policy to which the mission should conform a special meeting of Cabinet Ministers and Advisers was held on 25 July with the Prime Minister presiding.⁽⁶⁾ The meeting formally agreed that a special mission, to initiate the exchange of technical information, should be sent to the United States as soon as possible, and that it should be headed by a personality of outstanding eminence in the scientific world. To give practical expression to these formal conclusions it was further agreed that Sir Henry Tizard should be invited to lead the mission, that the three Service Departments, the Ministry of Supply and the Ministry of Aircraft Production, should each appoint delegates to it, and that the arrangements for its departure should be left to the Ministry of Aircraft Production.

72. Lists of the items on which it was proposed to exchange information were drawn up by each Department, and on 30 July 1940 were placed before the Prime Minister,⁽⁷⁾ who approved them without amendment.⁽⁸⁾ It was later decided however, that

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- (1) A.M. File S.4471, Encl. 48A: Ltr., S. of S. for Air to Prime Minister: 25 June 1940.
 - (2) A.M. File S.4471, Encl. 47A: Ltr., with enclosures, Prof. Hill to S. of S. for Air: 21 June 1940.
 - (3) A.M. File S.4471, Encl. 52A: Min., Prime Minister to S. of S. for Air: 30 June 1940.
 - (4) A.M. File S.4471, Encl. 67B: Tel., 1414, Foreign Office to Lord Lothian: 6 July 1940.
 - (5) A.M. File S.4471, Encl. 84A: Tel., 1474, Lord Lothian to Foreign Office: 22 July 1940.
 - (6) A.M. File S.5799, Encl. 29A: War Cabinet Paper 14/13/22, Mins. of Mtg.....: 25 July 1940.
 - (7) A.M. File S.4471, Encl. 95A: Min. to P.M.: 30 July 1940.
 - (8) A.M. File S.5799, Encl. 40: Ltr., Lt. Col. Jacob to P.S. to S. of S. for Air: 31 July 1940.

Sir Henry Tizard need not be bound rigidly by the lists, but would be empowered to disclose secret information on additional subjects as appeared desirable.⁽¹⁾ In fact Sir Henry Tizard's own broad interpretation of his instructions was that he should give all the assistance that he could on behalf of the British Government to enable the armed forces of the United States to reach the highest level of efficiency - in other words he was to tell them all they wished to know and to make provisional arrangements for them to get further details, as required, by sending representatives to Britain. As a complement he would do his best to get any technical information from United States scientists which appeared likely to further the British war effort.

73. On 11 August the British Ambassador in Washington was informed by telegram that the arrangements for the departure of the mission were complete.⁽²⁾ Sir Henry Tizard would leave for Canada on 14 August and would proceed to Washington after preliminary discussions with the Canadian authorities. This time-table was maintained and, he actually arrived in Washington on 21 August. By 11 September all the members of his mission had joined him.

74. During September the members of the mission were in constant contact with their counterparts in the United States and information was exchanged in accordance with the terms of reference.

75. Sir Henry Tizard himself returned to Britain about the middle of October 1940. He had arranged before his departure from Washington, however, that provisional machinery was set up to maintain and develop, under the aegis of the British Purchasing Commission there, the activities which he and his colleagues had initiated.⁽³⁾ On his return to London he raised the question of the establishment of some more permanent machinery.

76. The question was referred for consideration to the North American Supply Committee. This was a committee of the War Cabinet which had been set up in July 1940 under the chairmanship of Sir Arthur Salter to consider all major questions of policy in relation to the co-ordination of supplies from both the United States and Canada.⁽⁴⁾ It was composed of representatives from the Ministries of Supply, Aircraft Production and Shipping, and from the Foreign and Dominions Offices, and from the three Service Departments - the Permanent Under-Secretary of State (Sir Arthur Street) representing the Air Ministry. Sir Henry Tizard's question came before the 5th meeting of his committee on 24 October 1940.⁽⁵⁾ The importance of making some adequate arrangements to ensure the continuance of scientific liaison with the United States was fully appreciated, and in order that the problem could be fully investigated, a sub-committee of delegates from the three Service Departments, the Foreign Office and the Ministries of Supply and Aircraft Production was appointed to report on it.

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- (1) A.M. File S.4471, Encl. 105a: Ltr., Sec. to Scientific Advisory Committee to M.A.P.: 2 August 1940.
 - (2) A.M. File S.5799, Encl. 55A: Tel., 1867, Foreign Office to Lord Lothian: 11 August 1940.
 - (3) A.M. File 5799, Encl. 70A: N.A.S.(40)30: 22 October 1940.
 - (4) A.M. File S.5613 (Part I), Encl. 14A: N.A.S.(40)1: 9 July 1940.
 - (5) A.M. File S.5799, Encl. 72A: N.A.S.(40) 5th Mtg. 24 October 1940.

77. This sub-committee met on 29 October.⁽¹⁾ Before making definite proposals, however, they decided that it would be best to await the arrival in London of Mr. A. B. Purvis (the Director-General of the British Purchasing Commission in Washington) and the return of Sir Walter Layton (the Director General of Programmes at the Ministry of Supply) who was then visiting the United States.⁽²⁾ To cover the interim period the sub-committee recommended that the members of the Tizard Mission who were remaining in Washington should be attached to the British Purchasing Commission; and that pending the establishment of some permanent arrangement Sir Henry Tizard should act as special adviser on the subject. He could make use of the machinery of the Central Office for North American Supplies if he wished to follow up any questions resulting from his mission.

78. But one point of considerably broader implications was brought out during the sub-committee's deliberations: this was that no Cabinet directive of a comprehensive and authoritative nature on the subject of the release and exchange of secret information appeared to exist. The policy being followed by separate departments had been derived, it emerged, from incidental statements made from time to time by various high level authorities. In particular the Prime Minister's ruling at the time of the United States-British Staff conversations in August, that discussions should proceed on a basis of complete frankness had been taken as an authoritative direction. That this had been quite definitely the policy followed in Air Ministry was stressed by its representative (Air Marshal Joubert). He pointed for instance to the almost unlimited facilities which had been afforded the United States air observers: they had been shown almost everything there was to see. And his observations were echoed by the representatives from other departments.

79. This absence of a defined policy was, however, a defect which was soon to be remedied. During November the War Cabinet had the whole subject under consideration - they reviewed the principles which should govern the release of secret information, not only on scientific and technical matters, but also on supply programmes, on production plans, and on operational data as well. At their meeting on 21 November 1940, they enunciated the principles on which they had decided. But before turning to summarise these decisions of the War Cabinet, it will be well to review story of the prior exchanges of information during 1940 in the other two fields of interest.

2. Operational Air Intelligence

80. As with so many other aspects of Anglo-American co-operation, the origin of the exchanges of operational air intelligence also lies in the contacts which were always maintained between the United States Embassy in London and Air Ministry. From the outbreak of the European war, the Military Air Attaches at the Embassy had kept in close touch with the Director of Intelligence at Air Ministry (Air Commodore Boyle), and along this channel a certain amount of operational air intelligence continuously found its way to Washington. In the main, however, such intelligence had been limited to lessons which had been learnt from past operations, and to information concerning various targets in Axis-occupied territory

(1) A.M. File S.5799, Encl. 73A: N.A.S.(40) 33: 31 October 1940.
(2) The positions and duties of these two officials are dealt with in Part 3 of this Section.

(see para. 17 above).⁽¹⁾ For obvious reasons there was no disclosure of information concerning the details of future operations.

81. Then came the United States-British Staff Conversations in August 1940. It was envisaged beforehand that the subject of operational intelligence would at some point be introduced into the Agenda for these Conversations. Accordingly the British Joint Intelligence Committee had given some thought to the matter, and at their meeting on 27 August 1940 had agreed that, inasmuch as the United States Service Departments had fully justified the confidence placed in them whenever secret information had been officially disclosed to them, it would be mutually beneficial to give the United States officers as much information as policy allowed.⁽²⁾ And as this policy, on the authority of the Prime Minister, at least so far as the Conversations were concerned, was complete frankness, the Joint Intelligence Committee's recommendation therefore implied that little or no restrictions should be placed upon what would be disclosed to the United States delegates.

82. During the Conversations, the question of the exchange of intelligence was indeed raised. It was brought up, as will be recalled from paragraph 38 above, by General Strong at the 3rd Meeting in the series on 31 August 1940. He expressed the view that the time had come for a full interchange of intelligence between the United States and Britain on a regular basis; to which the Chief of the Air Staff replied that he would refer the matter to the Prime Minister.

83. In point of fact it was considered at a meeting between the Directors of Intelligence of the three services and the Chiefs of Staff and it was agreed to recommend that the exchange of "ordinary intelligence" with the United States should be unrestricted.⁽³⁾

84. This was the policy which seems to have been followed, in respect of air intelligence in any event, during the autumn of 1940. Each day the United States Military Air Attache was furnished with a copy of the Air Ministry Daily Summary of Operations and Intelligence, which gave a full resume of the air activities, allied and enemy during the previous twenty-four hours. In addition there were the facilities afforded the United States air observers. Among the other privileges accorded them, they were given manifold opportunities to see all types of operations in progress, even to the extent of living for periods on R.A.F. stations.⁽⁴⁾ British air strengths and dispositions were revealed to them; also similar information - such as was available - concerning the German Air Force. Again, they were given a copy of the confidential Royal Air Force list, and they had access to many secret documents which related to the various questions which they

(1) A.M. File S.7457, Encl. 8A: Note by S.6.:

(2) J.I.C. (40) 56th Mtg.: 27 August 1940.

(3) A.M. File S.7457, Encl. 8A: Note by S.6. ?

(4) Major Robert Williams and Capt. Frank Armstrong (interested respectively in night and day bombing) had spent some two weeks in October/November on an operational station with a squadron of No. 4 Bomber Group (A.M. File CS.6751, Min. 2: Note by A.I.1(f): 23 October 1940); Major Reuben Moffat spent a week at a Night Fighter Station about the end of November 1940 (A.M. File CS.6751, Encl. 16A: Min. A.I.1(f) to D. of I.: 27 November 1940); and there were other instances.

wished to investigate. In fact, to such an extent had the air observers been given information that it had been found almost unnecessary to make use of the channel through the British Embassy in Washington. (1)

85. This, then, was the state of affairs obtaining in regard to operational intelligence at the time of the War Cabinet's pronouncement in November 1940. To turn to the third category.

3. Information on Aircraft Supply Programmes and Production Plans

86. Some convergence of interest in matters relating to the production of aircraft was, of course, a natural consequence as soon as Britain began to buy aircraft from the United States. But in the earlier days of 1940 the degree of convergence was still slight. The two countries could, and did, still view their problems from their own particular angles. The United States was a seller: Britain was a buyer. True Britain was anxious that some of the errors corrected through operational experience in British aircraft should not be repeated in United States aircraft. But this was a technical problem. On the subjects of production programmes and future plans there was little need for much exchange of information.

87. But by the latter part of 1940 the situation had changed. Various contingencies had rendered it necessary for the aircraft production in the two countries to be considered less as two distinct problems than as one composite whole. Britain had reached the point where an integral assumption in her expansion plans was a flow of aircraft - in definite quantities and of definite types - from United States production. The United States, involved also in expansion plans for her own air forces, could only stabilise her plans when she knew what proportion of her own production would be left available to satisfy her own needs. Britain, therefore, was interested in United States production; the United States was interested in British programmes and plans. Without some exchange of information on these topics neither could formulate their respective policies.

88. Before giving any account of how this exchange developed, it should be made clear that in Britain the practical responsibility for the actual production of aircraft was laid upon a Ministry specially created for the purpose - the Ministry of Aircraft Production, the work of which rather falls outside the scope of this narrative. But in so far as the programmes and plans to which the Ministry worked reflected the trend of overall air policy, some consideration of them is essential to the development of the narrative. To this extent, therefore, the story of exchange of information on aircraft production plans and programmes finds a place in the subsequent paragraphs.

89. A few words first about the machinery which was set up during 1940 to control the procurement of aircraft from the United States.

90. In the earlier months of 1940 France was associated with Britain in purchasing aircraft - and other war materials - from the United States, and there was accordingly set up in Washington in March 1940 the "Anglo-French Purchasing Board". The head on the French side was M. Monnet; on the British, Mr. A. B. Purvis. After the fall of France, Britain took over, under the terms of an

(1) A.M. File S.7457, Encl. 2A; Ltr., A.P.S. to C.A.S. to War Cabinet Offices: 2 December 1940.

agreement signed on 17 June 1940 by authorised representatives of His Majesty's Government (the British Ambassador to France) and of the Head of the French State (General Weygand), all outstanding French contracts. Soon afterwards the Anglo-French Purchasing Board was dissolved; and the British Purchasing Commission with Mr. Purvis as Director General, became responsible henceforth for placing all British orders in the United States, for munitions, materials, and machine tools and for negotiating with the United States Administration on all matters of supply, apart from aircraft. Negotiations for the purchases of aircraft on the British account were made the responsibility of the British Air Commission, which was under the direction of Sir Henry Self. In addition the Minister of Aircraft Production had his own representative, Mr. Morris Wilson, whose headquarters were in Montreal, but who covered the United States as well.

91. Thus the British organisation in the United States had developed by the early autumn of 1940. Through it the purchases of aircraft proceeded smoothly. During September, however, there were portents of a rougher passage ahead.

92. The cause of the trouble may be traced to certain impressions carried back to Washington and expressed there by General Strong and Colonel Spaatz after their visits to Britain. It appears that from their observations and discussions these two officers had formed the definite impression that the British demands on the United States for aircraft represented a larger number of planes than could possibly be matched with trained crews. They felt, therefore, that Britain must be piling up an unnecessarily large reserve of aircraft; in other words that the United States were being asked to make unwarranted sacrifices.

93. The first echo of this to reach the British authorities in Washington was when the United States Secretary of the Treasury (Mr. Morgenthau) - to whom the President had specially delegated the task of co-ordinating the measures designed to afford assistance to Britain - advised Mr. Purvis on 26 September 1940 of how he had been confronted with this suggestion in a meeting which he had just had with United States Army representatives.⁽¹⁾ The Army representatives had stated definitely that their view was based on data obtained confidentially by General Strong and Colonel Spaatz while they had been in Britain. That these same views had also reached the ear of the highest authority became evident the next day. The Director General of Programmes at the Ministry of Supply (Sir Walter Layton), who was at that time in Washington,⁽²⁾ had an interview on that day with the President, and in the course of it the President expressed some anxiety about the number of pilots available to man the aircraft being supplied to Britain.⁽³⁾ During the same interview the President observed that he thought it might be useful if the British authorities could furnish his administration with weekly information showing the fluctuations in British needs which, he felt, must be resulting from the changing fortunes of war. Sir Walter Layton countered - as he did also in another conference in War Department on 4 October⁽⁴⁾ - by explaining how difficult it was in practice properly to synchronise aircraft output with pilot output. Both were long-term projects for which assessments had to be made many

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- (1) S.6. Folder No.7C: Tel. Pursa 128: 2 October 1940.
(2) Sir Walter Layton was in Washington with instructions from the War Cabinet to give to the U.S. Administration a general picture of the British supply position.
(3) A.M. File S.7055, Encl. 1B: Annex I to Ltr., Sir W. Layton to Sir A. Salter: 9 October 1940.
(4) A.M. File S.7055, Encl. 1B: Annex III to Ltr. Sir W. Layton to Sir A. Salter: 9 October 1940.

months before the projects materialised, so that by the time they did materialise they were often not in phase.

94. But it was clear that to dispel the false impression which had gained such wide currency among the responsible United States officials in Washington, a frank and full exchange of information on both British production and pilot production was highly desirable.

95. This the various British representatives in Washington realised, and accordingly reported the position to London in a telegram sent jointly on 2 October by Mr. Furvis, M. Monnet, and M. Wilson.⁽¹⁾ They urged as strongly as they could that if the negotiations then in progress were to succeed, it was essential that the President and Mr. Morgenthau should receive a statement, as fully documented as possible, of British plans. It should contain statistics applicable to the following nine months of, on the one side, the anticipated production of aircraft in Britain together with the expected deliveries to Britain from United States production, and on the other side the proposed output of pilots from the Flying Training programmes. Moreover this statement should then be supplemented by regular information on:

- (a) Aircraft production,
- (b) Aircraft losses,
- (c) Progress of the training schemes,
- (d) Progress of squadron formations.

Only thus would it be possible to convince the President and his advisers that the expansion of their own air forces was not being unnecessarily delayed.

96. In response to this cri du coeur a telegram was dispatched by the Ministry of Aircraft Production, with the concurrence of Air Ministry, on the following day, 3 October.⁽²⁾

It gave:

- (a) The comparative numbers of operational aircraft in the six principal types then in use on 10 May 1940 and on 27 September 1940.
- (b) The comparative numbers of pilots available on 15 June 1940 and 27 September 1940.
- (c) The anticipated output of pilots from the training schemes.

The telegram also emphasised the urgent need of United States aircraft to make good the losses in British aircraft production resulting from enemy bombing, and also to replace certain British types rapidly becoming obsolescent, such as Battles and Blenheims.

97. This telegram, it seems, was largely successful in its purpose. But in order to remove completely all possible misunderstandings, Mr. Morgenthau felt that a visit to the United States by the Chief of the Air Staff (Air Marshal Portal had just

(1) S.6. Folder No. 7C: Tel., Pursa 128: 2 October 1940.
(2) S.6. Folder No. 7(c): Tel., MAP 876, M.A.P. to H.M. Consul General, New York: 3 October 1940.

been appointed to the post) would be most opportune and timely.⁽¹⁾ He stressed to Mr. Purvis on 6 October the extreme importance which the United States Administration would attach to such a visit. The object of the Chief of the Air Staff's visit would be to inform the United States authorities of the principles of British air strategy and also to give them various other operational particulars, all with a view to an effort on the part of the United States Administration to bring about a concerted drive to meet promptly British needs. Lord Lothian, after he, too, had had an interview with Mr. Morgenthau strongly supported the suggestion that the Chief of the Air Staff or some capable and fully authorised deputy should pay a visit to the United States as soon as possible.⁽²⁾ He advanced an additional reason for the visit. He pointed out that Britain was on the point of placing large orders for aircraft in the United States, and it would therefore be in her interests if the United States Administration could be persuaded to adopt and produce some of the British types of aircraft which had been proved by war experience. The moment for this was opportune: the United States Army authorities had decided upon their air expansion programme, but had not yet reached agreement upon the types of aircraft which should be incorporated in the programme. It might thus be possible to exert a determining influence; but the opportunity was fleeting.

98. The proposal was warmly received in Air Ministry, but regretfully the Chief of the Air Staff found himself unable, on account of the urgency of the air battle then in progress and the responsibilities of his new post, to leave Britain at that time.⁽³⁾ In his place, however, as Lord Lothian was informed, an officer of the highest reputation and ability would be sent.

99. The officer chosen to undertake the mission was the Director of Plans, Air Ministry (Air Commodore Slessor).⁽⁴⁾

100. On 22 October the Secretary of State for Air explained the position to the Prime Minister.⁽⁵⁾ In his letter he brought up the question of the degree of frankness to be adopted by the British representative, and urged that, if possible, no limitations should be imposed upon Air Commodore Slessor regarding what he should disclose. Such a policy, the Secretary of State for Air pointed out, would only be in line with that adopted in respect of the Staff Conversations, and later, the Tizard Mission. However, he asked the Prime Minister for a ruling, because his colleague, the Minister of Aircraft Production, inclined to the view that in certain fields some degree of reticence should be shown.

101. In order to take advantage of available air transport to the United States, Air Commodore Slessor had to leave on 28 October, which was a little earlier than had been expected,⁽⁶⁾ and meant

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- (1) C.A.S. Folder No. 608 (Part I): Tel., 2213, Purvis to Salter: 6 October 1940.
 - (2) C.A.S. Folder No. 608, Part I: Tel., 2247, Lord Lothian to Foreign Office: 10 October 1940.
 - (3) C.A.S. Folder No. 608 Part I: Tel., Foreign Office to Lord Lothian: 14 October 1940.
 - (4) C.A.S. Folder No. 608 Part I: Min., S. of S. for Air to Prime Minister: 24 October 1940.
 - (5) C.A.S. Folder No. 608 Part I: Ltr., S. of S. for Air to Prime Minister: 22 October 1940.
 - (6) C.A.S. Folder No. 608 Part I: Tel., 2829. Foreign Office to Mr. Butler (Washington): 27 October 1940.

that he had to leave on the day before a meeting could be held with the Prime Minister finally to determine the lines of his brief. This meeting was, however, convened for 29 October, and the terms of the brief were telegraphed immediately to Washington to await Air Commodore Slessor's arrival. (1)

102. The document containing the information which, it was agreed, should be communicated to the United States authorities was prepared by Professor F. A. Lindemann (later Lord Cherwell), the Prime Minister's statistical adviser, from data provided by Air Ministry and the Ministry of Aircraft Production. (2) The essential points are given in summary below; from this it will be seen how fully it had been decided to lay the cards on the table:

I. Plans for Production

- (a) By June 1941 it was hoped to form 100 new squadrons in the R.A.F. at an average of 16 aircraft per squadron.
- (b) The total number of aircraft which it was planned to produce in the United Kingdom between October 1940 and June 1941 was:

Bombers	5,075
Fighters	7,640
General Reconnaissance	235
Army Co-operation	645
Total	<u>13,595</u>

But as actual production was showing a tendency to fall short of estimated production, it would not be safe to reckon on fully achieving the above total.

- (c) From the United States it was hoped to get during the same period operational aircraft to a total of: 3,530
- (d) Thus the total number of operational aircraft which, according to plans, was expected to become available by June 1941 (allowing for actual production in Britain falling short of the estimate by 20%) was: 14,410

II. Plans for Employment

Metropolitan Air Force

(a) Wastage, based on recent experience:	6,890
(b) 100 new squadrons:	1,600
(c) Operational Training Units required in connection with new squadrons:	1,700
(d) Reserve, at two months' production:	1,900
(e) Replacement of obsolete types:	<u>1,200</u>
Total	<u>13,290</u>

Overseas

(a) Wastage	900
Overall total:	<u>14,190</u>

(1) C.A.S. Folder No. 608 Part I: Tel. X929, S. of S. for Air to Slessor: 29 October 1940.

(2) S.6. Folder No. 70: Ltr., War Cabinet Offices to P.S. to S. of S. for Air (with enclosures): 29 October 1940.

III. Plans for Output of Pilots

(a) Output from Operational Training Units, October 1940 to May 1941:	8,569
(b) Output from Service Flying Training Schools:	822
	<u>9,391</u>

IV. Plans for Employment of Pilots

(a) Casualties, based on recent experience:	3,700
(b) New squadrons:	3,000
(c) Additional flying instructors required in connection with new squadrons:	1,500
(d) Operational Training Units in connection with expansion:	550
(e) Existing deficiency:	350
	<u>9,100</u>

Given this balance sheet, the United States authorities would, it was believed appreciate beyond question that all the aircraft which were being requested from their production would be completely utilised. It would indicate, too, that the programme of pilot output was fully in phase with the anticipated production and purchase of aircraft. At the end of the statement the further point was made that the programme set out represented only the first stage in the expansion of the R.A.F. After June 1941 the rate of this expansion would rise even more sharply.

103. Thus, in this document, the policy which the British Government had resolved to adopt towards the exchange of information on air matters with the United States Administration stood clearly revealed. The keynotes were frankness, sincerity and confidence.

104. Air Commodore Slessor arrived in New York⁽¹⁾ on 8 November 1940.⁽²⁾ He found, as soon as he made contacts, that the information sent in the Ministry of Aircraft Production telegram of 3 October (see para. 96) had already successfully allayed the false impression engendered by General Strong's misunderstanding of the position in Britain regarding aircraft and pilots. But he found nevertheless, that if similar misunderstandings were to be avoided in the future, the United States authorities must be furnished with further statements at regular intervals.

105. Just before Air Commodore Slessor arrived, Mr. Morgenthau, whom, essentially, he had come to see, had left for a tour in the

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- (1) Up to 16 November 1940, when it moved to Washington, the Headquarters of the British Air Commission were in New York (See S.6. Folder No. 7C: Tel. Briny 1425: 12 November 1940).
- (2) C.A.S. Folder No. 608 Part I: Ltr., Slessor to CAS: 11 November 1940.

West Indies, and it was found impossible, as things turned out, to arrange a meeting with him until 3 December.⁽¹⁾

106. In the meantime however, time was not wasted. It was arranged that Air Commodore Slessor should have discussions on air topics in general with various officers of the United States Army Air Forces and with Mr. Philip Young, Mr. Morgenthau's Under-Secretary.⁽²⁾ The opportunity was thus taken to convey the British point of view on a variety of problems relating to the air war. One immediate problem, as had been indicated by the British Ambassador (see para. 97), was the reaching of an agreed decision regarding the future pattern of aircraft production in the United States. A production programme of 12,000 aircraft was planned and its sponsors wanted to know what proportions should obtain between the different types and classes of aircraft which Britain would wish to receive from United States production. After discussion it was agreed that the following adjustments should be made in respect of proportional production: there should be

- (a) An increase in the number of advanced training aircraft;
- (b) A decrease in the number of short-range bombers; and
- (c) An increase in the number of long-range bombers - medium or heavy - which had the range and armament to bomb Germany effectively.

These adjustments, particularly in respect of the swing towards the long-range bomber, reflect Air Commodore Slessor's advocacy. British air strategy was rapidly becoming focussed about the heavy bomber, and it had been one of Air Commodore Slessor's main purposes to stress the importance which, from an operational point of view, the British attached to the inclusion in the R.A.F. of adequate numbers of this type of aircraft. It was a creed which was to be often repeated during the next few months.

107. Before Air Commodore Slessor was able to meet Mr. Morgenthau, the British War Cabinet had enunciated the principles which should in future govern the exchange of all information between Britain and the United States. Naturally, these principles affected to a greater or less extent all subsequent discussions. This is an appropriate point therefore to consider them.

4. War Cabinet Decides Policy on Release of Secret Information

108. During November, as indicated earlier, the War Cabinet, through one of its committees, had had the whole problem of the release of secret information under consideration. On 21 November the matter was placed on the agenda of the full Cabinet. The matter was fully discussed and it was finally agreed that certain principles should henceforth be applied.⁽³⁾ Very briefly these principles may be stated as:

- (a) A full statement of each of the supply programmes was to be given to the United States authorities, and any further information on the same subject was to be consistent with this statement.

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- (1) S.6. Folder No. 70: Tel., Z 37, Slessor to C.A.S.: 3 December 1940.
 - (2) C.A.S. Folder No. 608 Part I: Ltr., Slessor to C.A.S.: 27 October 1940.
 - (3) W.M. (40) 293rd Mtg.: 21 November 1940. Also W.P. (40) 441.

(b) Secret technical devices were to be fully disclosed to selected firms in the United States - subject to proper precautions for secrecy - when the manufacture of such devices was required for the British forces.

(c) Technical matters intimately connected with operations to be undertaken in the near future should not be disclosed.

(d) Operational information should be given only at regular intervals and in a summarised form.

109. The War Cabinet also considered what should be the procedure for the communication of information, and arrived at conclusions to the following effect:

(a) A committee of the three Supply Ministers (i.e. of Supply, of Aircraft Production and the First Lord of the Admiralty), should meet to advise, in consultation with the three Service Ministries, what information, in the light of the above principles, should in fact be disclosed.

(b) Their advice should be submitted to the Prime Minister in his capacity as Minister of Defence.

(c) All departments should advise their respective representatives in North America of all information given to United States representatives in Britain.

(d) In addition to information exchanged through the channels outlined above, the Prime Minister would himself from time to time give information to the President on a personal basis on the understanding that it would be disclosed only to the President's more immediate advisers.

110. A week or two later it was decided to revise the effect of the conclusion under (a) above to the extent that the committee of the three Supply Ministers should deal only with questions of Supply. For decisions regarding any other matter the Prime Minister would himself be responsible.⁽¹⁾ But it was, of course, difficult to draw a sharp dividing line, and the committee not unnaturally found that they had to take within their purview certain aspects of the exchange of technical and scientific information.

111. To sum up: the principles and procedures which the Cabinet had decided to adopt did not in effect reduce materially, except perhaps in regard to operational information, either the nature or the amount of information which could be communicated to the United States authorities.

5. Effect of War Cabinet Decisions

112. It remains now to consider what was the effect of the decisions of the Cabinet during the remaining months of 1940. This can best be done under three heads: (a) the effect on the exchange of information on matters relating to aircraft production and supply, which came within the purview of the proposed committee of the three Supply Ministers; (b) the effect on the exchange of operational air intelligence, which was mainly the concern of Air Ministry; and (c) the effect on current negotiations in Washington.

(1) A.M. File S.7867, Encl. 3A: Mtr., Sec. of War Cabinet to P.S. to S. of S. For Air: 15 December 1940.

(a) On matters relating to aircraft
production and supply

113. The Committee consisting of the three Supply Ministers held its first meeting on 17 December 1940. (1) Its terms of reference were to decide what information should be disclosed to the United States on matters relating to supply. (2) Within these broad terms, of course, came matters relating to aircraft production and supply. In order that the Committee might the more easily take stock of the existing situation an informatory memorandum had been prepared giving details regarding the previous practice adopted by various Departments when information had been exchanged. (3)

114. After considering the memorandum the Committee decided that the responsibility for action should rest as follows (it being understood that each organisation designated should act in strict conformity with the War Cabinet's declared policy):

(i) Production Programmes and Output: Mr. Purvis (who at that time had just been appointed Chairman of the newly-formed British Supply Council in North America (4)) would, on his return to the United States, supply the necessary information in the form of a memorandum to the President.

(ii) Technical Information; departments would furnish any technical information, including prototypes of secret equipment, without hesitation whenever its release would further the war effort. A statement, shewing what requests had been received from the United States and what action had been taken on each should, however, be rendered periodically to the Committee by each department.

(iii) Scientific Information; the Chairman of the North American Supply Committee in London (The Minister of Supply) would consult with Mr. Purvis regarding arrangements to be made for co-operation in scientific matters.

115. These decisions, as will be seen, had a broad application they covered the whole field of production and supply programmes. Definite rulings were now available both on policy and procedure.

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- (1) A.M. File S.7867, Encl. 5A: D.S.A.(40) 1st Mtg.: 17 December 1940.
- (2) A.M. File S.7867, Encl. 4A: D.S.A.(40) 1: 17 December 1940.
- (3) A.M. File S.7867, Encl. 5A: D.S.A.(40), 1st Mtg. (Encl.): 17 December 1940. The memorandum covered the same ground as the previous parts of this Section.
- (4) W.M.(40) 304th Mtg; 12 December 1940 (see A.M. File S.5613 (Part III) Encl. 611 B.). At this meeting the War Cabinet agreed to the suggestion made by the Minister of Aircraft Production (in W.P. (G)(40) 318; 11 December 1940) that a Committee to be known as the British Supply Council in North America be set up. Its Chairman would be Mr. Purvis; his deputy would be Mr. Morris Wilson (M.A.P.'s representative). The Council would deal with all issues of policy concerning supply, including all representations made to the U.S. Administration. The three Supply Ministries would, however, retain their separate organisations for dealing with their own problems, but the Head of each would be a member of the new Council.

Mr. Purvis who had taken part in the discussions antecedent to the above decision left for Washington a day or two after the date of the Cabinet Meeting.

(b) On matters relating to operational
Air Intelligence

116. The Cabinet injunction with regard to the release of operational intelligence was not so easily translated into practice. In Air Ministry its most obvious application was to the Daily Summary of Operations and Intelligence. An attempt was consequently made, by reducing the amount of information that it contained and increasing the intervals at which it was published to bring it into conformity with the Cabinet ruling. But it was not long before the changes evoked an energetic protest from the United States Military Air Attache (General Scanlon). On 27 November, he wrote to the Director of Intelligence, Air Ministry (Air Commodore Boyle), asking why the Summary for the last few days had contained little more information than was contained normally in the Press⁽¹⁾. He stressed the importance of keeping his Government fully informed of everything which had a bearing on the progress of the war. The situation, he pointed out, was at a critical stage. Congress might very shortly be called upon to decide on extending credits to permit Britain to continue her procurement programme, and if the impression were to gain ground in Washington that a complete, true, and up to date picture of the situation was not being given, it might affect adversely their discussions. And this apart, all lessons learned by Britain, when passed on, enabled the United States to avoid mistakes, delay, and much experimental work - all of which helped to increase the ability of the United States to give more and better support to Britain.

117. A few days later on 5 September, the United States Charge d'Affaires (Mr. Herschel Johnson) called to see the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Halifax) and, among other issues, raised the same question⁽²⁾. The Secretary of State pointed out in reply that the British Authorities had been as much concerned with the degree of circulation which had come to be accorded to important and confidential information, not only to friendly missions like that of the United States but also to departments within the British Administration. A tighter check had therefore been imposed all round.

118. In confirming these remarks in a letter to the United States Charge d'Affaires on 10 December,⁽³⁾ the Secretary of State added that if, as it had appeared from their conversation, it was information concerning damage to aircraft production by enemy bombs which was especially required, then perhaps it would be best to approach the Minister of Aircraft Production on the subject direct.

119. In the meantime, on 3 December, a Meeting had been held in Air Ministry to decide how the War Cabinet's instructions should be applied to Air Ministry policy in general. In the Chair was the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (General) (Air Marshal Peck) and other principal officers present included the Assistant Chiefs of the Air Staff for Training and Research respectively, the Director of Intelligence and the Director of Plans. Their conclusions were expressed in a memorandum addressed to the Secretary of State for Air.⁽⁴⁾

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- (1) A.M. File S.7457, Encl. 8B: Ltr., A.M. 2385, Colonel Scanlon to D. of I: 27 November 1940.
 (2) A.M. File S.7457, Encl. 8B: Note by S. of S. for Foreign Affairs: 5 December 1940.
 (3) A.M. File S.7457, Encl. 8B: Ltr., S. of S. for Foreign Affairs to U.S. Charge d'Affaires: 10 December 1940.
 (4) A.M. File S.7457, Encl. 8A: Memo. by S.6:

They made the observations that:-

- (i) Any abrupt change of policy would inevitably cause surprise (witness General Scanlon's letter) if not suspicion⁽¹⁾. It might, for instance easily be thought in the United States that the reason for concealment was a grave deterioration of the British position.
- (ii) The United States authorities had always dealt fairly in releasing to Britain information comparable in secrecy with that which had been released to them. Moreover the Service Attaches had provided a valuable source of Intelligence concerning enemy countries, and had always proved most co-operative.
- (iii) Experience had indicated that the security arrangements in the United States had been adequate and confidences had been respected.

In view of these considerations, the recommendations of the Meeting were that operational and intelligence materials should continue to be supplied to the United States authorities - excepting only that which was of a most secret nature, and especially that concerning impending operations. They further recommended that the information should be supplied by means of a weekly, instead of a daily, operational summary.

(c) On current negotiations in Washington

120. The British Ambassador there was sent a resumé of the War Cabinet policy decisions on 25 November 1940. He was instructed to inform the President of the gist of these discussions, and to make the point that while it was the wish of the British Government to deal with the United States Administration on a basis of complete trust, at the same time it was felt that it would be appreciated in Washington that under the circumstances, with Britain fighting for her very life, there was certain secret information which could not be divulged.⁽²⁾

121. Lord Lothian replied that he would not be able to see the President for some days, and suggested that in the meanwhile this proposed mode of approach be reconsidered.⁽³⁾ He felt that if information which it had been the practice to convey in the past were suddenly withheld, there could be only one result - friction and misunderstanding. He therefore recommended instead that the United States Administration be approached with a request to tighten up their security regulations to a standard which would ensure that no vital information leaked out. He felt sure that if this were done the United States authorities would co-operate, and would agree that if really satisfactory arrangements could not be made, information of special importance either should not be conveyed at all or should be passed only along some specially safeguarded channel.

122. The issue was however brought to a head as a result of questions raised by Mr. Morgenthau during his long deferred

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- (1) This view was, by a coincidence endorsed by the British Ambassador in Washington in a telegram despatched on the same day (See S.6. Folder No. 7C: Tel., 2887, Lord Lothian to Foreign Office: 3 December 1940).
 - (2) A.M. File S.7867, Encl. 3D: Tel., 3210, Foreign Office to Lord Lothian: 25 November 1940.
 - (3) S.6. Folder No. 7C; Tel. 2887, Lord Lothian to Foreign Office: 3 December 1940.

interview with Air Commodore Slessor which finally took place on 3 December 1940.⁽¹⁾ Mr. Morgenthau introduced the familiar subject of the British position in regard to aircraft production and comparative pilot availability. He asked again that he should be provided at regular intervals with statements on the lines of that which had been sent to him on 3 October (see para. 96), and which, he said, had been of the utmost importance in bringing the British position into its proper perspective before American eyes.

123. Air Commodore Slessor thereupon telegraphed Air Ministry requesting that such a statement be sent to him.⁽²⁾ He made his request more specific in a further telegram on 5 December in which he asked for details of:

- (a) For September 1940 - the actual pilot wastage.
- (b) For October and November 1940 -
 - (i) The planned and actual output of aircraft in the United Kingdom.
 - (ii) The planned deliveries of aircraft from the United States.
 - (iii) The planned and actual output of pilots from the service training schools.
 - (iv) The postulated and actual pilot wastage.⁽³⁾

Compliance with this request, however, was not unattended by difficulties for Air Ministry.

124. During November 1940, the Minister of Aircraft Production had decided, following current trend, that the circulation of statistics giving the actual deliveries of aircraft from British and United States production should be subject to greater restriction than it had been hitherto, and had decreed that, so far as British officials in Washington were concerned, the only recipient should be his own personal representative there - Mr. Morris Wilson. He therefore showed some reluctance to provide Mr. Morgenthau with information through Air Commodore Slessor. As a result a telegram despatched from Air Ministry to Air Commodore Slessor on 7 December gave all the information required with regard to output and wastage of pilots; it also gave the aircraft strengths in the six main operational types on 27 September and on 29 November; but it stated that for these statistics of planned versus actual output of aircraft application must be made to Mr. Morris Wilson.⁽⁴⁾

125. The restriction of information through this one channel became the subject of several telegrams exchanged during the succeeding days between the Minister of Aircraft Production and Mr. Morris Wilson.⁽⁵⁾ It must be stressed, however that at no time was there any suggestion of withholding essential information from the United States authorities; it was only the means of

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- (1) S.6. Folder No. 70; Tel., Z37, Slessor to C.A.S.: 3 December 1940.
 - (2) S.6. Folder No. 70; Tel., Z54, Slessor to C.A.S.: 5 December 1940.
 - (3) S.6. Folder No. 70; Tel., Z54, Slessor to C.A.S.: 5 December 1940.
 - (4) S.6. Folder No. 70; Tel., X271, C.A.S. to Slessor: 7 December 1940.
 - (5) S.6. Folder under 70; contains the relevant papers.

conveying it which was at issue. In fact the Minister of Aircraft Production told Mr. Morris Wilson on 11 December that if it could be stated exactly what it was that Mr. Morgenthau wanted, then he would arrange for such information to be forwarded at the beginning of each month, on the understanding that it was to be released only to the President, and to the Secretaries of the Navy (Col. Knox) of War (Mr. Stimson) and of the Treasury (Mr. Morgenthau).⁽¹⁾

126. On 15 December Mr. Morris Wilson reported that he had given to Mr. Morgenthau "up-to-date figures regarding stocks, pilots etc." on the lines of the statement conveyed in the telegram of 3 October.⁽²⁾ He had also promised to let Mr. Morgenthau have further similar statements month by month.

127. It was intended, of course, that all this telegraphed information should be supplemented in the comprehensive statement of British needs which Mr. Purvis was to take to Washington for submission to the President (See para. 114). Consequently Mr. Purvis, in order to be able to present adequately the requirements of Air Ministry had a conference prior to his departure with the Chief and Vice Chief of the Air Staff. As a result it was agreed that he should stress the vital importance of an almost unlimited supply of heavy bombers, and that he should point out the danger of either the United States or Britain concentrating too much on mere numbers of aircraft and on accumulating a hoard of superfluous fighters.

128. That reliance on the heavy bomber had become the key note of British Air Policy was of course already known to Air Commodore Slessor. Nevertheless the Chief of the Air Staff thought it well to advise him on 20 December how increasingly clear it was becoming - even during the few days since Mr. Purvis had returned to Washington - that to implement this policy Britain would have to turn more and more to the United States for the necessary aircraft.⁽³⁾

129. Such then were the briefs of the British representatives in Washington at the end of 1940. The more strongly they could convey the essentials of the strategic air plan to the United States Authorities the more hope there was of achieving that plan.

6. Conclusions

130. On the whole, as it will have been appreciated from the account given in this Section, the record of events relating to the exchange of information between Britain and the United States during 1940 is a happy one. Considering the circumstances, it is characterised by a remarkable degree of frankness. By the end of the year there was very little regarding the British war effort which was not available to the really responsible officials in the United States Administration. Certainly nothing was withheld which could have furthered in any way the joint war effort.

(1) S.6. Folder No. 7C: Tel., MAP. 2171, M.A.P. to Morris Wilson: 11 December 1940.

(2) S.6. Folder No. 7C; Tel., Briny 1938 Morris Wilson to M.A.P.: 14 December 1940.

(3) C.A.S. Folder No. 608 (Part I): Tel., X164 C.A.S. to Slessor: 20 December 1940.

PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH R. A. F. TRAINING SCHOOLS
IN THE UNITED STATES

Spring - Autumn 1940

131. Another aspect of the British air effort in which there was joint Anglo-American interest during 1940 was that of the provision of facilities for flying training. By the autumn of the year it had become manifest that it would not be possible to provide, within the relatively small area of the British Isles, the facilities necessary to meet all the R.A.F. requirements in this respect. The decision was therefore made that some of the training establishments should be transferred overseas. There were two possible locations: (a) those parts of the British Empire which were comparatively remote from the active battle-fields; (b) the United States. How the Empire Air Training Scheme was conceived and developed is, of course, outside the scope of this narrative, but the discussions regarding the possibilities in the United States must be given some consideration.

132. This story begins as far back as the spring of 1940. The potentialities in regard to flying training latent in the wide open spaces and excellent climate of certain parts of the United States had been fully realised by both the British Ambassador in Washington and the British Air Attache there (Air Commodore Pirie), and they had taken certain steps towards ascertaining what would be the reaction of the appropriate United States authorities to the suggestion that these potentialities might be used to further R.A.F. training schemes. They had approached, in the first instance, certain civil organisations which were devoted to flying training, and, having been well received, had then broached the idea to various Congressmen, who also were in favour. When, however, in June 1940, the subject was taken to still higher levels, the attitude adopted was not quite so encouraging.(1) The line taken by these higher authorities was that the necessity of expanding their own training facilities combined with a shortage of suitable instructors would prevent the acceptance in United States schools of any British or Empire pupils. The President himself, in fact, felt that it might perhaps be better if the training were carried out in Canada using United States instructors and rented United States training aircraft.(2)

133. So matters rested about the end of June. Then in July came Colonel Donovan's visit to Britain, his talks on the subject to various Air Ministry officers, and his report on his return to the President (see para. 30 above). There is no doubt that he pressed the case for the granting to Britain of certain flying training facilities in the United States, and that, as his views were deeply respected at the White House, his words bore weight.

134. Thus when the British Under-Secretary of State for Air (Captain H. H. Balfour) visited the United States late in August to discuss the whole problem thoroughly with the responsible authorities he found that by this time the mind of the President was not unfavourably disposed to the idea in general.(3) It

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- (1) C.A.S. Folder No. 578: Tel., No. 948, Lord Lothian to Foreign Office: 8 June 1940.
 - (2) C.A.S. Folder No. 578: Tel., No. 1094, Lord Lothian to Foreign Office: 24 June 1940.
 - (3) C.A.S. Folder No. 578: Tel., No. 8244, U.S. of S. for Air to S. of S. for Air: 24 August 1940.

still remained to discover, however, what were the practical possibilities and limitations.

135. For this purpose a meeting was held in New York on 28 August 1940.(1) The Under-Secretary of State for Air met and discussed the problem fully with representatives of the leading civil flying training schools in the United States. He explained at the outset that the scheme in mind had two purposes:

- (a) To provide a refresher and completion course for young United States volunteers to fit them for service with the R.A.F.
- (b) To provide, if possible, a course of training through all stages for British and Empire pupils.

136. After views had been fully exchanged it became clear that the provision of the refresher course was quite practicable, and that the necessary facilities could be established, assuming that a mutually acceptable financial basis could be agreed upon. The provision of training through all its stages, however, raised issues which needed further consideration. Briefly the position was that the civil schools had virtually no existing facilities for this purpose, but could provide them under some arrangement which would make it commercially possible. They would have the facilities for ground instruction, and would be able also to provide instructors, both for elementary and advanced training. It was agreed that bombing and gunnery training would be inadvisable for political reasons. The representatives felt, too, that they were so obligated to the Army that they could not develop any scheme except with the good-will and actual assent of the Army authorities. Regarding training aircraft, if the Army would release the elementary trainers then on order for the civil schools, these would meet the requirement for this type of aircraft; but there were no advanced trainers available at all and these therefore would have to be provided from somewhere. This lack of advanced trainers appeared, in fact, to be the main stumbling block in the whole scheme.

137. On 1 September 1940 the Under-Secretary of State for Air explained the whole position to the Secretary of the Treasury (Mr. Morgenthau).(2) It was made clear to Mr. Morgenthau that if any such scheme as had been discussed with the representatives of the civil flying schools should materialise it must be regarded as additional to the schemes already in hand under the Empire and Home training schemes and could not, therefore, be allowed to prejudice or retard these schemes, to which the Air Ministry was already committed. The project under discussion was undoubtedly practicable, provided that the British Government would approve the general policy and would sanction the necessary capital expenditure, and provided, too, that the requisite advanced training aircraft could be provided from somewhere. The British, however, were already short of needs in respect of this type of aircraft for their Empire and Home training schemes; it seemed, therefore, that the necessary aircraft would have to come from the United States sources. Mr. Morgenthau observed that there would no doubt be objections to this, but the final decision in any event rested with the President.

(1) C.A.S. Folder No. 578: Mins. of Mtg. held in St. Regis Hotel, New York: 28 August 1940.


(2) A.M. File S.6300, Encl. 1 B: Note of interview Mr. Morgenthau-Capt. H. H. Balfour: 1 September 1940.

138. The Under-Secretary of State for Air returned to England shortly after this interview with Mr. Morgenthau, and on 7 September reported all the pertinent data to his Air Ministry colleagues. (1)

139. During the next few weeks a draft scheme was prepared, providing for an output of 3,900 pilots per annum from eight new schools. The scheme entailed the use of 320 elementary training aircraft and 528 of the advanced type. (2) The former presented little difficulty, it was thought; but for the latter it was confirmed that the only possible source would be the United States. This draft scheme was the subject of full discussion between the British representatives in Washington, the United States Administration, and the Army and Navy Air authorities. (3) All the United States authorities were sympathetic, but their desire to push ahead with their own programmes made them reluctant to promise any advanced trainers.

140. Mainly for this reason negotiations had to be suspended, except for the small start which was made with the 'refresher' courses for United States volunteers. The R.A.F. Service Flying Training Schools were instead transferred to South Africa and Canada under the Empire Training Scheme. But the ground had been thoroughly broken and it proved fertile soil when negotiations were reopened a few months later under more auspicious conditions.

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- (1) C.A.S. Folder No. 578: Note of a Mtg. in Air Ministry: 7 September 1940.
 - (2) C.A.S. Folder No. 578: Tel., X 71, Air Ministry to Air Attache, Washington: 23 September 1940.
 - (3) C.A.S. Folder No. 578: Tel., X 31, Air Attache, Washington, to Air Ministry: 3 October 1940.



SECRET

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IX

PREPARATIONS FOR
STAFF CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON

October-December 1940

141. The procedures which had been developed during 1940 for the exchange of information on what may be termed current plans and projects was dealt with at length in Section VII. Exchanges of views on the longer-term naval, military and air strategy fell, however, into another category. They called rather for staff conversations. It is not surprising therefore that, after the preliminary discussions in August, the possibility of holding further inter-allied staff conversations should have been mooted. It was suggested, early in October 1940, that representatives not only of Britain and the United States, but of Holland and Australia as well, should enter into conversations by means of contemporaneous discussions in Washington, London and Singapore. It was a proposal which had the full support of the British Chiefs of Staff. A delegate was, in fact, forthwith appointed to go to Washington and the Joint Planning Sub-Committee was instructed to prepare a brief. By 9 October, however, a change of attitude in Washington had become apparent: Mr. Hull was now anxious not to make any move lest it should be construed - especially by the Press - as indicating that the President was provoking war in the Far East.⁽¹⁾ And an added reason for his caution was no doubt the proximity of the Presidential election. However, after further exchanges of views on the matter during the next six weeks the President eventually agreed, on 29 November, to Anglo-American talks being conducted in Washington.⁽²⁾ This was on 29 November, but in the event it was not until 14 January 1941 that the United Kingdom Delegation at last embarked for the United States. The delay however was not entirely unwelcome since it afforded ample time for the preparation and full consideration of an official brief.

142. The Joint Planning Sub-Committee produced the set of instructions for the Delegation as a whole. Their paper was submitted to, and approved by the Defence Committee of the War Cabinet, and was thus a fully authorised document.⁽³⁾

143. In addition, however, the Air Staff, at a conference on 10 December between the heads of the appropriate Air Ministry branches, prepared in draft a rather fuller set of instructions for the particular guidance of the Air Staff representative.⁽⁴⁾ After some amendments these instructions received the final approval of the Chief of the Air Staff on 18 December.⁽⁵⁾

144. The underlying hypothesis of both papers was that a state of war should be deemed to exist between Germany, Italy and Japan on the one side, and the United States, the British Empire and her allies on the other. With these two papers and the replies,⁽⁶⁾ also approved by the Defence Committee,⁽⁷⁾ which were given in response to a questionnaire submitted to the

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- (1) C.A.S. Folder No. 607 (Part II): Tel., 2241, Lord Lothian to Foreign Office: 9 October 1940.
 - (2) C.A.S. Folder No. 607 (Part II): Tel., 2851, Lord Lothian to Foreign Office: 29 November 1940.
 - (3) D.O.(40) 51st Mtg.: 17 December 1940. The paper as finally approved became C.O.S.(40) 1052: 19 December 1940.
 - (4) D. of Plans O.R.B.: Min., D. of Plans to A.M.T., D.C.A.S., D.N.O., D.H.O., D.O.O., D.W.O.: 9 December 1940.
 - (5) A.C.A.S.(P) Folder No. 3 (D. of Plans Folder No. 28): Min., C.A.S. to D. of Plans: 18 December 1940.
 - (6) C.O.S.(40) 1044 (Revise): 19 December 1940.
 - (7) D.O.(40) 51st Mtg.; 17 December 1940.

British Chiefs of Staff by Admiral Gormley and General Lee acting on behalf of the United States Chiefs of Staff,⁽¹⁾ the British delegates had chapter and verse for almost any topic which might arise during their forthcoming discussions. In particular, the Air Staff representative possessed in these papers a comprehensive dossier regarding contemporary British thought on how best to bring about, should the United States actively intervene in the European war, the closest and most effective air collaboration.

145. A resumé of the contents of the three papers will not, however, be given at this point because most of the subjects dealt with found a place in documents prepared by the United Kingdom Delegation after its arrival in Washington. A comprehensive review of the British standpoint is, therefore, best made when the proceedings at the actual conferences are under consideration in the next Section.

146. The officer delegated to act as the representative of Air Ministry was the Director of Plans (Air Commodore Slessor), who, as it will be recalled from Section VII, was already in Washington on another mission.⁽²⁾ He had been there since the last week in October, and was thus already in contact with the Air Staff of War Department.

147. From telegrams which he sent back to Air Ministry, it seems clear that during the month or two on either side of the turn of the year - 1940 to 1941 - the problem of how the United States Army Air Corps should be developed and organised was under active consideration.⁽³⁾ General Arnold had been given the task of providing for a great expansion of the forces under his command. Looking forward to its eventual utilisation he had gone so far as to instruct his Plans Division to draw up provisional arrangements for the move overseas of the G.H.Q. Air Force.

148. In connection with this work, Air Commodore Slessor felt that General Arnold might like to have available a copy of the Mobilisation Instructions, Western Air Plan, as drawn up for the original move of the R.A.F. to France. He relayed the suggestion to Air Ministry whence it was put to the Prime Minister and approved. The required documents were accordingly taken to the United States by the Secretary of the United Kingdom Delegation.

149. The Washington Conversations thus coincided with a period of active planning in the U.S. Army Air Corps, and it would not be surprising if some of the ideas and suggestions exchanged between the United States and British officers at this time found their way into the plans and projects which were subsequently evolved.

(1) C.O.S, (40) 31 (0): 16 December 1940.

(2) He was informed of this appointment on 30 November 1940. (S.6 Folder No. 7c: Tel., X 434, 30 November 1940).

(3) E.g.: S.6 Folder No. 7c: Tel., D.43, Slessor to C.A.S.: 4 December 1940.

THE WASHINGTON DISCUSSIONS

British - United States Staff Conversations

January - March 1941

150. The conversations which in the official records were called the "British - United States Staff Conversations" began on 29 January 1941. The Air Ministry did not make any special representation to War Department for the nomination of a United States Air Staff officer to take part in the talks. However it soon became clear when the conversations started that on air matters the spokesman on the United States side was Colonel J. T. McNarney, then of the War Plans Division, War Department, even though he may not have been named officially as such.(1)

1. The British Point of View

151. During the first few days of the conversations the United Kingdom Delegation presented to the United States Staff Committee(2) two papers conveying to the Committee the British point of view on the various questions which, it was believed, would have to be discussed. On the first day, 29 January, they submitted "a Statement by the United Kingdom Delegation" which summarised very briefly both the general strategic policy of His Majesty's Government and the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on naval, military and air matters, assuming the active intervention of the United States in the war:(3)

(a) The fundamental principles of British strategic policy were:

(i) The European theatre was the vital theatre: Germany and Italy should therefore be defeated first, then Japan.

(ii) The security of the Far Eastern territories of the British Commonwealth was essential to the maintenance of the associated war effort.

(b) The main principles of British air policy were:

(i) The British Chiefs of Staff would welcome the greatest possible degree of collaboration by United States air squadrons, especially heavy bombers, as soon as possible after intervention by the United States in the European war.

(ii) Such collaboration, however, should be subject to one principle which the British Chiefs of Staff regarded as of paramount importance: the air forces of the British Commonwealth were dependent for their expansion in ever-increasing measure upon a supply of material from the United States. Active collaboration by the United States, both in the air and on land, should not exceed that which could be afforded without prejudice to essential British supplies from the United States aircraft and armament industries.

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- (1) B.U.S.(41)4: 29 January 1941: Ltr., A.G. 334.8 Conferences: 30 December 1940.
(2) This was the official title of the U.S. Delegation.
(3) B.U.S.(J)(41)2: 29 January 1941.

(iii) The United Kingdom Delegation, while in complete agreement that the United States must retain sufficient resources to build up its own forces to the level necessary to provide for future security, considered that joint plans for defeating Germany could best be implemented if the United States allotted priority, especially in the air, to every form of direct and indirect assistance (i.e. training facilities as well as combat units) as soon as possible after their active intervention, even though British resources were still being built up. Such assistance should not be limited by preparations for a greater effort by the United States at the beginning of the second year, for by such time it was hoped that serious disparity with Germany would, at least, have been greatly reduced.(1)

152. Five days later, on 3 February, the British Delegation handed to the United States Staff Committee a paper which was concerned solely with air matters. It was entitled the "Provision and Employment of United States Air Forces".(2) Some of the principles enunciated in the paper referred to in the preceding paragraph were recapitulated; in addition there were several other points. These additional points were presented in considerable detail; the following is a summary of them:

- (a) During the second year of intervention by the United States their air forces should concentrate primarily on their own expansion with a view to a development, later, of the maximum associated air effort.
- (b) The highest possible number of heavy long-range bombers should be provided, both as formed units of the U.S. Army Air Corps and as part of the programme of supply for the R.A.F. It was realised that the former contribution could initially only be small.
- (c) The fighter contribution would be preferred as aircraft, not as formed units. This contribution would provide the U.S. Army Air Corps with useful experience in the operation of the latest United States types of aircraft, e.g. the Lightning (P-38) and Airacobra (P-39).

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- (1) The British views on air policy had been stated rather more concisely and more definitely in the Air Representative's special instructions. The substance of the relevant passage is:

Priority should be given to every form of direct and indirect assistance in the first year, with as much as possible in the first six months, not allowing any preparations for U.S. expansion in the second year to interfere with this. After the first year the British would prefer that the U.S.A. should concentrate on the building up of her own air forces, so that eventually they would be in a position to afford very material help with fully-formed and organised units equipped with up-to-date aircraft.

- (2) B.U.S.(J)(41)8: 3 February 1941.

(d) Extended facilities for training British pilots at United States Training establishments would be appreciated, and it would also be advisable to form Operational Training Units to complete training of crews intended for squadrons equipped with United States aircraft.

The British Delegation realised that the above proposals might result in some retardation in the expansion of the U.S. Army Air Corps, but at the same time felt that the course proposed was that which would best contribute to the common effort.

153. In order to present the British standpoint on air policy fully, the following views on three additional topics must be included to make the conspectus complete. These views were included in one or other of the two papers referred to in paragraphs 142 and 143 above, but were not presented in written form to the United States Staff Committee.

(a) The role of the United States bomber squadrons based on the British Isles should be to attack Germany; that of the fighter squadrons, the defence of the United Kingdom and of shipping. (1)

(b) It was hoped that the United States would agree to place those of their air forces in the United Kingdom and the Middle East which would be working in co-operation with the R.A.F. under R.A.F. Operational Commands. (In Iceland and in West Africa on the other hand, where the U.S. Army Air Corps would assume full responsibility for air defence, they would retain operational control). (2)

(c) The fact that United States forces, in the early stages at least, would have to fit in to the existing British operational and administrative organisation gave added force to the arguments for the despatch of the United States Air Mission to the United Kingdom. Similarly, British representatives should be sent to the United States; they would be needed to assist in translating into action reports which would be forwarded by the United States Mission. (3) As the U.S. Army Air Corps administrative organisation would probably be inexperienced, the United States Mission should be particularly strong in administrative officers. Common administrative machinery would be essential, and the United States organisation would at first have to be based on the British. Subsequently it could be split up as might be found most convenient. (4)

154. The summaries given in the last three paragraphs provide together a comprehensive review of contemporary British thought and opinion on the more important aspects of air co-operation in the event of the actual participation of the United States in the war, including:

(a) the extent and limitations of the United States contribution,

(b) the nature of this contribution,

(c) the operational roles of the United States Army Air Forces,

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- (1) C.O.S. (40) 1044 (Revise): 19 December 1940.
(2) Air Representative's special instructions.
(3) C.O.S. (40) 1052: 19 December 1940.
(4) Air Representative's special instructions.

- (d) command and organisation,
- (e) training facilities,
- (f) liaison.

2. The United States Point of View

155. It will help towards an appreciation of the force and influence of the British argument if some indication is given of how the United States representatives were thinking on the same topics, even though it would appear, as might be expected, that their views at this stage still lacked clear definition. The following is a summary from the official record:

(a) At the second meeting in the series, on 31 January 1941, the United States representatives drew attention to the difference between their organisation and that of the British in respect of air forces. It was that the U.S. Army Air Corps were employed under the command of the army for army purposes. But they also added that when called upon to do so, the Army Air Corps would normally execute strategic missions which might have no direct relation to the functions they normally carried out in support of the army or of the navy. In this respect the role of the Army Air Corps might be said to be similar to that of the R.A.F. when carrying out independent air actions.(1)

(b) Later in the same meeting Colonel McNarney, after referring to the concessions which had been made by the United States in respect of the production of aircraft, said that he felt that they must now meet the requirements of her own security. All their plans for expansion were, nevertheless, made on the basis of existing agreements by which aircraft and aircraft material produced in the United States were allocated almost equally between the United States and Britain. He wondered, however, whether the British were not accumulating aircraft in excess of available crews.(2) The United States plans were based on a fifty-four group programme: this force would form the air basis of the security of the United States while still a non-belligerent, but in the event of their participation in the war a proportion of it would be transferred to the United Kingdom.(3)

(c) However, in spite of Colonel McNarney's remarks, it would seem that the United States Staffs had not at that time (31 January) arrived at final views on the policy which would govern the employment of their Air Forces in the event of war.

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- (1) B.U.S. (J)(41) 2nd Mtg. (U.S. Serial No. 09212-6): 31 January 1941.
 - (2) This belief had been prevalent in the United States for some months and appears to have been based on data obtained by Colonel Spaatz and General Strong during their visit to Britain in the summer of 1940. It was expressed by General Strong (then of War Plans, War Department) to Sir Walter Layton, of the British Purchasing Commission, and others at a meeting in the War Department on 4 October 1940. (See Section VII para. 92 et seq.)
 - (3) B.U.S. (J)(41) 2nd Mtg. (U.S. Serial No. 09212-6): 31 January 1941.

It was not in fact until some seventeen days later, at the ninth meeting on 17 February, that Colonel McNarney was able to say that the United States Staff Committee had "arrived at an understanding on the general policy for the use of air force". It appeared that this was:

- (i) To provide for the protection and security of United States naval bases to be established in Iceland.
- (ii) To provide air support for the R.A.F. in the British Isles.(1)

More specifically, it was envisaged that pursuit aircraft would be so disposed as to protect United States naval operating bases, while bomber aircraft would be grouped in a single general area for operation with the R.A.F. Bomber Command. The United States Striking Force would normally operate against objectives in Germany but would, of course, operate against invasion ports or other vital objectives in accordance with the demands of the existing situation.

(d) Even so, Colonel McNarney was still not prepared to make a detailed statement in reply to the paper by the United Kingdom Delegation on "Provision and Employment of United States Air Forces"; but he could, he said, now make a study of it with a view to replying. In point of fact, Colonel McNarney never offered a written reply. It is evident, however, from a letter written by the Secretary of the United Kingdom Delegation on 10 March 1941, that the United States Staff Committee was at least in general agreement with that part of the paper which is summarised in paragraphs 151 and 152 above.(2)

156. Reviewing the last paragraph, it would seem that while the United States representatives, when the conversations began, had few formed ideas on the subject of how their air forces would operate in Europe, by the ninth meeting, some three weeks later, their ideas were taking definite shape. What this shape was will be seen in some detail in the following two paragraphs. Just how far their ideas were the result of discussions with the United Kingdom Delegation can be judged from a comparison of the Final Report of the Conversations (Part 4 of this Section) and the statement of the British viewpoint given earlier (Part 2 of this Section).

3. The United States Air Contribution: Positive Plan

157. During discussions, possibly on the same day, between the air representatives on both sides, the general policy outlined in the preceding paragraph was translated into more definite terms. In a telegram bearing the same date, (17 February 1941) the United Kingdom Delegation was able to report to the Chiefs of Staff that, while it appeared that the United States would be able to offer little but naval aviation before 1 September 1941, the following was the proposed disposition of their aircraft in Europe as and when they became available:

- (a) Iceland: Fighters - 1 squadron (Tomahawk-P-40B)
- Light Bombers - 1 squadron (Havoc - A-20)
- Flying-boats - 1 squadron

(1) B.U.S.(J)(41) 9th Mtg. (Revise) (U.S. Serial No. 09212-14):
17 February 1941.

(2) B.U.S.(41) 24: 10 March 1941.

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- (b) United Kingdom Fighters - Airacobras (P-39) in Northern Ireland, and Lightnings (P-38) in Scotland and North-east England, with a view to constituting a United States Wing suitable for concentration under R.A.F. Fighter Command.
- Bombers - All to be based in Britain for bombing Germany, and to be constituted as a United States Wing under R.A.F. Bomber Command.
- Flying boats - All to be based in Northern Ireland and the Hebrides.

158. After a lengthy study the British Chiefs of Staff conveyed their reactions to the above proposals in a telegram dated 22 March 1941. They stated that no difficulties of an insurmountable nature were anticipated in arranging for the accommodation of the forces envisaged; the suggested locations were also, in general, approved. Matters of detail could be settled later by appropriate officers of the proposed United States Military Mission in conjunction with the Air Ministry. It was desirable, they felt, that United States air units should arrive in Britain as nearly as possible trained up to the British operational standards so that a minimum period of training would be required after their arrival. To ensure consistency it was hoped that the United States authorities would agree to base their operational training syllabus on that in use by the R.A.F. United States air officers would be welcomed in R.A.F. Operational Training Units to study the methods evolved by the R.A.F. during actual war experience.

4. Agreed Conclusions

(a) The Main Report

159. After eleven full meetings had been held at intervals from the last three days of January to the end of February and after several papers on a variety of topics had been exchanged, the delegates on both sides began to prepare drafts of a Report which would embody their conclusions and recommendations. This process of drafting occupied practically the whole of the month of March; the final approved Report is actually dated 27 March 1941.⁽¹⁾ The Report came to be regarded as such an important and oft-quoted document that the items from it relevant to this narrative must be given in some detail (the references in brackets are those of the paragraphs of the Report):

(a) The General Strategic Concept (para. 12) should include as the principal offensive policies against the Axis powers:

(i) The application of economic pressure by all military and other means, including the control of commodities at their source.

(ii) A sustained air offensive against German Military power together with air offensives against other regions under the control of the enemy.

(1) B.U.S.(J)(41) 30; U.S. Serial 011512-12(R); Short Title ABC-1: 27 March 1941.

- (iii) The early elimination of Italy as an active belligerent.
 - (iv) The employment of the air, land and naval forces of the Associated Powers at every opportunity in raids and in minor offensives.
 - (v) The support of neutrals, allies and resistance groups.
 - (vi) The building up of the forces necessary for an eventual offensive against Germany.
 - (vii) The capture of positions from which to launch the eventual offensive.
- (b) Among the plans suggested for the Military Operations (para. 13) of the associated powers were:
- (i) Subject to the requirements of the security of the United States, of the British Isles and of their sea communications, the air policy of the Associated Powers would aim at achieving as quickly as possible superiority of air strength over that of the enemy, particularly in long-range striking forces.⁽¹⁾
 - (ii) U.S. Army Air Forces would support United States land and naval forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped organisations, they would undertake the air defence of those general areas in which naval bases used primarily by United States forces were located, and subsequently of such other areas as may be agreed upon. United States Army Air Corps bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the R.A.F., primarily against German military power at its source.
- (c) Among the suggested Principles of Command (para. 14) of the military forces of the Associated Powers were:
- (i) The forces of each of the Associated Powers should in general operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsibility of their own Power.
 - (ii) The forces of either Power employed normally under the strategic direction of an established commander of the other would be employed as task (organised) forces, charged with the execution of specific strategic tasks.
- Such forces would operate under their own commanders and would not be distributed in small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power.
- (d) Military Missions (para. 15) would be exchanged between the United States and Britain in order to effect proper collaboration to further the agreed military plans.
 - (e) Existing Military Intelligence Organisations (para. 19) would operate as independent intelligence agencies but would maintain close liaison with each other in order to ensure the

(1) The implication of this sub-paragraph does not seem to have been considered sufficiently clear; at a later date a rewording was suggested, (see para. 205).

full and prompt exchange of pertinent information concerning war operations. Intelligence liaison would be established not only through the Military Missions but also between all formations in the field with respect to matters affecting their operations.

(b) The Annexes

160. Further details regarding the agreements recorded in the Main Report were included in various Annexes. Annex 3 contained the "United States - British Commonwealth Joint Basic War Plan"; and in Section III of this Annex a definition was given of the composition and role of the Associated Air Forces envisaged as operating in the area of the "United Kingdom and British Home Waters." There was some repetition of points already made in the main Report, but there were also the following additional points:

(a) The tasks of the Associated Air Forces would be to defend the British Isles against attack and invasion, to protect shipping, and to conduct a sustained air offensive against German military power in all areas within range of the United Kingdom.

(b) British and Allied Air Forces were of the order of 165 squadrons of all classes.

(c) United States Air Forces of the order of 32 squadrons (bombardment and pursuit), with appropriate command echelons, would be available for despatch to Britain during 1941. Additional units would be provided as resources became available, the number and disposition depending upon the military situation from time to time.

(d) Administrative command of all United States land and air forces located in the British Isles and Iceland would be exercised by the Commander of the United States Army Forces in Great Britain. This officer would have authority to arrange details concerning the organisation and location of task forces (organisation of units in appropriate formations) and operational control, with the War Office and Air Ministry.

(c) A Comment

161. While the provisions of the final Report followed the general lines of the draft by the British delegates, in some instances they were perhaps somewhat less precise - which was probably advisable because they were thus considerably more flexible and adaptable. As an example, where the British delegates proposed that United States bombardment units should operate as a formation of R.A.F. Bomber Command, the final Report suggested that the Commander of the United States Army Forces in Great Britain should have the authority to arrange with the War Office and the Air Ministry the operational control of all task forces.

5. The Special Report on Air Policy

162. The policy relating to the supply and the allocation of aircraft was considered of such immediate and vital importance as to deserve special treatment. A Sub-Committee consisting of Captain Ramsay, United States Navy, Colonel McNarney and Air Vice-Marshal Slessor, was accordingly appointed to consider and report on the subject. Their recommendations were set out in a special report entitled "Air Policy".(1)

(1) B.U.S.(J)(41)39; U.S. Serial 011512-15; Short title ABC-2: 29 March 1941.

These recommendations had such a close bearing on the future development of and inter-relation between the R.A.F. and the U.S. Army Air Corps that they must be briefly recorded:

- (a) In conditions under which the British Isles were no longer available for air operations against the Axis Powers, an air force of fifty-four combat groups, plus the necessary personnel and facilities to undertake an expansion to one hundred combat groups, was the minimum strength considered necessary by the United States Army for its proportionate effort in achieving the air security of United States interests.
- (b) In circumstances as then existing, however, it would be the policy of the United States in the event of the intervention of the United States in the war as an Associate of the British Commonwealth, to operate a substantial proportion of those forces from advanced bases in the British Isles.
- (c) The rate of expansion of the air combat forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth would be largely dependent upon the ability of the two nations to provide adequate air material. All programmes of aircraft construction would be accelerated as rapidly as circumstances permitted.
- (d) In principle, the United States programme for the equipment and maintenance of existing and new units and of training establishments should be based on her total production, less
 - (i) Allocations to the British Commonwealth.
 - (ii) allocations which may be authorised to other nations.
- (e) Allocation of the output from new capacity for the production of military aircraft should be based on the principles:
 - (i) Until such time as the United States might enter the war, the entire output from such new capacity should be made available for release to the British.
 - (ii) If the United States entered the war, thereafter the output from such new capacity should be divided among the Associated Powers in such proportion as the military situation might require and circumstances might permit. For planning purposes Britain should assume that such capacity would be divided on an approximately equal basis between the United States and the British Commonwealth.
- (f) The United States should agree to defer the completion of the aircraft equipment for the fifty-four combat group programme, so long as she does not enter the war, and provided that any additional aircraft thus made available contribute directly towards the effectuation of the agreed strategic policy.
- (g) The United States Army should proceed with the initiation of its second planned aviation objective (the hundred group programme) to include total training facilities for 30,000 pilots and 100,000 technicians per year on the basis of a total planned strength of 7,800 first-line aircraft.

163. With the completion of the Reports and the signature on 27 March 1941 of the joint letter of transmittal to the United States and British Chiefs of Staff the work of the Delegates was complete. Taken together, the recommendations and conclusions as recorded in the Main Report (ABC-1), in its Annexes, and in the Air Policy Report (ABC-2) are applicable to almost every aspect of air collaboration between the United States and Britain.⁽¹⁾ In the true sense of the term ABC-1 and ABC-2 were basic documents; and they probably had more positive effect upon the shape of things to come than any other similar documents.

6. Air Vice-Marshal Slessor's Observations

164. Shortly after his return from Washington to Air Ministry, Air Vice-Marshal Slessor placed on record some of his personal impressions gained during five months of association with the personnel of the United States Army and Navy Departments. Two of these impressions bear closely upon the subject of this narrative. Regarding the agreements just concluded, Air Vice-Marshal Slessor was emphatic that the United States authorities had been very co-operative: they had deliberately restricted the expansion of their own air forces in order that the British, who were actually fighting, should have all the aircraft that the United States air forces could possibly afford. The other relevant observation was on the subject of a separate air force. Air Vice-Marshal Slessor was consulted on this point on frequent occasions. His consistent reply was that it was probably bound to come eventually, but that the first step desirable was the establishment of a proper Air Staff within War Department.

(1) It may be noted that there is no mention in either of the reports of the relative merits of day and night bombing.

BRITISH REQUIREMENTS FROM THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Harry Hopkins's Mission

January 1941

165. Coincident with the studies of the strategical and long-term issues which were in progress in Washington, discussions were also taking place in London on the question of how best the United States could help Britain with her immediate and short-term plans. The subject was at that time very much in the mind of President Roosevelt. He had received from Mr. Purvis on his return from Britain the memorandum setting out Britain's needs in the sphere of supply. The Prime Minister too, had sent personal communications on the same subject. But with the Lend-Lease Bill - that most timely and far sighted gesture of mutual aid - about to be introduced into Congress, (1) the President was anxious to make his own personal enquiries as to what it was that Britain most wanted from the United States. Accordingly, early in January 1941, he instructed Mr. Harry Hopkins to go to Britain as his personal representative to consult as necessary with the appropriate British authorities in order to obtain a first-hand indication of British needs.

166. Mr. Hopkins arrived on 9 January 1941, and was of course warmly welcomed. During his visit he was given the opportunity of discussing the many aspects of the problem with all responsible Ministerial and Service officials.

167. Eventually, in order to provide him with a comprehensive and considered picture of the British requirements, the Prime Minister directed that each interested department should prepare a list setting out those items which it was most desirous of obtaining from the United States during the next five months. The lists would be consolidated into a Note which Mr. Hopkins could take back with him. (2)

168. The requirements of Air Ministry were contained in a letter sent by the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Air (Sir A. Street) to the Secretary of the Cabinet (Sir E. Bridges) on 17 January 1941. In summary they were as follows:-

(a) Most needed were trained personnel, especially in all categories listed below. They were needed, if possible, to the numbers indicated:

(i) Pilots (800 to 1,000) - trained up to the stage at which they would be ready to enter Operational Training Units.

(ii) Observers (300) - trained in Navigation, Bombing and Gunnery.

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- (1) The Lend-Lease Bill was introduced into Congress and referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 13 January 1941; it was passed by the House of Representatives on 8 February; the Debate on it in the Senate opened on 17 February, and the Bill was passed on 8 March; the amended version was passed by the House of Representatives on 11 March and the Bill was signed by the President on the same day.
- (2) A.M. File C.S.8022, Encl. 1A: Itr., Sir Edward Bridges to M.A.P: 15 January 1941.

- (iii) Fitters (5,000) - engine or airframe
" (1,000) - armourers.
- (iv) Electricians (500).
- (v) Instrument Makers (500)
- (vi) Ground Wireless Operators (1,000).
- (vii) Metal-workers (200).
- (viii) Machine Tool Setters and Operators (150).

(b) Aircraft and aircraft equipment were also vital needs. After consultation with the Ministry of Aircraft Production, it had been agreed that accelerated deliveries (to the extent indicated below over existing allocations) should be pressed for as follows:

- (i) Heavy Bombers (as many as possible)
- (ii) Flying Boats (an additional 50)
- (iii) Reconnaissance Aircraft (an additional 50)
- (iv) Advanced Trainer Aircraft (an additional 500).
These would be used either in R.A.F. training organisations in Britain or the Empire or in United States organisations where facilities could be afforded to train R.A.F. pilots.

(c) Trained crews for ferrying new aircraft across the Atlantic would release additional R.A.F. crews for participation in actual combat.

(d) The allocation of United States shipping to transport those types of aircraft which could not be flown to Britain would ease what was becoming a very difficult situation.

169. Mr. Hopkins returned to the United States on 16 February 1941. He took back the above formal statement of British air needs; but in addition he was able to supplement his report to the President from his personal impressions gained during informal conversation and discussion. During his five weeks stay in Britain he had been able to survey the British problem very comprehensively, and was thus able to give the President a complete report.

170. It is of interest to add as a footnote to this Section that only two days after Mr. Hopkins had left Britain, Mr. Averil Harriman was appointed by the President to go to London as his personal representative, charged with the mission of expediting the flow of war supplies from the United States to Britain. Mr. Harriman actually arrived in London on 15 March 1941.

RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS TO ESTABLISH
R.A.F. FLYING TRAINING SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES

February - April 1941

171. It will be recalled that the negotiations to establish R.A.F. Flying Training Schools in the United States which had been in progress during the late summer and early autumn of 1940 were suspended during October owing mainly to the difficulty of providing the necessary quantity of advanced training aircraft. In this state of suspension the schemes remained through most of the winter of 1940/41 so that at the beginning of February 1941, the only project actually in operation was a so-called "refresher course" for volunteer United States pilots. Under this project three civilian flying training schools in the United States were being used to give volunteer United States pilots - at the rate of some forty a month - sufficient training to bring their flying experience up to a total of 150 hours prior to enlisting in the R.A.F.(1)

172. The impossibility of finding advanced training aircraft had proved an insuperable obstacle to the establishment of "all-through" R.A.F. training schools in the United States. Contributory obstacles had been the difficulties in giving training in armament, the need to have all pupils established on a civilian basis, and the consequent drain upon British dollar resources.(2)

172A. During the first half of March 1941, however, the situation changed. Two factors were mainly responsible. The first was the approval given by Congress to the Lend-Lease Bill.(3) The second was the effect of Mr. Harry Hopkins's visit to Britain. The Lend-Lease Bill, of course, radically changed the financial background to all negotiations between Britain and the United States. In the case of the training project, it removed a big difficulty from the British standpoint, since to bring the project to fruition would not now involve such a great depletion of the already strained British dollar reserves. Mr. Hopkins's visit to Britain influenced the scheme inasmuch as during that visit he had discussed with the Chief of the Air Staff and others the potentialities of establishing certain British flying training facilities in the United States and had reported on the matter to the President as soon as he returned to Washington.(4).

173. After receiving Mr. Hopkins's report the President lost no time in instructing General Arnold to consider the provision of immediate assistance, in the shape both of elementary and advanced flying training facilities. In consequence details of what was practicable were worked out by General Arnold and his staff, and were brought up for discussion on 5 March 1941 at a conference between General Arnold, the British Air Attache in Washington, and representatives of six of the best civilian flying training schools in the United States. General Arnold's proposals consisted of an offer to lease to Britain (assuming the safe passage of the Lend-Lease Bill through its final stages) for operation by

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- (1) C.A.S. Folder No. 578: Min., A.M.T./501, A.M.T. to C.A.S.: 10 March 1941.
 - (2) C.A.S. Folder No. 578: Note by U.S. of S. for Air: 14 April 1941.
 - (3) The Lend-Lease Bill was signed by the President on 11 March 1941.
 - (4) C.A.S. Folder No. 578: Tel., 105, Air Attache, Washington, to Air Ministry: 6 March 1941.

the six civilian schools up to 260 elementary training aircraft and 285 advanced training aircraft.(1)

174. This offer was naturally much welcomed by the British authorities in London. Details of how best advantage might be taken of it were arranged between the Air Member for Training, Air Ministry (Air Marshal Garrod), and the British Air Attache in Washington. It was envisaged that from the six schools there would be a yield of some 180 pupils a month, of which 60 would be volunteers from the United States and the remaining 120 would be pupils supplied from Britain.(2)

175. As a further contribution to British training, the United States authorities had also agreed to accept batches of ten British pupils at the Navigation School at Miami.(3)

176. Such, broadly was the position when, on 23 March 1941, the British Air Attache informed the Chief of the Air Staff that General Arnold had decided that he would, at last, be able to pay his long-deferred visit to England, and that one of the principal reasons for his coming would be to discuss fully the training problems.

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- (1) C.A.S. Folder No. 578: Tel., 105, Air Attache, Washington, to Air Ministry: 6 March 1941.
 - (2) C.A.S. Folder No. 578: Tel., X 761, Air Ministry to Air Attache, Washington: 7 March 1941; Tel., X 939, Air Ministry to Air Attache, Washington: 8 March 1941; and Tel., X 832, Air Ministry to Air Attache, Washington: 14 March 1941.
 - (3) C.A.S. Folder No. 578: Memo. by S.8: 24 March 1941.

GENERAL ARNOLD'S VISIT TO BRITAIN

April 1941

177. Had it not been for the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, General Arnold would almost certainly have paid a visit to Britain in the autumn of that year. Diplomatic exchanges on the subject had been taking place from June onwards.(1) After war was declared, however, circumstances were no longer considered propitious, and it was therefore not until March 1941 that General Arnold felt that he might perhaps be able to come to Britain.

178. One of his main reasons for making the visit, as stated in paragraph 176, was his desire to discuss the training problem in all its aspects. In addition he wished, as he said, to see Europe through the eyes of the Chief of the Air Staff, and those of the principal Staff Officers and the Air Officers Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F. Bomber, Fighter and Coastal Commands.(2). He also wanted to ascertain how, from a long-range point of view, the U.S. Army Air Corps might best assist the R.A.F. - particularly since at the back of his mind at this time was the thought that saturation point would soon be reached in respect of the number of aircraft which could be operated from bases in Britain, and it might therefore prove uneconomical, if the United States entered the war, to send her aid squadrons actually to Britain.

179. The Chief of the Air Staff extended a cordial welcome, and all arrangements for his visit were immediately put in hand.(3) On 12 April General Arnold arrived in England, accompanied by his Aide, Major Quesada. The first week of his stay was devoted mainly to a round of visits to the principal operational headquarters and to certain typical stations of the R.A.F. He was taken to the headquarters of each of Bomber, Fighter and Coastal Commands; to the headquarters of No. 3 Group of Bomber Command and No. 11 Group of Fighter Command - the nerve-centre from which the Battle of Britain had been directed; and to a night bomber and a day fighter station. Naturally there is no record of the informal discussions which took place during these visits, but there can be little doubt that views were exchanged freely with R.A.F. commanders of all ranks on a variety of topics.(4)

180. During General Arnold's stay in Britain, there were two important formal conferences with the Air Staff. One was on 13 April 1941 to discuss training problems; the other was on 23 April to review the question of the production of aircraft in the United States.

1. Discussion of Training Problems

181. At the conference on 13 April the Air Member for Training took the chair.(5) General Arnold brought with him General Harmon, the United States Military Air Attache

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- (1) A.M. File C.S. 1244. Various minutes and enclosures.
 - (2) C.A.S. Folder No. 659: Tel., 145, Air Attache, Washington, to Air Ministry for C.A.S.; 26 March 1941.
 - (3) C.A.S. Folder No. 659: Tel., X 524, Air Ministry, (C.A.S.) to Air Attache, Washington; 28 March 1941.
 - (4) C.A.S. Folder No. 659: Various papers refer.
 - (5) C.A.S. Folder No. 578: 'Flying Training Facilities in the U.S.A.' - Notes of a Mtg. in A.M.T.'s room: 13 April 1941. A copy was sent to General Scanlon.

(General Scanlon), and Major Quesada; on the Air Staff side there were Air Vice-Marshal Slessor and the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Intelligence) (Air Vice-Marshal Medhurst). The main points of the proceedings were as follows:

(a) The Air Member for Training outlined the general organisation of training in the R.A.F. and referred to the difficulties which had confronted them in their efforts to maintain an adequate flow of trained personnel. He indicated the most urgent need was for short-term assistance to enable the R.A.F. to increase its offensive power during 1941. Long-term assistance, however, would be none the less valuable, since it would ease the strain on the expanding R.A.F. training organisation. Finally he gave details of what sort of assistance would be most appreciated:

(i) Pilots - for the Atlantic Ferry Organisation; for ferrying duties within the United Kingdom; for instructors; and for operations, especially in heavy bombers and flying boats.

(ii) Observers - mainly because the R.A.F. lacked the necessary number of suitable training aircraft.

(iii) Radio Mechanics.

(b) General Arnold said that he wanted to assist in every possible way, and he had, in fact, certain facilities which he could offer. Moreover, he wished so to organise these facilities as to base training in the United States upon that which had been evolved in Britain from the lessons of actual combat. Specifically, he stated that he could offer:

(i) Adequate numbers of skilled ferry pilots for the Atlantic Ferry Organisation, and certain numbers to assist with internal ferrying and on the Takoradi route if necessary.

(ii) One-third of the capacity of the primary, basic and advanced schools in the United States for the training of operational pilots. This flying training organisation was expanding rapidly to a programme which aimed at completion by December 1941.

(iii) As there was a deficiency of observers for United States requirements, he could not place any of the Army training capacity in this respect at the disposal of the R.A.F. before the end of 1941. He would, however, hand over the entire facilities of the civil school at Miami which would provide for an entry of 190 pupils in August 1941 and a further 190 later.

The principles according to which the above suggested arrangements would operate would, of course, need to be determined. He proposed, therefore, to send General Johnson over to England to settle the details. He added that he would like General Johnson to be accompanied by some of the United States Training Staffs in order that they might study British methods. Generally it was his wish that there should be a full interchange of ideas and staff to an extent which would enable the training to be planned on similar lines in both Britain and the United States.

(c) In reply the Air Member for Training undertook to give to General Arnold a full statement of British needs which could be taken back to the United States for further study, and to supply complete details of British training courses and syllabuses.

182. During the conference it was made clear that this offer of General Arnold was over and above the 'Six-Schools' scheme - under which a number of pilots for the R.A.F. were to be trained at six civilian flying training schools in the United States. General Arnold was offering in addition a proportion of the training capacity which was being specially developed with a view to the eventual expansion of the U.S. Army Air Corps. He was able to do this because, for a time, there would be a shortage of operational aircraft in the Air Corps, and the training capacity being built up would prove more than sufficient for their current needs, this leaving an excess capacity available for use by the R.A.F.

183. On 17 April 1941 the Air Member for Training conveyed to General Arnold the deep gratitude of Air Ministry for his generous offer. The Air Council were "keenly desirous of accepting, subject to satisfactory arrangements being made to finance the scheme under the Lease and Lend procedure".(1).

2. Discussions on Aircraft Production in the United States: the British Insistence on the Heavy Bomber

184. The conference which was held on 23 April 1941 was occasioned by a letter sent by General Arnold to the Chief of the Air Staff two days earlier.(2). The letter enumerated several points, based upon his observations and discussions since he had been in England, which General Arnold felt he should bring to the notice of the Chief of the Air Staff. Primarily he had come to the conclusion that there was an urgent need to initiate a study to determine whether the programmes of aircraft production in the United States required revision in the light of changed or changing circumstances. Essential data for this study would be a statement of the categories and types of aircraft which Britain needed from the United States and a statement also of the probable quantities that would be required, if possible up to and including the requirements for 1943. General Arnold suggested that it would therefore be in everyone's interest if such statements could be prepared.

185. The Chief of the Air Staff was all in favour, and felt that the subject merited full discussion at a special meeting, for it was clear that only by some such rational approach could aircraft production in the United States really be planned to meet true operational needs.

186. The meeting which was convened was fully representative. General Arnold brought the United States Military Air Attache (General Scanlon), while the Chief of the Air Staff had with him his senior Staff Officers and the Scientific Adviser to Air Ministry.(3) The following is a summary of the proceedings:

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- (1) C.A.S. Folder No. 578: Ltr., A.M.T./596, A.M.T. to General Arnold: 17 April 1941.
See also in same folder: Tel., X 7, Air Ministry to Air Attache, Washington: 22 April 1941 and Tel., 211, Air Attache, Washington, to Air Ministry: 23 April 1941.
 - (2) C.A.S. Folder 'Technical Conversations with U.S.A.': Ltr., General Arnold to C.A.S.: 21 April 1941.
 - (3) C.A.S. Folder 'Technical Conversations with U.S.A.': Mins. of Mtg. at Air Ministry: 23 April 1941. Present at the meeting were General Arnold, General Scanlon, the Chief of the Air Staff, the Vice Chief of the Air Staff, the Air Member for Supply and Organisation, the Assistant Chiefs of the Air Staff (Intelligence) and (Technical) the Staff Officer to the Chief of the Air Staff and the Scientific Adviser to Air Ministry.

(a) The Chief of the Air Staff commenting on General Arnold's observations in his letter, remarked that the whole strategic position had been changed by the fall of France. So far as the R.A.F. was concerned it had meant that the only means of direct attack against the enemy had become that of long-range bombing. The British therefore had come to place much more importance upon the production of the long-range heavy bomber than upon that of the shorter-range medium bomber. He referred, too, to the problems which were constantly arising in the effort to produce modern and more efficient types of aircraft to meet the changing needs. All needed study.

(b) General Arnold commented that the list of priorities which had been prepared by Air Ministry showed clearly what type of aircraft was most desired - the heavy bomber.⁽¹⁾ He observed that this need was not yet fully appreciated by the United States Administration; in fact, it had only been brought home fully to him just prior to his departure for England. The prevailing idea in the United States was still that Britain wanted aircraft in quantity, regardless of type. On his return however, he hoped to be able to take steps to increase the production of heavy bombers to meet what was obviously a vital need.

(c) Discussion then turned to a general review of the new types of aircraft under development, aircraft armament, types of runways and tyre pressures.

(d) The question of Air Ministry representation under United States was also introduced; the Chief of the Air Staff said that this was a question which was then under review.

187. The significance of this conference from the point of view of the present narrative lies in the emphasis placed by the British representatives upon the supreme importance of the heavy bomber in the British war effort. It was not, of course, a new theme in Anglo-American discussions, as will have been appreciated from earlier Sections of the narrative. It had already been introduced during the Staff Conversations in Washington - notably in the British Paper on the "Provision and Employment of United States Air Forces" (see para. 152). It had also been brought to the attention of such influential United States officials as the Secretary for War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations at a meeting which they had had with the British delegates to the Staff Conversations on 25 March 1941, when the British officers had urged most strongly that new capacity for aircraft production additional to that already approved should be put in hand as soon as possible, and should include the highest practicable proportion of long-range, four-engined bombers. Even so, from General Arnolds remarks noted in paragraph 186, it would seem that the need for urgency had not been fully appreciated in Washington by the responsible authorities.

188. General Arnold on the other hand, as a result of his conversations and observations while in Britain, had become so fully convinced of the soundness of the British viewpoints that he asked the British Air Staff to collaborate with him in drafting a

(1) In the interval between the receipt of General Arnold's letter and the date of the conference a list had been prepared by Air Ministry indicating desired priorities in aircraft production.

telegram which he could send to War Department expressing this conviction. The resulting telegram, which was of considerable length, is such a useful statement of contemporary British thought on the subject that a summary of its essential points follows:(1)

- (a) British Air policy at that time was to build up a force of 4,000 heavy bombers by the Spring of 1943. The force would consist exclusively of bombers with an all-up weight in excess of 30,000 lbs.
- (b) The reason for this emphasis on large bomber aircraft was that essential qualities for bombing operations against Germany had been found through war experience to be long-range, a large bomb-load of heavy bombers, and good defensive properties. These qualities could be combined only in the heavy bomber. The heavy bomber, moreover, was economical in the use of skilled crews - the Stirling with a bomb-load of 10,000 lbs had a crew of seven as compared with the Blenheim having a bomb-load of 1,000 and a crew of three. Finally, if a substantial proportion of the Striking Force did not consist of heavy bombers, airfield requirements might exceed practicable limits.
- (c) Air Ministry was satisfied that a force of the size contemplated could be located in the United Kingdom. Additional accommodation would be found by the continued transfer abroad of training schools. The required crews and ground personnel would be available.
- (d) To make this accepted policy practicable, a great increase in heavy bombers - up to 1,000 per month by the end of 1942 - was essential. British production would supply only half of this quantity; the balance, therefore, must come from the United States. This would involve stepping up production there from the existing 200 per month to 500 per month.
- (e) So important did Air Ministry consider the production of heavy bombers that they would sacrifice a proportion of the deliveries of the lighter bombers and fighters.
- (f) The order of priority, therefore, in which aircraft were required for the R.A.F. over the subsequent two years was:

- (i) Bombers with all-up weight exceeding 30,000 lbs.
- (ii) Bombers and General Reconnaissance aircraft of less than 30,000 lbs;
- (iii) Fighters.
- (iv) Dive bombers.

189. General Arnold left Britain on 26 April.(2) A few days before he left, he received a letter from the Chief of the Air Staff expressing appreciation of "your evident readiness to bear sacrifices in the equipment of your own service in order that ours

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- (1) C.A.S. Folder No. 667: Tel., X 682, Air Ministry to A.A. Washington: 26 April 1941.
 - (2) C.A.S. Folder No. 659: Ltr., P.A. to C.A.S. to Maj. Quesada: 22 April 1941.

may have what it requires."(1) The letter also expressed the hope that "you may be represented in this country by an officer with whom I can deal on your behalf".

3. Developments as a result of General Arnold's visit to Britain

190. After General Arnold's departure negotiations concerning the two subjects which had been his principal interests while in Britain - training and aircraft production in the United States - were continued through normal channels, including those at the highest levels.


191. Even so early as 30 April 1941 - just four days after General Arnold left Britain - Mr. Averil Harriman(2) was able to inform Air Vice-Marshal Slessor that, according to a telegram which he had received from Mr. Lovett(3) every effort was already being made by the United States Administration to find a means "to increase heavy bomber production to meet your requirements", and that for final determination the matter would be put before the President.(4) That great efforts were, in fact, made to increase aircraft production in general is indicated by the report received from the British Air Attache in Washington on 6 June which stated that "the present schedule [of production] is the result of tremendous pressure and unprecedented measures by the Administration".(5) To what extent this increase in potential production influenced the future development of the U.S. Army Corps can, of course, only be assessed accurately by reference to its own archives.

192. To assist with the formulation of the training projects in the United States, the Deputy Director of Training, Air Ministry (Group Captain Carnegie), accompanied General Arnold back to Washington.(6) The 'Six-Schools' scheme - General Arnold's original offer made in March by which 180 pilots per month would be trained at civilian schools in the United States - had suffered set-backs and was still, at the end of April, not in operation in spite of having had the President's signed approval.(7) Then a legal difficulty was encountered in the "Arnold" scheme - General Arnold's supplementary proposals made during his visit to England - the United States lawyers maintaining that it would be a contravention of the law to accept British pupils in United States Army Schools.(8) However, all these difficulties, as a result of exchanges at the highest levels,(9) were ultimately overcome, and by mid-June 1941 the two schemes

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- (1) C.A.S. Folder No. 659: Ltr., C.A.S. to General Arnold: 23 April 1941.
 - (2) Mr. Harriman was at that time the personal representative of the President in Britain to expedite the programme of United States aid to Britain. (see para. 170 above).
 - (3) Mr. Lovett was the U.S. Assistant Secretary of War for Air.
 - (4) D. of Plans Folder "Heavy Bomber Production U.S.A.": Ltr., Mr. Harriman to A/V/M. Slessor: 30 April 1941.
 - (5) D. of Plans Folder "Heavy Bomber Production U.S.A." Tel., No. 454, Pirie to C.A.S: 4 June 1941.
 - (6) C.A.S. Folder No. 578: Tel., X 396, Air Ministry to Air Attache, Washington: 24 April 1941; and ltr., T-15/9, G/C Carnegie to D. of T.: 4 May 1941.
 - (7) C.A.S. Folder No. 578: Tels., 226 and 227, Air Attache Washington to Air Ministry: 28 April 1941.
 - (8) C.A.S. Folder No. 578: Ltr., T.15/9 G/C Carnegie to D. of T: 4 May 1941.
 - (9) C.A.S. Folder No. 578: Tel., No. 1985, Lord Halifax to Prime Minister: 5 May 1941 and tel Prime Minister to Pres: 10 May 1941.

for pilot training and the scheme for observer training at Miami were all in operation.(1) The effect of the establishment of these training projects upon the expanding U.S. Army Air Corps training programme needs no emphasis. Interchange of ideas between United States and British personnel was an integral part of the scheme as visualised by General Arnold, and there can be little doubt that British experience, however subtly the results of that experience might have had to be introduced, had a considerable influence upon the eventual shape of the U.S. Army Air Corps training organisation.

(1) C.A.S. Folder No. 578; Encls. to Ltr., G/C Carnegie to
D. of T: 29 May 1941.



UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT
TECHNICIANS IN BRITAIN

Assistance to the R.A.F.

January - June 1941

193. Another aspect of United States assistance to Britain under discussion about the time of General Arnold's visit to England was the possibility of help being afforded by United States technicians to bring into efficient operation the American types of aircraft which were being introduced into the R.A.F. It was no secret that difficulties were being encountered by the R.A.F. in maintaining these aircraft in a serviceable condition, and this fact was causing some concern to the United States authorities since it meant that these aircraft were not playing their intended part in active operations against the Axis.

194. Very early in 1941 representations on the subject were made by the United States Military Attache in London (Colonel Scanlon) to appropriate quarters in Washington. (1) Advantage had also been taken of the Mr. Harry Hopkins's visit to London in January to bring the topic to the ear of high authority. (2) The outcome was that at the beginning of March 1941 General Arnold - who had then just returned to Washington from a tour of Air Corps Units in the United States and had noticed how even among these units there was a differential reaction to new equipment - expressed a desire to help the R.A.F. in any way possible. After discussion with the British Air Commission in Washington, he felt that the necessary technical assistance might be provided from the various producing firms on the technical and design aspect, and from the Air Corps by maintenance personnel, operating personnel and pilots. This offer was conveyed to London on 4 March 1941 (3) and was gratefully accepted (4).

195. Just a week later the British Air Commission reported that General Arnold was arranging to supply the necessary personnel on the basis that they would be attached to the United States Embassy (either in London or the Middle East, where also United States aircraft were being used), would be classed as observers, and would wear civilian clothes. For each type of aircraft it was proposed to send as a basis two pilots, one project engineer, and four enlisted personnel with maintenance experience. The composition of the group might vary slightly as between the different types of aircraft, but the above would be the essential nucleus of each team. Groups of technicians were accordingly set up for each of the following types of aircraft: B-17, B-24, P-38, P-39, P-40, A-34, and P.B-7. In the case of the B-24 the R.A.F. had had the first aircraft produced of this type, so that the U.S. Army Air Corps were not able to send officers who could contribute any experience in their operation (5).

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- (1) A.M. File S.72615, Encl. 7A: Ltr., A.M. 2586/MFS, Col. Scanlon to A.M.S.O.: 17 March 1941.
 - (2) A.M. File S.72615, Encl. 1A: Tel., Briny 3516, B.A.C. to M.A.P.: 4 March 1941.
 - (3) A.M. File S.72615, Encl. 1A: Tel., Briny 3516, B.A.C. to M.A.P.: 4 March 1941.
 - (4) A.M. File S.72615, Encl. 2A: Tel., MAP 3978, M.A.P. to B.A.C.: 7 March 1941.
 - (5) A.M. File S.72615, Encl. 4A: Tel., Briny 3718: B.A.C. to M.A.P.: 12 March 1941.

196. Arrangements were made for the United States technicians, on their arrival in Britain, to visit a number of Air Service Units where United States aircraft were being dealt with, and afterwards to work in close association with that section in the Air Ministry Directorate of Servicing and Maintenance which was responsible for dealing with United States types of aircraft.(1)

197. This was the position when General Arnold visited England during the two middle weeks of April. The subject was discussed informally with him by Air Staff officers, with the result that when he returned to Washington he investigated the position and made a revised offer.

198. The new offer was conveyed to the Secretary of State for Air through the United States Ambassador in London on 8 May 1941(2). Its terms were:

(a) That the United States Army was prepared to furnish competent lead men for maintenance and for servicing crews in the following ratios:

one for each single-engine fighter; one and a half for each twin-engine fighter; and two for each heavy bomber - up to a total of ten aircraft in each category.

(b) That the offer was conditional on a definite agreement being reached that no duties other than supervisory would be assigned to the men, and that they would actually be used.

It was suggested that Lieutenant Colonel McReynolds and Majors Brandt, Price and Walsh, who were already in England, could supervise the work.

199. The offer was accepted gratefully by the Secretary of State for Air on 9 May 1941.(3) Details of whatever arrangements might be necessary could, he said, be settled between General Harmon at the United States Embassy and the Air Member for Supply and Organisation, Air Ministry. Within the next month, after full discussion, agreement was reached between the Embassy and Air Ministry on the arrangements which would be most acceptable. An indication of the details of these arrangements was conveyed to the British Air Commission in Washington on 2 June 1941(4) and a fuller formal statement was forwarded to the United States Embassy on 27 June(5). In brief, it was to the effect that Air Ministry would appreciate help from United States technicians on the basis, per class of aircraft, of one officer (servicing engineer), two officer pilots, and a number of enlisted personnel, the number being determined as follows:

(a) for the single-engine fighter and dive-bomber - two fitter riggers one armament and one radio mechanic,


(b) for the twin-engine fighter, medium bomber and general reconnaissance - three fitter riggers, one armament and one radio mechanic, and

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- (1) A.M. File S.72615, Encl. 12A: Min., P.S. to A.M.S.O. to P.S. to C.A.S.: 11 April 1941.
 - (2) A.M. File S.72615, Encl. 13A: Ltr., U.S. Ambassador to S. of S. for Air: 8 May 1941.
 - (3) A.M. File S.72615, Encl. 13B: Ltr., S. of S. for Air to U.S. Ambassador: 9 May 1941.
 - (4) A.M. File S.72615, Encl. 17C: Tel., MAP 6272, M.A.P. to B.A.C.: 2 June 1941.
 - (5) A.M. File S.72615, Encl. 20A: Ltr., S.72615/S.9, Air Ministry to U.S. Embassy, London: 27 June 1941.

(c) for the heavy bomber and flying boat - four fitter riggers, one armament and one radio mechanic.

The letter was accompanied by tables which showed the number of United States technicians per class of aircraft already either in Britain or the Middle East (the total number in Britain was thirty-three) and the number that was being additionally requested under the terms of the United States Ambassador's offer.

200. Thus by the end of June 1941 agreements had been reached and recorded which would enable the R.A.F. to benefit fully - in so far as aircraft servicing and maintenance were concerned - from any technical experience which was available in the United States. If any difficulties were still encountered in bringing the American produced aircraft into efficient service for the R.A.F., at least such difficulties could not be attributed to lack of full co-operation.



REPORT OF THE BRITISH - UNITED STATES
STAFF CONVERSATIONS APPROVED IN WASHINGTON
AND LONDON

April - May 1941

201. The last three Sections of this narrative have been largely concerned with short-term Anglo-American collaboration: the ways and means by which the United States could afford assistance to the R.A.F. in the more or less immediate future. In this Section the projects for long-term collaboration will be again considered.

202. During April 1941, the British delegates who had taken part in the Staff Conversations in Washington returned to London, bringing with them the mutually agreed proposals for co-operation in the event of the United States becoming involved in the European War. Their first task was to prepare an introductory memorandum to cover the presentation of their Report to the British Chiefs of Staff.⁽¹⁾ Two points which they made in this introductory paper deserve mention. The first was a recommendation on the inclusion of an Air Staff representative in the proposed United States Mission to London; the second was a recommendation regarding the line that the British Chiefs of Staff should take as a result of a change of viewpoint on the part of the United States Air Staff since the time of the Conversations.

203. The status of the United States Air Staff in the two-service organisation in Washington had become clearly apparent to the British delegates during their discussions there. It concerned them, however, only insofar as it might possibly result in the proposed Mission to London being similarly composed on a two-service basis, which basis, they felt, would impair the efficiency of the Mission as an instrument of liaison vis-a-vis the British three-service organisation. In view of this possibility, they recommended to the British Chiefs of Staff that representations might be made to their United States colleagues in favour of the inclusion of a senior Officer of the U.S. Army Air Corps in the Mission.

204. The change in viewpoint of the United States Air Staff, which occasioned the second recommendation of the British Delegation, had to do with the turning of thought in the War Department to the possibilities of North Africa and the Middle East as a base for their forces, instead of Britain. Behind this trend of thought, was the belief, which in March and early April 1941 was gaining ground in Washington, that the time would shortly arrive when Britain would be so congested that no more aircraft could be operated efficiently from the bases there. As it happened, though the British authorities did not believe that airfield congestion in Britain would ever become an insuperable problem, an indication of interest by the United States in the possibilities of operating in the Mediterranean area was not unwelcome in London at that time. Accordingly, the British Delegation recommended that the Chiefs of Staff, in commenting to their United States colleagues on the Report on the Staff Conversations, might suggest that the whole problem of associated strategy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, was a subject which could appropriately be reconsidered by the United States Chiefs of Staff in consultation with the members of the proposed British Mission to Washington. In the event, however, this subject assumed a somewhat academic interest, since by the time that any action could have been taken on this recommendation by the British Delegation, General Arnold had returned

(1) C.O.S.(41)274: 30 April 1941.

from his visit to Britain, and had returned with adequate proof that there was, in fact, little real danger of air congestion in Britain, especially if the Striking Forces were composed mainly of heavy bombers. The matter, therefore, was not pursued.

205. Before the end of April, the Report on the Staff Conversations came up for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff, both in London and Washington. The United States Chiefs of Staff found it acceptable apart from the provision which is summarised in paragraph 159 above. They regarded this provision as being insufficiently explicit in the form in which it had been expressed in the Report. Thus, when the approval of the United States Chiefs of Staff to the Report as a whole was conveyed to the British Chiefs of Staff, it was explained that it was provisional upon the following interpretation of the paragraph in question:

'Associated effort in the air, would mean the provision of the naval and land air components necessary for the accomplishing of naval tasks, for the support of land operations, and for independent air action against the sources of Axis military power.'(1)

206. On 1 May 1941, the Report came before the British Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.(2) After confirming the interpretation given by the United States Chiefs of Staff to the paragraph mentioned above, they agreed provisionally to all the conclusions and recommendations and submitted the Report for the approval of the War Cabinet. They also approved the air agreement recorded in ABC-2. In addition they took action to give immediate effect to certain of the recommendations in the Report: they gave instructions that the Director of Naval Intelligence should go to Washington to co-ordinate all forms of Intelligence and that the service departments should appoint the necessary staff to form the nucleus of a British Military Mission to be sent to Washington; and they agreed to express to the United States Chiefs of Staff the hope that the Mission to be sent to London would include officers who could collaborate with the British Air Staff at high level.

207. On 5 May 1941, a telegram was sent to the British representatives in Washington instructing them to convey to the Chief of Naval Operations and to the Chief of Staff the substance of paragraph 60 above.(3) For all intents and purposes, the Report had received full approval.

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- (1) C.O.S.(41)258: 22 April 1941. Ltr., U.S. Military Attache and Special Army Observer in London (Gen. Lee) and U.S. Special Naval Observer in London (Adm. Ghormley) to British C.O.S.
- (2) C.O.S.(41) 155th Mtg.: 1 May 1941.
- (3) C.A.S. Folder No. 666: Tel., Boxes 37: 5 May 1941.

THE UNITED STATES SPECIAL OBSERVER GROUP
(The Chaney Mission)

June - December 1941

1. Formation and Purpose

208. Before the end of May 1941 appropriate action had been taken regarding the exchange of Military Missions recommended in ABC-1. The Missions were in fact by then already formed and on their way to their duties. The R.A.F. officers of the British Mission(1) left London 19 May.(2) On 22 May the head of the United States Mission: Major General James E. Chaney, and his Chief of Staff, Brigadier General J. T. McNarney, were formally welcomed by the British Chiefs of Staff.(3)

209. With the appointment of General McNarney as the Chief of Staff to the military side of the United States Mission, there was available a senior United States Air officer who could participate in high-level discussions with the British Air Staff; the hope expressed by the British Chiefs of Staff to the United States Chiefs of Staff (see para 206) had been realised, but whether or not General McNarney's appointment was the direct result of this British representation cannot, of course, be determined from British records. In addition to General McNarney there were two 'Air Officers' on General Chaney's Special Staff: Colonel A. J. Lyon, A.C., and Major R. A. Snavely, A.C. The full composition of the Special Observer Group as it was in June 1941 is given in the Annex to this Section.

210. In order to avoid any political embarrassments the United States Mission was given the innocuous title of 'The United States Special Observer Group'. In reality the officers of the Mission were the accredited representatives of the War Department; thus the Special Observer Group became henceforth - at least during the remainder of 1941 - the body responsible for establishing the necessary policies and procedures for Anglo-American collaboration. On the United States side, General Chaney had informed the British Chiefs of Staff that according to his terms of reference ABC-1 would be taken as governing all military co-operation between the United States and the British Commonwealth, and that all his responsibilities and duties were covered by the provisions of the document.(4) On the British side, the Chiefs of Staff had agreed that the members of the Group should be treated with the utmost frankness, that the United States Staff Officers should be encouraged to establish direct contact with the British service departments, and that the Senior Officers should be invited to meetings of the British Chiefs of Staff as necessary.(5)

2. Arrangements for Liaison between the
Special Observer Group and the British Services

211. The responsibility for ensuring that effective liaison was established between the Special Observer Group and the British Services was laid by the British Chiefs of Staff upon the Operational Planning Section of the Joint Planning Staff.

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- (1) The official title of the British Mission was the 'Joint Staff Mission'.
(2) A.M. File S.8781: Min. 16, D.D.P. to D. of P.: 14 May 1941.
(3) C.O.S.(41) 184th Mtg.: 22 May 1941.
(4) C.O.S.(41) 184th Mtg. (Annex): 22 May 1941.
(5) C.O.S.(41) 291: 8 May 1941.

What this responsibility involved was discussed at a meeting between representatives of the Special Observer Group and members of the Operational Planning Section on 27 May 1941.(1)

212. As a preliminary, the United States officers were given an outline of the British Chiefs of Staff organisation. Then General McNarney reciprocated by giving analogous details of the organisation of War Department, and went on to describe the main tasks which the Chief of Staff of the United States Army had considered would fall to the Special Observer Group. These data formed a basis for the discussion which followed on what arrangements would be necessary to bring about the desired staff contacts.

213. The British Air Staff had already given some consideration to the problem and their representative in the Operational Planning Section (Group Captain Groom) was ready with some tentative proposals. Briefly these were(2):

(a) Air Policy Questions

(i) All general questions of policy, air strategy and future operations which did not involve Joint Planning should be discussed individually between the appropriate senior members of the Special Observer Group and the Director of Plans, Air Ministry (Air Commodore Dickson) or his Deputy (Group Captain Ivelaw-Chapman).

(ii) Current operational questions, it was felt, would not arise for some time in discussions with the Air Staff. If, however, members of the Special Observer Group wished to study such questions, they would be attached to the appropriate R.A.F. Command.

(iii) If any liaison on naval air problems was found desirable, the Director of Operations (Naval Co-operation) (Air Commodore Durston) would be the appropriate contact.

(b) Organisation

It would be necessary for the Special Observer Group to have close liaison with the department of the Air Member for Supply and Organisation (Air Marshal Courtney). To start, the appropriate member(s) of the Special Observer Group should deal with the Deputy Director of Organisation (Plans) (Group Captain Sharp).

(c) Training

The Air Member for Training (Air Marshal Garrod) had appointed the Deputy Director Flying Training (Group Captain Douglas Hamilton) as the staff officer to deal with all questions of United States liaison so far as training was concerned.

(d) Technical Operational Requirements.

The Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Technical) (Air Marshal Linnell) would deal personally with members of the Special Observer Group on matters which fell within his sphere of responsibility.

(1) A.L.(41) 1st Mtg.: 29 May 1941.

(2) A.L.(41) 1st Mtg. (Annex): 29 May 1941.

These proposals found general agreement, and in the main, as will appear later, the arrangements which were subsequently made for contacts with Air Ministry followed the lines indicated above.

214. In addition to this service-to-service liaison however, there were seven further meetings during the following six months on an inter-service basis, when members of the Special Observer Group met the Joint Planning Staff or its Operational Planning Section as a body, that is, with representatives present from each of the three British services. These meetings were given the common title of the 'American Liaison' series. The dates of the meetings and the nature of the subjects discussed were:

A.L.(41) 2nd Mtg.: 29 May - Strength of British Forces in certain areas in the Middle East. Channel of Communications between Washington and London.

A.L.(41) 3rd Mtg.: 6 June - Full discussion on the general strategic situation in the Middle East, and its importance in relation to the conduct of the war.

A.L.(41) 4th Mtg.: 5 July - A review of the Russo-German conflict.

A.L.(41) 5th Mtg.: 11 July - A review of the general strategic situation, and the broad conception of future strategy.

A.L.(41) 6th Mtg.: 19 July - Co-ordination between the United States and British Services in the use of code-names for operations.

A.L.(41) 7th Mtg.: 23 Sept. - Consideration of a draft agreement on the use of code-names.

A.L.(41) 8th Mtg.: 21 Nov. - A review of strategy.

215. From the above summary it will be apparent that problems associated with the air war in North-West Europe were brought directly into the discussions only at the 5th and 8th Meetings; and as the events which prompted the discussion at these two meetings are dealt with in the next Section of this narrative consideration of the main points which were made is more appropriately included in that Section.

3. First Meeting of the Special Observer Group with Air Ministry

216. The first formal meeting of the Special Observer Group with the British Air Staff took place on 6 June 1941. The Vice-Chief of the Air Staff (Air Chief Marshal Freeman) was in the Chair; there was full representation of the senior officers of the Air Staff; and General Chaney had with him General McNarney, Colonel McClelland (his G-3), and his Air Officers.(1) The following is a summary of the relevant proceedings at the meeting:

(1) V.C.A.S. Folder No. 242: Mins. of First Meeting between U.S. Special Observer Group and Air Ministry: 6 June 1941. Ten copies of these minutes were sent to Major Griffin, S.O.C., on 9 June 1941 (D. of Plans O.R.B.). Air Staff Officers present at the meeting were: the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, the Air Member for Supply and Organisation, the Air Member for Training, the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Research), the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Intelligence), the Director General of Organisation, the Director of Plans, the Director of War Organisation, the Director of Operational Training, the Principal Deputy Director of Signals, the Deputy Director of Plans, and other staff officers.

(a) It was agreed that:

(i) Similar meetings should be held at regular intervals to discuss questions of major policy.

(ii) Detailed planning should be undertaken direct with the appropriate Air Ministry Departments.

(b) Discussion ensued as to where the U.S. Army Air Corps units - bombardment and pursuit - should be located when they arrived in the United Kingdom and as to how they should operate.

(i) Bombardment Units. General McNarney said that in the United States plans it was contemplated that this force would operate from a close area under United States command but under the strategic direction of R.A.F. Bomber Command. It was intended that the force should consist of five Bombardment Groups which were expected to become available as follows:(1)

- 1 M.B. Gp. (4 sqdns.) - by 10 September 1941.
- 1 M.B. Gp. (4 sqdns.) - by 10 October 1941.
- 1 M.B. Gp. (4 sqdns.) - by 10 January 1942.
- 2 H.B. Gps. (8 sqdns.) - by 10 February 1942.

The Vice-Chief of the Air Staff suggested that the United States units might be concentrated as an integral formation at a number of airfields in the Huntingdon area. General Chaney agreed, provisionally.

(ii) Pursuit Units. General McNarney stated that initially it was proposed to send three United States Pursuit Groups to Northern Ireland. They would consist of single-seater fighters which were expected to become available as follows:(2)

- 1 Gp. - P-39 (80 a/c) - by November 1941.
- 2 Gps. - P-40 (160 a/c) - by December 1941.

Their primary task would be the defence of the bases to be used by United States warships and flying boats; a secondary consideration was that Northern Ireland would be a good training area where the United States squadrons could learn the organisation and procedure of R.A.F. Fighter Command. The Vice-Chief of the Air Staff pointed out that while Air Ministry wished to assist the United States authorities in their desire to preserve the entity of their Pursuit Wing, the scarcity of airfields in Northern Ireland might be a deciding factor. It was therefore suggested that the squadrons might, if necessary, be spread over Northern Ireland, South-West Scotland and North-West England, functioning nevertheless under their own Commander as a United States Group within R.A.F. Fighter Command.

(iii) Repair and Salvage Organisation. General Chaney stated that the United States would in due course set up their own repair and salvage organisation.

(c) As a result of the discussions it was agreed that there were points which needed further study, among them being:

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- (1) D. of Plans: O.R.B.: Min., Plans 1 to V.C.A.S.:
7 June 1941.
 - (2) V.C.A.S. Folder No. 242.

- (i) The operational training of United States fighter and bomber pilots - it was agreed that this question could be discussed between the Staff of the Special Observer Group and of the appropriate Air Ministry Branches.
 - (ii) The possibility of sending United States personnel to Britain to gain operational experience, particularly as Operations Officers, Intelligence Officers and Airfield Control Officers - General Chaney undertook to take this matter up with War Department.
 - (iii) The co-ordination of signals procedure.
 - (iv) The general problem of fitting the United States Pursuit Groups into the organisation of R.A.F. Fighter Command.
- (d) The Air Member for Supply and Organisation (Air Marshal Courtney) remarked on the necessity for close co-operation between the Special Observer Group and the Departments concerned in Air Ministry owing to the complexity of the various problems involved. It was agreed that the appropriate member of the Special Observer Group should make contact with the Director of War Organisation (Air Commodore Whitham) at the earliest possible moment to discuss the subject and to formulate a policy. The Vice-Chief of the Air Staff said that until the United States representatives were acquainted with Air Ministry organisation and knew to whom to refer on any particular problem, an officer in each Air Ministry Department and in each R.A.F. Command would be nominated as a contact to ensure that all enquiries were passed to the appropriate office.

The discussion during the meeting revealed how closely the plans of the United States authorities conformed to the understandings which had been reached during the Washington Conversations, and which were recorded in ABC-1 and ABC-2. At the same time it had the practical value of bringing into focus the various problems which would have to be resolved before the plans became workable projects. After the meeting the staffs, both of the Special Observer Group and of the responsible Air Ministry Branches, set to work upon them with commendable promptitude.

4a. The Location and Operation of United States Pursuit Units

217. The question of most immediate concern appears to have been the location and role of the United States Pursuit Units. On 9 June 1941, only three days after the first meeting with the Special Observer Group, the Director of Plans, Air Ministry, asked his appropriate colleagues on the Air Staff to let him have their views on:

- (a) the size of the fighter force essential for the defence of Northern Ireland,
- (b) the strength of the air forces necessary in Northern Ireland for other tasks, and,
- (c) the minimum number of airfields required to accommodate the necessary air units in all categories.(1)

(1) A.M. File C.S. 9887, Encl. 1A: Min., D. of Plans to D.O.N.C., D.F. Ops., D.B. Ops., D.M.C., D.W.O.: 9 June 1941.

So far as the fighter force was concerned, the Director of Fighter Operations (Air Commodore Whitworth-Jones) outlined his plan as follows:

- (a) The maximum fighter strength considered necessary for the defence of Northern Ireland - and this included the naval bases - was six squadrons, of which two should be night fighters, while
- (b) the disposition of this force would be:
 - (i) Group Headquarters at Dundonald, and
 - (ii) three Fighter Sector Stations in the Belfast, Lough Erne, and Lough Foyle areas respectively - each station to be capable of operating up to two squadrons.

This plan, he said, had the approval of the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F. Fighter Command, and had been included in a paper prepared for the Chiefs of Staff on the Air Defences of Northern Ireland.(1)

218. Having also obtained the views of his other colleagues regarding the air requirements for which they were responsible, the Director of Plans thought it advisable to get them all together to discuss the whole problem - and particularly the accommodation aspect - at a round table conference. Accordingly a conference was arranged for 25 June 1941, Colonel McClelland attending as the representative of the Special Observer Group.(2) The various questions were thrashed out, and tentative agreement was reached on the allocation of airfields. In the course of the discussion it was pointed out that the most troublesome period would be that when the responsibility for the defence of the area was being handed over by the R.A.F. to the U.S. Army Air Corps. During this period, which would be of uncertain duration, accommodation would have to be found for both United States and British units, since the former would obviously require a certain amount of time to settle down and obtain operational experience and would not be able to accept full responsibility immediately. The suggestion was made that perhaps the most satisfactory solution would be to allow the United States squadron to gain operational experience in certain Sectors of England, and only gradually to infiltrate them into North Ireland. To this Colonel McClelland agreed. He could not, however, give any indication whether such a policy would be approved by General Chaney, but he would at least represent it to him. Colonel McClelland then stated that, according to present plans, the United States Pursuit Wing in Northern Ireland would have its own repair depot and he asked for suggestions as to the best location for it. Two alternatives were put forward - Aldergrove and Sydenham - and after discussion it was agreed that the choice between the two should await the result of a personal reconnaissance of the area which members of the Special Observer Group proposed to undertake during the next

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- (1) A.M. File C.S. 9887, Encl. 2A: Min., D.F. Ops. to D. of Plans: 10 June 1941.
 - (2) A.M. File C.S. 9887, Encl. 7A: Mins. of Conference ... to discuss the allocation of aerodromes in N. Ireland: 25 June 1941. The S.O.G. were given two copies of the minutes. Present at the meeting were: Director of Plans (in the Chair), Director of Operations (Naval Co-operation), Director of Fighter Operations, Director of Bomber Operations, Deputy Director of Plans, Deputy Director of Organisation (Plans) together with other staff officers from the Directorate of Organisation, representatives of the Directorate of Signals; representatives of the War Office; and Col. McClelland of the Special Observer Group.

week or so. When the Director of Fighter Operations was asked whether he had a target date in view for the completion of his fighter defence programme in Northern Ireland, he replied that he was aiming at 25 September 1941.

219. After this concerted review of the accommodation problem, staff work proceeded on the preparation of the general plan to cover the assumption by the U.S. Army Air Corps of the defence of Northern Ireland. In Air Ministry the Director of Fighter Operations held a conference on 5 July at which the overall organisation of the Fighter Group in Northern Ireland was examined carefully.(1) The region was regarded for this purpose as equivalent to a Fighter Sector of the R.A.F., and on this basis a comprehensive scheme for its general composition and lay-out was evolved. The recommendations of the meeting were afterwards approved by the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff and were subsequently taken as the official British plan for the Air Fighter Defence of Northern Ireland, and the plan into which the United States Pursuit Units might be fitted.(2)

220. In the meantime, on 30 June, four officers from the Special Observer Group, accompanied by two officers from Air Ministry, went to Northern Ireland to examine the accommodation and other related problems on the spot.(3) They returned on 3 July; and six days later went out to Headquarters R.A.F. Fighter Command to pursue the matter further in the light of their observations.(4) From the discussion some concrete proposals emerged. It was agreed that, in accordance with the accepted defence plan, six United States fighter squadrons should be allocated to Northern Ireland - four day and two night fighter squadrons - while as to their location the Air Officer of the Special Observer Group was able on 11 July to inform the Directorate of Organisation, Air Ministry, that:

"pursuant to the provisions of ABC-1 American Fighter Forces will occupy the Sector Stations at Ballyhalbert, Eglinton, and St. Angelo, together with their satellites. Facilities for certain repair, salvage and maintenance work are desired at Langford Lodge, near Aldergrove, in addition to the station for the six Fighter Squadrons mentioned above."(5)

221. By this time the staffs, through combined effort, had brought their plans to a sufficient degree of finality for General McNarney to write to the Chief of the Air Staff on 10 July to say that the Special Observer Group were now in a position to discuss fully the plan for the employment of United States air forces in Northern Ireland, and to suggest that a general meeting be held with members of the British Air Staff at an early date with a view to reaching final agreement.(6)

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- (1) A.M. File C.S. 9887, Encl. 10B: Mins. of a conference ... to examine the Fighter Sector Layout in Northern Ireland: 5 July 1941. D.F. Ops. was in the Chair; seven officers were present from R.A.F. Fighter Command; and there were representatives from the Signals, Radar and Organisation branches of Air Ministry.
 - (2) A.M. File C.S. 9887, Encl. 10A: Min., F.O. 1 to D.G.O. etc.: 7 July 1941.
 - (3) A.M. File C.S. 9887, Encl. 9A: Tel., A 97, Air Ministry to R.A.F. Northern Ireland: 29 June 1941.
 - (4) J.O.M. (U.S.) Folder No. 18: Ltr., Col. McClelland to Plans 1: 9 July 1941.
 - (5) A.M. File C.S. 9756, Encl. 10A: Ltr., Col. Lyon to W.O.9, Air Ministry: 11 July 1941.
 - (6) D. of Plans O.R.B., 632/41: Ltr., Gen. McNarney to C.A.S.: 10 July 1941.

222. The Chief of the Air Staff agreed, and a conference was arranged for 15 July 1941 at which there was to be full representation both of the Special Observer Group and the R.A.F. (1) General McNarney had mentioned in his letter that there were four topics which, in his view, required discussion, and these in fact formed the basis of the agenda. They were:

- (a) the composition and location of the United States Pursuit Force,
- (b) the employment of certain R.A.F. squadrons in Northern Ireland for a time in conjunction with the United States units,
- (c) the location of United States aircraft repair and maintenance depot, and
- (d) the location and employment of those United States fighter squadrons which would be in excess of the number considered necessary for the defence of Northern Ireland.

At the meeting General McNarney spoke on the first two topics:

He outlined the proposed composition and the airfield locations of the United States Pursuit Units as designed to fit into the overall scheme for the Fighter Defence of Northern Ireland, and as agreed tentatively in conjunction with R.A.F. Fighter Command:

Group Headquarters	Dundonald
1 day fighter squadron)	Ballyhalbert
1 night fighter squadron)	
1 day fighter squadron)	Eglington
1 night fighter squadron)	
1 day fighter squadron	St. Angelo
1 day fighter squadron	Kirkistown

He then went on to explain that these units would almost certainly arrive in stages, so that inevitably there would be a transitional period when both United States and R.A.F. air units would be in Northern Ireland together. During this period, should it become necessary, there would be no objection to the reinforcement of Northern Ireland with British day or night fighter squadrons. But the United States authorities would, of course, hope to take over the responsibility for the complete defence of the region as soon as possible.

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- (1) C.S. 9887, Encl. 15B: Mins. of 2nd Mtg. U.S. Special Observer Group and Air Ministry: 15 July 1941. Six copies of the minutes were sent to the S.O.G. Present at the meeting were: Vice-Chief of the Air Staff (in the Chair), Air Officer Admin. Fighter Command, Air Officer Admin. R.A.F. Northern Ireland, Director of Plans, Director of Fighter Operations, Director of Operations (Naval Co-operation), Director of War Organisation, Deputy Director of Organisation (Plans) - all on the R.A.F. side; Gen. Chaney, Gen. McNarney, Col. Lyon and five other staff officers on the S.O.G. side; while the War Office also was represented.

Colonel Lyon then spoke on the location of the proposed United States repair and maintenance depot:

He explained that in the view of the Special Observer Group Langford Lodge was the most suitable site. He added that consideration was also being given, however, to the possibility of utilising the facilities for the repair of United States types of engines which were being established by the Ministry of Aircraft Production. It was agreed that a sub-committee with representatives from the Special Observer Group, the Ministry of Aircraft Production, Air Ministry and the War Office should be set up to work out a detailed plan.

As to the fourth topic, General Chaney expressed the views of the United States authorities:

He said that on present assumptions it seemed likely that there would be three United States fighter squadrons available in excess of actual needs in Northern Ireland. He hoped that, inasmuch as the task for which the United States fighter squadrons were allocated under the provisions of ABC-1 was the defence of United States naval bases in the United Kingdom, such excess squadrons could be used to defend the additional United States naval bases which would be located in the Clyde area (Gare Loch and Loch Ryan). Administratively, as Colonel McClelland pointed out, it would be most convenient if the three squadrons could be based in the Ayr area. With this desire to keep the United States squadrons together, the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff expressed full sympathy, and promised, after ascertaining the views of the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F. Fighter Command, to communicate further with General Chaney on the subject.

It was clear as a result of the meeting that there was no essential disagreement on basic issues. In consequence, almost immediately after the meeting nine officers of the Special Observer Group, including Colonel Lyon, left for another visit to Northern Ireland "to make a detailed reconnaissance prior to drawing up final plans".(1) They were accompanied by Wing Commander Cozens and were away for some five days (15 July - 19 July). The preparation of these "final plans" involved, of course, a great deal of detailed work, including the compilation of careful estimates of personnel, accommodation and maintenance requirements. In order to set a term for this work, 25 September 1941 was fixed as a target date for its completion; this being the arbitrary date which the Director of Fighter Operations had earlier decided upon as a target date for the overall scheme for the defence of Northern Ireland. (See para. 218.)

223. Just what the proposed schemes entailed in the way of detailed administrative arrangements was considered on 26 July at a further meeting of the Special Observer Group with representatives of the Ministry of Aircraft Production, the War Office and Air Ministry, over which the Director of War Organisation, Air Ministry, presided.(2) During the discussion general understandings were reached between all interests concerned as to how

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- (1) A.M. File C.S. 9756, Encl. 12 A: Report on a visit to Northern Ireland with S.O.G.: 20 July 1941.
- (2) A.M. File C.S. 9756, Encl. 16A: Mins. of 3rd Mtg. between Air Ministry and U.S.A. Special Observer Group: 26 July 1941. Present at the meeting were: the Director of War Organisation, Air Ministry (in the Chair), the Deputy Director of Servicing and Maintenance, the Deputy Director of Organisation (Plans), and other Air Ministry Equipment and Organisation Staff Officers; Col. Lyon, Col. Durn, Lt. Col. Middleswart, Lt. Col. Coffey of the S.O.G.; and representatives of War Office and Ministry of Aircraft Production.

The administrative requirements of the United States Forces in Northern Ireland should be met. Regarding the Repair and Maintenance Depot, it was definitely agreed that Langford Lodge should be made available for this purpose "on or after 25 September 1941". Accommodation questions were to be settled by negotiation between the Special Observer Group and the War Office; Air Ministry would arrange for the erection of the required hangars; while the Ministry of Aircraft Production would carry out work on roads and taxiing strips to the specification of the Special Observer Group.

224. It remained now only to work out the precise details. Work to this end was undertaken in the Ministry of Aircraft Production and in the Directorates of Organisation and Equipment in Air Ministry. Memoranda were drawn up embodying recommendations, and were considered by sub-committees. Eventually final agreed versions emerged. These were then held ready for implementation as soon as need be.(1)

225. Before the end of July, too, agreement was reached on the employment of the three United States fighter squadrons which would not be required in Northern Ireland. After consultations with the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F., Fighter Command (Air Marshal Douglas), the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, on behalf of Air Ministry, conveyed the following definite proposals on 28 July to General Chaney:(2)

- (a) A United States Pursuit Group to be located in the Ayr Sector, and when fully prepared for operations, to take over the Sector as a United States Command.
- (b) A British night fighter squadron to be retained in the Ayr Sector after it became a United States responsibility, and to be under the operational control of the United States Sector Commander.
- (c) The United States squadrons to be responsible for the protection of Naval bases at Gare Loch and Loch Ryan, the vital area at Glasgow, the Clyde and the North Channel; also to be available to reinforce other Sectors within No. 13 Group, R.A.F., Fighter Command (the Forth area) as required.
- (d) The United States Sector to be under the operational command of No. 13 Group, R.A.F., Fighter Command.

To these proposals General Chaney agreed on 5 August 1941.(3)

226. On 25 August the main points of the formal agreement as above were communicated by Air Ministry to the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F., Fighter Command.(4) The latter, in his acknowledgment, brought up one point on which, he said, he would like to know the position more clearly.(5) He wondered what was the attitude of the United States authorities towards the policy stated in the latter part of sub-paragraph (c) above, that United States squadrons could be moved away from United States Sectors.

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- (1) A.M. File C.S. 10441, Various papers refer.
 - (2) A.M. File C.S. 9887, Encl. 18A: Ltr., V.C.A.S. to Gen. Chaney: 28 July 1941.
 - (3) A.M. File C.S. 9887, Encl. 19A: Ltr., Gen. Chaney to V.C.A.S.: 5 August 1941.
 - (4) A.M. File C.S. 9887, Encl. 23A: Ltr., D.F. Ops. to A.O.C.-in-C. F.Cmd.: 23 August 1941.
 - (5) A.M. File C.S. 9887, Encl. 24A: Ltr., W.S.D/S.43, A.O.C.-in-C. F.Cmd. to Air Ministry: 31 August, 1941.

He said that it had always been his personal hope that they would be prepared to transfer a proportion of their squadrons to other R.A.F. Fighter Command Groups in the South of England, where more active operations were in progress; and he felt that it would be in the interests of the United States units to have experience of these combat conditions. In any event, he thought, they would not wish to remain indefinitely in the quieter Sectors.

227. The Air Ministry reply to the above enquiry was that, while the United States authorities had agreed in general to the attachment of their squadrons to British Sectors to gain operational experience, it was neither possible nor desirable at that time to record any firm agreement on the matter. It was preferred to leave such questions until the United States squadrons were actually available in the United Kingdom, and until the question of their training became a live issue with the responsible United States Commander in Britain, as opposed to a Negotiator.

228. Thus, by early September 1941 the general principles of where and how the United States Pursuit Units were to operate were clearly established. Considerable progress had also been made with questions of detail. Careful estimates of personnel requirements - officers and enlisted men - had been prepared; (1) plans for the necessary repair and maintenance facilities were agreed upon; proposals had been advanced as to the administrative arrangements necessary to ensure proper integration between the United States and British Forces in respect of facilities and services in Northern Ireland; (2) in fact the whole planning project for locating the United States Forces in the area and in South-West Scotland had progressed so well that before the middle of September General Chaney was able to submit his final recommendations on the subject to War Department. (3)

229. Subsequent discussion on this subject during 1941 between the Special Observer Group and Air Ministry related mainly to the details of what particular airfields especially in South-west Scotland were most suitable and what additional facilities etc. were required at each. (4) The basic plan was left essentially unchanged.

4b. The Preparatory Training of United States Pursuit Units

230. There was however another aspect to the provision of a United States Fighter Force in Britain - one to which General McNarney referred in a letter to the Chief of the Air Staff on 30 September - that of giving the units some preparatory training before they crossed the Atlantic. (5) As General McNarney pointed

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- (1) A.M. File C.S. 9756, Encl. 13A: Table, 'Tentative Disposition of Air Corps Units':
 - (2) A.M. File C.S. 9756, Encl. 17A: Memo. by M.A.P. 'Outline of Proposed Administrative Arrangements for the operation of U.S. Army Air Forces in Northern Ireland': 31 July 1941.
 - (3) A.M. File C.S. 9756, Encls. 25A and 26A: Tels., Susan 095, War Office to Brit. Military Attache, Washington: 18 September 1941 and Webber W.37, Air Ministry to RAFDEL: 20 September 1941.
 - (4) During one of the reconnaissances in connection with these discussions, the Director of Fighter Operations was accompanied by Col. Eaker who was then on a visit to Britain (A.M. File C.S. 9887, Min. 33: D.F. Ops. to D.D.O.P.: 30 October 1941).
 - (5) A.C.A.S. (Ops.) Folder No. J.2: Ltr., Gen. McNarney to C.A.S.: 30 September 1941.

out, it was obviously desirable that such training should be based on the procedure evolved by R.A.F. Fighter Command. Accordingly he proposed that there should be established in the United States the counterpart of a R.A.F. Fighter Command Sector where two squadrons, one day and one night, could be trained simultaneously. This would require the installation there of certain special R.A.F. equipment and the loan of trained personnel to act as instructors.

231. The Chief of the Air Staff wrote on 8 October warmly agreeing to the proposals and placing at General McNarney's disposal the necessary equipment - in so far as it was available - and, for a limited period, the requisite skilled personnel.(1) The Special Observer Group initiated the necessary arrangements to give effect to the proposal, and Major G. Saville (one of the original '1940' United States Observers - see para. 45) returned to Britain to take charge. By 3 December, instructions for the despatch of the necessary equipment and personnel were issued by Air Ministry.(2)

232. The Chief of the Air Staff in his letter of 8 October also advised General McNarney that the facilities available in No. 82 R.A.F. Fighter Command Group in Northern Ireland would permit not only the training of any United States personnel "from junior plotters to senior staff officers" but also the acceptance of a complete United States fighter squadron for full-scale training. The outcome was that the '82 Group Shadow Scheme' was drawn up. This scheme provided for the establishment in Northern Ireland of a nucleus organisation of United States Officers - just sufficient to provide the key men around whom could be built the full organisation as and when the United States accepted the complete responsibility for the defence of the area.(3)

5. The Location and Operation of United States Bombardment Units

233. There seems to have been fewer points of contention on the subject of how and where the United States Bombardment Units - their Striking Force - should operate. Initial proposals found readier acceptance. Some information about the projected strength of this force and about the United States intentions regarding its employment had emerged, it will be recalled, at the first meeting between the Special Observer Group and Air Ministry on 6 June 1941 (see para. 216). There were to be five groups - three heavy and two medium - which were to operate from a close area under United States command, but under the strategic direction of R.A.F. Bomber Command. The Vice-Chief of the Air Staff had suggested that this close area might be the vicinity of Huntingdon.

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- (1) A.C.A.S. (Ops.) Folder No. J.2: Ltr., C.A.S. to Gen. McNarney: 8 October 1941.
 - (2) A.C.A.S. (Ops.) Folder No. J.2: L.M. 378/D. of O.: 3 December 1941. The operation was given the code name of Trigger.
 - (3) A.C.A.S. (Ops.) Folder No. J.2: Notes of a conference on 20 November 1941. There were present: Director of Signals in the Chair, Col. McClelland, Major Saville, Director of Telecommunications, the Deputy Director of Radar, a representative of the Director of Fighter Operations and certain Telecommunication Staff Officers.

234. During the ensuing weeks there were exchanges of views on the subject in general between the Special Observer Group, Air Ministry, and Headquarters, R.A.F. Bomber Command, in the course of which the further information was forthcoming that the estimated troop strength of the Bomber Force was 15,000 Air Corps personnel.(1) A sufficient measure of agreement in principle on the airfields which should be allocated to this Force had been reached by the last week in July for General Chaney and members of his staff to go to the Huntingdon area in order to make a personal reconnaissance of them.(2)

235. The Special Observer Group afterwards sought information on certain points of detail with regard to the allocated airfields, but essentially there was mutual agreement, and on 16 August the Director of War Organisation (Air Commodore Whitham) was able to present a statement showing a fairly stabilised position.(3) In summarised form, his statement was as follows:

(a) The U.S. Army Air Corps intended to despatch to Britain, within two months of the declaration of war by their Government, the following Air Striking Force:

2 Medium Bomber Groups

(8 sqdns. = 104 B-25 a/c)

2 Heavy Bomber Groups

(12 sqdns. = 96 B-17 a/c)

entailing some 15,000 Air Corps personnel.

(b) One group would be located at each of the following five airfields in the Huntingdon area - Chelveston, Thurleigh, Polebrook, Molesworth and Upwood. In addition each of these main airfields would have a satellite airfield.

(c) The Air Headquarters of the Bomber Force would be at Brampton Grange, near Huntingdon.

(d) The United States Bomber Force would remain under United States command, but would operate under the strategic direction of R.A.F. Bomber Command.

At that date these arrangements still awaited the formal acceptance of the Special Observer Group, but there was every reason to think that such acceptance would be forthcoming.

236. In fact the only proviso to such acceptance, as appears from a letter sent by one of the Special Observer Group Air Officers (Major Snavely) to Air Ministry on 7 October,(4) was that an alternative to one of the ten suggested airfields was desirable. Upwood was considered unsuitable. An alternative (Desborough)

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- (1) A.M. File C.S. 11096, Encl. 2A: Ltr., Col. McClelland to H.Q. R.A.F., B. Command: 25 July 1941.
 - (2) A.M. File C.S. 9887, Encl. 55A: Mins. of War Office Co-ordinating Committee: 19 July 1941.
 - (3) A.M. File C.S. 11094, Encl. 2A and 2B: Min. D.W.O. to D.G.O.: 16 August 1941.
 - (4) A.M. File C.S. 11096, Encl. 7A: Ltr., Maj. Snavely to W.O.9, Air Ministry: 7 October 1941.

was suggested by Air Ministry,(1) and accepted by the Special Observer Group. As a result General McNarney wrote to the Chief of the Air Staff on 23 October,(2) listing the ten airfields and asking for confirmation that they would be available, in order that a "detailed reconnaissance for planning purposes" could be carried out by members of his staff. The Chief of the Air Staff gave the necessary confirmation on the following day, and expressed satisfaction at the arrangements made.(3)

237. For various reasons, however, the suggested reconnaissance was repeatedly postponed. In the first instance, a postponement was necessary to give time for a "key plan" to be drawn up by the Special Observer Group showing probable requirements for ground defence, for various items of supply, and for quartering - all War Office commitments.(4) This "key plan" was prepared by 14 December; but the reconnaissance was then further delayed as a result of the entry of the United States into the war, since all such pre-conceived plans were liable to alteration through change of policy at higher level - as will be apparent from later Sections - and there was thus the possibility that they might need considerable review.(5)

238. But in any case the reconnaissance had only been intended to settle matters of detail. The principal decisions had already been taken and agreement had been reached. Essentially no modifications had been found necessary to the arrangements stated by the Director of War Organisation on 16 August and outlined in paragraph 235 above.(6)

6. Repair and Maintenance Projects for United States Air Units Based in England: General Brett's Mission

239. Arrangements for the provision of repair and maintenance facilities for the United States Striking Forces which would operate from bases in England seem to have been given less immediate attention than was accorded to those for the Pursuit Units in Northern Ireland. It was not in fact until October 1941 - and then as a result of the mission of General G. H. Brett - that the problem seems to have been brought to the fore.

240. General Brett held at that time the appointment of Chief of the U.S. Army Air Corps, and came over to Britain on the suggestion of the Chief of the U.S. Army Air Forces (General Arnold). It was another of General Arnold's many efforts during 1941 to ensure that the U.S. Army Air Forces co-operated as fully as possible with the R.A.F. In this instance he made the suggestion because he felt that the complexity of Britain's day-to-day requirements was such as to necessitate a high level United States liaison officer working full-time in London and charged only with the task of co-ordinating British air requirements. This officer he visualised, could be in direct touch with the British Air Staff and thus in a position to translate accurately to Washington the

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- (1) A.M. File C.S. 11096, Encl. 8A: Ltr., C.S. 11096/D.W.O., W.O.9, Air Ministry to Maj. Snavely: 8 October 1941.
 - (2) A.M. File C.S. 11096 Encl. 9A: Ltr., Gen. McNarney to C.A.S.: 23 October 1941.
 - (3) A.M. File C.S. 11096, Encl. 9B: Ltr., C.A.S. to Gen. McNarney: 24 October 1941.
 - (4) A.M. File C.S. 11096, Encl. 11C: Mins. of Mtg. at War Office: 20 November 1941.
 - (5) J.O.M. (U.S.) Folder JOM/12: Ltr., G/C. Cozens to W/C. Hilton: 17 February 1942.
 - (6) A.M. File C.S. 11094, Encl. 10A: Min. by D.W.O.: 27 December 1941.

British needs. In particular his main responsibility would be to ensure the expeditious provision of the major items among British air needs in a list which Mr. Harry Hopkins had taken back to Washington after a visit which he paid to London in July 1941, foremost among which was the establishment of depots and the supply of personnel for the repair and maintenance of American aircraft which were being used or would be used in combat over Europe and the Middle East.(1)

241. General Brett was chosen for this mission, and he proceeded first, early in September 1941, to the Middle East to review the position there.(2) Afterwards he came on to London arriving during the first week of October.

242. He spent his first three weeks in England visiting various R.A.F. maintenance units. His observations during this period prompted him to make a definite proposal on what the United States could do to assist. It was conveyed to the Minister of Aircraft Production in a letter written towards the end of October.(3) Its gist was:

The Secretary of War had instructed him to determine how the United States Government could be of the greatest assistance in connection with the maintenance of aviation equipment operated by the R.A.F. in the Middle East and the United Kingdom. He has made certain suggestions regarding what should be done in the Middle East. Now as a result of his visits in the British Isles, he proposed that the aid rendered by the United States should take the form of a complete Base Repair Depot. After considering all the requirements of such a Depot, he was in favour of locating it, if possible, in the Blackpool area. He proposed, contingent upon British approval, to make this recommendation to War Department, and to associate with it a further recommendation that the units to be established should include provision for the housing of reserve pilots and should include also an airfield which could be used for operational training purposes.

243. Air Ministry did their share towards implementing the proposals by offering Warton airfield, then under construction. This airfield offered the facilities which seemed to meet General Brett's stated requirements:(4)

(a) It was located where it could conveniently provide service to British, and to projected United States establishments concerned with the maintenance of United States equipment operated from bases in the United Kingdom.

(b) It was suitable for base facilities constructed, operated, and controlled by United States Authorities, providing for airframe repair, engine and accessory repair, and the ancillary engineering works.

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- (1) A.M. File C.S. 11102, Encls. 1A, 2A, 3A, 6A: Tels., Caesar 639 - 20 August 1941, Caesar 444 - 21 August 1941, WX.576 - 22 August 1941, and Caesar 517 - 28 August 1941, exchanged between Air Ministry and R.A.F. Delegation, Washington, all refer to the subject-matter of this paragraph.
- (2) A.M. File C.S. 11102, Encl. 4A: Tel., Caesar 458, Harris to Tedder: 21 August 1941.
- (3) A.M. File C.S. 12429, Encl. 1B: Ltr., Gen. Brett to M.A.P.:
- (4) A.M. File C.S. 12429, Encl. 3A: Ltr., Col. Lyon to W.O.9, Air Ministry: 31 October 1941.

(c) It was on a site which was accessible to "municipalities where the amenities were suitable for the residence of United States civilian personnel."

(d) Airfield facilities would be available for the test of heavy and medium bomber aircraft and for the operation of air transport.

(e) The site provided space for expansion and for adequate dispersal of aircraft and ground establishments.

244. In order, as he said, to prepare a firm plan for United States air maintenance requirements, General Brett wrote on 1 November 1941 to the Chief of the Air Staff asking for details of the quantities of American-built aircraft which were expected to be in the British Isles on 30 June 1942 in the following categories: (1)

- (a) to equip squadrons operating from Northern Ireland,
- (b) to equip squadrons operating from Great Britain,
- (c) to be used for operational and non-operational training purposes.

He also asked for a rough forecast giving similar details relating to April 1943. The Chief of the Air Staff had to reply however that the existing uncertainty surrounding numbers and types of aircraft to be allocated to Britain made it difficult to provide all the requested information. (2)

245. General Brett, by basing his recommendations on such information as was available, did nevertheless submit a report on repair and maintenance problems in Britain to the War Department. No decision, however, seems to have been taken regarding the Warton project up to the date of Pearl Harbour, when, of course, all such plans and projects were liable to review and reconsideration in the light of the changed circumstances. General Brett meanwhile had left London early in December 1941 for an emergency mission to the Far East. (3)

7. Proposal to Establish the Basic Principles of Anglo-American Air Co-operation

246. From the time of their earliest contacts with the Special Observer Group, the staff of the Air Member for Supply and Organisation had appreciated that there would be a need for a set of agreed principles which could be applied to all aspects of collaboration between the United States Air Forces and the R.A.F., and which would form a firm foundation for the more detailed planning. The Air Member for Supply and Organisation, it will be recalled, had himself brought the point up at the first formal meeting of the Special Observer Group with Air Ministry on 6 June 1941 (see para. 216). It was agreed at this meeting that the matter was certainly one which should be pursued and that in Air Ministry the Director of War Organisation should be responsible for initiating the necessary procedure. Accepting this responsibility, the Director of War Organisation considered the matter

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- (1) A.M. File C.S. 12429, Encl. 5B: Ltr., Gen. Brett to C.A.S.: 1 November 1941.
 - (2) A.M. File C.S. 12429, Encl. 5C: Ltr., C.A.S. to Gen. Brett: 1 November 1941.
 - (3) A.M. File C.S. 11102, Encl. 21A: Tel., Airm. 4357, B.A.C. Washington to Air Ministry: 9 December 1941.

fully in a minute to the Vice Chief of the Air Staff on 4 July 1941. He suggested that authoritative steps should be taken forthwith, in conjunction with the Special Observer Group, to establish a set of basic principles on the assumption that the United States Air Forces would operate from the United Kingdom in accordance with the provisions of ABC-1.(1)

247. After the suggestions of the Director of War Organisation had been fully discussed by other members of the Air Staff(2) and after they had been conveyed informally to the Special Observer Group,(3) it was generally agreed that the definition of basic principles was highly desirable. As a result, on 6 August 1941, the Chief of the Air Staff communicated with General Chaney on the matter.(4) He stated that inasmuch as:

(a) the target date for the completion of preparation for the reception of the U.S. Army Air Corps Fighter Defence Units in Northern Ireland was rapidly approaching,(5) and

(b) the larger problem of working out arrangements for co-operation in England, with special reference to the projected location of the U.S. Army Air Corps Bombardment Groups in the Huntingdon area, lay ahead,

it would seem desirable that a committee be appointed to draw up and present recommendations on all matters of policy affecting the operation of the United States and British Air Forces in a common theatre of war. The committee could have representatives from the Special Observer Group, the Ministry of Aircraft Production, Air Ministry and the War Office. The Director of War Organisation, Air Ministry, could, if desired, co-ordinate these discussions. The subjects to be reviewed might include:

Training of United States Units.
Method of allotting specific tasks to United States Units.
Relationship of United States Wings with the Air Ministry.
Intelligence Liaison.
Inter-service signals arrangements.
Supply.
Organisation and Administration.
Accommodation, Pay, Rationing, Canteen and Medical questions.
Salvage, Repair and Maintenance.
Aerodrome defence.
Discipline.

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- (1) A.M. File S.9893, Encl. 1A: Min., D.W.O. to V.C.A.S.: 4 July 1941.
 - (2) The Director of Plans, in commenting to the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff on the suggestions of the Director of War Organisation, reported on 21 July 1941 that in most respects planning for the arrival of the United States Air Force was progressing satisfactorily. As, however, the Special Observer Group had only one officer qualified to discuss the problems of technical organisation and supply and as this officer was overworked, there had been delay in reaching agreement on certain points. (D. of Plans O.R.B., 754/41: Min., D. of Plans to V.C.A.S.: 21 July 1941.)
 - (3) A.M. File C.S. 9756, Encl. 14A: Ltr., W/C. Cozens to Col. Lyon: 24 July 1941.
 - (4) A.M. File S.9893, Encl. 6A: Ltr., C.A.S. to Gen. Chaney: 6 August 1941.
 - (5) This was 25 September 1941 as indicated by the Director of Fighter Operations at the meeting on 25 June 1941 (see para. 218).

248. On 9 August 1941, General Chaney agreed to the recommendations of the Chief of the Air Staff.(1) Arrangements were eventually made for the first meeting between the 'Inter-Service Committee' and the Special Observer Group to take place on 16 September 1941.(2) At the last moment, however, this meeting had to be cancelled "owing to the urgency of other matters". There is no indication in the papers directly associated with the proposals for this conference as to what these "other matters" were, but from other relevant records it would appear that it was probably the question of aid to Russia.(3) It was certainly a question which was exercising the attention of the Special Observer Group, as also of the British Services, at this time, for it will be remembered that it was during the autumn of 1941 that the German armies were advancing, apparently invincibly, deep into Russian territory. Whatever the cause no further move was made to establish agreed general principles until the beginning of January 1942. By then the active intervention of the United States in the war made such a move imperative.

8. Arrangements for the Exchange of Technical Information between the United States and Britain

249. Yet another aspect of Anglo-American air collaboration which had come within the ambit of the activities of the Special Observer Group is indicated by the nature of a conference that the senior Air Officer (Colonel Lyon) attended on 25 July 1941. It had been convened "to discuss measures for expediting the exchange with the United States of America of information on technical developments".(4) Several of the participants were high officials. They included the United States Ambassador (Mr. Winant), the United States Air Attache (Brigadier General Royce), and Colonel Lyon on the United States side; and on the British side the Secretary of State for Air (Sir Archibald Sinclair), the Minister of Aircraft Production (Colonel Moore-Brabazon) and his Controller of Research and Development, the Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Vansittart), and the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Technical) (Air Marshal Linnell) together with Staff Officers from the various departments.

250. The arrangements by then existing with regard to the exchange of information on technical matters were explained by the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Technical), who said that there were available three official channels:

- (a) Through the British Air Staff in Washington - the channel for information concerning the performance of United States aircraft in operation, and concerning the operational experience of pilots and crews.
- (b) Through the British Air Commission in Washington - the channel for technical information, especially regarding new projects under development.
- (c) Through the United States Embassy - the channel for requests from commercial firms.

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- (1) A.M. File S.9893, Encl. 8B: Ltr., Gen. Chaney to C.A.S.: 9 August 1941.
 - (2) A.M. File S.9893: various papers.
 - (3) A.M. File S.10441, Encl. 8A: Min., W.O.9 to E.40: 6 October 1941.
 - (4) D. of Plans O.R.B. 826/41: Minutes of Conference held on 25 July 1941: 30 July 1941. This question had been briefly referred to during the 2nd meeting S.O.G./Air Ministry on 15 July 1941 (see para. 222).

251. Colonel Lyon then outlined the proposals currently under consideration for improving the existing machinery. He said that:

- (a) It was proposed that experienced United States officers should work in the Directorate of Operational Requirements, Air Ministry, where they could be continuously in touch with new developments.
- (b) Steps had been taken to overcome the difficulties which had arisen in the past through ignorance on both sides of the proper channels for the passage of information.
- (c) It was proposed that a distinction be drawn between the functions of military and commercial representatives. It was essential that the former be informed of new developments as early as possible in order that production possibilities were not prejudiced. It would then be for the United States military authorities to decide at what stage the information should be passed to commercial interests.


252. General discussion followed. From this it appeared that the general feeling of the meeting was that if United States officers were attached to the Directorates of Signals and Operational Requirements in Air Ministry and to the Department of the Controller of Research and Development in the Ministry of Aircraft Production, then adequate facilities would be afforded for the timely passage of information on all new technical developments to the appropriate United States authorities, and no further action was required.

9. Conclusion

253. From the foregoing account it will have become evident that the Special Observer Group had been able by the end of November 1941 to make very considerable progress towards the accomplishment of their mission. Working on the only basis which was available to them - the provisions of ABC-1 - they had succeeded in establishing such policies, procedures and arrangements as seemed most likely to enable active Anglo-American collaboration to be effected with a minimum of embarrassment and delay. They could not then know how soon it would be necessary to take the plans from their pigeon-holes; as events turned out it was well that they had assumed that the term would be short. Their task had not been without its difficulties. To interest harassed British officers, fully preoccupied with the urgent problems of an arduous present, in the hypothetical problems of a future which at that time they hardly dared contemplate was not always the easiest of occupations. In spite of the best will in the world, the claims of the present loomed too large. That the Special Observer Group, in the face of the variety of difficulties and distractions, had contrived to bring their plans and projects to such a state of completion as they did represents no mean achievement.

ANNEX. Composition of the United States
Special Observer Group in June 1941

The composition of the Special Observer Group in early June 1941 was as follows:(1)



The functions of the Air Officers were:

- (a) Advisers to Commander and Staff on air matters.
- (b) Preparations and Plans for the use of air units.
- (c) Determination of necessary supplies.
- (d) Supervision of operations, of aircraft maintenance and of technical inspections.

(1) V.C.A.S. Folder No. 242.

THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE AND AFTER

August 1941

254. The work of the Special Observer Group forms a continuous and connected story from early June 1941 up to December 1941. It has been thought advisable, therefore, not to break the chronological sequence of the narrative in order to refer to an event of August 1941 - the Atlantic Conference - important though it was, because it did not materially affect their day-to-day activities. An account of the Conference, (1) the first of the historic war-time meetings between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, has, therefore, been reserved for treatment separately.

1. Proceedings at the Conference

255. The Atlantic Conference took place aboard ship off Newfoundland. It lasted for four days, 9 August to 12 August. Though each of the political leaders was accompanied by his Service chiefs, the conference was not made notable by any far-reaching military decisions. Such decisions indeed were hardly to be expected since the United States were then officially a neutral power. Nevertheless the opportunity was taken by the Chiefs of Staff to exchange views in a general way and to establish those firm and friendly personal contacts which were to stand them in good stead in the future. (2)

256. The British representatives had brought with them, as a brief for their discussions with the United States Chiefs of Staff, a paper containing a statement of what in the British view were the essentials of future strategy. (3) The main points of this paper were:

(a) Blockade, bombing, subversive activities and propaganda were the methods that it was intended to employ to reduce German military strength. Together they would so weaken the mobility and fighting value of the armed forces of Germany that a direct attack would in course of time again become possible.

(b) Bombing was the principal new weapon, and upon it much would depend. The present bombing policy was to direct attacks against targets which affected both the German transportation system and civilian morale, thus exploiting the weaknesses already created by the blockade. But to achieve the destruction of German economic life and morale within a reasonable time an increased bombing offensive on the heaviest possible scale would have to be conducted, subject only to the limitations imposed by operational difficulties in the United Kingdom. As the air forces increased it would be possible to make a planned attack upon the German civilian morale - an attack which would be pursued with the intensity and continuity that were essential to produce a general breakdown. With this policy in view the heavy bomber was being allotted the first priority in production programmes.

(1) The code name given to the conference was Riviera.
(2) C.O.S. (41) 505 (Annex VI) = C.O.S.(R) 15: 20 August 1941.
(3) J.P.(41) 608: 30 July 1941 = C.O.S.(41) 155(0): 31 July 1941, which became C.O.S.(41) 505 (Annex I) = C.O.S. (R) 14: 20 August 1941.

(c) The reduction of German armed strength would thus depend largely on the extent to which, with United States assistance, it would be possible to expand the R.A.F. and to obtain and protect the necessary shipping.

The paper thus re-stated the conviction of the British Chiefs of Staff that bombing - by heavy bombers - was of paramount importance in the prosecution of the war. It emphasised that since the previous April, when the same principles had been expounded to General Arnold, there had been no change in the British viewpoint.

257. This "General Strategy Review", as the British paper came to be called, was used as a basis for discussions at several meetings during the conference. On 9 August, at a meeting of the respective naval representatives, the First Sea Lord (Admiral Pound) handed a copy to the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Stark).(1) Mainly naval issues were considered at this meeting, but the Chief of Naval Operations interposed a query as to whether the British really intended giving the heavy bomber first priority in production schedules. To do so, he felt, would affect not only the production of coastal aircraft, such as Catalinas, but also the repair and production in the United States of British naval vessels, including escorts.

258. On the next day, 10 August, copies of the Review were given to each of the United States Chiefs of Staff, in anticipation of a general discussion of strategy during the morning of 11 August. For this discussion there was a full attendance of the representatives on both sides.(2) The British paper formed the basis of the agenda. Time did not permit consideration of the whole document, which was taken paragraph by paragraph. It was consequently suggested that the United States representatives might take it back with them to Washington for more detailed study with a view to offering full and frank comments. This was not perhaps an altogether satisfactory arrangement, since the document, being intended merely as a brief, was really only a condensed summary, containing statements rather than developed arguments. A rather longer and fuller presentation of the British case, as will be seen later, would probably have served the intended purpose better. It would have helped towards a clearer appreciation of proposed policies and projects.

259. At a similar meeting on the following day, 12 August 1941, discussion turned to the more practical considerations.(3) The First Sea Lord observed that on reflection it was clear that the many demands for equipment - for the United States forces, for Great Britain, and for Russia - could only be met if the United States made a big turn-over from civil to military production. The Chief of Staff (General Marshall) agreed and said he thought that perhaps the main advantage deriving from the conference would be that this point and the situation in the United States in general would be more clearly understood in Britain. The calls upon the productive capacity of the United States were insistent from all sides, and only a proper appreciation of the position would avoid misunderstandings. These remarks led the

(1) C.O.S.(41) 504 (Annex I) = C.O.S.(R) 5: 20 August 1941.

(2) C.O.S.(41) 504 (Annex II) = C.O.S.(R) 7: 20 August 1941.
Present at the meeting were: on the U.S. side - Chief of Naval Operations, C.-in-C. Atlantic Fleet, Chief of Naval War Plans, Chief of Staff, Chief of Army Air Corps and two Staff Officers; on the British side - First Sea Lord, Chief of Imperial General Staff, Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, and two Staff Officers.

(3) C.O.S.(41) 504 (Annex III) = C.O.S.(R) 10: 20 August 1941.

Chief of Naval War Plans (Admiral Turner) to express the view that there was an urgent need for the establishment of proper machinery to co-ordinate British requests. As things were, requests were being received through various distinct channels with the result that there was no indication of comparative priorities. There should instead be one central authority which would be in a position to correlate all British requirements and to allot priorities as between the various items comprising these requirements. These views were supported unanimously by all the United States representatives, and the British Chiefs of Staff undertook to take up the problem on their return as a matter of urgency.

260. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff (General Dill) then enquired whether the United States military authorities were producing plans for probable action in the event of war. The Chief of Naval War Plans replied that with ABC-1 as the general background Army, Navy and Air basic plans were being prepared. To a further enquiry from the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff (Air Chief Marshal Freeman) whether any consideration had been given as to where the United States forces would operate in the event of war, the Chief of Staff replied that detailed consideration had been given as to the action which the United States forces would have to take in the Western Hemisphere, but there had been no specific planning for action in the Eastern Hemisphere. Their main preoccupation at that time was to create forces which could be allocated to whatever tasks might become necessary.

261. Supplementary to the two plenary sessions described in the preceding paragraphs there were other meetings on an informal and service-to-service basis. During such meetings between the United States and British air delegates, various aspects of air policy came up for discussion. Principally, though it had not been included in the terms of reference which the British representatives had been given, there emerged the question of the allocation of aircraft from United States production to the R.A.F. With most categories of aircraft no difficulties arose; the R.A.F. would get the allocations provided for under the terms of ABC-2. But with regard to heavy bombers the position was different.

262. It soon became evident during the conference, that, in spite of the representations which had been made by the British authorities through various channels, opinion generally in Washington had remained unconvinced of the wisdom of conducting a heavy bomber offensive.(1) Little effort had in consequence been made to increase the production of this class of aircraft. The feeling was still prevalent that it was aircraft in quantities rather than aircraft of any special type which would meet adequately the British requirements. From figures which the Chief of the Army Air Corps (General Arnold) produced on the first day of the conference, it appeared that, out of the total of 6,000 heavy bombers which was required from United States production before June 1943 if the heavy bomber offensive were to be prosecuted with any certainty of success, just over 1,100 heavy bombers would be all that the R.A.F. could expect by that date.(2) Two days later, however, General Arnold produced a

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- (1) This attitude had been reported some weeks earlier by the British Air Staff in Washington. (D.B. Ops. Folder, No. 15: "The Heavy Bomber": Tel., Caesar 353, Harris to C.A.S.: 4 August 1941).
- (2) C.O.S.(41) 504 (Annex V, Appendix I) = C.O.S.(R) 12: 20 August 1941.

further set of figures.(1) These showed the quantity of heavy bombers which the R.A.F. would get if 50% of the total of United States production were allotted. But even with this allocation the quantity was only 2,295 in the same period; still less than half the stated British requirement. And in any case General Arnold did not appear to regard any such allocation as a binding commitment. Thus it was not a quantity upon which the British could place any real reliance when formulating their plans. There seemed no escaping the fact that the United States authorities were tending to retract from the provisions of ABC-2, since under the terms of this agreement the major part of the United States production of heavy bombers would have been allocated to the R.A.F.

263. The immediate prospect which faced the British representatives, therefore, was somewhat alarming. Nor did the future prospect appear much brighter. With both the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations frankly antagonistic to the whole conception of a bombing offensive - they were apparently fearful lest the implied increase in heavy bomber production might jeopardise the timely production of equipment for their own arms of the service - there seemed little grounds for hope that an increase in the production of heavy bombers would ever materialise. At the same time it is only fair to state that the British contention had the support of General Arnold; not unnaturally since a considerable expansion of the U.S. Army Air Corps was at that time projected and an increased production of heavy bombers in the United States would of course enable General Arnold to have at call the production potentialities necessary to provide for this envisaged expansion.

264. The one real glimmer of hope came from Mr. Harry Hopkins. He said that ultimately the assignment of aircraft was a matter for the President, and, that as the President was a firm believer in bombing as the only means of gaining a victory, it was unlikely that he would agree to the suggested reduction in the allocation of aircraft to Britain.

265. Nevertheless the whole situation was viewed with much concern by the British delegates; and it was clear to them that the subject of the production of heavy bombers would have to be taken up at the highest levels as soon as they returned to London.

266. Other aspects of air policy received far less attention during the conference. During an informal meeting on 12 August, however, between General Arnold, General Burns, Mr. Harriman, the Vice Chief of the Air Staff (Air Chief Marshal Freeman) and the Staff Officer to the Chief of the Air Staff (Group Captain Yool) - conversation turned to a discussion of the initial plans and preparations which were being made for the employment of the U.S. Army Air Forces should they ever be based in Britain.(2) It was agreed that the provisions of ABC-1 appeared to offer a satisfactory basis for all such preparatory work. The Vice-Chief of the Air Staff made the suggestion that the United States might consider sending air units to the United Kingdom straightaway in order to gain experience, but with regard to this General Arnold was non-committal.

267. At the same meeting General Arnold referred to a proposal to train bomber crews in the United States after they completed their courses in the Service Flying Training Schools, so that they would

(1) Ibid.

(2) C.O.S.(41) 504 (Annex V) = C.O.S.(R) 12: 20 August 1941.

be used to ferry new aircraft across the Atlantic. There would be no need for a return ferry service. Mr. Harriman subsequently informed the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff that the necessary arrangements to provide this training would be made at once.

268. Thus during the conference the discussion on air matters centred on the practical issue of the British bombing policy and its implications upon production programmes in the United States. Regarding the less immediate considerations - the ways and means of co-operation if and when the United States became an active partner in the air war - there was much less debate. Upon these problems the United States Chiefs of Staff did not appear to have formed any very definite ideas, still less detailed plans. In their view, ABC-1 remained an adequate statement of combined strategic policy. Beyond it they had clearly not carried their thoughts; their energies were bent instead upon the expansion of their fighting forces. At the moment preparation rather than disposition was their primary concern.

2. Developments

269. As might be expected, the most immediate developments after the delegates returned to London took the form of representations by the British on the subject of the allocations from United States production of heavy bombers to the R.A.F. Only three days after the conclusion of the Atlantic Conference - on 15 August 1941 - the Chief of the Air Staff handed to the United States Ambassador a note on the subject.⁽¹⁾ Reasoned arguments were adduced in support of an increased air offensive against the Axis using heavy bombers and in support therefore of an increased flow of aircraft from the United States to build up the necessary force.

In summary the argument presented was:

- (a) No alternative had yet been suggested to the proposition that Germany could only be defeated after her will to resist had been crushed by bombing operations of vast and sustained intensity. The final coup de grace might need operations on land but for these operations to be a success, a bombing offensive on the heaviest possible scale was an essential preliminary.
- (b) An area of 700 miles radius from East Anglia included the whole of Germany; its whole area was thus within reach of heavy bombers. But to ensure the collapse of industrial Germany ten times the current bombing effort would be necessary. To achieve this effort 1,000 bombers per month would have to be produced - perhaps even more, if provision were to be made for the probable increase in daylight operations. Facilities in Britain, however, were already strained to the limit to produce 500 heavy bombers per month. The balance must therefore come from the United States. There was no doubt of the capacity of the United States to meet these requirements, and at the same time provide the aircraft necessary to build up a powerful striking force of her own.
- (c) Following General Arnold's visit to Britain during the previous April, much had been done to augment the production of heavy bombers in the United States. But in recent months forecasts of production showed a disappointing trend, and the conversations just concluded had indicated that nothing on the scale or of the urgency necessary was yet contemplated.

(1) S.6. Folder No. 19A, Encl. 14B: Note on the production of heavy bombers in U.S.A.: 15 August 1941.

(d) The aim of the note, in brief, was to stress the fact, already accepted by the British Chiefs of Staff that with a vast flow of heavy bombers from the United States the defeat of Germany could be accomplished. Lacking such flow the operations undertaken would have no intelligible aim beyond the mere avoidance of defeat. The hope was therefore expressed that before it was too late this essential principle would be accepted also by the United States Chiefs of Staff and translated into action.

The theme of this argument was, of course, by no means unfamiliar to the United States Chiefs of Staff. Essentially it was that which had been presented to them at the Atlantic Conference in the British paper on future strategy, and even before that they had been made aware at various times, notably during the conversations in Washington in the early months of 1941, and at the time of General Arnold's visit in April, of the general trend of British thought on this subject. The note from the Chief of the Air Staff, however, did develop the argument more fully than had been possible in a paper the purpose of which had been, not to emphasise a particular aspect of air policy, but to survey the whole broad field of strategy.

270. For the studied reactions of the United States Chiefs of Staff (actually the recently formed Joint Board) to this declared British policy, it was necessary to wait until early October 1941, when their "formal reply" to the General Strategy Review, handed to them at the Atlantic Conference, was received in London.(1) The comments followed in the main the lines which might have been expected from the trend of remarks by the United States Chiefs of Staff at the Conference. On the general principles of strategy there was little disagreement; the United States Chiefs of Staff adhered firmly to the provisions of ABC-1. They considered them applicable equally to a war in which the United States and British Commonwealth were associates, or to the existing conditions in which the United States were not directly involved in the war. On the subject of the heavy bomber offensive, however, the United States Chiefs of Staff expressed their misgivings. They were afraid that the British were giving "undue importance to the probability of success solely through the employment of bombing offensives". They were critical, too, of the policy that was being adopted in the execution of the offensive. On this point they felt that "at any one time offensives should be specific as to objectives and means in order to obtain satisfactory results". In particular bombing offensives should be directed not against German "general civil morale" but against "objectives which have an immediate relation to German Military Power".

271. These comments were given full consideration by the British Joint Planning Staff. They were seriously concerned at the apparent failure of the United States Chiefs of Staff to appreciate the importance of the bombing offensive and accordingly prepared a statement presenting fully the arguments in support of the British policy. This paper was ready by 11 November 1941, and received the approval of the British Chiefs of Staff. The channel chosen for the transmission to the United States Authorities of views expressed in the paper was that of the Special Observer Group. On 21 November 1941 the Joint Planning

(1) C.O.S.(41) 231 (0) (Annex I): 16 October 1941. The U.S. Joint Board paper (J.B. No. 325 - Serial 729) was transmitted jointly to the U.S. Special Naval Observer and the U.S. Special Army Observer in London, with instructions that it be presented to the British Chiefs of Staff.

Staff accordingly met the senior members of the Special Observer Group to convey their views in informal discussion.(1)

272. The Chairman (the Director of Plans, War Office) explained at the outset that, after study of the comments of the United States Chiefs of Staff, it was felt that there had been some mis-interpretation of certain passages in the "General Strategy Review", perhaps owing to their brevity. Informal discussion would afford an opportunity for any such misunderstandings to be cleared away. General Chaney agreed, and offered to interpret the views of the British Chiefs of Staff, as expressed during the meeting, to his Chiefs in Washington - an offer which was readily accepted.

273. Observations on the various points raised by the United States Chiefs of Staff were made at considerable length during the meeting. A summary has, however, been made of the more pertinent points; it follows below:

(a) It was true that in the British view the importance of the bomber offensive could hardly be over-emphasised, but at the same time it was fully realised that preparations must be made to accelerate victory by the landing of forces on the Continent. With the size of the bomber force available spectacular results could not be expected. Nevertheless, the cumulative effect even of the current attacks was considerable, and the bombing offensive was being developed on an increasing scale in spite of improved German defences. This development would continue. Plans were already made to provide a higher proportion of heavy bombers, giving better proportional results. Improved navigational aids were also coming into use. Heavier and more efficient bombs would soon be available. Finally, improvements in the armament of the newer types of heavy bomber had been introduced. Night operations were thus being intensified and though it might be some time before they would be supplemented by daylight bombing, it was hoped that when all the new developments were in use, the bomber effort would be multiplied fifty times.

(b) So far as current policy was concerned, the British bombing offensive was in fact being conducted according to a well-defined plan. The specific objectives against which attacks were being directed were German transportation and German morale. These objectives had been chosen because they were complementary. Transportation targets being located within built-up industrial areas, offered an insurance of useful bomb fall from the "morale" standpoint even if there were inaccuracies of bombing due to having to carry out attacks by night. There were certain tactical factors which dictated the main lines of bombing policy: the accessibility of the selected objectives within the hours of darkness; the need to use most effectively the limited bomber force; the need to provide insurance against inaccuracies in bombing; and finally the need to have available suitable alternative targets in case of weather difficulties. Having regard for all these determining factors, it was believed that the policy adopted was calculated to have the maximum possible effect on the German war effort.

(c) Regarding the direction of bombing against German civil morale, this policy had been adopted only after careful

(1) It was the 8th Meeting in the American liaison series (A.L. (41) 8th Mtg.): 21 November 1941.

consideration. It had been concluded that it would be more economical in view of the limitations upon bombing imposed by circumstances, to attack the German war effort through the focus of the workers themselves, rather than through the factories in which they worked. The aim was not kill the workers, but rather to affect their will to resist through the dislocation of their industrial and social life. Moreover this policy, for the reasons given under (b) above, should be combined with the policy of attacking transportation targets.

274. Through the Joint Planning Sub-Committee, the British Chiefs of Staff thus left the Special Observer Group in no doubt as to the faith which they placed in the bomber offensive. They were convinced that given a chance to prove itself it would make a substantial contribution to ultimate victory, indeed was an essential preliminary to ultimate victory. It was agreed that to achieve its full potentialities proper direction was needed; but even more essential were adequate resources. Of the current British offensive it was felt that, considering all the limitations imposed upon it, it was achieving all it could. Only with that added strength which was the persistent theme of British advocacy could it do more.

PEARL HARBOUR

December 1941

275. Thus far the story of Anglo-American collaboration has been carried up to the end of November 1941. It has been carried through that period when the United States was the "arsenal of democracy" and Britain the active protagonist: True, it had been the mission of the Special Observer Group for six months to prepare the way for the United States also to become an active partner, at least in Europe. But this had been a somewhat shadowy prospect in an indefinite future. Then suddenly, in a matter of hours, the kaleidoscope of world events took on a new and portentous pattern. It was on 7 December 1941 that the Japanese launched their treacherous attack upon Pearl Harbour. Four days later Germany and Italy were the allies of Japan; they too pronounced themselves at war with the United States. That shadowy prospect of United States participation in the European scene had become a formidable reality.

276. The time had come to put to the test those tentative plans which for so long had been the subjects of discussion and conference. To transfer the vast potential of the United States to positions whence it could be used effectively against the common enemy was a mighty task which now had to be carried through with the minimum of delay. It was in fact a race against time; and in this race there is no doubt that the preparatory work which had been accomplished did provide an appreciable start. In some respects, as might be expected, the starts proved false - through no fault of those who made them, but rather because of changing thought and plans at high levels, the result of unpredictable circumstances. Nevertheless some useful agreements had been reached and some valuable arrangements made.

277. The value of this anticipatory work will, it is felt, be more readily appreciated if a summary of it is given at this point. (1) The events of the days and weeks following Pearl Harbour will then be the more easily seen against their appropriate background. There follows, therefore, in brief summary, an account of the position which had been reached just before the United States came into the war:

(a) General Strategic Principles

The provisions of ABC-1 had been accepted as fundamental to United States - British Strategy. They had underlain all the work of the Special Observer Group. Differences of opinion had arisen on certain matters of detail, but these did not affect the essential unanimity of thought on basic principles.

(b) Proposed United States Air Contribution to the European War

It was understood that the United States contribution to the Air War in Europe, in the event of their active intervention, would consist of (a) the allocation of aircraft to the R.A.F. and (b) the dispatch to Britain of a United States air contingent. It was with the detailed

(1) A.M. File See C.S.11094, Encl. 10A; Min. by D.W.O.; 27 December 1941.

plans for the operation of the latter that the air staff of the Special Observer Group had been principally concerned. Arrangements mutually agreed upon with the British Air Staff were:

(i) Bombardment Units

The United States Air Striking Force consisting of two medium and three heavy groups would be located in the Huntingdon area (No. 8 Group R.A.F. Bomber Command), with headquarters at Brampton Grange. It would operate as an integrated unit under the operational control of R.A.F. Bomber Command. Its mission would be to assist R.A.F. Bomber Command in bombing Axis territory.

(ii) Pursuit Units

The United States fighter squadrons would be located in Northern Ireland and South-west Scotland. They would be organised independently in United States Sectors, but would be under the general operational control of R.A.F. Fighter Command. Their primary mission would be the defence of the United States naval bases in the area; but they would also be responsible for the protection of the vital areas of Glasgow and the Clyde, and of the North Channel, and would in addition be available, if need be, as reinforcement to the British, for the protection of the Forth area. Arrangements were in hand for the operational training of the United States Pursuit Units prior to their crossing the Atlantic, the training to be based on British standards and given, initially by British instructors.

(iii) General Principles of Air Co-operation

The need for agreement upon a set of general principles, upon which the details of United States - British co-operation could be based, had become evident, and steps had been taken to draw up a list of such principles preparatory to full and authoritative discussion. Owing, however, to the pressure of events, the project had had to be left temporarily in abeyance.

(c) Schemes for United States Assistance already in Operation

Under the general principles of mutual aid, as defined in the Lend-Lease Bill, considerable direct assistance was already being afforded by the United States to the British air effort; there were the substantial allocations of aircraft from United States production; the dispatch of United States technicians to England to help to put these aircraft into effective operation; the establishment of flying training schools for the R.A.F. in the United States; and the arrangements for the exchange of technical information.

There was thus already in existence a firm ground-work upon which future projects could be built. It might be found to need adjustments; it might even need radical re-arrangement; but in any event a fund of experience in the work of collaboration had been accumulated which could not but be of help whatever policy future circumstances might decree.

THE WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE

December 1941 - January 1942

278. The implications of the attack on Pearl Harbour and the subsequent declaration of war upon the United States by Germany and Japan obviously extended to the very core of the concerted Anglo-American war effort. It is not surprising, therefore, that within a very few days the Prime Minister, together with the Minister of Aircraft Production, the Minister of Supply, the three Chiefs of Staff and various Staff Officers left for Washington. Their mission was to discuss with the President and his Staffs how best to wage war now that Japan had shown her hand and the United States was an active belligerent.

279. Conversations between the President and the Prime Minister, or between their advisers, took place almost daily from 23 December 1941 to 14 January 1942. (1) General Arnold, as Chief of the U.S. Army Air Forces attended all the combined conferences and presented the United States Air Staff point of view. There is no documentary evidence, however, to indicate that any special steps had been taken in advance by the British authorities to ensure that the United States Air Staff was represented at the Conference.

280. During the higher level discussions there were relatively few allusions to air matters. In general, it would seem, sufficient measure of agreement on policies and procedures had already been reached through the work of the Staffs during the preceding months.

281. In effect, the agreements reached regarding the employment of the United States forces to be based in the British Isles simply confirmed those reached during the British-United States Staff Conversations in Washington almost twelve months earlier. The land forces would take over the defence of Northern Ireland; the specific task of the air pursuit units would be to protect those land forces and the United States naval bases in the area; while the bombardment units would be based in England and charged with the mission of bombing Germany and the Axis-occupied countries.

282. The command of all U.S. Army and U.S. Army Air Forces would, it was agreed, be vested in General Chaney. He would be designated 'Commander, United States Army Forces in the British Isles', and he would be given plenary powers to arrange with the appropriate British authorities for the employment both of United States organisations under British control and of British organisations under United States control.

283. While the higher level discussions were in progress, there was also constant contact between the Staffs, United States and British, on a service-to-service basis. Between the two Air Staffs the discussions revolved mainly around the problem of the mutual allocation of aircraft.

284. The Chief of the Air Staff, in a letter to General Arnold on 2 January 1942, expressed his concern at certain aspects of the proposed allocations to the R.A.F. (2) His main anxieties were with regard to the pursuit and light bomber classes. The

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- (1) The code name given to the Conference was Arcadia. For a summary of those discussions, see Appendix I.
(2) S.6 D.S.D. Papers: D.S.D. (41) 17. Ltr., C.A.S. to Gen. Arnold: 2 January 1942.

allocations of heavy and medium bombers were also lower than those to which he had looked forward, but in this case he fully realised the difficulties which faced the United States Air Staff. He was, in fact, as anxious as General Arnold that the United States should build up her air combat groups as rapidly as possible. The British placed great store on the prospect of such groups being sent shortly both to Britain and to the Middle East.

285. Further discussion led to certain modifications of the original proposals. These went far to allay the anxieties of the Chief of the Air Staff with regard to the allocations.

286. In the same letter of 2 January 1942, the Chief of the Air Staff said he firmly believed there was complete agreement between the two Staffs on the vital necessity for a largely increased total production of aircraft in the United States, and said, too, that he felt that the R.A.F. would share in the benefits accruing from this. General Arnold hastened to confirm these views;(1) and in a separate letter gave a 'general outline' of his proposals regarding the U.S. Army Air Forces to be sent initially to the British Isles.(2) The proposals, as conveyed to Air Ministry on 3 January 1942, were:(3)

(a) Bombardment Units: two heavy bomber groups, equipped with the most up-to-date version of the Flying Fortress (the B-17E), would be ready for despatch in March 1942.

(b) Pursuit Units: one pursuit group of Tomahawks (P-40), plus one Turbinlite unit, would be ready for despatch to Northern Ireland in February 1942.

(c) A Bomber Group Operations Officer would be ready to proceed for attachment to a R.A.F. Bomber Command Group in Britain in January 1942.

On the same day, in instructions received by the Special Observer Group from the War Department, it was made clear that General Chaney would be given full powers to make all the arrangements necessary for the reception, accommodation, distribution, maintenance and command of these forces.(4)

287. In the instructions from War Department, there was also a mention of Army Support Aviation. General Chaney was informed that until such time as the U.S. Army Air Corps would be able to provide the reconnaissance and support aircraft necessary for U.S. Army training and operations, such aircraft would be provided by the British. Air Ministry offered all that they could, but had to tell General Chaney that there was only one R.A.F. Army Co-operation Squadron available in Northern Ireland, and suggested

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- (1) S.6 D.S.D. Papers: D.S.D.(41) 21. Ltr., Gen. Arnold to C.A.S.: 2 January 1942.
 - (2) S.6 D.S.D. Papers: D.S.D.(41) 20. Ltr., Gen. Arnold to C.A.S.: 2 January 1942.
 - (3) V.C.A.S. Folder No. 407, Encl. 8A; Tel., Caesar Arcadia 589, C.A.S. to V.C.A.S.: 3 January 1942.
 - (4) C.O.S. (42) 6(O) (Annex): 3 January 1942. See also Tel., Gleam 188 J.S.M. to C.O.S.: 3 January 1942 (V.C.A.S. Folder No. 407, Encl. 1A).
The code name Magnet was allotted to the move of U.S. land forces to Northern Ireland.

at the same time that General Chaney might try to get more aircraft for this purpose from the United States; the R.A.F. would be prepared to man them for the time being. (1)

288. Even though a 'general outline' of the United States plans for the despatch of their aircraft to Britain had been available on 2 January, it was not until three weeks later that firm decisions on the subject were reached. Apparently the United States Air Staff had found considerable difficulty in arriving at these decisions, and their original plans had, in the interval, been somewhat modified. However, on 22 January, the following statement regarding the U.S. Army Air Corps units intended for Britain was received in Air Ministry from the British Air Staff in Washington: (2)

(a) Bombardment Units: it was intended to despatch a total of twenty heavy bomber groups during 1942. Immediate plans were:

- (i) Composition: 1 Group (B-24) by 15 March 1942.
1 Group (B-17) by 31 March 1942.
1 Group (B-17) by 15 May 1942.
1 Group (B-24) by 31 May 1942.

together with two Photographic Reconnaissance Lightning (P-38) squadrons to operate with these heavy bomber groups, one squadron to arrive on 15 March 1942 the other on 15 May 1942.

(ii) Organisation, etc.: it was proposed to set up a United States Bomber Command as soon as possible. Brigadier General Ira Eaker, with a nucleus staff of thirteen key officers, would leave the U.S.A. about 1 February 1942.

(b) Pursuit Units: two groups would be sent to Northern Ireland and one to Northern England or Scotland to arrive about July 1942; in addition there would be one Turbinlite flight attached to each group for night-fighting.

289. The British Air Staff in Washington felt that it was essential for General Eaker and his staff to be located at Headquarters, R.A.F. Bomber Command, in order to become familiar with the general organisation and operational procedure, and in order to work in close collaboration with the R.A.F. Such collaboration, they felt, appeared to be the only solution, so far as organisation was concerned, since it was clear that the United States personnel were not in favour of any arrangement which might imply subordination. (3)

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- (1) V.C.A.S. Folder No. 407, Encls. 5A & 7A: Tels., Boxes 162, C.O.S. to J.S.M. and Webber W. 126, A.M. to RAFDEL: 5 January 1942.
 - (2) J.O.M. (U.S.) Folder No. 2: Tels., Caesar 201, 202, & 203, Sharp to Hollinghurst: 22 January 1942. G/C. Sharp (D.D.O.P.) who had been one of the 'Arcadians', had remained in Washington after the main party had returned to London, and thus was able to keep his senior officer, A/V/M Hollinghurst, (D.G.O.), fully informed of U.S. plans. The information was circulated to the A.M. branches concerned in L.M. 1245/D.G.O.: 24 January 1942; L.M. 1266/D.G.O.: 27 January 1942; and L.M. 1291/D.G.O.: 30 January 1942 (V.C.A.S. Folder No. 407, Encls. 51A, 55A & 56A). It was conveyed to R.A.F. Bomber Command on 24 January 1942 by Postagram 286/1246/D.G.O.
 - (3) J.O.M. (U.S.) Folder No. 2. Tel., Caesar 201, Sharp to Hollinghurst: 22 January 1942.

Formation of Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee.

290. It might be noted here, paranthetically, that one of the most important decisions reached at the Washington War Conference, was the formation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee. This Committee would meet regularly in Washington, and would be composed of the British Chiefs of Staff (or in their absence from Washington their accredited representatives) and the United States Chiefs of Staff. The British representatives would be Field Marshal Sir John Dill, as head of the Joint Staff Mission and personal representative of the Prime Minister, and an alter ego of each of the three British Chiefs of Staff. Henceforward, all matters of highest policy could be discussed fully and regularly, and agreed decisions at the highest level promptly reached. (1)

291. At their second meeting on 27 January 1942, the Combined Chiefs of Staff formally agreed to the allocation of the first two heavy bomber groups for operations from bases in Britain. (2)

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- (1) C.O.S. (42)-80. (Annex XI) = W.W.16 = ABC-4 - C.S. 4:
14 January 1942.
- (2) V.C.A.S. Folder No. 407, Encl. 62A: Tel., Caesar 471,
Strafford to Hollinghurst and Dickson: 30 January 1942.

DEFINITION OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN AIR COLLABORATION

292. During the Washington Conference the Staffs both of the Special Observer Group and of Air Ministry were considering how best they could concert together to translate into reality the plans for the reception of the United States Air Force on which they had been working in partnership through the previous six months.

293. In Air Ministry, the problem was much in the minds of officers at the highest level. On 27 December 1941 the acting Chief of the Air Staff (Air Chief Marshal Freeman) had asked the Air Member for Supply and Organisation to ensure that all plans for the reception of the United States Air Forces were brought up to date; (1) and on 4 January 1942 he asked the acting Vice-Chief of the Air Staff (Air Marshal Peck) to be responsible for keeping a watchful eye on the overall picture and for maintaining close contact with General Chaney. (2) The Air Member for Supply and Organisation assured the acting Chief of the Air Staff on 3 January 1942, that the arrangements already made would permit the accommodation of the envisaged United States air units - six fighter squadrons in Northern Ireland and three in the Ayr district and eight heavy and twelve light bomber squadrons in the Huntingdon district - at three or four weeks notice. (3)

294. At the same time he took the opportunity to re-state the need to determine the essential general principles which would cover active collaboration between the United States Air Forces and the R.A.F. He recalled how the intention of forming a Working Committee to make recommendations on this question did not materialise in September 1941, (4) and how in the meantime administrative planning had necessarily proceeded, but without any guiding principles.

2. The Preparation of a Document embodying Agreed Basic Principles.

295. Realising that the administrative planning for the arrival of the United States Air Forces had now become an urgent problem, the Air Member for Supply and Organisation arranged for the formation within his Department of a special branch to deal with it. (5) The branch was given the title of: 'Joint Organisation and Maintenance (U.S. Army Air Corps).' Reference to it in this narrative, however, will be by its short title: 'J.O.M.(U.S.)'. Its function was defined as: 'to draw up the principles for the organisation and maintenance of the Units of the U.S. Army Air Corps operating with the R.A.F. in the United Kingdom and in

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- (1) V.C.A.S. Folder No. 407, Encl. 29A: Min. A.C.A.S. to A.M.S.O.: 27 December 1941.
 - (2) A.M. File C.S. 12569, Min. 1: Min. A/C.A.S. to A/V.C.A.S.: 9 January 1942.
 - (3) A.M. File S.9893, Encl. 21A: Min. A.M.S.O. to A/C.A.S.: 3 January 1942.
 - (4) See Section XVI, Part 7.
 - (5) J.O.M.(U.S.) Folder No. JOM/1: Min. A.M.S.O. to E.O.: 6 January 1942.
V.C.A.S. Folder No. 407: Min. D/A.M.S.O. to A.C.A.S.(G): 13 January 1942.

other theatres of war'. (1) Naturally, therefore, for the following several months it had much to do with the definition of policy to govern the administrative arrangements for the reception and operation of the United States Air Forces in Britain. Naturally, too, it worked in close collaboration with the Special Observer Group, and especially with the Air Officer, Colonel A. J. Lyon.

296. The Staff Officers appointed to J.O.M. (U.S.) set to work immediately. (2) Their aim was to draft a document which would embody basic principles, mutually agreed between the Special Observer Group and Air Ministry, to cover all the various aspects of collaboration between the U.S. Army Air Corps and the R.A.F. No less than forty-four such aspects were eventually listed, ranging from 'Higher Command' to 'Postal Arrangements'. The drafting work was made easier by the fact that thoughts on all these subjects had been marshalled and put on paper prior to the proposed September conference. (3) Nevertheless there was still a considerable amount of co-ordinating work required before final approval on each aspect could be obtained. Not only had the agreement of the Staff of Headquarters, United States Army Forces in the British Isles, (4) and of the interested branches of Air Ministry to be sought, but also, finally, General Chaney's personal concurrence. This last step, though it had resulted from an agreement between the Air Member for Supply and Organisation and General Chaney, (5) was, in the event, difficult to negotiate. General Chaney proved hesitant to add his formal authority to the various papers, even when the previous agreement of his Staff to them had been forthcoming. It appeared that his reluctance was due to a desire to avoid investing with the legal force of a U.S. Army Regulation a document which was intended only as a statement of working agreements. (6)

297. The outcome was that General Chaney wrote to the Air Member for Supply and Organisation on 24 February 1942, suggesting that the agreed principles be published only on the understanding that they be regarded as "preliminary drafts of working agreements". (7) forming "a basis for the preparation of detailed plans and executive actions of the Air Ministry and Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles." He suggested too that "reference to your authority and mine" be deleted. To this suggestion the Air Member for Supply and Organisation agreed on

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- (1) A.M. Office Memorandum: 16 January 1942.
 - (2) A/Cdre. Gibbs was appointed as head of the branch; his principal assistant was W/C (later G/C) Cozens.
 - (3) V.C.A.S. Folder No. 242 Min., D.W.O. to V.C.A.S.: 11 September 1941.
 - (4) On 8 January 1942 in accordance with the decision at the Washington War Conference, General Chaney became 'Commander, United States Army Forces in the British Isles'. In this narrative, reference to his Headquarters will be by its short title: 'Hq., U.S.A.F.B.I.' For further details, see the Annex to this Section (para. 306).
 - (5) A.M. File C.S.12602, Min. 2: Min., J.O.M. (U.S.) to D/A.M.S.O.: 6 February 1942.
 - (6) A.M. File C.S.12602, Min. 6: Min., J.O.M. (U.S.) to A.M.S.O.: 27 February 1942.
 - (7) A.M. File C.S.12602, Encl. 5A: Ltr., AG.320.3-G, General Chaney to A.M.S.O.: 24 February 1942.

2 March 1942, (1) because it was realised that unless this concession were made, no guiding principles were likely to be published. (2)

2. Air Ministry Secret Document 348

298. J.O.M. (U.S.) thereafter proceeded in accordance with General Chaney's suggestions and had the introduction and eight sections of a memorandum ready for distribution as a printed document by 23 March 1942. (3) The document was entitled: 'Principles for the Operation, Organisation and Maintenance of U.S. Army Air Force Units operating in the same Theatre of War as the Royal Air Force', and was allotted the reference: S.D. (= Secret Document) 348. The remaining sections were drafted and the necessary agreements obtained during the succeeding months; in addition, various sections were revised as found necessary. S.D. 348 became one of the basic documents relating to the principles underlying Anglo-American air co-operation, and it was generally regarded and quoted as such by Air Ministry Directorates and R.A.F. Commands. It would seem, however, that the United States organisations did not always hold it in quite the same respect, although General Lyon found it useful in countering the 'new broom tactics' which his recently-arrived colleagues were occasionally rather prone to adopt.

299. No reference in detail to the provisions of S.D. 348 will be made in this narrative, since its distribution to U.S. organisations was so wide that there must be many copies of it in the archives of War Department. (4) Moreover a large proportion of its sections related only to what may be termed the minutiae of air collaboration. The aspect of 'Higher Command', however, was rather different. It had necessarily been the subject of expressions of views at a high level.

3. The Problem of 'Higher Command'

300. At a meeting of the British Chiefs of Staff on 16 January 1942, the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff observed that the United States authorities would probably place their air forces under R.A.F. 'operational direction' but not under R.A.F. command. (5) The Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that the whole subject of the command of the United States forces in Britain should first be discussed personally between the United States and British Commanders concerned and that afterwards the position could be reviewed informally with General Chaney.

301. The Chief of the Air Staff, on his return from the Washington Conference, expressed his thoughts on the command of the United States Bombardment Units. (6) He informed his staff on 23 January 1942, that he had made no arrangements with General Arnold about the control of the United States Heavy Bomber Force expected in the United Kingdom during the spring,

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- (1) A.M. File C.S.12602, Encl. 8A: Ltr., AFMSO/12/4, A.M.S.O. to Gen. Chaney: 2 March 1942.
 - (2) A.M. File C.S.12602, Min. 6: Min., J.O.M. (U.S.) to A.M.S.O.: 27 February 1942.
 - (3) A.M. File C.S.12602, Min. 15: Min., J.O.M.(U.S.) to D/A.M.S.O.: 17 March 1942.
 - (4) The distribution of S.D.348 to the U.S. Forces, in September 1942, was: Hq. ETOUSA - 60 copies; Hq. SOS - 10 copies; All USAAF Stations - 3 copies each; All US Headquarters down to Wings - 3 copies each.
 - (5) C.O.S.(42) 17th Mtg.: 16 January 1942.
 - (6) A.C.A.S. (Ops) Folder No. J.3.B.: Min., C.A.S. to D.C.A.S.: 23 January 1942.

but it would not be 'under the command of' the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F. Bomber Command. He felt, however, that its activities would have to be co-ordinated with those of the R.A.F. and it would presumably accept a general directive and operational instructions from Air Ministry. The Chief of the Air Staff asked for the views of his Staff on how such co-ordination and general direction might be achieved.

302. The matter was referred to J.O.M.(U.S.), and by 3 February, after co-ordination with the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, a statement on the whole subject of Higher Command, which it was thought might be suitable for inclusion in S.D.348, had been prepared in draft.(1) A few days later, however, the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff informed J.O.M.(U.S.) that the time was not yet opportune to press for the concurrence of Hq., U.S.A.F.B.I. to this draft; the reason being that, although agreement had been reached on the subject of the command of the United States fighter units, no such stage had been reached regarding the command of the bombardment units.(2)

303. The lines along which thoughts on the subject were running at that time may, however, be gathered from the following:

(a) The opinions of the temporary Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command, (Air Vice-Marshal Baldwin) and the Director of Bomber Operations (Air Commodore Baker), recorded after a conference on 2 February, were that it would be premature to attempt to make any final decisions until General Eaker had had some experience of the problems involved and was in a position to make recommendations. They felt that while General Eaker and his Staff should be accommodated at Headquarters, R.A.F. Bomber Command until the United States Headquarters was fully formed, eventually they could be located in a separate headquarters, but one which was within two or three miles of R.A.F. Bomber Command Headquarters.(3)

(b) The Deputy Chief of the Air Staff expressed the view that the eventual solution might prove to be one of two alternatives:(4)

(i) That the United States formations would operate under a general directive issued by the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F. Bomber Command, the United States Bomber Headquarters being located for this purpose either at or in the immediate vicinity of Headquarters R.A.F. Bomber Command. (The lay-out of communications and the general machinery of Intelligence and Operational control would be suitable for this purpose.)

(ii) That the control of the United States Bomber force would remain completely with the United States Command, but that it would operate under a general directive and

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- (1) J.O.M.(U.S.) Folder No. I: Min., DCAS/O.23/43 D.C.A.S. to J.O.M.(U.S.): 2 February 1942.
(2) J.O.M.(U.S.) Folder No. I: Min., DCAS/O.17/4, D.C.A.S. to J.O.M.(U.S.): 5 February 1942.
(3) A.C.A.S. (Ops) Folder No. J.3.B: Min., D.B.Ops. 3339, D.B. Ops. to D.C.A.S.: 4 February 1942.
A.C.A.S. (Ops) Folder No. J.3.B: Min., DCAS/I. 1/25, D.C.A.S. to C.A.S.: 6 February 1942.
(4) J.O.M.(U.S.) Folder No. I: Min., DCAS/O.17/4, D.C.A.S. to J.O.M.(U.S.): 5 February 1942.

operational instructions issued from Air Ministry, its activities being co-ordinated with those of the R.A.F. by locating the United States headquarters either at or in the near vicinity of Headquarters, R.A.F. Bomber Command.

(c) In Washington, the viewpoint was equally indeterminate.⁽¹⁾ The British Air Staff there, on 5 February, advised that the problem of the organisation of the United States Air Force within the United Kingdom was at that time under very active discussion between War Department and General Chaney, with the result that views were tending to change almost daily. This state of uncertainty was no doubt the result of General Chaney cabling to War Department with regard to the conclusions reached in consultation with the Chief of the Air Staff on 29 January 1942, for it had then been agreed that the scheme for the organisation of the United States Forces in Britain as proposed by War Department was suitable only for a virgin theatre of war and could not be superimposed in Britain without the utmost confusion.⁽²⁾

304. After the subject had been left in abeyance for some six weeks, it was re-opened on the initiative of Hq., U.S.A.F.B.I. On 13 March Colonel Lyon approached J.O.M. (U.S.) with a request that a paragraph of the draft 'Higher Command' Section of S.D. 348 be published as soon as possible.⁽³⁾ His reason for the request was that a large number of U.S. Army Air Corps officers were apparently thinking that they would have to operate in the British Isles entirely as a part of the R.A.F. and were not happy about this prospect. Publication of principles of command, mutually agreed between the United States and British authorities, would, Colonel Lyon felt, do much to quash these thoughts. The relevant section of S.D. 348, already in draft, was somewhat amended; the necessary approvals were obtained; and the section was eventually published before the end of March 1942.⁽⁴⁾

305. Section I of S.D. 348, as published, read as follows:⁽⁵⁾

(a) The Strategic direction of the United States Army Forces in the British Isles will be exercised by the British Government through the Commander, United States Army Forces in the British Isles.

(b) The United States Army Air Forces will maintain their national identity in the theatre of war, and the chain of command between United States formations will be as determined by the Commanding General of the United States Forces, British Isles.

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- (1) V.C.A.S. Folder No. 407: Tel., Caesar 637, Strafford to Hollinghurst; 5 February 1942.
 - (2) C.A.S. Folder No. 876 (Part I): Min., C.A.S. to A.M.S.O.: 29 January 1942.
 - (3) J.O.M. (U.S.) Folder No. I: Min., J.O.M. (U.S.) to D.C.A.S.: 14 March 1942.
 - (4) It was sent to the printers on 24 March 1942. (J.O.M. (U.S.) Folder No. JCM/9: Min., J.O.M. (U.S.) to S.5(b): 24 March 1942).
 - (5) Para. (b) was part of the original draft; paras. (c) (d) and (e) were added by J.O.M. (U.S.), with the approval of the Air Staff; and para. (a) by Hq., U.S.A.F.B.I. Para. (a) was based directly on the agreement made at the Washington War Conference.

(c) The channel of command of United States Army Air Force Units allocated by the Commanding General of the United States Army Forces in Great Britain to operate in close support of the United States Army will be laid down by him at the time.


(d) Pursuit Units allocated by the Commanding General to take part in the organized fighter defence of a Sector of British territory in the United Kingdom will be under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, Fighter Command of the Royal Air Force.

(e) The channel of command of other United States Army Air Force Units will be promulgated by the Commanding General later.

It will be noted that no direct reference was made to the system of command applicable to the U.S. Bombardment Units; presumably it was to be one of the provisions to be "promulgated by the Commanding General later". Section I remained in the above form until September 1942 when, by common consent, it was modified to conform to the changed conditions by then prevailing. (See para. 396 below.)

ANNEX. Staff of H.Q., U.S.A.F.B.I. in
January 1942

306. On 8 January 1942, Major General Chaney was designated Army Member of the United States Military Mission and Commander of the United States Army Forces in the British Isles. (1) In the first capacity he assumed command over all U.S. Army personnel in the British Isles, and was responsible to the Commanding General U.S. Army Field Forces, though, at the same time, under the strategic direction of the British Government. In the second capacity his duties included those previously delegated to him as Special Army Observer. The staff of the Special Observer Group accordingly became the nucleus staff of Hq., U.S.A.F.B.I., and the Special Observer Group, by that name, ceased to exist. The following table, showing how the transformation took place by the stroke of a pen, is adapted from General Order No. 2 issued by Hq., U.S.A.F.B.I., on 8 January 1942. (2) It may be compared with the table which forms the Annex to Section XVI.



(1) C.O.S.(42) 18(0): 15 Jan. 1942.

(2) C.S.11097: General Order No. 2, Hq., U.S.A.F.B.I.:
8 January 1942.

THE FLYING FORTRESS AND DAYLIGHT BOMBINGBritish Experience in 1941

307. The mission of the United States Army Air Forces in Europe was defined during the Washington War Conference, but in broad terms only; and the task of the United States Air Staff during the weeks which followed was to interpret it in the form of detailed plans for operation. Any such plans would obviously be influenced by the potentialities and limitations of the aircraft which were to be used to implement them. The British had had some experience of these aircraft, particularly the Flying Fortress (the B-17), in actual operations from the United Kingdom - experience which would naturally tend to colour their reactions to the United States plans. There follows, therefore, a brief review of what missions had been undertaken by the British prior to Pearl Harbour, and of what conclusions were drawn from the results.

308. The early story of the effort to get Flying Fortress aircraft released to Britain is told in Section VII (Part 1); the story was brought to the point where, in December 1940, twenty of these aircraft had been allocated to Britain, subject only to the condition that United States Observers be allowed to obtain direct information about their performance during actual operations. Even then, however, some months elapsed before they began to arrive. The position at the beginning of March 1941, as reported by the British Air Attache in Washington (Group Captain Pirie), was that six complete ferrying crews composed of British civilians had then been in the United States for over five weeks awaiting delivery of the aircraft.(1) The delay had been due to the lack of certain pieces of equipment - in particular self-sealing tanks. It was hoped, however, that the first two aircraft - for training only and without the self-sealing tanks - would become available in a matter of days; while the first six to be fully equipped should be ready for delivery later in March.(2)

309. In the event, however, delivery of Fortress aircraft did not begin until April 1941. The type was B-17C, or in British

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- (1) A.C.A.S.(P) Folder No. 361: Min., British Air Attache in Washington to British Ambassador: 3 March 1941.
 - (2) It is of interest to observe that similar delays had been experienced with the delivery of the twenty-six Liberators which it had been decided to release to Britain in early October 1940. In the first week of March 1941, by which time at least eighteen should have become available for delivery, only one had actually been handed over, and that was still in Montreal, temporarily unserviceable. The delays in the case of this class of aircraft had been due to the numerous teething troubles which always attend the introduction of a new type of aircraft. They were not very serious, but were sufficiently important to need remedy before an Atlantic crossing was attempted. It was expected that it would be at least the end of March before any Liberators would be ready for ferrying to Britain. (A.C.A.S.(P) Folder No. 361: Min., British Air Attache in Washington to British Ambassador: 3 March 1941).

parlance the Fortress Mark I.(1) When they began to arrive No. 90 Squadron R.A.F. Bomber Command was formed to operate them and to try them out under combat conditions. It was located first at West Raynham. By that time, it may be noted, the Flying Fortress was equipped with the Sperry bombsight and not the Norden, which in the Autumn of 1940 had been the obstacle in the way of its release.(2)

310. The Staff of Air Ministry were fully aware of the tactical conception upon which the Flying Fortress was intended to be operated. As long ago as December 1939 the Air Attaché in Washington had reported that the U.S. Army Air Corps were coming more and more around to the view that air bombardment should be carried out from as great a height as possible.(3) They considered that the higher the aircraft could operate, the more immune they were likely to be from anti-aircraft fire and the more secure from detection by fighters. To achieve effectiveness from this height they placed great faith in the performance of their bombsights. They realised, however, that a stable bombing platform was an essential provision and that this was possible only with a four-engined aircraft. Hence the large number of such aircraft which were then in service or on order (twenty were in service and one hundred and twenty-three on order). The Flying Fortresses were, in short, the outcome of a firmly held belief by the United States Authorities in the possibilities of precision bombing by day from high altitudes.

311. It was upon this tactical conception therefore, that the activities of No. 90 Squadron were planned; they were to be high altitude operations by day. This type of operation was of course new to British air tactics, and a variety of navigational problems was consequently encountered during the testing and training period. For this reason it took several weeks to bring the Unit to an operational status. Even with the greatest possible measure of assistance from United States technicians (see Section XIV), it proved beyond the capacity of the Unit to maintain more than three or four aircraft operational at any one time(4) However, on 8 July 1941, by which time the Squadron had moved to Polebrook, the Fortresses made their first attack on enemy territory. Three aircraft were sent to attack Wilhelmshafen: further missions, each by two or three aircraft were undertaken on 23, 24 and 26 July; on the first the aircraft had to return before reaching the target, on the second and third they were sent to Brest and Hamburg respectively.(5) Eight further attacks on enemy territory were made during August 1941,

(1) The comparative U.S. Army Air Corps and R.A.F. classifications of the successive versions of the Flying Fortress aircraft were as follows:-

<u>U.S.A.A.C.</u>	<u>R.A.F.</u>
B-17B	None delivered to Britain
B-17C)	Flying Fortress Mark I
B-17D)	
B-17E)	Flying Fortress Mark II
B-17F)	
B-17G	Flying Fortress Mark III

(2) A.M. File C.S. 9119, Encl. 4A: Report by A.T.(B): 29 May 1941.
 (3) A.M. File S. 2978, Encl. 1A: Min., S-2/1, Air Attaché Washington to D. of I. Air Ministry: 6 December 1939.
 (4) A.M. File C.S.9119, Encl. 78A: Report on "Experience with Fortress aircraft": 6 January 1942.
 (5) A.M. File C.S.9119, Encl. 24A: Min., Air Ministry War Room to A.T.(B): 17 August 1941.

and another eight during September. Each attack was made with four aircraft or less. Targets included Wilhelmshafen, Berlin, Brest, Hamburg, Kiel, Bremen, Cologne, Dusseldorf, Duisburg, Essen and Oslo.(1) The operations up to 20 September 1941 were summarised as:

No. of sorties despatched ... 49
No. of sorties effective ... 21
No. of bombs dropped ... 84 x 1,100 lb demolition bombs.

Casualties by enemy action:

Aircraft missing over enemy territory ... 2
Aircraft crash landed in U.K. ... 2
Aircraft slightly damaged ... 1

A collection of reports on each individual mission up to 29 August 1941 was forwarded to the United States Embassy in London and to the British Air Staff in Washington early in September 1941. So also were reports on how the various items of equipment, etc., functioned under operational conditions.

312. As the summer advanced, weather conditions deteriorated, and the occasions on which tasks had to be abandoned, either through technical troubles or through the formation of condensation trails, became very frequent. In September 1941, therefore, it was decided to review the experiences to date with the Fortress aircraft as a result of operations from bases in Britain, and to send four aircraft out to the Middle East in order to try them out under the different conditions which obtained there.

313. The Air Staff accordingly formulated a set of tentative deductions based on the experience gained from the operations of No. 90 Squadron, and on 25 September 1941 sent them to the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F. Bomber Command, for his comments. The deductions were:

- (a) The Fortress could not rely on evasion below 32,000 feet.
- (b) Once intercepted, the Fortress had little chance against the modern fighter.
- (c) Precise bombing above 32,000 feet, even with the Sperry sight, was extremely difficult owing to the physical and mental strain of using the equipment at this height.
- (d) Dependence on suitable weather limited the frequency with which the Fortress could operate.
- (e) Even in clear weather condensation trails limited the occasions on which the aircraft could penetrate to targets without the risk of interception.
- (f) The average bomb load was uneconomical in relation to crew and technical maintenance requirements.

In effect the British Air Staff view was that it was doubtful whether the Fortress was likely to achieve more than intermittent harassing operations in daylight in face of the existing air situation. The Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief was asked

(1) A.M. File C.S. 9119, Encl. 45A: Min., D.D.A.T. to D.B.
Ops.: 28 September 1941.

whether he agreed with these deductions, and what opinion he had formed regarding the range and scope of the daylight operations on which the Fortress could best be employed. He was also asked whether he thought the Fortress was suitable for conversion into a night bomber.(1)

314. In his reply the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F. Bomber Command, indicated that he concurred in the conclusions of the Air Staff.(2) In his view the unescorted day bomber needed to be faster than the contemporary fighter, or else it should operate at an altitude of 40,000 feet. The high altitude bomber had, therefore, to be equipped with a pressure cabin and with a remarkably accurate bombsight. Even then weather conditions over North-west Europe would limit the number of occasions on which it could be effectively used, so that such aircraft would be required only in small numbers. But such high altitude bombing would, he thought, even on a small scale, have a high moral effect on the enemy. As regards the range of the Fortresses, the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief believed it to be less than 500 miles at 32,000 feet, which he regarded as its minimum operational height. The Sperry sight had proved difficult to operate even in the hands of United States experts. The Fortress, he felt, might be modified for operation by night if the Sperry sight were replaced by a standard sight and if the turbo-chargers were dispensed with. The turbo-chargers would, he thought, be unnecessary in any case, because it would generally be impossible to locate the targets by night from heights above 20,000 feet. In sum, he considered that the Fortress was not suitable for use under modern war conditions in the manner in which its designers had intended. He expressed the hope that the Fortress Mark II (the B-17E) would be usable by night in the same way as the Liberator.


315. On 6 December 1941 the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F. Bomber Command, wrote again to Air Ministry, this time elaborating his views on the limitations which were imposed on the operations of the Flying Fortresses by the meteorological conditions which obtained over North-West Europe.(3) He said that although the Fortress had an outstanding performance in terms of speed and ceiling, it was unfortunate that its ceiling was not 6,000 feet higher. The aircraft could then fly in the stratosphere at all times, and thus avoid the formation of condensation trails. A height of 38,500 feet had been reached on one occasion by a Fortress aircraft, but the maximum practicable operational height might be said to be 34,000 feet, and this did not permit it to operate above the tropopause at just the time when cloud and other conditions were favourable for high altitude bombing. As things were, therefore, the occasions on which the Fortress would be able to operate effectively over North-west Europe and yet not attract fighter opposition by the formation of condensation trails would be very limited. So limited, in fact, did the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief consider them that he recommended that neither the Fortress Mark I (B-17C) nor the Fortress Mark II (B-17E) should be used for daylight bombing, but instead should be developed for night bombing. The principal alterations necessary would be the replacement of the Sperry bombsight and the provision of flame-dampers for the exhausts.

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- (1) A.M. File C.S. 9119, Encl. 44A: Ltr., C.S. 9119/D.B. Ops., D.B. Ops. to Hq. Bomber Command: 25 September 1941.
(2) A.M. File C.S. 9119, Encl. 48A: Ltr., BC/S. 25303/C.-in-C., Hq., Bomber Command to Air Ministry: 8 October 1941.
(3) A.M. File C.S. 9119, Encl. 60A: Ltr., BC/S. 25303/Air, Hq., Bomber Command to Air Ministry: 6 December 1941.

316. Air Ministry replied three weeks later stating that the development of the Fortress as a night bomber had, in fact, been approved by the Air Staff.(1) The necessary modifications to enable the engines to be used without the turbo-chargers were under consideration; so, too, were experiments with the necessary bombsights.

317. At the time of the entry of the United States into the war, it was therefore the view of the British Air Staff that unless the Fortress and Liberator aircraft could be adapted for employment by night, they were not likely to achieve more in the European theatre than occasional harassing operations. They were under no illusions, however, about the limitations of data upon which conclusions had been based; equally it was realised that such conclusions were applicable only to the Fortress aircraft of the type and in the quantities that were then available. Only twenty Fortresses had been delivered to Britain in all; a number of these had been employed for training purposes - for training in the unfamiliar technique and with the unfamiliar equipment had early been found, through bitter experience, to be a vital need(2) - and in experiments designed to foster technical developments; thus all operational experience had been derived only from some ten or twelve aircraft, of which no more than four had been sent on any one mission.(3) The Fortress had therefore been used only in the role of an unescorted bomber with reliance placed upon its own fire-power and high-flying potentialities. It had not been possible, by reason of the inadequate numbers available, to experiment in any way with the formation flying which was later to prove so successful. Nor, in the absence of fighters having the requisite range, was it possible to experiment with long-range fighter escorts. These were potentialities of the future - a fact which must be borne in mind before any judgment is formed on the soundness of the British views.

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- (1) A.M. File C.S. 9119, Encl. 67A: Ltr., C.S. 9119/D.B. Ops., D.B. Ops. to Hq., Bomber Command: 24 December 1941.
 - (2) A.M. File C.S. 9119, Encl. 30A: Report, A.A.E.E./A.T.O./M.11, by Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment: 14 August 1941.
 - (3) A.M. File C.S. 9119, Min. 65: Min., D.B. Ops. to D.C.A.S.: 16 December 1941, Min. 66: Min., D.C.A.S. to D.B. Ops.: 22 December 1941, and Encl. 78A: Report on "Experience with Fortress Aircraft": 6 January 1942.



PLANS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE U.S. A. A. F.
FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

February and March, 1942

318. After the Washington conversations in January 1942, the United States Staffs paused for reflection. They took stock of the vast problems confronting them. By the middle of February some tentative plans had begun to emerge. So far as the mission of the United States forces in Europe was concerned, inevitably all such plans hinged on the conception that Britain would be the springboard from which attacks on the Axis could be launched, and on which, therefore, United States forces would initially be based. The broad outlines of the plans were debated on an inter-allied basis; at the highest level in the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, at a lower level between the United States and British Staffs.

319. On the purely domestic side, one of the major results of the deliberations was that the United States authorities resolved drastically to re-organise the War Department. They decided to establish the Army Air Forces, the Army Ground Forces and the Services of Supply on a co-ordinate footing, each with a Commanding General at the head.⁽¹⁾ In the Army Air Forces, the positions of the Chief of the Air Corps and of the Commanding General Air Force Combat Command were discontinued and their functions, duties and powers were assigned to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces. This re-organisation was put into effect on 9 March 1942. It is mentioned in this narrative only to make the point, with particular reference to one of Professor Hopper's questions, that British officers in Washington always avoided offering any opinions or stating any views on domestic matters affecting only the United States forces. Certainly no documentary evidence has been found to indicate that the British Staff in any way influenced what took place on this occasion.

320. A desire to get to grips with the problems arising out of active participation in the war also characterised the work of the United States Operational Planning Staffs. The Air Staff were engaged on plans which, if translated into action, would represent fully the mission assigned to them. The air forces available, however, on which these plans could be based, were limited: on paper an expansion to twenty heavy bomber groups by the end of 1942 was visualised; of these, however, probably no more than twelve would be ready to proceed overseas. The Air Staff were, consequently, striving to ascertain where this limited force could be employed most effectively to relieve the pressure on Russia in the autumn of 1942. If no reasonable case could be made out that their employment from bases in Britain would produce such an effect, then it seemed likely that there would be a strong body of United States opinion in favour of diverting them to the South-west Pacific.⁽²⁾ This possibility had been very real at the end of January, and General Arnold had asked urgently for the support of the Chief of the Air Staff to help him in his struggle to resist the threatened diversion.⁽³⁾ The requested support was readily forthcoming. The Chief of the Air Staff confirmed on the following day that in the British view the bombing of Germany was the key-note of combined strategy.⁽⁴⁾

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- (1) A.C.A.S. (Ops) Folder No. J.2: Ltr., AG 320.3-G, Gen. Chaney to C.O.S.: 11 March 1942.
 - (2) A.H.B. Collections, A.3a: Tel., Caesar 255, Strafford to Dickson: 25 February 1942.
 - (3) V.C.A.S. Folder No. 407: Tel., Caesar 415: Harris to C.A.S.: 29 January 1942.
 - (4) V.C.A.S. Folder No. 407: Tel., Webber W.403, C.A.S. to Harris: 30 January 1942.

321. The United States Air Staff was firmly wedded to the conception that the role of their air forces would be precision bombing by day. The whole structure of their plans for the contribution of the United States Air Forces to the war in Europe was built upon this foundation.

322. The essentials of the United States plans were conveyed to Air Ministry by the British Air Staff in Washington on 19 February 1942, as follows:(1)

(a) The United States Army and Air Staffs were very firmly convinced of the inadequacy of night bombing and consequently of the need to intensify the day bombing effort.

(b) They accordingly intended to employ the heavy bombers which they proposed to send to Europe as much as possible on daylight operations.

(c) They hoped that with improved armament, training and tactical handling, the heavy bomber could eventually be operated without fighter escort; but they felt that initially two United States fighter groups, equipped with Thunderbolt (P-47) aircraft, would be necessary to develop the technique.

(d) The two fighter groups would operate as elements of the United States striking force.

323. In the same telegram the British Representatives in Washington informed Air Ministry that they had already drawn the attention of the United States Staffs to some of the implications of this new conception. They had pointed out that there would, for instance, be inevitable difficulties in a congested area such as Britain with accommodation, airfield facilities, and operational control.

324. In Air Ministry, opinions on the possibilities of daylight bombing by the United States Army Air Forces, even if carried out with fighter escort, were not unaffected by the results of operations with the Flying Fortress in daylight during the summer of 1941, and by their experiences more recently in attempting the bombing by daylight of the two German battleships, the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst at Brest. It is not surprising therefore that their reactions to the United States plans were:(2)

(a) that the heavy losses over Brest did not encourage the policy of intensifying daylight bombing for the time being, especially when it was taken into account that the penetrations had only been shallow and that there had been available considerable fighter cover:(3)

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- (1) A.C.A.S. (Ops) Folder No. J.3.B.: Telegram Caesar 82, RAFDEL to Air Ministry: 19 February 1942.
 (2) C.A.S. Folder No. 876 (Part I): Tel., Webber W708, Air Ministry to RAFDEL: 22 February 1942.
 (3) The following is a summary of the operations conducted by daylight against Brest during December 1941 and January 1942:

<u>Date</u>	<u>A/c Attacking</u>	<u>A/c Lost</u>	<u>A/c Damaged</u>
18 Dec.	18 Stirlings	5	2
	18 Halifaxes	1	-
	11 Manchesters	2	1
30 Dec.	16 Halifaxes	3	2
12 Jan.)			
13 Jan.)		No effective sorties	
24 Jan.	5 Hampdens	-	-

The battleships escaped from Brest on 12 February 1942.

(b) the radius of action of the Thunderbolt(P-47) aircraft was insufficient to permit its use as an escort over Germany, where lay the targets of greatest importance; and

(c) great difficulties would be encountered in providing the necessary accommodation for the United States pursuit groups in addition to the bomber force since they would have to be located either in an area already congested with essential British fighter forces, or in an area where a major building project would be necessary.

At the same time, in spite of the above misgivings, the British Air Staff pointed out in their reply to their colleagues in Washington that they shared fully the desire of United States Air Staff to undertake day bombing at the earliest opportunity. They felt, however, that much was dependent upon the provision of large numbers of adequately armed and well-trained squadrons, together with ample reserves.

325. An authoritative expression of British views on the employment of the combined air resources of the United States and Britain was given by the senior British Air Representative in Washington (Air Marshal Evill) on 5 March 1942.⁽¹⁾ He was commenting on the following proposals regarding air dispositions just expounded by General Arnold:

After provision had been made for

- (i) the air defence of Australia,
- (ii) the support of operations by the United States Navy in the South-west Pacific, and
- (iii) a bombing offensive from India, and ultimately China,

the remaining combined United States and British striking force should be concentrated in Britain to operate against objectives in Germany and in the occupied territory of North-west Europe.

The British Representative said that in general terms these proposals coincided with the policy of the British Air Staff. The British would certainly welcome United States Bomber Forces in Britain. Two special factors, however, could not be ignored:

(a) British experience during 1941 had led to the conclusion that fighter-escorted raids could not reach targets sufficiently vital to Germany, and that the main bomber offensive into Germany must be by night.

(b) Inasmuch as the effect of a consistent night offensive was great but slow-acting, it could not be relied upon to prevent Germany from concentrating temporarily superior forces in South Russia and in the Middle East. A spring offensive was expected in this area; it was essential therefore that overall plans should include provisions for strengthening the air forces in the Middle East.

326. During March, General Arnold was still faced by the dilemma which had become all too familiar. He was receiving requests from all quarters which, if honoured, would have meant the dispersal of the United States Army Air Force all over the world. Consequently on 27 March he again sought the help of the Chief of the Air Staff to enable him to resist this heavy pressure.

(1) A.H.B. Collections, A.3a: Tel., J.S.M.104, J.S.M. to C.O.S.: 5 March 1942.

327. The Chief of the Air Staff was in full sympathy with General Arnold's views; he firmly believed in the need for the heaviest possible scale of bombing against Germany during the summer of 1942, and therefore the need to resist diversions of the United States air effort to other theatres.

328. By the end of March 1942, the United States and British views on the possibilities of bombing Germany by day had been reconciled. General Arnold had made it clear that he did not propose to attempt daylight bombing of Germany until after the German fighter force had been defeated; and on this understanding, the Chief of the Air Staff was in "complete agreement".(1)

329. By that time, too, the thoughts of the United States Staffs, regarding their overall contribution to the United Nations effort in Europe, had crystallised to such an extent, that, a few days later, Mr. Harry Hopkins and General Marshall left for London carrying with them, for the consideration of the British War Cabinet, the 'Marshall Plan'.

(1) A.C.A.S.(Ops) Folder No. J.3.A: Min., C.A.S. to Prime Minister: 27 March 1942.

THE 'MARSHALL PLAN'

United States Proposals for an Offensive in Western Europe
April 1942

330. Details of the proposals made in the plan brought to London by Mr. Harry Hopkins and General Marshall will, of course, be available to United States historians; there is no need, therefore, to recount them in this narrative. The salient features must be briefly outlined, however, in order that their implications may be appreciated.⁽¹⁾

331. The United States Staffs considered that the primary strategic objective of the United Nations should be the defeat of Germany, and that the best means of attaining this objective would be by staging the main Anglo-American offensive on the Western Front. This way lay the shortest route to the heart of Germany; it was the easiest area in which to achieve air superiority and in which to concentrate a large United States force; finally, it was the easiest front on which to maintain an active sector during the summer of 1942, and thus to relieve pressure on Russia. It was estimated that the very large combined forces, both air and ground, necessary to attain the objective, (these forces were assessed at 5,800 combat aircraft and 48 divisions) could be assembled in the United Kingdom by the spring of 1943. The 'Marshall Plan' envisaged the offensive unfolding in the following stages:

1. A preparatory stage during which
 - (i) priorities would be co-ordinated, material allocated and troops moved;
 - (ii) an active front would be established in 1942 by raids with United States - British land and air forces for purposes of training, deception, demonstration and destruction; and
 - (iii) plans and preparations would be made for the launching, if conditions were favourable, of a possible emergency operation during 1942, utilising such combined forces as might then be available.
2. A cross-channel assault to establish bridge-heads between Le Havre and Boulogne.
3. The consolidation of the bridgeheads.
4. The expansion out of the bridgeheads.

General Marshall and Mr. Hopkins presented the United States Plan to the British Chiefs of Staff on 9 April 1942. Between then and 14 April it was the subject of urgent discussion by the United States and British Staffs.⁽²⁾

332. The British authorities expressed themselves in general agreement with the framework of the plan - subject to the understanding that it was essential to safeguard India, the Middle East and positions in the South-west Pacific including Australia; that

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- (1) D. of Plans Folder No. 115(Part I): J.P.(42)383(S): 9 April 1942; also Tel., C.O.S.(D) 1: 13 May 1942.
 - (2) C.O.S.(42) 111(O): 25 April 1942. (This document contains the U.S.P. Series of papers, recording discussions between the United States and British Staffs 11 to 14 April 1942 in ad hoc committee under the chairmanship of Colonel Oliver Stanley.)

Japan must be held in the Indian Ocean; and that the evolution of operations in Western Europe in 1942 must be governed largely by the course of events on the Eastern Front.(1)

333. It was mutually agreed that all necessary preparations to implement the plan should be put in train. The preparations would involve:

(a) Conversion of the United Kingdom into an advanced base for operations, which would mean the construction of airfields, troop accommodation, etc., and the development of facilities such as harbours, railways, etc.

(b) Raiding operations during 1942 on the largest practicable scale from Northern Norway to the Bay of Biscay.

(c) The continuation and intensification of an active air offensive with the object of inflicting the greatest possible wastage on the German Air Force.

(d) The planning of an emergency operation in 1942 with the purpose of capturing a bridgehead on the Continent.

(e) The planning of large scale operations in the spring of 1943 to destroy the German forces in Western Europe.

(1) D. of Plans Folder No. 115 Part I: Tel., C.O.S.(D) 1:
13 May 1942.

A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY

April - May 1942

1. The Significance of the 'Marshall Plan':
Initial Moves in London and Washington

334. General Chaney had been forewarned of the trend of thought in Washington before Mr. Hopkins and General Marshall reached London, and he had given some consideration to the effect that this new trend might have on the plans being made for the reception of the United States air forces in the United Kingdom. On 7 April 1942, he had written to the Chief of the Air Staff on the subject, making the following points:(1)

(a) Information reaching him from War Department indicated that the employment of large U.S. Army forces - both ground and air - in major offensive operations in Europe was being contemplated. In one plan, the despatch of sixteen heavy bomber groups was visualised; two of which would be sent during the summer.

(b) According to the terms of ABC-1, it had been understood that the main United States effort would be in the form of a large bomber command. During the subsequent Staff Conversations, it had been agreed that the nucleus of this force would be established in the Huntingdon area, whence, it was visualised, it would expand in all directions.

(c) The nature of the information so far received did not warrant the initiation of detailed planning. Preliminary consideration might, nevertheless, be given to the general problem of accommodating an expanding quantity of United States air units, and particularly to the problem of providing the requisite supply and repair facilities, since new airfields might have to be constructed and additional repair and supply depots built - all of which were long-term projects.

(d) Two considerations however were, he felt, more urgent: arrangements to meet the requirements for repair facilities prior to the completion of the United States depots then under construction by making available "an existing British facility"; and the initiation of projects which, when complete, would meet the eventual need.

335. By the time that the letter arrived, efforts were already being made by Air Ministry, through prior knowledge of its contents, to correlate the British viewpoint on the subjects raised; more particularly on how to accommodate those United States bomber forces which would be in excess of the units planned to go into the Huntingdon area (No. 8 Group of R.A.F. Bomber Command).

336. To effect this correlation a conference was held on 7 April 1942.(2) General Eaker represented the U.S. Bomber Command, and delegates from the staff of the Air Member for Supply and Organisation and from Headquarters, R.A.F. Bomber Command, attended. After it had been explained that

(1) A.C.A.S.(Ops) Folder No. J.3.A: Ltr., A.G. - 370, Gen. Chaney to C.A.S.: 7 April 1942.

(2) A.D.O.(U.S.) Folder No. VIII (1942 Papers): Min. L.M.202/DDOP, D.D.O.P. to D/A.M.S.O.: 7 April 1942.

General Chaney's idea for the expansion of the United States bomber forces was that they would spread radially from the Huntingdon area, the following views were expressed:

(a) The Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F. Bomber Command, (Air Marshal Harris), protested strongly against General Chaney's conception. He pointed out that in practice it would result in a division of R.A.F. Bomber Command into two distinct geographical areas, which would not be conducive to the highest efficiency. He suggested that instead the United States bomber units should move on arrival into Yorkshire (No. 4 Group) and then, as necessary, expand southwards into East Anglia (No. 5 and No. 1 Groups).

(b) General Eaker fully appreciated the point of this argument, but at the same time he expressed considerable doubt as to whether General Chaney would agree to the alternative proposals made by the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, since he knew that General Chaney held very definite views on this subject.

337. With such widely separated view points, it is not surprising that the subject remained an open question for the next month. Finally, on 8 May, a combined conference was called at which not only this problem, but also that of the arrangements for the accommodation of the whole of the U.S. Army Forces in Britain, came up for discussion. The proceedings at this conference are summarised in paragraph 347 below.

338. When General Chaney's letter of 7 April was received in Air Ministry, it was referred to the Air Member for Supply and Organisation.(1) His broad comment was that General Chaney appeared to have overlooked the considerable measure of progress in administrative planning already made by the members of the staff of Hq., U.S.A.F.B.I., and J.O.M.(U.S.). In particular he pointed out that:-

(a) Arrangements for the supply of spares, etc., for the expected United States aircraft and engines were dealt with in Section XII of S.D.348.

(b) The subject of British aircraft repair facilities being made available to the U.S. Army Air Forces was covered by the terms of Section XXIV of S.D.348.

He also added that investigations had been initiated regarding the provisions necessary to meet eventual needs in regard to repair facilities, but it was difficult to make much real progress until more definite information became available as to the size of the force to be accommodated.

339. This plaint - the lack of reliable information as to the probable size of the U.S. Army Air Forces to be based in Britain - was a recurring theme during the two months now under review; not without some justification, especially in so far as it related to long-term plans.(2) The main difficulty seems to have been that no master plan embracing world-wide aircraft

(1) A.C.A.S.(Ops) Folder No. J.3.A: Min., A.M.S.O. to C.A.S.: 14 April 1942.

(2) A summary of ten different forecasts, received between 3 January 1942 and 27 April 1942, of the U.S. air forces that would be in the U.K. at different dates is given in A.C.A.S.(P) Folder No. 40, Part 3: Min., Plans 4 to A.C.A.S.(P): 28 April 1942.

allocations as between respective theatres had been mutually agreed upon. There were thus no available terms of reference.

340. It was a difficulty which, however, had been appreciated already at a high level; and on 7 April 1942, General Arnold, Rear-Admiral Towers, United States Navy, and the representative in Washington of the Chief of the British Air Staff (Air Marshal Evill) had been asked to concert together to present a complete picture of all the United States and British air resources - their review to include operating strengths, reserves of all types, production, proposed expansion and the existing and future distribution by theatres. Upon the basis of this review the necessary master plan could be devised and could be fitted into the overall general appreciation of United Nations strategic policy which was then in course of preparation.(1)

341. A few days later, on 12 April 1942, the Arnold/Evill/Towers Committee, as it came to be called, was invited to visit London for personal consultation with the Chief of the Air Staff.(2) Exchanges of views on United States - British air problems in the United Kingdom during the latter part of April and the early part of May were, in consequence, undertaken with the thought constantly in mind that such exchanges were in the nature of preparations for the full discussion which, it was hoped, would take place during the visit of General Arnold, Rear Admiral Towers and Air Marshal Evill.

342. Some idea of the general line that the United States representatives were likely to take during these discussions was, however, obtainable from a letter sent by General Arnold to the Chief of the Air Staff on 16 April 1942. In this letter General Arnold set forth his views of how the current trends in strategic thought might be translated into a concerted Air Plan for the war in Europe - in other words, they were his views on what should be the air contribution to the Marshall Plan. General Arnold's letter was thus an important document. A summary of its main points follows:-

(a) Continued efforts to meet Axis threats by dispersal of forces throughout the world could result only in a purely defensive policy and one which could never have any decisive effect and might even be disastrous.

(b) There were six considerations associated with this problem which were virtually axiomatic:

(i) Air supremacy must be attained over the German Air Force.

(ii) Air supremacy over the German Air Force could be attained only by forcing them to fight under conditions which would mean that their rate of attrition would exceed their replacement capabilities.

(iii) The combined air strength of Britain, Russia and the United States if their Air Forces were concentrated in the European theatre would be superior to that of Germany, and would thus force Germany to reduce her forces elsewhere.

(1) A.C.A.S.(P) Folder No. 40, Part 2: Tel., Marcus 877, RAFDEL to Air Ministry: 9 April 1942.

(2) A.C.A.S.(P) Folder No. 40, Part 2: Tel., Webber W. 377, C.A.S. to Evill: 12 April 1942.

- (iv) An air offensive in the West would force the Germans to maintain a major part of their Air Force there and thus would relieve pressure on Russia.
 - (v) Shortage of shipping resources was rendering transportation to distant areas increasingly difficult.
 - (vi) Any air offensive presupposed a thoroughly organised air base.
- (c) In view of the above considerations, the plan of action most likely to lead to success would be that the greatest possible mass of Air Forces should be concentrated in England with a view to initiating an all-out air offensive across the Channel and into Germany. Daylight offensive operations must be resumed, since night bombardment alone could not be counted upon to wear down German air power. In the first stages this daylight offensive should be conducted in such a way as to keep to a minimum losses through enemy fighter action and anti-aircraft fire. It would thus mean (1) that a large fighter force would have to operate with the bombers, and (2) that in consequence the area of operations would be limited, initially at least, to the radius of action of this fighter force. Within the radius, however, there were sufficient targets of vital importance to the enemy to cause a major diversion of German air power. Later, it was possible that the development of a greater defensive firepower in the bombers, and of improved technique in formation flying providing mutual supporting fire, would enable the bombers to penetrate in daylight beyond the radius of action of the escorting fighters.
- (d) Night bombardment should not, however, be abandoned. It should indeed be maintained to the fullest extent possible as a complement to the daylight offensive.

That, briefly, was General Arnold's plan. He realised the restrictions which might be placed upon its fulfilment by weather and other considerations - especially by the probability that the U.S. Army Air Forces would not have sufficient aircraft available in Britain to take their full share in the plan before the autumn of 1942. But he looked forward to the time when, if the plan could be carried out, there would be a very considerable attrition of the German Air Force, and a very definite contribution made to the efforts to establish Allied Ground Forces once again on the mainland of Europe. In any event, it was his firm conviction that a definite and large-scale plan of action in Europe on the lines he suggested was sounder strategy than small-scale and piecemeal activity scattered throughout the world.

343. In General Arnold's letter, the British Air Staff thus had a clear indication as to the general pattern of the plan of operations which General Arnold and Rear Admiral Towers might be expected to advance when they visited London, and from it they could form reasonable estimates of what the implications were likely to be. It was with this strategic conception of the United States Staffs as a background that planning went on during the weeks before the visit of the Arnold/Evill/Towers Committee. The preparatory work fell into two broad categories: (a) short-term planning for the reception of the earlier units of the U.S. Army Air Forces scheduled to arrive in Britain: (b) long-term planning with the requirements of the "Marshall Plan" in view.

2. Short-term Plans: the Location and Function of United States Air Units

344. Some information regarding the United States plans for the immediate future became available through the Chief of Staff, Hq. U.S.A.F.B.I., (1) on 2 May 1942. It was intended to send to Britain, about the middle of May, the following aircraft:

- 1 Pursuit Group: 80 Lightnings (P-38)
- 1 " " : 80 Airacobras (P-39)
- 1 Heavy Bomber Group: 35 Flying Fortresses (B-17E)
- 1 Transport Group
- 1 Mobile Repair Group
- 1 Photographic Squadron

together with essential service elements. But there were complications in other directions. Plans for the reception of the earlier units to arrive had been made on the assumption that the agreements reached at the Washington War Conference were still to be taken as the guiding principles: that the United States heavy bombers would operate from the Huntingdon area and the pursuit units would afford protection to the United States forces and bases in North Ireland and North-West Scotland. General Arnold's letter to the Chief of the Air Staff had indicated, however, that this conception was liable to modification, and during the early days of May it became increasingly clear that this was so. It became clear that the first two Pursuit Groups to arrive were intended by the United States authorities to be used, not for the defence of Northern Ireland, but rather as escorts for their heavy bombers in active operations over North-West Europe.

345. The new conception raised several problems: in particular it would mean the re-orientation of many of the existing plans for the accommodation of the United States air units. The views of the British Air Staff on the subject as a whole were co-ordinated at a meeting on 5 May 1942, presided over by the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy) (Air Vice-Marshal Slessor) (2). On the aspect which seemed to have the greatest significance for future arrangements - the organisation and employment of the United States Pursuit Groups - the Director of Fighter Operations (Air Commodore Whitworth-Jones) was instructed to prepare a special paper setting forth the agreed British viewpoint.

346. This paper was forwarded to General Chaney on 7 May for the information of his staff prior to their attending a combined conference arranged for the following day. (3) It was realised that there were points of difference between the United States and British views, but it was hoped that during the conference it would at least be possible to arrive at a firm agreement as to where the Pursuit Groups should be located on arrival. Extracts from the paper by the Director of Fighter Operations, inasmuch as they give the British views on the problems of bomber escort based on the experience of the previous eighteen months, are given as an Annex to this Section (para. 360).

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- (1) A.C.A.S.(Ops.) Folder No. J.3.A: Ltr., AG-320. 3-0, C/S, Hq., U.S.A.F.B.I. to C.A.S.: 2 May 1942.
 - (2) S.6 Folder No. 240A: Mins. of Mtg. in Air Ministry to discuss arrangements for reception of U.S. Air Forces in the U.K.: 5 May 1942. Present at the meeting were: A.C.A.S.(P) in the chair, A.M.S.O., A.C.A.S.(Ops), D.G.O., D.W.O., D.F.Ops., D.D.B.Ops, D.D. of S., D.D.O.P., D.D.P.D., S.O. to C.A.S., S.A.S.O. F. Cmd., G.C.Org. B. Cmd.

347. At the combined conference on 8 May the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy) presided.(1) With him were four other Air Staff Officers, while General Chaney brought his Chief of Staff, his G-3, and one of his Air Officers. The following summary presents the main points of the discussion:

(a) Pursuit Units

The Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy) put to the meeting the Air Ministry view:

- (i) Of the first three Pursuit Groups to arrive, one should be located in the No. 12 Group of the R.A.F. Fighter Command (roughly the counties of Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, Cambridgeshire and Norfolk, together with a part of the Eastern Midland Counties), and the other two in Northern Ireland.
- (ii) When operationally fit, the units could be moved to sectors in the South which could be taken over by the U.S. Army Air Forces. From these sectors the fighters could be used to escort the United States heavy bombers and also to take part in offensive operations against the Continent.
- (iii) Northern Ireland could be retained as a base area where units could work up to operational fitness, and where also they could recuperate.
- (iv) Eventually, an entire R.A.F. Fighter Command Group in the South could be taken over by the U.S. Army Air Forces.

General Chaney, after confirming that the conception of the United States Pursuit Units defending Northern Ireland and South-west Scotland belonged to an earlier plan, stated that his most recent instructions, just received from Washington, were that:

- (i) The United States fighters would now be used only for bomber escort and for co-operation in offensive operations against the Continent in the summer and autumn of 1942.
- (ii) They would not be used in any way to form part of the air defence of Great Britain.

Therefore he suggested that:

- (i) They should be located on six fighter airfields in the Huntingdon area.
- (ii) They should be allowed to operate independently of the system of communications and control practised by R.A.F. Fighter Command.

(1) A.C.A.S.(Ops) Folder No. J.3A: Mins. of Mtg. in Air Ministry to discuss arrangements for accommodation of U.S.A.A.F. in U.K.: 8 May 1942. Present at the Mtg. were: A.C.A.S.(P) in the chair, A.C.A.S.(Ops), D.G.O., D.F.Ops., D.D.O.P.: Gen. Chaney, Gen. Bolte, Gen. McClelland and Col. Snively.

The Air Ministry Staff officers then explained that:

- (i) Airfields in the Huntingdon area with facilities for fighters all formed part of the defence system of R.A.F. Fighter Command and thus could not be transferred to the United States units until the latter were fit to play a full part in operations.
- (ii) Offensive, as well as defensive, operations undertaken by the R.A.F. were based on the system of sector control and communications, so that it would not be possible, in practice, for the United States fighter forces engaged on bomber escort to operate outside the sector system.
- (iii) The only solution, therefore, would be that the U.S. Army Air Forces should take over sectors, complete with control and communications within the system of R.A.F. Fighter Command, and should accept the responsibility for defensive as well as offensive operations.
- (iv) United States staff for sector control should be provided for this purpose.

Finally, it was suggested to General Chaney that he might consider all these points further. If he found himself unable to agree to the Air Ministry proposals, he might offer some alternative solution.

(b) Heavy Bomber Units

The Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy) outlined the plan for the location of the United States heavy bomber units as proposed by Air Ministry and as strongly supported by the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F. Bomber Command. The units would be accommodated in the first instance in the Huntingdon area (No. 8 Group, R.A.F. Bomber Command), and would expand from there into East Anglia (the new "B" and "D" Groups and No. 2 Group), at which time the R.A.F. units in East Anglia would take the place of the United States units in the Huntingdon area. If necessary the United States units could also extend into Cambridgeshire (No. 3 Group). The advantages of the scheme were that R.A.F. Bomber Command would not be divided into two distinct parts, and that the United States bomber units would all be located in a unified area in East Anglia, an area into which, moreover, the United States fighter forces also could move as soon as they were operationally trained.

General Chaney was unable, however, to accept any departure from the original plans. He felt that the advantages of retaining these plans after so much effort had been expended upon preparations in No. 8 Group were greater than any operational advantages which may possibly accrue from the change.

It was accordingly agreed that the arrangements for the reception of the first United States heavy bomber units in the Huntingdon area should stand. The plans for expansion, however, would require further consideration.

348. General Chaney wrote to the Chief of the Air Staff on 12 May to say that he found the Air Ministry suggestions, regarding the

location of the United States Pursuit Groups, unacceptable, and that he therefore proposed the following alternative:(1)

- (a) The first two groups to arrive should be placed on three airfields, but not on more than one airfield in each sector of R.A.F. Fighter Command.
- (b) The three airfields selected should be as near to the Huntingdon area as possible.
- (c) The movement of United States Pursuit Units to Britain should be limited, for the time being, to the first two of the seven groups then envisaged.

349. In his reply, on 14 May, the Chief of the Air Staff presented a considered and authoritative exposition of the Air Staff views on how the United States pursuit units should be employed and on where they should be located.(2) The points he made were:

(a) Comments

- (i) General Chaney's new proposals were only of a provisional nature and did not offer a basis for a long-term plan. They would mean that the United States fighter units would be widely separated and would come under the control of British sector commanders, which would be unsatisfactory. Training and accommodation would also be difficult. General Chaney's alternative proposals would mean, too, that, through the deliberate restriction of the flow of pursuit units to Britain, the timely arrival of the aircraft envisaged in the 'Marshall Plan' would become a matter of doubt, and their opportunity to gain the necessary operational experience would be considerably reduced.
- (ii) The plan for locating the United States Pursuit Groups in Northern Ireland, which had originated during the Staff Conversations in Washington early in 1941, had been confirmed during the Washington War Conference in January 1942, and had subsequently received the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The agreements had been worked out in detail and all arrangements had been made for the reception and accommodation of the United States Pursuit Groups in Northern Ireland.
- (iii) The British Air Staff was anxious that the primary task of the United States pursuit squadrons should be offensive and that they should escort the United States heavy bombers and should co-operate in combined operations against the Continent; the R.A.F. would gladly co-operate during the early stages in escorting the United States bombers since there would be insufficient United States fighters in Britain suitable for this purpose for some time.
- (iv) Any units in a sector of R.A.F. Fighter Command were responsible not only for offensive sweeps and bomber escort but also for convoy escort and defence of the sector; and as they were dependent during all types of operations on the same system of control,

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- (1) A.C.A.S. (Ops.) Folder No. J.3.A: Ltr., AG-323.6-G, Gen. Chaney to C.A.S.: 12 May 1942.
 - (2) A.C.A.S. (Ops.) Folder No. J.3.A: Ltr., C.A.S. to Gen. Chaney: 14 May 1942.

communications, warning, etc., it would not be practicable to have United States fighters on bomber escort operating outside this closely enmeshed system.

(v) The British Isles were becoming a vast Anglo-American base, and it was felt that the U.S. Army Air Forces might take their proportionate share in the defence of that base, including the defence of United States ships bringing in United States troops and equipment and of United States base ports. In any event quiet sectors for recuperation would be found essential for the efficient operation of the United States pursuit squadrons.

(vi) The concentrations in the South of England which would result from the preparations for the offensive against the Continent were likely to lead to heavy air fighting there; it was felt that the United States pursuit squadron would wish to participate in that fighting.

(b) Proposals

(i) United States pursuit units on arrival should be located in Northern Ireland for acclimatisation and operational training. If more accommodation were required temporarily two airfields in North Lincolnshire (Caistor and Goxhill) would be available.

(ii) During this period of acclimatisation and training, facilities for operating with the United States bombers would be provided in the Huntingdon area.

(iii) After the first United States Pursuit Group had had a short spell of actual operations in Northern Ireland a suitable sector in No. 12 Group of R.A.F. Fighter Command would be handed over to the Group so that their offensive employment could be entirely as bomber escorts, subject to their accepting the defensive responsibility in that sector.

(iv) The ultimate aim would be to hand over to the U.S. Army Air Forces the whole of No. 12 Group of R.A.F. Fighter Command so that they would be covering their own bomber area. This would be their active battle sector, while the Northern Ireland and Ayr areas would be their sectors for operational training and recuperation.

(v) For co-operation in offensive combined operations across the Channel, for which the airfields in No. 12 Group would not be suitable, special ad hoc arrangements would be made as for the R.A.F.

The Chief of the Air Staff ended his letter with the suggestion that General Chaney should pay a visit to the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F. Fighter Command, who would be pleased to discuss in more detail the proposals outlined above.

350. General Chaney acted on this suggestion. After his visit he wrote, on 27 May, to the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief reaffirming his intention to put the first two U.S. Pursuit Groups on three fighter airfields - no two in the same sector and all somewhere near the Huntingdon area - in order to learn the system of operational control in use by R.A.F. Fighter Command. He had, he said, been impressed with the need for a system of control for fighters in defensive as well as offensive action. However he

felt that, while home defence must be maintained at all times on a scale commensurate with the current situation, in the final operations it would be necessary to pass from home defence control to mobile control, and it might therefore be advisable to build up and to train for such mobile control as soon as possible.

351. On the eve of General Arnold's visit to Britain there was thus no true reconciliation of views on the location and employment of the United States Pursuit Groups, or on the location of the Heavy Bomber Groups; such reconciliation awaited his personal authority and decision.

3. United States Air Support Command

352. This is a convenient point at which to interpose a summarised account of the negotiations which had taken place during the first five months of 1942 with regard to the formation of a United States Air Support Command in the United Kingdom:

(a) At the Washington War Conference in January 1942 agreement was reached that until such time as the U.S. Army Air Corps could provide the reconnaissance and support aircraft necessary for U.S. Army training and operations, the required aircraft would be provided by the British.(1) In accordance with this agreement, Air Ministry offered the only Army Co-operation squadron then available in Northern Ireland; but at the same time asked General Chaney to try to get more aircraft for this specific purpose from the United States.

(b) By the end of February 1942 positive plans for the formation of a United States Air Support Command were afoot. A combined conference was held in Air Ministry on 28 February to discuss its accommodation in Northern Ireland.(2)

The composition of the force, as proposed, was

1 Medium Bomber Group	69 a/c
1 Light Bomber Group	69 "
4 Observation Squadrons	56 "
2 Pursuit Groups	160 "
4 Transport Squadrons	<u>48 "</u>
	<u>402 "</u>

The above units, it should be noted, would be in excess of the two Pursuit Groups earmarked for the static defence of Northern Ireland.

It was decided that thirteen specific airfields, some still under construction, should be allocated to the Air Support Command. The Deputy Director of Organisation, Air Ministry, undertook to estimate what additional accommodation would be necessary at each of the selected airfields, and undertook also to issue the necessary instructions for the completion of the airfields up to the required establishment.

(1) See para. 287 above.

(2) D.B.Ops. Folder 'U.S.A.A.C. in U.K.': Mins. of Conference at Air Ministry: 28 February 1942. Present at the Conference were: D.D.O.P. in the chair, D.D.O.1, G/C Airey (R.A.F. Delegation, Washington), O.1(a); Col. McClelland, Lt. Col. Snavelly, Lt. Col. Orton, Lt. Col. Schroder.

It was agreed that the Headquarters of the Command should be located at Wilmont.

(c) On 15 April 1942, the Deputy Director of Organisation, Air Ministry, circulated for the use of the Air Staff some information about the proposed United States Air Support Command. This information was, in effect, the substance of the agreements reached at the conference on 28 February. There had been slight modifications of the proposals in the interval, but only of minor details.(1)

No further developments seem to have taken place up to the time of General Arnold's visit. It seems likely, however, that the Air Staff had by then appreciated that the January proposals had been somewhat overtaken by the march of time, and would have to be recast in view of the 'Marshall Plan'.

4. Long-term Plans

353. During the meetings of the U.S. and British Staff Officers at the time of General Marshall's visit, it was resolved that an appreciation of the resources needed by April 1943, in order to carry out the strategical plans which had just been agreed upon, would be of great assistance, to the production authorities both in the United States and Britain. Such a statement which, it was thought, might be prepared by collating estimates submitted independently by staffs in London and Washington would provide both a guide and a target. It was essential, of course, that both staffs should work on the same strategical hypothesis when making their calculations. The British Joint Planning Staff therefore suggested the following as fundamental principles:

- (a) Germany should be defeated whilst holding Japan.
- (b) The world should be divided into three main areas of responsibility.
- (c) The British would accept the United States plan for operations on the Continent of Europe in 1943.(2)

354. In Washington on 29 April 1942, the Special Air Force Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff - which consisted of representatives of the U.S. Army Air Forces (Colonel H. S. Vandenberg), the U.S. Navy (Lieutenant-Commander G. W. Anderson), the Royal Navy (Commander E. R. S. Jackson), and the Royal Air Force (Group Captain H. P. Fraser) - submitted the "Vandenberg Report".(3) This report gave the details of the composition of the air forces of the United Nations and of their expected expansion, also the expected overall production.

355. In London, the Joint Planning Staff produced their estimate by 8 May.(4) That part relating to the air forces was arrived at by reducing General Marshall's figures of what he would send to conform with what was considered practicable, taking into account the limitations imposed by shipping, accommodation and maintenance in face of probable heavy wastage.

356. Then, on 7 May 1942, General Arnold introduced at a meeting of the Arnold/Evill/Towers Committee a far-reaching series of

(1) A.C.A.S.(Ops) Folder No. J.3.A: Loose min., L.M.130/D.D.O.1.: 15 April 1942.
(2) J.P.(42) 420: 19 April 1942; also Tel., C.O.S.(W) 160, C.O.S. to J.S.M.: 23 April 1942.
(3) S.6 Folder No. 240A: Paper AT/42/1: 29 April 1942.
(4) J.P.(42) 488: 8 May 1942.

proposals.(1) They proved to be proposals which, by involving a drastic revision of the existing basis of allocation of United States-produced aircraft as between the U.S. Army Air Forces and the R.A.F., implied the rejection of the Arnold/Portal agreement of January 1942. Their underlying principle was that, wherever possible, United States aircraft should in future be manned by United States personnel; in other words the United States air contribution to the common effort, instead of being mainly in the form of aircraft, would be in the form of complete air units. The result would be a considerably increased build-up of the U.S. Army Air Forces, and a proportionate scaling-down of the expansion of the R.A.F.

357. The proposals thus affected what had been up to that time a fundamental supposition in all the future plans of the R.A.F. An analysis was made of the probable effect on the R.A.F. between June and December 1942; it was as follows:(2)

	<u>Arnold/Portal Agreement</u>	<u>General Arnold's Proposed Allocation</u>	<u>Loss to R.A.F.</u>
Heavy Bombers	447	26	421
Medium Bombers	1,160	140	1,020
Light and Dive Bombers	2,237	621	1,616
Fighters	2,105	248	1,857
	<u>5,949</u>	<u>1,035</u>	<u>4,914</u>

358. Naturally the above analysis gave rise to some anxious thought. In view of General Arnold's expected visit to London, discussions took place in Air Ministry, and telegrams were exchanged with the British Air Staff in Washington. The significance of the proposals - their effect on the future expansion of the R.A.F., on the overall United Nations' effort in 1942 and on the air requirements of the 'Marshall Plan' - was closely studied. Out of all the exchanges of views there emerged gradually the attitude which the British Air Staff proposed to adopt toward this somewhat unexpected development. It was realised that upon the outcome of the talks with General Arnold much depended. During the conversations the pattern of all future allocations of United States-produced aircraft would take shape, and in this pattern would be discernable the framework for long-term planning.

5. Recapitulation

359. The situation was complex. In order to bring into closer focus the various plans and arrangements regarding the U.S. Army Forces which were currently in progress, and so provide the background to the conversations with General Arnold, the following summary is therefore given of the state of planning and preparation reached by the third week in May 1942.

General Policy

The eventual strength and composition of the U.S. Army Air Forces to be despatched to the United Kingdom was dependent upon the result of high-level negotiation then in train on the subject of the allocation of United States-produced aircraft. Until this allocation was finally decided, the dates of arrival of individual

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- (1) S.6 Folder No. 240A: Paper AT/42/8: 16 May 1942. (Contains a summary of proposals transmitted in telegram Marcus 38, RAFDEL to Air Ministry: 8 May 1942.)
- (2) S.6 Folder No. 240A: Paper AT/42/8: 16 May 1942.

formations and the policy to govern the deployment and function of these formations necessarily remained to some extent indeterminate.

Heavy Bomber Units

A U.S. Bomber Command Headquarters (known as 'Pinetree') had been opened on 15 April 1942 at High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, in close proximity to Headquarters, R.A.F. Bomber Command. It would be ready to assume control of the operational units on arrival.

On 23 April 1942, Brigadier General Ira Eaker had been appointed Chief, U.S. Army Bomber Command in Europe.(1)

On 2 May 1942, Major-General Carl Spaatz was named as Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force.(2) As, at that time, he was still in the United States, the detachment of the Eighth Air Force then in Britain, including all United States Bomber, Pursuit and Transport Units, was placed, by Hq., U.S.A.F.B.I. directive, under the temporary command of General Eaker.(3)

On 12 May 1942, the first contingent of the Eighth Air Force - 39 officers and 384 enlisted men - had arrived in the U.K.(4)

The first operational units had not yet arrived. When they did, they would be located in the Huntingdon area (No. 8 Group), where eight airfields had been made available. When expansion became necessary, they would take over the East Anglian area ("B" and "D" Groups and No. 2 Group), and, if required, the Cambridgeshire area (No. 3 Group). Ultimately, in the British view, the U.S. units should vacate the Huntingdon area (No. 8 Group) and take over the Norfolk area (No. 2 Group), to avoid dividing R.A.F. Bomber Command into two distinct regions. This proposition, however, was viewed with considerable disfavour by General Chaney.

Pursuit Units

The policy for the location and employment of the pursuit units was still in dispute. The original intention had been to locate them in Northern Ireland and South-west Scotland; the current United States policy was to concentrate all the pursuit units in the vicinity of the bomber units.

The allocation of the airfields necessary for this purpose was still under discussion. As a temporary measure it had been agreed that if the first two Pursuit Groups arrived before the issue was settled they would be located in the Huntingdon area.

Air Support Units

The original plan envisaged the location of a United States Air Support Command in Northern Ireland. Arrangements had been made in February 1942 for the accommodation of the necessary air units; the preparation of airfields and the provision of the required additional facilities was proceeding on a high priority.

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- (1) Official Guide to the Army Air Forces: Washington 1944: p. 330.
 - (2) Hq. and Hq. Sqdn. Eighth Air Force had been activated at Savannah, Georgia, on 28 January 1942. (Official Guide to the A.A.F.: Washington 1944: p. 330).
 - (3) A.C.A.S.(Ops) Folder No. J.3.B: Min., L.M.1852/D.G.O., D.G.O. to A.C.A.S.(P): 6 May 1942.
 - (4) Official Guide to the A.A.F.: Washington 1944: p. 330.

Some uncertainty, however, regarding the project had arisen as a result of the 'Marshall Plan'; it seemed probable that the Air Support Command Units would form part of the main United States forces which would be taking part in the assault on the Continent.

ANNEX. British Tactics of Day Bombing
under Fighter Cover

360. As stated in paragraph 148A above a paper prepared by the Director of Fighter Operations on the "Co-ordination of American and British Fighter Forces in the British Isles" was sent to General Chaney by the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy) on 7 May 1942. Included as an Appendix was a memorandum on "British Tactics of Day Bombing under Fighter Cover." As this subject is raised in one of Professor Hopper's questions, relevant extracts from the memorandum are given below:

"Introduction

1. Operations consist of attacks by bombers, escorted by fighters, in which the primary object of the attack is either:

(a) To bring the enemy fighters to action. Here, the destruction of the bombers' target is of secondary importance, the primary object being to induce enemy fighters to join in action.

(b) To destroy specific targets on land or sea.

"Method of Execution

2. Orders for the operation are issued by teleprinter, or if time is short, by telephone on the operational lines, and detail the forces to be employed, the rendezvous, the target and bombing height, the role of the forces, the route and timings at various points, the direction of turn by the bombers over the target and any special signal arrangements.

3. The bombers should arrive at the rendezvous - which should be a fairly prominent landmark - a few minutes before zero hour, in order to assist the fighters in joining up with them without wasting the fighter's petrol. Both bombers and fighters should so far as possible, gain height and approach the rendezvous in the manner best calculated to minimise the time of warning given by the enemy R.D.F. The bombers should leave the rendezvous at zero hour and not before, having satisfied themselves that their escort and other supporting fighters have arrived. W/T silence will be maintained, except in emergency, until the enemy coast is reached. Bombers should fly in a "box" as compact as possible, avoiding straggling or wasting time over enemy territory, and on reaching the English Coast on return should steer a course inland and not remain near the coast any longer than necessary.

"Roles of the Fighters

4. In major operations, wings of fighters will be employed at: escort wing, escort cover wing, high cover wing, target support wings, forward support wing and rear support wing. A brief description of the role of each of these wings is given below.

"Escort Wing

5. (a) The role of this Wing is to protect the bombers from interference by enemy fighters. This Wing must remain with the bombers as far as possible, and during the whole of the penetration and withdrawal, they must not be drawn off.
- (b) The Wing consists normally of three or four squadrons. Originally, it consisted of three squadrons, but it was found necessary to provide an additional squadron to protect the bombers from enemy fighter attacks from below. Consequently, one of the escort squadrons was detailed to this role. The remaining two or three squadrons of the escort wing provide close protection against attacks from above.
- (c) The role of the squadron providing the close escort is to stay to protect the bombers under all circumstances. They are there in a purely defensive role, and must not be led away into a fight.
- (d) The second squadron is free to engage and fight any enemy fighters attacking our bombers.
- (e) The third and top squadron acts as a top cover for the escort wing, and should remain in position as far as possible.
- (f) The fourth squadron in the escort wing acts as underneath cover for the bombers, as it has been found that enemy fighters sometimes attempt to get at our bombers by diving down behind, and coming up from below. This squadron normally flies 1,000 feet below bomber height, and in the same formation as the first squadron of the close escort wing. This fourth squadron should open to the flanks in flak areas, but should remain under the umbrella cover above.
- (g) All squadrons in the escort wing weave continuously.
- (h) The height interval between each squadron in the escort wing is 1,000 - 1,500 feet.

"Escort Cover Wing

6. (a) The whole of this wing is to protect the bombers and the escort wing.
- (b) The bottom squadron of this wing usually about 1,000 feet above the top squadron of the close escort, the second squadron being 1,000 feet above the bottom squadron and the third squadron 2,000 feet above the middle squadron. The wing should be able to prevent enemy fighters from positioning themselves for a favourable attack on the escort wing and bombers.
- (c) This wing normally consists of three squadrons. It has greater freedom of action than the escort wing and usually flies in a more open formation.
- (d) This wing makes the same rendezvous with the bomber formation and flies the same course out and home as the bombers and escort wing.

(e) One essential rule for this wing is that it should be up sun of the main formation, and squadrons in the wing should be stepped up sun of each other.

(f) As long as at least one squadron of this wing remains as top cover, the lower squadrons are free to engage and fight the enemy.

"High Cover

7. (a) The role of this wing is to protect the escort cover wing. It flies in a more open formation and has greater freedom of action than the other two wings.
- (b) This wing consists normally of three squadrons. The formations vary and are left to the discretion of the wing and the squadron leaders. The three squadrons are stepped up from the escort cover of 1,000, 2,000, 4,000 - 5,000 feet intervals.
- (c) This wing should be up sun of the escort cover wing and squadrons in the wing are stepped up sun of each other. All the squadrons weave and the two lower squadrons are free to engage the enemy as long as the highest squadron remains as top cover.

"Target Support Wings

8. (a) The role of these wings is to achieve air superiority on the route to the target area itself, prior to the arrival of the bombers. As soon as the wings arrive over the target they split into sections of four and cover the whole area at varying heights above the bombers.
- (b) One wing usually approaches on approximately the same line as the bombers, but overtaking them on the way to the target. This wing must deal with any opposition met with on the way to the target.
- (c) Other wings take the most suitable route as selected for the operation, and remain over the target until after the bombing and then cover the withdrawal of the bombers and escort wing.
- (d) It might be thought that the advantage of surprise would be lost by indicating our selected targets in this way. This is not so, however, because as soon as the enemy R.D.F. system indicates an approaching raid, enemy fighter patrols are put up in the vicinity of all the important targets.

"The Forward Support Wing

9. (a) The role of this wing is to cover the withdrawal of the bombers and the escorting fighters. The wing is positioned on the withdrawal route of the bombers either on, or a few miles inside the French Coast. They should be at high or medium altitude according to the expected height of the enemy. The forward support wing will take up its position shortly before the bombers are due to cross its patrol line on their return.

As this wing will have fuller petrol tanks than the wings which have been the whole way to the target, it will be in a position to stay and fight while the main force returns.

(b) This wing should remain in its patrol area for some minutes after the withdrawal of the bombers and their escort, in order to prevent the enemy following the main formation back to the English Coast.

"The Rear Support Wing

10. (a) The role of this wing which may consist of only two squadrons is to act as reserve in position about half-way across the Channel at medium altitude and is capable of being directed quickly to reinforce any of our forces which are in trouble on their return.

(b) This wing takes off in time to be in position a few minutes before the main force approaches the French Coast on its return journey.


(c) On some occasions, this wing may be used to patrol an area about 10 miles off the English Coast from 1,000 - 10,000 feet. The reason for this positioning is that on many occasions enemy aircraft have crossed the Channel from the French Coast very low and have pulled up to a medium height near the English Coast. They have then dived for France, shooting down any of our stragglers or damaged aircraft returning at low altitude.

11. The above detail gives the task of each wing, but it is not necessary for all these wings to be employed in every operation. Much depends on the position of the target and the estimated strength of enemy opposition. The tactical situation has been changing constantly, and whereas at certain times it is only necessary to have one target support wing, the enemy may increase his opposition and make it necessary for the provision of a second wing with the same role.

12. Similarly, one can dispense with a forward support wing for targets close to the French Coast. When particularly strong opposition is expected, very successful operations have been carried out by staging one operation some 50 minutes before another. The first one will not penetrate deeply and its object will be to draw up as many enemy fighters as possible. Then when the enemy aircraft are going down to land, the second main penetration will take place.

"Low Altitude Attacks

13. These attacks are normally carried out by lightly escorted fighter/bombers. The whole formation proceeds at sea level, in order to minimise the possibility of early R.D.F. detection, climbing to the heights from which the attack is to be delivered on approaching the target. In these attacks the fighter/bombers are closely escorted by one, or possibly two, wings of fighters and are often supported in their task by a squadron of fighters whose role is to attack flak concentrations in the target area."



THE UNITED NATIONS AIR FORCES CONFERENCE

26 May 1942 - 31 May 1942

Visit of General Arnold and Admiral Towers to Britain

361. The series of conversations which constituted the United Nations Air Forces Conference began on 26 May 1942. At the opening meeting General Arnold and Rear Admiral Towers were welcomed by the Prime Minister, who outlined very briefly what, in the British view, were the essential principles upon which discussion should be based. Further meetings, with representatives of the British Air Staff, took place on the three succeeding days.

362. From the point of view of this narrative the proceedings may be broadly divided into (1) those relating to the high-level subject of the allocation of aircraft and those relating to the more domestic issue of the function and deployment of the United States Army Air Forces once in the United Kingdom.

1. Discussion regarding Aircraft Allocations

363. The question of what general principles should underlie the allocation of aircraft from United States industry was raised at the second meeting in the series.(2) The Chief of the Air Staff, who presided, explained that after searching thought the British had accepted the principle that the requirements, in the shape of air forces, which would be necessary to put into effect the agreed strategic policy could be met either by the R.A.F. or by United States units. The policy which should govern the distribution of these units, and thus the allocation of effort, should therefore be determined largely by considerations of timing and transportation.

364. After this statement by the Chief of the Air Staff, subsequent discussion was guided by the study, paragraph by paragraph, of a paper on the subject which had been prepared in advance by the British Air Staff.(3) Naturally during the discussions its contentions were modified, but a revised version which was published later contained a statement of the principles as mutually approved.(4)

365. This revised version of the British paper was entitled "Policy Governing the Allocation of Aircraft from United States Industry to the Air Forces of the United Nations in Active Theatres of War", and was given the reference of U.N.A.F.(42)3 (Revised). Actually its content went a little beyond its title in that function and organisation as well as allocation were covered. It was thus a comprehensive and important document. On the subject of allocation, its provisions are summarised immediately below; the subject of function and organisation is dealt with in paragraph 370.

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- (1) C.A.S. Folder No. 858: U.N.A.F.(42) 1st Mtg.: 26 May 1942.
(2) C.A.S. Folder No. 858: U.N.A.F.(42) 2nd Mtg.: 26 May 1942.
Present at the meeting were: C.A.S., V.C.A.S., A.M.S.O., A/M Evill, A.C.A.S.(P), 5th Sea Lord, D.N.A.D., D.D.P.D., D.D.O.P., O.F.; Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold, Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Col. H. S. Vandenberg, Lt. Cmdr. G. W. Anderson.
(3) C.A.S. Folder No. 858: U.N.A.F.(42)3: 25 May 1942.
(4) C.A.S. Folder No. 858: U.N.A.F.(42)3 (Revised): 28 May 1942.

(a) There were two considerations of policy which were fundamental to the problem:

(i) The strength of the air forces in the various theatres of war should be determined in accordance with the strategic policy of defeating Germany while holding Japan.

(ii) Every appropriate United States-produced aircraft should be manned and fought by United States crews, subject to the condition that no action to give effect to this policy should result in any weakening of the combined strength in any theatre.

(b) To give effect to the above policy the following principles should govern allocations of aircraft:

(i) The principal object should be to bring into action as soon as possible the greatest strength in fully trained air forces.

(ii) Subject to the above object and to the condition that a certain proportion of the air forces of the British Commonwealth could be equipped only from United States production, as many United States aircraft as possible, operated by United States crews, should take their place in the active theatres with the least practicable delay.

(iii) The relative size of each nation's air forces in any particular theatre should be governed by the relative availability of transportation.

366. After four days of conferences General Arnold submitted to the Chief of the Air Staff on 30 May a memorandum in which he set out "an outline of the procedure which I can submit to the President of the United States as being likely to be acceptable by you".⁽¹⁾ The proposals had been drawn up to conform as closely as possible to three basic principles, in which were incorporated the stated policies of both the President and the Prime Minister:

(a) that all United States aircraft be flown by United States crews;

(b) that the maximum air strength be brought against our enemies;

(c) that the air strength in all theatres be either maintained or built up.

367. His proposals covered a wide field. The following table provides a summary of those which related to the United States Army Air Forces to be despatched to Britain, and to the allocations of United States-produced aircraft to the R.A.F.:

(1) C.A.S. Folder No. 858: Memo., Gen. Arnold to C.A.S.: 30 May 1942.

A/c Category	Proposed Allocation of U.S. A/c to U.S.A.A.F. in Europe	Proposed Allocation of U.S. A/c to R.A.F. - Percentage of Allocations under Arnold/Portal Agreement		
		1 April 1943	June 1942	July 1942
Heavy Bombers	700	50%	25%	0%
Medium Bombers	800	50%	25%	0%
Light Bombers	342	See Note 1		
Pursuit	960 See Note 2	50%	25%	0%
Observation	400	-	-	-

Note 1. The allocation of Light Bombers presented serious problems owing to the shortage both in the R.A.F. and in the U.S.A.A.F. and to the comparatively limited production. Inasmuch as the R.A.F. had been dependent upon the U.S.A. for the supply of this type of aircraft, it was essential if the R.A.F. strength were to be maintained that the proposed U.S.A.A.F. strength should be reduced to the minimum of $1\frac{1}{2}$ squadrons per division. It was hoped that by certain manipulations, there might be a definite increase in allocations over and above the present assignment of light bombers to the R.A.F.

Note 2. This represented a reduction from the 1440 Pursuit aircraft which the United States authorities had originally intended to have in Britain to implement the 'Marshall Plan'. General Arnold had appreciated the difficulty that there would be to construct sufficient airfields to accommodate the intended force.

368. The Chief of the Air Staff offered his comments in a memorandum submitted to General Arnold on the following day.(1)

He stated that the British Air Staff accepted the proposals made regarding the despatch of United States heavy and medium bombers under the requirements of the 'Marshall Plan', and that they welcomed the proposal to reduce appreciably the complement of United States light bombers and fighters considered necessary for the same purpose. They regarded the proposed figure of 400 observation aircraft, however, as still somewhat excessive by British standards. In sum, the revised figures came nearer to those which the British planners had embodied in their paper referred to in paragraph 355 above - a paper which by then was in the hands of the British Planning Staff in Washington and was fully available for use in combined discussions.(2)

On the subject of the proposed percentage reductions in the future allocations of aircraft to the R.A.F., the Chief of the Air Staff commented that he could not accept them without

(1) C.A.S. Folder No. 858: Memo., C.A.S. to Gen. Arnold; 31 May 1942.
 (2) See also D. of Plans Folder No. 1A: Tel., Webber W 134, Air Ministry to RAFDEL: 29 May 1942.

further clarification. Time would not allow a detailed examination of the subject before General Arnold's return to the United States. He therefore suggested that any settlement on this issue must be left until the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy), who would accompany General Arnold back to Washington as the representative of the Chief of the Air Staff, had had the opportunity of exploring the matter fully with General Arnold in the United States.

The Chief of the Air Staff did observe, however, that a decision on the whole question was a matter of urgency in order that administrative planning might proceed. Further there were two reservations which he wished to make:

- (a) That British squadrons equipped with United States aircraft which became operational before 1 April 1943, should be allocated the aircraft necessary to meet attrition after that date.
- (b) That the proposed out in Mustang (P-51) aircraft should be restored, because the Spitfire was not suitable to provide the Fighter Reconnaissance aircraft necessary for the re-equipping and expansion of the squadrons for the support of the British Army. In return the R.A.F. would provide the United States Pursuit squadrons in the United Kingdom with an equivalent quantity of Spitfires.

The Chief of the Air Staff proposed in conclusion that the aim should be to produce a revised Agreement to cover (a) a time schedule for the arrival of United States air units in appropriate theatres in replacement of planned British units which would not be formed as a result of revised allocations (b) a detailed statement of allocations of United States aircraft to the R.A.F.

369. By 3 June General Arnold and the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy) were in Washington, and work was begun on the drafting of a revised Air Agreement.

2. Discussions on the Function and Deployment
of the U.S. Army Air Forces in the
United Kingdom

370. To return to the more local issue - the role and the accommodation of the United States Army Air Forces which would be located in Britain - the paper defining general principles referred to earlier in this section contained some relevant provisions.⁽¹⁾ Four principles were agreed to be fundamental to co-operation between the United States Army Air Forces and the R.A.F. in Britain. They were:

- (a) That the responsibility for the air defence of Great Britain would rest with the R.A.F.; that 75 day and 30 night fighter squadrons would be the minimum requirements for this purpose; and that no arrangements could be accepted whereby this number of R.A.F. fighter squadrons in the Metropolitan Air Force would be reduced.
- (b) That the primary role of the United States Pursuit Groups would be to escort United States bombers and to participate in offensive combined operations against the Continent; they would, however, collaborate in the air defence of any sector in which they might be located.

(1) C.A.S. Folder No. 858: Paper U.N.A.F. (42)3(Revised):
28 May 1942.

(c) That when United States units were assigned to British theatres of responsibility in lieu of such R.A.F. units as would have been formed with United States aircraft, the former would be organised in homogeneous United States formations.

(d) That air units required for direct co-operation with the British Army should normally be manned by the R.A.F.

In relation to (a) above it was noted that the R.A.F. fighter squadrons would, in addition to their defensive duties, also be vigorously employed in offensive operations against the Continent. They would have to be retained in Great Britain, however, to meet the contingency of renewed enemy air attack.

371. At a meeting on 28 May 1942, the question of applying the above general principles to the physical problems of how and where the United States Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom would operate was fully discussed.⁽¹⁾ The Air Member for Supply and Organisation, with members of his staff, and the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy) represented the Air Ministry, while General Arnold was accompanied by General Eaker, and members of the Air Staff of Headquarters, U.S.A.F.B.I. The main points of the proceedings and decisions are given below.

(a) Tentative Programme of Arrival of United States Air Units.

A provisional programme of arrival of United States Army Air Force Units in the United Kingdom on 1 June 1942, 1 July 1942, 1 November 1942, and 1 March 1942 was presented to form a basis for administrative planning. Details are given in the Annex to this section.

(b) United States Bomber Command

Operational units would, in the first instance, be located in the Huntingdon area (No. 8 Group), where eight airfields were already available. Thereafter the new "B" and "D" Groups in East Anglia, where seven airfields would be available by the end of June, would be taken over, and ultimately Cambridgeshire (No. 3 Group). Before the end of 1942 it would be advisable to consider the exchange of No. 8 Group for No. 2 Group, in order to obtain distinct geographical zones for the United States and British forces; a decision on this point would depend on the relative growth of the two forces.

(c) United States Pursuit Groups

After acclimatisation, the aim would be to fit one United States squadron into each active Fighter Sector in order to gain experience of actual operations. Progressively complete sectors could be taken over, and ultimately complete groups - all within the general framework of R.A.F. Fighter Command

(1) S.6 Folder No. 240B: Note of Mtg. in Air Ministry to discuss the accommodation of the U.S.A.A.F. in the U.K.: 28 May 1942. (The U.S. authorities received ten copies of this Note). Present at this meeting were: A.M.S.O., A.C.A.S.(P), D.G.W., D.W.O., D.D.O.P., O.P.1; Lt. Gen. Arnold, Brig. Gen. Eaker, Brig. Gen. Lyon, Col. Snavelly, Col. Smyser.

In addition the United States Pursuit Groups would ultimately become responsible for the static defence of Northern Ireland, and the second two groups to arrive would be allotted this task.

On the suggestion of General Eaker, it was agreed that the above procedure should be modified in respect of the first two groups to arrive: they would go initially not to Northern Ireland but instead to No. 8 Group of R.A.F. Bomber Command where facilities for acclimatisation were available and where preparations had already been made for their reception.

(d) United States Air Support Command

It was agreed that the requirement as envisaged in the original plans had been absorbed in the current plan, and that it would not therefore be additional to the programme presented at the outset of the meeting.

(e) Observation Groups

These groups would move with the Army Units with which they would be operating. Some thirteen airfields would be required for their accommodation: five in Northern Ireland and eight in South-west England.

(f) Standards of Accommodation

The United States Army Air Forces would accept whatever standards of accommodation might be adopted by the R.A.F., and vice versa.

372. The decisions reached during General Arnold's visit did much to bring to an end the state of uncertainty and indecision which, in general, had characterised working conditions during the previous two months. There was at last at least a provisional basis on which to work.

ANNEX. Programme of Arrival of
United States Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom

373. The table given below, showing the expected arrival dates of United States Army Air Force Units between 1 June 1942 and 1 March 1943, was submitted for consideration at the meeting with General Arnold in Air Ministry on 28 May 1942.

Type	1 June 1942		1 July 1942		1 Nov. 1942		1 Mar. 1943	
	Gps.	A/C	Gps.	A/C	Gps.	A/C	Gps.	A/C
Heavy Bomber	1	35	4	140	12	420	19	665
Medium Bomber	-	-	2	114	4	228	12	684
Light Bomber	-	-	-	-	4	228	12	684
Pursuit	2	160	5	400	7	560	15	1200
Transport	1	52	4	208	8	416	8	416
TOTALS:	4	247	15	862	35	1852	66	3649

The above did not include Observation Squadrons.

AFTER THE UNITED NATIONS AIR FORCES CONFERENCE


Action in London and Washington

June 1942

374. In this Section the sketch of events can be drawn with considerably firmer detail. As a result of decisions made during General Arnold's visit to London, the Staffs whose task it was to make plans and preparations for the reception of the U.S. Army Air Forces had a much clearer definition of what lay ahead of them.

1. Organisation of the U.S. Army Air Forces in Britain

375. Of not the least significance to the planning and administrative staffs was the fact that information on the general framework of the intended organisation of the U.S. Army Air Forces in the U.K. had become available. (1) In diagrammatic form this was as follows: (2)



376. With this table of organisation available, naturally the question arose of how liaison between the Eighth Air Force and the R.A.F. should be effected: which headquarters should communicate direct with Air Ministry, which with R.A.F. Commands and so on. Hq., U.S.A.F.B.I. intimated that any recommendations on the subject which Air Ministry had to offer would be welcomed. (1) The feeling of the Air Staff was that, provisionally, Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, might work with R.A.F. Commands, leaving

(1) A.M. File S.9893, Min. 31: Min., J.O.M.(U.S.) to S.6: 29 May 1942.

(2) V.C.A.S. Folder No. 131: Loose Min. from A.1.3. (U.S.A.): 17 June 1942.

Hq., U.S.A.F.B.I. to deal with Air Ministry.(1) But it was suggested that a firm decision on this point should await the arrival of General Spaatz.

2. Arrangements for Intelligence Liaison

377. The arrangements necessary to ensure an adequate exchange of intelligence between the Eighth Air Force and Air Ministry had also been considered in some detail. On 28 May 1942, the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Intelligence), Air Ministry, circulated to his Staff a minute giving details of the intended organisation:(2)

(a) Until General Spaatz had established his headquarters, R.A.F. Bomber Command would be responsible for ensuring that General Eaker's headquarters received all requisite intelligence. It was General Eaker's intention to attach a liaison officer to the department of the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Intelligence) to gain experience in the methods which had been developed for the exchange of intelligence between R.A.F. Commands and Air Ministry.

(b) As soon as the Eighth Air Force headquarters was established, the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Intelligence) would undertake to supply to it, on a parallel with R.A.F. Commands, all intelligence necessary for the effective discharge of its operational function.

(c) An Air Liaison Officer from the Intelligence Section of General Spaatz's headquarters would be permanently attached to the department of the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Intelligence). A reciprocal exchange would also be made until General Spaatz was satisfied that his section could work without assistance.

(d) A section (A.1.3. U.S.A.) established in the department of the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Intelligence) would be the normal liaison channel between the U.S. Army Air Forces and Air Ministry on all questions concerning operational intelligence or security.

(e) The liaison already existing between the United States Embassy and the Director of Air Force Liaison would continue. Through this channel information would be supplied and visits arranged when such were required by United States authorities other than the U.S. Army Air Force units in Britain.

3. The Location and Aircraft Equipment of the United States Pursuit Groups

378. Within a day or two of General Arnold's departure, General Chaney took steps to bring to a close the long wrangle over the location of the first United States Pursuit Groups due to arrive in Britain. On 5 June he wrote to the Chief of the Air Staff with reference to the latter's letter of 14 May(3) (see para. 150 above). At that time discussions on the subject had, for all

(1) A.M. File S.9893, Mins. 33, 34, 35: Mins., S.6 to A.S.P. 4, A.S.P. 4 to S.6 and S.6 to J.O.M.(U.S.), dated respectively 30 May, 2 June and 4 June 1942.

(2) A.C.A.S.(G) Folder No. 41 H/30: Min., A.C.A.S.I/314/42, A.C.A.S.(I) to D. of I.(O), D. of I.(S) and D.A.F.L.: 28 May 1942.

(3) C.A.S. Folder No. 1806 (Part II): Ltr., AG.686-G, Gen. Chaney to C.A.S.: 5 June 1945.

practical purposes, reached an impasse; after General Arnold's visit, however, General Chaney shifted his ground somewhat, and offered alternative proposals. He suggested that of the first five Groups to arrive, the initial one should go to two airfields in Shropshire, the second to three airfields in North Lincolnshire, the third and fourth to Northern Ireland and the fifth to East Anglia. To this proposal, with the modifications that only two airfields in North Lincolnshire should be used, and that the fifth Group should go instead to South Lincolnshire, the Vice Chief of the Air Staff wrote agreeing on 5 June.⁽¹⁾ General Chaney signified his concurrence to the modifications on 7 June,⁽²⁾

379. During May, the possibility of equipping with Spitfires the first United States Pursuit Groups to arrive in Britain had been raised by War Department through General Chaney. Air Ministry agreed, on condition that an equivalent number of Tomahawk (P-40) aircraft was sent by the United States to the Middle East to replace the Spitfires earmarked for that area. To this condition, however, War Department could not see the way clear to agree, and the negotiations consequently were carried no further.⁽³⁾ While General Arnold was in London, however, the subject was again brought up: this time the equipping of the United States Groups with Spitfires was conditional upon an equivalent number of Mustang (P-51) aircraft being supplied to the R.A.F., to which the United States authorities found themselves able to agree. General Chaney conveyed to the Chief of the Air Staff on 6 June a message from General Arnold stating that in exchange for 200 Spitfires 80 Mustang aircraft would be released to the R.A.F. immediately, and 40 more in each of the three succeeding months.⁽⁴⁾

380. On 21 June, the air echelons of the first United States Pursuit Group to operate from Britain - its official designation was the 31st Pursuit Group - arrived to join the ground echelons which were already in the country and the Group was duly equipped with 80 Spitfires.⁽⁵⁾

4. An authoritative Statement of the Position in early June 1942

381. A comprehensive and authoritative statement of the position in the early days of June is contained in a memorandum which was issued on 4 June 1942 by the department of the Air Member for Supply and Organisation.⁽⁶⁾ In contrast to the uncertainty of the previous weeks, the Department was now able to record that "details were now available of the U.S. Army Air Forces which were to be

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- (1) C.A.S. Folder No. 1806 (Part II): Ltr., V.C.A.S. to Gen. Chaney: 5 June 1942.
 - (2) C.A.S. Folder No. 1806 (Part II): Ltr., Gen. Chaney to C.A.S.: 7 June 1942.
 - (3) C.A.S. Folder No. 1806 (Part II), and A.C.A.S. (P) Folder 'American Fighter Problems: Spitfires' contain the relevant documents.
 - (4) C.A.S. Folder No. 1806 (Part II): Ltr., AG.452. 1-G Gen. Chaney to C.A.S.: 6 June 1942; Ltr., V.C.A.S. to Gen. Chaney: 6 June 1942; Tel., Webber W.315 Air Ministry to RAFDEL: 6 June 1942.
 - (5) C.A.S. Folder No. 1806 (Part II): Mins., A.P.S. to C.A.S., 17 June 1942; and C.A.S. to A.M.S.O.: 19 June 1942.
 - (6) C.A.S. Folder No. 1806 (Part II): Loose min., L.M.409/D.D.O.P.: 4 June 1942. Copies were sent to Hq., U.S.A.F.B.I. and to Gen. Eaker. The essential points of the Memo. were conveyed by C.A.S. to the Brit. C.O.S. on 12 June 1942 (C.O.S.(42)403: 12 June 1942).

despatched to the British Isles", and that "agreement had been reached in regard to their employment and disposition". The greater part of the memorandum consists of a resumé of agreements reached during General Arnold's visit. These were noted in Section XVII; there is no need, therefore, to repeat them here. Included in the memorandum, however, were certain other points which, though they were not brought up specifically during the formal conversations with General Arnold, seem to have been incorporated because agreement had been reached on them and this was a convenient medium for making the fact known. These points were:

- (a) The U.S. Bomber Forces would be established under a U.S. Bomber Command operating independently of, but in close collaboration with, the R.A.F. Bomber Command.

NOTE: This had been tacitly assumed for some considerable time, but it was the first official publication of the principle - see para. 391.

- (b) The headquarters of the U.S. Fighter Command would be located at Stanmore under arrangements to be made mutually between the Headquarters, British and U.S. Fighter Commands.

Initially (as recorded in the last paragraph) the first five United States Pursuit Groups would be accommodated in Shropshire, North Lincolnshire, Northern Ireland (2 Groups) and South Lincolnshire.

Thereafter, their regrouping in United States sectors within the two R.A.F. Fighter Command Groups, located respectively in Eastern England (No. 12 Group) and Northern Ireland (No. 82 Group), would be arranged by Headquarters R.A.F. Fighter Command, in collaboration with Headquarters, U.S. Fighter Command.

Ultimately the U.S. Army Air Forces would assume control of one or more complete groups in R.A.F. Fighter Command, under the operational control of the Air Officer, Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F. Fighter Command.

- (c) The primary role of the Observation Units would be close co-operation with, and direct support of, the U.S. Army. Five squadrons would be located in Northern Ireland; and thirty-three in South-west England.

In the Appendices pertinent statistical data were given, so that in all the memorandum provided a useful contemporary summary and afforded terms of reference for the various administrative staffs.

5. Negotiations in Washington on the Allocation of United States Aircraft: the Arnold/Towers/Portal Agreement

382. For three weeks the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy), representing the Chief of the Air Staff, conferred in Washington with General Arnold and his staff on the subject of the proportional allocation of United States - produced aircraft.⁽¹⁾ Finally on 21 June the proposed agreement on the subject was in final form; it was signed by General Arnold, as Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Rear-Admiral Towers as Chief of

(1) C.A.S. Folder No. 858, and A.C.A.S. (P) Folder No. 40, (Part IV), contain the documents which tell the story of these negotiations.

the Bureau of Aeronautics, U.S. Navy, and Air Vice Marshal Slessor vice the Chief of the Air Staff. The President and the Prime Minister (who was at that time in Washington) initialled it on 22 June.⁽¹⁾ This Arnold/Towers/Portal agreement was a document which had a far-reaching effect on the relative roles to be played in the future by the U.S. Army Air Forces and the R.A.F. So far as its provisions affected the interrelation in North-west Europe, they are recorded in very abbreviated form below:

Policy

- (a) The Policy of the President concurred in by the Prime Minister was that powerful United States Forces must be created and maintained and every appropriate aircraft built in the United States should be manned and fought by United States crews, subject to the conditions:
 - (i) that the combined aim should be to create and bring into decisive action as quickly as possible fully trained United States and British Air Forces adequate for the defeat of our enemies, and all combined resources should be employed to that end;
 - (ii) that a revision of previously agreed allocations of aircraft to Great Britain should be made so as to avoid weakening the combined strength in any theatre.
- (b) In accordance with this policy the United States would:
 - (i) allocate aircraft to Great Britain to equip and maintain certain existing and projected squadrons of the R.A.F. for which units of the U.S. Army Air Forces could not be substituted;
 - (ii) assign to and maintain in theatres of British and combined strategic responsibility certain United States Air Forces by dates which had been agreed.
- (c) The United States would undertake - subject to review in June 1943 - to allocate the necessary aircraft to meet attrition in British squadrons which were equipped with United States aircraft and which would be operational on 1 April 1943.
- (d) United States Air Combat Units assigned to theatres of British strategic responsibility would be organised in homogeneous United States formations under the strategic control of the British Commander-in-Chief.

Aircraft Allocations

The table overleaf shows what aircraft it was intended to allocate ~~(1)~~ to the U.S. Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom by 1 April 1942 in order to implement the 'Marshall Plan', and ~~(2)~~ to the R.A.F. from United States production.

383. Comparison of the table overleaf with that given in paragraph 162 above indicates that the allocations as finally agreed represented greater concessions to the R.A.F. than those which had been contained in General Arnold's original proposals. They reflected very distinctly, of course, the declared United States policy of building up the U.S. Army Air Forces. In the end, however, the general British reaction to this policy seems to have been that, if the United States could guarantee that their formed Air Units would arrive in the United Kingdom early enough to prevent any overall reduction in the combined air offensive, then the uniform of the crews taking part need not cause any concern.

(1) A.H.B. Collections (Document ref. II F2) contain a signed and initialled copy (No. 2) of the agreement.

A/c Category	Proposed Allocation of U.S. A/c to U.S.A.A.F. in Europe	Proposed Allocation of U.S. A/c to the R.A.F.								
		1 9 4 2							Total	Extra Allocations
		By 1 April 1943	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	1942
Heavy Bombers	595	28	6	4	4	4	4	4	54	4 per month.
Medium Bombers	570	-	-	-	17	63	20	-	100	-
Light Bombers ⁽¹⁾	342	201	276	304	299	302	324	238	1944 ⁽¹⁾	1049
Pursuit	960	180	190	90	150	110	110	120	950 ⁽²⁾	50 per month.
Observation	399	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Transports	416					See Note (1)				-

Note (1) This total included 200 troop-carrying transport versions of the Hudson Light Bomber.

Note (2) Of the total of 950 Pursuit aircraft the allocation of 250 P-39 and 200 P-51 aircraft was made on the understanding that the R.A.F. would allocate 350 Spitfires to equip two U.S. Pursuit Groups (see para. 379).

THE ARRIVAL OF THE EIGHTH AIR FORCE

June - September 1942

384. In June 1942 the United States authorities began to put into effect their plans for the re-organisation of their forces in Europe. On 8 June, General Chaney informed the British Chiefs of Staff that, as from that day, a European Theatre of Operations for the United States Army had been established. (1) On 10 June, Major General Carl Spaatz left Washington to assume in the United Kingdom his responsibilities as Commanding General of the U.S. Eighth Air Force. On 24 June, Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower replaced Major General Chaney as Commanding General, European Theatre of Operations. (2) The changes were significant.

385. This final Section of the present narrative is concerned with the few weeks after General Spaatz's arrival - the weeks when he was moulding the organisation under his command into the form in which he considered it could best carry out its assigned mission.

1. Location of Headquarters

386. His main headquarters (code name 'Widewing'), (3) it was decided, should be located at Bushy Park, Kingston-upon-Thames, near London, and at a meeting with Air Ministry representatives on 14 June, the arrangements necessary for its establishment there were discussed. (4) Headquarters, VIII Bomber Command, had, of course, already been established for some two months at High Wycombe (see para. 359 above); but it was not until the meeting noted above that it was decided to requisition Bushey Hall Hotel, near Watford, for the headquarters of VIII Fighter Command (code name 'Ajax'). 'Widewing' was soon ready for occupation, but some weeks elapsed before VIII Fighter Command could occupy 'Ajax'. (5) In the meantime the headquarters found a temporary home by sharing accommodation with Headquarters VIII Bomber Command. (6)

2. Acceptance of the Principles defined in S.D. 348

387. On the question of the principles that should underlie co-operation between the Eighth Air Force and the R.A.F. in matters of operation, organisation and maintenance, the terms of Air Ministry Secret Document 348 (for the preparation and production of this document in the early months of 1942 see Section XII) were mutually accepted. General Spaatz signified his personal

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- (1) C.O.S. (42) 166(0): 10 June 1942. Hq., U.S.A.F.B.I. simultaneously became Hq., E.T.O.U.S.A.
 - (2) C.O.S. (42) 333: 3 July 1942.
 - (3) J.O.M. (U.S.) Folder No. JOM/17: Circular letter issued from Hq., Eighth Air Force: 28 June 1942.
 - (4) A.D.O. (U.S.) Folder 'Eighth Air Force, 1942 Papers': Mins. of Mtg. at Hq., E.T.O.U.S.A. Present at the meeting were: Brig. Gen. Lyon, Col. Bacon, Col. Cassidy, Col. Willis; G/O Culley and S/L Wood.
 - (5) J.O.M. (U.S.) Folder No. JOM/27: Loose min. O.3 to J.O.M. (U.S.): 21 August 1942.
 - (6) C.S.A. (42) 15(0) - Bolero Progress Report No. 9: 13 July 1942.

concurrence in a letter to the Air Member for Supply and Organisation on 5 July;(1) and on 11 July, Hq., E.T.O.U.S.A. invested the Document with the full force of an official United States instruction.(2) A directive was issued to all its subordinate units to the effect that the appropriate United States agencies in the Theatre would be responsible for implementing the agreements that the Document contained. Further, in order that amendments might be incorporated as found necessary, machinery was established by which any proposed alterations could be considered, and, if mutually agreed by Hq., E.T.O.U.S.A. and Air Ministry, included in the Document.(3)

3. Co-ordination of the Combined Air Effort - Principles

388. By the end of July 1942 sufficient U.S. aircraft had arrived to make the inauguration of active operations by the U.S. Army Air Forces a possibility of the very near future. The problem of how the combined efforts of the United States and British Air Forces should be directed and co-ordinated had thus become off more than academic interest.

389. On 30 July General Eaker wrote to the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F. Bomber Command, on the subject.(4) The main points of his letter were:

(a) Agreement had been reached between "our two Governments" that the two Bomber Commands should operate by close liaison and co-ordination.

(b) To ensure such co-ordination, it had early been realised that the United States Bomber Commander and Staff should study the operational practices and doctrines of R.A.F. Bomber Command. To that end he had been working since February, under conditions in which he had received every possible assistance.

(c) As a result of his experience, he proposed the following means of achieving co-ordination:

(i) He would himself continue to attend the operational conferences at Headquarters, R.A.F. Bomber Command, and so "retain the maximum familiarity with your operational methods and doctrines". A senior United States officer would be detailed for liaison with the Operations Section of R.A.F. Bomber Command, and in addition the closest reciprocal co-operation would be maintained between the staff sections of each headquarters.

(ii) The target programme would be mutually discussed in advance to avoid possible conflict and to obtain the benefits of R.A.F. experience.

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- (1) A.M. File S.9893, Encl. 36B: Ltr., Gen. Spaatz to A.M.S.O.: 5 July 1942.
(2) A.M. File S.9893, Encl. 39B: Directive, AG-Misc. 320.3, Hq., E.T.O.U.S.A.: 11 July 1942.
(3) A.M. File C.S.12602, Encl. 40B: Min., J.O.M.(U.S.) to D/A.M.S.O.: 22 July 1942.
(4) A.M. File C.S.12569, Encl. 5B: Ltr., Gen. Eaker to A.O.C.-in-C., R.A.F. Bomber Command: 30 July 1942.

- (iii) The R.A.F. watch officer and the United States operations liaison officer would control any diversions to United States or R.A.F. airfields made necessary by weather conditions.

The letter concluded with an expression of confidence that co-ordination would present no difficulties "as long as we retain our respective assignments".

390. In his reply the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F. Bomber Command, stated that while he personally was in complete agreement with General Eaker's proposals he would have to refer to Air Ministry for guidance on the broader issue. (1)

391. This exchange of correspondence ^{de v} reminded the British Air Staff that co-ordination of command and direction at a higher level was, in fact, a problem which had still to be resolved. It may be recalled that when the subject was under consideration in January and February 1942 (see Section XX, Part 3), it was agreed that final decision should be postponed until General Eaker had had some experience of the various difficulties involved. As no time limit to the postponement was set, the matter had, however, remained in abeyance; and apart from the reference in L.M. 409/D.D.O.P. (see para. 381 (a) above), no further relevant pronouncement had been made.

392. The intention of the United States authorities regarding the internal command and direction of their Forces in the European Theatre was explicit enough. It had been conveyed to the British Chiefs of Staff in a letter from General Chaney dated 8 June 1942. (2) The mission of the Commanding General, European Theatre of Operations, U.S. Army, who would command all U.S. Army Forces in that Theatre, would be to prepare for and to carry on military operations against the Axis Powers and their Allies under strategical directives from the Combined United States-British Chiefs of Staff. Such directives would be communicated to him by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

393. On 13 August 1942, the Chief of the Air Staff gave his views on the subject making particular reference to the directions given to the Commanding General, E.T.O.U.S.A.: (3)

In his opinion they clearly implied that a directive would be issued to the Eighth Air Force by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It could be made a common directive for both Eighth Air Force and R.A.F. Bomber Command. The machinery by which it was to be produced might prove to work slowly, but it could be assumed that the necessary directive would eventually emerge. Once it was available, it could be issued to the Eighth Air Force through the Commanding General, E.T.O.U.S.A., and to the R.A.F. Bomber Command through Air Ministry. Co-ordination between Eighth Air Force Headquarters and Air Ministry should then present few problems.

The essence of the problem, he thought, would rather be co-ordination between the Commanding General, U.S. Bomber Command and the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F. Bomber Command, but, with the officers then holding these appointments, he could not foresee the slightest difficulty.

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- (1) A.M. File C.S.12569, Encl. 5C: Ltr., ATH/DO/70, A.O.C.-in-C., R.A.F. Bomber Command to Gen. Eaker: 31 July 1942.
(2) C.O.S.(42) 166(0): 10 June 1942.
(3) A.M. File C.S.12569, Min 8: C.A.S. to A.C.A.S.(P): 13 August 1942.

He advised strongly against setting up any rigid form of machinery other than that necessary to ensure the issue of a common directive. Better results would be obtained by direct contacts. If difficulties emerged in practice, they could probably be dealt with more easily if there had not previously been long negotiations in which both sides had taken up positions which they felt they should defend.

394. The essential procedure thus appeared to be clear: what was now wanted was the basis of a proposed directive for submission by the British Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. On 17 August, the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy) (1) suggested to the Chief of the Air Staff that a paper on bombing policy in relation to the projected Cross-Channel operations, which had been prepared by the Combined Commanders, (2) might provide a suitable basis. (3) If so, it could be referred to the Joint Planning Staff for the preparation of a draft. The Chief of the Air Staff agreed. (4) In a few days a draft was ready, (5) and was submitted to the Chiefs of Staff on 2 September. (6)

395. The Chiefs of Staff, however, proved to be of the general opinion that, in view of the comparatively small size of the U.S. Army Air Forces then in the United Kingdom, the submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff of an elaborate directive would, at that time, be somewhat premature. It was accordingly agreed that for the time being the necessary co-ordination of the combined operational effort could safely be left to the commanders concerned. Subsequently, the question was left in abeyance until the Casablanca Conference in January 1943.

396. Meanwhile, in order to bring the relevant section of Air Ministry Secret Document 348 up to date, the staff officers of J.O.M. (U.S.) had been endeavouring to draft a statement which would find mutual acceptance as a precise definition of the principles of Higher Command. On 5 August it was found possible to submit a provisional version for the consideration of the staff of Headquarters, E.T.O.U.S.A. (7) Agreement, after a slight modification, was obtained on 2 September; (8) the Air Ministry approved the modification on 21 September; (9) and a few days later the following revision of Section I of S.D. 348 was issued:

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- (1) C.O.S. (42) 229(O) = C.C. (42) 39 (Final): 14 August 1942.
 - (2) The so-called 'Combined Commanders' were a trinity consisting of the Commanding General, E.T.O.U.S.A., the A.O.C.-in-C., R.A.F. Fighter Command, and the C.-in-C., Home Forces. They were charged with the planning of the projected Cross-Channel assault.
 - (3) A.M. File C.S.12569, Min. 9: A.C.A.S. (P) to C.A.S.: 17 August 1942.
 - (4) A.M. File C.S.12569, Min. 10: C.A.S. to A.C.A.S. (P): 17 August 1942.
 - (5) J.P. (42) 774: 31 August 1942.
 - (6) C.O.S. (42) 252nd Mtg.: 2 September 1942.
 - (7) J.O.M. (U.S.) Folder No. I: Ltr., J.O.M. (U.S.) to Gen. Lyon: 5 August 1942.
 - (8) J.O.M. (U.S.) Folder No. I: Ltr., AG 322.98-A, Hq. E.T.O.U.S.A. to J.O.M. (U.S.): 2 September 1942.
 - (9) J.O.M. (U.S.) Folder No. I: Min., J.O.M. (U.S.) to A.C.A.S. (O) and A.C.A.S. (P): 18 September 1942 and Min., A.C.O.S. (O) to J.O.M. (U.S.): 21 September 1942.

(a) The Commanding General, European Theatre of Operations, prepares and carries on military operations against the Axis Powers and their allies under strategical directives of the Combined United States - British Chiefs of Staff.

(b) All U.S. Army troops (including the Eighth Air Force), in the British Isles are under the command of the Commanding General, European Theatre of Operations, United States Army (E.T.O., U.S.A.).

(c) The term "strategic direction" is understood and employed to mean the function of prescribing for a force, as a whole, the general mission which it is to carry out, and such modifications of that general mission as may from time to time become necessary or desirable, without any control of details of tactical operations or administrative matters.

(d) The term "operational control" is understood and employed to mean the functions of prescribing initially and continuously, the details of tactical missions and operations to be carried out by forces and by any and all elements of those forces, together with modifications thereof, without the responsibility or authority for controlling matters of administration, discipline or statutory authority or responsibility for such matters as promotion, transfer, relief and assignment of personnel.

(e) This definition of "operational control" is operative whether United States troops are under the operational control of a British Commander or vice versa.

(f) The Channel of command for Eighth Air Force units allocated to operate in close support of the U.S. Army will be laid down by the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, at the time.

(g) Units of the Eighth Air Force may be placed by the Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force under the operational control of R.A.F. Commands and similarly units of the R.A.F. may be assigned for duty to a Command of the Eighth Air Force.

(h) In such cases operational units and staffs of any subordinate headquarters controlling these will maintain their national identity and will be administered by the Service to which they belong.

4. Co-ordination of the Combined Air Effort - Practice

397. To turn from principles to practice - positive steps towards bringing about the personal collaboration envisaged by the Chiefs of Staff were taken during the second half of August 1942. It was realised that with the commencement of operations by the Eighth Air Force, closer association between the staffs of Eighth Air Force and Air Ministry would be essential. (1) To this end a series of weekly combined meetings was initiated. (2) At first it was thought that the agenda might be confined to operational questions, since it was believed that adequate

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- (1) A.C.A.S. (Ops) Folder No. J.2: Min., D.B.Ops to A.C.A.S. (Ops): 15 August 1942.
 - (2) A.C.A.S. (Ops) Folder No. J.2: Min., A.C.A.S. (Ops) to A.C.A.S. (I), A.C.A.S. (P), D.F.Ops., D.B. Ops., D.W.O.: 19 August 1942.

liaison already existed between the organisation and administrative staffs. During the second meeting, however, General Spaatz proposed that administrative problems, as they arose, might also be profitably discussed at these meetings. In the future, therefore, administrative staff officers also attended.

398. The first meeting was held on 20 August 1942. (1) It was attended by: the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Operations), Air Ministry, in the chair; the Commanding General, the G-3 and the Plans officers from Eighth Air Force Headquarters; and the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy), the Director of Intelligence, the Deputy Director of Bomber Operations, the Deputy Director of War Organisation, and the Director of Fighter Operations from the British Air Staff. The appointments of the officers indicate the possible scope of the discussions, and the authority attaching to decisions reached. Sixteen such meetings were subsequently held during the autumn and early winter of 1942 - at weekly intervals up to the 12th meeting, and fortnightly afterwards - until, apparently, it was felt that a sufficiently firm foundation for collaborative effort had been laid.

399. The main business at the first two meetings was the consideration of the draft of a joint United States-British directive on day bomber operations involving fighter co-operation. After modifications to meet the views of both staffs, as expressed at the meetings, it was agreed on 4 September that the directive could be issued. (2)

400. In this important document were set out the aim of the combined bomber forces in day operations and the methods by which it was proposed to achieve that aim: in other words it defined the mission of the Eighth Air Force. Summarised, its main points were:

(a) Aim

The aim of the day bombardment by Allied Air Forces based in Great Britain was to achieve continuity in the bombing offensive against the Axis.

(b) Allocation of Responsibility

The primary instrument for night air bombardment would be R.A.F. Bomber Command; day bombardment would be the primary responsibility of the U.S. Eighth Air Force.

(c) Methods of Achieving the Aim

Night bombardment methods would remain as defined in existing Air Ministry directives to R.A.F. Bomber Command. The method of achieving the aim of day bombardment would be by the destruction and damage of precise targets vital to the Axis war effort.

(d) Development of Day Offensive

The day bomber offensive would be developed in three phases as follows:

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- (1) A.C.A.S. (Ops) Folder No. J.2: Mins. of Mtg. held at Air Ministry to discuss Anglo-American Co-ordination of Current Air Operations: 20 August 1942.
 - (2) A.C.A.S. (Ops) Folder No. J.2: Mins. of 2nd Mtg. of the Anglo-American Committee to discuss Co-ordination of Current Air Operations (Appendix): 28 August 1942.

(i) Phase 1

U.S. day bomber forces, under R.A.F. fighter protection reinforced by U.S. fighter forces, would attack suitable objectives within the radius of action of R.A.F. fighter cover.

(ii) Phase 2

U.S. day bomber forces, under R.A.F. and U.S. fighter protection would attack suitable objectives within the radius of action of R.A.F. and U.S. fighter types. In this phase, the direct protection of the bomber forces would be provided by U.S. fighter forces; R.A.F. fighter forces would be used principally for diversionary sweeps and withdrawal cover. During this phase the range characteristic of the U.S. fighter type aircraft would be exploited to increase the depth of penetration of the bomber force. It would be the responsibility of the Eighth Air Force to develop the tactics of deep penetration of the enemy day fighter defence.

(iii) Phase 3

The Eighth Air Force would develop its full day bomber offensive receiving such support and co-operation as might be required from the R.A.F. short-range fighter force.

(e) Objectives

Objectives suitable for the day bomber offensive under Phase 1 would be determined periodically, within existing strategy, between the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, and Air Ministry, as occasion might demand.

(f) Role of R.A.F. Day Bomber Force

During the development of the day offensive, the R.A.F. day bomber forces would be used in a secondary role to add weight to R.A.F. diversionary operations, and to maintain the attack during periods unsuitable for the operations of the United States heavy day bombers.

(g) Machinery for Implementing the Plan

During Phase 1 it would be the responsibility of the Commanding General, VIII Bomber Command, to initiate offensive operations, making preliminary arrangements for fighter co-operation with the Commanding General, VIII Fighter Command. It would be the responsibility of the latter to ensure full consultation with the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F. Fighter Command. The detailed planning and the conduct of the fighter operations would be the responsibility of the Commanding General, VIII Bomber Command, and of the Commander of the R.A.F. Fighter Group instructed to provide support. The latter would arrange with the Commanding General, VIII Fighter Command, for the necessary U.S. fighter reinforcements.

When Phase 3 was reached, it would be the responsibility of the Commanding Generals of VIII Bomber and VIII Fighter Commands together to make both the general and detailed plans, and to conduct the operations under the direction of the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force. The Commanding

General, VIII Fighter Command, would arrange with the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F. Fighter Command, for such R.A.F. ground facilities and fighter co-operation as may be required.

The Commanding Generals of the VIII Bomber and VIII Fighter Commands and the Air Officers Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F. Bomber, Fighter and Coastal Commands, would at all times keep each other informed of operational intentions to ensure proper co-ordination.

401. Thus by September 1942, the course of the United States Air Forces in North-west Europe had been set. The principles and the practice of their mission had been stated unequivocally in the directive mentioned above. They had, in fact, already begun to discharge their allotted task: on 17 August they had despatched twelve aircraft led personally by General Eaker to attack the marshalling yards at Rouen. Whether they would prove capable of achieving all that was expected of them would depend, of course, upon whether they could be given the requisite resources. Clouds of uncertainty already dotted the horizon. But that is another story and one which must be left to another narrative.

THE WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE

An account of the High-level Discussions

1. In the following paragraphs a summary of the high-level discussions at the Washington War Conference is given. Owing to their particularly secret nature, it has been thought best not to include this summary in the main body of the narrative but to give it as an appendix.

1. President - Prime Minister and United States -
British Chiefs of Staff Discussions

(a) Preliminary Discussions

2. Before the actual conference began on 23 December 1941, there has been preliminary consideration of the problems by both Staffs:

(a) British. On 18 December 1941, the Prime Minister, in commenting on a note on Anglo-American strategy prepared by his Staffs, stressed the importance of getting United States bomber squadrons into action from the United Kingdom at the earliest possible date. To achieve this, he felt that it would be worth making some sacrifices in the supply of bombers from the U.S.A. to the R.A.F. (1) He emphasised this same point again the next day at a meeting with the British Chiefs of Staff, and expressed the view that initially this force might consist of some six bomber squadrons. (2)

(b) United States. That the United States authorities were thinking along the same lines is indicated in a memorandum dated 20 December 1941 which contained a "suggested analysis of basic topics" prepared by Mr. Stimson as a brief for the President. (3) Under the heading "The Safety of the British Isles", he had "assumed that air forces were to go into the British Isles", and had then posed the questions:

1. "Should America land any forces other than air forces in the British Isles?"

2. "Should not American forces take over the defence of Northern Ireland, releasing the present British forces in Northern Ireland?"

(b) Discussions during the Conference

90. On two occasions the subject of the United States air contribution was introduced into the conversations:

(a) At the first combined plenary meeting on 23 December 1941, the President, in his opening remarks, said that while in his view it would be a mistake to send United States land forces to England, there was much to be said for sending United States air forces in the form of bomber squadrons to operate against Germany from the British Isles. It would greatly encourage the American people to hear that their bombers were in action against Germany, and the German people would be proportionately distressed. He thought, however, that United States Army forces should take over the defence of

(1) C.O.S. (42) 79 (Annex IV) = C.R.8: 18 Dec. 1941.
(2) C.O.S. (42) 79 (Annex V) = C.R.10: 19 Dec. 1941.
(3) C.O.S. (42) 81 (Annex I - Enclosure) = W.W. 2nd Mtg.:
20 Dec. 1941.

Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister was in full agreement with the proposal that United States troops should take over in Northern Ireland, and emphatically welcomed the idea of United States bomber squadrons operating from the United Kingdom. They would not only add powerfully to the weight of the attack on Germany, but they could also make their presence felt over France by dropping leaflets and by bombing the invasion coast. General Arnold said that United States bomber squadrons would be available, he hoped, to move over to the United Kingdom in March or April 1942.(1)

(b) At the seventh plenary meeting on 4 January 1942, General Arnold referred to the pursuit aircraft which he proposed to allocate to Northern Ireland, and said that eventually two groups of 160 aircraft would be sent, but these would not be in the first convoy. When Mr. Stimson asked whether air protection could be arranged for the United States troops prior to the arrival of these aircraft, the Chief of the Air Staff replied that there were, in fact, no British aircraft then in Northern Ireland, but the general organisation of the air defence of Great Britain would be available to cover the United States troops. He stressed that it would be a great advantage to have these United States fighters in Northern Ireland, since it would relieve the R.A.F. of the necessity of sending fighter aircraft there if an invasion took place.

(c) Conclusions

91. In the agreed conclusions of the Conference there are the following references to air matters:

(a) In W.W.1, the paper defining the agreement on United States-British Grand Strategy(2) (which replaced ABC-1 as the basic reference paper on Anglo-American collaboration) there is merely the terse statement that in 1942 there would be ever-increasing air bombardment by British and United States Air Forces.(3)

(b) In W.W. 12, a paper on the establishment of United States forces in Northern Ireland, it was laid down that it would be the responsibility of the British to provide appropriate air protection and support for the United States field forces, establishments and installations in Northern Ireland, until such time as the Commander, United States Forces in the British Isles, could assume the responsibility.

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- (1) C.O.S.(42) 81 (Annex I) = W.W. 2nd Mtg.; 20 Dec. 1941.
- (2) The basic concept of Anglo-American strategy was stated to be: to concentrate on the defeat of Germany first since the defeat of Italy and Japan would then follow. This concept would involve as basic principles of action:
- (a) The security of the main centres of war industry.
 - (b) The maintenance of essential communications.
 - (c) The wearing down and undermining of German resistance by air bombardment, blockade, subversive activities and assistance to Russia.
 - (d) The development of offensive action against Germany.
- (3) C.O.S.(42) 80 (Annex I) = W.W.1 (Final) = United States Serial ABC-4/CS-1: [this document bears no date].

(c) In W.W. 12 are also some statements of the agreements regarding the command and strategic direction of the United States forces in the British Isles.(1)

(i) The command of all the United States armed forces and personnel in the British Isles, including those in Northern Ireland, would be vested in Major-General J. E. Chaney, who had been designated 'Commander, United States Army Forces in the British Isles'. General Chaney was authorised to arrange with the appropriate British authorities for the employment both of United States organisations under British control and of British organisations under United States control.

(ii) The strategic direction of the United States forces in the British Isles would be exercised by the British Government through the Commander, United States Army Forces in the British Isles.

(d) Summary

92. At the conclusion of the Conference the agreements regarding the employment of the United States forces based in the British Isles may be summed up as:

(a) Land Forces: to take over the defence of Northern Ireland and to be prepared to protect Eire in the event of an Axis attack.

(b) Air Forces: bombardment units to be based in England to bomb Germany and German occupied countries; pursuit units to be based in Northern Ireland to afford protection to the United States land and naval forces based there.

(c) Command: The command of all United States Army and United States Army Air Forces to be vested in General Chaney who was to have plenary powers to make such arrangements with British authorities as seem to him desirable.

In other words the agreements were virtually a re-statement of those contained in ABC-1.

(1) C.O.S.(42) 80 (Annex VII) = W.W. 12 = United States Serial ABC-4/7 (Approved): 11 Jan. 1941.

LIST OF RECORDS CONSULTED1. AIR MINISTRY REGISTERED FILES

C.S. 1244 Proposed invitation to Gen. Arnold to visit U.K.

S. 1657 Report on visit of W/C Anderson to U.S.A.

S. 2978 U.S. Bombing Policy - Influence of Technical Considerations.

S. 3464 Annual Report on Aviation in U.S.A. - 1939.

S. 3871 Proposed Appointment of two Additional U.S. Air Attaches.

S. 4471
(two parts) Exchange of Radio Information - U.S.A.

S. 5004 Visits of Col. Spaatz and Capt. Kelsey to R.A.F. Commands.

S. 5145 Probable Organisation of American contingent in U.K.

S. 5185 Desire of U.S. Attaches to spend few days at an Operational Unit.

S. 5799 Exchange of technical information with U.S.A.

S. 5613
(eight parts) North American Supply Committee.

S. 5902 Permission for Col. Spaatz (and others) to visit certain R.A.F. Units.

S. 5938 Visit of Col. Spaatz and Col. Hunter to Boscombe Down.

S. 6070 Request for specialist officers from U.S. to be attached to R.A.F. units.

S. 6300 Attachment of American officers to units and formations in U.K.

S. 6573 Visit of Major General Yount to U.K.

S. 6594 Visit of Major General Chaney and Capt. Saville to R.A.F. units.

S. 6751 Visit of Major R. Williams and Capt. F. Armstrong to night bomber squadron.

S. 6935 S.D.228. Hand book on Air Services of U.S.A. - printing of.

S. 7005 Interim report by Sir W. Layton on negotiations with U.S. Administration - October 1940.

S. 7262 Visit of Col. W. R. Taylor - U.S. observer to U.K.

S. 7457 Cabinet sub-committee on release of information to U.S.A. - Dec. 1940.

C.S. 7867 Supply of Technical Information to U.S.A. - Committee of Supply Ministers.

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C.S. 7917 Secondment of volunteers from the U.S. Air Corps for six months service with the R.A.F.

C.S. 8022 Appreciation of British short-term needs from U.S.A.

C.S. 8484 Possible U.S. Naval Participation.

S. 8771 Release of information to U.S. Embassy.

S. 8781 Composition and Proposed Reorganisation of British Military Mission to U.S.A.

C.S. 8993 Signals Liaison with the U.S.A.

C.S. 9119 Boeing B.17: Tactical Matters concerning,

C.S. 9755 U.S. Ferry Services - Policy.

C.S. 9756 U.S. Spheres of Participation - Northern Ireland: General

C.S. 9877 American Participation - Iceland.

C.S. 9887 American Participation - Employment and Location of Pursuit Squadrons.

S. 9893 Anglo - U.S. Co-operation - Policy: General.

C.S. 10441 Northern Ireland - Supply and Administration of U.S. Forces.

C.S. 10602 Air Operations with Allied Forces - U.S.A.

C.S. 10639 Transfer of O.T.U.'s to U.S.A.

C.S. 11088 Anglo - U.S. Co-operation - Inter-service co-ordinating committee.

C.S. 11090 U.S. Ferry Services - Trans-Atlantic: Northern Routes.

C.S. 11091 U.S. Ferry Services - Trans-Atlantic: Southern Routes.

C.S. 11094 U.S. Spheres of Participation - Higher Policy.

C.S. 11095 U.S. Spheres of Participation - Scotland.

C.S. 11096 U.S. Spheres of Participation - England.

C.S. 11097 U.S. Special Observer Group - Constitution and Function.

C.S. 11098 U.S. Special Observer Group - Conferences and Meetings.

C.S. 11102 Gen. Brett's Mission.

C.S. 11128 Aids to Russia.

C.S. 11180 I.T.W. in U.S.A. - Finance.

C.S. 11245 U.S. Spheres of Participation - Middle East.

C.S. 11329 Request from U.S. War Department for Industrial Targets Reports.

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C.S. 11744 Notes on British Bombing Policy by M.I.D., War Department.

C.S. 11809 Aircraft for O.T.U's in Canada and U.S.A.

C.S. 12190 Visit of Mr. Watson Watt to U.S.A.

C.S. 12429 U.S. Spheres of Participation - Maintenance Projects in U.K.

C.S. 12486 Operation 'Magnet'.

C.S. 12569 American Air Corps Units in Bomber Command: Policy.

C.S. 12602 Preparation of J.O.M. (U.S.) Memorandum No. 1: S.D. 348.

C.S. 12791 British Bombing Committee Papers - Request for copies from U.S. War Department.

C.S. 15967 Eight U.S.A.A.F. Headquarters - Tactical Liaison.

C.S. 16287 Anglo/American Committee for co-ordination of Current Air Operations.

C.S. 16536 Anglo/American Bomber and Fighter Operations - Joint Directives.

S. 60176 Use of Kinloss and Lossiemouth by Bomber Command.

S. 72615 Gen. Arnold's offer of servicing officers for American aircraft in U.K.

S. 73310 W.O.9.: Establishment of

S. 76050 Supply of Secret and Confidential Publications to U.S.A. Units.

S. 80920 Documents and Information Supplied to U.S. Bomber Command.

S. 88519 Airfields for U.S. Eighth Air Force.

C. 5408 Appointment of Col. Carl Spaatz as U.S. Assistant Military Attache.

C. 5409 Appointment of Capt. B. S. Kelsey as U.S. Assistant Military Attache.

C. 6006 Visit of Col. Spaatz (and others) to various R.A.F. Units.

2. AIR STAFF FOLDERS

{ C.A.S.
V.C.A.S.

Many files were consulted by reference to the index which has been compiled and is kept in C.A.S.'s office.

D.C.A.S.

Meetings to discuss Anglo/American Co-ordination of Current Air Operations.

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I. Former D. of Plans Papers

- 1 General Strategy.
- 17a Bombing Policy (Main Strategic Policy).
- 21 Technical Assistance from U.S.A.
- 36 U.S. Plans.
- British-U.S. Staff Conversations: March 1941
(B.U.S. Series).
- British-U.S. Staff Conversations: ABC-1 (March 1941);
Riviera (August 1941); Arcadia (January 1942).
- British-U.S. Technical Conversations (Various
papers 1940-41).
- War Department Paper (AWPD-1 - Munitions Require-
ments of U.S. Army Air Forces).
- Washington War Conference (Arcadia)
(i) Report - C.O.S.(42) 78 to 81 incl.
(ii) Folder - W.W. Meetings.
(iii) Bundle - Various papers: U.S. Brit. C.O.S. Mtgs.
D.S.D. papers
W.W. papers & ABC-4.
- 3 American Papers.
- 165 A.D.A. Working Papers.
- 361 A/V/M Slessor: Miscellaneous Papers.

II. A.C.A.S.(P) Folders

- 23/1 American Reinforcements to U.K. - Forecasts.
- 29 U.S. Plans for Overseas Reinforcements: Jan. 1942 -
(4 parts).
- 29/1 Middle East.
- 29/2 Takoradi - Assembling Arrangements.
- 29/3 India - Arrivals.
- 30 Allocation of Aircraft - 1942.
- 30/1 Vengeances and Kittyhawks.
- 30/2 Allocation of Aircraft.
- 40 Part 1 A.T.P. Discussions 9/12/41 to 13/1/42.
- 40 " 2 " " 7/4/42 to 24/5/42.
- 40 " 3 " " 3/1/42 to 27/5/42.
- 40 " 4 A.T.P. Agreement Papers June 1942.
- 40 " 5 " " " July 1942.
- 40 " 6 A.T.P. Agreement and Signals on Attrition Clause.

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40 Part 7 A.T.P. Agreement Papers, 1st to 31st August 1942.
40 " 8 A.T.P. Agreement, 1st September 1942 to November 1942.
40 S A.T.P. Agreement - Statistics.
40/2 Minister of Production's Visit to Washington.
40/6 Eagle Squadrons.
40/7 Fighter Requirements.
UNAF and AT Papers.
Marcus Signals: June 1942.
Webber Signals: June 1942.
Heavy Bomber Production: U.S.A.
C.O.S. (42) 351 and other papers.

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J.2. Co-operation with the U.S. Air Forces.
J.3.A. U.S. Air Forces in U.K. - Despatch and Location.
J.3.B. U.S. Air Forces in U.K. - Employment, Operational Procedure.

A.C.A.S. (G)

41H/30. United States Air Forces in Britain.
General (Liaison, Public Relations, Publicity, etc.)

D. of Plans

1A Liaison with America: Miscellaneous.
I/1 American-British Planning - March 1941 - January 1943.
112 Germany - Bomber Offensive.
112/1 Pt. I Bomber Offensive - Part I.
112/1 Pt. II Bomber Offensive from U.K. - Part II.
113 Parts I and II Operations on the Continent. Command and Planning.
114 Part I Operations on Continent. "Bolero".
114/1 Part I Bolero. Build-up of U.S.A.A.F. "Sickle". See also "Working": 243/8.
114/1 Part II Bolero/Sickle. Part II.
114/2 Bolero. Miscellaneous.
115 Pt. I Operations on Continent. December 1941 - April 1943.
202 Mediterranean Command.

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D.B. Ops.

- U.S.A.A.C. in U.K.
- 15 The Heavy Bomber.
- S.6.
- 7.C. A/V/M Slessor Telegrams.
U.S.A. 1940/41. Pre-Slessor Agreement.
- 19A Exchange of Technical Information with U.S.A. (Part only).
- 60.C. A/M Harris - Correspondence.
- Mr. M. J. Dean [U.S.A.A.C. Organisation, Dec. 1941, &c].
- Programme of British Requirements. 3rd Lease/Lend and Victory Programme.
- Arcadia. D.S.D. Papers.
- " President's Speech.
- " U.S. Strengths.
- " Supply organisation questions.
- " Victory Programme.
- " Caesar Arcadia Telegrams relating to allocations.
- " B.A.C. Memoranda on Third L/L and the Victory Programme and other papers.
- 240.A. Papers in A/T Series and Minutes of related Meetings.
- 240.B. UNAF Papers and Minutes.

J.O.M. (U.S.)

A series of folders.

3. A.H.B. RECORDS

I. Telegrams

- A.1 BOXES: 67-169 C.O.S. to J.S.M.: 30 June 1941 - 15 Jan. 1942.
- A.2 GLEAM: 74-190 J.S.M. to C.O.S.: 22 June 1941 - 4 Jan. 1942.
- A.3a CAESAR: RAFDEL to A.M.: Jan. - Mar. 1942.
- A.3b MARCUS: RAFDEL to A.M.: 17 Mar. 1942 - 22 Aug. 1942.
- A.4 WEBBER A.M. to RAFDEL: Sept. 1941 - Dec. 1942.
- A.5a CMJ 1 - 24 J.S.M. to W.C.O.: 4 May 1942 - 16 July 1942.
- A.5b and c CPRB 1 - 36 J.S.M. to W.C.O.: 1 Aug. 1942 - 15 Sept. 1942.
- A.6 JWPS 1 - 53 W.C.O. to J.S.M.: 2 May 1942 - 27 Aug. 1942.

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A.7 MAP M.A.P. to B.A.C.: Feb. 1942 - Apr. 1942.
A.8 BRINY B.A.C. to M.A.P.: Jan. 1942 - Apr. 1942.
A.9 - Adm. to B.A.D.: Jan. 1942 - July 1942.
A.10 B.A.D. to Adm.: 31 Jan. 1942 - 22 Aug. 1942.
A.12 J.S.M. }
B.A.S. } to War Office: Jan. 1942 - June 1942.
A.13 A.A. }
A.M. to } B.A.D.: Feb. 1942 - Apr. 1942.
A.14 A.A. to A.M.: Feb. 1942 - Apr. 1942.

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II F 2 Arnold/Towers/Portal Air Agreement: June 1942.
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II F 2/9 Telegrams: J.S.M. (to and from): Jan. 1942 -
Aug. 1942.
II F 2/10 Telegrams: Foreign Office/Washington: Autumn 1940.
II F 2/11 Memorandum on ARCADIA: Jan. 1942.
II F 2/12 P.M.'s telegram to President Roosevelt (with relevant
papers): Dec. 1940.
II J/41 Arnold/Towers/Portal Air Agreement: June 1942 and
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D. of Plans War Diary: Sept. 1939 - Dec. 1940 (5 Bundles).
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" " " : Sept./Oct. 1941 (1 Folder).